Declassified CIA file - Review of KIBITZ-15 net (19 January 1953)

7/28/2019 Declassified CIA file - Review of KIBITZ-15 net (19 January 1953)

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VIA: DISPA , NO. SPECIFY AlFt OR SEA POOCH) Secret-Security InformatioCLASSIFICATIONTO :FROM

Chief of Mission, FrankSurt DATE: 19 January 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL-SPECIFIC-

OPERAT.TOMALReview of KIBITZ-15 Net

I. GENERALIn accordance with your request, a review of the operations of theKIBITZ-15 net is herewith forwarded for your consideration. T he reviewwas based on a thorough study of available files, answers to written

questions which were submitted by the reviewer to both the case officersand the chief agent, special reports prepared by the chief agent forthe review, and a thorouji interrogation of the chief. agent and hisdeputy by a polygraph examiner. The special written reports and writtenanswers to questions were considered necessary as both the German andEnglish files are inadequate--detailed contact reports do not exist. The'reviewer briefed the polygraph examiner in detail and provided him witha set of written questions for the interview with the chief agent. Thesix-hour interrogation of KIBITZ-15 by the examiner was monitored by thereviewer at the time of the interrogation.

II. EXTENT AND PURPOSE OF PROJECTa. The KIBITZ-15 operation encompasses the development and establish-ment in Western Germany of a stay-behind organization consisting oftrained 11/T operators, agents, cut-outs, and informants who could beactivated in the event of hostilities. The component parts of the

are to


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organization are to consist of separate teams including a V/T

Secret - Security Information 2 -posal of the Americans. After several meetings, c: 1 suggested toKIBITZ ,a5 the establishment of a stay-behind organization. KIBITZ-15did not like this idea in the beginning, and made it quite clearfrom the start that he and his friends were not suited for agent-type activities and that there will never be an organized or effed-tive resistance movement in Germany. He requested guarantees thathe would always be free to take his place in a West German army orGerman contingents of the European army and suggested that we use ourinfluence to get him an appropriate position in the German army as areward for his services. He finally reluctantly agreed to set upVIT teams as suggested by us with the Understanding that he wouldbe in charge of organizing and controlling the net; he agreed to workwith us but not for us.

c, was the case officer for this project from An c .r-1950. until March, 1952, when the prolect was turned over to. In December, 1952, .i:1, was hospitalized and at thepresent time it:lis the case officer.

d. EIBITZ-15 contacted a pproximately five hundred persons in WesternGermany to recruit members for his net. Of these five hundred, onehundred twenty-five were asked to participate in the stay-behindorganization. These one hundred twenty-five were asked to take partin an organization which is ready to defend Western culture againstBelshevism. They were further told that this organization is led andtrained by German officers who work closely with American authori-ties. The recruits were informed that they =old receive trainingand would be expected to report on certain activities when and ifGermany should be overrun by the Soviets.

e. Twelve two-man teams and one singleton team have now been set up. Allteams have one W/T operator trained by KUBARK communications personnel.The training of only two of the WIT operators has been completed.


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Secret- Security information

a definite security risk. He has submitted handwriting samples of atleast nine members of the net to the Graphological Institute inHeidelberg, Kaiserstrasse 1. Names and birthdates of at least fivemembers of the net were submitted to the two investigating bureaus,Bilrgel and S chimmelpheng, respectively.

f. During the interrogation, 1IBITZ-15 stated that he carries the namesof all members of his net with him in his typewriter. The securityimplication of this action needs little amplification.

g. KIBITZ-15 has drawn up lengthy plans containing detailed instructionson stay-behind activities. These plans are to be :iiven to theindivi-dual teams upon activation after the start of hostilities. T heseplans were shown to a few of the members of the net but according toKIBITZ-15 all cO pies are either in his own possession or in the safewhich is used by both KI2ITZ-15 and our staff officers in the Heidelbergoffice. These plans were mimeographed a year and a half ago and it isimpossible to establish at this time exactly how many copies wereproduced. KIBITZ-15 did admit during the interrogation that he hadsome in his house which, of course, is a serious security risk.

h. It appears highly likely that two of the so-called "63" active agentswho have been recruited but not trained are also part of the ZIPPERfield organization. (N114734)i. KIBITZ-15 is a salesman for a tractor company and part owner in afarm machinery firm and a general sales store. Although it is not

believed that any of these positions are very remunerative, they appearto be adequate as personal cover when taken together with the factthat he is quite active in veterans affairs. Accordi ng to him, therehave-been no difficulties in connection with his cover and he believesthat it is acce pte d by most veterans with whom he is associated andby the German government. KIBITZ-15 states that he has never informedanybody in the German government about the existence of the organiza-


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--Samet-Securityinformetion_ 5 _

figurines. KIBITZ-15 agrees that this cover will have to be changed.k. During the interrogation and in answer to a written question, KIBITZ-15has admitted that he discussed his aim of "protecting Europe" with a

member of German industry in the Spring of 1951. KIBITZ-15 refusesto give the name of the person with whom he discussed the plans.KIBITZ-15 states that the discussion was in general terms and was forthe purpose of soliciting sup port and fin4ng out what responsibleGermans thought of his ideas. According to KIBITZ-15, nobody wastold that he receives American su pport. The contact -with German indus-try was su pp osedly dropped shortly after the initial meeting with theinformation that KIBITZ-15 felt that his plans were too Cumbersomeand could not be realized.

1. KIBITZ-15 appears to have very little understanding of the n ecessityof a securely compartmentalized organization. He has unnecessarilyclose personal ties with some members of the organization and thereis a strong possibility that he tried to solicit our financial supportfor some members of the net for strictly personal reasons.

m. In 1951, the case officer and the chief agent decided to set up anotional cover organization. This notional organiiation was supposedto be a news service which was called "Cosmopress". Stationery giv-ing the name Cosmopress was printed. The location of this agency .was the Heidelberg safe house at Rohrbacherstrasse 56. In addition,Cosmopress had a post office box in Stuttgart. NO activities werecarried out to strengthen this cover and to give the appearance thatCosmopress was in fact a news service. KIBITZ-15 states that hiscover organization never had any contact with the bonafide news servicethat carries the some name and operates in West Germany. Communica-tions with four agents; namely, 177, 182, 191 and 171 were carried outon Cosmopress stationery. Correspondence with the investigatingbureaus was also carried out on behalf Of Cosmopiess. A Volkswagenpurchased by us was legally registered by KIB/TZ-150 as a Cosmopress,


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- 7 -at this time as it helps to promote ideas and plans in which, hepersonally believes. Although he is definitely anti-Communst,he presents somewhat of a security risk because of this oro-nounced nationalism.

,..zrit-Security Information

(2) Since the beginning of 1952, K13ITZ-15 j has been worried consider-able about his own personal status. From the available agendaof meetings between case officers and the chief agent, it wouldappear that this subject was taken up at almost every meetingsince April, 1952. Unfortunately, it was impossible to recon-struct just exactly what was discussed because of the absenceof detailed contact reports. KIBITZ-151was thoroughly questionedon this point in the course of the interview. KlBITZ-15Grequestsdefinite answers to the following three points:A. Establishment of a platform which will define the legal posi-

tion of his organization vis a vis Bonn, NATO and theEuropean army,B. Arrangements between U.S. authorities and the Bonn government

to legalize the services of KIBITZ-15,C. Formulation of a definite mission for the organization dur-ing peace time and in the event of war.KIBITZ-15 exPlained in great detail that as a former Germansoldier he is absolutely unwilling to undertake any activitieswhich might be contrary to German law. (However, he does not worry about the weapons which he possesses.) He does not feelthat his present activities are illegal and arrives at this conclu-sion with the peculiar reasoning that the German government is not permitted activities of the type in which he is engaged and,therefore, they also can not prohibit them. In the same vein,he explains that he is in general opposed to Partisan activities


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Secret- Secu rity Information8

be continued during his assignment.In a short yearly report, 1IBITZ-15 points out that during thelast year, his work has 7"- , -..tAd com p letely and + 3 1 Atnothing hasbeen accomp lished sinceg-1 took over froml: in March,1952. The main reason for this stagnation is our inability toclear up the status question which was explained ab ove. Inaddition, KIBITZ-15 feels that the question of res ponsibility hasnot been sett led and that our bureaucratic methods and the p hysicaldistance make close cooperation with the Am ericans impossible.A successful solution to the responsibil ity question would meanto KIBITZ-15 that he is put in com p lete charge of the organiza-tion. He feels that he should only be requested to report fromtime to time to a superior on his p rogress. With the solutionof this problem, the difficulty supposedly arising out of ourbureaucratic behavior would vanish as t would no longer benecessary fotKTBITZ-15 to comnly With detailed instructions andparticularly fnrther PR O IRp nuld have to be submitted. The -animos ity to C.. :3 and E :3 seems to stem m ainly fromthe fact that they requested him to adhere to a very few basicadm inistrative requiremen ts. The main on e being the c learing ofpersonnel prior to train!mg them as W IT operators. KIBITZ-15considers this unnecessary as he feels that he knows G ermans wellenough to decide wto is a Com mun ist agent and who is not. Onthe other hand, KIBITZ-15 has seriously jeopardized the securityof the operation by subm itting names of mem bers of the net toGerm an investigating agencies.1IBITZ-15 has from the beginning. refused to becom e an Americanagent and as far as he is concerned; he does not hold such a po si-tion at this time. For this reason, he has also refused to signa contract vhich rould put our relat ionship on a regu lar basis.Instead, KI3ITZ-15 has drawn u p a contract of his own which doesnot only specify his duties but also our responsibility towards


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ucrot-Secutyinforrua)n- 9 -we would agree to find KIBITZ-15 an appropriate private orgovernment job after the expiration of the contract.

KIBITZ-15 has had am ple experience in the German army but noneof it appears to have been in the clandestine field. He had noexperience in setting up a WIT net when we contacted him twoyears ago. In spite of this, he has hardly ever accepted theguidance of the case officer. There has certainly never beenany control whatever over TRITZ-15 and his activities on ourbehalf. Listening to KIBITZ-15's characterization of the variouscase officers who 'nave been connected with this project, itappears that he divides them roughly into two categories; namely,those that tried to control or influence him, and those that lethim run the shovr on his own terms. He only seems to like thosecase Officers that permit him complete freedom of action. Thereviewof his operations clearly indicates, however, that KIBITZ-15is definitely in need of guidance as he is quite naive and ignor-ant about some aspects of setting up a'clandestine stay-behindorganization. He stated, for instance, that one of the mainreasons why his organization could never be uncovered is the factthat it does not have-a name. Certain passages in his writtenplans on WiT Aay-behind activities which were to be issued toindividual teams, show similar naivete and verbosity. On theother hand, basic written information on his present organiza-tion is almost completely lacking. He 'also seems to have given.little, if any, thought to the .two i m portant problems of compart-mentalization and stay-ability. He seems to have close personalties to many members of his net and it is hard to fight the feel-ing that one of the agents (162) was hired only because she ishis girl friend. He has also not considered it below himself'to request DE 3,000 for her so that she could be set U101in an

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Secret- Seczity Idormation- 10 -One hundred fifty. This concept s undoubtedly to a largemeasure the result of his personal ambitioni, During theinterrogation, he intimated that he alone would like to beres p onsible for setting up W/T nets in West Germany. He statedmost uneq ,4voca1ly that he will not agree to continue his assign-ment if we a, not increase the present scOpe of the operationbeyond the existing thirteen teams.Twenty-five of these active agents have now been assigned toteams. Our records and those submitted by KIBITZ-15 in answerto a written question do not exactly agree on the composition ofthese teams. However, since his information is more up-to-dateand since he appears to be running this operation, his statementsform the basis of this short analysis. On three of the twenty-five persons who are supposedly assigned to teams, NB do nothave any information at all. Ten of the persons have notreceived security clearances.

The WIT operators of eleven teams were soldiers, most ofwhom fought on the Eastern front against Russia. One WiT opera-tor is a housewife and one a disabled soldier. The average ageof the operators is thirty-seven. Little or no considerationseems to have been given to the occupation of the person whowas accepted for W/T training. Obviously the Stayability of athirty-seven year old person during times of war is not very goodunless he holds an essential job. Moreover, we have trainedYoung men who were only tmentyseveW:or twenty-eight (KIBITZ-198,192) years old. To make matters worse, these two and KIBITZ-199work for Thwzburg Military Post. This seems hardly the rightoccupation for a WIT stay-behind man. These three operatorsform the nuclei for three teams although they also know each


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Secret -Security Informationbehind organization. Only in the last few months has the agentreceived guidance on these problens. There is no indication .in the files that the chief agent ever received adequate instruc-tion or guidance on the setting up of a stay-behind organiza-tion. The reviewer does not feel that the teams as now constitutedrepresent a valuable asset for sty-behind activities; they do nothave stayability nor is the organization 71roperly compartmenta l

V. RECOLVENDATION

It is recommended that this operation be discontinued as soon aspossible. The operation has not been securely conducted nor have we hadany control or large measure of influence over the chief agent.

It is obviously the function of an Intelligence Agency to set upWI' stay-behind nets, but this has to be done in a professional Manner.It might be possible to develop the services of KIBITZ-150 for futureoperations in the stay-behind field. He seems to be more amenable thanhis chief to American guidance and would probably be willing to work forDs as an agent. He - could be entrusted,to establish six new secure two-man teams. We can, however, only approach KIBITZ-150 after we havearranged an acceotable job for KIBITZ-15. KIBITZ-15 1 stalent as anorganizer could be put to good use by letting him set up a' net in theEast Zone. An approach to 1IBITZ-15 should, however, only be made if wehave a suitable senior case officer who will be able to direct KIBITZ-151sactivities.

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Secret-Security !affirmationCHART I

KIBITZ TEAMS

TEAM NAME AG E ADDRESS OCCUPATION- CLEARANCESALARY MILITARY-POLITICAL W/T TRAINING

KIBITZ-156 37 Albisheim, Pfrimm/Pf, Alleestr. 1 Bricklayer; YesDM.280.00 Sergeant,Luft-waffe loog completeKIBITZ-256 25 Same as 156 Housewife, No None

(6f 156)

Team 2 KIBITZ-180 39 Backnang, Untereau 24 Tanner; DM Yes250.00 Sergeant,Luft-waffe, easternfront 100% completeKIBITZ-181 Backnang,Postgasse No further infoavailableT e a f . 1 3 KIBITZ-191 31 KaiserslauternDonnerbergstr. 29 Insurance sales- Yeeman,DM 500-600.00 Disabled inRussia 75% complete

KIBITZ-291 Same as 19 1 Housewife,(of 191) No further infoavailable

Team 4 KIBITZ-199 37 Arzburg, Jaeger-etr. 5 Arzburg Military YesPost,civ personneloffice;DM 495.00 1st Lt inanti-aircrafttraining 50% completeKIBITZ-200 43 Same as 199 Housewife,. Yes(of 199) Was plane ob-server 50% complete

Secret-Security Infoirceien


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ecret-Security information_ _____ 2 -TEAM NAME AGE ADDRESS OCCUPATION- CLEARANCESALARY MILITARY-POLITICAL W/T TRAINING

5 KIBITZ-137 34 Gauersheim, PfalzMainzerstr. 109 Farmer Yes Infantry off-icer None

KIBITZ-237 29 Same as 137 Housewife,(of 137) Yes None None

Team 6 KIBITZ-127 36 Stuttgart, Park-str. 14

Interior furn-ishings oarpen-ter;DM 340.00

Yes Was officer onEastern front

50% complete

KIBITZ-227 36 Same as 127 Housewife,(of 127 No No further infoavailable

Team 7 KIBITZ-177 37 Milhlacker,Wttm.-Stuttgarterstr.17 Waiter; DM400.00 Yes Was sergeanton Eastern front;was member of50% complete

DTLINEN in EastZone.KIBITZ-277 Same as 177 Housewife,(of 177) In-Turther infoavailable

Team 8 KIBITZ-182 37 Dielkirchen/Pfalz Housewife Yes. DRK 75'A completeHauptstr. 62. KIBITZ-134 Gernsheim/Rhein(Rheinstrompolizei) Rheinstrompolizei No further infoavailable

Secret-Security Information


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OCCUPATION-SALARY MILITARY-POLITICAL W/T TRAININGEAM

Tirm9 KIBITZ-221

KIBITZ-321

40 Dieselstr. 63

No identifying dataavailable-Probablywife or 221

City insurance Yesoffice; DM350.00 Longtime RussPOW Lt in anti-aircraft 10% completeTeam 10 KIBITZ-161 Gauersheim, Pfalz.Marnheimerweg 21KIBITZ-261 28 Gauersheim /121,Kreis Kircheimbol-anden, RhinelandPalatanate

11 KIBITZ-17334tuttgart/sBoeheimstr. 41KIBITZ-273 Same as 173 Electrical fore-man; DM 200.00Housewife,(of 161)Merchandise;DM 450.00 -Housewife,(o f 173) Luftwaffe ins-tructorNo further infoavailableSergeant onEastern frontNo further infoavailable 50% complete50% completeYe sNoYesNo

NAME AGE ADDRESS CLEARANCETeam 12 KIBITZ-192 WilrzburgSteinbachtal 10 WUrzburg Military YesPost & student;DM 300.00

Captain, Luft- log completewaffe

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Secref-Seanity Information- -

NAME AGE ADDRESS OCCUPATION-SALARY MILITARY-POLITICAL W/T TRAININGEAM CLEARANCE

10%

659

TC 13 KIBITZ-198 28 WUrzburg, Pallen- Warzburg Mili- Ye s Lt . 25% completebergweg 21a tary Post & stu-dent iv person-nel officer!DM 395.00KIBITZ-120 WUrzburg, No further infoEgloffsteinstr. available7/ 1

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CHART II:150"

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S x"-efSecurity Informatio'11 , 4 Z e . *

Declassified CIA file - Review of KIBITZ-15 net (19 January 1953)

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