Defining Terrorism at the Macro, Meso, and Micro Levels

By: Damian Niolet

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INTRODUCTION

In order to write this paper, I felt I needed to wrap my mind around the totality of the BSI

415 curriculum. In order to wrap my mind around the totality of the curriculum, I needed to

build a visual representation of all that was discussed during class. This I have done. Said visual

representation can be found in Appendix 1. There are numerous inferences that I can draw from

this particular chart, each of which carry implications at the various levels of consideration for

policymakers and analysts alike within the Intelligence Community (IC). That is, the chart

provides insights on the act of “defining terrorism” on the Macro, Meso, and Micro levels of

analysis within the IC.

Within each section below, I am first going to focus on the purpose for defining terrorism

at that level. More often than not, it is important to understand why an action is being carried out

before carrying it out, at least, that is, if you wish to carry the action out optimally. At all levels,

the overarching goal is to proactively prevent terrorism, but within each level, that goal takes a

different form. I will then emphasize one key point from the class lectures that stood out as most

vital for success at that level, supporting my assertion with various sub-arguments. As you will

see, each level can feed the effectiveness of the level next to it. The Macro can feed the Meso,

which can feed the Micro and vice versa. This symbiotic relationship is important for overall

success in the stated task. You will also notice that there is a common theme throughout, which

is: “truth is relative.” What exactly that statement entails will be articulated within each section.

MACRO

It seems to me that the purpose for proactively defining terrorism at this level must be

strategic in nature and therefore must be focused on understanding WHY terrorist choose to

commit terrorist acts. Breaking this out further, acts are the result of some motive, so we want to

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understand what drives a terrorist’s motives. Ultimately, we want to understand these things so

that we can intervene, and possibly “rewrite the narrative,” or the story that potential terrorists

buy into. In order to understand motives and driving forces within people, we have to use tools

meant for that very task, namely psychological and sociological theories on human development

and behavior. Here, we are concerned with how individuals create self-identity, group identity,

and ultimately their world views.

What stands out as being most critical for success at this level is allowing “them” to

define themselves for us. Our obtaining a copy of AQAP’s Inspire Magazine is the best chance

we will ever get at truly understanding the motives and driving forces of the most prolific

terrorist organizations of today, that can be discussed here. We covered, during discussions,

numerous sets of theories regarding human development and behavior, which find their roots in

either psychology or sociology. There are several reasons why such theories are ineffectual for

achieving success at this level. I will explain those reasons in separate paragraphs below.

First, but not foremost, no single theory can account for the myriad of factors that

influence the growth of individuals. Psychological theories, such as Maslow’s needs paradigm,

Erikson’s 8 stages, or Freud’s psychosexual development, leave several gaps in an analysis, and

worse, are wholly inadequate for analyzing some people.1 Sociological theories, such as Tajfel’s

Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses so heavily on interaction with others that it seems

individuals do not make decisions on their own, but at some point they must.2 Only when all of

these theories are utilized in conjunction with each other can an analyst hope to glean any incite

into human development and behavior. As Appendix 1 shows, this is a daunting task, but as 1 You need only ask a female how applicable Freud's theories are to her personally to see just how inapplicable his theories can be to a vast majority of people. Erikson’s theory presumes an established rationality and morality exists in humanity that just is not accurate. Maslow’s needs are very structured, human behavior often is not. 2 People have original thoughts, made completely apart from any group they may be affiliated with; for example, people have “gut” feelings all the time, a sense deep within that prompts action.

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Cronin suggested, a necessary one. Not only should analysts consider the totality of the

individual, but the organizations and state they belong to, as well as the international

atmosphere.3 An analyst does not stand a chance at appropriately plotting the typical path a

terrorist takes through such a maze of theories, space, and time.

Second, an analyst may as well not even begin to utilize such theories for proactively

defining terrorism or identifying terrorists because the process is doomed from the start.

Definitions demand some semblance of underlying truth. It is not ideal to use theories to come

to definitive conclusions. Such theories as were covered in class are not “absolute” truths, which

blanket all of humanity whether humanity knows it or not; they are merely theories, based on

trends that their creators witnessed, which they witnessed only from their perspectives as well-

off, white men. To a certain degree, theories that seek to define people will be used by people to

define themselves and their world views. For example, Astrology seeks to define people by their

signs; people in turn use Astrology to define themselves. I do not believe that terrorists of the

past have been too concerned with Maslow, Erikson, Freud, or Tajfel.

Third, and foremost, we cannot hope to successfully proactively define terrorism because

“truth is relative.” This point is similar to the one made above. Maslow, Erikson, Freud, nor

Tajfel are appropriate for the task (proactive prevention) because they produced biased theories.

But, even if a potential terrorist was exposed to the theories of one or more of these men and

began using the theories as a basis for defining themselves and their world view, we still could

not possibly hope to predict their every action, thus, preventing any future terrorist acts, because

the issue of perspective still exists. We can never fully walk in their shoes. Their interpretation

of the theories may stray far and away from the original as the theories are morphed in

3 Taken from the “Tactics, Targets,Waves, Theory & the Religious Aspect” Lecture and Slides.

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accordance with their cultural contexts. They will create a truth apart from the truth that was

intended.

Even though “truth is relative,” really, it is only relative to some, just depending on what

side one stands. Despite the relativity of truth, people will none-the-less form world views. The

dangerous world views involved extremes, wherein the person holds certain things scared and

most everything else profane, and they will believe these truths to be universal, absolute,

encompassing everyone. They will likely also believe whole-heartedly that only they and their

compatriots (in-group) stand between that which they consider sacred and that which they

consider profane. Their senses of identity are completely wrapped up in their extreme visions of

the sacred and profane - the absolute and the intolerable. This imbues such individuals with a

justification for forcing these “absolute” truths on others. While, we can at least determine this

much about human behavior, we cannot know the process by which they create these world

views without material like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine.

AQAP’s Inspire Magazine is the prime channel by which we can determine the motives

and driving forces that lead a certain group of people to commit terrorist acts. Undoubtedly, that

is being picked apart at this very moment. I will not mention in what ways for obvious reasons,

but with the gleaned information from the review, we can then begin to rewrite the narrative,

countering much of what AQAP’s Inspire Magazine has to say. We will better understand what

motives can be influenced and in what directions driving forces can be steered. In the absence of

such a boon as obtaining AQAP’s Inspire Magazine, there are other avenues by which we can

learn the same information. Again, I will not delve into these avenues. The point is, if we

attempt to proactively define and identity terrorists - their motives and driving forces - we would

more than likely be off target and remain off target until proven wrong.

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MESO

In an effort to proactively prevent terrorism at this level, the operational level, it is

necessary that IC agencies, such as the NSA, which I have worked for, understand WHAT

terrorists are targeting, so that they can provide risk assessments to US entities or US allies.

Obviously, the best way to obtain this information is through sources like AQAP’s Inspire

Magazine again. However, at this point, it is possible for IC analysts to actually conduct some

note-worthy analysis. The key to success in this endeavor is to fully understand ourselves in

relation to the defined threat, which requires a sturdy springboard from the Macro level. IC

agencies should be looking at that which stands out to terrorists as vulnerabilities, centers of

gravity, or high-profile opportunities. In order to come to determinations in this way, it is

necessary to look within as if through the eyes of the threat. In other words, analysts must cross

over the “proverbial relativity line” and see the enemy’s “truth”

Having a clear understanding of what motivates and drives terrorists, analysts should

look for the “operational targets” of said terrorists. These would be incremental steps in their

overall strategic plan as outlined in the Macro level. Here analysts assess those components of

the US infrastructure, citizenry, and culture, which the terrorists consider inconsistent with their

world view, either as competition to their “absolute” truths or a direct attack upon them. So,

analysts are focusing on that which would be a glaring infarction to terrorists’ world view.

Drawing cartoons of Muhammad is an example of an intolerable offense upon that which they

have deemed sacred, hence, their targeting the cartoonists involved. At the same time analysts

should consider that which terrorists could exploit in their campaign to promote their world

view. Analysts should look for possible in roads that terrorists could widen an an attempt to

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drive a wedge between the US government and the citizenry or the US government and the

international community. An example might be staging a fake US bombing of an orphanage.

Simultaneously, analysts at this level could assess the risk level of potential targets of

terrorist recruitment. Analysts would be looking for individuals that have yet to form strong

world views of their own, which terrorist recruiters use to their advantage. If the theories from

the chart in Appendix 1 were applied at this point, the potential terrorists would reside before the

horizontal line created by extreme world views and self and group identities. Terrorist would

look for individuals who have not had successes in life and begin to offer them the chance to

have success, if not in this life, then the next. The recruiters will attempt to indoctrinate the

young minds with symbolism, influencing them to respond courageously when one of their new

found truths are rebuke by others. Lastly, the recruiters are trying to bring the recruits to a

“tipping point,” where they feel compelled to act. Analysts would be on the lookout for recruits

who are testing their new views, perhaps by blogging. Potential recruits can then perhaps be

targeted with a counter propaganda campaign.

Generally this kind of analysis is initiated once word comes from the Micro level;

however, there is no reason why it should not begin at this level and be corroborated with

analysis from the Micro level. In fact, analysis at this level could even initiate analysis at the

Micro level. How well analysis works at this level, as in, how accurately analysts can accurately

pinpoint potential operational targets, without using shotgun tactics, depends on how thoroughly

the enemy is known. The more complete the understanding of the enemy, the fewer potential

operational targets need be analyzed and the more accurate the chosen ones will likely be. The

final analysis will center on a risk estimate for each potential operational target, which could be

used by analysts working in the Micro level to “Rack ‘n Stack” and direct collection efforts.

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MICRO

At this level, the tactical level, proactively defining terrorism entails understanding

exactly HOW terrorists intend to carry-out terrorist acts. With this information, the IC stands the

best chance at assisting in preventing planned attacks. Logistical knowledge of the enemy is of

utmost importance here. All-source analysts will need to discover what resources, from

communications to execution, are available to the terrorists in question. With this information,

analysts can direct collectors on how, when, and what to collect for better intel. NSA analysts,

for instance, will work to exploit intel regarding the enemy’s communications network, since the

NSA will be responsible for collecting on these communication lines and extracting as much

detail as possible about any planned attacks, or amplifying information. As the collection

commences, tips will undoubtedly present more leads, which will lead to a fully picture of the

terrorists complete logistical infrastructure, and all the while, planned attacks will be thwarted.

Yet again, the best source for obtaining information about a terrorist networks logistical

infrastructure is from material like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine. While they probably did not

come right out and reveal their logistical infrastructure, small pieces here and there can be

acquired that when pieced together can present the framework needed to plot a way ahead, which

focuses on filling gaps. Analysts have to be weary, however, in that, considerations at the Meso

level still need to be applied here. Analysts should consider how much the terrorist network

knows about US capabilities. Such knowledge on their part could allow them to enact Denial &

Deception campaigns that steer use away from their actual target. Here again, the common

theme of this paper surfaces, “truth is relative.” That which analysts believe to be true about a

threats planned actions might change if they viewed the matter from a different perspective, one

that incorporated foreign knowledge of us. This type of analysis would be done at the Meso

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level, but handed off to analysts at the Micro level as appropriate in order to adjust collection

efforts.

CONCLUSION

This paper has summarized the importance of proactively defining terrorism at the

Macro, Meso, and Micro levels, which the IC is tasked with performing ceaselessly. In order to

follow-through with this charge flawlessly, it is important to understand what the desired goal is

at each level. This paper has postulated what those goals are at each level. As shown, the goal

changes at each level, requiring focus on different aspects of the task. This paper then

highlighted the key(s) to success within each level, citing example instances throughout. The

summation is below.

The Macro level is concerned with the reasons WHY a terrorist chooses terrorism. The

key to understanding WHY is in allowing “them” to tell us from their own perspective. The

Meso level is concerned with WHAT the terrorists are targeting. The key to success is having a

full and accurate impression of oneself (nation) from the perspective of the enemy. The Micro

level is concerned with HOW terrorists are planning on conducting terrorist acts. The key to

success at this level is obtaining complete logistical knowledge of the enemy, in terms of their

resources, from communications to execution. The thread that ran through all of the levels was

the concept that “truth is relative.”

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APPENDIX 1

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