Declaratory Releif

8/14/2019 Declaratory Releif

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Regional Trial CourtQuezon City

Branch _____

ROQUE, Atty. Herminio Harry;MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLES ALLIANCE;DIZON, Fr. Joe; SORIANO, Rodinie;ABIERA, Stephanie; ALCAIN, Maria Lourdes;ALFEREZ, Voltaire; ALTEZ, Czarina May;BALOT, Sheryl; BATACAN, Renizza;CAETE, Edan Marri; CARAMOAN, Leana;

CAMANCE, Aldwin; DELORINO, Rene;DUMAN, Paulyn May; FAJARDO, Rodrigo III;GO, Anna Marie; JIMENEZ, Anna Arminda;LEE, Mary Ann; MANALAYSAY, Luisa;MUSNGI, Miguel; OCAMPO, Michael;OCANA, Norman Roland III; RAGAMAT, William;RAMOS, Maricar; REYES, Cherry Lou;SICAT, Melissa Ann; TABING, Cristine Mae;and TORNO, Vanessa,

Petitioners,

- versus -

ERMITA, Eduardo, in his capacity as Executive Secretaryand Chairman of the Anti-Terror Council (ATC);GONZALEZ, Raul,in his capacity as Secretary ofthe Department of Justice and Vice Chairman of the ATC;ROMULO, Alberto, in his capacity as Secretary of theDepartment of Foreign Affairs and Member of the ATC;

PUNO, Ronaldo, in his capacityas Secretary of theDepartment of Interior and Local Government andMember of the ATC; TEVES, Margarito, in his capacityas Secretary of the Department of Finance and Member of theATC; GONZALES, Norberto, in his capacity as

National Security Adviser, and as Director-Generalof the National Security Council, Officer-in-Charge

1

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO._____________________For: Declaratory Relief (Sections3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 of RepublicAct 9372, otherwise known as theHuman Security Act of 2007)


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of the Department of National Defense, and Member ofthe ATC; ANDAYA, Rolando, in his capacityas Secretary of the Department of Budget andManagement; TAN, Roberto, as Officer-in-Chargeof the Bureau of Treasury; ESPERON, Gen. Hermogenes,in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces of the Philippines; CALDERON,Gen. Oscar, in his capacity as Director Generalof the Philippine National Police;

Respondents.

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PETITION

COME NOW THE PETITIONERS by the undersigned attorney, and unto

this Honorable Court, respectfully allege:

1. Petitioner Prof. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., of legal age, Filipino

citizen, married, taxpayer, is an active law practitioner and professor of

constitutional and public international law at the University of the Philippines

College of Law. He may be served with pertinent papers and processes through

his undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan Law Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel

2000 Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.

2. Petitioner Moro Christian Peoples Alliance, is a peoples

organization existing under the laws of the Philippines. It may be served with

pertinent papers and processes through its undersigned counsel, the Roque and

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Butuyan Law Offices, at Unit 1904, Antel Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street,

Salcedo Village, Makati City.

3. Petitioner Fr. Joe Dizon, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single,

taxpayer, is a long time activist-priest and an advocate against abuses of the

government. He may be served with pertinent papers and processes through his

undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan Law Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel

Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.

4. Petitioner Rodinie Soriano, of legal age, single, Filipino citizen,

taxpayer, is a student of the University of the Philippines and a member the

League of Filipino citizens. He may be served with pertinent papers and processes

through his undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan Law Offices, at Unit

1904 Antel Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.

5. Petitioners Alcain to Torno, are all of legal age, Filipino citizens,

taxpayers, and students of the evening class of the University of the Philippines

College of Law, Diliman, Quezon City. They may be served with pertinent papers

and processes through their undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan Law

Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village,

Makati City.

6. The Respondents are officials of the National Government, thus;

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7. Sec. Eduardo Ermita is Executive Secretary and Chairman of the

Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), he may be served with summons and other papers

and processes at the Office of the Executive Secretary, Malacaang Palace,

Manila;

8. Sec. Raul Gonzalez, is Secretary of the Department of Justice and

Vice Chairman of the ATC. He may be served with summons and other papers and

processes at the Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila;

9. Sec. Alberto Romulo is Secretary of the Department of Foreign

Affairs and Member of the ATC. He may be served with summons and other

papers and processes at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Roxas Boulevard,

Pasay City, Metro Manila;

10. Sec. Ronaldo Puno is Secretary of the Department of Interior and

Local Government and Member of the ATC. He may be served with summons and

other papers and processes at the Department of Interior and Local Government,

Kamias cor. EDSA, Quezon City, Metro Manila;

11. Sec. Margarito Teves is Secretary of the Department of Finance and

Member of the ATC. He may be served with summons and other papers and

processes at the Department of Finance, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, MetroManila;

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12. Sec. Rolando Andaya is the Secretary of the Department of Budget

and Management. He may be served with summons and other papers and

processes at the Department of Budget and Management, Gen. Solano St., San

Miguel, Manila;

13. Hon. Roberto Tan is the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Treasury.

He may be served with summons and other papers and processes at the Bureau of

Treasury, Palacio del Gobernador Bldg., Intramuros, Manila;

14. Sec. Norberto Gonzales is National Security Adviser and concurrent

Officer-in-Charge of the Department of National Defense and Member of the

ATC. He may be served with summons and other papers and processes at

Department of National Defense, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Metro Manila;

15. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon is Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines. He may be served with summons and other papers and processes

at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Metro Manila;

16. Police Gen. Oscar Calderon is Director General of the Philippine

National Police. He may be served with summons and other papers and processes

at the Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, Metro Manila;

17. The Public Respondents may also be served with summons and other

processes through the Solicitor-General, Office of the Solicitor General, 134

Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, Metro Manila.

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18. Petitioners hold that sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 of Republic Act

9372, or theHuman Security Act of 2007, need judicial determination in relation to

the petitioners rights as provided by the Bill of Rights, Article III of the 1987

Constitution. Petitioners further hold that due to the ambiguity or the need for

judicial determination of the aforesaid sections, any disbursement of public funds

for purposes provided for in the law are illegal.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

19. A citizen of the Republic of the Philippines is granted rights and

privileges as well as duties by the 1987 Constitution as embodied in Article III

thereof, also known as the Bill of Rights.

20. As provided for in the 1987 Constitution and as a signatory of the

United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, the Philippine government is duty-

bound to uphold these rights and to ensure that any action of any entity, private or

public, does not infringe upon these rights.

21. The construction of the 1987 Constitution regarding the relationship

between the government and the citizens of the Republic ensures that the latters

rights are respected above all else. Sec. 5 of the Declaration of Principles and

State Policies, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states that:

Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection oflife, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfareare essential for the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings ofdemocracy.

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22. This is reinforced by Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights, Article III of the

1987 Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal

protection of laws.

23. To ensure this, any omission or excessiveness of actions of any of the

three branches of government are checked and balanced by other branches of the

government. This is an important process in the safeguarding of the rights of its

citizens.

24. Particularly, the actions of the legislative as repository of police

power of the state, and the executive as wielder of the same, are prone to question,

especially when they infringe upon the rights and privileges of the individual

which are protected by the Constitution.

25. And the final arbiter of questions regarding this nature is the

Judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as it is part of its expanded certiorari

jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the government. The Supreme Court in Francisco v. House of

Representatives1 emphasized that judicial review is not just a power but also a

duty under the 1987 Constitution .

1 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

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26. On this aspect, the Supreme Court, in a line of decisions, has always

upheld the rights of the citizens as sacrosanct in any working democracy. Even in

times of crises and national emergencies, the roles of the branches of government

and government as a whole, has been limited due to the rights of its citizens. This

was what the Court, in a recent decision, David vs. Arroyo2, through Justice

Sandoval-Gutierrez meant when it declared that:

xxx

During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadthand intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as tounduly restrain our peoples liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theoristswho studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is

possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises withoutsurrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: themaintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and politicalresponsibility of the government to the governed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

27. At present, a silent threat exists, one that has haunted the world since

the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

28. Terrorism or acts of terrorism have become bywords because of one

event that changed the worlds socio- and geopolitical landscape, the September

11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in

Washington D.C., U.S.A. To the shock of millions worldwide, terrorists, hijacking

2 David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396.

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and commanding two airplanes, crashed the said aircrafts into the buildings in

New York City and Washington, D.C.

29. The group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, was blamed and later

claimed responsibility for the attacks.3

30. In response to the September 11 attacks, US President George W.

Bush, addressed a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress and called for a War on

Terror. He called on all its allies to join the United States in this war. In his

speech, he stated:

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not endthere. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has

been found, stopped and defeated.4

31. The first salvo in this war was directed on Afghanistan, where the

Taliban, a regime that is closely allied with Al Qaeda, was in control. When the

Taliban refused to negotiate with the U.S. and its allies, war was commenced. On

October 7, 2001, American and British forces began aerial attacks on Afghanistan,

particularly Kabul.

32. On November 12, 2001, Kabul fell. What followed soon was the

establishment of a democratic government through a nationwide election which

put the first post-Taliban president, Hamid Karzai, in power.

3 September 11attacks, .

4 War in Afghanistan (2001-present), http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript.html>.

9
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript.html%3Ehttp://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript.html%3E


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33. In the meantime, as the War on Terror was being waged, Presidents

and Prime Ministers of governments around the world threw their support to the

US campaign. The Philippine President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, threw in her

support. According to Time Asia website:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was the first Asian leaderto back the U.S. in its war on terror after 9/11and she has pledgedher "general support" for a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.5

34. After Afghanistan, the War on Terror turned towards Iraq then

being ruled by dictator Saddam Hussein. The rationale for the Iraq War was that

the country under Hussein is developing weapons of mass destruction. This was

offered by Pres. Bush and Prime Minister Blair to their allies.

35. On 2 March 2003, the US led the coalition forces in the war in Iraq.

Despite the eventual ouster of Saddam Husseins regime, and the election of a

democratic Iraqi government, Iraq currently remains a volatile country still under

U.S. military occupation.

36. Six (6) years into the War on Terror, Osama bin Laden remains at

large and Al Qaeda, with its ideological allies like Jemaah Islamiyah and the

Philippines Abu Sayyaf, still threatens world security.

37. In response to Bushs call to global war on terror, the US Congresspassed The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools

5 For or against the War on Iraq, .

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Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 or the USA Patriot Act

of 2001. Similarly, other nations followed, such as Great Britain, whose Houses of

Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and Australia, which

passed the Anti-Terrorism Bill into law in the year 2005. Other countries also

passed their own anti-terror laws.

38. In response to the developments worldwide on anti-terror legislation,

the Houses of Congress initiated two different bills towards an anti-terror law.

39. On 30 June 2004, Sen. Manuel Villar initially filed Senate Bill No.

735, An Act to Define and Penalize Acts of Terrorism and For Other Purposes.

This was later on substituted along with other Senate Bills with Senate Bill No.

2137 on 12 October 2007. Senator(s) Manuel B. Villar, Jr., Panfilo M. Lacson,

Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy P. Ejercito-Estrada, Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. and

Alfredo S. Lim sponsored the bill in substitution.

40. On 11 October 2005, Rep. Imee Marcos, with several Congressmen

and women as co-sponsors, introduced House Bill No. 4839.

41. On 12 October 2005, these bills were certified by the President of the

Philippines for immediate enactment.

42. The two bills were submitted to Joint Conference Committee where

the Senate members of the Conference Committee approved it on 08 February

2007, while the House of Representatives members of the Conference Committee

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approved it on 19 February 2007. The approved bill was transmitted to the

President on 27 February 2007.

43. On 06 March 2007, the President acted on the submitted bill and

approved and signed it into law which became Republic Act No. 9372.

44. The effectivity of RA 9372 was scheduled two (2) months after the

May 14, 2007 elections as contained in Sec. 63 of the law thereof. It states:

Sec. 62. Special Effectivity Clause.

xxx

After the publication required above shall have been done, theAct shall take effect two months after the elections are held in May2007.

Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be automaticallysuspended one month before and two months after the holding of anyelection.

45. However, a month before the scheduled effectivity, the Secretary of

Justice, Raul Gonzalez, issued statements that sent chilling effects to the populace.

In an interview with the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stated that the interviews and

sources of media practitioners are sacred. However, he further stated:

Of course, unless there is sufficient basis or if they are beingsuspected of co-mingling with terror suspects.6

6 DoJ can recommend wiretap on alleged terrorists Gonzalez, by Tetch Torres,INQUIRER.net, July 04, 2007, < http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story_id=74741>.

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46. On 05 July 2007, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines

(NUJP) called on the 14th Congress to act posthaste on this potential threat not

just to press freedom but to democracy itself by reviewing or, better still, repeal

altogether this law that is worse than the disease it purports to cure.7

They were particularly concerned with Sec. Gonzalezs statement quoted

above, to which chairman Jose Torres Jr. and secretary general Rowena Paraan, on

behalf of NUJP, issued a statement stating thus:

This is a statement as vague and as fraught with danger asmany of the anti-terror law's provisions, especially those thatsupposedly define what terrorism is and who terrorists are, provisionsso open-ended they could actually lead to anyone and everyone whogovernment deems fit being tagged a terrorist.8

47. On the other hand, Ambassador Alistair MacDonald, head of

delegation of the European Commission to the Philippines said in Bacolod City,

The anti-terrorism law is not an excuse to go out and shoot people to target

people for matters not provided in the law.9

48. In relation to the aforementioned, a phenomenon has arisen in the

recent history of our country that is reminiscent of the Martial Law days when

people simply disappear and probably summarily killed. In addition, there is a

growing number of persons, supposedly or suspected to be allied with the Left,

who are killed in a pattern that is not unique to our country: motorcycle-riding and

7 Gonzalez wiretap media statement slammed , by Nonoy Expina, INQUIRER.net, July 05,2007, < http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story_id=74992>.

8 Ibid.

9 Anti-terror law not a license for killings -- EU envoy, by Carla Gomez, INQUIRER.net,July 05, 2007, < http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story_id=74986>.

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bonnet-wearing hitmen shooting their target even in broad daylight in the presence

of a lot of people.

49. Sec. Eduardo Ermita, in an interview with The Daily Tribune said that

concerned agencies of the government and the anti-terrorism council are now

preparing the implementing rules and regulations, as well as the publication of the

law for public awareness.10

50. On 15 July 2007, as scheduled, Republic Act 9372 became effective.

51. As with any law, RA 9372 requires that Implementing Rules and

Regulations be developed. Executive Secretary Ermita has said that concerned

agencies of the government and the Anti-Terrorism Council have begun the

preparation of the laws IRR, as well as the publication of the laws

implementation for public awareness. Ermita likewise parried the possible

postponement of the implementation of the law despite the absence of the IRR.

52. However, due to the ambiguity of some of its provisions and given

the present state of our system of investigation and custodial procedure, there is an

imminent possibility of misinterpretation thereby opening the identification of

terrorists to any and all citizens who commit acts within the supposed purview

of the definition.

10 Wiretap on journalists possible under anti-terror law DoJ chief, by Benjamin B. Pulta,The Daily Tribune, July 5, 2007, < http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20070705hed3.html>.

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53. Moreover, several provisions of the said law pose a grave threat to the

life, liberty and property of Filipinos which are held sacrosanct in the Bill of

Rights enshrined in our present Constitution. Hence, this petition.

NATURE OF THE PETITION

54. This is a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised

Rules of Court seeking the declaration of the validity of construction of Republic

Act 9372 particularly sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 in relation to the petitioners

rights as provided for in Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

LOCUS STANDI

55. Petitioners, lawyer and students, are suing as citizens of the

Philippines and, being a professor and students of law, aver that it is their

responsibility, nay duty, to assert their public rights when there is a clear and

present danger of these rights being unconstitutionally restrained by the political

branches of government in the promulgation and execution of the Human Security

Act of 2007.

56. Petitioner Fr. Dizon is suing as a member of clergy, stating that the

law infringes on the right of the people to freely exercise their religion, that by not

including confessions made by a person to a priest or minister as included among

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the privileged information not subject to unconstitutional surveillance, the law

itself does not recognize the right of the people to practice their religion, of which

such confession is an integral part.

57. Petitioner Moro Christian Peoples Alliance is an organization that

seeks to promote harmonious and just relationship between the Bangsa Moro

people and the Christian. They allege that due to the vagueness of definition of

terrorism and unless the enforcement of the statute is restrained, their organization

and members may be classified as a terrorist organization.

58. Petitioner Rodinie Soriano is suing in his personal capacity and on

behalf of the League of Filipino Students (LFS), an association of activist-students

which represents the Filipino studentry in the fight for their rights. He alleges that

due to the vagueness of the definition, he and other members of the LFS stand the

immediate danger of prosecution under the assailed statute.

59. The causes of action for this complaint, as outlined below, assail the

encroachment of the law on the individuals zone of privacy, the lack of due

process in the taking of liberty and property, and the violation of the privacy of

communication and correspondence without due process. These violations of the

rights enshrined in Article III of our Constitution are, without a doubt, of

transcendental importance which need to be acted upon early.

60. The Court has recently sustained the direct injury testin determining

locus standi in our jurisdiction. CitingPeople vs. Vera, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez

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stated in David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo that the person who impugns the validity

of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he

has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result11. However, the Court went

on to say that it has adopted a rule that even when the petitioners have failed to

show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of

transcendental importance12. Thus, a citizen may be given locus standi in public

suits provided that there must be a showing the issues raised are of transcendental

importance which must be settled early.13

61. Petitioners are likewise suing as taxpayers, stating that any funding

provided to operationalize the law, being unconstitutional, is unlawful and is a

waste of public funds. Moreover, the law does not speak where the funding for

day-to-day operations of the Anti-Terrorism Council will come from, and

petitioners assert that it is their right under Section 7 of the Bill of Rights and as a

taxpayer to know how the ATC and the so-called War against terror will be

funded. Nevertheless, as the law is unconstitutional, such funds will likewise be

illegally disbursed.

RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION

62. Justice Regalado, in his book, Remedial Law Compendium,

enumerates the following requisites for an action for declaratory relief, to wit:

11 David vs Macapagal-Arroyo. G.R. No. 171396. May 3 2006.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid

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(a) The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed,will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order orregulation, or ordinance;

(b) The terms of said documents and the validity thereof aredoubtful and require judicial construction;

(c) There must have been no breach of the documents inquestion;

(d) There must be an actual justiciable controversy or theripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are adverse;

(e) The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

(f) Adequate relief is not available through other means orother forms of action or proceeding.

63. Paragraph (a) points to the subject matter of the action. The present

petitions subject matter is Republic Act 9372, otherwise known as the Human

Security Act of 2007, especially sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27.

64. Paragraph (b) provides for the issue or cause of the action. In this

petition, the provisions of the aforesaid sections, read in their pure form, are of

doubtful constitutionality, and their implementation may lead to arbitrariness;

hence, they require judicial construction.

65. Paragraph (c) requires that no damage has yet been done to the one

suing for declaratory relief, since such occurrence already gives way to an ordinary

civil action.

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66. Paragraph (d) requires ripeness for judicial determination. As RA

9372 is now in full effect, albeit awaiting its implementing rules and regulations,

this criterion is met. In this regard, the Court declared in Ople vs. Torres, to wit:

xxx [t]he ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is

not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No.308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not

premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fataldefects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the

implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.(emphasis supplied)

67. Paragraphs (e) and (f) point to the exhaustion of any and all available

remedies for adequate relief. In the case when a statute is involved, the principle

of presumption of constitutionality stands; hence, the only remedy for any

questions concerning the constitutionality of the law lies in the Judiciary.

68. Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court states, to wit:

All persons who have or claim any interest which would beaffected by the declaration shall be made parties xxx

69. The determination of the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, the

hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration, and even the immediate

and substantial impact upon the respondents of the implementation of the Human

Security Act of 2007 have bases as well on jurisprudence.

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70. Consistent with the controlling doctrine espoused in Gonzales v

COMELEC,14 this instant petition is filed after the effectivity date of 15 July 2007.

In the aforementioned case, the petitioners therein waited for the assailed law to

become effective before filing the suit; to avoid the vice of prematurity in their

suit, petitioners herein similarly adopt the same approach.

71. In another decision, the Supreme Court, in Bayantel vs. Republic,

which was a petition for declaratory relief, stated that [a]n issue is ripe for judicial

determination when litigation is inevitable or when administrative remedies have

been exhausted.

72. Due to the national scope of the law and its application dependent on

the authorities implementing it, any ambiguity of the definition or concern on the

procedural aspect of the law could lead to breach of rights of any Filipino citizen

suspected as a terrorist.

73. The US Supreme Court in Poe vs. Ullman,15 declared that for the

Court to adjudicate petitions for declaratory judgments on state or federal laws,

there must exist a realistic fear of prosecution must be met. In this instant

petition, this requirement is highly met. The petitioners, citizens of the country,

are indeed susceptible to prosecution for the effect of the law extends to any

citizen, regardless of affiliation. All could well be under the definition of terrorist

14 Gonzales v COMELEC, 9 SCRA 230 (1963).

15 Poe vs. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

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as provided by the law and be subjected to prosecution. This could have serious

repercussions on the civil liberties of the people of the Philippines.

74. Subsequently, the Philippines, a staunch ally of the US global war on

terror in Southeast Asia, has manifested its support of the classification of certain

groups as terrorists. No less than the President herself proclaimed at the three-day

Mindanao Peace and Security Summit at the Pryce Hotel in Cagayan de Oro that

[i]f you are a communist terrorist, we will stop you. If you are a religious

terrorist, we will stop you. If you are a rogue element of our own police or

military, we will stop you.16 And yet, due to the still undefined word,

terrorism, there is still confusion as to who the President is addressing such

remarks.

75. Even before the effectivity of RA 9372, critics and the political

opposition, as well as those who simply earned the ire of those in power, have been

prosecuted or have been threatened with prosecution as a result of their criticisms

and political leanings. If petitioners have been subjected to prosecution or threats

of prosecution prior to the effectivity of RA 9372, then the said law now in effect

with all its attendant unconstitutional provisions as alleged in the discussion that

followsraises the possibility of inevitable litigation or prosecution to new

heights.

16 1st targets: Rogue AFP, red terrorists, Paolo Romero, The Philippine Star, Vol. XXI, No.346, Wednesday, July 11, 2007, p. 1.

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76. Therefore, as stated, a petition for declaratory relief is the proper and

only remedy available to petitioners in this case.

DISCUSSION

Section 3 of Republic Act No.

9372 is void for being vague

since it does not provide for adefinition of terrorism.

77. Sec. 3 of Republic Act 9372, or the Human Security Act of 2007,

states:

Sec. 3. Terrorism. Any person who commits an act

punishable under any of the following provisions of the RevisedPenal Code:

a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seasor in the Philippine Waters);

b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);

c. Article 134-a (Coup dEtat), including acts committed byprivate persons;

d. Article 248 (Murder);

e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);

f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction);

or under

(1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);(2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous

and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);

(3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory andLiability Act of 1968);

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(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Highjacking Law);

(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,

(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decreecodifying the Law on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture,Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions orExplosives);

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread andextraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coercethe government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of

the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) yearsof imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for underAct No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,as amended.

78. The attempt at defining the word terrorism proceeds from an

enumeration of crimes and felonies provided for by the Revised Penal Code or

special laws and qualified by thereby sowing and creating a condition of

widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to

coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

79. It is a well-settled principle that a law must be sufficiently explicit to

inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them

liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with

ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application

violates the first essential of due process of law.17

17 Connally v General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385.

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80. The test of whether or not a law is vague is that men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.18

Applying once again the doctrine set in the recent case ofDavid vs Macapagal-

Arroyo19, a litigant may challenge a statute if it is vague in all its applications.

81. Even though terrorism has been a common term in the past several

years, no definition has been put forth to which majority of the authorities have

agreed. In the language used by the Court in David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, the

phrase acts of terrorism is still an amorphous and vague concept. The extent of

this vagueness can be gleaned from the comment in the same decision, which

deserves to be quoted in full:

In fact, this definitional predicament or the absence of anagreed definition of terrorism confronts not only our country, but theinternational community as well. The following observations arequite apropos:

In the actual unipolar context of internationalrelations, the fight against terrorism has become one of the

basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use offorce against certain states and against groups operatinginternationally. Lists of states sponsoring terrorism and ofterrorist organizations are set up and constantly beingupdated according to criteria that are not always known to the

public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.

The basic problem underlying all these militaryactions or threats of the use of force as the most recent bythe United States against Iraq consists in the absence of anagreed definition of terrorism.

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legalcategorization of acts of violence either by states, by armedgroups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying Onecountrys terrorist is another countrys freedom fighter. Theapparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the

18 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v City Mayor. 20 SCRA 849.

19 David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396

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term terrorism may further be demonstrated by thehistorical fact that leaders of national liberation movementssuch as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouibain Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only afew, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who

controlled the territory at the time, but later becameinternationally respected statesmen.

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts fromeventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

Since the times of the Cold War the United NationsOrganization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on

the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensifiedits efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gapbetween those who associate terrorism with any violent actby non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries orinfrastructure or military installations, and those who believein the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistanceagainst foreign occupation or against systematic oppressionof ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.

The dilemma facing the international community can

best be illustrated by reference to the contradictingcategorization of organizations and movements such asPalestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a terroristgroup for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs andMuslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who areterrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in thatof Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua freedomfighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp

or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later tobecome the Taliban movement): during the Cold War periodthey were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured

by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the SovietUnion. One could go on and on in enumerating examples ofconflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in anyway because of opposing political interests that are at theroots of those perceptions.

How, then, can those contradicting definitions andconflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the samegroup and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basicreason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent

interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, oradversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, thedefinition of terrorism will fluctuate accordingly. A statemay eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certainethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a

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liberation struggle, not of terrorism when acts ofviolence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable toreach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly

because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states thatdetermine in each and every instance how a particular armedmovement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to theterrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A policy of doublestandards on this vital issue of international affairs has beenthe unavoidable consequence.

This definitional predicament of an organizationconsisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in spite ofthe emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter!

has become even more serious in the present global powerconstellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role inthe Security Council, former great powers of the Cold Warera as well as medium powers are increasingly beingmarginalized; and the problem has become even more acutesince the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the UnitedStates.

The absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may result inabuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An

illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in adrinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act asan act of terrorism and immediately arrest them x x x . Obviously,this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered thatan act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining thesame as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.20

(citation omitted)

82. In a half-hearted attempt at defining terrorism, the legislature

merely enumerated acts already punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and

merely added the phrase thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread

and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the

government to give in to an unlawful demand. This attempt at defining the

already vague term of terrorism only added confusion with vague words and

phrases like widespread, extraordinary, fear, panic, and unlawful

demand. Petitioners contend that this feeble attempt at defining terrorism only

20 David vs. Macapagal Arroyo, ibid.

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gives the military, police, and other branches of the executive unbridled discretion

in describing certain acts as acts of terrorism without giving the people the

faintest idea of what acts should be avoided in order to evade persecution for

terrorism.

83. Sec. 3 does not provide complete and sufficient standards to guide the

authorities in dealing with an accused alleged to have committed the offense. In

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan21 citingPeople v. Nazario, the Supreme Court said:

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lackscomprehensible standards that men of common intelligence mustnecessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In suchinstance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:

a) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to

avoid; and

b) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carryingout its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the

Government muscle. (emphasis supplied)

84. Due to this, there exists a danger of prosecution to petitioners and to

any citizen of the country who may be branded as a terrorist. The arbitrariness

which unfortunately rocks our bureaucracy poses a real threat to all citizens.

Section 7 of RA 9372 violates

the Right to Privacy ofCommunication and Due

Process

85. Sec. 7 of Ra 9372 provides:

21 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

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Sec. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording ofCommunications. The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-wire TappingLaw) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and themembers of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to,intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or

other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the useof any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication,message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between membersof a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or groupof persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism orconspiracy to commit terrorism.

Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording ofcommunications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalistsand their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not beauthorized.

This is clearly violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy of

communication:

Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondenceshall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when

public safety ororderrequires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the precedingsection shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

86. Moreover, petitioner Fr. Joe Dizon avers that his rights as a priest as

well as those of his penitents stand to be violated since priest-penitent relationships

are not included in the exclusions, making confessions made to priests

unconditionally susceptible to Section 7 of the Human Security Act of 2007.

87. The abovementioned section also violates due process. It is clear that

intrusion is allowable upon an order of the court or when public safety or order

requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. But if the intrusion is to be done through

wiretaps for any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or

written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist

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organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or

suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism when a

definition of terrorism is wanting, it makes the provision applicable to just any

person.

88. Moreover, this provision allows violations of the privacy of

communication of people on mere suspicion of conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Not once in the history of world jurisprudence has there been a penalty for mere

suspicion of conspiracy to commit a crime. The reason is very clear: conspiracy, as

a state of mind, can only be proven when there was an agreement between two or

more persons to commit a certain crime and thereafter decide to commit it. Being

a mental act that would only become manifest. Being a state of mind, the burden to

prove that there was conspiracy lies heavily in the prosecution. Sec. 7 of RA 9372

attempts to remove this heavy burden by including persons suspected ofx x x

conspiracy to commit terrorism together with persons charged with terrorism.

The inclusion of such persons suspected of conspiracy to commit terrorism in

several provisions of RA 9372 is violative of due process and therefore,

unconstitutional.

Section 18 of RA 9372 is

violative of the Due Process

Clause

89. The whole Sec. 18 of RA 9372 smacks of violations to the Bill of

Rights. The first paragraph thereof states, to wit:

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Sec. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant ofArrest. The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code tothe contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement

personnel, who having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with orsuspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy tocommit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability fordelay in the delivery of charged or suspected person to the proper

judicial authority within a period of three days counted from themoment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended orarrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or lawenforcement personnel:Provided, That the arrest of those suspected ofthe crime of terrorism or conspiracy must result from the surveillancexxx.

90. Sec.18.Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrestviolates

Sec. 22 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides, to wit:

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted

(emphasis supplied)

91. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., in his book, The 1987 Consitution of the

Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, mentions that Sec. 22 of the Bill of

Rights can be applied to criminal procedural law prejudicial to the accused. 22

Clearly, by changing the duration of custody, the law has prejudiced the accused.

This will allow the police or the military unwarranted access to the suspects

thereby increasing their exposure to torture and intimidation during the course of

the investigation.

22 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Consitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary,(Quezon City: Rex Printing Compnay, Inc., 2003), p. 600 citing Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74, 78 (1903);US v. Jueves, 23 Phil. 100, 105 (1912); Roman Cath. Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367(1918); Province of Camarines Sur v. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600(1937); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86Phil. 50, 54 (1950); Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309, 318 (1956); Phil. National Bank v. Ruperto , G.R.No. L-13777, June 30, 1960; Snatos v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. L-16049, March 18, 1967.

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92. The acts of terrorism as enumerated under Sec. 3 of RA 9372 are acts

punishable under the existing RPC. It has repealed, in effect, Art. 125 of the RPC

in relation to the felonies described as terrorism as the provision would not be

made to apply to detained persons under this Act.

93. Under Art 125, for crimes or offenses punishable by capital penalties,

the public officer or employee who detains, on legal ground, an accused for more

than 36 hours would be liable for a felony. Under RA 9372, the police or law

enforcement officer is allowed to detain for a maximum number of three days, a

person he has previously arrested without a warrant. The maximum length of

warrantless arrest and detention is also made applicable to a person suspected for

committing a conspiracy to commit any of the acts of terrorism, which is not

originally punished under the RPC. The said article states, to wit:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to theproper judicial authorities. The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer oremployee who shall detain any person for some legal ground andshall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authoritieswithin the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses

punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18)

hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, ortheir equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses

punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. Inevery case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of hisdetention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate andconfer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O.

Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).

94. It also violates Sec. 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Sec. 2. x x x adopts the generally accepted principles ofinternational law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the

policy of peace, equality, justice, fredom x x x. (emphasis supplied)

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95. As a signatory of the United Nations Universal Declaration of

Human Rights which was approved by the General Assembly of the United

Nations of which the Philippines is a member at its plenary meeting on December

10, 1948 where the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights

as applied to all human beings were proclaimed, the Philippines has a duty to

uphold these principles for they are, after all, adopted as part of the law of the

land.

96. Furhtermore, the UDHR provides that:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in degreeand rights;

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedomset forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such asrace, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status;

xxx xxx xxx

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy bythe competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamentalrights granted him by the Constitution or by law;

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,detention or exile (emphasis supplied)

97. Sec. 18 of RA 9372 also violates Sec. 1, Article III of the 1987

Constitution stating:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property withoutdue process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protectionof laws

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98. In view of Sec. 2, Article III of the Constitution, the rule is that no

arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining

the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable

cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The

exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in

Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rulesof Criminal Procedure which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrestedhas committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the

person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who hasescaped from a penal establishment or place where he is servingfinal judgment or temporarily confined while his case is

pending, or has escaped while being transferred from oneconfinement to another.

99. However, in RA 9372, no probable cause is needed to be determined

by the judge. The judicial determination by the police or law enforcement officers

who will make the arrests is based on or must result from the surveillance under

Sec 7 (recording of communications) and Sec 27 of the Act (examination of bank

deposits). Court authorization is needed for the conduct of surveillance but not for

the arrests to be made.

100. Moreover, RA 9372 violates the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (hereinafter cited as ICCPR). The UN General Assembly adopted

the ICCPR on December 16, 1966. The Philippines signed the convention on

December 19, 1966 but ratified it only on October 23, 1986. International

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Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains the protection of a

citizen(s) from illegal/arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, torture and court delay.

The Philippine government is a state party to the ICCPR. It is provided in Article

9 therein, to wit:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shallbe deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordancewith such procedures as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of

arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed ofany charges against him;

3. Anyone arrested or detained in a criminal charge shall bebrought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law toexercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within reasonabletime or to release.

4. Anyone who was deprived of his liberty by arrest ordetention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in orderthat such court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of hisdetention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

5. Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest ordetention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

101. In relation to this, in the case, Roger Posadas et. al., vs The Hon.

Ombudsman,23the Court declared, to wit:

The determination of the existence of probable cause that thepersons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make.The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen toarrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have justcommitted a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officersthe determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil

liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirementsbefore a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of theConstitution provides:

23 Roger Posadas et. al., vs The Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000.

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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures ofwhatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to

be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.24

Section 26 of RA 9372

violates the Right of the

People to Travel

102. Section 26 of RA 9372 provides:

Sec. 26. Restriction on Travel In cases where evidence ofguilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime ofterrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail andgranted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shalllimit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or

city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest ofnational security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city,without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation ofthe terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as

provided under the Rules of Court.

He/she may also be placed under house arrest, by order of thecourt at his or her usual place of residence.

x x x (emphasis supplied)

103. This provision clearly violates Section 6, Article III of the

Constitution, which provides for an inviolable right of the people to travel shall not

be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public

health, as may be provided by law. Imposing a restriction on people charged with

terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism when evidence of guilt is not strong

24 Ibid.

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does not fall under the exception provided for in the Bill of Rights. The inclusion

of the phrase in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with

Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution in Sec. 26 is but a mere superfluity,

invoking the exception provided in said Constitutional provision without stating

the reason why such persons charged, when evidence of guilt is NOT strong, fall

under the exception. In any case, it is beyond logic and reason to say that a person

whose evidence of guilt is not strong can be the subject of the States interest of

national security, public safety, or public health.

104. This grave violation of Sec. 6 Art. III of the Constitution must not

escape the scrutiny of the Courts. The issue is of transcendental importance and

petitioners invoke their right as citizens in seeking the nullity of the said Section

26 of RA 9372.

Section 27 of RA 9372 is

violative of Section 2, Article

III of the Constitution

105. Section 27 is in violation of right to property and the right against

unreasonable search and seizure inasmuch as it did not specify the transactions and

the period the deposits, accounts and records to be viewed. It is a blanket authority

to open said accounts. It states, to wit:Sec. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank

Deposits, Accounts, and Records. The provisions of Republic ActNo. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices ofthe Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable

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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to exercise

its power to:

a.) declare the unconstitutionality of Secs. 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 of

Republic Act 9372 ;otherwise known as the Human Security Act

of 2007;

b.) restrain public respondents, members of the ATC, from

discharging their functions under the statute;

c.) restrain the Departments of Budget and Management, and

Finance, and the Bureau of Treasury from disbursing any funds

for the purpose of implementing such statute;

d.) restrain the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippines

National Police from enforcing the statute.

Quezon City.

17 July 2007.

ROQUE BUTUYAN LAW OFFFICE

Counsel for the Petitioners

Unit 1904, Antel Corporate Centre,

121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village,Makati City, Philippines

By:

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H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.

PTR No. 0310306/10 Jan 2007/Makati CityIBP Lifetime Member

Roll No. 36976

EXPLANATION

Due to distance and lack of messengers at the Law Office to effect personalservice, the foregoing PETITION was sent through registered mail.

H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.

Counsel for the Petitioners

Copy Furnished:

Sec. Eduardo Ermita

Executive SecretaryOffice of the Executive SecretaryMalacaang Palace, Manila

Sec. Raul GonzalezSecretaryDepartment of JusticePadre Faura, Manila

Sec. Alberto RomuloSecretaryDepartment of Foreign AffairsRoxas Boulevard, Pasay City

Sec. Ronaldo PunoSecretaryDepartment of Interior and Local GovernmentKamias cor. EDSA,Quezon City

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Sec. Margarito TevesSecretaryDepartment of FinanceRoxas Boulevard, Pasay City

Sec. Rolando AndayaSecretaryDepartment of Budget and ManagementGen. Solano St., San Miguel, Manila

Hon. Roberto TanOfficer-in-Charge of the Bureau of TreasuryPalacio del Gobernador Bldg.,Intramuros, Manila

Sec. Norberto GonzalesNational Security Adviser and concurrent Officer-in-ChargeDepartment of National DefenseCamp Aguinaldo, Quezon City

Gen. Hermogenes EsperonChief of StaffArmed Forces of the PhilippinesCamp Aguinaldo, Quezon City

Dir./Gen. Oscar Calderon

Director GeneralPhilippine National PoliceCamp Crame, Quezon City

Hon. Agnes DevanaderaSolicitor-GeneralOffice of the Solicitor General134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village,

Makati City, Metro Manila.

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Declaratory Releif

Documents

Transcript of Declaratory Releif