1975 O16C/255 HEADQUAREEHS, FL3ST ItARlES KHC3, PACIFIC, Ser", # OOI.715-45 % FI33T POST OJTICS, SAIT ISIA:TCISCO,

From; The Commanding G-eneral, Distribution List .

Subject:* $upport, JlVO

Snclo sure: (A) Ifeval Gunfire Officer, ^xpoditi , report, -aWO JIMAf

1. "Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Additional copies are available at this headquarters upon request.

2. Transmission of this document by registered mail within" the continental limits of the United States and via Faval Postal Service, is • necessary and hereby authorized. ,

Deputy, Chief of S ta f f ;

Cominch (2) CG-;6th ia-my (2) CinCPac-POA (-Ad.v Kq) (2) CG, o th Army (2) CinCpac-POA (Adv-Hq Readiness Sec) (1) CG,10th Army (2) CinCPac-POA (Hear) (2) Ca,AirFI-IFPa-c (2) C inCPac-POA (Bear Seadine s s Sec) (1) CG-[ IIIPhibOorp.s (3)CinCSpA • ' (2) O0rfYA0 : ' (3) CMC (2) C£*IX.CorV>s (3)ComCru-DosPac (10) C 0 , X A I V Corps (3)

(3) (5)ComHinPac •. (3) CCT • 2dMarI>i v (5) ComServPac (1) CG-, 3rdMarDiv (5)

(1) CG,UthI'-!arDiv (5) (1) CC-,5thHarJ3iv (5)

COTGPac (1) CG',6th!"IarDiv (5)COTCLant ' (1) C(r] Tthlnf Di.v (5)

Of i^7+-Tn Trr^Tt"? \rComfeenPQA (2) O , T . C [ 1 I 1IJL iix Ux v (5) Com3rd]?leet (1) CS,77thlnfDiv (5) Gom5thITleet (1) CO,01stInfDiv (5).OomJthFloot CD CG-,96thInfDiv (5) ComPhibsPac U) C&|9SthrnfDiv.. (5) AdC omPh ib sPac (1) CO,lst ASCO (30)•.C.omUDQ? s, Phib spac C0,2d ASCO (30) CD CorajrdPhibFor ( l ) CO, 3rd ASCO (30) Com5thPhibPor, CD' CO.J+th ASCO (30) Com7thIJhibJ'or . (D CO,5th ASCO' (30) Comlhib Group 1 ( i ) CO,6th ASCO (30) Oomlhib (D CO,71st JASCO: (30) OooPhib ( i ) CO,75th JASCO (30)

(D C0,292d JASCO (30) (D C0,29Uth JASCO (30)

ComFhibG-roup ( i ) CO,295th JASCO !30) OoraPhibG-rpuji CO, 591st JASCO (30)

lftcC0,592d JASCO (30) ro 10 CO,593rd JASCO (30)

ConiP (D CO,-59^th. JASOO (30) ComP ( i ) ComPhibTrapac (5)ComI CD OIC, pacFl tCry&Torp Schl (5) ComPhibG-ro OIC.FaclitCICSchl (2) (D

(U) OIC,FacFlt Radar C en t er (1) OomPhibGrroup (D 01C FG-IiOSchl PhibTraFac HCS ( i ) ATB.Coronido ... _J£5)

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S u b j e c t ; Fnva l Gunf i re Suppor t , WO JIKA.

(xo) CO.fwdScliITIiIPac C2) ComDesEon &UBikMFwEL

ffiyCQ.SoSu 1 CO,VQC I 1 (10) JSKRY, BDW^wHTIaffl CAPPS, DD 550 w W l mmCO,?0C 2 (5) SVA1S, DD 55g (1)CO;YC 33 JOHH bt MMitiM. W 553 CD (5ComBatHon 1 ComDesDiv 9^ (1) ComBatDiv 2 CD BOYD, DD 5UU CD

E, B3 ^ 3 CD B3ADP0HD, DD 5^5 CD BB 36 : (D CD

ComBatDiv 3 CD BOOKS, DD SOU ' • ; CD IDAHO, B3 k2 CD ComDesDiv 9U CD ComBatDiv U CD GB53GOEY, DD S02 ( DW3ST VIBGXHIA, BB US' CD ComDesBpn ko (1) ComBatDiv 5 CD CD­TEXAS, ,BB 35 CD OomDesBon.^>0 CD A3EAi>iSAS, . B3 33 ' . CD- CLARSHJE K. BEO^SOU, DD 66% •CD HEM YOPJC, BB 3I+ CD COTTSF, DD 669 ( i ) OomBatBon 2 CD DOHTCH, DD 670 (i) ComBatDiv 6 CD GATHFG, DD 671 ' (D

'WASHIxTGSOi!, BB 56 CD E.3ALY,. DI: 672 (1) HQR2JH CABOLIiiA, BB 55 CD ComDes.lon 51 -(DComCruDiv 4- CD HaLL, DD 5^3 (D IHDIAJAPOLIS, CA 35 (D PAUL KAMIIfl?02T, DD 590 (DComCruDiv 5 CD ComDesEon 5^ (1) CHESESH,. CA 2J CD LSUTZS, DD kol CD PMSACOLA, .GA 2k CD HBwCOlIB, DD 5^5 CD SALT CITY, CA 25 CD B31ITI01T, DD 662 CD

CD H3YW0OD L . SDTiARDS, DD 663 CD -.SAIT PEiiilCISCO, CA 38 CD HIGHA?D P . 1SAEY, DD 66k CD TO.SGALOOSA, CA 37 CD ComDesDiv 112 « CD ComCruDiv 10 CD IZA3Dr- DD 5o'9 (1) BOSTOI,. CA 69 CD BHYAHT, DD 665 ComCruDiY 13 /CD ComDesEon 60

(1) CD

SANTA PS, CL 60 \ CD ComDesDiv 120 (DBIMIIGHAM, CL 62 (1) IITGSAILiK, DD 69U CD 3XL0XI, CL GO (1) ComDesSon 62 CD ComCruDiv lU (1) ¥ALDE02f, DD 699 CD VICK&BiraG, CL Go (1) ComDesEon 63 Ci) ComCruDiv 17 CD ComDesDiv 126 CD PASAD2EFA, CL 65 (i) HYMAF, ED 732 . CD ASTORIA, CL 90 ComDesEon 66 CD WILE3S BilB?Ji3,. CL 103 CD PUTIAK, !DD 757 (1) ComDesEon 1 ' CD ^CiiLL, D.0 UOO CD JXIMY, DD 3^9 . CD ComHinEon 3 CD ComBesDiv 2 CD Com'iinDiv 7 CD •AtLwIF, DD 355 CD SHiiH!TOSf, DM 25 ' CD QpmDosHon 6 CD BQB£ET H. SMITH, DM 23 Ci)CoraDesDiv 12 CD 7HCMAS S . J E A ^ E , DM 2U CD RAI PH TilSOT, DD 390 CD HAEEY Yt 3ADSE, D¥. 26 CD

CD ComHinDiv a CD 3ACSE, DD kfO CD HEFHT A. ifllSY, D!! 29 CD AilTHOlIY,. DD 515 CD Com LCS F l o t i l l a 3 . CD •WADSWORiH,' DD 516 CD Com LCS Grou-o 7 (1) ComDesDiv ko CD LCS 31 (DtiULLAKT, DD 52S CD LCS 32 CD YA1 VALIOTBUSGH, DP 656 CD LCS 33 (DComDesEon U5 CD LCS 3U CD GUEST DD CD LCS 35 CD FULLAK, DD LCS 36 CD CD

LCS 51 ' CD HJDSOII/DD U75" CD LCS 52 CD ComDesDiv 90 LCS 53 CD STiUJLY, DD kjX i CD LCS* 5U CD

CD

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Subject: Naval Gunfire Support, 1W JIMa.

LCS (1) 55 LCS 56 (1) Com LCI F l o t i l l a 3 (1) Cod LCI Orour> o (1) LCI 3^-6 " ' (1) LCI 3^-c (1) LCI (1) LCI (1)

ILLLC) • LCI (1) LCI (1) LCI U-57 (1) LCI IL§6 (1) LCI ^73 (1) LCI 627 (1) Com LCI F l o t i l l a 6 (1) Com LCI Grou.) 17 (1) LCI 655 (1) LCI 659 ' • (1) LCI 660 (1) LCI 75 - (1) LCI 1056 (1) LCI 1057 (1) LCt 105S (1) LCI 1059 (1) LCI Flot i l la 16 (1) Cora tCI Group kS (1) LCI (1) sec . " . Com LCI F l o t i l l a 15 (1) Com LCI. Grou-D. 37 (1) LCI 30 (1) LCI 3^5 • . . (1) LCI ^25 (1) LCI ^37 (1) LCI 63G (1) LCI (1) Com LCI F l o t i l l a l ^ Cora LCI (Jr.otto ^0 cu LCI 739' "• (1)LCI 7^0 (i) Ldi 7I+I (1) LCI 7^2 (1) Cora LCI F l o t i l l a 21 (1) Com LCI Group 6l (1) LCI 630 (1) LCI 6 3 1 '•' (1 LCI 632. (1) LCI 633 (1) LCI 756 , (1) LCI 757 \ (1) LGI 760 (1) LCI 1010 (1) LCI 1011 (1) LCI 1 0 1 2 ••' (1) LCI 1023 (1) Com LCI Grou-o 63 LCI 614-2 (1) LCI 651 (1) LCI 707 (1) LCI 70S (1)

/ L C I 771 (1) LCI 7 7 2 • | ; 1 (1) LCI 1077. - V 4

1

(i) LCI' 1029 - ^ (1) LCI 1030 mgiM

Com LCI F lo t i i : La*23.' ' - ^ (1) Oora LCI.

LCI Group ( 351

5f.;>,^ - ' ' A " , ,

'• / ' (1) (1)

LCI 352 (1) LCI 35^ LCI 355 LCI 356 (1)

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t 0269/25$ HEAJDqUAR3SRS, FLEET MARINE FORCE; PACIFIC, 1975 . ^FIEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

9 June,.

Prom: The Naval Gunfire Officer, Expeditionary Troops, FIFTE-Fleet, ' ,

To: 5?he Commanding General.

Subject; Naval Gunfire Support in Operations a ^ i n s t IWO pa* . , : ' [ \

The following complete outline of this document isincluded toserve as a guide toitsuse.

I PIANFING

' A, General B. Shore Fire Control Parties

. C. AirSpotters D. preliminary Bombardment

; II TRAINXFG

V ' A, General B. Shore Fire Control Parties C. 'Air Spotters . •

. . •' D.. Fire Support Ships . E, Rehearsals .. •

'ill- CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

.A. Preparation Pires B. Call Fires and light Illumination

'• , C. Deep Support Missions D. Organization ofControlling Agencies

• . • E . Air Sp.ot P. Special Support Craft

- • . .. / •

TV nmn'

: A. General B. Personnel C. Equipment D,. Frequencies

V EXTRACTS FROM SHIFS' ACTION RSPORTS

A. Training; B. General Procedure C. Preliminary Bombardment . D. Communication B. l i gh t Il lumination F. Air spot :, . 8> •"• Suppor t d r a f t - • Mi ' Gunnery anddunnery P r o c e d u r e s

VI COIOigglOITS AHD RBC0Miy[5FriATI0ITS ' . '

A. Conclusions B. Recommendations

APPENDIX I CHRO1TOI.OGIC RSCORD OF EVENTS, DOG DAY APPENDIX I I IAH3ATIVE :'••'' APPMDIX III ANALYSIS OP ?SI^Il'iIHARY APPENDIX IV AM1U1TITI0F E i i t e

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t A.

1. In p laning Faval G-urifire support for the _ ^ _._ emphasis was l a i d on'-combining'and applying the techniques developed, in e a r l i e r bombardment of small a t o l l s with those developed during•• th.fi bombardment of the MAHIAHAS, where t e r r a i n fea tures d i c t a t ed many specia^jneasures in cont ro l of f i r e . Par t icular a t t en t ion was given to improving ai$hii$c^"£a«ilit ies and to arranging that an experienced bardments aboard an A§0 to inte:. the targets upon whic^ f i re wa,s however, of one lesson learned in the M.^±j£;A3; namely, ^that by allowing Sor,^a bombardment of considerable length pr ior to DOG- pay, considerable reduction c'dfi--' be effected in casua l t i es among landing troops.

2 . The resu l t of emphasis on a i r spot and target in te l l igence was a marke'd increase in the efficiency of the bombardment. '41 though the t o t a l length of the bombardment was not as great as requested by the Landing ^orc$[ the greater efficiency of each day's f i r i n g was such as to minimize the loss en^ t a i l ed in the reduction of time.

B; SHORE FIRS CQITTROL PARTIES . ; . , • .

1. 1st and 3rd JASCOs remained attached to the ^th and 3rd.Marine Divisions- respectively; 5fe JASCO was attached to 5th Marine Division;

2. Shore Fire Control Sections of these three JASCOs were expanded before the operation to include Regimental laval .Gunfire liaison Officers, Assistant Division Uaval Gunfire Officers, and their respective teams, in accordance with recently authorized increases in the (Table of Organization. Experienced officers were supplied from Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to f i l l these requirements. ,

3» &s a r e s u l t of experiences in the MARIAMS, two ITaval Gunfire Liaison Officers and two Haval Gunfire Spotters were a t tached to each of the *+th and 5th Marine Divisions to ac t as on-the-spot replacements. Ho r ep l ace ­ments were supplied to the 3rd Marine Division, but one Liaison Officer r e p o r t ­ed to tha t organizat ion immediately p r i o r to the operation on orders of the Bureau of Personnel and p a r t i c i p a t e d as an ava i l ab l e replacement.•

C. AIR SPOTTERS "" ' • .

1. . Four Air Observers from 3rd, Uth, and 5th Marine Divisions were^ assigned t o f i r e support ships to spot ITaval Gunfire. Final assignments a t tached one such observer to each of AHMTSAS, TSXkS, M*I Y05K, F3JVADA, IDAHO, TBHUTESSSB, SALT LAKE'CITY, PS1TSACOLA, CHESTER, TUSCALOOSA, SAMTA P^, and. BILQXI.

2 . . YOC 1, .a f i g h t e r - s p o t t e r squadron, was a l so made ava i l ab le aboard •WAKE ISLAND to supply a i r spot for designated f i r e support sh ip s .

D. PRELIMIIIAHY

l t The in i t ia l plan for preliminary bombardment as set forth in the Concept provided for one Cruiser Division to bombard the objective beginning on DOG- MfKUS EIGHT Day, to be joined on DOG- MBTUS THHBS Day by seven OBBs and six CAs or CLs. Based on a preliminary study of the number of targets at the objective, V Amphibious Corps recommended, on 2k October, that ten days of bombardment by a Cruiser Division, plus three OBBs be arranged. The Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S PACIFIC Fleet, stated, in reply to this recommendation, that "limitations on the availability of ships, difficulties of ammunition re­placement, and loss of surprise interpose, serious obstacles to meeting your recommendation." He further stated that the objective would be bombarded by one Cruiser Division on 15 December, and at irregular intervals thereafter, and that three days of bombardment by the designated ships "would provide for.de­livery of more major calibre fire than had been requested by V Amphibious Corps.

2. On &- l\Tovember, after a more careful studs'1 of the target area had been made, V Amphibious Corps submitted a recommendation for a total of nine days of preliminary bombardment. On 26 November, the Commander, 'Amphibious

replied tp' (this recommendation with a study in­

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* * dicating the necessity of slightly more than three days of 'bombardment, and a statement that the troops would be provided with the best possible preliminary bombardment consistent with limitations of ammunition suppjj subsequent troop requirements.

3« On 2^ November, V imphibious Corps requesi day of preliminary bombardment be provided. This lette^ favorable endorsement by the Commanding General, Expedi-1 _ Fleet. The Commander, Amphibious forces, TJ. S, PACIFIC Fleet, forwarded' request, requesting approval provided that there was no objection on the part of the Commander, FIFTH Fleet, based on the general strategic situation; and, further, provided that the fast carrier strike could be delivered on DOG- HI M S THEEE Day. This recommendation was disapproved "DJ the Commander, FIFTH Fleet, for reasons indicated bolow. '

a. That initial surface bombardment must be simultaneous with the initial carrier attack on the TOKYO Area, and that, if continuation of the carrier strikes beyond two days were neither desirable nor necessary§ the enemy could then recover early enough to initiate threatening air attacks at the objectives by DOG- Day.

b. That shore based air attack to be provided could be con­sidered-at least as effective as the recommended additional day of surface ship bombardment, . •

c. That there would be no opportunity for replacement of naval ammunition, and that there was therefore a limit to the amojonl;bi ammunition that could be made available for preliminary bombardment,* allowing sufficient ammunition for DOG- Day.

h. ' On 2 January, after a careful study of the preliminary bombard­ment plan which had been prepared, V Amphibious Corps stated that it believed the preliminary gunfire to be inadequate for destruction of tar-gets immediately inland from, and flanking, the landing beaches* and recommended that either an increase in time be allotted for preliminary bombardment, or a greater concen­tration of effort be placed oni e&nd adjacent to, the main landing beaches, with a corresponding reduction in the amount of fire placed on the other areas of the island. This recommendation was approved by the Commanding General, Hbqpedition­ary Troops,' FIFTH Fleet. It was in turn forwarded by the Commander, .Amphibious Forces, U.S. PACIFIC Fleet, recommending disapproval for the reasons previously set forth by the Commander, FIFTH Fleet. Further comment indicated that the concentration of fire in the vicinity of the main landing beach was not consid­ered sound, since other areas would then receive too light a coverage of fire; and that, in any case, the Commander, Amphibious Group 01£3t. would have the nec­essary authorits?- to make changes in the plan as necessary.

5» Further changes made necessary the substitution of »U3W YORK, TEXAS, AHKMSAS, TEHIfESSSS, JDAHO, and IMADA, plus" W1SHIITGTQH and FORTH CAROLINA on DOG MI BUS OKB Day only, for ships originally allotted but later unavailable.

6. A special bombardment by IKDIAHA plus Cruiser Division FIT! was executed prior ^o DOG Day, with unknown results. The allotment of WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA fOr bombardment on DOG MIIKJS QHS Day was cancelled.

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• # II.

A. GSwERAL

In training personnel, both ashore and afloat, for the assault on I".r0 Jima, special emphasis was given to lessons learned^&gring operations,against the MARIAHAS Group. Corrective communication training wets' giyon, based on '• detailed analysis of radio logs from those operations while impVove^bcontrol of starshell firing, closer command integration between the various ecHelens, and improved methods of distributing the locations pf front lino positions $V all hands, were emphasized; as well as more extensive use of air spot. Radar :

Beacon Operators were added to Division and Regimental ITaval Gunfire Teams ashore, and "both ship and shore personnel were trained in their use. ITow changes in the firing mechanisms aboard rocket and mortar ships were described to all Shore Fire Control Personnel.

B. .. SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES ,

1. Shore Fire Control Sections of the 1st and 3rd JASCOs both received intensive retraining at' PEARL HAKBQR in preparation for this operation, Exercises were conducted in new techniques, and classroom instruction was given to bring all hands up to date on the latest developments, including the results of reports and critiques on recent operations in this area. laval Gunfire Liaison Officers were given additional gunnery training at the Pacific Fleet -; Gunnery School, as practicable* Shore Bombardment; Exercises were conducted at\; KAHOOL&WE Island with available ships of the PACIFIC Fleet. All training activities were closely supervised by the Division Haval Gunfire Officers concerned.

2. The Shore Fire Control Section of the 5th JASCO, all new oxcept for Assistant Division and Regimental Haval Gunfire Officers, received advanced, training similar to that described ,in Paragraph .1above, rather than retraining. Every effort was made to give this new organization as full advantage,as < possible of recent operations and to emphasize group activities considered especially valuable to a new organizationi

3. The Shore Fire Control Section of each JASCO executed a final rehearsal at EAHOOLAv/S Island for a twenty-four hour period in which a tactical situation ashore was assumed. This included overhead fire, starshell illum­ination, harassing fires, call fir,:S, and the KING Hour preparations. The exercise proved an excellent finale .-to.the training not only of the Shore Pirej Control Parties but also of the firing ships participating, who gained a real- : istic picture of what twenty-four hours of continuous fire support duty involves.

C. AIR SPOTTERS ...'••

1. Air Observers from the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Division received intensive training at PEARL HARBOR, including bombardment exercises at KAH00LAW3 Island, in preparation for their assignments to fire support ships. Training of V Amphibious Corps Observers was planned, but the schedule could not be completed in the time available so that they were not assigned for the operation,

2. The fighter-observer squadron to be employed, YOC 1, was given intensive training, including Bombardment Exercises at KAJTOI&WE"Island. Lectures were also given aboard US.S WAKE ISLAM), and all current information was supplied to the unit.

3« I Replacement pilots for heavy ships of the fleet received training in communication,procedure and shora bombardment while attached to SoSu 1 Replacement Pool. Others, atta ched-.to ships engaged in Communication and Shore Bombardment Exercises, received training through thoir participating in these ­exercises. '

)4. Underwater Demolition Teams were<included.^ on request, in Shore

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t

Bombardment Exercises at K^H$5£M xlaval Gunfire Section, Headquarters^Fleet Marine Force, Pacific^£art%|ip§ted in the exorcises. . Aftey this i n i t i a l indoctrination, the ^ l | | ^ r . | ' ai|cf'lo:%, conduct their own practices without further supervision, "^ ? ' ^ / ' | - 1 %"!

D. FIRS SUPPORT SHIPS'

1. • The training program operated in the past by the Commander, Cruisers and Destroyers, PACIPIC Fleet, in conjunction with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific was continued and expanded in the period leading up to th_e attack on 'IWO Jima. All but a very few of the ships employed at IWO Jima had qualified in the Shore Bombardment Course at KAHOOtAWS Island.

2. Communication Drills of several types^ including Radar Beacon Dril ls , were conducted with ships made available by the Commander, Cruisers and Destroyers, PACIFIC Fleet. All ships qualified in communication i)rocedure before executing actual bombardment pract ices.

B. HEHSABSALS • : \

1 . F i n a l r e h e a r s a l s f o r the Landing Force were h e l d i n t he HAWAIIAN Area from 13 Janua ry , 19)45, t o IS Janua ry , I9U5, i n c l u s i v e * Simulated bombard­ments by a l l available fire support units were conducted during the f irst three days. Actual bombardments were conducted on the following days; while Shore Fire Control Parties landed on KAHOOIAItfS Island on the ifth to conduct call fires, reembarking on the .ISth.

2. Since only a limited number of fire support ships had been present at the Landing Force rehearsal, the bulk of the'group having been at ULITHI Atoll, further rehearsal • exercises were held Off the ¥est Coast of TIHIiil on 12 and IJ> Februaryf 19^5^ primarily for their bohe£iti Simulated fires were ^executed by fire support ships and communication nets were operated.

^Actual transmissions, however, wore kept to a minimum in order to- maintain the greatest possible degree of security.

3t In order to give a l l fire support shijps complete details of a l l Plans and preferred techniques, especially those ships recently added-to the fire support grou'p as .replacements, the Naval G-unfire Officer, Landing Force, gave ships* personnel special briefing at PEARL HAHBOK, ULITHI, and SAIPAH.

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YPE DESTRUCT\ UO FUHTJ.1.C. HIP| APIIO.l.C SHIPS REMARKS UNCLASSIFIED SHIP CAL Ann. PQft ROS RN poa

HC PRESUMED DESTROYED VICKSBURG 15.6 NiO OBSERVAT\ON OBSCURED TARG-ET HC

V1CKSBURG 6 HC POOR VISIBILITY VICKSBUK& 18.6 HC JRP JBMMING VICKSBUR.G 6 IT HC POOR VISIBILITY VICKSBUR6 16 6 MAD-3 1

66 HC

HC NEVADA AAC

APPEARED TO BE ON TARGET 6 J84 DIRECT HITS VICKSBURC "19 5 TENNESS 1 - - 2PREL D~DAY BOMBARDMENT IDAHO

NEW YORK HC 2 OR MORE GUNS DESTROYED I wo PENSPlCOLft TEXAS*

ARKANSAS HC NO SPOTS VICKSBURG 6 HC CHEST VtCKSBURG 3 6 19 RA FIRING CEBSED NOTES PENSACOLA*

1. THIS MAP PREPARED FROM SHIPS ACTION REPORTS, AIR PHOTOGRAPHIC INTER­ HC GUNS PROBABLY DAMAGED PRETATION, JICPOA AND P.O.W. SOURCES. PEN6AC0LA 3 5 6SALT LAKE CITY* TO \Z

2. TARGETS SHOW ARE FROM 11 FEBRUARY 1945 ENEMY INSTALLATION MAP PLUS TUSCALOOSA* PENSACOLA 12 2 * ESTIMATED 1/3 DESTROYED HC 8ADDITIONAL MAJOR TARGETS DISCOVERED BY JICPOA INTELLIGENCE TEAMS

SUBSEQUENT TO D-l. VICKSBURO*

3. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MORE DESTRUCTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED THAN THAT SHOWN BUT PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE WAS POOR DURING THE THREE DAYS OF BOMBARD­ TOTAL 3 1 2 1 7 10 10 MENT AND INCOMPLETE INTERPRETATION RESULTED.

2 5 % DESTROYED HC * Destruction or Dmage determined from PENSACOLA 24 8 12

4. JICPOA RESULTS WERE CONSIDERED ONLY FOR THE BEACHES AND TARGETS CLOSE photo Interpretation V1CKSBURG 10 6 22.4 VOF REPORTED ON TARGET H.C TO THE BEACHES WHICH WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEFORE D-DAY. VICKSBURG 1 22.2 SPOTTED ON H.C.

VICKSBURG 14 1Z P\\R BURSTS HC. 5. AN UNOFFICIAL JICPOA ESTIMATE SHOWS ON 4TH DIVISION BEACHES UP TO 400

YDS. INLAND 70% OF THE PILLBOXES WERE DESTROYED. FROM 400 YDS. IN­ 24 WELL COVERED HC LAND TO EDGE OF NO. - 1 AIRFIELD Z0% OF PILLBOXES WERE DESTROYED. VICKSBURG 32 6 VICKSBURG 6 21.5 AIR BURSTS HC.

6. MAJORITY OF SECONDARY BATTERY NEUTRALIZATION FIRES DURING U.D.T. ATIONS ARE NOT SHOWN.

7. ALL RANGES ARE SHOWN IN THOUSANDS OF YARDS TO THE CLOSEST HUNDRED YARDS. HC BRTTERY SILENCED PENSACOLA 18 8 HC ?NEW YORK \A-' " I * 8. DATA ON NEW YORK TAKEN PRINCIPALLY FROM MESSAGES RECEIVED AT THE HC TARGET. SHIPS ACTION REPORT INDEFINITE AS TO NUMBER OF ROUNDS, FUZE NEWYORK 21 14 8<fc HC AND TYPE AMMUNITION FIRED AT INDIVIDUAL TAR(BETS.» NEW YORK I I 14 AAC NEUTRA NEVADA 4O 5 9 AAC 9. WHEN S.N.P. APPEARS IN TYPE AMMO COLUMN IT REFERS TO H.C. FUZED WITH NEVADA 72 5 10 NEUTRAl STEEL NOSE PLUGS. ALL OTHER H.C UNLESS NOTED WAS FUZED WITH P.D.

HC NEW YORK IO 14 10. MAIN BATTERY AMMUNITION FIRED BY TUSCALOOSA WAS FUZED bO% P.D.

S.N.P. 81) SEVERAL H\TS OR NEAR PENSACOLA 31 8 \c H C

V *

AA F\RE SUPPRESSED , HC PENSACOLA 8" 10.1 STRIPPING HC CHESTER Z 8 6.1

CHESTER 6 8.5 STRIPPING NO. AV DESTRUCTION a HC 5 NEAR HITS

CPlL HIP API. d i e NftU SHIP fl.fl JIC tNRL SHIPS REHARVSS CHESTER 5 S.I AAC RDS RN. CHESTER 8 8POA POPi HC

CHESTER 2 8 8.2 STRIPPING HC CHESTER 8 © STRIPPING HC

22 IO TARGET NEUTRALIZED \CHESTER 8 7.6 STRIPPING HC TUSCALOOSA 13 2H1TS \\CHESTER 8 9.5 I NEAR HIT HC TUS-ALOOSA 44 NO RESULTS A.AC CHESTER 9 5 10.8

CHESTER 82 2.-5 ZZ NERR HITS SNP f\\J LAKE CITY 124 \\ 4HITS -NEUTRALIZED a TOT 240

OF DPiHAGE MADE ? HC NEW YORK 14 54 1 \\ NEUTRALIZED CHESTER 2 8 8.3 STRIPPING, HC AAC NEVADA 44- 5 3 NEUTRAL\ZATIOM

SALT LAKE CITY 64 B 12 2HITS AABTRY. NEUTRAL^ NEVADA 6 I 5 8 AAC NO H\TS OBSERVED NEVADA 14 8 HC NO H\TS

TEXAS, 12 14 10.6 AREA COVERAGE I COVERED

SALT LAKE CITY 2o 9.1 NOEST\t*\ftTE OF DAMAG»E| 6

NEVADA 32 II NO DAMAGE

TEXAS 22 9 AREA COVERAGE

TEXAS a 14 9.8 AREA COVERAGE

DEFENSE SYMBOL KEY

DESTRUCTION D A M A G E BLOCKHOUSE IRNHUSHIP RPI. J.I.C. \HRU1 SHIPS REMARKS

TEXAS 44 14 12 AREA COVERAGE NO H\TS OBiSERVED COAST DEFENSE GUN P.Qft TEXR5 32 14 10.1 i ¥ POSSIBLY H\T ONE TEXAS 14 8.9 AREA COVERAGE COVERED ARTY. EMPLACEMENT

SILENCED BATTERY HC DUAL PURPOSE GUN

AAC TENNESSEE TENNESSEE COUNTER BFVTTERY HC MEDIUM A.A. GUN

ANTI TANK EMPLACEMENT

OPEN ARTY. EMPLACEMENT TEN H\TS IN AREA ft AC IDAHO RESULTS NOT O&SERVED AAC TENNESSEE PILLBOX

ARKANSAS 21 15 HITS I N CAVES HITS NOT OBSERVED HC EARTH COVERED STRUCTURE * RADAR

H I T S N O T OBSERVED HC IDAHO HC RANGEFINDER H I T S NOT OBSERVED NEVADA 116 8 DAMAGE UNKNOWN 10AHO H I T S NOT OBSERVED HC

\DRHO SEARCHLIGHT RESULTS NOT O B S E R V E D AAC|

TENNESSEE 4DIRECTHITS SEVERAL NEAR fUSSES SNP COMMAND POST NEVADA HC NEVADA

NO HITS HC AMMUNITION DUMP ARKANSAS 31 12. SEVERAL NEAP, HISSES AREA CJOVERED NEVADA HC NO HITS NEVADPi HC NO HITS NEVADB HC 2 H\TS 2 N E A R M I S S E S NEVADA ARKANSAS \Z HAZY HARD TO OBSERVE. TlUlS HC RESULTS NOT OBSERVED TENNESSEE

THESE RREAS 2DIRECTH TOG EXPENDED THROUGHOUT

AAC FUR BURSTS NEAR M\SSES NEVADA

TENNESSEE RESULTS NOT OBSERVED HC

HITS NOT OBSERVED - LARCcE RMM0 EXPLOS\ON HC IDAHO RESULTS NOT OBSERVED HC TENNESSEE RESULTS NOT OBSERVED HC

TENNESSEE 14 \Z 8 NO HITS

ENCLOSURE. CO) TQ ft?PtHWX

TENNESSEE 1 4 \ 4 )O RESULTS NOT OBSERVED

TENNESSEE II. 2NEAR MISSES

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APT^FDIX

AMrfUMITIOF

I . COMMENT

A. Thovo follows a compilation of ammunitl^^--e"xp-en*ded: "by f i r e support ships at IWO Jima. In many cases the f igures do not correspond with those -ziven in Paragraph IT of sh ips ' ac t ion r epor t s because where poss ib le , f igures were taken frora the s t a t i s t i c a l record of f i r e s , which i s believed to be in ore accura t e . Some f igures a re es t imates whore act ion r epo r t s have not been received by t h i s headquarters . Figures a re compiled to show the types of ammunition, the number of rounds, and the t o t a l weight,

3 , The following symbols are used:

AP; Armor P ie rc ing Ammunition HC: High Capacity Ammunition

C. 55*2 pounds i s t&e weight f igure used for a l l 5" / "^ p r o j e c t i l e s .

I I ,

SHELLS

SKIP TYPE MJMBEH 01 HOUSES WJSIG-ET ( l b s )

S3 33 1 2 " HC 262 933,£30 5tf/5i

1, 90,400

3750 5,655

3B . 34 HEW YOHE 14" HC 010 1,297,950 1, 14' ' AT 19 23,500

712 35,6oo 420 5,564

3B 35 TEXAS 923 G79

3B 36 imY.h " HC 950 - 1, 211, 250 lf A? 20 3 ° 000

» i 5 /33 7, 09 , ' 977

IDAHO " HC 1.2G5 200,CIS

HC ,35 7>V5 6,730 371,496

iS W3SC i6 I ? HC 463 s 79?7oo

103.040 1 6 " AT 46 5,376 296.. 755

33 55 l61 ? HC 955

2,753

l c i r55 HC 790 1,501,000 5ff/5s 2,440

?" FO 691,020 73,"72

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