The Death of Synchronization?The Death of Synchronization?Command and Control, Planning, and Command and Control, Planning, and

Lessons Learned from Lessons Learned from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM IOPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM I

Colonel Eric M. Walters MA MSSIColonel Eric M. Walters MA MSSI

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence)Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence)

III Marine Expeditionary ForceIII Marine Expeditionary Force

E-mail: waltersem@iiimef.usmc.milE-mail: waltersem@iiimef.usmc.mil

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Selected unclassified source material Selected unclassified source material listed in handoutlisted in handout

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1994 Prediction: “The Death 1994 Prediction: “The Death of Mission Tactics”of Mission Tactics”

““The U.S. Army has finally adopted The U.S. Army has finally adopted mission tactics—just in time for it to mission tactics—just in time for it to become irrelevant to modern warfare.”become irrelevant to modern warfare.”

““Mission tactics is a philosophy Mission tactics is a philosophy concerning command and control. It…concerning command and control. It…describes a concept in which decision-describes a concept in which decision-making authority is delegated to making authority is delegated to subordinate levels of command.”subordinate levels of command.”

» Robert R. Leonhard, author of Robert R. Leonhard, author of The Art of ManeuverThe Art of Maneuver

Source: Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War.(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 112.

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Obligatory Dead German QuoteObligatory Dead German Quote““The first, the supreme, the most far-The first, the supreme, the most far-

reaching act of judgment that the reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”something that is alien to its nature.”

-- Karl von Clausewitz-- Karl von Clausewitz

Source: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howardand Peter Paret, editors and translators. (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 88

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AgendaAgenda What’s the Problem? Definitions, Implications, and Examples OIF I Diagnoses:

– Deliberate Planning Prior to Hostilities– Exercising Prior to Deployment– Deliberate Planning During Hostilities

Prescription: Adaptation, Coordination, and Cooperation during Execution

Critique of Current Warfighting TTP Some Recommendations

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What Is the Problem?What Is the Problem? Take a look at our TTP on Planning!Take a look at our TTP on Planning! Strong emphasis on deliberate staff Strong emphasis on deliberate staff

planning, less on staff planning during planning, less on staff planning during execution of the operation execution of the operation – MSTP and MCWP 5-1 MSTP and MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Marine Corps Planning

Process Process – R2P2 for MEU CE and subordinate element HQsR2P2 for MEU CE and subordinate element HQs– Execution: MEFEX and SOCEXExecution: MEFEX and SOCEX

These are good for the situations these references and processes are designed to solve—but what about anything else?

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What is the Problem?What is the Problem? Deliberate Planning: Deliberate Planning:

– Operations OrderOperations Order– Decision Support Template and MatrixDecision Support Template and Matrix– Synchronization Matrix and Annex X: Execution Synchronization Matrix and Annex X: Execution

ChecklistChecklist Rapid Planning:Rapid Planning:

– ““Fill in the blank” formats and playbookFill in the blank” formats and playbook

TTP are necessarily focused on product and process—butdo these cover all potential situations/requirements?

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What Is the Problem?What Is the Problem? MAGTF C2 “Parts and Pieces”:MAGTF C2 “Parts and Pieces”:

– MCWP 3-40.1 MCWP 3-40.1 MAGTF Command and ControlMAGTF Command and Control– MCWP 3-40.2 MCWP 3-40.2 Information ManagementInformation Management– MCWP 3-40.3 MCWP 3-40.3 Communications and Information Communications and Information

SystemsSystems (to be reissued as MCWP 6-22) (to be reissued as MCWP 6-22) Bringing it all together?Bringing it all together?

– MCDP 6 MCDP 6 Command and ControlCommand and Control– Nothing in the MCWP 6-# “Command Series”Nothing in the MCWP 6-# “Command Series”

There is very little in Marine Corps Warfighting Publications and/or Marine Corps Reference Publications that detail how the C2 “parts and pieces” are integrated to execute the plan.

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What Worked in OIF I?What Worked in OIF I? AdaptationAdaptation Coordination Coordination

and cooperationand cooperation High tempo opsHigh tempo ops DecentralizationDecentralization Implicit CommunicationsImplicit Communications

– Commander’s IntentCommander’s Intent– CohesionCohesion

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DefinitionsDefinitions DoD: “Synchronization: The arrangement of

military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time..”– Joint Publication 1 DoD Dictionary of Military Terms

U.S. Marine Corps: “…synchronize the course of action (COA) across time, space, and purpose….” – MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

What are the implications of arranging military actions to achieve“maximum” vice “sufficient” relative combat power?

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DefinitionsDefinitions “Synchronize: 1. to cause to agree in time or

rate of speed; regulate (clocks, a flash gun and camera shutter, etc) so as to make synchronous 2. to assign (events) to the same date or period; represent as or show to be coincident or simultaneous 3. Film to align (the picture and soundtrack)—synchronization”– Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College

Edition

All English language definitions indicate that “synchronized” things are meant to happen together as scheduled/regulated/aligned, or--to use DOD language—as “arranged” in “time, space, and purpose.”

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DefinitionsDefinitions Synchronization is more than coordinating

– “Coordinate: (2) To harmonize in a common effort. To work together harmoniously.”

– “Harmonize: (1) To bring into harmony or agreement.”

– “Harmonious: (2) Having component elements pleasingly or appropriately combined.”

By itself, however, such coordination is no guarantee of synchronization, unless the commander first visualizes the consequences to be produced and how activities must be sequenced to produce them.

-- FM 100-5 Operations, 1993

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DefinitionsDefinitions Synchronization is more than planning

– “Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about.” (MCDP 5 Planning)

Synchronization is more than just arranging/regulating/aligning/sequencing– Achieving maximum combat power is what

makes it different—”good enough ain’t enough!”

In the end, the product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource to make the greatest contribution to success.

-- FM 100-5 Operations, 1993

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ImplicationsImplications Maximizing combat power is paramount;

more is preferred over “good enough”– But fleeting “decisive times/places” could be

lost waiting to optimize/maximize Requires a single entity—the commander

—to sequence actions to achieve it in planning and/or execution– But subordinate initiative actions “outside

the sequence” risks losing maximized combat power…also doesn’t account well for friction

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ImplicationsImplications Requires commander to actually know

where the decisive place and time is ahead of time– But does this really happen in a reliable

manner?

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Implications: An Army ViewImplications: An Army View

CONCENTRATION TACTICS:-- A synchronized combined arms force-- Velocity equals speed of the slowest unit

Source: Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War.(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 157

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Implications: An Army ViewImplications: An Army View

PREEMPTIVE TACTICS:-- Force divided along lines of mobility-- No longer combined arms -- Velocity equals speed of the fastest unit

Source: Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War.(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 157

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Implications: A Marine VariantImplications: A Marine Variant

PREEMPTIVE TACTICS:-- Force divided along lines of mobility-- Combined arms at smaller unit level – MAGTF Warfare -- Velocity equals speed of the fastest unit

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Examples of Synchronization Examples of Synchronization Matrices (see handout)Matrices (see handout)

CURRENT PRODUCTSCURRENT PRODUCTS

MCWP 5-1 MCPP Synchronization MatrixMCWP 5-1 MCPP Synchronization Matrix MCWP 5-1 Annex X ExampleMCWP 5-1 Annex X Example

““BACK TO THE FUTURE”BACK TO THE FUTURE”

1974 Soviet Operation Network Diagram1974 Soviet Operation Network Diagram LOGGY/SEAWAY application screenLOGGY/SEAWAY application screen

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Diagnosis: Deliberate Planning Prior to Diagnosis: Deliberate Planning Prior to HostilitiesHostilities

Worked well to orient all hands– MSTP-led training in Spring 2002 prior to

exercise DESERT SPEAR 02 Long lead time (approximately one year) Massive intelligence development Current enemy contact: OPERATION

SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW)/OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH (ONW)

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Diagnosis: Exercising Prior to DeploymentDiagnosis: Exercising Prior to Deployment MSTP-facilitated DESERT SPEAR-02 (Spring

2002) MSTP-facilitated MEFEX-03 (Autumn 2002) Enhanced familiarization of tactical/

operational problems Limitations of computer-driven CPX

constrained some understanding Exercise geared to support established

staff procedures

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Diagnosis: What We WantedDiagnosis: What We Wanted

“…as the 3d MAW G-3, Colonel Jonathan G. Miclot, stated on the morning of March 20, ‘We have to be very methodical with regard to what we have to target and why we have to target….It’s not a war against Iraqi forces per se; this is a war against the regime….That’s the challenge right now; who’s going to shoot, when are they going to shoot, and can we re-target them effectively, efficiently, and quickly?”

Source: LtCol Michael D. Visconage & Maj Carroll N Harris, Third MarineAircraft Wing: Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 2004), p. 63.

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Diagnosis: What We GotDiagnosis: What We Got

“For Walters, the immediate challenge was to adjust the timeline of the battle damage assessment process. ‘The first two days of combat operation was really blistering fast,’ Walters said, ‘We completely outran the targeting cycle.’ As Walters had expected, the volume of intelligence information was immense. There was more information than could be processed.”

Source: LtCol Michael D. Visconage & Maj Carroll N Harris, Third MarineAircraft Wing: Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 2004), p. 165.

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Diagnosis: FrictionDiagnosis: Friction “Careful planning failed…to deliver the

desired result….The Marines had anticipated trouble in Nasiriyah….Trouble came, but not of the sort anticipated. The defending division, the 11th, deserted, as predicted….during 22-23 March, fedayeen fighters began to arrive….Neither side was properly organized to conduct the battle that ensued. It was a recipe for confusion and confusion quickly followed….the battle for Nasiriyah was a catalogue of errors.”Source: John Keegan, The Iraq War. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 149-151.

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Diagnosis: Deliberate Planning During Diagnosis: Deliberate Planning During HostilitiesHostilities

Despite technology, “Fog of War” still high– Information barrage at senior headquarters;

dearth of gouge at lower level headquarters and combat units

“Current Plans” could not function effectively– Forecasted situations rapidly became OBE– Target nominations rapidly became OBE– Subverted Air Tasking Order (ATO) process

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Diagnosis: Disorder, ComplexityDiagnosis: Disorder, Complexity

“General Usher said it was sometimes a matter of ‘brute force logistics.’ Despite all the FSSG’s careful preparations, sometimes it came down to Marines muscling their way through a problem….the general added, ‘It wasn’t pretty. It wasn’t elegant. It was just sheer adrenaline.’ This was especially true as the Marine division sprinted towards Baghdad.” Source: Col. Nicholas E. Reynolds,

USMCR (Ret), Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 90.

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Diagnosis: FluidityDiagnosis: Fluidity “…even if a higher headquarters had good

information and wanted to micromanage, it was often difficult to do so, especially if the subordinate command was moving or was at or below the digital divide….The staffs who tried to stay ahead of the curve and ‘paper the war’ often failed….Events happened faster than anyone could write old-fashioned op orders, especially Fragmentary Orders, before they were overtaken by events.”

Source: Col. Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Ret), Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 160.

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Diagnosis: Deliberate Planning During Diagnosis: Deliberate Planning During HostilitiesHostilities

Inability to plan ahead into immediate future with a high degree of fidelity enough to synchronize battlefield activities– Tension between maneuver and fires– Tension between maneuver and logistics

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Prescription: Adaptation, Coordination, and Prescription: Adaptation, Coordination, and Cooperation during ExecutionCooperation during Execution

“’Shared Understanding’ continued to make it possible to work smoothly…to rely on mission orders and the commander’s intent, and to operate with lean staffs and a ‘light’ communications suite. The intended result was speed, the mantra that permeated MEF, Division, and Wing planning….”

Source: Col. Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Ret), Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 52.

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Prescription: Lateral coordination & cooperationPrescription: Lateral coordination & cooperation Prime Example--CG 1st MarDiv (MajGen James

Mattis) and CG 3rd MAW (MajGen James Amos): “…how much things had changed since Desert Storm, especially in terms of communications between the actuals: ‘There was the twice daily….video-teleconference. They also talked on the phone a lot. Compared to Desert Storm…they talked far more than their predecessors [in that conflict]….they were called the ‘Talking Jims’ by their staffs.’”

Source: Col. Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Ret), Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 52.

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Prescription: Adaptation, Coordination, and Prescription: Adaptation, Coordination, and Cooperation during ExecutionCooperation during Execution

Key to winning the campaign in a rapid fashion

Twice daily I MEF CG VTC– Participants: I MEF Fwd/Main, I MEF Rear, 1st

MarDiv, TF Tarawa, 1st UK Div, 3d MAW, 1st FSSG, MEG, MLC

– Shared Commander’s Estimate, Commander’s Intent, Commander’s Concept

Staffs coordinated improvisations Decentralized execution on the ground AND

IN THE AIR

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Critique of Current Planning & C2 TTPCritique of Current Planning & C2 TTP MCWP 5-1 MCPP suitable regarding deliberate

planning for and during set-piece battles– Little insight on planning and execution

procedures for “hyper war”– “Transition” between plans and operations is

key MCPP weakness (Chapter 7)– Synch matrix, DST, Annex X Execution

Checklist do not communicate much meaning to those not engaged in planning

R2P2 is “MEU-centric” and very “pre-scripted”– Need something that is fast but also works for

larger MAGTFs and subordinate elements

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Some RecommendationsSome Recommendations Synchronization is not dead--just best for

“set-piece battles” where:– Enemy is immobile--probably in fixed fortified

positions– Time is not a factor– Requirement for maximization of combat power

paramount to reduce friendly losses Examples:

– “Classic” amphibious assaults against defended beach

– Attacking fortified zones with no effective enemy mobile reserves or reinforcements

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Some RecommendationsSome Recommendations Leverage information age C2 technology to

enhance adaptation/cooperation– MCDP 6 Command and Control vignette,

“OPERATION VERBAL IMAGE”» COP often wrong about the terrain and enemy, but

enhanced moral courage of local leaders to improvise» Examples of successful COP use alongside examples of

misuse

C2 style/systems should facilitate “Basketball” rather than “Football” tactics– Continuous “swarming” instead of “plays” with

pauses– Players talk to each other “across the court”

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Some RecommendationsSome Recommendations Training regime MUST change:

– Increase force-on-force freeplay exercises– Accelerated tempo of action leaving little time

for deliberate planning during execution– Longer exercises with high possibility of

unpredictable events invalidating current plans Develop ideas at lower levels

– What works is floated up to senior leaders– Senior leaders enable everyone to “get the

word” on what works

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Some RecommendationsSome Recommendations We need yet another planning process in

addition to what we already have:– MCPP too deliberate and slow during execution– R2P2 good for MEU and some unit/mission

mixes, but doesn’t cover larger headquarters rapid planning needs.

Start with draft “Recognitional Planning Model Field Manual (RPM FM)”– Heavy Marine contribution (Maj John Schmitt)– Modify for MEF and below use

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RPM FM Process SchematicRPM FM Process Schematic

Situationalinformation

Guidance/Taskingfrom HHQ

UnderstandMission

Conceptualize COA

Test/Operationalize COA

Wargame COA

Develop Orders

DISSEMINATEEXECUTEIMPROVISE

Includes executorsas well as planners

Once COA satisfices in wargame and/or testing, it becomes THE PLAN. No need to compare options.

The “Decision” (subject to test and evaluation)

QUESTIONS??QUESTIONS??

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