REVIEW

Decision-making in the Campeche Octopus maya fishery in twofishing communities

Martha Laura Rosales Raya1 & Julia Elena Fraga Berdugo2

Received: 21 May 2018 /Accepted: 25 October 2018# Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

AbstractDecision-making in fisheries, particularly those involving capture, is a vital moment for participants. Fishers weigh their optionswhile considering factors such as the environment, economy, resource availability, sociocultural environment, ability, andpreferred method/gear. Eventually, the decision will be to resort to illegal and/or undeclared practices, which can affectcommon-pool resources. Octopus maya is an immense common-pool resource off the coast of the state of Campeche,Mexico, which could become unsustainable if current illegal and undeclared practices continue. Synchronic and diachronicperspectives were applied with methods such as the following: revision of the legal and sociodemographic dimensions, design ofan ethnographic questionnaire applied in 2006 and 2016, and recording of biological parameters for landed specimens. Inresponse to constant and increasing market demand for marine products, decisions were made to employ Illegal and undeclaredpractices to maximize profits. The practice of diving for O. maya capture boosted production by increasing the biomass landedper boat while requiring half the time investment and lower fuel costs. Catch biological data clearly indicated the use of illegalpractices, with sizes below the authorized minimum size (mantle length, 110 mm) and the presence of spent females.Questionnaire data suggested that each community behaved in their own way and established its own local decision-makingsystems while considering socioeconomic risk and market demands. Sustainable management of the CampecheO. maya fisherywill require greater data transparency and fluidity between government institutions and fishers, negotiation of compliance withcurrent regulations, and more effective legal enforcement of them.

Keywords Fishing . Octopus . Illegal . Undeclared .Mexico

Introduction

Fishers have a toolkit of options they use in decision-makingto optimize economic yields from the extraction of common-pool resources (CPRs). These resources represent a set ofsituations in which individuals are involved in decision-making that generates a sum of events (Ostrom et al. 1994).

Whenmany social actors are implicated in economic activitieslinked to CPR extraction, those involved are collectively af-fected in the decision-making process and its consequences. Itis essential to distinguish between the resource system, theresource unit flow produced by the system, and their interde-pendence (Ostrom 1990; Pascual 1996; Ostrom 2009;Kooiman et al. 2005).

Consensual collective actions are beneficial to CPRextraction-related economic activity, although to attain con-sensus communities’ socioeconomic surroundings must beknown and understood (Ostrom et al. 1999; Degnbol andMcCay 2006; Pomeroy 2011). Research addressing the be-havior of CPR users is generally placed within the Btragedyof the commons^ scheme (Acheson 2014; Acheson 2015) orapplies game theory and the prisoner dilemma to model terri-torial changes and the presence/absence of cooperation amongactors. As a social and economic group, fishers normally havetheir activity symbolized as a Btragedy of the commons,^ fre-quently confused with the use of open-access resources

* Julia Elena Fraga Berdugojfraga@cinvestav.mx

1 Facultad de Ciencias Químico Biológicas, Universidad Autónoma deCampeche, Campus I, Av. Agustín Melgar s/n entre Juan de laBarrera y Calle 20, Col. Buenavista, 24039 San Francisco deCampeche, Campeche, Mexico

2 Unidad Mérida, Depto. de Ecología Humana, Centro deInvestigación y Estudios Avanzados del Instituto PolitécnicoNacional (CINVESTAV del IPN), Antigua Carretera a Progreso Km.6, 97310 Mérida, Yucatán, Mexico

Maritime Studieshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40152-018-0127-3

(McCay and Finlayson 1995; Nonini 2008; Gutiérrez andMora 2011; Acheson 2015). The challenge in adopting trage-dy of the commons theory is that its focus tends to be limitedto chaotic systems with minimal control, it ignores social in-stitutions, and the resulting solutions consider privatizationand stricter laws and fines. As one of the four property regimesin fishing, open access tends to combine with and superim-pose itself over CPR access. However, from an institutionalperspective, neither approach guarantees fishery resource sus-tainability (Acheson 2014; Acheson 2015).

The literature on fishing and the tragedy of the commons isample (approximately 16,000 citations, with over 800 in LatinAmerica), but the literature addressing overfishing and illegalfishing is even broader (approximately 147,000 total citations;1260 in Latin America). Mexico has contributed little to thisliterature; for example, only two studies (Ojeda and Ramírez2012; Ponce-Díaz et al. 2013) stand out for signaling overfishingas problematic. Illegal, undeclared, and unregulated (IUU) fish-ing practices are worldwide problems with economic-environmental effects that tend to be more severe in developingcountries (FAO 2002, 2016; Bórquez et al. 2009; Ballesterosand Rodriguez-Rodriguez 2018). This is reflected in collapsingfisheries around the world and the difficulty of attaining fishingresource sustainability (Clark 2006; FAO 2016; FAO 2017).Organized, sustainable CPR extraction remains challengingsince users generally search for strategies and make decisionswith the goal of short-term gains, even when this strategy candegrade CPRs and the environment. This is because the collec-tive logic of users considers market laws to be those that orga-nize their social and economic life. Families and households areparticularly affected by these laws since it is at these levels thateconomic decisions are made, be they regarding subsistence ormarine product marketing (Breton et al. 2006).

Fishing is tangled in a complex net of economic, social,environmental, historical, and local factors; fishers must try torespond to the changing needs of the global market fromwith-in this net (McGoodwin 2002; Breton et al. 2006; Berkes2008; Fraga et al. 2008; Evans and Andrew 2009).Sometimes they are over-capitalized, which can become aneconomic and social trap (Fernández 2006; Acheson 2015).Shore and small-scale fisheries are focused on extracting andmarketing any aquatic CPR (Degnbol and McCay 2006;Ruddle and Satria 2010; Pomeroy 2011). Under theseschemes, fishers frequently opt for IUU capture practices,negatively affecting this activity’s sustainability.

Fishing implies risks or unforeseen circumstances that fish-ers must manage: resource variability and perishability, risksimplied by the medium, seasonality, market fluctuations, andinstitutional regulations. Social collaboration networks play afundamental role in dealing with temporal-spatial variations infishery populations, recruitment, zone regulations, and marineecosystem destruction (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2009; Ostromet al. 1999; García and Fonseca 2011; Neis and Ommer 2014).

On the Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico, theOctopus maya fish-ery is a very important fishery resource subject to the socio-economic conditions of the regional fisher population. Manyinvolved in the shore and small-scale fisheries opt to use ille-gal and undeclared practices, raising the questions of whatdecisions drive them to adopt these practices? How does so-cial diversity in coastal communities affect these decisions?And do fishers consider immediate, short-term financial gainto be the most important factor when making these decisions?The present study objective was to identify the relationshipbetween socioeconomic and biological variables, and howthese affect the decisions that lead fishers to engage in illegaland undeclared capture.

Materials and methods

Very few studies have addressed O. maya biology in the Gulfof Mexico, and the socioeconomic and institutional elementsthat affect the fishery, including aspects of illegal and unde-clared capture. Based on the CPR concept (Ostrom et al.1999), analyses of legal and biological dimensions related toO. maya were included in the present study. Fishery, socio-economic, and biological behavior associated with O. mayawere studied in two communities in the state of Campeche,Mexico, using a combined synchronic/diachronic approach. Atemporal axis was included in the selection of indicators in theyears 2006 and 2016, comprising the synchronic aspect of thestudy, and responses and catches were compared between thetwo communities. The research is based on two ethnographicmoments when questionnaires were applied based on mea-sured variables and behavior in the O. maya fishery. To pro-vide a broad panorama of the process, the etic (observationfrom the researcher’s perspective) and emic (observation fromthe interviewers or subjects’ perspective) were constantlymonitored in both the synchronic and diachronic perspectives(Harris 1976). Questionnaire results were used to select twosmall-scale fishing communities: one was a highly committedno-risk community (Isla Arena) (Beck 2013; Huchim-Laraet al. 2016) while the other was under risk and included cap-italization even when making risky decisions (Villa Madero)(FAO 2002; Berkes 2008). The categories of risky communi-ties were derived after our fieldworks and it is a proxy explo-ration. The former (IA) takes advantages to conservation ac-tivities to sustain the daily lives, same we noticed the increas-ing illegal activities and the later, VMmet more illegal fishingactivities like a form to take advantage in decision-making.

Research design

Analysis was done of data collected from questionnaires ap-plied to a sample of the population and from fishing records(Ponce-Díaz et al. 2013). As a qualitative method, the

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questionnaire model was used to collect data on catchmethods and changes over time. A total of 104 questionnaireswere applied: 78 in 2006 and 26 in 2016 (all related to the2006 questionnaire round). The size of the sample was select-ed by a non probabilistic method (Pérez Tejada 2008) Itemswere organized by domains under a mixed questionnairescheme, with some closed items (verbal protocol comparativescale) and some open items (García 2003). The social organi-zation level is not relevant in our discussion because the maintechnique utilized (questionnaire) was applied selecting fish-ers individually in a horizon time (two fishing seasons, 2006and 2016) and looking for the experience, the know-how tech-niques, and fishing methods. In the section of maturity andcatch analysis was done with two season data (2005 and2006).

Legal and social dimensions of O. maya capture

Octopus is one of the most significant fisheries inMexico; it is11th in terms of volume but fourth in terms of monetary value.On the country’s Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea coasts, itis the most important fishery in terms of volume and the sec-ond in terms of value. It is among the largest octopod fisheriesin the world. Fishing activity in the state of Campeche isdiverse and complex, and involves large numbers of fishers.Normally, approximately 12,000 fishers work along the state’scoast. However, during octopus season, an additional 10,000fishers join the activity, many from inland locations and evenfrom other states (e.g., Tabasco, Chiapas, Yucatan, andVeracruz).

Regulation of the O. maya fishery began in 1993 withfederal regulation NOM-008-PESC-1993 (SEPESCA 1993).Over time, this has been modified, and the current applicableregulation is NOM-008-SAG/PESC-2015 (SAGARPA 2016).This regulates fishing gear (gareteo), vessel type (small ves-sels along the Campeche coast, 10 m), minimum permissableorganism size (mantle length, 110 mm), and permit holderadministrative responsibilities (catch records, periodic sub-mission to fisheries authorities, notice of arrival per trip, andproviding data to monitors). It also includes clear prohibitions:use of stone crabMenippe mercenaria or terrestrial organismsas bait is not permitted; the same holds for use of unauthorizedfishing gear and methods, use of explosives, and omitting/falsifying data. In this zone (Yucatan Peninsula andCaribbean Sea), closed season for O. maya normally extendsfrom 16 December to 31 July (NOM-009-PESC-1993,SEPESCA 1994). The most widely used and only permittedfishing gear in the Campeche O. maya fishery is known asgareteo. It is unique to the region, selective and sustainable,resulting in no incidental capture. Fishers also use their knowl-edge of the species’ feeding habits. Illegal practices such asdiving, closed season harvest, and taking of undersize individ-uals or spent females are increasingly used.

Six communities in Campeche have been reported as par-ticipating in commercial O. maya capture: Sabancuy,Champoton, Villa Madero, Seybaplaya, Lerma-Campeche,and Isla Arena (Solís et al. 1999; Arreguín et al. 2000;Markaida et al. 2017). The communities of Isla Arena andVilla Madero were included in the present study (Fig. 1).Isla Arena (IA) is located in the northern extreme of the stateof Campeche and is inside the Ria Celestun BiosphereReserve (a federal natural protected area administered fromCelestun in the state of Yucatan). Its 754 inhabitants live in amoderate degree of marginalization. Villa Madero (VM) is inthe municipality of Champoton, south of the capital city ofCampeche, and is not officially considered a fishing port(SEDESOL 2010). Its 3954 inhabitants live in a high degreeof marginalization (the degree of marginalization is based onSEDESOL (Social Development Ministry 2010) taking intoaccount mainly the education proficiency, health access, sala-ries minimum, sanitary water, and lodging access).

O. maya biology: maturity and catch size

Endemic to the waters west and north of the YucatanPeninsula (Voss and Solís 1966), O. maya has a repro-ductive period spanning from November to February,with peak reproductive activity in November andDecember (Solís et al. 1999; Arreguín et al. 2000).The open season (1 August–15 December) overlapswith a portion of this period, although most of it isnominally within the closed season (16 December–31July) (Solís et al. 1999). During this period, femaleO. maya deposits fertilized eggs in a cave or otherrefuge, which they then guard to ventilate the nest andprevent predators from entering (Solís et al. 1999). Thefemales do not feed during this period and are thereforenot susceptible to capture with legal methods, althoughthey are exposed to illegal methods.

For the purposes of the present study, O. maya capturewas defined as furtive if it involved illegal methods and/oroccurred during the closed season. Illegal capture wasdefined as the catching of individuals smaller than thelegal minimum size based on mantle length (ML =110 mm) or spent females. A total of 4269 organismswere sampled that had been collected from landings inthe 2005 and 2006 seasons. Individuals were chosen ran-domly for the meristic sample, in an effort to include allsizes and maturity stages. Mantle length (ML) was mea-sured, sex confirmed by visual identification of the go-nads (S), and sexual maturity stage (SMS) indicated basedon an established O. maya maturation scale (Guerra andManríquez 1980; Arkhipkin 1992; Jiménez-Badillo et al.2008). Furtive capture was quantified using the percent-age of landed spent females as an indicator under theunderstanding that spent females can only be captured

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using the illegal practice of diving. Illegal and furtivecapture was also measured using a combination of SMS,ML, and percentage of spent females.

Statistics

Data were analyzed with confidence intervals (95%) formeans with Z and F, and a one-way ANOVA (Zar 2009).Analyses were run with the Excel ver. 1703 and IBM SPSSStatistics ver. 23 programs. The size of the sample of thequestionnaire follows up a non probabilistic currently methodknown as snowball or chain of selecting informants (PérezTejada 2008). This method has the opportunity to collect in-formation in the underground economy or informal activitiesthat are impossible to collect in official institutions because areconsidered not habitual, same if the informants are in a col-laborative networking with other groups. The approach iscomplicated when arrives the fieldwork, the veracity of theanswers by the side of the users required a constant monitor-ing using qualitative methods. The researcher needs a goodcapacity for the techniques and to apply good questions.

Results

In an effort to interconnect the results with the synchronic anddiachronic focuses used in the study, the results are presentedby dimension, starting with official reports, and followed bysocial parameters, economic parameters, and finally biologicalcatch data.

Fishing activity and O. maya catch in Campeche

To regulate O. maya catch in the waters of the YucatanPeninsula, the Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería,Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación SAGARPA (2014)fixed permissable catch quotas at 10,500 t in 2005 (7206 tcaught) and 11,270 t in 2006 (10,138 t caught). Campeche’s523 km of coast experience intense fishing activity, with an-nual production ranging from 40,000 to 56,000 t annually.Relative to national fisheries production, the state is the eighthlargest producer by volume and the sixth by value; octopus isthe state’s largest fishery. The commercial value ofCampeche’s fishing production has increased over time,

Fig. 1 The study location. Modified from Markaida et al. (2017)

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surpassing MXP$1,063,184 in 2012 (USD$70,879); O. mayaaccounted for 27% of this total. Annual volume of theO. maya fishery in Campeche between 1997 and 2013 fluctu-ated, with peaks in 2001, 2006, and 2012 (this was a histori-cally high catch of 9614 t) (CONAPESCA 2013). Frequently,the researchers need to work in the absence of data transpar-ency.Mexico improved this mechanism by law but there is notguarantee to have the corresponding statistical way.

Demography and economy in decision-makingin the O. maya fishery

Octopus capture in Campeche is limited to O. maya. Itcan only be fished by small-scale vessel of which therewere 3776 active and registered in 2013. The O. mayafishery is organized into production units in the form offishing cooperatives (255) as well as other forms of socialorganization (144) (CONAPESCA 2013). Decision-making is vital within the organizational levels of thefishery (e.g., cooperatives, families, vessels) given theimmense diversity of choices implied by the knowledge,skills, abilities, and other attributes, such as success andrisk management, assumed by participating fishers. Aspart of this process, fishers function in one or more roles(at times switching between them). These roles follow anascending hierarchy of approximately five levels: appren-tice, loader (alijero; fisher on a personal, smaller boat),vessel captain (or one who accompanies a larger vessel),permit holder (financed fisher, company owner), and other(based on interviews, these include divers and intermedi-aries known as Bcoyotes^). In this hierarchy, the alijeroand vessel captain obtained the same benefits from thecatch, although the alijero had less responsibility.BOthers^ included those engaged in illegal and undeclaredfishing, such as divers, off-season fishers, and coyotes.

During the two seasons included in the study, fisherage fell within a confidence interval of 38 to 43 years

(F = 1.389, p = 0.241, nsd). Use of fishing methodschanged over the 10 years between the first and seconddata collections, with increased use of diving and a mixedstrategy (gareteo/diving) (Fig. 2). Those who usedgareteo had an average of 21 years’ experience whilethose using diving had 11 years. At both study locations,the use of a mixed strategy was only reported in the 2016season, and those who used it had an average of 27 years’experience (Table 1). During the 2006 season, most of theinterviewees (92%) in both communities stated they usedgareteo and 2% decided not to respond. By 2016, thepercentage stating they used only gareteo dropped to73%, while 23% admitted to using a mixed strategy (div-ing/gareteo), and 4% used only diving. In 2006, only twoalijeros (20 and 32 years of age) admitted to using diving.In 2016, fisher age ranged from 26 to 67, regardless ofactivity.

Different O. maya fishing strategies required varying in-vestments in fuel and time. For example, diving used an av-erage of 85 l/day of fuel while a mixed strategy used 71 l/dayand gareteo 39 l/day (sd, F = 4.701, p = 0.004). The distancecovered also changed according to strategy: diving, □ = 22 km(CI = 1–250, p = 0.05); gareteo, □ = 29 km (CI = 19–39, p =0.05); and mixed, □ = 56 km (CI = 1–132, p = 0.05).

Bait species and costs were different at each community.The preferred bait species at IAwere Libinia emarginata (spi-der crab) and Rhithropanopeus harrisii (mud crab), whereas atVM, Callinectes sapidus (blue crab) was preferred. At bothlocations, bait was supplied through the local market (50%),brought from other states (45%), and caught directly whenpossible (5%). Both bait costs and the required investmentfor the catch were higher at IA than VM (Table 1).

Investment in boats and motors was higher in 2016 than in2006 at both communities. In contrast, the cost of poles at VMincreased minimally because fishers planned ahead for lossesfrom movement and speed by purchasing six to eight units pervessel (Table 1). In 2006, 60% of the interviewed fishers used

Fig. 2 Years of fisher experienceinO. maya fishery, by communityand catch season with the fishingmethod (mixed, gareteo, diving,and not answer (NR); source, datafrom fieldwork)

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GPS and radios, and in 2016, this had increased to 90%. Somefishers at IA had the additional expense of transport from nearbyinland towns (e.g., Tancuche, Santa Cruz, San Antonio Siho,Pucnachen, and Halacho).

Fisher perspectives about fishing activity

Additional questionnaire items addressed organization of thefishing activity and its relationship with the authorities. Onthe permitting process, 50% of interviewed fishers stated thatthe process was slow and 60% observed corruption in the sys-tem. For 40% of the interviewees, the main problem in theO. maya fishery was predation, 30% did not respond, 20%believed it to be a lack of agreements, and 10% provided mul-tiple answers blaming the authorities. When asked how welltheir community honored the closed season, 40% in IA saidtheir community did so, while in VM only 10% said they did.Notably, 58% chose not to respond when asked about theirpersonal honoring of the closed season. Items addressing re-sourcemanagement showed 79% thought not enoughmeasureswere implemented to protect the species and minimize the im-pact of illegal and furtive capture. Proposals for better manage-ment mainly (55%) focused on coordination with the authori-ties, 10% mentioned negotiation of applicable rules, 8% mademore radical proposals, 5% proposed new prohibitions, and22% did not respond. As far as how the resource would respondif barely sustainable practices were to continue, 40% believed itwould become exhausted over the medium to long term, 23%thought it would remain unchanged, 19% were not sure whatwould happen over time, and 18% did not respond.

Maturity and catch size analysis

Taking into account two seasons (2005 and 2006) from anO. Maya sample analyzing maturity and catch size, thelater showed 38% of the landed individuals to be imma-ture (n = 1618; ML = 96–97 mm; p = 0.05), 24% to be

maturing (n = 1011; ML = 105–107 mm; p = 0.05), 38%to be mature (n = 1615; ML = 112–113 mm; p = 0.05),and 1% to be spent (n = 25; ML = 109–120 mm; p =0.05). Clearly, 39% of the catch consisted of individualsoutside the official size range (i.e., immature individualsand spent females); the remaining 60% were of legal size(i.e., maturing and mature). In the 2005 and 2006 seasons,over 50% of the catch was not of legal size regarding theOfficial Mexican Rule (NOM-008-SAG/PESC-2015;SAGARPA 2016), meaning the fishers in both communi-ties had made decisions to use illegal techniques (Fig. 3).Spent females were recorded only at VM. Only in themonth of November did all catches fall within the officialsize range.

Discussion

Use of the diachronic dimension in the present results high-lights the economic and sociocultural importance of theO. maya fishery. The synchronic dimension reflects the fish-ers’ decision-making process and the consequently greaterpressure it has placed on fishery resources.

Official data for legal O. maya catch in the state ofCampeche indicate that it has increased over time, with peaksapproximately every 6 years. These data obviously do notreflect the reality of this fishery’s commercial chain, in whichlegal and illegal fishing practices are combined to produce agenerally financially successful result. This in turn allows thecountry, the state, and even individuals to justify these eco-nomic riches while sidestepping the impacts this de factooverfishing will have on the resource’s sustainability and itsassociated consequences in the communities that depend on it.Combining legal and illegal practices makes sense to permitholders as an overall approach to maximizing profits. It is aclear decision for them to add additional fishers since the samestrategy is applied by the other permit holders sharing the

Table 1 Social, economic, andperception data for O. maya catchin the towns of Isla Arena andVilla Madero in 2006 and 2016

Factor Isla Arena Villa Madero

2006 2016 2006 2016

Age range (years) 20–66 13–78

Years’ experience gareteo (□) 17 30 21 21

Years’ experience diving (□) No data 10 12

Years’ experience mixed methods (□) 24 7 34

Bait costs (price/kg) $35 $58 $17 $74

Boat maintenance costs (□) $6144 $11,200 $3221 $15,500

Fuel costs gareteo (l/day) 37 38 49 71

Distance traveled from coast (km) 33 21 37 44

Distance traveled from coast, diving (km) No data 3 14

Source, questionnaires applied in 2006 and 2016

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CPR. As Larkin (1977:6) states: B… what prevails is the mar-ket of money as unlimited profit….^

A major challenge with illegal fishing is its complex, dif-fuse nature, and the lack of transparency in the markets forfishing-related inputs and resources (Bórquez et al. 2009;Ballesteros and Rodriguez-Rodriguez 2018). It also mobilizesimmense amounts of money across the globe. Large marketslike the USA, Russia, China, and Japan establish prices anddemand in response to consumption levels; illegal fishingpractices are also deeply rooted in their fisheries (Pramodet al. 2014). What portion illegal fishing constitutes of fisher-ies varies by country and fishery. For instance, overall illegaland undeclared fishing is over 40% of legal fishing levels(Agnew et al. 2009). In the USA, conservative statistics indi-cate that illegal and undeclared catch represented from 20 to32% of fishery products in 2011 (Pramod et al. 2014). On thePacific Coast of Mexico, illegally caught abalone represents27% of the commercial catch, and the illegal lobster catch is5% of the commercial catch (Ponce-Díaz et al. 2013). In thecurrent results, interview responses were used to calculate theproduction of furtive practices at 8%, whereas the biologicaldata (i.e., immature and below-minimum size individuals andspent females) showed illegal practices to produce 39% of thecatch. This discrepancy between declared and actual illegalcatch levels, and incomplete and/or untrustworthy fishery da-ta, highlights the difficulties of applying any kind of partici-patory social action proposal.

To understand the environment that social agents in thisfishery consider when making decisions, the factors identifiedas most relevant in this process were fisher and permit holderage, years of experience, role in the activity, and financialprofit.

In Isla Arenas (IA), fishers entered the activity withina narrower age range, largely young adults of produc-tive age, and a very few elderly people. Fishers in VM,in contrast were of a much broader age range, includingmany of parenting age.

Younger permit holders were more likely to promote unsus-tainable practices such as diving, illegal gear, and closed seasonharvest, and to focus on immediate financial gain. Boat captainsin VM had more years of experience than those in IA, whilepermit holders in IA hadmore experience than their counterpartsin VM. There was also a generation gap between fishers 25 to39 years of age and those 60 to 64 years of age. This is importantbecause the different generations expressed different perceptionsof resource management and fishing gear; for example, diverswere younger. Another example is that VM permit holders, whocontrol the local market, have participated in this fishery for lesstime and are younger than those in IA, and they therefore tend totake more risks (Huchim-Lara et al. 2016). Accelerated, com-petitive, and neoliberal production practices have made fishinginto a social risk production activity (Beck 2013; Vázquez 2006;Korstanje 2010). Fishers weigh economic, environmental, cul-tural, and social factors when deciding which fishing technique(and variations thereof) to apply. Decisions are made based onthe known risk assumed with the use of illegal and/or controlledmethods, and the goal of immediate economic gain.

Financial criteria were also included in decision-making.Prior investment and bait costs were higher in IA, whereasfuel costs and distance from the coast were higher at VM.Divers required investments less than a quarter of those madeby those using gareteo.

Diversification and intensification were adaptive strategiesadopted by fishers in response to process intensity.Diversifying the ways to solve or confront an environmentalproblem was applied as a Bdiffusion of risk^ that broadenedthe alternatives for facing the environmental process.Intensifying the use of new (albeit illegal) strategies helpedto compensate for the risk effect through investment (Beck2013; Korstanje 2010).

The fishers of each studied community expressed differentvisions of the CPR. A protectionist discourse including a self-monitoring agreement prevailed in IA, although they wereunable to prevent illegal or furtive catch by other fishers,

Fig. 3 Catch maturity by sex inVilla Madero and Isla Arena,2005 and 2006 seasons. Dottedline indicates the officialminimum size: mantle length,110 mm (source, data fromfieldwork)

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especially those they subcontracted from nearby communities.In VM, the fishers approached the resource as a prospect forimmediate financial gain.

Fisher perspectives of official corruption in the fisheriessector are at least partially justified given the absence of datatransparency. In a recent study, the data produced by theNational Fisheries Commission (Comisión Nacional dePesca (CONAPESCA)) were found to be inadequate to eval-uate its management of fishing rights, subsidies, andinspection/monitoring (Hayashida et al. 2016). Particularlyin terms of inspection/monitoring the CONAPESCA doesnot have consolidated data on its activities.

The interviewed fishers were generally aware of the declinein the O. maya fishery. However, they opted to depersonalizeit, deny responsibility for their actions and their consequences,and blame the authorities. As an economic activity, theO. maya fishery (legal + illegal + furtive + undeclared) func-tions within a scheme of communities at risk; that is, an activ-ity can be carried out and continued without taking personalresponsibility for it (Beck 2013; Huchim et al. 2016). This isexacerbated by the general perception of official corruption inthe sector. In VM, the fishers acknowledged that they did nothonor the closed season and had decided to give more weightto financial criteria than sustainable use criteria. Those at IA,in contrast, maintained that they tended to give more weight tofollowing sustainable use criteria.

Federal fishing authorities have continued to use arbitraryannual catch limits. Illegal fishing practices result in real catchstatistics that clearly differ from official numbers, makinggovernment studies and reports a flimsy baseline from whichto try control the O. maya fishery. Since official data does notreflect reality and is thus untrustworthy, and because accurateinformation based on landings is not collected, establishingmanagement plans and programs, for O. maya or any otherspecies, becomes a very complex venture (Arbex 2006).

If the environmental problem or process is solved or im-proved, or conditions change for the better, use of the presentstrategies in this CPR will incur lower economic, social, andbiological costs for the system. In contrast, if the negativeprocesses in this environmental process remain unchangedor worsen, the strategies will become more exposed and couldcollapse the system, leaving a thin margin for resilience(Walker et al. 2004).

In communities, decision-making melds with individ-uals’ identification of the territory, which, in conjunctionwith time, allows reappropriation of CPRs and nature.Over time and in a given territory, tradition and modernityfuse within local structures, favoring the resilience of so-cial groups (Leff 2005). Although the interweaving ofsocial, cultural, and economic aspects in the O. maya fish-ery is extremely complex, social actors in both the studiedcommunities expressed interest in co-management pro-posals for this vital CPR. This is important because, as

stated in Ostrom’s (2009) collective action theory andsocial theory, CPRs are more likely to be better managedif certain conditions are present: user access to accurate,trustworthy opportune data; user acceptance of reciprocalresponsibility; clear regulations and rules; and monitoringand fulfillment supervised by the social actors involved(García and Fonseca 2011). Research and communitycoastal resource management proposals are the best meanstowards a social-territorial governance that guaranteesfisher well-being.

Conclusions

Current regulations in the Campeche O. maya fishery drivefishers to make decisions that intensify exploitation levels andthus temporarily increase profit margins for those who contin-ue fishing. The intent of these regulations is to prevent over-capitalization in the sector, assuming savings in investmenttowards capital that would be surplus. However, this situationproduces extraordinary profits, constantly increasing pressurefor new actors to enter the sector and leading to continuoussocial and political pressure to ignore imposed limits. It alsogenerates strong social, economic, and environmental pres-sure without improving the fishery and diminishes CPR avail-ability. Illegal and furtive fishing practices are the logical re-sponse to this situation as is increasing corruption in regula-tory institutions.

Illegal, furtive, and undeclared fishing will continue to beconsidered options in the O. maya fishery as long as massiveextraction for financial gain is promoted, and no effort is madeto begin negotiations to reach coastal management agreementsin every affected community while legal instruments are rein-forced. Agreements need to consider official regulations, spe-cies biology, and community sociocultural context. Fishingcommunities establish their own regulatory institutions andprofits are managed by permit holders, who have beenbypassed in co-management plans in Mexico. In the dynamicof illegal/furtive/undeclared fishing, fishers (as wage earners)require more attention than investors/capitalists (i.e.,intermediaries/permit holders); the latter must manage thepressure for immediate financial gain generated by interna-tional markets.

Greater data flow at all levels of the fisheries sector isneeded to promote empowerment of the involved social actorswhile also assigning them specific responsibilities and actionsin their communities. This is increasingly important sincethese same social actors understand that prioritizing economicvalues over CPR sustainability over the medium termwill leadto collapse of Campeche’s most significant fishery.

On an academic level, holistic research is needed inMexico to better understand the fisheries sector and participatein the joint search for solutions. Further study is also needed

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on how theO. maya stock is affected by decisions to engage inillegal/furtive/undeclared fishing practices. The lens of imple-mentation of SSF-FAO (Small-scale fisheries Food andAgriculture Organization) Guidelines will be needed in thiskind of studies and we need for the future perspective aboutCampeche fishing communities a governance andgovernability analysis (Kooiman et al. 2005). This articlekeeps one dimension of the fisher behavior and decision-mak-ing, where they decided to go out to capture commercial spe-cies like the O. Maya. The fishers manage economic advan-tages searching better technologies that they buy sometimewith money comes from illegal activities. They need to gofar reaching target species. Market is the voice of the fishers,the state control remains in the last corner of the world, andfishing cooperatives are now fragmented and almost collaps-ing in a private sector that only profits are the main voices(Sommers González 2007). By the side of the profits from thecaptures are managed by the holders of fishing permits (targetspecies). Sometimes, the fishing communities establish theirown regulatory mechanisms as users with customs.

We need more ethnographic studies in the world likeBallesteros and Rodriguez-Rodriguez in Galicia, Spain(2018), Bórquez et al. (2009), and Ponce-Díaz et al. (2013).Finally, this article is an incentive for students and researcherslooking for human-fishing interaction or ecosystem approachin fisheries.

Acknowledgements The authors thank Dr. Unai Markaida Aburto forassistance with the fieldwork and Rocío Saide Albornoz from theMaritime Anthropology Laboratory (Human Ecology Department) forthe revision of the manuscript. This manuscript benefited greatly fromthe comments and observations of reviewers and the editorial committee.The research was financially supported by the National Council forScience and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología(CONACYT)) and the Program for Teacher ’s ProfessionalDevelopment (Programa para el Desarrollo Profesional Docente(PRODEP)). It was also supported by the Colegio de la Frontera Sur(ECOSUR) Campeche doctoral program.

Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdiction-al claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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