Defeating the Jihadists 2. Summary

8/14/2019 Defeating the Jihadists 2. Summary

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DEFEATING THE JIHADISTS:ABLUEPRINT FOR

ACTION

SUMMARY OF A FORTHCOMING CENTURY

FOUNDATION REPORT

Richard A. Clarke, Chairman of the Task Force

Glenn P. Aga, Roger W. Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, EricRosenbach, Blake W. Mobley, Steven Simon, William F.

Wechsler, Lee S. Wolosky

This digest offers highlights of the principal recommendations andarguments of the forthcoming report of a task force assembled and

chaired by Richard A. Clarke

OVERVIEW

Government spokespeople and the media often use the phrase al Qaeda or al Qaeda-related asshorthand for a larger and more complex array of jihadist terrorist groups. In fact, despite the U.S.invasion of Afghanistan and the arrests of jihadist leaders around the world, the jihadist networkremains strong, diverse, and may well be growing in complexity. These groups have conducted twice

as many attacks since September 11, 2001, as they did in the three years prior to that date. Jihadistleaders who have been captured or killed have been replaced. Although it is difficult to be precise,the strong consensus among experts is that the rank and file of jihadist membership has increasedsignificantly since 9/11.

Significantly, in evaluating U.S. progress in neutralizing the jihadist movement, we need toacknowledge that the war in Iraq has been deeply counter-productive to the greater effort. As a sinof commission, the Iraq war alienated crucial allies in the battle against jihadists, made friendlyMuslims into skeptics, made skeptics into radicals, and created a sanctuary for itinerant jihadistinsurgents. Iraq had no strong connection to the terror threat facing the United States and Saddamsremoval has done nothing to lessen the threat we face from al Qaeda and the jihadists. Perhaps themost vivid demonstration of this point is that a year and a half after Saddams removal, the terror

alert level in America remains unchanged and there is anticipation of a major al Qaeda attack withinthe next few months. The simple fact is that even if Iraq magically turned into a stable, securedemocracy today, the United States could suffer another 9/11-type attack tomorrow.

The Century Foundation conducts public policy research and analyses of economic, social, and foreign policy issues, including inequality, retirement securityelection reform, media studies, homeland security, and international affairs. The foundation produces books, reports, and other publications, convenes taskforces, and working groups and operates eight informational Web sites. With offices in New York City and Washington, D.C., The Century Foundation is

nonprofit and nonpartisan and was founded in 1919 by Edward A. Filene.

HEADQUARTERS:41EAST 70THSTREETNEWYORK,NY10021212.535.4441212.535.7534(FAX)[email protected]:1333HSTREET,NW10THFLOORWASHINGTON,D.C.20005202.387.0400202.483.9430(FAX)[email protected]


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As a sin of omission, the Iraq war diverted massive and much-needed resources from the fightagainst jihadists. The continued unrest in Iraq will further delay any U.S. effort to create a newinternational coalition to confront Syrias and Irans support for terrorist activities, a point not loston Damascus and Tehran. As a result, they may do everything in their power to further bog downU.S. efforts in Iraq. Ironically, the war in Iraq has contributed to creating the breathing room Syria

and Iran so desperately needed to avoid a robust international action response to their terroristactivities.

Despite these many challenges, the battle against the jihadists can and must be won. Theforthcoming Century Foundation Report, Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, endorses andbuilds on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, providing ten concrete actions that thenext presidential administration should pursue. The full report offers substantial detail on specificstrategies for implementing the following list of key recommendations:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Focus on Winning the Struggle of Ideas: The U.S. should work with its allies to erode

support for jihadists in the Islamic world by engaging in what the 9/11 Commission called thestruggle of ideas.

2. Invest in Education and Development in Islamic Nations: The U.S., the EuropeanUnion, and the international financial institutions must greatly expand financial and programmaticsupport for development, including support for human rights, education systems, and economicopportunities, especially for women.

3. Implement Tailored Strategies for Key Countries: Five countriesIran, Pakistan, SaudiArabia, Egypt, and Iraqare particularly critical. They require the tailored, detailed, proactive, andintegrated policies outlined in the full report.

4.Defuse Sources of Islamic Hatred for the United States:

Many supporters of thejihadists oppose the U.S. because of specific actions and policies, chief among them our support forIsrael and the occupation of Iraq. The U.S. can, without compromising its core interests, values, orsupport for allies take steps that would reduce our exposure.

5. Improve U.S. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Organization: In addition toimplementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the U.S. should facilitate non-career tracksin the FBI and CIA and separate the domestic intelligence activities of the FBI into a distinctorganization. The external oversight board should be independent, as recommended by the 9/11Commission, rather than the internal advisory group created by recent Executive Order.

6. Reinvigorate Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financing: The president should designate a

Special Assistant to the President for Combating Terrorist Financing at the NSC to lead U.S. effortson fighting terrorist financing. In addition, the U.S. should build a new framework for U.S.-Saudirelations and create a certification regime for terrorist financing.

7. Bolster Special Forces and Improve Their Coordination with IntelligenceCommunity: Special operations forces for counter-terrorism should be greatly expanded andenhanced to facilitate small unit operations. These units should be supported by a militaryorganization with a covert presence. Congress must make clear that it will accept necessarycasualties in counterterrorism operations.

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8. Accelerate Security Investments for Ports, Trains, and Chemical Plants: Funds shouldbe significantly increased, with priority given to vulnerabilities in our rail systems, chemical plants,and ports. Assistance to states and cities should be based upon a multi-year plan that is driven byrisk assessments and provides essential minimum capabilities to each.

9. Strengthen and Improve Oversight of Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Efforts: The

president should appoint a senior official to direct all U.S. nuclear non-proliferation and nuclearcounterterrorism efforts. A new initiative should provide countries with international guarantees ofnuclear energy supplies in return for agreements to terminate enrichment.

10. Improve U.S. Energy Security by Reducing Reliance on Middle East Oil: The UnitedStates should appropriate significant funds to subsidize a rapid shift to energy sources that do notrely upon oil and gas.

I.THE FIRST STEP:BETTERUNDERSTANDING THE JIHADIST THREAT

We argue that the threat is not terrorism, nor even all terrorist organizations, but rather jihadistterrorists, who seek to hijack Islam and use violence to replace existing governments with non-democratic theocracies. In most predominately Muslim nations, these affiliated jihadist groups seekto overthrow the existing government and replace it with a non-democratic regime which enforces aparticular strain of fundamentalist Islam. These jihadist groups view most Western governments assupportive of the existing systems in such countries as Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,Uzbekistan, and Indonesia, and thus as a barrier to the creation of a multinational theocraticgovernment.

In Islamic countries, the jihadists seek to expel non-Muslims and non-Muslim influences. In nationswhere Muslims are in the minority, jihadists seek to create sub-cultures that are insulated from thenations and societies in which they exist. Often they also use their presence in these nations as abase for propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and terrorism aimed at influencing the host

governments.

Targeting the West to Affect the Islamic World

The jihadist movement uses terrorist attacks on the West, particularly the United States, for a varietyof purposes:

to influence American and Western opinion to abandon the U.S. and European presence inIslamic nations and support of existing Islamic governments;

to demonstrate to fellow Muslims that the United States and its allies are not omnipotent andcan be humbled;

to raise financial donations and new recruits by demonstrating results; to influence potential adherents in Islamic nations to join them in changing governments in

those nations by showing, through successful attacks, that history is on their side.

To achieve these purposes, the jihadists conduct spectacular attacks, often involving targets with aniconic value, or those that will affect the target nations economy.

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There is disagreement as to whether jihadists are motivated chiefly by U.S. actions, such as theinvasion of Iraq or U.S. support to Israel, or by their desire to create theocratic governments.Jihadists successfully employ criticism of U.S. policies to widen their support. Whether or not theU.S. were in Iraq or Israel in the West Bank, however, the core jihadists would still seek tooverthrow existing regimes to create theocracies, and would target the U.S. because American

support of existing Islamic governments makes that goal harder to achieve.

Al Qaeda and More Much More

Governments and media often use the phrases al Qaeda or al Qaeda-related as shorthand forthe jihadist movement, a practice which blurs the nature of the current threat. Al Qaeda has alwaysbeen a relatively small terrorist group, with an inner core of several hundred and a cadre in the fewthousands. Its strength lay in the relationships it has fostered with other jihadist groups. Whateverthe truth about the strength of al Qaeda today, the network is clearly still vibrant and dangerous.

What al Qaeda did uniquely was to assist other jihadist groups with organization, training, andfinancing. In states where there were no effective jihadist groups, they helped to create them(Philippines); in states with pre-existing jihadist organizations, they provided the missing elements

needed to strengthen them (Uzbekistan). They provided logistical and financial support to freelanceterrorists, such as Khalid Sheik Muhammad, as well as to the Taliban regime in its struggles againstregional militias. In short, Al Qaeda wasprimus inter paresamong the jihadist groups.

With the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al Qaeda lost its nation-state sanctuary, as it hadearlier when ejected from Sudan in 1996. Significant U.S. ground forces were not introduced intothe al Qaeda base areas until seven weeks into the invasion, however, and the United States chose torely on its newly found Afghan allies to pursue the al Qaeda leadership into the Afghan-Pakistanborder area. As a result, most al Qaeda leadership and much of its paramilitary were able to escapeimmediate capture or death.

U.S. officials have repeatedly claimed that two thirds of the known al Qaeda managers have been

captured or killed. These statements refer to the current status of the individuals who werebelieved to be members of al Qaedas consultative council, or Shura, in the summer of 2001. Thestatements omit two important elements: (a) the two top leaders of al Qaeda remain at large formore than three years following the 9/11 attacks; (b) al Qaeda replaces managers expeditiouslyafter they are killed or incapacitated.

The success in eliminating al Qaeda leadership led many terrorism analysts to believe in 20032004that al Qaeda as a terrorist organization was largely out of business. Then several arrests in latesummer 2004 in Pakistan and England suggested a different picture: al Qaeda still exists and retainsa communications network that links its leaders with cells in Europe and elsewhere. The emergingpicture is of an organization with less experienced personnel, but one that retains the capability toplan large scale terrorist attacks, recruit personnel to carry them out, and obtain explosives and othernecessary logistics.

Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda was one of the few organizations in the jihadist network that conductedlarge and successful terrorist attacks or campaigns. In the three years following 9/11, other jihadistgroups successfully carried out twice as many major attacks as they and al Qaeda had in the threeyears prior to 9/11. The connections between various national groups are now strengthening. WereOsama bin Ladin to be captured or killed tomorrow, both al Qaeda and the global jihadist wouldcontinue to operate.

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Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Actionprovides comprehensive profiles of thevarious groups that compose the Hydra of international jihad, includingAbu SayyafGroup(ASG),Jemaah Islamiya(JI),Al-Ittihad al-Islami(AIAI), Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan(IAA), Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat(GSPC),Jamaat al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad(JTJ), Salafiya Jihadiya, and others.

The Concentric Circles of Jihadism

When thinking of the growth and evolution of jihadist threat, it may be helpful to think of therelationship among distinct groups as four concentric circles. In the inner circle are the terrorists ofthe al-Qaeda organization, whose population is probably in the hundreds. The second circlecontains active members of other jihadist groups, many of whom are willing to commit terrorist actspersonally and die in the process as suicide bombers; it probably contains several tens of thousandsof people. The third circleconsists of those who identify with the jihadist cause or aspects of itsideology, and who might, if called upon, facilitate logistical or financial activity. This circle, whichtends to support more Islamist governments, may contain tens of millions or perhaps as many as afew hundred million depending on the criteria. The outer circleis that of the Islamic world, thefollowers of the Prophet Muhammad both in majority Islamic countries and scattered throughoutthe world. They number over one billion people, most of them non-Arab.

Key to the overall management of the U.S. response to the jihadist threat is an understanding ofhow each U.S. action impacts each of the four concentric circles. It may well be, for example, thatto defeat a jihadist terrorist group (second circle), the United States might choose to support agovernment that is widely disliked by its people for its corruption and suppression of civil libertiesand democracy (such as Uzbekistan). Doing so, however, may be counter-productive to gainingsupport in the third and fourth circles within that country and undermine our longer term goals ofdiminishing the appeal of the jihadist ideology to those societies. Understanding those trade-offsand making them an explicit part of the policymaking process will be key to the overall long- termsuccess in suppressing the jihadists.

For details on the nature of the threat, see the complete report: Defeating the Jihadists: ABlueprint for Action.

II.RECOMMENDATIONS FORACTION

Beyond better understanding the nature of the terrorist threat, the next presidential administrationneeds to make some proactive policy changes in order to most effectively execute a war on terror.The following section summarizes the concrete action steps proposed in Defeating the Jihadists: ABlueprint for Action.

1. Engage in the Struggle of Ideas

The U.S. must erode support for the jihadists in the Islamic world through what the 9/11Commission called the struggle of ideas, but we cannot do it alone. Traditional propagandamechanismsinternational broadcasting, for exampleare a small part of the solution. U.S.activities in Iraq, as portrayed by the Islamic news media, make it difficult for the United Statesgovernment to successfully promote its values and ideas among the worlds Muslims. Themessenger is as important as the messageand right now any message delivered from the UnitedStates is greeted with suspicion in the Islamic world.

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Therefore, other countries, respected non-governmental organizations, and individual Islamicleaders must take the lead in appealing to Muslims to denounce intolerance and terrorist violencecommitted in the name of Islam. These efforts need to celebrate our common values in order toovercome misunderstandings and neutralize terrorist propaganda. The role of the U.S. governmentshould be to stimulate these groups and then wait backstage.

As part of this struggle of ideas, the United States and Europe must demonstrably welcome Islam asa part of their cultures. On this front, the European Union should have two priorities: fighting anti-Islamic discrimination in its member countries and initiating discussions on Turkeys accession tothe European Union. Both the European Union and the United States must engage in a concertedprogram to fight religious intolerance against Islam. Moreover, the United States could do a betterjob promoting interventions that have aided Muslims, such as the military campaigns andsubsequent humanitarian efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

2. Invest in Education and Development in Islamic Nations

Poor, disenfranchised people form one base of support for jihadists in some Muslim countries. Byimproving livelihoods and connecting these populations to the rest of the world through trade and

education, we rob the extremists of some of their most likely supporters.

The next administration should greatly expand its development assistance to Afghanistan, Jordan,Morocco, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen and other low-income Muslim allies in the war on terror.These efforts should be pursued in close cooperation with the European Union and theInternational Financial Institutions, and must support human rights efforts and strengtheneducational systems and economic opportunities, especially for women.

U.S. assistance to friendly governments is an important tool, particularly when that assistance isconditioned upon government reform. The long-term interests of the United States will best beserved by actively influencing such governments to eliminate the causes for popular unrest,particularly when they involve civil liberties infringements and human rights abuses. Assistance can

be aimed either at getting the government to cease activities that create jihadist support (such asindiscriminate police crackdowns and widespread use of torture) or at enabling the friendlygovernment to provide services that gain them increased popular support (such as offering publicschools that serve students better than the jihadist madrassas.)

The U.S. should design and implement strategies of assistance on a country-specific basis topersuade and facilitate parties in these nations to engage in rapid but non-revolutionary change,increase participation in governance, expand economic opportunity, strengthen public education,and encourage democratic and civil libertarian forces.

3. Implement Tailored Strategies for Key Countries

The U.S. must develop country-specific strategies that help policymakers think more systematicallyabout the trade-offs and consequences associated with targeting particular circles within theconcentric circles framework. In particular, the U.S. needs coherent strategies for five criticalnations that have been the target of jihadists. Those nations are Egypt (with the worlds largest Arabpopulation), Saudi Arabia (with the largest oil reserves), Pakistan (a non-Arab Islamic nation withnuclear weapons), Iran (a non-Arab Islamic nation which supports terrorism and is actively seekingnuclear capability), and Iraq, which at the moment is the most volatile of all these countries.

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Although near-term radical changes in the governments of most of these nations is not the mostprobable scenario, our lack of understanding of political, religious, and socio-economicundercurrents in these nations prevents us from ruling out surprise shifts. The governance andeconomic systems in all of these nations are inherently unviable over the near-to-long term.

Our experience in the Shahs Iran illustrates this shortcoming well. In 1979, the United States was

surprised by the extent of the opposition to the Pahlavi government. Our surprise stemmed in partfrom our lack of independent sources of intelligence and our reliance upon regime reports of itsown stability. Although the U.S. government pledged after the fall of the Shah not to be put in asimilar situation in the future, we still lack adequate independent sources of information on thestability of most of these key countries.

In Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, we outline the specific challenges facedby each regime. Each regime will require a different set of tactics, and U.S. policymakerswill need both better independent sources of information and better mechanisms to applydifferent tools to different challenges.

4. Defuse Sources of Islamic Hatred for the United StatesAs we discuss above, jihadist terrorists oppose the United States not for what it believes or does, butbecause they see America as a barrier to their creation of theocratic nation-states, known ascaliphates. Many supporters of the jihadists, however, are persuaded to support the terroristsbecause of specific U.S. actions and policies, especially Americas support for Israel and occupationof Iraq.

In the March 2003 Telhami/Zogby poll, respondents were asked whether their attitudes toward theUnited States are based more on your values as an Arab or on American foreign policy in the MiddleEast? In each survey country, a plurality of respondents indicated that their opinion was influencedmore by foreign policy considerations. In short, these results confirm that, much like the Americanpublic, Arabs care mostly about facts on the ground.

Large majorities of those living in the Middle East and North Africa evaluate U.S. foreign policy asout of step with their own world-view. On no issue is the divide greater than with respect to theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. Not surprisingly, the Pew Center recently found that 96 percent ofPalestinians, 94 percent of Moroccans, 77 percent of Kuwaitis, 99 percent of Jordanians, and 90percent of Lebanese believe that U.S. policies in the Middle East favor Israel too much. Giventhe importance of this issue in the Arab world, there is little doubt that these sentiments fuel muchof the animosity felt by Arabs toward the U.S.

While our foreign policy should never be dictated by foreign publics, the effect on public opinion ofspecific policiesremember the importance of the third and fourth concentric circles should be aconsideration in the formulation and implementation of policy. To that end, the United States

should not alter its support of Israel, but should seek to revive the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process.The United States should not withdraw from Iraq before indigenous security forces are in place, butshould cease U.S. military operations against urban areas, transfer rebuilding activities to Iraqientities, and reduce U.S. goals in Iraq so that a withdrawal can be achieved at an early date.

Solutions that focus exclusively on public diplomacy are based on the faulty premise that the carefulmanagement of perception will allow the U.S. to improve its image abroad while essentiallybracketing foreign policy. This strategy may help at the margins, winning over a few fence-sittersand agnostics, but is unlikely to turn the tide in any meaningful way. Ultimately, public diplomacy

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efforts are secondary to Americas performance in Iraq, its role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, and the character of its relationships with governments in the region.

Simply put, U.S. action abroad sets the context for dialogue; rhetoric vis--visthe Middle Eastremains a distant second to action, whether it be in the form of aid distribution, observableinterventions, or U.N. votes.

Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Actiondiscusses how the U.S. can, withoutcompromising its core interests or values, change its policies in the Middle East to reduceits exposure to Islamic resentment.

5. Improve U.S. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Organization

Good information is the key to defeating jihadist terrorists, and as the 9/11 Commission concluded,chronic intelligence failures have hindered our efforts to protect the American homeland and weedout dangerous jihadists in their havens abroad. To address this institutional shortcoming, the 9/11Commission offered broad and concrete suggestions for intelligence reform. In our report, weanalyze and expand on their important contribution. Our main points are summarized below.

Restructuring: 9/11 Commission recommendations, and the subsequent detailed proposal bySenate Intelligence Committee Chair Pat Roberts (R-KS), form a basis for reform of the U.S.Intelligence Community to better counter jihadist terrorism. The proposals are workable,justified, and essential to intelligence reform. None of them would diminish the ability ofintelligence agencies to support the needs of the war fighter in peacetime or during conflicts.

CIA: Many of the CIAs failures to deal with al Qaeda in the 1990s stemmed from aninstitutional reluctance to engage in operations which risked personnel or the reputation of theagency. Both the President and the Congressional oversight committees must make clear theirdesire that the intelligence agencies be less risk-averse, and more willing to accept failures andcasualties.

NOCs: Reduce reliance on agents posing as diplomats by building a cadre of not officialcover (NOC) agents, including limited-term contract NOC agents.

FBI: Create a new agency within the bureau, a completely different kind of organization withits own budget, personnel and procurement systems, and a different bureaucratic culture.Within the new unit, analysts must be given priority over agents, and prevention over arrests.The new unit must develop sources and engage in agent penetrations of potential threat groups,as the FBI has done in the past with the Cosa Nostra and the Ku Klux Klan. The agencywithin the bureau must be supported by police intelligence units in major metropolitan areas.These intelligence units should, however, be subject to oversight by an office within the U.S.Department of Justice in order to avoid civil liberties abuses. Similarly, the 9/11 Commissionsrecommendation of an external and independent civil liberties oversight board should beadopted.

6. Reinvigorate Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financing

As long as jihadist groups maintain a lucrative financial network, they remain a lethal threat to theUnited States. Unfortunately, three years after 9/11, the U.S. government is still not organizedproperly to combat terrorist financing at home or abroad. In Combating the Jihadists: A Blueprint forAction, we discuss several specific steps that would help remedy this.

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Designate a Special Assistant to the President to Combat Terrorist Financing: For severalyears after 9/11, the General Counsel of the Treasury Department led the Bush administrationsefforts in cracking down on terrorist financing. Even the most competent Treasury GeneralCounsel is poorly equipped, from an institutional standpoint, to lead such important work.

The next president should designate a Special Assistant to the President for Combating TerroristFinancing at the National Security Council with the specific mandate to lead U.S. efforts onterrorist financing issues. Such an official would direct, coordinate, and reaffirm the domesticand international policies of the United States on a daily basis and with the personal authority ofthe president of the United States.

Today we do not today have a clear sense of how financial and human resources are allocated.Appointing a coordinator would help officials make fully informed strategic decisions aboutwhether functions are duplicative or resource allocations are optimal. Moreover, such adesignation will go a long way toward putting issues regarding terrorist financing front andcenter in every bilateral diplomatic discussion with every frontline state in the fight againstterrorismat every level of the bilateral relationship, including, on a consistent basis, the

highest.

Reassess U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia:According to numerous reports, including that ofthe 9/11 Commission, Saudi Arabia is at the center of terrorist financing activities. But aspreparations for the war on Iraq took center stage in the administration, the heat was turneddown on Saudi Arabia, and an implicit arrangement allowed the U.S. to continue to imposeblocking actions only in the context of a joint designation with Saudi Arabia.

Since the May 2003 terrorist attacks, Saudi officials have finally started to address the mindsetthat enables and condones acts of terrorism, and have made steps toward reform in theeducation, legal, and regulatory regimes. But Saudi Arabia has not effectively implemented itsnew laws and regulations, a step that is just as important. Additionally, Saudi enforcement

actions directed against al Qaeda have largely avoided financiers. The Bush administrationremains unusually and unconstructively reluctant to criticize Saudi Arabia on this subject, andthe President even remained silent when the Saudi Crown Prince publicly announced that Israel,not al Qaeda, was responsible for the bombings in his country.

U.S. policymakers should seek to build a new framework for U.S.-Saudi relations that, in thewords of the 9/11 Commission, allows the two nations to build a relationship that politicalleaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defenda relationship about more than oil. . . . Itshould include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into acommitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.

Institute a Certification Regime on Terrorist Financing: Congress should enact, and thenew president should support, an interagency, Treasury-led certification regime on terroristfinancing. Certification regimes have the ability to quickly galvanize action consistent with U.S.interests, and require official findings of fact that can compel sustained U.S. attention toimportant issues. Legislation requiring the executive branch to submit to Congress an annualwritten certification (classified if necessary) detailing the steps that foreign nations have taken tocooperate in efforts to combat terrorist financing would be valuable.

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7. Improve U.S. Military Organization

While the United States military performed brilliantly in prosecuting military operations inOperations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, we are unlikely to see another large-scale militaryoperation in the name of counter-terrorism for the foreseeable future. The continued problems inIraq, and force presence requirements there, will severely hinder the U.S. ability to conduct major

operations against Iran or other state sponsors of terrorism.

As a result, emphasis will shift to operations against non-state targets, such as terrorist leadershiptargets and terrorist training camps, in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Thatpotentially means operations in nations such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen, the Philippines,Indonesia, as well as parts of Africa. Such missions will place a premium on special operationsforces (SOF) that are agile, independent and fully mission-capable. To do so will require severalactions:

Provide Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with necessary resources to become alead player in military counter-terrorism operations. While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld andDeputy Secretary Wolfowitz have extolled the performance of Special Operations Forces (SOF),

they have not backed up their words with appropriate resource support. SOCOM remainsunderstaffed and insufficiently funded.

Sustain and expand cooperation between CIA and SOF in prosecuting terrorism targets.More effective integration of SOF and the CIA Clandestine Service will be critical for success inboth openly hostile and more permissive environments.

Provide SOF with their own cadre of covert operatives so that the military does not have torely on CIAs covert operatives to support military operations. Even though strongerCIA/DoD cooperation is necessary, SOF has been too dependent on the CIAs bureaucracy forsupport. This could be achieved through reconstitution of the military Non-Official Cover(NOC) program.

Provide SOCOM with a dedicated Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)capabilityfor both reconnaissance and strike missions, and sufficient infrastructure so the UAV can bedeployed globally. One of the major successes of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns was theuse of the Predator, which provided outstanding real-time intelligence to military forces. Thiscapability should be a cornerstone of future special operations counterterrorism missions.

8. Accelerate Investments in Securing Ports, Trains, and Chemical Plants

Three years after the 9/11 attacks, some critical infrastructures in the United States remain asvulnerable as they were September 10, 2001. Chief among those vulnerable systems are rails (bothfreight and passenger), ports and shipping containers, and chemical plants. In the major

metropolitan areas, emergency services personnel (police, fire, medical) continue to lack minimumessential equipment, training, staff, plans, and technologies. Moreover, the current Federalassistance program does not identify minimum essential capabilities or guarantee that they will everbe achieved. Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Actionhighlights some of our greatest weaknessesand offers pragmatic policy responses for each. This section summarizes some of theserecommendations:

Reduce Seaport Vulnerabilities: The U.S. government has taken numerous steps since the9/11 attacks to improve container and port security. But the new mandate has not come with

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the resources required to meet it. Since 9/11 Washington has provided only $516 million dollarstowards the $5.6 billion the Coast Guard estimates U.S. ports need to make them minimallysecure. In the FY2005 budget, the White House asked for just $50 million more.

Americas borders represent only a territorial line where our sovereign jurisdiction begins, butthe threat to container security begins much farther back. Virtually all containers coming into

the United States pass through a few foreign seaports. In fact, approximately 70 percent of theeight million containers that arrived in U.S. ports in 2002 originated from or moved throughfour overseas terminal operators. These operators are the second-to-last line of defense andshould ensure that only secure boxes are loaded on ships that cross the Atlantic and PacificOceans.

Guaranteeing that a container has not been tampered with will become much easier if we canensure that the container was loaded in a secure facility at its point of origin. Secure facilitiesshould have loading docks with safeguards to prevent unauthorized entry, as well as digitalcameras with time signatures to record container interiors during loading. Containers shouldhave additional light, temperature, and pressure sensors to detect unauthorized intrusion, and

internal sensors to detect gamma or neutron emissions associated with WMDs. GPStechnologies should also be installed to track whether the truck or ship strayed from its route.Use of these new technologies and procedures to check and double-check containers wouldcreate a deterrent against terrorists shipping a nuclear weapon in a container.

The cost for all this would be reasonable. Assuming that the average container is used for tenyears, the initial cost of installing sensor technology into the box would add about $5 to the priceof each shipment, and the latest radiation detection portals and container scanning equipmentunits cost about $1 million each. Some of the cost of security can be passed on to the privatesector by providing appropriate incentives; one initiative could be establishing green lanes inseaports, similar to the E-Z Pass toll collection system, which would providing the benefit ofexpedited travel to shippers who adopt the new security technologies.

Secure Our Trains:The Madrid commuter train attacks that killed 191 people on March 11,2004, exposed the extreme vulnerability of our public transportation systems. Since the attacksthe U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been testing out more rigoroussecurity measures on some commuter trains, including bomb screening machines, random bagchecks, and patrols with bomb sniffing dogs. These efforts are sporadic, however, and the U.S.government has not allocated necessary funding for sustained and effective security measures.The $155 million appropriated by Congress for this effort is about 1% of the fundingappropriated for aviation security, though 16 times as many people travel by publictransportation every day than by air. The next administration has the opportunity to play acritical role in this process by ensuring the passage of a block grant program dedicated toenhancing transit system security, focusing in particular on subways, commuter trains, andAmtrak railways.

Secure Chemical Facilities:America is at risk of chemical attacks on civilian populations.Today, there are 123 chemical plants in this nation that, if attacked, could threaten up to onemillion people each. Yet there is no requirement to secure these plants. A GovernmentAccounting Office (GAO) report released in March 2003 noted that even though U.S. chemicalfacilities were attractive targets for terrorists, the ability of any facility to respond to an attackwas unknown. GAO found that the chemical industry was not required by law to assessvulnerabilities or take action to secure its facilities, and that the federal government has not

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comprehensively assessed the chemical industrys vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. Since theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) currently has no ability to force security measures onthe industry, citizen safety is ultimately dependent on the willingness of plant owners andmanagers to work with DHS officials and spend the money and time.

Fund our Emergency Responders: Local and state emergency responders are a vitalcomponent of Americas front line, and play a central role in managing the immediate responseto a terrorist attack. Their efforts in the initial minutes following an attack will determinewhether lives are saved and how quickly order is restored. Unfortunately, Americas emergencyresponders are under funded and, as a result, unprepared for this duty.

9. Strengthen and Improve Oversight of Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Efforts

All the essential elements of a nuclear terrorist attack loom clearly before us. Numerous terroristgroups, from Chechen rebels to al Qaeda operatives, have both the motivation and capacity toacquire nuclear weapons. In the former Soviet Union, nuclear material and weapons are poorlysecured, and Pakistan and North Korea have already established their willingness to supply nucleartechnology for the right price. At present, U.S. ability to prevent, detect or respond to threatened or

actual nuclear terrorism is low. We have various tools at our disposal in fighting nuclear terrorism,and suggest several initiatives:

Improve Coordination and Oversight: Graham Allison writes that Today, if the presidentasked at a Cabinet meeting who is responsible for preventing nuclear terrorism, six or eighthands in the room might go up, or none at all. A nuclear terrorism czar would help establishpolicies, priorities, and objectives for combating WMD proliferation, as well as setting budgets,and developing guidelines for cooperation among the various Federal agencies and departmentsresponsible for combating WMD proliferation. Leaders in the field, including academic expertslike Allison and senators such as Lugar and Nunn, have made proposals in this direction, as hasthe Deutch Commission, but while the idea has been much discussed, very little work has been

done on how to implement it.

On the Homefront: Homeland preparedness represents the last line of defense ifnonproliferation and counter proliferation fails. Currently, the resources devoted to preventingand responding to nuclear terrorism are extremely low. The perception of an extremely lowreturn on investment complicates the decision of how to allocate resources to preparedness,prevention, and detection.

Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Actiondiscusses how a new National Strategy toCombat WMD should dictate an international security environment and emphasize theneed for counter-proliferation initiatives to defuse potential weapons and deter potentialstate-sponsors of nuclear terrorism.

10. Improve U.S. Energy Security by Reducing Reliance on Middle East Oil

In a period of great volatility and uncertainty in world energy markets, the term security is notalways easily understood. When speaking about national security in general, George Kennan offeredperhaps the definition that best applies to energy security policy today: the continued ability of thiscountry to pursue its internal life without serious interference.

The greater our dependence on foreign oil, the greater we expose ourselves to the will of othernations and terrorists. World events in 2004, including violence in Iraq, terrorist attacks in Saudi

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Arabia and political maneuvering in Russia, all strongly affected the price of oil and, moreimportantly, demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States. As oil demand in North Americaand China continues to climb, we must assess the future stability of the United States oil supply.

Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Actiondetails the specific problems that U.S. oildependence poses vis a visSaudi Arabia and Russia, and suggests action to reduce our

vulnerabilities.

CONCLUSION

The completion of the presidential campaign, the inauguration of a new administration, and theconvening of a new Congress present an opportunity to fundamentally rethink how we have beenfighting against the jihadists. Despite the lack of a major terrorist attack within our borders since2001, evidence is abundant that the ranks of the jihadists have grown significantly. They have beenconducting far more attacks worldwide than before 2001a clear warning sign that our policies arenot working and may even be counterproductive in some cases.

The plan of action laid out in Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Actionis ambitious, complex, andexpensive. But the challenge posed by the jihadists fundamentally threatens our nation and the worldorder, and seems sure to be with us for more than a generation. During World War II and the ColdWar, the United States and its allies triumphed over comparably grave threats through fortitude,ingenuity, and substantial sacrifice. We will triumph again over the jihadists. But to do so will requirea much greater demonstration of our national strengths than we have put forward to date.

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THE TASKFORCE

Richard A. Clarke is an on-air consultant for ABC News and previously served the last threepresidents as special assistant to the president for global affairs, national coordinator for security andcounterterrorism, and special advisor to the president for cyber security. Prior to his White House

years, Clarke served for 19 years in the Pentagon, the intelligence community, and State Department.During the Reagan administration, he was deputy assistant secretary of state for intelligence. Duringthe George H. W. Bush administration, he was assistant secretary of state for political-military affairsand coordinated diplomatic efforts to support the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the subsequent securityarrangements.

Glenn P. Aga is president and co-founder of IC Associates, LLC, advising U.S. government andcorporate clients on a wide range of security issues and technologies. He is a former U.S. Air Forceintelligence officer with overseas crisis experience in the Middle East, Africa, and Balkans. He alsoserved in the Clinton White House, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of the Secretaryof Defense, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Functionally, he hassupported and applied technology for counter-terrorism operations, U.N. peacekeeping operations,

and served as an analyst on global chemical and biological weapons capabilities.

Roger W. Cressey is president of Good Harbor, advising clients on homeland security, cyber-security and counterterrorism issues. He is currently an on-air counterterrorism analyst for NBCNews. Previously, he served as director for transnational threats on the National Security Councilstaff, where he was responsible for coordination and implementation of US counterterrorism policy.During this period, he managed the U.S. governments response to the Millennium terror alert, theUSS Coleattack, and the September 11 attacks. Prior to his White House service, he served in theDepartment of Defense, including as deputy director for war plans. From 1991 to 1995, he served inthe Department of State working on Middle East security issues. He has also served overseas withthe U.S. Embassy in Israel and with United Nations peacekeeping missions in Somalia and the

former Yugoslavia. While in the former Yugoslavia, he was part of a United Nations team thatplanned the successful capture of the first individual indicted for war crimes in Croatia.

Stephen E. Flynn is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at theCouncil on Foreign Relations. He is a retired U.S. Coast Guard commander and foremost expert onhomeland security and border control. Dr. Flynn recently served as Director and principal authorfor the task force report "America: Still Unprepared? Still in Danger," co-chaired by former SenatorsGary Hart and Warren Rudman. He has written extensively on security issues, including his recentbook,America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism.

Blake W. Mobley is a doctoral candidate specializing in counterterrorism and international relationsat Georgetown University.

Eric Rosenbach is a national security consultant for the Belfer Center for Science and InternationalAffairs at Harvard University. He previously worked as the Chief Security Officer for the largestinternet service provider in Europe, and served four years as a military intelligence officersupporting operations in the Balkans. He is a former Fulbright Scholar who studied law atGeorgetown and public policy at Harvard.

Steven Simon specializes in Middle Eastern politics at the RAND Corporation. Previously, heserved in London for three years as assistant director of the International Institute for StrategicStudies and Carol Deane Senior Fellow in U.S. Security Studies. He came to the IISS in November

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1999 from the National Security Council staff at the White House, where he served for over fiveyears as director for global issues and senior director for transnational threats. During this period hehad coordination responsibilities for Near Eastern and South Asian security policy andcounterterrorism policy and operations He is the coauthor ofThe Age of Sacred Terror(RandomHouse: 2002), which won the Council on Foreign Relations 2004 Arthur Ross Award and coeditor

ofIraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change(Oxford University Press/IISS2003).

William F. Wechsler was director for transnational threats on the U.S. National Security Councilduring the Clinton administration. He headed a commission that looked into the sources of Osamabin Ladens money.

Lee S. Wolosky is Of Counsel at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP and adjunct professor ininternational affairs at Columbia University. He served as director for transnational threats on theNational Security Council under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. His responsibilitiesincluded coordinating White House policy formulation, program oversight, and new initiativesrelated to international crime, including illicit finance affecting national security.

This report was commissioned by The Century Foundation as part of its major Homeland Security Project cochairedby former Governors Thomas Kean and Richard Celeste and supported in part by the John S. and James L. KnightFoundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and the John D. andCatherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The task force was assembled and chaired by Richard A. Clarke. Moreinformation on this project can be found atwww.homelandsec.orgor the foundation's websitewww.tcf.org.

The opinions expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and members of the task force. Nothing writtenhere is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Century Foundation or any supporting organizations,or as an attempt by them to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

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