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Chapter 4

1. In Bahrain, the ascension of Shaykh Hamad bin Isa al Khalifah in 1999

marked the fourth occasion on which the eldest son succeeded his father asemir. Similarly, in Qatar, Shaykh Khalifah al Thani seized power by deposinghis cousin in 1972. Khalifah was followed by his son in June 1995, who con-sequently named his own son, Jasim, as heir apparent. Abu Dhabi also holds tothe pattern. As Sultan Qabus bin Said has no offspring, Oman remains theonly Gulf state without an heir apparent. See, e.g., J. E. Peterson, Successionin the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Washington Quarterly 24(4)(August 2001): 17386.

2. The notion of a military-mullah alliance is taken from the International

Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, ICG Asia Report No.49, March 20, 2003.3. International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the

Military, ICG Asia Report No. 36, July 29, 2002: 2021.4. Ibid., 20.

Chapter 5

1. Shibley Telhami, A View from the Arab World: A Survey in FiveCountries, Brookings Institution, March 13, 2003.

2. Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Pew Global AttitudesProject: Wave 2 Update Survey (2003) (April/May 2003).

3. Marc Lynch, Taking Arabs Seriously, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2003).

4. Kim Cragin et al., Strategic Influence Policy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,forthcoming 2004), p. 6.

5. Edward Djerejian et al., Changing Minds Winning Peace: A NewStrategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,October 1, 2003.

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6. Cragin, Strategic Influence Policy.7. For example, the promotion of human rights in the context of the prison-

er abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib.8. President Bush acknowledged as much in a November 2003 speech, not-

ing that we must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Yournation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerateoppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlookthe faults of local elites, available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html.

9. CNN/USA Today /Gallup, Nationwide Poll of Iraq: Final Topline,March 22April 9, 2004.10. BBC, Iraqi Media Test New Environment, June 29, 2004.11. In November 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council temporarily banned al-

Arabiya from broadcasting in Iraq and seized its equipment in Baghdad. InAugust 2004, the Iraqi government announced it would shut down al-JazeerasBaghdad bureau for thirty days.12. Adapted from a table appearing in GAO, U.S. International Broad-

casting: Challenges Facing the Broadcasting Board of Governors, GAO-04-711T, April 29, 2004.13. Broadcasting Board of Governors, Alhurra and Radio Sawa: Progress

Report, April 2004 data compiled by ACNielsen in April 2004 for all coun-tries excluding Qatar. Qatar data were compiled in a similar telephone surveyconducted in August 2003. The survey group was limited to adults fifteen yearsor older. The sample size was 5,737 adults. Weekly listeners refers to thosewho listened to Radio Sawa at least once in the previous week. Reliabilityrefers to those who agreed that Radio Sawas news was very or somewhat reli-able.14. Ibid.15. Alan Sipress, For Many Iraqis, U.S.-Backed TV Echoes the Voice of Its

Sponsor; Station Staffers Acknowledge Their Reluctance to Criticize,Washington Post,January 8, 2004.16. Terrestrial transmission allows non-satellite ready households in Iraq to

view al-Hurra via Channel 12 in Baghdad and Channel 3 in Basra; BBC,Iraq/USA: Survey of U.S.-funded al-Hurra TVs Audience, July 21, 2004.17. GAO, U.S. International Broadcasting: Challenges Facing the

Broadcasting Board of Governors, GAO-04-711T, April 29, 2004, p. 9.18. Broadcasting Board of Governors, Alhurra and Radio Sawa: Progress

Report, April 2004.

19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Pew Global Attitudes

Project.

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