Defining Indonesian Islam - Traditionalist vs. Modernist Muslims

Islam in

Indonesia

E

Jajat Burhanudin and Kees van Dijk

Islam in Indonesia

C

and Interpretations

2

An examination of the construction of the national Islamicidentity of traditionalist and modernist Muslims

Ahmad Najib Burhani

A journalistic report from Newsweek magazine in September 1996about Islam in Indonesia was entitled Islam with a Smiling Face. Thetitle is indicative of the image of Islam in the archipelago, which differsfrom Islam elsewhere in the Muslim world. In general, according tothis report, Islam in Indonesia is peaceful, moderate and shows a posi-tive attitude towards democracy, modernity, plurality and humanrights. This conclusion is echoed by Azyumardi Azra (2010b), who em-phasises that Islam in Indonesia is different from that in the MiddleEast due to its distinctive traits, such as its tolerance and moderateviews, and the fact that it provides a middle way (umma wasat

) be-

tween secularism and Islamism. Such an assessment obviously repre-sents the positive meaning that contemporary accounts give to the dis-tinctiveness of Islam in Indonesia. Although certain Muslims fromother parts of the world might object to this claim to exclusivity, theparticularity of Islam in Indonesia in general has been recognised bymany scholars.

Early American scholarship on Islam in Indonesia was aware of itsdistinctiveness. However, in contrast to the current connotation, whichgenerally tends to have a positive meaning, these scholars perceivedthe distinctiveness of Indonesian Islam in a negative way, particularlyin comparison to normative Islam and Islam in its heartland. In thiscontext, Indonesian Islam tended to be seen as incomplete or cor-rupted. Clifford Geertz (1960a), for instance, shows his reluctance tocategorise the nominal Muslims in Java, who constitute the majority,as Muslims. Instead of calling Islam in Java Javanese Islam, he pre-ferred the term religion of Java, as is reflected in the title of his classicbook. Geertz is not alone in perceiving the particularity of Islam in In-donesia in this negative sense. C.L.M. Penders and several other schol-ars perceive that the majority of Indonesian people could be barely con-sidered Muslims based on the degree of correspondence with High Is-lam, to follow the terminology used by Ernest Gellner (1981). Pendersrecalls that in the beginning, the Javanese and peoples in the Indone-sian archipelago attached themselves to Islam at only one stage higher

t a pro forma. And as it progressed, Islam was never able to replacetraditional Javanese civilisation in its totality. In fact, Islam was only athin and easily flaking veneer on top of a solid body of traditional be-liefs, which consist of a mixture of animism and Hinduism/Buddhism.The core of Javanese ideas and practices remained non-Islamic. Thecanon law of Islam (shara) never supplanted adat-law (Penders 1977:236-7).

What can be inferred from these two contrasting perspectives on thesame subject? Is the smiling Islam the same as the corrupted Islam?Is puritan Islam identical to terrorist Islam? From an international se-curity perspective, as a result of the impact of 9/11, Islam seems to beconsidered benevolent and good when it stays away from Middle East-ern culture and influences and keeps its distance from scriptural Is-lam. The closer people are to Islam, the more dangerous they become.The less Islamic a society is, the better it is in terms of the human rela-tionship. However, from an Islamist perspective, which is also the per-spective held by Orientalist scholarship, this kind of Islam is not reallyIslam. Following this line of argumentation, people often come to themisleading conclusion that Islam in Indonesia is perceived as a be-nign, peaceful and friendly Islam because it is impure or corrupted.Another conclusion is that what makes Islam in Indonesia distinct isthe fact that it is not authentic.

Several scholars attempt to examine the concept of Indonesian Islamas a specific term for the Islam of Indonesia. Michael Laffan (2006),for instance, traces its history back in particular to the nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries, when the Indonesian Muslim communitiesin Cairo and Mecca were commonly called Jawi Islam, although he ad-mits that the term has been used since the thirteenth century. Fromhis observations, he concludes that Jawi Islam does not constitute aspecific form of Islam in terms of identity and authenticity. Jawi Islamsimply refers to those who studied in Mecca or Cairo, who happenedto come from Southeast Asia and seemed to have an inferior outlookon religiosity and Islamic knowledge compared to those from the restof Muslim world, including Malaysia (Laffan 2006: 18-21). Just like Ja-wi Islam, the phrase Indonesian Islam does not refer to any specificform of Islam, but rather to the Islam in Indonesia that has been leastinfluenced by foreign cultures. The further back in time we go, thetruer, more authentically Indonesian, the Islam is assumed to be [...]The further back in time we go, the more Indonesia itself fades fromview, and the less it is recognizably Islamic at all, being replaced byour scholarly regional conception of Southeast Asia with its inherentlypolycentric and variegated mandalas (Laffan 2006: 13).

In contrast to Laffan, Martin van Bruinessen (1999) explains,although only in passing, that the contemporary demand for the con-

26 AHMAD NAJIB BURHANI

s!"#$tion of Indonesian Islam is initiated by the pembaruan (renewal)movement, and in particular by some intellectually sophisticated Mus-lims in Indonesia as a response to globalisation. They consider Indo-nesian-ness as a legitimate dimension of their own Muslim identities(Van Bruinessen 1999: 170). Unfortunately, Van Bruinessen does notelaborate this concept any further. He only mentions that the accep-tance of Pancasila is a significant element of authentic Indonesian Is-lam, since it highlights an Indonesian Islamic identity that differs fromthat in the Middle East. It seems that Van Bruinessens intention is toshow that the acceptance of Pancasila has been used as a symbol of Is-lam of Indonesia in order to free itself from a centre-periphery dichoto-my in which Indonesia is primarily the recipient of influences fromother Muslim countries, particularly centres of Islam such as Meccaand Egypt.

This contribution delineates the construction of Indonesian Islamand analyses the above-mentioned contrasting interpretations by takingthe position that although there are several points of similarity, theconcept of Indonesian Islam has a different meaning in Indonesiantraditionalist and modernist Muslim circles. For traditionalist Muslims,the concept reflects the efforts to define what is authentic in Indone-sian Islam and to avoid a blind imitation of foreign influences. Unlikethe concept of Jawi Islam, Indonesian Islam has consciously been usedin this way to refer to a nationally distinct Islam. In modernist circles,Indonesian Islam is mainly used to solve the problems surroundingthe relation between religion and state. To elaborate this position, theauthor will examine the embryos of the concept by analysing the unifi-cation between Islam and Indonesia as proposed by two of the most in-fluential Islamic thinkers in Indonesia: Abdurrahman Wahid, who hasa traditionalist background, and Nurcholish Madjid, who has a mod-ernist one. Although these two scholars do not use the term Indone-sian Islam to designate a distinctive form of Islam in Indonesia,through their concepts, such as pribumisasi of Islam (indigenisation ofIslam) and the idea of integrating Indonesian-ness and Islam-ness,they pioneered the notion of what is now popularly proclaimed as In-donesian Islam.

Abdurrahman Wahid and pribumisasi of Islam

Abdurrahman Wahids idea of pribumisasi of Islam is perhaps thestrongest embryo for the construction of Indonesian Islam in its cultur-al aspect. Wahid introduced this concept in an article, Pribumisasi Is-lam, published in the book Islam Indonesia menatap masa depan (Indo-nesian Islam contemplates its future) (1989). The article was actually

DEFINING INDONESIAN ISLAM 27

w%&''en by Abdul Munim Saleh, one of the books editors, based on hisinterview with Wahid. Six years before it appeared, Wahid had intro-duced his concept in an article entitled Salahkah Jika Dipribumikan?(Is it wrong to indigenise [Islam]?) in Tempo magazine in July 1983.The definition of pribumisasi of Islam is not explicitly mentioned inthese two articles, but it can be inferred from several statements relatedto the term that the meaning of pribumisasi Islam is the manifestationof Islam in a local context.

What is the connection between pribumisasi of Islam and Indone-sian Islam? Wahids conception of pribumisasi of Islam is a critique ofAmerican and Dutch scholars and modernist Muslims who argue thatIslam in Indonesia loosely corresponds with High Islam. Instead ofconsidering Geertzs form of Islam as nothing more than a thin veneercovering pre-Islamic traditions, Wahid considers Islam in Indonesia tobe a correct manifestation of Islam. Unlike Geertz and other scholarswho share this perspective, he argues that the distinctiveness of Islamin Indonesia does not signify that this kind of folk Islam is less Is-lamic in comparison to Islam in other parts of the world (Wahid 2006:244). Instead, Islam in Indonesia reflects the cosmopolitan characterof Islamic culture, which necessarily differs from one country to anoth-er. Furthermore, instead of casting this particular characteristic of Is-lam in a negative light, Wahid perceives it as positive, and even makesthe distinction clearer and stronger by proposing the project of pribu-misasi Islam, based on distinctive Indonesian characteristics. The pro-ponents of Indonesian Islam build an authentic Islam for IndonesianMuslims called Indonesian Islam. In short, in this context, Wahidsrole is to shift the perception of Islam in Indonesia from impurity toauthenticity. The meaning of authenticity here is certainly differentfrom that used by the modernists, which refers to a return to the sa-cred texts of Islam. Wahids meaning refers to an Indonesian authenticversion of Islam.

As explained by Wahid, he introduced the concept of pribumisasipartly in response to the feeling of inferiority experienced by some In-donesian Muslims with respect to their own identity as Muslims. Theyfeel that Indonesian Islamic traditions and their own identity are lessIslamic than those in other Muslim countries, particularly in the Ara-bian Peninsula; that Indonesian Muslims are second-class Muslims(Wahid 2006: 244). Islam in Indonesia has been portrayed as syncre-tistic, impure and weak. In a bid to improve the quality of Islam in thiscountry, some Muslims have imitated the culture of the Middle East,for instance by using Arabic terms and vocabulary in communication.Wahid considers the adoption of Arabic terms to replace traditional Is-lamic ones as a manifestation of this inferiority complex rather than asa sign of the process of becoming more Islamic.


T() use of words such as shalat (Ar. salah), mushalla (Ar. mus

alla),

and ustadz (Ar. ustadh) in place of sembahyang, langgar and kiai or tuanguru is one example of the unnecessary adoption of Arabic culture.This inferiority complex may have been influenced by two factors men-tioned in passing at the beginning of this chapter. The first factor isthe paradigm promoted by Geertz and other Western scholars, whoconsider Islam in Indonesia to be just a thin veneer over pre-Islamictradition and thus something that cannot be considered truly Islamic.The second factor is the onslaught of the puritan movement, whichtries to eradicate any alien element from Islam, such as Indonesian lo-cal traditions, and which strives to bring this religion back to its origi-nal form. The combination of these two factors has resulted in the ef-fort that is commonly called re-Islamisation and phenomena such asthe replacement of old Indonesian-Islamic words. Wahid does notagree with the school of modernist and puritan Muslims who accentu-ate the impurity of Islam in Indonesia. He believes that the distinctive-ness of Islam in Indonesia is more a reflection of a different manifesta-tion of Islam than of its incompleteness. The concept of pribumisasi ofIslam was introduced partly to overcome this inferiority complex andto create confidence among Indonesian Muslims in relation to theirtraditional culture, and to assure them that their model of Islamic prac-tices is no less orthodox than that of those who proclaim themselves tobe puritan Muslims. There are three main elements in the construc-tion of pribumisasi of Islam namely tradition, politics and law. Inwhat follows, these three main elements of pribumisasi will be elabo-rated in detail.

Reconciliation with Indonesian tradition

Since Islam was revealed in Arab culture, it is difficult, if not impossi-ble, to separate the two. For Wahid, the key is not to divorce Islamfrom Arabness but rather to identify and differentiate the universal val-ues and cultural elements of Islam. By understanding these universaland cultural values, Muslim people outside Arabia can embrace Islamwithout necessarily abandoning their own culture. In his UniversalismeIslam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam (Universalism of Islamand cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilisation), Wahid (1994a) writesabout this issue clearly; Islam as religion is universal, but its manifesta-tion can be different in different countries.

It seems that Wahid follows Franz Boass concept of cultural relativ-ity and, consequently, he is aware of the danger of forcing certain cul-tural manifestations on other cultures. Several times in Pribumisasi Is-lam, Wahid stresses the menacing effect of the process of Arabisation;the process of adopting and identifying with Middle Eastern culture.


H* +,-+ ./,. 0- 13*4.15-146 71./ 89,0 :;9 *?,@A

fBDFGDI in his dress code wearing Javanese attire such as blangkon(Javanese male batik headdress) and beskap (a Javanese-style male jack-et) instead of Arab dress as described in many chronicles, but moreimportantly in his religious practices, such as using traditional songsas a medium for transmitting Islamic teachings (Wahid 2008: 284).

Pancasila as national ideology and Azas Tunggal

The second element of pribumisasi of Islam is nationalism, with theacceptance of Pancasila as its consummate manifestation. Some mightwonder why Abdurrahman Wahid was so certain on this point, eagerto accept Pancasila as the azas tunggal (sole foundation or principle) forall political and social organisations, including religious ones, whenthe majority of elite Muslims in the 1980s were still reluctant and evenopposed to doing so (Prawiranegara 1984; Raillon 1993). A number ofscholars, among them Douglas Ramage (1993), have analysed this is-sue from a political perspective. It has been suggested that the politicalsituation in the New Order would have put anybody who dared to re-ject Pancasila as the azas tunggal in a difficult position. Another argu-ment is that by accepting Pancasila, Wahid rescued Indonesian Mus-lims from political defeat. Other, similar analyses attempt to provide anexplanation for his position in the 1980s. However, it is difficult to findan analysis from a religious perspective.

While it is not incorrect to approach this issue from a political pointof view, to rely solely on a political perspective seems to suggest thatWahid adopted this stance with only short-term goals in mind, and thathis position had a weak ideological foundation. In fact, the decision toaccept nationalism and Pancasila as the azas tunggal is consistent withWahids view on Islamic cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism requiresIslam to adapt to local tradition and culture. Since Islam should mani-fest itself in different forms based on cultural differences, then nation-alism should be part of Islamic cosmopolitanism. Based on this view,Pancasila is not only in line with Islamic values, it is also the best man-ifestation of Islamic universal teachings in the Indonesian context. It isthrough Pancasila that the combination of Islam and Indonesia canfind its ideal form, and it is only through this kind of manifestationthat the ideal and universal values of Islam can be realised in thisworld.

Could the acceptance of nationalism and Pancasila be considered abetrayal of Islam? Accepting Pancasila as the Indonesian state ideologyautomatically excludes Islam from becoming the national ideology, andaccepting azas tunggal meant replacing Islam with Pancasila as thesole foundation of the NU. With regard to this issue, Wahid states con-fidently that the guiding principle of the pribumisasi of Islam is fiqh


lJK. According to him, the principle of fiqh law will often clash withviews that treat Islam as a social ideology, especially a political ideol-ogy, for example, when Islam is used as the basis of the state (Wahid1986: 181). By rejecting the notion of Islam as an alternative politicalsystem or ideology, both Wahid and the NU automatically give an en-dorsement of the type of state which already exists (Wahid 1986: 181).Furthermore, Wahid writes, the formal aspects of government do notconstitute a problem for the NU so long as they conform to formal be-havior patterns of state which are not in conflict with fiqh law (Wahid1986: 181). Following this argument, Wahid believes that nothing inPancasila opposes Islam or is against fiqh law. Therefore, acceptingPancasila as the azas tunggal is not contrary to Islam. Some peoplehave stated that since Indonesias independence, the political characterof the NU has been based on opportunistic principles. This accusationrefers to several historical events. At the end of the Old Order, for in-stance, the NU became the only Islamic party that allied with Sukarnoand the Communist Party. In 1954, the NU even gave Sukarno the titlewaliyyul amri d

aruri bis-shawka (effective holder of interim power) when

a number of Indonesian Muslims opposed him. Wahid rejects accusa-tions of opportunism as incorrect and misplaced, since the main prin-ciple in the NU is not politics, but fiqh: everything is measured from afiqh perspective.

The NUs norm is not strategies of political struggle or Islamicideology in the abstract sense but endorsement in the eyes of fiqh(Wahid 1986: 181). Therefore, Wahid is of the opinion that the decisionto accept Pancasila as the azas tunggal was taken with full religiousconviction, and that it was not just a political strategy or inspired by po-litical opportunism. The totally fiqh approach to solving these prob-lems of state has been responsible for making it relatively easier forthe NU to accept the governments decision on Pancasila principles inorganizational life (Wahid 1986: 180). Without understanding the reli-gious principle behind the NUs political position, the NU could be ac-cused of opportunism not only with regard to the issue of Pancasila asthe azas tunggal, but also the NUs political stance during the Old Or-der, which surprised many. Also in colonial times, the NU declaredthat the Netherlands Indies was a territory in which the religion of Is-lam could be practiced and [therefore] must be defended against Japa-nese aggression (Woodward 1996: 147). This decision certainly seemsodd. The Dutch had colonised Indonesia for centuries and when, witha Japanese invasion, a chance presented itself to be free from that colo-nisation, instead of helping Japan, the NU decided to align with theDutch. The decision was based on the argument that the Dutch af-forded Muslims the right to practise their religion, while it was as-sumed that the Japanese would force Indonesian Muslims to bow in


LMN direction of Tokyo (saikere) as a sign of respect for the divine Japa-nese Emperor, an act that Muslim people often understood as worship-ping the sun.

The connection between cosmopolitan Islam and Pancasila seemsobvious, since Pancasila is considered to be a manifestation of Islam inIndonesia. But the relation between fiqh as the main principle of theNU and Pancasila needs yet further explanation. Cosmopolitanismgives a positive justification to Pancasila, while fiqh law gives a nega-tive one. The meaning of the negative justification is that both nation-alism and Pancasila are not forbidden in Islam; they are not againstfiqh law. This is in accordance with Islamic legal theory, which statesthat al-as

l fi al-ashya [ghayr al-ibadah] al-ibah

ah illa idha ma dalla al-dall

ala khilafihi (in principle, all non-religious activities [except rituals] arepermitted except for when there is religious proof to the contrary). Inhis Pribumisasi Islam, Wahid (1989: 95) states that Islam is compatiblewith any kind of system, except t

aghut or a tyrannical system. And Pan-

casila is certainly not tyrannical.It can be said that the main argument for Wahids acceptance of

Pancasila as national ideology and the azas tunggal is the cosmopolitancharacter of Islam. In this context, the role of fiqh law is to provide reli-gious endorsement. Wahid believes that Islam is not an ideology andtherefore cannot create a state based on Islam. As long as Islamicteachings can be realised on earth, the nature of the system of govern-ment is irrelevant. Islam lets things related to the form of state, thesystem of government, the orientation of citizens, and their politicalideology be determined by the historical process [this] enables Mus-lims to have a double loyalty; to the Islamic teachings and to the non-Islamic state (Wahid 1994b: 582-3). If Muslims force Islam to becomethe national ideology, Wahid believes, it would make non-Muslim citi-zens become second-class citizens, both legally and in practical reality(Wahid 2006: 112). In sum, for Indonesian Muslims, the nationalideology of Pancasila should be taken as the constitutional basis of thelife of nation and state, while Islam should be embraced as their aqda(religious creed).

Adoption of local custom into Islamic law

Before Wahid introduced his ideas on pribumisasi of Islam, several In-donesian scholars promoted the integration of Islamic law with Indo-nesian customs. Among the most prominent are Hasbi al-Shiddieqy,Hazairin and Munawir Sjadzali. Given his writings on fiqh, it seemsthat Wahid endorses al-Shiddieqys ideas on Indonesian fiqh, Hazair-ins ideas about National Mazhab and Sjadzalis thoughts on contextu-alisation. Following the Hanafi school of Islamic law, Wahid frequently


OPQPRO that urf or custom can be used as the basis of law. In many ofhis writings, Wahid quotes one of the Islamic legal maxims (qawaid al-fiqhiyya) that cultural usage (al-adah muh

akkama) shall have the

weight of law. With this, Wahid intends to synchronise adat or custom-ary law (Ar. adah or urf) and Islamic law.

One example he mentions is the law of inheritance. The Javanesesystem of inheritance famously includes a form of property calledgono-gini, household property obtained together by husband and wife.When either spouse dies, this gono-gini property must be dividedequally into two before it can be inherited. Half of the property has tobe distributed to the heirs according to Islamic inheritance law, whilethe other half is to be given to the husband or wife of the deceased(Wahid 1989: 84). According to Wahid, this practice is acceptable to In-donesian ulama, despite being considered a good choice or adna-l qaw-lani (second in its strength), rather than the best choice.

Wahid has presented three other examples to show the dialogue be-tween Islam and Indonesian-ness: marriage, alms giving (zakah) andthe system of education. With respect to marriage, according to Islam,the requirements for a legal marriage are ijab (Ar. Ijab, offer of con-tract), qabul (Ar. Qabul, acceptance or approval), witnesses and a wali(legal guardian). If these requirements are satisfied, then the rest ofthe wedding ritual and celebrations can follow the adat system or localcustom. With respect to alms giving, certainly according to classicalfiqh books, rice has never been considered one of the staple foods forpaying zakat al-fit

r. Yet, in Indonesia, there are no objections to this

practice. Regarding education, Indonesian ulama allow co-education,being of the opinion that a school is the safest place for interaction be-tween boys and girls (Wahid 1989: 85-6).

In fact, having argued for convergence between Islam and Indone-sian identity, Wahid encourages Muslims to do more than just confinethemselves to the law within the boundary of one community of faith,Islam. He urges Muslims to talk about national law in general, since itautomatically covers the general interests of Muslims. The standard ofjudgment should move away from the debate about whether some-thing is Islamic or not, to Indonesian public interest (al-mas

laha al-am-

ma) in general. For him, the life of the nation as a whole is more im-portant than that of one community of faith, and Islamic law shouldtherefore be set within a national framework. He writes: the teachingsof Islam as the components that make up and fill the social life ofour nation should play the role of a complementary factor for othercomponents, rather than a counter factor that will disintegrate the lifeof the nation as a whole (Wahid 2007: 236).


SUVWXYZ[\X Madjid and the integration of Islam and Indonesianidentity

Nurcholish Madjids main contribution to the construction of Indone-sian Islam can be traced from his idea of integrating keindonesiaan (In-donesian-ness) with keislaman (Islam-ness). This idea is mentioned ina number of his works, such as Integrasi keislaman dalam keindonesiaanuntuk menatap masa depan bangsa [Integrating Islam-ness into Indone-sian-ness for the future of the nation] (1981) and Islam, kemoderenandan keindonesiaan [Islam, modernity, and Indonesian-ness] (1987). Incontrast to Abdurrahman Wahid, who uses culture as the basis of hisIndonesian Islam, Madjids analysis puts weight on political integra-tion.

Madjids involvement in the hurly-burly of national politics in the1960s and 1970s had a significant impact on his ideas about the inte-gration of Islam and Indonesian identity. Two complementary reasonslie behind this idea. First, after 1945 and until the 1970s, some Muslimactivists were still reluctant to accept, or even rejected, the very form ofIndonesia the idea of nationalism, and Pancasila as the ideology ofthe Indonesian state. Some, such as those participating in Darul Islam(DI), were involved in armed resistance against the established govern-ment in order to create an Islamic state. A number of activists engagedin a constitutional struggle to make Pancasila more Islamic and tofight for the re-inclusion of the seven words dengan kewajiban menja-lankan syariat Islam kepada pemeluknya (with the obligation for Mus-lims to carry out Islamic law), which were removed from the JakartaCharter (Piagam Jakarta) on 18 August 1945, into the first of the fiveprinciples of Pancasila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Believe in the Oneand Only God). A small number of activists still considered national-ism to be a kind of modern tribalism (as

abiyya). Instead of national-

ism, these Muslims believed that they should follow the concept of um-ma, a Muslim brotherhood beyond the geographical boundaries of thenation-state.

Second, as explained by Alan Samson (1972), some Indonesians didnot believe that Muslims could have national sentiments or be patri-otic, since as Muslims they are required to be loyal to their religion,which is another type of nationalism. Sukarno, the first Indonesianpresident, for instance, harboured this kind of suspicion, although hemaintained that Islam could be integrated with nationalism. In one ofhis speeches, Sukarno rhetorically asked, [] can the Nationalist move-ment be joined with the Islamic movement, which essentially denies thenation? [] With full conviction, I answer: Yes! (Sukarno 1970: 38-9,my italics). According to Madjid, there was a widespread perception inthe Indonesian political elite that people with a strong orientation and


c]^^_tment to Islam tended to oppose the government. Madjid be-lieved that this kind of perception had been disseminated by colonialofficials, such as Snouck Hurgronje, and had significantly influencedthe Indonesian intelligentsia, even after independence had been pro-claimed. The reason why these officials did so was that in colonialtimes, Islam was consistently used as a rallying cry to resist colonial-ism (Madjid 1987: 89, 200).

With this background in mind, Madjid introduced his idea of a unitybetween Islam-ness and Indonesian-ness, his intention being to endthis exclusive image of political Islam (Madjid 1987: 90). He arguesthat there is no contradiction between a commitment to Islam and acommitment to Indonesia (patriotism); or, as stated by Van Bruinessen(2006: 22), there is no contradiction between devotion to Islam andnationalism. Madjid explains further that this integration is not in-tended to compromise or reject the ideals of Islam; instead, it intendsto manifest the ideal objectives of Islam or, to quote Madjid, to ensurethat all people may hear the word of Allah (Q. 9.6) (Madjid 1987:90).

Nationalism, umma and Pancasila

In a number of his writings, Madjid mentions at least four main com-ponents that are indicative of the integration between Islamic and In-donesian identity: the acceptance of modern nationalism, the redefini-tion of the concept of umma, the acceptance of Pancasila, and the re-jection of the perception of Islam as a political ideology. Nationalismprovides a strong basis for the first element of Indonesian Islam,namely Indonesian-ness. However, this nationalism becomes problem-atic when juxtaposed with the second element of Indonesian Islam,namely Islam-ness, since this can also be understood as another formof nationalism, or even as the original form of nationalism (Asad2003: 195). Such an interpretation would require a Muslim to have adouble loyalty to the nation and to religion.

Responding to the problem of double loyalty, Madjid believes that tobe a good Muslim and a nationalist is not only possible but also neces-sary. The reason is not simply that Islam is the religion of the majorityof the Indonesian people, with almost 90 per cent of them being Mus-lim, but also because Islam is the main component of Indonesian-ness;the past, present and future of Indonesia is strongly related to Islam.There are several other concepts that might be used as the basis of In-donesian identity, such as Javanese identity. However, this would meanthat one ethnic group would dominate the whole nation. Madjid arguesthat only Islam can be used as the basis of Indonesian-ness, as this isthe strongest component that binds Indonesian citizens throughout


`ab country. In short, Islam is the most important marker of Indone-sian national identity and, consequently, Indonesian-ness and Islam-ness cannot be separated (Madjid 1987: 198).

For Madjid, there are several reasons (although not all of them areconvincing) why Islam should be used as the basis of Indonesian-ness.First, Islam is the only religion professed by Indonesian people in al-most all areas. Therefore, it is the main element of Indonesian identityand enables the unity of the country to be maintained. Second, while itis true that historically, the Dutch created the boundaries of the Indo-nesian nation-state from Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east, forMadjid, this boundary would be very weak in the absence of the Is-lamic bond. Following Benedict Andersons concept of an imaginedcommunity, and as Michael Laffan writes in his Islamic nationhoodand colonial Indonesia (2003), Madjid observes that Indonesia as a na-tion had been imagined far before Indonesian independence preciselybecause of its religious bond. Third, the Malay language was chosen asthe national language because of its egalitarian character. Indonesiadid not choose Javanese, since the non-egalitarian character of this lan-guage does not fit with the needs of a modern nation. The Malay lan-guage is associated with Islam because it used to be written in Arabic.Fourth, what is called Indonesian culture, a culture that goes beyondthe boundaries of Indonesian ethnicities and localities, is a culture thatis significantly influenced by Islam. Fifth, the future of Indonesia is insantri hands, because santri culture is characterised by cosmopolitan-ism, egalitarianism and universalism, all three of which are relevant inthe modern world (Madjid 1997: 58-60).

Madjid explains why he supports nationalism by differentiating be-tween old and modern nationalism. For him, modern nationalism isnot contrary to Islam. It is different from the concept of tribal-minded-ness (as

abiyya), which has been condemned by Islam. Madjid calls it

modern because it differs from the old form, which refers to unityand group consciousness in a tribe or clan. Modern nationalism isopen to the participation of all members of society. It is not based onsimilarity or ascriptive relations such as friendship (perkawanan), re-gionalism (kedaerahan), tribal relations (kesukuan), ancestral relations(keturunan), kinship (kekerabatan), and so on (Madjid 2004: 71). Fur-thermore, quoting Robert N. Bellah, Madjid writes that the first modelof modern nationalism was the Madina society established by theProphet Muhammad and continued by his caliphs (ibid. 70). There-fore, this concept of national sovereignty is certainly not in contradic-tion with Islam.

Regarding the idea that Muslims should give priority to the ummaand not to nationalism, Madjid provides a different interpretation ofumma. There are several verses in the Quran that contain the phrase


udde wahida (the One Community), such as Q. 23.52, 2.213, 5.48,

10.19, 11.118, 12.92, 42.8 and 43.23. For instance, Q. 23.52 states: Andverily this Brotherhood of yours is a single Brotherhood and I am yourLord and Cherisher: therefore fear Me (and no other). The umma isusually translated as the unified Muslim community. However, forMadjid, the umma is the nation-state. He refers to the contemporaryusage of this term in Arabic, such as al-umam al-muttah

ida, which

means the United Nations. He concludes that the meaning of ummais closer to nation-state than the unity of the Islamic world (Madjid2004: 42-3).

Madjid points out that the Madina society, which should be the mod-el for modern nationalism, did not consist of only one single religiouscommunity. There were several tribes and religions (Islam, Christian-ity, Judaism and pagans) in Madina. To ensure coexistence and har-mony among people with different religious beliefs and from differenttribal communities, the Prophet Muhammad drafted a social contractor constitution, the Constitution of Madina or the Madina Charter(Madjid 1987: 73-4). In this constitution, no religion or community issuperior to the other; all religious communities have equal rights, free-dom of religion, the same responsibilities and enjoy security and pro-tection. The term used to describe all these communities in this Con-stitution is umma. Therefore, Madjid concludes, the Constitution ofMadina is an endorsement of the idea of pluralism (Madjid 1987: 55).

Madjid writes that in the Indonesian context, the position of Pancasi-la is similar to that of the Madina Charter agreed upon by the ProphetMuhammad and other people of different religions in that city.Although the majority of the population adhere to Islam, like Madina,Indonesia is socio-religiously heterogeneous: it is multi-religious, mul-ti-ethnic and multi-cultural. And though Muslims as the largest popu-lation group had the biggest share in the struggle for independence,freedom was not won by the efforts of Muslims alone. Moreover, evenwithin the Islamic community itself, there is a plurality of ideas onhow the country should be maintained. Therefore, as was the case withthe Madina Charter, the acceptance of Pancasila is a necessity. The es-tablishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia would betray the veryemergence of a state in which both Muslims and non-Muslims have ashare.

Just like nationalism, which can be traced back to the Prophetic Tra-dition, there is no valid reason why Indonesian Muslims should rejectPancasila. Madjid agrees with Muhammad Hatta, who, together withSukarno, proclaimed Indonesias independence and became the coun-trys first vice-president, and Hamka, a national figure from the Mu-hammadiyah, that the first principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Be-lief in the One and Only God) is the primary and main principle of


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kusumo, the former president of the Muhammadiyah and a memberof the committee that discussed Sukarnos Pancasila, that this principleis no less than tawhd, the doctrine of the oneness of God or the con-cept of monotheism in Islam (Madjid 1997: 25).

Madjid is aware that the reason why some Muslims were reluctantto accept Pancasila as the foundation of the Indonesian nation-state (orthe kefinalan [ finality] of Pancasila, to use Achmad Siddiqs terminol-ogy) was the suspicion that Pancasila would be treated as being equalto religion or even as a rival to religion (Madjid 1997: 23-4). For Mad-jid, such fears are misplaced. In connection with Islam, the function ofPancasila is to give a constitutional framework for the implementationof Islamic values in an Indonesian context. Through this, Islamic val-ues become relevant to national and governmental problems (Madjid1981: 13). In connection with other religious communities, the positionof Pancasila in Indonesia is mainly to provide a common platform (ka-lima sawa) within the boundary of the Indonesian nation-state (Madjid1994: 577). In short, Pancasila is not a religion and cannot be treatedas a religion.

Addressing those Muslims who want to reinsert the seven words in-to the principles of Pancasila, Madjid writes that even if it were possi-ble to return to the time when the Jakarta Charter was drafted, hewould still prefer a Jakarta Charter that omitted these words (Madjid1997: 55). He further states that the correct attitude towards Pancasilawould be to bridge the gap between the concepts of umma (konsep keu-matan) representing the unity of Islamic world and nationhood (kene-garaan) [...] This would become the basis for the development of the re-lationship between Islam and Indonesia, in which Islam-ness (keisla-man) does not differ from Indonesian-ness (keindonesiaan), andIndonesian-ness is mostly the same as Islam-ness (ibid. 57-8).

To further strengthen his idea that Islam-ness and Indonesian-nesscan be integrated, Madjid rejects the intention by some Muslims to re-gard Islam as an ideology. This is very evident from his famous slogan,Islam, Yes, Islamic Party, No! Madjid mentions two reasons why someMuslims consider Islam an ideology or want to create an Islamic state.The first is an apologetic response to the modern ideologies that haveemerged in the West, such as socialism, communism and democracy,which offer comprehensive solutions to human problems. In responseto these ideologies, some Muslims maintain that Islam is not only a re-ligion but also a political ideology. In short, Islam is not merely a reli-gion like other religions, but it is din that is, it is more comprehen-sive than religion and it goes beyond issues of spirituality. Madjid be-lieves this line of reasoning to be incorrect because the term din doesnot exclusively belong to Islam; it can also be applied to other religions.


result of an inferiority complex in Muslim society. The second cause heidentifies is the legalistic tendency to implement Islamic law in society.In a pluralistic society such as Indonesia, law should be applicable toall citizens as a way to maintain order (Madjid 1987: 253-5). This iswhy Madjid intends not only to integrate Islam-ness and Indonesian-ness in the political sphere but also in the fields of law and social rela-tions (Madjid 1987: 69).

Islam pinggiran

Besides the integration of Islam-ness and Indonesian-ness with a spe-cial focus on politics, are any of Nurcholish Madjids other ideas con-nected with the concept of Indonesian Islam? Does Madjid think thatIslam in Indonesia is distinctive from Islam elsewhere? Or, does hereally want Indonesian Muslims to be distinct from their fellow Mus-lims? Why, in his view, does Islam in Indonesia seem to be differentfrom that in the rest of the world?

Madjid agrees that compared to other Muslim countries, Islam in In-donesia is the least influenced by Arabisation. He calls this Islam ping-giran (peripheral Islam) (Madjid 1987: 67). The term is not only re-lated to the geographical location of Indonesia, far from the heartlandof Islam in the Middle East, but also reflects the fact that IndonesianMuslims have only adopted Arabic culture and traditions to a minimaldegree. One of the examples presented by Madjid in his writings is thatof culture. Comparing the cultural heritage of India and Indonesia re-veals a striking difference. Although Muslims in India constitute a mi-nority, Islamic monuments such as the Taj Mahal and the Fateh Purimosque are dominant and attract more attention than Indias Hinduand Buddhist heritage. By contrast, whereas in Indonesia almost 90per cent of the population is Muslim, many more tourists visit Hinduand Buddhist monuments such as the Borobudur and Prambananthan any example of the countrys Islamic heritage (Madjid 1997: 19).For Madjid, buildings such as temples not only symbolise somethingin the past, they also preserve and maintain culture and religious val-ues. He illuminates this point by stating that although Islam came toJava via East Java and reigned for centuries in Central Java, nowadaysIslam in West Java is better than in Central and East Java [...] becauseWest Java barely has temples (ibid. 54).

In contrast to Wahid, Madjid does not consider the uniqueness of Is-lam in Indonesia as something that needs to be preserved. It does nothave a positive value. Instead, its manifestations prove the existence ofa gap (kesenjangan) between Islam in Indonesia and the Islamic civili-sation that he greatly esteems. Therefore, this gap has to be closed if


sian Muslims do not want to be considered inferior by Muslimsin other countries. With this perception of Indonesian Islam, MadjidsIslam pinggiran could be translated as marginal Islam rather thanperipheral Islam. Indonesian Islamic authenticity cannot be estab-lished solely on the basis of Indonesian tradition, since Indonesia doesnot possess a rich Islamic intellectual tradition. For Indonesia, theonly way to create authenticity is to draw links with Islamic tradition(Madjid 1997: 45-6).

There are factors that contribute to the formation of Indonesian Is-lam, which outwardly looks different or only superficially embraces Is-lam. First, Islam came to Indonesia long after the Islamic world hadstarted to fall into decline (Madjid 1987: 64). In this context, Madjidagrees with Robert Bellah that this is the main reason there is a hugegap between the social reality of Indonesian Islam and High Islam.Compared to Islam in other countries, Madjid maintains, Islam in In-donesia is still very young and weak (Madjid 1997: 44). Second, forcenturies Islam has functioned in Indonesia primarily as a politicalidentity in opposition to colonial domination, not as a civilisation (ibid.18). Madjid writes, Islam in Nusantara [Indonesia] was mainly utilizedto satisfy ideological needs in facing raiders who came from the West(ibid. 20). Because of this, Islam has only partially been adopted in In-donesia. Third, one of the social groups that played a dominant role inbringing Islam to Indonesia was that of the sufi. Consequently, the eso-teric element of Islam in Indonesia is stronger than the exoteric one. Itis also due to sufi influence that Islam in Indonesia has often been de-scribed as being tolerant, smiling and eager to adapt to existing cul-ture (Madjid 1987: 66).

What is Indonesian Islam?

From the above discussion about Wahids pribumisasi of Islam andMadjids integrationism, it can be concluded that what is commonlycalled Indonesian Islam is nothing other than another designation oftraditionalist Islam, a resistance to political Islam and an Indonesianmanifestation of Islam. In what follows, these three elements will beelaborated.

Indonesian Islam is a new expression of traditionalist Islam

In the sphere of tradition, the integration between Islam-ness and In-donesian-ness is clearly a unique characteristic of traditionalist Islam.The modernists have little regard for Indonesian traditional culture asthe foundation of Indonesian Islam and even tend to disregard it. In


the issue of culture and tradition became a point of difference andeven conflict between traditionalist and modernist Muslims in Indone-sia long ago, ever since the inception of Islam in Indonesia. This con-flict has been described using several paradigms: Sunan Kalijaga ver-sus Sunan Kudus, Kaum Tuo versus Kaum Mudo (the Old Generationversus the Young One), Adat (custom) versus Padri (shara), Abanganversus Santri, Low Islam versus High Islam, and Traditionalist versusModernist. Culturally, therefore, a discussion of Indonesian Islam con-cerns a continuation of these classical differences and is simply a newexpression of traditionalist Islam.

There is a shifting paradigm in the way scholars and others perceivethe difference between traditionalist and modernist Muslims. Betweenthe 1950s and the 1980s, studies on Islam in Indonesia were guidedby the spirit of modernism and took a Weberian perspective. High Is-lam was associated with economic development, the modernist move-ment was regarded as an incarnation of the Protestant ethic in theMuslim world or was portrayed as a Calvinist movement in Islamic so-ciety, and puritan Muslims represented urban and egalitarian Muslims.This paradigm has been in decline since the 1980s, particularly sincethe birth of postmodernism. Instead of praising modernist Muslimsfor helping the national economy to develop, there are those whoblame modernist Muslims for eradicating the richness of local culturesand increasing feelings of spiritual emptiness. This trend is growing,and nowadays Islamic puritanism and modernism have become closelyrelated to scripturalism, fundamentalism and even terrorism. Whenpeople talk about a peaceful and smiling Islam, they tend to think oftraditionalist Muslims. Indonesian Islam, with its friendly attitude totraditional culture, has the same connotation.

It is certainly not an accident that discussions about Indonesian Is-lam are more intense in traditionalist circles than in modernist ones.One indication of this intensity is the various activities organised bythe traditionalists that deal with this topic. The most important aca-demic journal of Islamic thought in the NU, Tashwirul Afkar (from theArabic tashwr al-afkar, the exchanges of ideas), for instance, has de-voted several issues to this topic, such as Islam Nusantara (No. 26,2008), another term for Indonesian Islam, and Islam Pribumi: MenolakArabisme, Mencari Islam Indonesia (Indigenous Islam: Resisting Arab-ism, Seeking Indonesian Islam, No. 14, 2002). The Indonesian Minis-try of Religious Affairs, the only Indonesian ministry dominated byNU members, has also eagerly promoted Islam Nusantara by organis-ing an international conference on the theme of Reintroducing Nusan-tara or Indonesian Islam (Mengenalkan kembali Islam Nusantara) inBanjarmasin in November 2010. The UIN Sunan Ampel, which is lo-cated in East Java, the Indonesian province that is the stronghold of


onalist Islam, is publishing a new journal entitled Journal of In-donesian Islam. Besides these activities, a number of op-eds in Indone-sian newspapers and academic articles on this issue have also beenwritten by NU activists, such as Zuhairi Misrawi (2011).

Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjids differences regardingtraditional culture reflect the old dispute between traditionalists andmodernists. In analysing the distinctive character of Islam in Indone-sia, Wahid emphasises that this kind of Islam is a completely valid ex-pression of Islam and part of the cosmopolitan character of Islam. Asdescribed by Wahid, the cosmopolitan character of Islamic civilisationemerged in the process of absorbing other civilisations during the timeof Islamic expansion, from the remnants of ancient Greek civilisationin the form of Hellenism to the civilisation of the Indian subcontinent(Wahid 1994a). As a consequence of this cosmopolitanism, Islamcould also absorb local culture when it came to Indonesia. In contrastto Wahid, Madjid perceives that the distinctiveness of Islam in Indone-sia is not entirely positive. The distinctive characteristics of Islam in In-donesia reveal that there is a gap that needs to be bridged between In-donesian Islam and Islam in the Middle East. As previously men-tioned, he calls Islam in Indonesia Islam Pinggiran. Not only is itgeographically in the Islamic periphery, it is also marginal in terms ofcivilisation.

In fact, the perceptions of both these scholars regarding Indonesiantradition emerge from the same concerns namely, how to revive Is-lam in Indonesia and ensure that Indonesia catches up with the levelof development in other civilised countries. Where the scholars differis in terms of the strategy required to achieve this goal. Wahid putsmore weight on tradition, Madjid on modernity. The reason Wahidtries to develop Indonesian Islam by relying on Indonesian traditioncan be found in his belief that a country must stand on its own feet.Uprooting Indonesian Islam from Indonesian tradition means separat-ing it from its identity. Wahid intends to identify something authenticfor Indonesian Muslims that is different from Islam in the Middle Eastand in other countries.

Madjid, on the other hand, does not see a strong intellectual tradi-tion in Indonesia that can be used as the foundation for developing thecountry. When he writes about Indonesian-ness, he has a modern In-donesia in mind. In a number of his works, Madjid makes a compari-son between Jayabaya, a scholar and King of Kediri in East Java from1135 to 1157, and al-Ghazali, a Muslim scholar from Iran who livedfrom 1058 to 1111, and between the Kingdom of Majapahit, the greatestempire of pre-modern Indonesia from 1293 to around 1500, and theSultanate of Delhi, an Islamic kingdom in Delhi between 1206 and1526. Although Jayabaya, who is considered to be the greatest pujangga


of letters) of ancient Indonesia, and al-Ghazali were contempora-ries, there was a major difference between them. While Al-Ghazali leftus dozens of internationally recognised and influential books, Jayabayaleft only one important book, Jangka Jayabaya, which only has a localaudience (Madjid 1997: 4, 43). Comparing the Kingdom of Majapahitand the Sultanate of Delhi results in a similar conclusion. Majapahit,which is often seen as the greatest Indonesian civilisation, was only es-tablished one century after the Hindu land in India fell under Islamiccontrol. In short, Indonesia does not have an intellectual traditionequivalent to that of the Arab world and the West that could be used asthe foundation for developing modern Indonesia. Therefore, it is nec-essary for Indonesian Islam to link up with intellectual traditions inthe Islamic world.

Indonesian Islam and the resistance to political Islam

After presenting two different approaches to the cultural foundationsof Indonesian Islam, Wahid and Madjid come up with the same sug-gestion regarding how Indonesian Islam should be constructed politi-cally. For them, Islam and Indonesia are inseparable. Islam is Indone-sias most important identity. From a political perspective, Madjidstresses that the independence of Indonesia was the outcome of thelong struggle by Indonesian Muslims against colonialism. After inde-pendence was won, promoting political Islam meant having the inter-ests of only one community that of Indonesian Muslims at heart.Consequently, this struggle would lose its Indonesian character, sinceit meant neglecting other Indonesian communities. From a culturalperspective, according to Wahid, the current form of government theIndonesian Pancasila state is the consummate manifestation of Islamin an Indonesian context. Therefore, for both scholars, accepting politi-cal Islam would only separate Islam and Indonesia. To defend thisunity of Islam and Indonesia, the first and the most important require-ment is to resist political Islam.

For both Madjid and Wahid, resisting political Islam means some-thing other than banning participation in politics, a policy enforced bythe colonial authorities at the beginning of the twentieth century. Forthem, political Islam means projecting Islam as a political ideology.This can take many forms, such as a rebellion against the establishedIndonesian nation-state, the hesitance to accept Pancasila and question-ing its conformity to Islam, and transnationalism. For them, as Indo-nesian history has shown, the struggle for political Islam can only re-sult in the separation of Islam-ness and Indonesian-ness. Both stressthat political Islam does not acknowledge the plurality of Indonesiaand only results in the creation of second-class Muslim citizens.


Wahid and Madjid have defined their position on the relationbetween religion and state, between Islam and Indonesia, since the be-ginning of their intellectual endeavours and reform projects. Althoughthey present different arguments, they believe that the meaning of um-ma can be transformed into nation-state without there being a contra-diction between devotion to Islam and to Indonesia. After establishingthis solid foundation, they proceed to demonstrate how this integrationcan produce meaningful results for the prosperity of Indonesia.

They both observe that much time has been wasted debating Islamicideology. The time has come, therefore, to tackle topics that are moremeaningful and useful for Indonesian people. These two scholars be-lieve that it is important to realise the essence of Islam on earth, notjust hold up the banner of Islam. Wahid calls attention to the fact thatmany Islamic teachings have been implemented in society withouttheir Islamic background being made explicit. He believes that actingin such a way is more effective and efficient than yelling Islamic slo-gans and talking about the blessings of Islam without any real sub-stance, as many Islamic organisations do. He is critical of the fact thatin general, Islamic movements only display the ornamental aspects ofreligious teaching (Wahid 2007: 206), while what is important is man-ifesting the essence of Islamic teachings. For Wahid and Madjid, ac-cepting Pancasila means implementing the substance of Islam withoutbeing preoccupied with ornaments and jargon.

Perhaps the only difference between the debate about the integrationof Islam-ness and Indonesian-ness in the 1980s and the currentdiscussion about Indonesian Islam is the challenge faced by Indone-sian Muslims. In the 1980s, the discussion was a response to internalissues in Indonesia; today, it is a reaction to transnational Islamicmovements such as Hizb al-Tah

rr, which flourish in several cities in

Indonesia. In both cases, attempts were made to use Islam as a politi-cal ideology.

Indonesian Islam is distinctive in manifestation, not in essence

Some scholars, such as Mujiburrahman (1999, 2000), perceive theconcept of Indonesian Islam as simply a new name for old nomencla-tures such as pribumisasi Islam (indigenising Islam), kontekstualisasiIslam (contextualising Islam) and membumikan Islam (making Islama native religion). This implies that Islam in Indonesia is, in essence,not distinctive from Islam in the rest of the Islamic world. It is only inits manifestation that Islam in Indonesia appears to be different. Wa-hid and Madjid agree on this point, particularly in respect to the law.For them, Islam is a universal religion, but its culture is cosmopolitan.The principles of Islamic law are the same, but they need to be imple-


in different ways based on the context. The universal values ofIslam do not have any real, worldly meaning unless they are imple-mented according to social context. Madjid states this position veryclearly:

So we as Indonesian Muslims, after believing the dimensions ofthe universal teachings of Islam, we need to believe in the exis-tence of special rights that we have in the context of the [Indone-sian] nation-state to solve our problems here and now, accordingto the socio-cultural development of our society and its de-mands. The solutions that we give to our problems, in relationto the obligations of implementing the teachings of God, conse-quently may not be similar to the solutions found in other na-tions for their problems, therefore they cannot be replicated,although we use the same universal values as the starting pointto solve the problems, namely Islam. And the opposite also canhappen: we cannot simply mimic what the other Muslim na-tions do in the way of implementing Islam. (Madjid 2005: lxxiii)

Wahid and Madjid differ on how Islam should be implemented in dif-ferent contexts. For Wahid, the manifestation of Islam should considerlocal tradition or culture, but it should not neglect modernity. For Mad-jid, it is not Indonesian traditional culture that should be the strongestconsideration but modernity. It seems that Madjid follows the methodof his teacher, Fazlur Rahman, in his understanding and interpretationof Islam. Rahman is famous for his hermeneutical method, which hecalls the double movement theory:

[] from the concrete case treatments of the Quran taking the nec-essary and relevant social conditions of that time into account tothe general principles upon which the entire teaching converges []from this general level there must be a movement back to specificlegislation, taking into account the necessary and relevant social con-ditions now obtaining. (Rahman 1984: 20; italics in original)

This theory stresses two concepts: authenticity and modernity. Themeaning of authenticity is returning to the Quran and Sunna, whilethat of modernity is rationality. Adopting Rahmans concept, Madjidperceives that authentic Islam should become the first and foremostprinciple in implementing Islam in Indonesia, because it concerns thesources of validity, [] without this the claim of religious legitimacywould be impossible (Madjid 1994b: 341). And the manifestation ofthis authentic Islam should, following Rahmans second principle, bein accordance with the contemporary social conditions of Indonesia.


abandon long-held traditions. Therefore, when he talks about themeaning of the manifestation of Islam, he is, first and foremost, bring-ing Islam into harmony with existing traditions. Therefore, the con-cepts of urf, custom or adah (Ind. adat) and culture or heritage (tur-ath) are dominant in Wahids ideas about how Islam should be mani-fested in Indonesia. Wahids mode of thinking appears to be in linewith that of Muhammad Abid al-Jabir and Hasan H

anaf, both of

whom are very sceptical about the model of authenticity that attemptsto leap frog the rich tradition of classical Islam and return to the pres-tige of origins where pristine Islam can be found. For al-Jabir, thereason why Muslim society, particularly that of the Arab people, hasnot achieved any significant progress since al-Afghani and Abduhlaunched their nahd

a or renaissance projects is because it has been

trapped in the imagination of the past (al-Jabir 1999). For Hanaf,

meanwhile, instead of rehabilitating the Muslim condition, this Islamicauthenticity has every potential to isolate the Muslim world from thepresent, since it is all at once a kind of escapism, rejectionism and ro-manticism (Asmin 2002: 209). It is on the basis of this idea that Wa-hid tries to create his own authenticity, which is rooted in Indonesianculture and does not imitate the Middle Ages of Islam or Islam in theMiddle East.

Conclusion

There are two points of agreement between traditionalist and modern-ist Muslims regarding the construction of unity between Islam-nessand Indonesian-ness or Indonesian Islam. First, both camps acceptPancasila as the national ideology and nationalism as the ideal for In-donesian Muslims. Second, the manifestation of Islam in the Indone-sian context must be different, though not necessarily distinctive, fromits manifestation in other countries. However, the modernists and tra-ditionalists are in disagreement on two points. The traditionalist em-phasises the distinctiveness of Indonesian traditional culture as the ba-sis of the unity of Indonesian Islam, while the modernist tends to dis-regard this traditional culture. Consequently, they respond differentlyto international influences. The traditionalist tends to emphasise na-tional identity, whereas the modernist puts more weight on catchingup with achievements abroad, sometimes compromising traditionalheritage in doing so.


Defining Indonesian Islam - Traditionalist vs. Modernist Muslims

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