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Nominalizations and tropes

David Nicolas, Institut Jean Nicod ENS - EHESS - CNRS

http://d.a.nicolas.free.fr/research, david.nicolas@m4x.org

Barcelona

March 23, 2011

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1. Introduction

What semantics should we attribute to mass expressions derived from gradable expressions?

Gradable expressions are expressions that accept comparatives: Julie is wiser than Fred, Julie loves Fred more than Tom.

Examples of nominalizations: wise → wisdom, sad → sadness, to love Fred → love for Fred, to work → work.

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Plan

1. Introduction

2. The uses of mass expressions derived from gradable expressions

3. The interpretations of derived mass expressions

4. The semantics of derived mass expressions

5. Conclusion

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2. The uses of mass expressions derived from gradable expressions

We look at cases in which a gradable expression gives rise, through nominalization, to a nominal expression that behaves morphosyntactically like a mass noun. This means that it can be used in the following ways.

First, it can appear together with a possessive phrase: Julie’s wisdom, or in a definite nominal expression with a relative (non-possessive) phrase: the love that Julie felt for Fred.

Second, it can appear together with an indefinite, mass determiner like much or a lot of: Julie showed a lot of wisdom, Julie didn’t feel much love for Tom, Julie did a lot of work.

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Third, it can appear in comparative constructions, its grammatical number being singular: Julie had more love for Fred than for Tom.

Fourth, it can be used without any determiner, in sentences that are not comparative: Wisdom is rare, Julie encountered love.

Fifth, it is in general invariable in grammatical number: uses in the plural (?wisdoms, ?loves) require a special context and induce a change in meaning.

Finally, it may sometimes be used together with a count determiner, notably in expressions like a great wisdom, an untiring love. NB: There are lexical variations and exceptions, e.g.: tall is gradable but tallness isn’t. Yesterday, we’ve done a lot of walking (*a lot of walk).

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3. The interpretations of mass expressions derived from gradable expressions 3.1. The interpretations of possessive and definite uses

Julie’s wisdom attracted Tom. Julie’s love for Fred attracted Tom.

What do these sentences mean? What do their subjects refer to? Let’s see how the sentences may be paraphrased. (NB: Caution will be required when interpreting the results.)

First kind of paraphrase: ‘The fact that Julie was wise attracted Tom.’ Julie’s wisdom might refer to a fact.

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Second kind of paraphrase: ‘Tom was attracted by how wise Julie was.’ (‘The degree at which Julie was wise attracted Tom.’) Julie’s wisdom might refer to a degree of wisdom.

Third kind of paraphrase: ‘How Julie was wise attracted Tom.’ ‘The way in which Julie was wise attracted Tom.’ Julie’s wisdom might refer to a way, a manner, a sub-property of wisdom (as in Julie and Mary have the same wisdom).

Or it might refer to an instance of a property, the very particular way in which a property manifests itself in a given individual. (On instances of properties and relations, i.e. tropes, see Lowe 1998.)

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Certain predicates seem to select a particular interpretation:

to acknowledge seems to license only a paraphrase in terms of facts: Tom finally acknowledged Julie’s wisdom. ‘Tom finally acknowledged the fact that Julie was wise.’

to be greater than seems to license only a paraphrase in terms of a comparison: Julie's wisdom was greater than Fred's. ‘Julie was wiser than Fred.’

to describe seems to license only a paraphrase in terms of ways or instances of a property: Tom described Julie's wisdom. ‘Tom described the way in which Julie was wise.’

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to last yields yet a different kind of paraphrase: Julie's sadness lasted several days. 'Julie was sad during several days.' Julie's sadness might refer to the state the verbal sentence describes.

Observations: to last doesn't combine with derived mass nouns describing activities: *Julie's work lasted only two days. to last combines only with derived mass nouns describing transitory properties or relations: Julie's love for Tom lasted several years. ??Julie's wisdom lasted several years.

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3.2. The interpretation of indefinite and comparative uses Indefinite uses:

Julie had much wisdom. ‘Julie was very wise.’

Julie had a lot of love for Fred. ‘Julie loved Fred a lot.’

These sentences express something concerning how wise Julie was, and how much Julie loved Fred.

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Comparative uses:

Julie had more wisdom than Fred. ‘Julie was wiser than Fred.’

Julie had more love for Fred than for Tom. ‘Julie loved Fred more than Tom.’

These sentences compare and order certain entities with respect to the extent at which they possess a certain property.

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3.3.The interpretation of bare uses

Julie encountered love.

‘Julie encountered someone who loved her.’ (‘Julie encountered an instance of love from a certain individual.’) Wisdom is rare.

‘It is rare that someone be wise.’ (‘Instances of wisdom are rare.’)

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3.4. The interpretation of count uses

Julie had an incredible love for Fred. This seems to be a case of conversion, where the mass noun love is used as a count noun.

The interpretation of the sentence is indeed parallel to that of: Julie bought an incredible wine. This sentence says that the wine Julie bought is of a particular type, to which the predicate expressed by the adjective applies.

Similarly, the sentence that concerns love says that the love felt by Julie is of a particular type, to which the predicate expressed by the adjective applies.

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4. The semantics of derived mass expressions

4.1. Independent theoretical choices

Genericity I follow Gillon (1990): bare uses of mass nouns or plurals are indefinite uses, whose interpretation is an existential one. According to Gillon, what is called genericity corresponds to a variety of independent phenomena, which are neither restricted, nor specially attached, to bare uses.

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Gradability (Some reference works on gradability: von Stechow 1984, Klein 1991, Kennedy & McNally 2005)

We find gradable expressions among: - Plural count nouns (more cats), but not singular count nouns (*more cat) - Mass nouns, be they concrete (more wine, less furniture), or derived (more sadness, less love, more work) - Gradable adjectives: taller, less sad - Gradable verbs: to love less, to work more

The dominant approach uses degrees (abstract representations of measurement) everywhere in the semantics of gradable expressions. Alternatively, one may want to use degrees only when explicitly mentioned (Nicolas 2010, Moltmann 2009). Can this be done compositionally?

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4.2. Is reference illusory?

Julie’s wisdom attracted Tom. Prima facie, Julie’s wisdom seems to refer, just like Julie’s gold in Julie’s gold attracted Tom.

But is reference genuine? Various philosophical positions: - Realism: Julie’s wisdom refers to something. Perhaps to an instance of a property, the particular way in which wisdom is instantiated in Julie. (Cf. Lowe 1998.)

- Fictionalism: Julie’s wisdom makes as if to refer to something. (Cf. Bentham 1842.)

- Reductionism: Julie’s wisdom neither refers nor makes as if to refer. A sentence containing the expression is directly interpreted in terms of a suitable paraphrase. (Cf. Dummett 1973.)

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4.3. What do derived mass nouns mean? Here are various conceivable linguistic answers.

Definite descriptions like Julie’s wisdom A) have no fixed meaning: it is only the linguistic and extra-linguistic context that allows us to interpret them; B) have fixed meanings: they are ambiguous; C) have one fixed meaning: they really or primarily refer to entities of a certain type, but they may be coerced to refer to entities of another type in certain contexts; thus, they really or primarily refer to: C.1) facts C.2) degrees (Tovena 2001) C.3) ways, manners or sub-properties C.4) instances of properties and relations (several philosophers + Nicolas 2002, 2004, 2010; Moltmann 2004) C.5) states (Parsons 1990; Asher 1993) and activities (Julie's work was slow and careful)

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What about strategy A? Let's flesh it in terms of paraphrase: Interpreting a sentence with a derived mass noun consists in finding an appropriate paraphrase given the context.

Causal and perceptual sentences (Lowe 2006, Schnieder 2006): Socrates' paleness shook Kriton. [causal] Kriton could be shaken by something else than the mere fact that Socrates was pale. But what about other paraphrases? 'How pale Socrates was shook Kriton'. 'The fact that Socrates was so pale shook Kriton.'

Kriton saw Socrates' paleness. [perceptual] Kriton could have seen Socrates' paleness, without seeing that Socrates was pale. Unclear. Socrates can be understood de re in Kriton saw that Socrates was pale. So what is the argument?

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More decisive arguments:

* How do we arrive at any given paraphrase? * Why do we arrive only at a small number of paraphrases? All this remains mysterious under approach A (which is not an ambiguity view).

* How will we paraphrase complex sentences where we combine apparently different interpretations? Julie's sadness was greater than Mary's, lasted a long time and worried Fred a lot. We can't replace Julie's sadness by a single paraphrase. We must break the sentence into pieces: 'Julie was sadder than Mary. She was sad for a long time. It worried Fred a lot.' This conflicts with direct compositionality.

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* Related argument: type uniformity Expressions of the same syntactic type should receive the same kind of interpretation. So a semantic theory should say that Julie’s wisdom, just like Julie’s wine, refers to (or singles out) a certain entity. Question: is type uniformity always desirable? The average American drinks 1.3 liters of soda every day.

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What about the other approaches?

Expressions like Julie's sadness

B) have fixed meanings: they are ambiguous;

C) have one fixed meaning: they really or primarily refer to entities of a certain type, but they may be coerced to refer to entities of another type in certain contexts; thus, they really or primarily refer to: C1) facts C2) degrees (Tovena 2001) C3) ways, manners or sub-properties C4) instances of properties or relations (several philosophers + Nicolas 2002, 2004, 2010; Moltmann 2004) C5) states (Parsons 1990; Asher 1993) and activities (Julie's work was slow and careful)

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Under B), one can't respect direct compositionality for complex sentences combining two different senses, e.g. the degree and state interpretations: Julie's sadness was extreme and lasted a long time. Under C), approach C4) offers a unified solution, which respects direct compositionality in more cases: Derived mass nouns are not ambiguous, and they refer to instances (i.e. concrete manifestations) of properties or relations.

This accounts for the paraphrases observed with definites:

- Fred described Julie’s love for Tom. An instance of love is a concrete manifestation of a property. It is therefore something that can be perceived and described.

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- Julie’s love for Tom lasted half a year. An instance of a property is a concrete manifestation of a property. It can subsist over time.

- Julie’s love for Tom surprised Fred. Something may surprise us for a variety of reasons. So we may take it that it’s an instance of love that surprises Fred in all cases.

- Julie’s love for Tom was greater than her love for Fred. This sentence compares two instances of love using an ordering relation associated with the adjective great.

- Fred finally acknowledged Julie’s love for Tom. The meaning of the direct object of the verb is coerced, so that it receives, in this context, a novel interpretation in terms of a fact. Independent motivation for coercion: Fred finally acknowledged the problem.

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With these predicates (except acknowledge) the property instance interpretation is satisfactory, and so complex sentences won't be a problem.

NB: Coercion seems a real and unavoidable phenomena, so it's incorporated in several theories. But allowing for it seems a breach to compositionality nonetheless.

What about other options under C)? Fact, degree and way interpretations don't cover as many cases in a unified way: - the “fact interpretation” only works with acknowledge and surprise - the “degree interpretation” only works with greater and surprise - the “way interpretation” only works with describe and surprise So each of them must appeal to coercion in several cases, often without independent support.

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What about C5), the state and activity interpretations? Potentially this option may be as successful as C4), if we take states and activities to be concrete, perceivable, etc.

This raises several interesting questions about the relations between property instances, states and events. What are states? Vendler (1967) distinguished between several kinds of entities that verbal predicates describe: states (to be sad), activities (to work), accomplishments (to eat the cake) and achievements (to reach the summit).

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States and activities vs. accomplishments and achievements: John was sad / worked for an hour. *John ate the cake / reached the summit for an hour. *John was sad / worked in an hour. [or change of meaning] John ate the cake / reached the summit in an hour.

Activities and accomplishments vs. states and achievements: John was working / John was eating the cake. *John was being sad / #John was reaching the summit. For Vendler, a state is what is described by a stative predicate (one satisfying Vendler's criteria).

A derived mass noun could refer to (or identify) the state or activity that the corresponding gradable adjective or verb describes.

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Remarks: * There is no direct connection between states so defined and what is denoted by expressions like (the state of) John being sad. We should distinguish the two.

* Applying the criteria isn't as easy as Vendler thought.

* In particular, what about predicates left out of this classification, such as those describing permanent properties? John was wise ??for twenty years / *in twenty years. A C5) approach à la Vendler will have to say that Julie's sadness and Julie's wisdom refer to different kinds of things (perhaps transitory vs. permanent states). Is that a problem?

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Is the property or relation instance approach too general?

According to it, a derived mass noun refers to (or identifies) an instance of the property or relation described by the predicate it derives from. This much would be common to Julie's sadness, Julie's love for Tom and Julie's work.

But the approach could also make distinctions among various kinds of properties and relations and their instances. Thus, what Vendler called activities would just be property or relation instances satisfying certain linguistic criteria.

For a linguistic and semantic theory, I don't see why this would be problematic. (If there were opposition, it would be because of certain ontological worries.)

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Looking at this from a different angle:

- We need to draw several distinctions because of linguistic data such as those corresponding to Vendler's criteria.

- The question is then whether we also need a common genus, of which states, processes and events, say, would be species? Some have called this genus ‘situations’. I think we can view all of them as instances of properties and relations (cf. Mulligan 1999).

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What semantics for verbal expressions? Classical semantics vs. neo-Davidsonian framework: John loves Mary is true iff love(John,Mary) John loves Mary is true iff ∃e (love(e,John,Mary))

The neo-Davidsonian semantics explains so-called “permutation” and “drop” entailments for various predicates. But it doesn't explain why certain predicates don't allow such entailments.

In the neo-Davidsonian approach, what kind(s) of entities correspond to this 'e' which is existentially quantified over for all verbal expressions? As before, we can think that there is a common genus: the entity quantified over is a property or relation instance.

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Alternative: use meaning postulates (cf. Partee 2009 for adjectives).

Meaning postulates have an attractive feature: they encode the intuitive effect of nominalization, namely reification, a “something-from-nothing transformation”: loveV(John,Mary) ↔ ∃p (loveN(p,John,Mary))

Is the neo-Davidsonian approach really simpler than an approach in terms of meaning postulates?

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6. Conclusion What do derived mass nouns mean? The hypothesis that they refer to instances of properties or relations provides the most unified explanation of their various uses. Linguistic data like Vendler's will lead us to distinguish various kinds of property and relation instances, corresponding roughly to Vendler's states, activities and events.

Verbal expressions describing states and activities are gradable, while those describing events are not. So the nouns derived from them will typically be mass VS count. Neo-Davidsonianism is attractive, but doesn’t seem forced upon us.

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