De Roy and Ramos vs. CA [G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988]

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Monday, March 26, 2012 Posted

by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and

destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in

injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private

respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity

to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts,

the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.

Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and

awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was

affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a

copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,

the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion

for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by

the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their

motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution

because the same was not filed within thegrace period as enscribed in the present

jurisprudence .

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying the denied the motion and let the petitioner be bound by the negligence of their

counsel

Held: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of

discretion when it denied petitioners' motion forextension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was more

than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the

coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of

the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August

25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said

rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period. It

is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of

decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,

consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court

decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated

(SCRA) and law journals.

Tanada vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)

TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera

CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish

and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,

letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of

implementation and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it “would be granted to a private

individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be

subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds

with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ

when public rights are to be subserved”.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition

for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right

recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the

clause in Article 2 “unless otherwise provided”.

HELD:

“Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not with the

publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the

law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all

unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by

the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate

notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this,

there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code “Ignorance of the law excuses no one

from compliance therewith”.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette

all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so

published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Manzano vs Sanchez

Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been

married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four

children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with

Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that

both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that

the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of

David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife

for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and

had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who

both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for

5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to

marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated

in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would

make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary

cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a

subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross

ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Lupo Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes

243 SCRA 32

Facts:

Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has two children with De Castro, saw

the respondent Judge Brillantes sleeping in his bed. The houseboy claimed that the

judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on the

ground that the respondent is already married and has five children. Judge denies the

claim of being married stating that the alleged union wasn‘t valid because it lacked a

marriage license. Although upon the request of the woman‘s parents they held another

marriage ceremony later that year, they still didn‘t apply for a marriage license. The

woman abandoned the Judge nineteen years ago leaving their children to his care. He

claims that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first

marriage took place in 1965 and was thus governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines;

while the second marriage on 1991, governed by the Family Code.

Issue:

WON the judge can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.

Held/Ratio:

No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family

Code in 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of

the FC, said Article is given ―retroactive effect since it does not prejudice or impair‖any vested right. His failure to secure a marriage license on two possible occasions

betrays his sinister motives and bad faith as a lawyer and judge.

Dismissed from service.

Guy v. Court of AppealsFacts:Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by and through her mother Remedios

Oanes, filed a petition for lettersof administration before the RTC of Makati. Respondents alleged that

they are duly acknowledgedillegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati on October

29, 1992, leaving an estate ofP10, 000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known

heirs are his surviving spouseShirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,

all surnamed Guy. Respondentsare a asking for an appointment of a regular administrator for the

orderly settlement of Sima Wei·s estate.They also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special

Administrator of the Estate. Petitioner is praying forthe dismissal of the petition for the reason that his

deceased father left no debts and that his estate can besettled without securing letters of

administration. He argued that private respondents should haveestablished their status as illegitimate

children during the lifetime of Sima Wei.Issue:1.

Whether private respondent·s petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with ruleson non-

forum shopping?2.

Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming

theirSuccessional Rights?3.

Whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving filiation?Holding:1.

Yes, the petition lacks merit. The law provides that certification of non-forum should beexecuted by the

plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply means cause for a dismissalof the case. Merits of the

case and the absence of an intention to violate rule with impunityshould be considered to temper the

strict application of the rules.2.

Private respondents cannot be bar from claiming successional rights. To be valid andeffective, waiver

must be couched clearly and in unequivocal terms to leave no doubt withregards to the intention of a

party in giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waivercannot be attributed to a person if it not

explicitly and clearly evinces intent to abandon aright. This case has no waiver of hereditary rights.3.

Private respondents must not be barred from proving filiation because the law provides thatfiliation of

an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civilregister or a final judgment,

or an admission by means of a public document or a privatehandwritten instrument. Action for

recognition may be brought by the child during his/herlifetime. However, action must be based upon

open and continuous possession of the statusof an illegitimate child.

AZNAR VS GARCIA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner

Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN

Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen,

as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it

deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been

declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier

case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he

resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,

and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the

fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so

that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by

acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case

returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine

law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16

of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country

where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of

succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of

testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose

succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and

regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the

meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal

property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under

the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form

and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil

Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is

deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the

State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,

should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of

Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen

was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,

and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the

validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of

the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the

rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict

of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and

appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in

the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in

California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the

domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with

the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most

matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as

the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of

California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and

another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to

the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California

Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the

contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the

deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article

16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article

946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s

domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers

back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,

the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer

the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of

determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth

between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and

the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in

the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,

especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for

children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,

makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing

them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is

the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged

natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the

domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of

California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary

provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law

applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law”

indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean

or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of

the State of California.

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470

October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent

Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and

begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then

re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business

in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to

render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to

manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by

previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein

respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of

June 11, 1982.

The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned

case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the

Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this

certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal

property in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the

Complaint…

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property

relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative

community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime.

The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over

petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also

obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce

case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that

there were neither community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of

KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on

my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me, without further

contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States

of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American

citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in

this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,

only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same

being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens

may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they

are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released

private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which

divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of

petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband

entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his

own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision

he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from

asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling,

a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of

marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce

proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,

promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two

complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still

married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant

Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases

on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city

fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against

the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to

the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent.

Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO,

seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital

relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for

adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for

adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE

and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO

issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.

NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a

sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been

established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a

jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action,

it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal

representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical

consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the

supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the

time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of

a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the

accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the

former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his

country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects

may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view

of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the

same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of

petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture

that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia.

However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving

the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at

Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the

couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of

fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,

1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy

on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s

marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as

evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued

was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized

Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal

capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said

decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily

because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be

used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a

public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the

record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular

officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the

record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan

City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity

to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO (1965)

Short summary: Former Filipina obtained divorce while still a Filipina then obtained

Nevadan citizenship, remarried. Now being sued for legal separation and damages,

which are both granted

Facts:

-Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tenchavez were both married w/o parental knowledge

-marriage registered w/ local civil register

-marriage lacked authority from Archbishop or parish priest but no remarriage because

father f Escano did not consent to remarriage

-Tenchavez returned to Manila. Escano lived with parents, left for US in 1950 and sued

for divorce because of "extreme mental cruelty" which was granted by Nevadan court,

ruled final and absolute in 1950

-1951: Escano's parents sought annulment of marriage w/ Archbishop of Cebu

-1954: Escano sought Papal dispensation of her marriage

-1954: Escano married an American in Nevada

-1955: Tenchavez filed complaint for legal separation and damages vs. Escano

Answer: Nevada Court decree of divorce was valid, so is her 2nd marriage

-1958: Escano obtained American citizenship

LC: no legal separation, but Tenchavez do not need to support Escano

WON Tenchavez and Escano were already divorced by virtue of the Nevada Court

decree? NO

-at the time the divorce was issued, Escano was still a Filipino citizen, then subject of

RP Law which does not admit absolute divorce (only legal separation)

-Divorce is against public policy so by virtue of Art17, NCC: the foreign decree of

absolute divorce cannot render ineffective prohibitive RP laws

WON Tenchavez entitled to Damages? YES

-Refusal to perform wifely duties, denial of consortium, desertion of husband constitutes

wrong + adultery

Summary:

1 Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens not recognized

1 Remarriage of divorced wife and cohabitation with person other than lawful

husband is ground for legal separation

1 Desertion and securing of individual divorce decree entitles one to damages

1 An action for alienation of affections against parents does not lie if NO Malice/

unworthy motives

~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO

Short Summary: Filipino wife and foreigner husband had properties in RP but got

divorced, acknowledging that they had no community property. Foreigner husband now

sues wife for accounting of their conjugal property in RP. SC held that since they are

already divorced, no community property. Unfair if Filipina is still bound to someone who

does not consider her his wife. :p

Facts:

ALICE (RP Citizen) and RICHARD (US Citizen):

-married in HK

-resided in RP as husband and wife for 10 years

-divorced in US

-afterwards, Alice married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada

RICHARD sued Alice for accounting of conjugal property and to manage conjugal

property (the Galleon Shop in Ermita)

-MTD by Alice: there was a previous judgment of divorce by the Nevada court ruling that

they had no community property

--DENIED: (1) property invoked is located in RP; (2) Divorce decree has no bearing in

this case

WON DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED AS VALID IN RP? It depends…But here it was

recognized.

-though it is true that DIVORCE is against public policy in RP, but absolute divorce is

just not applicable to Filipino nationals but NOT on aliens who may obtain divorce

abroad validly under their national law. If such was the case, divorce would be

recognized in RP.

-In NEVADA LAW: Divorce dissolves the marriage. The marriage tie, when thus severed

as to one party, ceases to bind either. …

-Thus, pursuant to RICHARD's national law, HE IS NO LONGER THE HUSBAND OF

ALICE. He would have no standing to sue in the case as Alice's husband entitled to

exercise control over the conjugal estate.

-To maintain that under RP laws, American Richard should still be considered married to

Alice cannot be considered just. Alice should not be discriminated against in her won

country if the ends of justice are to be served.

~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~

PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA

Short summary: After obtaining a divorce decree in Germany, German ex-husband of

Filipina wife sued the latter for adultery. The court held that since they were already

divorced, there's no marital relationship to protect and the ex-husband has no COA.

Facts:

-IMELDA MANALAYSAY-PILAPIL (fil) and ERICH GEILING (german) were married in

Germany, stayed in RP

-marital discord >>> separation de facto

-GEILING initiated divorce proceedings in GERMANY. Pending decision of German

courts, Imelda filed action for legal separation, support and separation of property.

-GERMAN COURT granted DIVORCE.

-Afterwards, GEILING sued IMELDA for ADULTERY

…Imelda had affairs w/ 2 other men during their marriage

>>>initially dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence

>>>Reconsidered, refiled

-IMELDA filed MOTION TO QUASH: no jurisdiction, as the complainant is not the

"OFFENDED SPOUSE" there being a final decree of divorce already

>>denied. This case is the special civil action for the annulment of the order denying the

motion to quash.

WON COURT HAS JURIDICTION OF THE ADULTERY CASE, IT BEING THAT

FOREIGNER EX-HUSBAND ALREADY OBTAINED A FINAL DECREE IN HIS

COUNTRY GRANTING THEIR DIVORCE? NO

-in adultery charge, status of the complainant as the "OFFENDED SPOUSE" important

-offended spouse: still married to accused at the time of filing of complaint

-since here, already divorced, then not the offended spouse which the law requires

-ON ALLEGATION THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE AFFAIRS WHEN THEY

WERE STILL MARRIED SO HE COULD NOT HAVE FILED IT THEN: no matter.

>No longer a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of marriage is

decreed.

>No danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family (rationale for adultery law)

-ON ARGUMENT THAT RPC INTENDED TO PUNISH ADULTERY ALTHOUGH THE

MARRIAGE IS AFTERWARDS DECLARED VOID: can't file adultery charge after

divorce, which declares the marriage void ab initio. The case used to support such

argument contemplated a situation when the adultery charge was filed before a judicial

declaration for nullity ab inition of the marriage was rendered (or in this case, if it was

filed before the judicial decree of divorce was final).

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QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Short summary: A Filipina wife divorced her Filipino husband then remarried twice.

When her former husband (who also remarried and had kids) died, she now claims a

share from his estate, claiming that the divorce decree she obtained is not valid as she

is a Filipino national. Court held that the 2nd wife of the decedent was not the surviving

spouse because they were married even before the divorce decree was obtained by the

1st wife. The court remanded the case just to determine WON the 1st wife was already

an US citizen when divorce decree granted.

Facts:

-Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan (both Filipinos) were married May 1941.

-Arturo Padlan married Blandina Dandad April 1947.

-Fe Quita obtained a divorce decree in California in July 1954. She remarried 2x

-1972: Arturo died intestate, leaving his 2nd family and Fe

WHO WAS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE? FE OR BLANDINA? Secret!

-Blandina's side implied that Fe was no longer a Filipino citizen when she acquired a

divorce decree. However, not threshed out during the trial so remand the case (the TC

merely said that since divorce is not valid in RP, divorce decree was also not valid)

-However, as the marriage between Blandina and Arturo was contracted when the 1st

marriage between Arturo and Fe was still subsisting, it is considered bigamous and thus

void. Blandina is clearly not the surviving spouse.

-but as the children of Blandina were all recognized by Arturo as his children, these

children are assured of shares in the intestate estate

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1 VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FOREIGNERS

HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE AND LEGAL

SEPARATION

: when foreign divorce is recognized by a contracting state:

a Respondent/petitioner had habitual residence in that state

a Both spouses were nationals of that state

a Petitioner national + habitual resident

In US: full faith and credit clause of consti:

>if BOTH Souses domiciled in 1 state, can recognize divorce decree by a sister state

>if only 1 spouse: additional conditions

>if divorce decree by a foreign country: Not covered but would recognize divorce

provided that the parties are domiciled in that State

IN RP: no law recognizing foreign divorce but under international comity, it is recognized

as long as not violate strongly held policy of RP

A ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY

-affect STATUS & DOMESTIC RELATIONS of parties

DIVORCE ANNULMENT/NULLITY

Ground Occurs after marriage

celebration

Defects are present at the time of

celebration

Lex fori On validity of marriage

CHOICE OF LAW APPROACH: grounds for annulment and nullity

TRADITIONAL POLICY-CENTERED

Lex loci

celebrationis

Law of the state of marital domicile - considered to have the most

significant interest in the status of the parties

WHO MAY CLAIM JURISDICTION

*place of celebration of marriage

*place of marital domicile