De La Contingence Des Lois de La Nature Chapter 1

8/14/2019 De La Contingence Des Lois de La Nature Chapter 1

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CHAPTER I

NECESSITY

BY what sign do we recognise that a thing is neces

sary ? What is the criterion of necessity ?

If we attempt to define the concept of an absolute

necessity, we are led to eliminate therefrom everyrelation that subordinates the existence of one

thingto that of another as a condition. Hence absolute

necessity excludes all synthetic multiplicity, all possi

bility of things or of laws, and so there is no occasion

to inquire if it holds sway throughout the given

universe, which is essentially a multiplicity of things

that depend, more or less, upon one another.

In reality, the problem under investigation is the

following : by what sign do we recognise relative

necessity, i.e. the existence of a necessary relation

between two things ?

The mostperfect type

ofnecessary

concatenation

is the syllogism, in which we have a particular pro

position shown to result from a general one because

it is contained in it and consequently was implicitlyaffirmed the very moment the general propositionitself was affirmed. The syllogism, after all, is but

the proof of an analytical relation that exists between


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8 Contingency of the Laws of Nature

genus and species, the whole and the part. Conse

quently, where there exists analytical relationship,we find necessary concatenation. This concatenation,

however, per se, is a purely formal one. If the general

proposition is contingent, the particular one deduced

from it, as such, at all events, is equally and neces

sarily contingent. It is impossible, by syllogism, to

obtain demonstration of real necessity, simply by

connecting all the conclusions with a major neces

sary in itself. Is this process compatible with the

conditions of analysis ?

From the analytical point of view, the only pro

position wholly necessary in itself is that which hasfor its formula A = A. Any proposition in which theattribute or predicate is different from the subject, as

is the case even if one of the two terms results

from the decomposition of the other, leaves behind

a synthetical relationship as a counterpart of the

analytical relationship. Can syllogism reduce syn

thetically analytical propositions to purely analytical

ones.

At the outset, we find a difference between the

propositions on which syllogism works and the one

we have to reach. In the latter, the terms are connected by the sign = ; in the others, by the copulais. Is this a radical difference ?

The copula is, used in ordinary propositions, is

perhaps not unrelated to the sign =. From the

standpoint of the extension of the terms the stand

point of reasoning it means that the subject ex-


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Necessity 9

presses only a part of the predicate, a part whose

relative magnitude is not indicated. The proposition "All men are mortal" signifies that the species"man" is a part of the genus

"

mortal," and leaves

the relation between the number of men and the

number of mortals an indeterminate one. Were this

relation known, one might say : "All men = - mortals."n

The progress of science, it may be added, consists in

determining with greater accuracy and completeness

the species contained in the genera, so that, in a

perfect science, the sign = would everywhere have

replaced the copula is. The formula of this science

would be A = B-fC + D + . . .; B = a + 6 + c . . .,etc. Substituting their values for B, C, D, etc., we

should finally obtain: A = -f + + . . . Now, isthis a purely analytical formula ?

No doubt the relation between A and its partsis analytical, but the reciprocal relation between the

parts and the whole is synthetical ; for multiplicitydoes not contain the reason of unity. And there is

nothing to be gained by alleging that when we

replace a + b + c+ . . . by their values we obtainA = A, for what science does is to consider A as adecomposable whole and to divide it into its parts.

Still, the objection will be raised, the ideal ana

lytical form, towards which science tends, may be

conceived otherwise. The effect of interposing a

middle term M between two given terms S and Pis to divide in two the interval resulting from their


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io Contingency of the Laws of Nature

difference of extension. Middle terms will likewise

be interposed between S and M, between M andP, and so on, until all the gaps are completelyfilled up. The passing from S to P will then be

imperceptible. Continuing in this way, we come

back to the final essence A, with which everythingwill be connected by a chain of continuity.

This point of view, indeed, admits of the reduc

tion of all propositions to the formula A is A. Butthis time the copula is cannot be replaced by the

sign=

,for the interposition of any number what

soever of middle terms cannot entirely fill up the

intervalbetween

theparticular and the general.

The transitions, though becoming less sudden, arenone the less discontinuous

;and so there is always

a difference of extension or denotation between

subject and predicate.It is therefore impossible to reduce particular

relations to the formula A = A, i.e. by analysis toarrive at the demonstration of radical necessity.

Analysis and syllogism demonstrate only derivative

necessity, i.e. the impossibility of a certain thing

being false if a certain other thing is admitted to

be true.Where analysis is wrong, in so far as it professes

to be self-sufficient, is that it admits of nothing

beyond an identical proposition as a final explana

tion, and is unable to reduce to such a formula the

propositions that have to be explained. It is useful

only if an identical proposition, made up of hetero-


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Necessity 1 1

geneous elements, is supplied as its point of depart

ure;

it demonstrates necessity only if it develops a

necessary synthesis. Do such syntheses exist?

Experience, which offers no universal knowledge

whatsoever in time and space and simply makes

known the external relations between things, mayreveal constant though not necessary relations.

Thus, above all else, that it may be necessary, a

synthesis must be known a priori. True, we mighthave to find out whether such a synthesis is neces

sary from the standpoint of things, as it is for the

mind. At the outset, however, it is sufficient that

it be necessary for the mind for there to be no

occasion to discuss its objective reality, since this

discussion could only take place in accordance with

the laws of the mind. If, perchance, the course of

things did not exactly conform to the principleslaid down a priori by the mind, we should have to

conclude, not that the mind is mistaken, but thatmatter betrays its participation in non-entity by a

feeble revolt against order.

How are we to recognise that a judgment is apriori ?

For a judgment to be regarded as a priori, its

elements, terms, and relation must not be derived

from experience. That the terms may be consideredas not coming from experience, it is not enoughfor them to be abstract. Experience, after all, givesus no datum which does not present both a con

crete and an abstract aspect. I cannot gather up


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in a single intuition both the colour and the odour

of one and the same object. The boldest abstractions may be no more than the extension, performed by the understanding, of the subdivision

outlined by the senses. Moreover, experience itself

sets us on the path of this extension by giving us

more or less abstract data about things, accordingto distance, duration, or intensity. That a term,

therefore, may be considered as laid down a priori,it must proceed from experience neither directly,

by a process of intuition, nor indirectly, by a process of abstraction.

Similarly, for a relation to be considered as laiddown a priori, it is not enough that it should set

up any kind of systematisation between intuitions,

as though experience supplied nothing that re

sembled a system. To suppose an intuition abso

lutely devoid of unity is to depart from the condi

tions of reality. The most immediate perceptions

imply the grouping together of similar parts and

the separation of dissimilar objects. A multiplicity,pure and simple, is something altogether incon

ceivable ; if it offers nothing upon which thought

may lay holdit

cannot be a datum of experience.Actually, then, in the very objects perceived, there

is a certain degree of systematisation ; and so,

before affirming that a relation of dependence, set

up between two terms, is not due to experience,we must find out if this relation is radically distinctfrom those we are privileged to set up. This rela-


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Necessity 1 3

tion must radically differ from those which experience offers us or which we can read in the data

of experience.

The field of experience, besides, may be clearlydefined: it consists of facts and their observable

relations. Facts may be divided into external and

internal facts, those proper to the being which is

their subject. By the senses we can become acquainted with the former ; by empirical conscious

ness, or the inner sense, we can apprehend the

latter within ourselves. Observable relations consist

of relations of resemblance or contiguity, whether

simultaneous or successive.

A synthetical judgment is subjectively necessary,if stated a priori ; but in order that it may be a

sign of necessity, from the standpoint of things, it

must in addition affirm some necessary relation

between the terms it compares. A major which

stated a contingent relation would pass on thischaracter to all its consequents. Now, the objectiverelations that may exist between two terms arereducible to four : the relations of cause to effect,

of means to end, of substance to attribute, and of

whole to part. The relations of substance to attribute and of whole to part may be reduced to

causality and finality. In the last issue, then, there

remain only these relations of causality and finality.We cannot say regarding any end that it must

necessarily be realised, for no event, of itself alone,is

the whole of what is possible. On the contrary,


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there are infinite possibilities apart from the event

under consideration. The chances, then, of realising this event compared with the chances of realis

ing something else are as one to infinity ; and so

the realisation of any given end, such as the

uniformity with which phenomena succeed one an

other, is, in itself, infinitely improbable and far from

being necessary. Besides, even if an end is laid

down as one that must be realised, the means to

be used with a view to this result are not deter

mined at the same time. Any end may equallybe realised by different means, just as any goal

may equally be reached along different roads.True, the means will not all be alike simple or

good in themselves. The end, however, as such,is not interested in these differences ; and the

reason we take this into account is that we exalt

the means itself into a secondary end v The realisation of the end by the means presupposes an

agent capable of knowing, preferring, and accom

plishing ; and so it is not necessary per se.

It is not the same in the production of an effect

by its cause, if the word cause is given its strict

meaning as a productive force.The cause, strictly so called, is only such if it

produces an effect. Moreover, it acts solely byvirtue of its nature; it cares nothing for the

aesthetic or moral value of the result. Thus, there

are no grounds for admitting any degree of contin

gency in the simple relation of cause to effect.


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Necessity 1 5

This relation is the perfect though unique type of

primordial necessity.And so it is only to a priori causal syntheses

that necessity, alike objective and subjective, appertains : they alone are capable of producing wholly

necessary analytical consequences.

To sum up, the criterion of the necessity of arelation is the possibility of reducing it analytically

to a subjectively and objectively necessary synthesis.

The principle of the necessary conjunction of things,the magnetic stone whose virtue is transmitted to

every link, can only be the a priori causal

synthesis.

Now, if it happened that it were impossible to

establish the legitimacy of like syntheses as con

stitutive or regulative principles of the knowledgeof given things, would all necessity become delusive

or fallacious ?

Assuredly we should no longer be dealing with

a radical necessity, as prevailing throughout the

given world, since, even though certain syntheses

implied in experience were necessary per se, the

mind, in the case in question, would not be in a

position toascertain this.

Nevertheless, the combination of experience and analysis might still

manifest a certain kind of necessity : the only one,

indeed, usually followed by the positive sciences.

It may, in fact, be conceived that particular syntheses empirically given may be reduced to more

general syntheses, and these latter to still more


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1 6 Contingency of the Laws of Nature

general ones, and so on, until we come to a more

or less restricted number of practically irreducible

syntheses. The ideal would be to reduce every

thing to a single synthesis, one supreme law which

would contain all the laws of the universe as

particular cases. No doubt these general formulae,founded on

experience,would retain the character

of this latter, which is to make known what is,not what is incapable of not being. Nothing could

prove them to be necessary per se. They would,

however, set up a necessary relation between all

particular facts, as such. The slightest change in

detail would imply the overthrow of the universe.

We may therefore accept the possibility of anecessity of fact along with the necessity of theory.

The latter is present when the synthesis developed

by analysis is stated a priori by the mind and

unites an effect to a cause. When thissynthesis,

without being known a priori, is implied in a

totality of known facts and is constantly beingconfirmed by experience, it manifests, if not the

necessity of the whole, at all events the necessity

of each part, on the supposition that all the other

parts are realised.

De La Contingence Des Lois de La Nature Chapter 1

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