DEBATE DOCTORS DEBATE BRIEFS · DEBATE DOCTORS 2016 6 U.S. MILITARY AND OKINAWA MARCH 2016 PFD...

THE U.S. MILITARY AND

OKINAWA

MARCH 2016 PFD TOPIC:

Resolved: The United States

should withdraw its military

presence from Okinawa.

DEBATE DOCTORS DEBATE BRIEFS

DEBATE DOCTORS 2016 1 U.S. MILITARY AND OKINAWA


Resolved: The United States should withdraw its military presence from

Okinawa.

Contents EXAMINING THE RESOLUTION............................................................................................... 4

PRO Strategy: ............................................................................................................................. 5

CON Strategy: ............................................................................................................................. 6

PRO SPEECH ................................................................................................................................. 7

POINT 1: CURRENT US MILITARY PRESENCE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED

GLOBALLY ........................................................................................................................... 7

POINT 2: CIVIL SOCIETY DOES NOT SUPPORT MILITARIZATION ON OKINAWA7

POINT 3: CHANGE CAN ONLY COME FROM NATIONS IN THE REGION ................ 8

PRO EVIDENCE ............................................................................................................................ 9

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS COSTLY ............................................ 10

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IS NOT AIDED BY MILITARY PRESENCE IN

OKINAWA ............................................................................................................................... 11

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA COMPLICATES US/JAPANESE

RELATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 12

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA HARMS LOCAL POPLUATIONS 13



JAPAN CAN HANDLE CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE .............................................. 16

JAPAN DOES NOT NEED AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT ..................................................................................................................... 17

JAPAN DOES NOT NEED AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT ..................................................................................................................... 18

A UNITED ASIAN ALLIANCE IS PERFERABLE TO CONTINUED AMERICAN

MILITARY PRESENCE .......................................................................................................... 19

A UNITED ASIAN ALLIANCE IS PERFERABLE TO CONTINUED AMERICAN

MILITARY PRESENCE .......................................................................................................... 20

THE ISSUES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA ARE COMPLEX AND NOT JUST MILITARY

PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................................. 21

THE ISSUES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA ARE COMPLEX AND NOT JUST MILITARY

PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................................. 22




Okinawa.

CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION FACES HEAVY PROTEST ........................................ 23

CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION FACES HEAVY PROTEST ........................................ 24

JAPANESE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IS PERFERABLE TO AMERICAN MILITARY

DEPLOYMENT ....................................................................................................................... 25


DEPLOYMENT ....................................................................................................................... 26


DEPLOYMENT ....................................................................................................................... 27

MILITARIZATION OF OKINAWA HAS UNCERTAIN RESULTS.................................... 28

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON MORE THAN MILITARY POWER ...... 29

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON MORE THAN MILITARY POWER ...... 30

CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS POLITICALLY RISKY .................. 31

CON SPEECH .............................................................................................................................. 32

POINT 1: CHINA IS ACTIVELY TRYING TO UNDERMINE US AND JAPANESE

NATIONAL INTERESTS .................................................................................................... 32

POINT 2: OKINAWA IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH JAPAN AND THE US................... 33

POINT 3: EVEN IF THE US MIILTARY LEAVES, THERE WILL BE A NEGATIVE

PERCEPTION ...................................................................................................................... 33

CON EVIDENCE ......................................................................................................................... 35

CHINA IS EXPANDING MILITARILY ................................................................................. 36



CHINA IS SECRETIVE OF IT’S MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA .................. 39

OKINAWA SERVES AS LYNCPIN FOR JAPANESE-US MILITARY ALLIANCE ......... 40

CONTINUED AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED IN THE SOUTH CHINA

SEA ........................................................................................................................................... 42

CHINA DOES NOT RESPECT JAPANESE CLAIMS .......................................................... 43

RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AMERICAN PRESENCE IN OKINAWA ARE FALLACIES

................................................................................................................................................... 44

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED .............................................................. 45





Okinawa.

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DESIRES AMERICAN MILITARY AID ..................... 47



EVEN NATIVES DESIRE MILITARY PRESENCE ............................................................. 50

MILITARY POWER IS ONLY ONE PART OF OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY ............... 51

MILITARY POWER IS ONLY ONE PART OF OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY ............... 53

LACK OF MILITARY PRESENCE IS GLOBALLY CRITICIZED ...................................... 54



WITHOUT A STRONG ALLIANCE OF COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA,


WITHOUT A STRONG ALLIANCE OF COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA,





Okinawa.

EXAMINING THE RESOLUTION Dylan Lee, Editor

This topic is one that largely depends on the perception of those examining the issue. US

military presence in Okinawa was established at the end of WWII. It was one of several locations

to host the US military up to the present. The need for this presence is directly linked to the

treaties signed by both nations at the end of the war. Japan agreed to reduce its military

spending to no more than 1% of its GDP annually. Consequently, it’s military spending remains

small. The last recorded military increases came in 2002 and 2013 respectively. This pittance of

a military budget is balanced by a US promise in the same treaty to provide military support

should Japan even need it.

This military relationship has persisted for more than 60 years. In that time, there has

been tremendous backlash by native populations for many reasons. There have been

environmental impacts which have harmed native species. There has also been complaints of

noise pollution and increased levels of violence, one notable case being the rape of a Japanese

school girl by three service men in 1995 which propelled US military presence in Okinawa to the

forefront of debated military policies.

Many argue that while there may have been good reasons for the terms set down at the

end of WWII, in the present political atmosphere there is little reason to keep Japanese military

power at such low levels. Japan and many other South East Asian states have been embroiled in

a conflict with China over right-to-travel issues in the South China Sea. China claims up to 90%

of the area, a claim disputed by these nations and the US. With current Chinese military buildup

and its increasing economic might, China represents a clear danger to the national interests of

both Japan and the US. Of course, as stated above, the use of the word “danger” is subjective

and China would undoubtedly say the same things about the US and Japan. Regardless of what

side you choose to take, the reality is that this conflict is one of the primary reasons that US

military power in the region is a complex issue. Without this threat, some argue that there would

be little to keep the US military at its Japanese bases.

This ignores the overarching US practice of placing bases all over the world so as to be

able to react at any time to any threat it may face. This is an issue of military strategy and has its

own pros and cons. This is obviously a VERY brief overview of the state of US military presence

on Okinawa. One very important point which must be made before we dive into analyzing the

cases in this brief is that while the resolution calls specifically for military presence in Okinawa

stay or go, the pros and cons that will be discussed are not limited to that one military location.




Okinawa.

This should be kept in mind while debating the issues as any arguments that are made should be

framed in the larger context of US and Japanese military policy.

PRO STRATEGY:

The Pro case lays out the limitations of current US military power. By showing that the conflicts

it has been involved in in the past few years have drained its ability to operate efficiently in areas

where there is less instability. And make no mistake, while there is an acknowledgment that there

is tension with China, there is little instability in comparison with the Middle East or Africa.

This leads us to the second point which notes the lack of public support among Japanese

nationals for continued or increased US military presence. This is a vital point as it leads to a

negative perception and less willingness to participate in cooperative endeavors. A lack of civil

support delays the preparation needed to deal with large scale issues such as conflict with China

in the South China Sea. If that is the case, then what is the solution? Obviously it falls on japan

and its neighbors to tame the beast that is China. While the evidence notes that such cooperation

is not currently in place, it does note that there is a clear correlation between regional pressure

and the cooling of China’s aggressive stances.

The strong point of this case is that it allows the Pro to bypass the typical arguments associated

with military power. The Con will undoubtedly argue that only military power can address the

issues that both sides acknowledge exist, but they will be unable to show that there is undisputed

proof that military power has the capability to overcome the problems laid out in this case. It

comes down to the fact that there is no way to measure the impact of military presence on a

conflict that hasn’t happened. Whereas there is still very real instability in the Middle East which

has drawn the attention of the US over the past few years.

What the Pro needs to be careful of is not allowing the Con to draw them into a discussion of

American responsibility toward Japan due to the treaty signed after WWII. The correct response

to that argument is that continued US military presence prevents Japan from building its own

military structures and harms the ability of the region to counter China’s expansion policies,

especially since it has been demonstrated that the US has not been successful at countering the

problem on its own. By sticking to the reality of the situation the Pro demonstrates that there is

little practical reason for keeping a military presence in Okinawa.




Okinawa.

CON STRATEGY:

The Con case starts off by establishing that is a real problem being presented by China

towards the US and Japan. By showing that both nations are threatened by the expansionist

policies of China’s military, we link the two in a very tangible way. Without that being

established, the Con would face a difficult time in justifying US policy in light of a very real

public backlash related to the issues mentioned at the beginning of this paper. This being the

case, we establish Okinawa as the lynchpin for this combined military cooperation. Many cases

will try to lump Okinawa into a larger military policy perpetrated by the US, but this will force

them to justify the resolution solely on the merits of this particular location.

This is all assisted by noting that there is no way for the US military to win in the public

arena whether it stays or goes. Since it has been established that there is a real need to counter

China’s influence in the region and that Japan and the US both have interest as stake, then the

fear of public backlash should not prevent these nations from operating in the manner most

conducive to doing so. In this case, it is using Okinawa as a military base to assist in securing

national interests of both countries.

The danger in this case lies in the fact that we choose to disregard the native people

living on Okinawa in favor of a broader military policy. While it can boil down to utilitarian

mentality, we would encourage the Con to focus on the fact that this is done with the intention of

comprehensive protections for both nations. This cuts off the risk of losing moral ground and

allows the Con to assert that it has the most practical solution to the issues at hand.

Overall, we predict that this topic will provide both sides with great experience in

discussing present and historical issues that are present in our society. As always, we encourage

you to do your research, learn what you can, and most importantly; HAVE FUN!

Good luck!

~The Doctors~




Okinawa.

PRO SPEECH

My partner and I are Resolved: The United States should withdraw its military presence

from Okinawa.

We will demonstrate that the continued presence of the US military in Okinawa detracts from the

overall US military power and at the same time is less effective than other approaches.

POINT 1: CURRENT US MILITARY PRESENCE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED

GLOBALLY

"A Global Test Of American Power." YaleGlobal Online (2015).

The United States can still wield great global influence in terms of political and military power.

Many nations and US citizens, too, expect the United States to police the globe by guaranteeing

borders, reassuring allies, guaranteeing freedom of navigation for trade. But use of such power is

costly. Military power also does not guarantee territorial control or winning over populations as

shown in the Middle East. Current disputes in Russia, the Baltic States and the South China Sea

suggest that "the control of territory is still fundamental to world politics," writes Gideon

Rachman for the Financial Times. Instability in the Middle East suggests that the US has lost

control. Some analysts even suggest that the country should reconsider its pivot to Asia and once

again make the Middle East a priority. President Barack Obama clearly does not want prolonged

conflicts, particularly with Russia or China which push back at US power and demonstrate

expansionist tendencies in their regions. Global security is needed, though some disputes could

by design encourage the United States to overextend itself.

It is common knowledge that the US has been involved in several conflicts in recent years. These

conflicts have stretched the overall ability of the military to perform globally. To continue

military support in Okinawa is irresponsible.

POINT 2: CIVIL SOCIETY DOES NOT SUPPORT MILITARIZATION ON

OKINAWA

Key-young, Son, and Ra Mason. (2013)"Building a maritime 'great wall' to contain China?

explaining Japan's recalibration of risk with the militarization of Okinawa." Asian Perspective

37.3 (2013): 437+.




Okinawa.

With an increasing number of Chinese tourists visiting Okinawa and other business opportunities

coming from Taiwan, the resistance against the militarization of the Ryukyu island chain is

relatively strong. Playing up the China threat, which is often used as a rationale for building new

military facilities, is not likely to be all that effective. With the discourses of national security

weakened after the end of the Cold War, civil society has emphasized the suffering of residents

and the environmental problems that result from the construction of new military facilities and

the introduction of new military equipment. This resistance by civil society has caused

substantial delays and revisions of the schemes to fortify the Ryukyu island chain

As this card has shown, there is little civil support for continued military presence. The overt

hostility has delayed and harmed military actions. Due the already unsustainable state of US

military policy, we turn to our final point.

POINT 3: CHANGE CAN ONLY COME FROM NATIONS IN THE REGION

"With Tensions Rising, Asia Should Not Delay Settling South China Sea Disputes." YaleGlobal

Online (2016).

Boats have been rammed, crew beaten and equipment and fishing catches stolen, according to

the Vietnamese. Over the Spratly Islands, off the coasts of the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia,

the Chinese military recently warned away a civilian aircraft chartered by the BBC. There is no

evidence that a US Navy carrier group will settle this dispute. Indeed, the challenge might make

it worse, and there are signs that China is beginning to listen. Entering office in 2012, China's

President Xi Jinping began by deepening the rift with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

He angered Vietnam by bringing an oil drilling rig into its waters and he tried to subdue the

Philippines with an economic boycott as well as making a confrontational show of force along

the Line of Control with India. Now, facing multiple and simultaneous disputes with its

neighbors, China appears to be cooling off. On both the maritime sovereignty issues, Beijing

stands isolated. In the long term, despite economic and military power, it will have to get on with

neighbors who are increasingly united and bold.

Despite any reason that the CON can state for keeping US military presence on Okinawa, better

results can be achieved through the cooperation of South Asian countries putting pressure on

China. While it is true this is a slow process, US military presence delays and prevents this from

progressing. Combined with the fact that current US military is unsustainable and the hostile

civil presence in japan towards continued militarization, there is little to suggest that keeping the

US military on the island can be supported. Therefore, we can see no other than a vote for the

PRO in today’s debate. Thank you.




Okinawa.

PRO EVIDENCE




Okinawa.

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS COSTLY

"A Global Test Of American Power." YaleGlobal Online (2015).

The United States can still wield great global influence in terms of political and military power.

Many nations and US citizens, too, expect the United States to police the globe by guaranteeing

borders, reassuring allies, guaranteeing freedom of navigation for trade. But use of such power is

costly. Military power also does not guarantee territorial control or winning over populations as

shown in the Middle East. Current disputes in Russia, the Baltic States and the South China Sea

suggest that "the control of territory is still fundamental to world politics," writes Gideon

Rachman for the Financial Times. Instability in the Middle East suggests that the US has lost

control. Some analysts even suggest that the country should reconsider its pivot to Asia and once

again make the Middle East a priority. President Barack Obama clearly does not want prolonged

conflicts, particularly with Russia or China which push back at US power and demonstrate

expansionist tendencies in their regions. Global security is needed, though some disputes could

by design encourage the United States to overextend itself.


Online (2016).

The US military is challenging China's claims to 90 percent of the South China Sea that includes

some of the world's busiest shipping lanes. "The unpredictability of the American presidential

election now heightens the risk because inevitably it will come with ramped-up anti-China

campaign rhetoric," reports BBC journalist Humphrey Hawksley. The United States and

countries in Asia are divided internally over whether intervention is the correct approach

considering that the nations of East Asia are tightly interconnected through trade and economic

ties, and the country that instigates conflict could expect condemnation. The governments of the

region could unite and take control of the matter. Hawksley notes that "A deal struck between

Washington and Beijing could trample on East Asia's more nuanced interests that might be

forgotten amid horse-trading on a basket of global issues." He points to the region's expanding

institutions and networks, and concludes that Asian leaders would display global responsibility

by resolving the conflicts over maritime borders quickly, fairly and on their own, without

depending on the United States as referee or enforcer.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IS NOT AIDED BY MILITARY PRESENCE

IN OKINAWA

Bamford, James. (2015) "Cloak and danger: could risky U.S. intelligence missions in the South

China Sea provoke war with Beijing?" Foreign Policy 215 (2015): 90+.

As tensions continue to mount between the United States and China, it's time to take a closer

look at U.S. spying practices and determine which ones aren't worth the risks involved.

Certainly, zooming planes over islands in the South China Sea--with or without a media team

present--to draw Beijing's ire seems unwise. But it's also important for the White House and

intelligence agencies to formally assess, through some kind of coordinated review process, which

routine missions are no longer necessary. With so many spy satellites now in orbit, able to

photograph even small objects on Earth and eavesdrop on everything from cell phones to radar

signals, the need for expensive air and sea operations may be overkill: spying for the sake of

spying, sometimes with lethal consequences. Given that the purpose of intelligence should be to

prevent wars rather than start them, the current U.S. administration would do well to ask when

espionage is necessary to national security--and when it simply means playing with fire.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA COMPLICATES

US/JAPANESE RELATIONS

Zhuge, Scott. [2013]"Okinawa occupied: current US naval bases in Japan." Harvard

International Review 34.3 (2013): 7+.

Being a hegemonic global power, the United States has a large presence on all the world's

continents. Although the majority of media attention has focused on the US military presence in

the Middle East, the United States also holds a strong presence in East Asia centered on the bases

in Okinawa, Japan. From the US defense point of view, the bases serve as an important strategic

check on nearby countries such as China and North Korea. Despite the strategic importance of

the bases on the international level, the foreign US military presence has spurred strong local

opposition in the Okinawa prefecture. This special arrangement in Okinawa draws in issues

ranging from major international security interests between the United States and Japan to the

systemic local impact on the lifestyle in the islands.



The Okinawa prefecture consists of a chain of islands extending from the southwestern-most

main island of Japan down toward Taiwan. During World War II, US forces launched a famous

massive amphibious assault on the Okinawa islands, resulting in a bloody battle with an

estimated 75,000 military casualties and 150,000 civilian deaths. The Allied forces emerged as

the victors and planned to stage an invasion of the Japanese mainland from the Okinawa islands.

However, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki drew Japan to surrender, removing

the need for a mainland invasion. The Treaty of Peace with Japan, which officially ended World

War II, left the Okinawa islands under US administration. However, the continued postwar

presence of US troops in Okinawa began building local resentment against the foreign

occupation. In November 1964, Eisaku Sato became the Japanese Prime Minister, and pledged to

return Okinawa back to Japanese control. Gradually, the United States began making

arrangements with Japan concerning the reversion of Okinawa. As the Vietnam War progressed

in the 1960s, the United States began to favor a less interventionist strategy in Asia. On July 25,

1969, President Nixon issued the Nixon Doctrine, which expected US security allies to handle

their own military defense, promising aid only when necessary.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA HARMS LOCAL

POPLUATIONS



Therefore, since the United States maintains the troops stationed in Okinawa, Japan spends less

than 1 percent of its GDP maintaining its purely defensive Japan Self-Defense Forces. Despite

the strategic benefits of extended deterrence that Japan enjoys on the national level, the same

cannot be said for the systemic impact of a foreign military presence on the local community in

Okinawa. The ongoing presence of the US military bases has created reports of excessive noise,

environmental pollution, and crime, prompting local opposition. These issues escalated with the

September 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old Japanese schoolgirl by three US servicemen., which

created waves of opposition to the US military presence in Okinawa, along with a challenge by

the former prefectural governor against the central Japanese government. Although that crisis

was surmounted, tensions related to the base have not desisted. Today, it remains a point of

contention between the United States and Japan--and one that will come under increased scrutiny

with the new "pivot" of the United States to Asia.

Arakaki, Robert. [2013] "U.S. bases in Okinawa." Asian Politics & Policy 5.2 (2013): 305+.

The U.S. bases in Okinawa have long been a contentious issue in Japan-U.S. relations. Much of

the controversy stems from (a) Okinawa bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of

hosting the American forces in Japan, (b) excessive noise due to the close proximity of the bases

to the local civilian population, (c) sexual assaults by U.S. service personnel on local women,

and (d) the potential destruction of Okinawa's unique environmental habitats. This has given rise

to anti-base sentiment locally in Okinawa as well as abroad in the United States and other

countries. Attempts to relocate the bases have become further complicated by China's rise as a

world power and the Obama administration's Asia-Pacific pivot.




Okinawa.


POPLUATIONS

Key-young, Son, and Ra Mason. [2013] "Building a maritime 'great wall' to contain China?


37.3 (2013): 437+.

With an increasing number of Chinese tourists visiting Okinawa and other business opportunities

coming from Taiwan, the resistance against the militarization of the Ryukyu island chain is

relatively strong. Playing up the China threat, which is often used as a rationale for building new

military facilities, is not likely to be all that effective. With the discourses of national security

weakened after the end of the Cold War, civil society has emphasized the suffering of residents

and the environmental problems that result from the construction of new military facilities and

the introduction of new military equipment. This resistance by civil society has caused

substantial delays and revisions of the schemes to fortify the Ryukyu island chain



37.3 (2013): 437+.

Takae, a small village of 160 residents in Higashi Village in northern Okinawa, has drawn

unusual media attention because villagers, anti-base protesters, and environmentalists have

joined forces to prevent the construction of six helipads (seventy-five meters each in diameter) in

addition to fifteen already in service there. The US Marine Corps Northern Training Area was

first established there in 1958 as a counter-guerrilla school in the early years of the Vietnam

War. Since July 2, 2007, in particular, the villagers and anti-base activists have launched a sit-in

protest at the main gate leading to the construction site close to the village's residential areas. The

construction project is closely tied to the relocation of the MCAS Futenma from Ginowan to

Henoko, also located in northern Okinawa, as part of steps agreed upon by the Special Action

Committee on Okinawa (SACO) (Nam and Lee 2004; Nam 2005, 2008). The committee was

formed in November 1995 between the United States and Japan to reduce the burden of the US

military presence on the people of Okinawa in the wake of the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl

by three US servicemen in September 1995.




Okinawa.


POPLUATIONS



37.3 (2013): 437+.

In spite of Japan's agreement with the United States, the protesters have argued that the noise

pollution by the V-22 Ospreys is beyond human forbearance. The Ospreys were believed to be

less noisy than the CH-46s that they replaced, but are still noisy enough to have caused a storm

of protests against an Osprey flight into a municipal airport in Brewton, Alabama, on January 19,

2011 (Shimoji 2012). Furthermore, there is a greater risk of crash, as shown by the crash landing

of the forty-year-old CH-53D transport helicopter into the campus of Okinawa International

University (OIU) just outside the MCAS at Futenma in 2004. Despite considerable resistance,

the increased deployment of Ospreys to Okinawa provides further evidence that the islands are

being maintained, and even upgraded, to mediate the risk of "China's rise." Indeed, despite the

transfer of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, the willingness to allow the operation on the

Ryukyu Islands of a craft with an extensive record of problems and fatalities confirms the degree

to which the risk of technical malfunction and resulting loss of life has been subordinated to a

portrayal of the Asia-Pacific as inherently unsafe at the interstate level. This portrayal is

premised on the risks of China's military modernization and the uncertain nature of the

relationship between state and societal actors, such as activists from both China and Taiwan.




Okinawa.

JAPAN CAN HANDLE CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE

Ezrati, Milton. "Asia's odd couple." The National Interest 141 (2016): 41+.

At the same time, the decline in America's diplomatic and military profile has intensified Indian

and Japanese anxieties. Washington, of course, has spoken endlessly of its "Asia pivot," which

both Japan and India would welcome if it had substance, but there is little sign of that so far.

Though the United States possesses overwhelming naval superiority, with a fleet of more than

one hundred large surface ships, it is also clear that Washington's huge obligations elsewhere in

the world limit how many of those ships it could commit to Asia at any one time. Comparative

trends in naval power have added to the unease. The U.S. fleet has shrunk by more than half

since 1990, when it possessed 230 large surface vessels, and seems poised to shrink further. In

this turbulent security environment, India and Japan have much to offer each other. Even a loose

cooperation between these two countries would blunt Beijing's military advantage, since Beijing,

in confronting one, would have to hold military resources back to cover the possibility of trouble

with the other.


Formal agreements between Tokyo and New Delhi have stressed both ideological and material

support for security cooperation. Their 2006 Strategic and Global Partnership Agreement and

their 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation both emphasize how the two countries

stand as Asia's major proponents of "democracy, open society, human rights, and the rule of

law." They acknowledge a "common interest in the safety of sea lines of communications," and,

not insignificantly, a common desire to "reform the United Nations, including the expansion of

[its] Security Council." They also itemize specific ways in which each will support the other,

including arrangements for regularly scheduled port calls, joint exercises and naval and

coastguard exchanges, as well as sharing technical expertise. In clear recognition of Japan's

technological advantages, as well as the opportunity opened by Japan's not-coincidental decision

to ease its rules on weapons exports, India has taken steps to purchase Japan's Soryu-class diesel-

electric submarines. India's navy already possesses fifteen submarines but acknowledges that

Japan's product is far superior. India's navy has made further plans to buy twelve Japanese-

designed, Japanese-built us-2 amphibious search-and-rescue planes. Cooperation has gone so far

that the two countries are exploring ways to manufacture the planes jointly.




Okinawa.

JAPAN DOES NOT NEED AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT


Japan's educational, technological and capital superiority suit it best for the production of high-

value, sophisticated goods and services. Any effort to produce lower-value, labor-intensive

products for itself wastes those advantages, while Japan's high wage scale makes it

uncompetitive anyway. Instead, Japan would do best to export part of its high-value products and

import simpler, lower-value items. India's economy is ideally suited to act as counter-party on

both sides. Low-value, labor-intensive products minimize the handicap imposed by that

economy's lack of capital, its technological backwardness and the low levels of education and

training generally in its workforce, while its plentiful, low-wage workforce actually gives India a

competitive edge in this area. And indeed, this is the direction in which India's economy has

moved. An overwhelming share of India's industrial workforce produces textiles and clothing,

the quintessential labor-intensive, low-value products. Despite some headlines, only a small

fraction of Indian exports are higher-tech goods and services, and even these, according to

industry sources, lean toward the less sophisticated side of the scale. The Indian government

acknowledges the situation, characterizing its own export strategy as aimed at employment for

the unskilled and semiskilled.


Online (2016).

The unpredictability of the American presidential election now heightens the risk because

inevitably it will come with ramped-up anti-China campaign rhetoric. This begs the question as

to whether it would be better for the East Asian region to sort out the dispute itself and ask the

United States to step back. Opposition to that concept within the United States itself comes from

the criticism and perceived failure of President Barack Obama's non-interventionist brand of

foreign policy. But the testing ground for this has been in the Middle East where neither

intervention nor holding back has worked well. East Asia is very different. Having picked itself

up from many wars over the past century, it has built world-class economies with strong

institutions. The region has shown how trade can be used to dampen political tensions, and how

dictatorships can transition peacefully to varying degrees of democracy. It has an enviable track

record of prioritizing trade and the future over war and historical grievances and has earned a

reputation for brave ideas - from Japan's post-war recovery to the development of the

Singaporean city-state to the economic giant that China has become.




Okinawa.

JAPAN DOES NOT NEED AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT


Online (2016).

This region now has a chance to shift away from the American security umbrella and mentorship

that has helped it get this far and show that complex, seemingly intractable problems can be

solved in-house. It has made a start. Japan has forged stronger alliances with India and Australia

and is taking a lead to balance China's economic muscle flexing through the region in the past

decade. The Japanese focus is on infrastructure with a pledge of $110 billion over the next five

years for projects such as the East-West Economic Corridor running from Vietnam, though Laos

and Thailand to Myanmar. This acts as a counterweight to China's similar investment plans

which include a high-speed rail connecting China to Singapore through Laos, Thailand and

Malaysia. Japan is running much of its investment through the the Asian Development Bank,

modeled after the World Bank, whereas China has set up its own counterpart, the Asia

Infrastructure Investment Bank.




Okinawa.

A UNITED ASIAN ALLIANCE IS PERFERABLE TO CONTINUED

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE


Online (2016).

Japan has also strengthened strategic partnerships with Indonesia and Malaysia and is helping the

Philippines and Vietnam - nations openly confronting China over the South China Sea - with

intelligence sharing and building up their maritime patrol capability. India, too, joined with Japan

to produce a joint statement from two of Asia's biggest hitters warning against China's

"expansionist policies" in the region. Japan and South Korea agreed to end the contentious

dispute over Second World War sex slaves, enabling a move toward a strategic alliance that

would impact the parallel dispute in the East China Sea over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu

Islands.


Online (2016).

So far there is no group of nations with a unified enough position to force Beijing to negotiate.

China is refusing outright to join any multilateral forum to find a settlement and continues to

reclaim land and build strategic outposts on reefs and atolls, including a 3,000-meter-long

runway on the Spratly Islands' Fiery Cross reef. Chinese vessels have also harassed Vietnamese

and Filipino fishermen, and the country has announced that two aircraft carriers will soon join its

expanding blue water navy. China has also shown how events might unfold if its policy is

challenged. From May to August, it has imposed a South China Sea annual fishing ban enforced

with attacks on fishermen. From one community alone, Ly Son Island off the coast of central

Vietnam, 20 out of the 50 boats have been targeted during the past year as they ventured towards

the Paracel Islands that lie midway between the Vietnamese and Chinese coastlines.




Okinawa.

A UNITED ASIAN ALLIANCE IS PERFERABLE TO CONTINUED

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE


Online (2016).

Boats have been rammed, crew beaten and equipment and fishing catches stolen, according to

the Vietnamese. Over the Spratly Islands, off the coasts of the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia,

the Chinese military recently warned away a civilian aircraft chartered by the BBC. There is no

evidence that a US Navy carrier group will settle this dispute. Indeed, the challenge might make

it worse, and there are signs that China is beginning to listen. Entering office in 2012, China's

President Xi Jinping began by deepening the rift with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

He angered Vietnam by bringing an oil drilling rig into its waters and he tried to subdue the

Philippines with an economic boycott as well as making a confrontational show of force along

the Line of Control with India. Now, facing multiple and simultaneous disputes with its

neighbors, China appears to be cooling off. On both the maritime sovereignty issues, Beijing

stands isolated. In the long term, despite economic and military power, it will have to get on with

neighbors who are increasingly united and bold.


Online (2016).

There is enough common ground within East Asia to create solid multilateral alliances that,

while challenging Beijing, could specifically search for a settlement allowing compromise

without loss of Chinese face. The stronger the unified front, the more China must listen. The

blunt instrument of American military power on the other hand might succeed in deterring

China's excesses, but also risks wounding its dignity and taking control away from the

governments of the region. A deal struck between Washington and Beijing could trample on East

Asia's more nuanced interests that might be forgotten amid horse-trading on a basket of global

issues. Washington also needs to deliver a linear and clear message to its electorate based on the

paradox that an Ohio farmer seeking a better deal on grain prices can influence the deployment

of US warships in faraway places.




Okinawa.

THE ISSUES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA ARE COMPLEX AND NOT JUST

MILITARY PROBLEMS



37.3 (2013): 437+.

Increasingly, the already militarized Okinawa Island and the planned fortification of the outlying

Ryukyu island chain by the United States and Japan could be metaphorically comparable to the

construction of a "giant maritime Great Wall" to contain China (McCormack 2012). The creation

of this Great Wall and its relation to the ongoing US base relocation issues on Okinawa are

closely associated with the threats perceived from the rise of China. But they have also become a

high-risk game in Japanese society, in which the responsibility for risk has shifted from external

(US) to state (Japan) actors and then to sub-national actors. In this article we illustrate this

process through an analysis of some major cases of the militarization of the Ryukyu island chain-

-cases that reveal the intersection of state, market, and societal spheres. Central to this analysis

are the dynamics of coercion and persuasion on the part of the central government in Tokyo and

protests and accommodation on the part of local residents. We argue that the "rational" action-

reaction sequence between "China threats" and the Japanese and US governments' countervailing

responses has been complicated by the intervention of market and societal actors peddling

different values in what we term a complex interplay of state, market, and societal actors.



37.3 (2013): 437+.

We need to go beyond the confines of a (neo)realist explanation of Okinawa's prefectural

governance as a function of state strategy informed by the structural constraints of the

international system (Waltz 2000). Indeed, only a small minority of the societal and market-

based actors responding to rapes by US military personnel, helicopter crashes, or base

construction will consider the structural constraints as the determinants of state behavior.

Undoubtedly, the risks of localized harms being inflicted against residents and the environment,

as well as those of abandonment by the United States or encroachment by China, have been

major factors influencing decisions and actions. This is why the complex interplay of these

stakeholders has to be examined in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the

processes that underpin policy formation and implementation.




Okinawa.

THE ISSUES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA ARE COMPLEX AND NOT JUST

MILITARY PROBLEMS



37.3 (2013): 437+.

The Japanese and US military actions have been both welcomed and sabotaged by many

different market and societal actors, all subscribing to different sets of values and worldviews.

For example, market forces are not always favorable toward the construction of new military

installations because some local businesses, dependent on eco-tourism or Chinese tourists, are

against the presence of military facilities. In other words, the dividing line between those

favoring the militarization of the island chain and those rejecting it exists not only in the sphere

of state-versus-society but also in the intersection between market and societal actors.




Okinawa.

CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION FACES HEAVY PROTEST



37.3 (2013): 437+.

Nevertheless, the US and Japanese governments did not heed the collective actions of the

protesters and pushed ahead with the construction projects. The Japanese authorities even

prosecuted some of the local protesters for obstructing traffic. The heavy-handed approach

infuriated the residents and anti-base activists and led to the formation of the Residents

Association Against the Helipad Construction. In particular, the destruction of a few tents

accommodating the sit-in protesters by a US helicopter on December 23, 2010, which hovered

only fifteen meters above them, further alienated the residents and made them continue to

obstruct the traffic and the arrival of heavy construction equipment (Ryukyu Shimpo 2011a).

Ikeo Yasushi, a lecturer in Peace Studies at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, who joins the sit-in

protest on a regular basis, argued that, although one helipad was completed in Takae, the

residents and anti-base activists "succeeded in stopping the construction of other helipads" (Ikeo

2009). According to Ikeo, the protesters amounted to more than 10,000 over the last several

years. These protesters take turns spending time in the tents established at the four gates of the

US base. In October 2009 the protesters collected 51,298 signatures against the construction of

additional helipads and submitted them to the Naha District Court (Ikeo and Ogawa 2010).




Okinawa.

CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION FACES HEAVY PROTEST



37.3 (2013): 437+.

The Japanese government considered obstruction to the helipads by the civil society groups in

Takae to be serious enough to risk a media and societal backlash by using heavy-handed and

indiscriminate tactics to enforce their construction. As one protest leader put it, "They arrested

and charged a few people, even though they were doing nothing different to the others--it was

arbitrary whom they picked on"(Ikeo 2009). While domestic actors gave priority to the social

and environmental risks arising from the Osprey deployments, the state was in effect responding

not only to the potential risk of security being jeopardized by the protests but also to the

consequential recalibration of risks attached to the continuation of Futenma's existence in its

present, deteriorating state. In addition, the state prioritized the risk of antagonizing its external

security partner, the United States, ahead of that of alienating its own regional society and media.

These actions demonstrate that Japan views the US military presence on Okinawa as central to

countering China's rise in the Asia Pacific. However, for civil society actors and residents, there

is no greater risk than the realization of this policy directive, and they are willing to go to great

lengths to postpone and divert it, jeopardizing the implementation of the additional helipad

construction.

Tate, Fiona. [2015] "Impunity, peacekeepers, gender and sexual violence in post-conflict

landscapes: a challenge for the international human rights agenda." Law, Crime and History 5.2

(2015): 69+.

Though it is rare that states surrender their jurisdiction, there have been occasions where 'states

have not insisted on their strict legal rights when faced with great public pressure' and scrutiny.

For instance, in 1995, in Okinawa, locals were publically angered that a US soldier had allegedly

raped a Japanese girl. Protests followed which called for a US military base to withdraw from

Japan. Attempting to maintain relations and appease the locals, the US waived its rights and

permitted the Japanese authorities to arrest the soldier before he was formally indicted. It is

important to note that this is not a general procedure. Nevertheless, 'an alternative model exists',

and it is one that could be acceptable to the various states involved. This could then serve to

assuage the problem of impunity for crimes committed by peacekeepers.




Okinawa.

JAPANESE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IS PERFERABLE TO

AMERICAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENT



37.3 (2013): 437+.

Along with the possibility of use of civilian Japanese facilities by US forces, the SDF

deployment was forecast in Yonaguni when the NDPG was revised in 2010 to substantially

reinforce the SDF presence and operations in the outlying Okinawan islands (Ministry of

Defense 2010). Given that China's increasing military presence and activities in the East China

Sea could transform the regional strategic balance, both the Japanese and US governments have

been determined not to give the signal that there is a "power vacuum," which China might

translate into a "window of opportunity" (Takahashi 2012). The planned SDF deployment almost

evenly divided the villagers into proponents and opponents with diverging calibrations of the

incumbent risks. In its heyday under imperialist Japan, Yonaguni maintained close economic ties

with neighboring Taiwan in the form of a thriving black market (Oura 2002). However, the

economic prosperity enjoyed by the islanders until the early postwar years came to an end when

the United States banned illegal trade with Taiwan during the Cold War. In the absence of a high

school, hospital, or significant industry, except for tourism, the population of Yonaguni has

declined from a peak of about 12,000 in 1947 to 1,534 (735 households) in 2012 (McCormack

2012). In particular, many children had to leave the island at the age of fifteen to enter high

schools on other Okinawan islands or Japan proper.




Okinawa.





37.3 (2013): 437+.

The visit by US warships to Ishigaki has further increased the risk involved. About 350 people

attended a protest rally in April 2009 against the visit (Japan Press Weekly 2009b). The rally was

organized by labor unions, political parties, and peace organizations; it was joined by tourist

associations, fishing groups, and women's organizations. Ishigaki mayor Ohama Nageteru

expressed his opposition to the visit to the civilian port, which is regarded as a major hub of

traffic and transportation connecting the Ryukyu island chain. Those participating in the rally,

including Japan Communist Party prefectural assembly member Masaaki Maeda, expressed their

opposition to the idea of turning "Okinawa into a useful tool for the US forces and the Japanese

Self-Defense Forces" (Japan Press Weekly 2009b). Meanwhile, the JCG sought to enlarge

Ishigaki's port to accommodate as many as five large patrol vessels. It held negotiations with the

Ishigaki city government and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. At

present, there is only room for two vessels. The new Ishigaki mayor, Nakayama Yoshitaka,

opened the island to SDF port visits and took steps to strengthen Japan's jurisdiction over the

Senkakus. Nakayama said, "Beijing sees this as completely their ocean.... In order to get out into

the Pacific Ocean, Japan is really in the way" (Wall Street Journal 2012). In December 2010

Ishigaki adopted a resolution to declare "Senkaku Islands Colonization Day" in commemoration

of Japan's annexation of the islands in 1895, inviting a protest from the Chinese government

(McCormack 2011).



37.3 (2013): 437+.

The Japanese government has been engaged in a multifaceted recalibration of risks associated

with US troop deployment and territorial sovereignty issues. As observed thus far, plans to

militarize the outlying Okinawan islands have recorded only a partial success because of

opposition from anti-base activists and residents. Nevertheless, some businesses and residents

favor the deployment of more Japanese troops, mainly for economic purposes. As seen in

Ishigaki and Yonaguni, the mayors in these outlying islands started to embrace the proposals of

militarization by accommodating the government's request. The outlying islands have, however,

been deeply divided between proponents and opponents of militarization schemes, possibly

damaging the social fabric of these societies, to say nothing of the destruction of pristine

subtropical ecosystems.




Okinawa.





37.3 (2013): 437+.

With the aim of building up its capacity for the surveillance and defense of remote islands, the

SDF has drawn up its own plans (Yomiuri Shimbun 2013a). The Maritime Self-Defense Force

plans to introduce the P-1 patrol aircraft and extend the useful life of a total of sixteen escort

vessels and submarines by five to ten years through repair. The Air Self-Defense Force plans to

reinforce the capability of its surveillance equipment, such as the Airborne Warning and Control

System, the early-warning E2C aircraft, and the radar system on Miyakojima Island in Okinawa.

The Ground Self-Defense Force seeks to deploy a coastal monitoring unit on Yonaguni Island

and expand the scale of joint exercises with US Marines. In April 2012 the SDF completed the

deployment of its ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptors in four locations in

Okinawa (Naha, Nanjo, Miyako, and Ishigaki islands) to prepare for North Korea's rocket launch

(Japan Times 2012). The SDF brought about thirty vehicles to Ishigaki, including the Air Self-

Defense Force's two PAC-3 launchers and ammunition, and deployed them at a reclaimed area

near Ishigaki port, since the SDF has no facilities there. In particular, the opening of the Ishigaki

port to the visits of SDF and US force vessels caused a public protest since the port is a civilian

facility (Japan Press Weekly 2009a).




Okinawa.

MILITARIZATION OF OKINAWA HAS UNCERTAIN RESULTS



37.3 (2013): 437+.

All in all, the Japanese government and the local government have pursued the construction of an

SDF base with apparently different objectives, with Tokyo seeking to strengthen security and the

local government focusing only on the economic benefits. The two proponents of the base plan

have faced opposition from many villagers and organizations protesting the militarization of the

island. Amid this standoff, the SDF deployment plan is still undecided. While it is not certain

how China would respond to it, the SDF base plan has become a high-risk game involving the

state and local governments, local businesses, anti-base activists, and residents.



37.3 (2013): 437+.

The rise of China has been changing the life of the otherwise sleepy Okinawan islands. Although

the US forces in Okinawa have long been regarded as a fixture, an extensive blueprint for the

relocation of US bases and the fresh construction of new SDF bases or JCG facilities is

irreversibly altering the roles of the outlying islands. The schemes for militarization by the US

and Japanese governments have faced both accommodation and resistance from the local

governments, NGOs, and residents. All in all, the framing of China as a threat, with the

Okinawan islands as a frontline base to counter it, has become a high-risk game for all actors

involved.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON MORE THAN MILITARY

POWER

Graham, Euan. [2013] "Southeast Asia in the US rebalance: perceptions from a divided region."

Contemporary Southeast Asia 35.3 (2013): 305+.

President Obama's "no-show" at the October 2013 East Asia Summit (EAS) and US-ASEAN

Summit in Bali--compounded by cancelled bilateral visits to Malaysia and the Philippines either

side--has added to doubts already being expressed volubly within the region about the durability

and commitment of the US "pivot" or "rebalance" to the wider region, particularly given

Washington's claims to be pursuing a sub-regional focus on Southeast Asia. There is, however,

nothing especially new about alternating swings in regional attitudes towards the United States.

As Alice Ba has argued, regional perceptions have tended to cast US policy towards Southeast

Asia in binary terms, alternating between the extremes of over-militarization and "systemic

neglect". (1) The first and second George W. Bush administrations typified this curve, initially

sparking concerns that the United States was intent on opening up a "second front" in the so-

called "war on terror" in Southeast Asia, yielding to disappointment at Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice's non-attendance at successive meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF).



The rebalance (3) to Asia--launched two years into Barack Obama's first term--initially re-

awakened the over-militarization critique of US policy, given its up-front focus on US force

realignment and rising tensions in the South China Sea. Within the US military global commands

structure, the Western Pacific and eastern Indian Ocean fall within the Pacific Command

(PACOM) and Pacific Fleet's area of responsibility. This automatically subsumes Southeast Asia

in--a wider strategic context. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's intervention at the July 2010

ARF in Hanoi, and her subsequent November 2011 Foreign Policy article--still the closest

document to an official doctrine for the pivot--clearly signalled an intensification of US interest

in the South China Sea. (4) Attention in Southeast Asia was further garnered by Washington's

apparent interest in a more "redistributive" footprint for the US military forward-deployed

presence in the Western Pacific, given its top-heavy dispositions in Japan, South Korea and

Guam. According to Don Emmerson, "the pivot's association with security unbalanced the policy

itself", overshadowing the pivot's economic rationale and creating the impression that the "goal

of tapping into the material dynamism of emerging Asia seemed to be more of an afterthought"

(5). Since 2012 there has been a conscious re-calibration to the pivot/ rebalance, widening the

base of US engagement efforts to include diplomatic and economic legs to match the already

extended defence component.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON MORE THAN MILITARY

POWER



US Vice-President Joe Biden, in a speech delivered at George Washington University ahead of

his visit to Singapore in July 2013, noted that the United States has a bigger investment profile

than China in Southeast Asia, hence "President Obama has put particular focus on Southeast

Asia: ASEAN now represents a US$2 trillion economy of 600 million people." (6) Trade may be

a limited indicator of "depth" and maturity to commercial relationships, yet by 2010 the US

relative market share of ASEAN's trade had more than halved, to 9 per cent, from 20 per cent in

1998. (17) The Obama administration has appeared cognizant of the perception problem this has

posed for the credibility of the "pivot" in Southeast Asia, as well as the genuine necessity of

underpinning the expansion of its defence and diplomatic relationships in Southeast Asia with

initiatives directed at economic revival. (18) Hillary Clinton, for example, focused on deepening

US business partnerships as the theme of her November 2012 "economic pivot" speech

delivered, notably, at Singapore Management University, while a sizeable commercial delegation

accompanied President Obama as he toured mainland Southeast Asia in the lead-up to the 2012

EAS.




Okinawa.

CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS POLITICALLY

RISKY



Aside from "entrapment" concerns on Washington's part, concerning the possibility of being

drawn into a conflict instigated by the junior partner in an alliance, keeping within the volatile

limits of Philippine domestic sentiment over Status of Visiting Forces issues will be a tricky

balancing act for both governments as the pivot continues and the US military presence becomes

more regular, particularly if US Marines from Okinawa are to form a major part of the US

rotational presence in future. (44) Although the naval footprint is generally less conspicuous than

ground or air forces, the grounding and destruction of the USS Guardian minesweeper in January

2013 demonstrates that navies can attract their fair share of negative publicity when things go

awry. (45)

Sempa, Francis P. [2013] "American Naval Strategy in a Time of Declining Resources."

American Diplomacy (2013).

Missing from the Admiral's talk was a geopolitical vision that should help determine our force

structure and deployments. We are re-balancing to the Asia-Pacific region for a reason--the

potential threats to our security are likely to emanate from there. The elephant in the room is

China and the PLA Navy which is increasing its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and

elsewhere in the world. Our resources are declining--the Admiral noted naval reductions of $11

billion in 2013 and $14 billion in 2014--China's are not. We have come a long way from the 600-

ship navy of the 1980s. The United States is an insular maritime power and our defense

resources should be apportioned on that basis. If China is to be "contained," the navy will be our

primary instrument of containment. Of course, that is a political decision to be made not by naval

officers, but by their political leaders.




Okinawa.

CON SPEECH

My partner and I reject the proposition that: the United States should withdraw its military

presence from Okinawa.

We will demonstrate that there is a pressing need to keep an American military presence on the

island and in the South China Sea.

POINT 1: CHINA IS ACTIVELY TRYING TO UNDERMINE US AND

JAPANESE NATIONAL INTERESTS

"China To Expand Naval Operations Amid Growing Tensions With US." YaleGlobal Online

(2015).

China outlined plans to shift its armed forces' focus toward maritime warfare and accused

foreign countries of "meddling" in the South China Sea, setting the stage for a confrontation

between senior U.S. and Chinese defense officials at a security conference this weekend. In its

first public summary of military strategy, the State Council-China's cabinet-said the navy will

expand its operations from offshore areas to the open seas, while the air force will shift its focus

to include offensive operations as well as defense of China's territory. The changes were

designed to tackle new security challenges, including the U.S. shift of military and other

resources to Asia, Japan's efforts to overhaul its defense policy, and "provocative actions" from

neighboring countries in the South China Sea, the State Council said in a white paper on military

strategy published Tuesday. "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely

counterattack if attacked," the paper said, reaffirming a long-standing commitment to a strategy

of "active defense" of Chinese territory and national interests. The document comes amid

growing discord between China and the U.S. over artificial islands that Beijing is building in

disputed waters in the face of protestations from Southeast Asian nations with competing

maritime claims.

Our first point shows that there is a clear danger in the military posturing of china. Its current

policy is to directly interfere with the national interests of both Japan and the US. Therefore we

must ask not if we need military power present , but when where and how should it be used?




Okinawa.

POINT 2: OKINAWA IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH JAPAN AND THE US

Zhuge, Scott. [2013] "Okinawa occupied: current US naval bases in Japan." Harvard


The reversion of Okinawa fit perfectly with the overall philosophy of the Nixon Doctrine, and

Nixon and Sato continued dialogue over the state of the Okinawa islands. Finally, on November

21, 1969, Sato and Nixon issued a joint communique to conclude the reversion affair; the actual

reversion took place officially on May 15, 1972. Although the Japanese government received

administrative control over the Okinawa islands, the United States still stationed troops in

various naval, land, and air bases, as promised in the negotiations. Indeed, the US military bases

in Okinawa serve as a linchpin for the US-Japanese military alliance. Firstly, the postwar

Japanese constitution forbids the creation of a full-blown Japanese military, instead constraining

Japan to maintain forces for purely defensive purposes. Consequently, Japan relies on the US

military presence in Okinawa as a deterrent against neighboring states like China and North

Korea. Additionally, the nuclear threats of China, Japan, and Russia further encourage Japan, a

non-nuclear state, to accept the extended deterrence provided by the United States.

The Okinawa base serves as the lynchpin of military cooperation between the two countries.

Combined with the fact that Japan current spends only 1% of its GDP on defense spending per

treaties signed with the US after WWII, it would be irresponsible for the US to withdraw its

presence.

POINT 3: EVEN IF THE US MIILTARY LEAVES, THERE WILL BE A

NEGATIVE PERCEPTION



However, as doubts have accumulated about the fiscal sustainability of the US forward-deployed

posture and whether its commitment is primarily rhetorical, the narrative has swung from over-

militarization back towards "neglect", a theme reinforced in recent media coverage. (11) The

trend was evident even before the US federal government "shutdown" in October 2013, but has

since gathered momentum, especially given unfavourable comparisons inevitably drawn with

President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang's inaugural and highly symbolic visits to the region.




Okinawa.

(12) Pendulum-like swings between these persistently polarized narratives about America's role

in Southeast Asia prompt the question whether, in fact, there is such a thing as a happy medium

for US engagement in Southeast Asia that is neither overbearing nor inattentive, and how this

might be defined?

As this card shows, even if we were to follow the resolution, there would be no benefit on a

public relations level and we would still have to deal with a negative global perception. If this is

the case then we should keep our military presence as it provide a public good even if there was

some public protest.

In conclusion, our case has shown that there is a clear need for US military presence, both

countries rely on it, and despite some public backlash, it is the preferable to a lack of US military

presence. Therefore, we can see no other vote but for the CON. Thank you.




Okinawa.

CON EVIDENCE




Okinawa.

CHINA IS EXPANDING MILITARILY


(2015).

China has released a so-called "white paper" on a defense strategy that responds to the US pivot

to Asia. The paper suggests "forces for world peace are on the rise," but points to "new threats

from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism," adding that "International

competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests is tending to intensify." Global

experts take the paper as a positive sign with China demonstrating some measure of

transparency. China maintains that its construction of artificial islands near reefs and islets in the

South China Sea, some also claimed by neighboring nations, is lawful, and the paper notes, "We

will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked." A recent

Pentagon report has pointed out that China "seeks to ensure basic stability along its periphery

and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to focus on domestic development

and smooth China's rise" and demonstrates "a willingness to tolerate a higher level of regional

tension as China sought to advance its interests, such as in competing territorial claims in the

East China Sea and South China Sea." China's paper points to efforts to cooperate with militaries

around the globe including those of Russia and the United States as well as UN peacekeeping

and humanitarian missions.


(2015).

China outlined plans to shift its armed forces' focus toward maritime warfare and accused

foreign countries of "meddling" in the South China Sea, setting the stage for a confrontation

between senior U.S. and Chinese defense officials at a security conference this weekend. In its

first public summary of military strategy, the State Council-China's cabinet-said the navy will

expand its operations from offshore areas to the open seas, while the air force will shift its focus

to include offensive operations as well as defense of China's territory. The changes were

designed to tackle new security challenges, including the U.S. shift of military and other

resources to Asia, Japan's efforts to overhaul its defense policy, and "provocative actions" from

neighboring countries in the South China Sea, the State Council said in a white paper on military

strategy published Tuesday. "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely

counterattack if attacked," the paper said, reaffirming a long-standing commitment to a strategy

of "active defense" of Chinese territory and national interests. The document comes amid

growing discord between China and the U.S. over artificial islands that Beijing is building in

disputed waters in the face of protestations from Southeast Asian nations with competing

maritime claims.




Okinawa.



(2015).

One of the main changes highlighted in the document is a shift of focus toward preparations for

"maritime military struggle," a Chinese military term for maritime warfare. China claims almost

all of the South China Sea, one of the world's busiest shipping routes, and its efforts to enforce

control of the area in recent years have caused growing concern in the U.S. and in Asia, where

several nations have competing claims, including Vietnam and the Philippines. Tensions have

recently centered around the Spratlys chain, where China controls eight reefs and rocks, while

rival claimants-the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan-occupy several islands and other

geographical features. Beijing has been expanding the features it controls into artificial islands,

which U.S. officials say could help Chinese forces take control of surrounding waters and

airspace. The Wall Street Journal reported this month that Mr. Carter had asked his staff to study

ways of directly contesting Beijing's territorial claims, such as by flying Navy surveillance

aircraft over China's artificial islands and sending U.S. naval ships to within 12 nautical miles of

the features.


(2015).

Beijing on Tuesday defended its building work in the Spratlys, saying the activity was

comparable to construction of homes and roads on the mainland. "From the perspective of

sovereignty, there is absolutely no difference," Sr. Col. Yang Yujun, spokesman for China's

Defense Ministry, said at a news briefing. While the artificial islands can be used for military

purposes, they would also facilitate noncombat and civilian activity, such as maritime search-

and-rescue, oceanic research and environmental protection, Col. Yang said. "This doesn't help

just China, but benefits the entire international community." Separately Tuesday, Chinese state

media reported Tuesday that China's transport ministry started building lighthouses on two reefs

in the Spratlys, which Beijing calls the Nansha Islands. Col. Yang accused some countries of

interfering in the South China Sea disputes, referring to a recent U.S. surveillance flight-the

subject of a CNN report last week-that drew radio warnings from the Chinese navy when the

aircraft passed close to Chinese-controlled reefs in the Spratlys. "Why has this issue [of

surveillance flights] become such a hot topic? On one hand, some countries have stepped up

surveillance activity against Chinese waters, and making this issue more stark," said Col. Yang,

in an apparent reference to the U.S. "On the other hand, there are people deliberately stirring up

such discussions, with the aim of smearing the Chinese military and raising regional tensions-we

can't rule out an intention to find excuses for justifying future action by certain countries." The

U.S. has long maintained that it doesn't take sides in the territorial disputes in the South China

Sea, though it has a national interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the area. Even so,

U.S. officials have in the past year stepped up criticism of China's efforts to enforce and justify

its claims in the region.




Okinawa.


Ezrati, Milton.[2016] "Asia's odd couple." The National Interest 141 (2016): 41+.

Behind this aggressiveness, and no doubt making it that much more unsettling to New Delhi and

Tokyo, is Beijing's impressive military upgrade. Japan's ministry of defense points out that

China's defense budget has grown forty-fold over the past quarter century and three-and-a-half

fold in just the last ten years. Neither Japan nor India has kept pace. China's air force is now

twice the size of India's. Though at the turn of the century, India and China had rough naval

parity, today China's navy can deploy some forty large surface ships against India's twenty-three.

Though Japan still has rough naval parity with China, with thirty-nine large surface ships, it is

well aware that in 2000, it had twice China's number. It only adds to Tokyo's and New Delhi's

feelings of vulnerability that Taiwan's fleet has also shrunk during this time from thirty-two to

twenty-five large vessels. The Times of India reports that Beijing needs only two days to

mobilize on the Chinese-Indian border, while New Delhi, hampered by a lack of transport

infrastructure of all sorts, would require at least a week to do so. As well, in thirty days China

could place thirty divisions, about 450,000 troops, at the border, three times what India could

muster in a much longer time frame.




Okinawa.

CHINA IS SECRETIVE OF IT’S MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA

SEA

Bamford, James. [2015] "Cloak and danger: could risky U.S. intelligence missions in the South


In May, the U.S. Defense Department invited a CNN team onto the Navy's newest, most

sophisticated spy plane, the P-8A Poseidon. After taking off from Clark Air Base in the

Philippines, pilots flew the aircraft near three islands in the South China Sea, where Chinese

reclamation and military building projects are taking place. The operation, however, wasn't just

intended to collect intelligence. It appears it was also meant to provoke a hostile reaction from

China and, thanks to the news cameras on board, use that response for propaganda-to blatantly

tell the world that America thinks China's territorial claims are illegal and dangerous. The

Chinese sent eight strong warnings to the plane. "This is the Chinese navy," said one radio

operator. "Please go away ... to avoid misunderstanding." Later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry

called the flight "very irresponsible and dangerous" and noted that Beijing would "take the

necessary and appropriate measures to prevent harm to the safety of China's islands and reefs as

well as any sea and air accidents. When CNN broadcast its story, it played a recording of the

warnings, and Jim Sciutto, the correspondent who had been on the plane, dutifully adopted the

Pentagon's party line as his own. "China's enormous land grab ... [is] alarming," Sciutto said. "It's

hard to see how this tension doesn't escalate going forward." To reinforce the need for alarm, the

network also featured former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, who cautioned that war is

"absolutely" a possibility.

Bamford, James. [2015] "Cloak and danger: could risky U.S. intelligence missions in the South


The incident is just one confrontation in a duel now escalating between the United States and

China. This September, the Pentagon blamed China for allowing military jets to make an unsafe

maneuver by passing in front of the nose of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the

Yellow Sea. The following month, the U.S. Navy penetrated the 12-nautical-mile limit that

China claims as territory around its artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago--a deliberate

challenge to Beijing's self-declared sovereignty. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told

Congress, "We will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits and whenever our

operational needs require." China's Foreign Ministry responded to the incident by stating that

Beijing "will not condone any action that undermines China's security. American history shows

that this perversion of purpose--turning missions into provocations--is fraught with hazard. Half

a century ago, for instance, the Pentagon ordered a National Security Agency (NSA) spy ship,

the USS Maddox, to breach North Vietnam's territorial limit in the Gulf of Tonkin. The series of

events that ensued (namely false reports of attacks on the ship) led Congress to pass the Gulf of




Okinawa.

Tonkin resolution, which authorized the use of force in Southeast Asia and catapulted the United

States into a war that killed millions of people.

OKINAWA SERVES AS LYNCPIN FOR JAPANESE-US MILITARY

ALLIANCE

Zhuge, Scott. [2013] "Okinawa occupied: current US naval bases in Japan." Harvard


The reversion of Okinawa fit perfectly with the overall philosophy of the Nixon Doctrine, and

Nixon and Sato continued dialogue over the state of the Okinawa islands. Finally, on November

21, 1969, Sato and Nixon issued a joint communique to conclude the reversion affair; the actual

reversion took place officially on May 15, 1972. Although the Japanese government received

administrative control over the Okinawa islands, the United States still stationed troops in

various naval, land, and air bases, as promised in the negotiations. Indeed, the US military bases

in Okinawa serve as a linchpin for the US-Japanese military alliance. Firstly, the postwar

Japanese constitution forbids the creation of a full-blown Japanese military, instead constraining

Japan to maintain forces for purely defensive purposes. Consequently, Japan relies on the US

military presence in Okinawa as a deterrent against neighboring states like China and North

Korea. Additionally, the nuclear threats of China, Japan, and Russia further encourage Japan, a

non-nuclear state, to accept the extended deterrence provided by the United States.



37.3 (2013): 437+.

For the past sixty years, Okinawa has been exposed to a shifting set of risks associated with its

hosting of large-scale US military installations (Smith 2006; Tanji 2006; Calder 2007; Cooley

2008; Lutz 2009). The Ryukyu island chain's precarious position and contested utilization have

been brought to the fore by multilateral posturing over the sovereignty of a set of its outlying

rocks. China, Japan, and Taiwan all lay claim to the Senkakus (known also as Diaoyudao or

Pinnacle Islands), as shown in Figure 1. The US Marines stationed on Okinawa could potentially

be those sent to the Senkakus in the unlikely event that they are seized by China. Indeed, US and

Japanese forces have conducted exercises under the scenario of retaking the islands, and--as we

explore in this article--Japan has made several important moves to further militarize the

archipelago.




Okinawa.




Okinawa.

CONTINUED AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED IN THE

SOUTH CHINA SEA

"To Tame A Dragon." YaleGlobal Online (2016).

US President Barack Obama, hosting the first US-ASEAN summit, is calling for a negotiated

settlement over South China Sea disputes. "For the past several years, the US has sought

unsuccessfully to nudge Asean members to take a unified stance against China's aggressive

moves in the South China Sea," writes Nayan Chanda, founding editor of YaleGlobal Online, for

the Times of India. "Although member states Vietnam and Philippines strongly protested

Chinese expansion, including its construction of airstrips on artificially built islands, the wider

group has only expressed its concern without specifically naming China." Countries in the

region, especially Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, have strong ties with China, which oversees

vast supply- chain networks and infrastructure investment. Many resist scolding the country with

Asia's largest economy and military. The United States dispatched naval vessels to sail within the

12 miles of disputed islands, as permitted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and

two of the ten members expressed support. ASEAN must take a firm, vocal stance on such

disputes, or collaboration among the community of nations will disintegrate.

"Rethinking North Korean Missile Capabilities." YaleGlobal Online (2015).

North Korea conducted a flight test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile from a floating

barge in November. "[E]ven as anti-DPRK watchers might feel a sense of schadenfreude when

Pyongyang's missile development team stumbles and falls, or even snigger at the lackluster

qualities of their missiles, gloating is not only premature but ill-advised," warns Nah Liang

Tuang for the Diplomat. He adds that "the best that Washington, Seoul and Tokyo can do is to

adopt a two pronged strategy of utilizing their collective international influence to ensure the

proper enforcement of the United Nations Security Council resolutions barring all transfers of

missile or heavy weapons related technology to the DPRK..., while bolstering their military

defenses against North Korean ballistic missiles." Despite low quality weaponry, range and

accuracy have gradually increased over the decades. The regime's banks on unpredictable

military power preventing political change. The essay concludes that a missile defense system is

a priority for the region.




Okinawa.

CHINA DOES NOT RESPECT JAPANESE CLAIMS

Ezrati, Milton.[2016] "Asia's odd couple." The National Interest 141 (2016): 41+.

Japan's Chinese anxieties are of more recent vintage but are no less intense. There is the dispute

over the East China Sea islands that the Japanese call the Senkakus and the Chinese call the

Diaoyus. Both countries claim them, both from time to time have behaved in provocative ways

and both have confronted the other's naval power around the islands. But if these events

dominate the headlines, they are hardly the whole story. In recent years, Chinese warships have

navigated unsettlingly close to Japanese shores, including in the Osumi Strait in Japan's south

and the Soya Strait in its north. At least one Chinese nuclear submarine has been recorded in

Japanese territorial waters. In the air, Tokyo scrambled its fighter jets against Chinese aircraft in

or near Japanese airspace 464 times in the latest annual count and 415 times in the year prior;

that number was less than fifty for most years in the decade before 2010. In November 2013,

China announced its Air Defense Identification Zone (adiz) over the East China Sea. Only a

month later, Beijing had mobilized eighty-seven reconnaissance and early-warning aircraft--

fighters, too--to the adiz's airspace. All of this is an effort to control sea and air traffic across

much of the South and East China Seas. Under what Beijing refers to as "nine-dashed line," it

has all but claimed sovereignty over 90 percent of the South China Sea. Recent remarks by the

commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet captured the common view in Tokyo well: "When one looks

at China's pattern of provocative actions," he said, "serious questions about Chinese intentions

[arise]."


While prompted by security matters, this India-Japan embrace has gained strength by

emphasizing the huge economic and financial benefits of closer ties. These lie in the remarkable

complementarity of the two countries' economies. Japan is capital rich, technologically advanced

and has a highly trained (if expensive) workforce. India lacks the financial capital necessary for

its own development, has an inexpensive, plentiful but poorly trained workforce and, despite

some headlines, is technologically backward through most of its economy. Because each country

is a mirror image of the other in every aspect of economics and investment, close economic

relations should allow each to supplement the other's weakness while leveraging its strength, to

the benefit of growth prospects and wealth creation in both places.




Okinawa.

RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AMERICAN PRESENCE IN OKINAWA ARE

FALLACIES



37.3 (2013): 437+.

Indeed, the narrative element of this process is central to the third component of risk's

explanatory power, namely, its distinction from threat perceptions. The narrative of an identified

risk such as the rise of China, for example, may be attached to a particular external threat (such

as an attack by China's growing naval power), but the risk itself is distinct from this. Rather, the

risk amounts to the internalization of relative potential harms into a series of decisions (Luhmann

1996). Through the intervention of market and societal actors, the size of the risk could grow

further, as illustrated in Figure 2. For actors on Okinawa, these risks might include whether to

engage or contain China (external threats), accept the presence of US forces or the SDF or seek

to remove it, and maintain economic stability and growth without destruction of the local

environment due to noise pollution and aircraft crashes (internal threats). (1) Each decision

carries a risk, but each is often based on a narrative fallacy, the components of which are not well

explained by established IR theories alone (Taleb 2007). (2) This narrative will usually be

constructed from a politicized and contested framing and calibration of risk rather than rigorous

calculation of probable or relative harms.



37.3 (2013): 437+.

The Japanese and US military actions have been both welcomed and sabotaged by many

different market and societal actors, all subscribing to different sets of values and worldviews.

For example, market forces are not always favorable toward the construction of new military

installations because some local businesses, dependent on eco-tourism or Chinese tourists, are

against the presence of military facilities. In other words, the dividing line between those

favoring the militarization of the island chain and those rejecting it exists not only in the sphere

of state-versus-society but also in the intersection between market and societal actors.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED



37.3 (2013): 437+.

As part of the Obama administration's pivot to Asia, US secretary of defense Leon Panetta

(2012) said that "by 2020, the Navy will re-posture its forces from today's roughly 50/50 percent

split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans. That will

include six aircraft carriers in this region (the Pacific), a majority of our cruisers, destroyers,

Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines." Meanwhile, Western China watchers believe that

Chinese military doctrine portrays two island chains as forming the geographical basis for

securing its maritime spheres of influence. The "First Island Chain" is thought to run from the

Japanese main islands through the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo, while the

"Second Island Chain" stretches from the Bonin Islands in the north southward through the

Marianas, Guam, and the Caroline Islands (Van Tol et al. 2010). To deny potential enemies

access to its areas of core interests, Chinese strategies have developed the concept of "A2/AD"

(Anti-Access/Area Denial).



37.3 (2013): 437+.

Regardless of whether China has expansionist strategies in East Asia, the rise of China as an

economic and military power made the Japanese and US governments strengthen their defense

cooperation, as well as take independent steps to fend off China's security challenges. First, the

Abe Shinzo administration in Japan sought to increase the defense-related budget to 4.68 trillion

yen for fiscal year 2013, up 35.1 billion yen (0.8 percent) from the previous fiscal year. This was

the first defense spending increase in eleven years (Yomiuri Shimbun 2013a). Nevertheless, the

size of the increase is modest in comparison with the double-digit rises in China's defense

spending. Second, the Japanese government decided to form a panel on revising the National

Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program to strengthen Japan's

defense capabilities in light of China's increasing maritime activities near the Senkakus (Cheng

2013). The current guidelines, adopted in 2010 by the Kan Naoto government of the Democratic

Party of Japan, called for a cut in the defense budget.




Okinawa.

AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED



37.3 (2013): 437+.

In fact, Abe's return to power as prime minister under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) marks

entrance into the next phase of risk framing, mediation, and recalibration in relation to security

issues on Okinawa. His leadership is likely to contrast sharply with that of his predecessors. As

seen in the case of North Korea, Abe is a notoriously proactive politician in the spheres of

national security and foreign policy. He would seem more predisposed than any other leader in

recent memory to highlighting the risk of Chinese encroachment, hence justifying the

consolidation of territorial defense in Japan's outlying regions. Early indications certainly

suggest that his intention is to marginalize domestic opposition to a reinforced US-Japan alliance

and prioritize the amelioration of risks to national security (Mainichi Shimbun 2013). In this

vein, the Japanese government included research costs in the latest draft budget for the Global

Hawk high-altitude reconnaissance drone, fit for lengthy surveillance missions, and the upgraded

Osprey transport aircraft necessary for the defense of remote islands (Yomiuri Shimbun 2013a).




Okinawa.

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DESIRES AMERICAN MILITARY AID



37.3 (2013): 437+.

The Japanese government considered obstruction to the helipads by the civil society groups in

Takae to be serious enough to risk a media and societal backlash by using heavy-handed and

indiscriminate tactics to enforce their construction. As one protest leader put it, "They arrested

and charged a few people, even though they were doing nothing different to the others--it was

arbitrary whom they picked on"(Ikeo 2009). While domestic actors gave priority to the social

and environmental risks arising from the Osprey deployments, the state was in effect responding

not only to the potential risk of security being jeopardized by the protests but also to the

consequential recalibration of risks attached to the continuation of Futenma's existence in its

present, deteriorating state. In addition, the state prioritized the risk of antagonizing its external

security partner, the United States, ahead of that of alienating its own regional society and media.

These actions demonstrate that Japan views the US military presence on Okinawa as central to

countering China's rise in the Asia Pacific. However, for civil society actors and residents, there

is no greater risk than the realization of this policy directive, and they are willing to go to great

lengths to postpone and divert it, jeopardizing the implementation of the additional helipad

construction.




Okinawa.




37.3 (2013): 437+.

Yonaguni, the westernmost Japanese island, runs the risk of becoming Japan's frontline base in a

confrontation with China. In August 2011, then Japanese defense minister Kitazawa Toshimi

announced the decision to deploy SDF forces on Yonaguni in the form of a coastal surveillance

unit by the end of 2015 and set aside 1 billion yen as a budget appropriation for survey, selection,

and acquisition of a site (Okinawa Taimuzu 2011). With the Chinese naval and coast guard

vessels increasingly strengthening their presence in the nearby areas, the action was clearly

intended to beef up Japan's military preparedness. In fact, the tension in the East China Sea,

following the September 2010 collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese coast

guard ship in waters adjacent to the Senkaku Islands, created a favorable environment for the

SDF's permanent stationing in Yonaguni. In reality, however, the SDF's presence in Yonaguni is

not the only military measure. From June 24 to June 26, 2007, two US mine countermeasures

ships--the USS Guardian and the USS Patriot--made a port call at Yonaguni's Sonai Port, the

first of its kind since Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japan. The visit was greeted by about fifty

protesters, including some activists from the other Okinawan islands. According to a secret

telegram by US consul general Kevin K. Maher in Okinawa, Yonaguni "could become a hub for

mine countermeasures operations in the event of a contingency in the Taiwan Straits" (Wikileaks

2007). As for the operational suitability of the Sonai Port, the consul general noted that the port

was deep enough for safe access and wide enough for four mine countermeasures ships to fit

through at one time. As long as US helicopters could use Yonaguni's airport with a 2,000-meter

runway in support of mine countermeasures ships, the consul general claimed it would be

"operationally significant" to use Yonaguni's civilian facilities for future contingencies.




Okinawa.




37.3 (2013): 437+.

The ramming of a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol boat by a Chinese trawler in 2010 was a

major catalyst for increased SDF investment in both equipment and technology in the outlying

islands of the Ryukyu chain. The media, for instance, sought to sell the story and highlight

China's maritime activity in the region, driving momentum toward the consolidation of Okinawa

as a key site in the Western Pacific security perimeter (Okinawa Taimuzu 2013). Since that time,

a seemingly erratic calibration and taking of risks at the state level has ensued. In 2012, for

example, the central government's acquisition of Uotsurishima, Kita-Kojima, and Minami-

Kojima in the Senkakus, undertaken by the Noda Yoshihiko administration in order to quell a

potential backlash as the result of right-wing Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara's attempt to

purchase them, proved a decisive step in souring already strained Japan-China relations (Ryukyu

Shimpo 2012). To what extent this can be seen as either a miscalculation of Beijing's response to

Japanese action or as a well-veiled, deliberate step taken in order to assert sovereignty over the

islands remains in doubt. What is clear, however, is that risk was once again mediated to exert a

significant influence upon state-level actions. In this case, the risk of allowing the Senkaku

Islands to fall into the private hands of anti-Chinese sub-national actors was deemed too great for

the state to stand aside.




Okinawa.

EVEN NATIVES DESIRE MILITARY PRESENCE



37.3 (2013): 437+.

However, the island itself is divided because the strategy of aligning strongly with the Tokyo

government risks militarization of the island, whose main industry is tourism. Chinese tourists

have increased their presence in Ishigaki after direct charter flights between Hong Kong and

Ishigaki and between Shanghai and Ishigaki started their services in 2011 (Ryukyu Shimpo

2011b). In 2012 a total of 69,500 tourists from mainland China, up 110.6 percent from the

previous year, and 58,000 from Hong Kong, up 13.3 percent, arrived in Okinawa Prefecture. But

the confrontations over the Senkaku Islands resulted in a decline in the number of Chinese

tourists from September, as illustrated in Figure 4 (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). The territorial

disputes have thus become one of the greatest risks to the local tourism industry, and it comes at

a time when many affluent Chinese tourists have become a major source of revenue for other

East Asian countries.



37.3 (2013): 437+.

As for the implementation of the militarization schemes, anti-base movements have strongly

impacted the relocation of the Marine Corps' Futenma base to Henoko and the construction of

helipads at Takae (Makishi 2006; Hook and Son 2013). These were cases in which the

government sought to secure land for the construction of new facilities. The civic forces will

remain extraordinarily tenacious in keeping these pieces of land from militarization by

propagating the risks to human and environmental security--which they bear disproportionately--

against the government's portrayal of threats to national security emanating from China.

Nevertheless, the militarization is under way in the areas where the land appropriation is not

necessary, as in the case of the deployment of the Ospreys.




Okinawa.

MILITARY POWER IS ONLY ONE PART OF OVERALL FOREIGN

POLICY



Although the pivot concept, as originally used by US officials, "suggested the transfer of

resources and strategic attention from the Middle East and Europe to Asia", the military

substance--at least in terms of additional US military deployments--in Southeast Asia has been

somewhat underwhelming. (6) Nonetheless the region has maintained a consistently high profile

within the overall geographical focus on Asia, borne out in the high number of senior

administration officials visiting the region, beginning with Hillary Clinton's February 2009 visit

to Jakarta in the early phase of the Obama presidency, which was judged to be "the public

relations highlight of her first trip to Asia as Secretary of State". (7) Clinton went on to visit all

ten ASEAN capitals, while "a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia" was further reflected in the

thirteen visits to Asia made by Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, as well as

senior officials and military officers including the National Security Advisor and Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (8) Notwithstanding the cancellation of two previous presidential visits

to Southeast Asia before October 2013, the overall engagement effort has been relatively

consistent, given the considerable presidential "face time" invested in annual attendance at both

the EAS and APEC leaders meeting. The US diplomatic focus on Southeast Asia has also

benefited from the Obama administration's embrace of multilateralism, given ASEAN's

importance as a hub for Asia-wide trade and security dialogues and groupings. (9) A recent study

from the Center for New American Security duly acknowledges the administration's efforts to

"expand engagement with partners in Southeast Asia".



US Vice-President Joe Biden, in a speech delivered at George Washington University ahead of

his visit to Singapore in July 2013, noted that the United States has a bigger investment profile

than China in Southeast Asia, hence "President Obama has put particular focus on Southeast

Asia: ASEAN now represents a US$2 trillion economy of 600 million people." (6) Trade may be

a limited indicator of "depth" and maturity to commercial relationships, yet by 2010 the US

relative market share of ASEAN's trade had more than halved, to 9 per cent, from 20 per cent in

1998. (17) The Obama administration has appeared cognizant of the perception problem this has

posed for the credibility of the "pivot" in Southeast Asia, as well as the genuine necessity of

underpinning the expansion of its defence and diplomatic relationships in Southeast Asia with

initiatives directed at economic revival. (18) Hillary Clinton, for example, focused on deepening

US business partnerships as the theme of her November 2012 "economic pivot" speech

delivered, notably, at Singapore Management University, while a sizeable commercial delegation

accompanied President Obama as he toured mainland Southeast Asia in the lead-up to the 2012

EAS.




Okinawa.




Okinawa.

MILITARY POWER IS ONLY ONE PART OF OVERALL FOREIGN

POLICY



Part of the problem that America faces in enhancing its political leadership role in Southeast

Asia is that power factors are difficult to divorce from the economic policy realm. Indeed,

China's diplomatic gains in the region since the late 1990s have been delivered inseparably from

economic initiatives, originating from Beijing's diplomatically effective if largely cost-flee

supportive stance towards Southeast Asia as the region's economies recovered from the 1997-98

Asian Financial Crisis. Economic inducements (real or apparent) were an effective tool of

China's regional diplomacy in the decade that followed, as Beijing "attempted to co-opt ...

Southeast Asian states by providing incentives in the form of trade concessions, investments and

large-scale Official Development Assistance projects". (20) Although China's economic

statecraft in Southeast Asia has been characterized by regional analysts as an exercise in soft

power, (21) an explicit linkage between geopolitical influence and trade in Southeast Asia is

increasingly acknowledged in the mainstream Chinese media, while competitive comparisons are

drawn openly with the United States. (22) China's confidence in the economic element of its

statecraft has also taken on a selectively punitive aspect since the denial of market access has

been employed by Beijing as a pressure tactic in maritime territorial disputes in the East and

South China Seas. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines has become the primary target of economic

as well as diplomatic pressure from China, including the suspension of banana imports in 2012,

as tensions spiked with Manila over Scarborough Shoal. (23) President Benigno Aquino did not

attend the 10th China-ASEAN Expo, held in Nanning in September 2013, after China was

reported to have linked his attendance to the Philippines dropping its international arbitral

proceedings that challenge the legal basis for China's territorial claims in the South China Sea.

(24)




Okinawa.

LACK OF MILITARY PRESENCE IS GLOBALLY CRITICIZED



However, as doubts have accumulated about the fiscal sustainability of the US forward-deployed

posture and whether its commitment is primarily rhetorical, the narrative has swung from over-

militarization back towards "neglect", a theme reinforced in recent media coverage. (11) The

trend was evident even before the US federal government "shutdown" in October 2013, but has

since gathered momentum, especially given unfavourable comparisons inevitably drawn with

President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang's inaugural and highly symbolic visits to the region.

(12) Pendulum-like swings between these persistently polarized narratives about America's role

in Southeast Asia prompt the question whether, in fact, there is such a thing as a happy medium

for US engagement in Southeast Asia that is neither overbearing nor inattentive, and how this

might be defined?



While such coercive tactics by China potentially cast the United States in a comparatively

favourable light, Washington has faced a perception problem, beyond its declining relative share

in Southeast Asia's trade, in how the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which includes Singapore,

Brunei, Vietnam, has been readily perceived as a sphere of influence vehicle for US grand

strategy that deliberately excludes China--this, in spite of the TPP's humble origins as a relatively

obscure "mini-lateral" liberalization initiative. (25) As a tool of grand strategy for embracing less

developed economies, the TPP in fact carries a more basic limitation for the United States, given

that Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, generally regarded as falling within China's economic orbit,

are unlikely to clear its ambitiously high bar for admission, in contrast to the more inclusive if

less ambitious Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership and China's existing free trade

agreement with ASEAN.




Okinawa.




US-China competition is commonly identified by leading regional commentators as an

increasingly divisive dynamic for ASEAN. Hugh White identifies Asia's power shift as the

underlying reason why ASEAN is increasingly split on the South China Sea and sees some form

of accommodation of China's "challenge" by the United States as essential to avoiding conflict.

(26) White is not specific about what this would entail for Southeast Asia, but it would

presumably involve a parallel accommodation of China by its "continental" Southeast Asia

neighbours and rival territorial claimants in the South China Sea. Emmerson foresees the

possibility that "if Sino-American rivalry escalates, ASEAN's members could split into China-

deferring and China-defying camps". (27) Evelyn Goh also identifies the US-China dynamic--

though differently interpreted--as the major wedge in ASEAN's cohesion. Goh sees Southeast

Asia as facing a parallel US-China "resurgence" in the region, requiring adaptive responses that

fit neither within the International Relations template of bandwagoning or balancing behaviours.

(28) Both Goh and White agree that ASEAN has lost its ability to control the Great Power

dynamics that are now dominating Southeast Asia's strategic architecture, despite the fact that

regional institutions have been deliberately layered around ASEAN in order to reinforce its self-

styled "centrality" to regional multilateralism. Awareness of these crumbling foundations is

leading individual ASEAN members to tacitly or overtly welcome a revival of US interest and

presence in the region for essentially Realist logic.



In terms of US force realignment, the military substance of the rebalancing strategy so far has

been modest within Southeast Asia, headlined by the deployment of only the first of up to four

Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore. (30) The objective of a 60:40 split between the

Pacific and Atlantic-based fleets--as announced by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta at the

Shangri-la Dialogue in June 2012 (31)--remains a relative measure that does not guarantee any

absolute shift of military assets, and in terms of the basing distribution of US submarines already

in the Pacific, for example, represents the status quo. The number of surface and subsurface

vessels assigned to PACOM could even hold constant, as US forces are drawn down elsewhere.

To a large extent the numbers and home-porting debate is a distraction. Forward deployment and

prepositioning reduce crisis reaction times, but the inherent mobility of naval platforms means

that, barring the parallel outbreak of crises in different regions, substantial additional forces

could be surged to the Western Pacific if really needed. However, forward presence is also

linked to reassurance and deterrence, and it is at this politico-diplomatic messaging level that the




Okinawa.

rebalance is primarily intended to resonate, and Southeast Asia has been designated as a target

audience.




Vietnam's South China Sea strategy therefore needs to be interpreted more broadly than

bandwagoning with the US pivot, in which Hanoi seeks a broad-based international stake in its

security, including deepening longstanding relations with India--which enjoys an exemption to

the single port-call restriction--and developing incipient security ties with Japan, Australia and

South Korea, among others. (56) Vietnam has also embraced UNCLOS as a means of buttressing

its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims against Chinese challenges, but has not offered public

support for the Philippines legal manoeuvres. On the US side, there are also inhibiting factors to

the relationship including human rights concerns, which situate Vietnam somewhat awkwardly

as a nondemocratic outlier among Washington's preferred security partners in Southeast Asia.



Southeast Asian attitudes towards the US rebalance have swung back towards the narrative of

"neglect" following the October 2013 federal government "shutdown" and cancelled presidential

visits. While the Obama administration has gone to substantial lengths to seed bilateral and

multilateral relations in Southeast Asia beyond the superficial optic of attendance at annual

summits, the diplomacy behind the rebalance also relies on symbolic effects. The pendulum-like

swing back towards negative perceptions of Washington, as domestically distracted and unable

to sustain its attention on the region, may be indicative of polarized regional narratives towards

the United States that are highly sensitive to presentational triggers. Nonetheless, the fallout for

the rebalance may be more than cosmetic, given that none of the economic, diplomatic and

security prongs of the rebalance "trident" have yet reached an irreversible tipping point in terms

of regional acceptance, even from states that actively support a strong US presence in the region.




Okinawa.

WITHOUT A STRONG ALLIANCE OF COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST

ASIA, AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED



Meanwhile, over a longer event horizon, the spectrum of Southeast Asian perceptions of

benefits, constraints and limitations to the US rebalancing strategy is steadily widening. There is

a loose, geopolitical division within the region between continental and maritime states that

influences states' orientation towards Great Powers, with the "offshore" insular countries better

disposed towards an invigorated US presence. The divide, however, is porous, with Vietnam and

Malaysia serving as partial "outlier" counter-examples. On the South China Sea, and the

fundamental question lying behind it about whether China poses a strategic threat to Southeast

Asia, ASEAN's fragile unity has already been publicly shattered, causing some of its individual

members to seek closer relations with the United States, while others tilt towards China. One of

ASEAN's long-serving diplomatic rationales has been to "flatten" Southeast Asia's strategic

geography, projecting an image of solidarity towards the Great Powers that masks internal

divisions, uppermost of which in geopolitical terms is the continental versus maritime gap.

Narrowing this divide will require more than a reform of ASEAN's decision-making structures,

but basically a new grand bargain among its members. There is no sign yet that this is in

prospect.



In a recent talk at the American Enterprise Institute, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan

Greenert discussed how the navy is operating and planning in an era of declining resources.

Budget constraints affect manpower, force structure, deployment, forward presence, and

planning for the future. He made clear that the future involves continuing to re-balance to the

Asia-Pacific region. He noted the navy's expanding relationship with Japan, South Korea,

Singapore, Australia, and Indonesia. Admiral Greenert also mentioned the evolving relationship

with both China and Russia, including military-to-military contacts.




Okinawa.

WITHOUT A STRONG ALLIANCE OF COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST

ASIA, AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEEDED



Strategy cannot help but be affected by resources. The navy, he noted, has about 630,000

personnel: 320,000 active duty; 110,000 reserves; and 200,000 civilians. The number of ships is

down to 285, with an average deployment of 95 at a time throughout the world. The navy's

mission, according to the Admiral, is to deter aggression, reassure allies, and ensure that U.S.

interests are protected all over the world. There is a need to maximize forward presence;

maintain adequate readiness; and increase asymmetric capabilities.

DEBATE DOCTORS DEBATE BRIEFS · DEBATE DOCTORS 2016 6 U.S. MILITARY AND OKINAWA MARCH 2016 PFD...

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