Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism · Dangerous associations: Joint...

An analysis of the processes of criminalisation of Black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals

January 2016Patrick Williams and Becky Clarke

Research Findings

Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism

About the authorsPatrick Williams is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the Manchester Metropolitan University. His research interests include the disproportionate impact of Criminal Justice processes and interventionsfor racialised individuals and communities.

Becky Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the Sociology Department at Manchester Metropolitan University. Her current research interests include the gendered experiences of penal and welfare policies, processes of ‘othering’ and criminalisation, and the construction of knowledge (and ignorance).

AcknowledgementsThis report is the product of a collaboration between Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG), theCentre for Crime and Justice Studies (CCJS) and Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA) andMMU. The two case studies were constructed by Matt Ford, Research and Policy Assistant at the Centre forCrime and Justice Studies.

Our thanks to a number of groups for providing official data to support both the previous and currentanalysis which underpins this report. This includes local criminal justice agencies and Professor BetsyStanko, Head of Evidence and Insight and Paul Dawson, Research Manager at the Mayor's Office forPolicing and Crime.

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The views expressed and the data used in this document are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies.

3CENTRE FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES

Research Findings | Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism | January 2016

Following the publication of Baroness Young’s reviewImproving outcomes for young black and/or Muslim men inthe Criminal Justice System in 2014, the Centre for Crimeand Justice Studies commissioned the authors to write aresearch and policy project to explore the relationshipbetween Joint Enterprise, gangs, and the police's gangdatabase, and ethnicity. This study also forms part of theauthors’ response to a call by the House of CommonsJustice Committee for a rigorous consideration of thepossible relationship between the disproportionateapplication of collective punishments/sanctions and inparticular, the Joint Enterprise (JE) upon BAME individualsand groups.

The findings offer a critical analysis of contemporaryresponses to the ‘gang’, highlighting limitations in theevidence base that currently informs the pursuit ofcollective sanctions against alleged ‘gang’ members andtheir associates.

This report reveals the dangerous associations of aseries of negative constructs, signifying racialisedstereotypes that endure and underpin contemporarypolicing and prosecution strategies in relation to seriousyouth violence in England and Wales.

The net effect of criminal justice policies which aredesigned to ‘disrupt’ and ‘end’ the gang, is thedisproportionate punishment of young people fromminority ethnic (particularly black) groups while failing toadequately curtail levels of serious youth violence acrossEngland and Wales.

The research question The key questions for the project were:

– To what extent do ‘gang’ discourses influence the process ofcriminalisation of young Black men?● What is the relationship between the ‘gang’ and

those convicted of serious youth violence?● How is the ‘gangs’ discourse used in the process of

prosecution within JE cases?

How we approached the research questionsThe following report presents analysis from a range ofofficial data sources, alongside a JE prisoners’ survey andtwo JE case studies.

Data sources:

– The ethnic profile of individuals registered on police ganglists in three locations:

● Greater Manchester Police’s Xcalibre Task Force● London Metropolitan Police’s Trident Gang Crime

Command ●Nottingham’s Vanguard Police Team

– Comparative data on gangs and youth violence from:● Manchester’s Ending Gangs and Youth Violence

(EGYV) problem profile (comparing those on policegangs lists and those convicted of serious youthviolence offences)

● Data provided by the London Mayor’s Office forPolicing and Crime (MOPAC) (comparing theprofile of individuals recorded in gang accusedcases with those recorded in serious youth violenceaccused events)

The research team invested significant resourcesdeveloping networks in support of requests for official dataon gangs and serious youth violence. This includedcorrespondence and meetings with strategic and datapersonnel from organisations including MOPAC, theNational Offender Management Service (NOMs), LondonCommunity Rehabilitation Company, London SeriousViolence Group and Birmingham Reducing Gang ViolencePanel. In the majority of cases such efforts wereunsuccessful, whether due to lack of resources or theincreased fragmentation of cohort data held by differentparts of the system.

Prisoner survey and case studies

A survey captured the experiences of serving JE prisoners,exploring the relationship between their experience ofcollective punishments and the use of the ‘gangs’ discourse.In total 550 questionnaires were sent to prisoners in contactwith Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA)1

and 241 questionnaires were returned. This survey built on aprevious study conducted by Cardiff University.2

The candid responses and in many cases the in-depthinformation captured within the questionnaires providedqualitative personal accounts of the prosecution process,and the relationship between the gangs discourse and JEconvictions.

Further, two actual case studies of JE prosecutions fromBirmingham were developed in order to provide a contextto understanding the process of criminalisation. These arederived from a range of sources and have been includedwithout commentary in order for readers to form their ownimpressions about the prosecution evidence andsentencing consequences.

Introduction

Contemporary responsesto gangs and youth violenceThe creation of the Metropolitan Police’s OperationTrident in 1998, and the establishment of ManchesterAction Against Guns and Gangs (MAAGGs) in 2001,signal the genesis for dedicated police and criminal justiceteams (‘gun and gang’ units) tasked with managingcoordinated responses to the gang. Importantly, suchteams were initiated in response to a series of high profilefatalities attributed to the importation and growth inAmerican style gangs. The ‘gang’ was characterised byweapon-enabled (gun and knife) criminal behaviour andthe perpetration of serious violence offences. In theensuing fifteen years, there has been an increase of CJpolicies enacted to respond to the perceived growth in thenumber of gangs in England and Wales.3 Significantinvestment and CJ practice interventions have continuedapace to support the ‘war on gangs’ which haveconsistently been referenced as being responsible forincreased levels of interpersonal violence which pose asignificant ‘risk of harm’ to members of the public, withinspecific areas of England and Wales.4 For our purposes,there is little robust evidence to inform the effectiveness ofgang policy in England and Wales.5 Further, academic andpolitical debate continues as to the precise definition andoffending patterns of the gang.6 Despite this, there is anexpansion of a ‘gang industry’ with recent policy andpolicing strategies designed to collectively respond tothose identified as involved or associated with the gang.7

The Ending Gangs and Youth Violence (EGYV) policyThe English riots of summer 2011 led to a speedy reviewinto the growing problem of gangs and gang violencebeing established by the then coalition government.8 Thisprocess culminated in the launch of the government’sEGYV policy, supported in its first year of implementationby significant investment, (HM Government).9

We will provide £10 million in Home Office funding in2012/13 to support up to 30 local areas to improve theway mainstream services identify, assess and work withthe young people most at risk of serious violence, withat least half of this funding going to the non-statutorysector.

In pursuance of the Home Office EGYV agenda, LocalAuthority areas that could demonstrate the existence of a‘gang problem’ were funded and commissioned toundertake secondary data analysis to provide a ‘problem

profile’ of young people who had been convicted of aserious youth violence offence or who were identified asbeing at risk of or involved in gangs.10 It was envisagedthat the profiles would identify the personal, social andcrime causative factors that contributed to young peoplebecoming involved with gangs or committing seriousviolence and in turn would inform the development anddesign of interventions (for which 50% of the funding wasallocated) to reduce the likelihood of future criminalbehaviour. The resultant analysis provided one of the firstopportunities to gather and analyse data from a range ofofficial sources, in order to compare those individuals whowere flagged as involved in ‘gangs’ to the profile of thoseconvicted of ‘serious youth violence’.11

With reference to the problem profile exerciseundertaken in Manchester, there emerged a number ofdistinct differences on pertinent dimensions, confirming aclear disconnect between the two groups targeted by thesingle EGYV policy. Primarily, differences emerged inrelation to the age, gender and risk profiles of the twogroups. The analysis had found that those identified as‘gang’ involved were older, male and surprisingly, assessedas posing a lower risk of harm, with a reduced likelihoodof reoffending. A significant proportion (21%) of peopleregistered to the police ‘gang’ list had no risk assessmentcompleted, indicating they had never been convicted of acriminal offence. A further 21% had no record ofconviction within the previous three years. Similarly, theMOPAC Gangs and Serious Youth Violence report (2014)indicates that of the 3,495 gang nominals12 in the Londonarea, ‘only 6% of individuals are assessed as within themost harmful red category, half of whom are in custody,’with ‘the majority (57%) currently assessed as within thelowest (green) status.’13 Arguably, such findings challengethe assumed violent nature of gangs in England, whichhas hitherto dominated and provoked crime controlresponses to the gang.14

Of more significance, there were profound differences inthe geography and home address locations of individualsflagged as gang-involved and those perpetrating seriousviolence. The mapping of postcodes revealed a stark visualillustration of the different neighbourhoods in Manchesterwhere the two groups resided. Importantly, and to bedeveloped later in this report, although these areas sharedsocio-economic profiles (as measured by deprivationindices), the racial composition of the geographic locationswas different. The communities with higher concentrationsof BAME people were more likely to be the areas identifiedby the police and criminal justice partners as having a‘gang problem’. Since its introduction, the centrally drivenEGYV initiative has been beset with conceptual problems,

4 CENTRE FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES


‘Arguably, such findings challenge theassumed violent nature of gangs in England,which has hitherto dominated and provokedcrime control responses to the gang’

which are further complicated by its attempt to target andrespond to two divergent groups presenting with differentcharacteristics and profiles.15 In acknowledging this tension,the strategic partnership in Greater Manchester noted:

Despite the need for a more systematic evidence base,partners are already coming to recognise that youthviolence is linked to, but is not the same as, gangactivity as currently identified by local agencies in GM[Greater Manchester]. Whilst serious youth violence andgang violence can be understood as problems withmany shared characteristics, a large proportion if notthe majority of individuals convicted of youth violenceare not identified by local agencies as gang involved. (New Economy, 2013)16

That serious youth violence perpetrators are ‘notidentified…as gang-involved’ reflects the processes andmechanisms through which the police select, register andregulate so-called gang-involved people. In the absence ofspecific ‘gang offences’, the police identification ofindividuals as gang-involved is contingent upon thereliability of ‘police intelligence’. That is, beyond self-disclosure, it is the police who determine who is a gang-nominal. Albeit that increasingly this process involves arange of multi agency partners such as Job Centres.Despite the development of gang databases acrosscriminal justice and welfare agencies there is no objectiveor reliable understanding of how many gangs or gangmembers exist in England and Wales. As such, penalstrategies designed to reduce levels of serious violence,which focus upon the ‘gang’, are likely to be misconceivedand ineffective in addressing the levels of serious violenceperpetrated throughout England and Wales.17

The (re)emergence of collective punishmentThe incursion into the lives of young BAME peopleidentified as gang-involved or at risk of ganginvolvement occasions an alarming disregard of therights of the young people so classified. [T]he stigmaticeffect of the gang label, the inflation of risk and theimposition of punitive court disposals (disproportionatesentences and incapacitation strategies) can have aprofound impact in curtailing the life opportunities andchances for many young BAME people...[T]heattribution of the label gang has significantimplications for those who are so defined, not least inthe new EGYV strategy (HM Government 2011) thatrecommends the doubling of sentences for proven gangmembers, for instance.18

In light of the significant investment and the reportedsuccess of the EGYV strategy, the Home Office hasrecently sought to clarify and extend the definition of thegang further ‘to make it less prescriptive and moreflexible’. This reconfiguration of the gang definition hasbeen accompanied by legislative changes to widen thescope for the use of ‘gang injunctions’ and other penalpowers including the use of collective punishmentstrategies.19 The most recent manifestation of the trendtowards collective responses to the gang can be found inthe piloting of Operation Shield within the Londonboroughs of Haringey, Westminster and Lambeth. Theproject will:

[T]arget gangs as a whole (rather than individualmembers). This will see every known member of thegang penalised through a range of civil and criminalpenalties when one gang member commits a violentcrime, such as a stabbing. Any members of the gangwho genuinely want to leave their violent lifestylebehind will also be helped to do so under the pilotscheme. (emphases added)20

There is further evidence of ‘Shield tactics’ beingdeployed beyond the pilot areas. The Metropolitan Policehave posted letters to the homes of individuals on thebasis of their perceived gang involvement, warningexplicitly of the likelihood of collective punishments suchas JE on the basis of ‘gang’ membership or association(see letter overleaf).

This extraordinary shift towards the collectivepunishment of a group based upon the behaviour of anindividual marks a significant development in the State’sresponse to the perceived problem of the UK gang. Giventhe nature of such strategies, the aforementionedintelligence processes through which the police and widerCJ agencies identify and monitor those deemed to be‘associated’ with the gang member requires urgentreflection. Yet our own previous research involvinginterviews with criminal justice and VCS practitionersconfirms that of other findings, that the processes ofidentification and association lack transparency andaccountability.21 The use of collective punishment asemployed through the doctrine of JE has significantlyadvanced since 2004-2005.

The joint enterprise doctrineJoint Enterprise (JE) is a doctrine of common law whichhas been developed by the courts in cases where morethan one person is to be prosecuted for the same offence.



‘Despite the development of gang databasesacross criminal justice and welfareagencies there is no objective or reliableunderstanding of how many gangs or gangmembers exist in England and Wales’

It has emerged as a prosecution tool for the collectivepunishment of groups where it can be proved that thesuspects were ‘in it together’. Controversially, it applieseven where the suspects may have played different rolesand in many cases, where a suspect was not in theproximity of the offence committed. Intrinsic to theapplication of the doctrine is the principle of ‘commonpurpose’ where it is alleged individuals have conspired tocommit a crime together. Moreover, where such a‘common purpose’ is shown to exist in committing onecrime, all the participants may be held liable for othercrimes committed by one member of the group, eventhough they may not have participated in or intended thatthe further crime should have been committed. Instead, JEhas been contingent upon police and prosecution teamsdemonstrating possible ‘foresight’, that is, establishingsome association between those involved to demonstratea shared ‘belief and contemplation’ that the principal‘offender’ might commit the offence.22

Recent analysis by the Bureau of InvestigativeJournalism (BIJ) suggest that at ‘least 1800 and up to 4590’people have been prosecuted for JE homicide over theperiod 2005/2006 and 2012/2013.23 Since 2005, there hasbeen a marked increase in the use of JE reaching a peak in2008 when approximately 20 per cent of all homicidesinvolving four or more defendants were prosecuted as JE.Critically, this increase in JE has been accompanied byemerging evidence of the disproportionate application of JEto particular groups and individuals.24 For example, the BIJsuggest that ‘people are being drawn into homicideprosecutions without enough evidence to convict’. This isparticularly so in cases where there are a greater number ofdefendants charged with homicide, where it is argued theCPS are more likely to ‘offer no evidence’ in respect of atleast some of the defendants.25

The application of joint enterpriseI didn’t even know what Joint Enterprise was, when myQC was trying to explain it to me… all I was saying tohim [was] ‘look, the pathologist said I haven’t touchedthis guy, the friends have said I haven’t touched thisguy, so therefore I’m not guilty’. That’s how I thought itwas anyway. But I was wrong, I was wrong.26

This quote appeared in a written submission to the Justice Committee by academics from the University ofCambridge. Their findings derive from a survey of 294young people serving lengthy sentences, where over half ofrespondents were convicted under JE. The study offers

comparative analysis between prisoners who wereconvicted using the doctrine of JE against those who werenot. What the research found was a number of differencessuggesting that ‘those convicted under the doctrine areserving longer tariffs, are more likely to considerthemselves to be not guilty of the offence’ and at the timeof the submission, were more likely to be in the process ofappeal.27 In addition, JE prisoners were more likely to feelthat their convictions and sentences lacked legitimacy.Such sentiments arise due to the absence of ‘proceduralfairness’ and a series of ambiguities related to the ‘morallegitimacy’ of the doctrine as illustrated below. Moreover,the Cambridge submission found that the proportion ofBlack/Black British people serving custodial sentences forJE offences is 11 times greater than the proportion of thegeneral population who are Black/Black British (37.2%compared to 3.3%).28

The following two case studies (overleaf) reveal themultiple and complex mechanisms used in the applicationof the joint enterprise doctrine in response Black andminority ethnic men. These case studies were compiledfrom official legal sources. The first is taken from aJudgment in the Court of Appeal, criminal division, R vs.Smith and others, as well as Mr Justice Mitting’sSumming Up of the original trial, provided by JENGbA.The second case study is taken from a Judgment in theCourt of Appeal, criminal division, Lewis and others vs. R;Laing and another vs. R.

It is with reference to these two case studies that wenow seek to understand the process through which the‘gang’ is used as a tool in support of collectivepunishments such as JE, and further explain the complexrelationship between the ‘gang’, youth violence and JEpunishments.





In December 2005, six black men, includingMichael Christie, were convicted of themurder of Birmingham doorman IshfaqAhmed and the attempted murder of threeof his colleagues under the common lawdoctrine of joint enterprise. 24 year-oldAhmed was shot and killed in an alleywayon 20 November 2004, as he tried to stop agroup of 11 men forcing their way via a sidedoor into the nightclub where he worked.

The prosecution case against Christie andhis co-defendants was that they were in thegroup of 11 men, who together formed anarmed gang acting with the joint purpose offorcing their way into nightclubs. Althoughneither handgun involved in the killing ofAhmed was ever recovered, and in thewords of the judge, there was ‘no sureproof’ of the identity of the killer, theprosecution further argued that eachmember of the group must have knownguns were being carried and would be usedwith lethal intent if necessary.

To firm up their case that the group of menformed an armed gang, the prosecutionintended to call evidence that thedefendants were members of the ‘JohnsonCrew’, an alleged Birmingham gang. Theonly direct link between any of the six menand the Johnson Crew was a tattoo, ‘JC’ onone of their chests, admitted by that personto have represented the initials of the gangwhen he got it two years before. The judgesaid of the gang link in his summing-up:

There is no evidence in the case of all

other defendants that they belong to the

Johnson Crew, and none in any event

that this incident resulted from Johnson

Crew activity. In their case the Johnson

Crew issue is simply irrelevant and

should be put to one side.

Evidence of some connections betweensome of the defendants mainly revolvedaround mobile phone contact betweenthem in the months leading up to and onthe night of the incident, as well as somehaving each other’s numbers in theirphones. These connections were notdenied by the defendants. Connectionscould only be shown to exist between threeof the men, and between Christie and adefendant admitted to be his friend. Therewas no evidence presented to demonstratethat one particular defendant knew any ofthe other five.

Cell-site evidence and CCTV footage piecedtogether the movements of a group ofaround eleven men alleged to include thedefendants, and a ‘convoy’ of carsbelonging to three of the defendants, asthey went around the centre of Birminghamand to different nightclubs in the earlyhours of the Saturday morning when theshooting took place. Telephone records of amobile associated with Christie linked himto the journeys made by the cars.

Facial mapping experts were brought in tosee if reference images of the defendantscould be matched to the CCTV images.Neither of the expert witnesses could provethat Christie was in the footage, nor thatthe only other defendant he had links towas in any of the scenes. In any case, theexperts described the CCTV footage as ofpoor quality. Neither Christie nor his friendwere identified by eye witnesses as beingpresent at the scene of the shooting.

Identification/recognition evidence ofChristie in the CCTV images came from apolice officer responsible for supervisinghim after his release from prison afterserving half of a 14 year sentence forattempted murder. The prosecutionadduced Christie’s previous conviction as‘bad character evidence’.

According to the appeal judgment, thestrength of the case hinged on theprosecution argument that theconfrontational behaviour of the groupmeant that no-one in it could have beenunaware that guns were carried and wouldbe used with lethal intent if necessary.

Christie, along with the other five men,was convicted of one count of murderand three of attempted murder as asecondary party and sentenced to aminimum of 30 years in prison.29

Case Study 1 Michael Christie and the murder of Ishfaq Ahmed



Jermaine Lewis was one of a group ofyoung black men convicted of riot,possession of a firearm with intent toendanger life, and arson being reckless asto whether life was endangered, for anincident in Birmingham which occurredduring the August 2011 disturbances incities across the UK.

On the evening of Tuesday 9 August, agroup of 42 mostly black men congregatedoutside The Barton Arms pub in the Astonarea of Birmingham. Some of the menbegan throwing furniture from the pub intothe A34 road and set the ground floor alightwith petrol bombs. Four different firearmsdischarged at least 12 rounds in thedirection of police arriving at the scene andat the police helicopter capturing events onCCTV from above.

Lewis could not be identified on any of theCCTV footage as being at the scene. One ofhis co-defendants, whom he had met onholiday and who had travelled up toBirmingham, could be identified, but was notseen to engage in any acts of violence.Lewis maintains that he drove his friend andhis cousin, who was identified as one of thegunmen, to the scene and then drove off.

The prosecution used cell-site evidence toallege that phones linked to Lewis, his friendand his cousin were in the same generalarea at around the same times on theevening of 9 August. They then inferred thata break in regular telephone contactbetween the three phones during this periodmeant the men were together throughoutthe evening.

The prosecution brought the defendants’previous convictions and various mediareports supposedly demonstrating gang

affiliation to the trial. This so-called ‘badcharacter evidence’ was intended to showthat the defendants had a propensity to beinvolved in violence involving guns, knewguns were being carried by some membersof the group and would be used with intentto kill if necessary, and had negativeattitudes towards the police. This enabledmembers of the group who did notpersonally commit acts of violence to beconvicted of the offences anyway.

Evidence of gang affiliation mainly revolvedaround rap videos posted online andpictures downloaded to the defendants’phones. These were interpreted by expertwitnesses who were in fact police officers.They gave accounts of elaborate networksof, ‘affiliated gangs with their own identitieswho were aligned with the Johnson Crew. Itwas not alleged that any of the defendantswere actually members of the JohnsonCrew. The officers claimed to be able todiscern (from police intelligence) gangscalled ‘Shot and Neel’, ‘Goon Squad Army’,‘Raiders’, and ‘Money over Bitches 19’. Theyalso claimed that some of these gangsaffiliated to the Johnson Crew formed acoalition called the ‘Mob Squad’.

One of the defendants appeared in rapvideos associated with ‘Shot and Neel’ or‘SAN’, a group made up of mainly Asianyoung men. In August 2011 ‘SAN’ had notbeen identified as being a group involved inany specific law-breaking. One of the expertwitness police officers claimed that instead,it was made up of ‘wannabes’, or youngmen who aspired to be members of thenotorious Johnson Crew.

Evidence was adduced linking some of thedefendants with the ‘Raiders’. A music videofeaturing alleged members of the Raiders

appearing alongside alleged members of theJohnson Crew was presented as evidence ofan association between the two gangs.

Members of these affiliated groups weresaid by the police officers to have ahallmark hand gesture known as ‘throwingthe sixes’. This hand signal is given in someof the rap videos by some of the defendants.Lyrics referencing ‘gang behaviour’ werecited by the prosecution. Tattoos with theinitials of some of the gang names wereused as evidence against some of thedefendants.

Lewis appeared in a video called‘Gangbusters R Us’ together with his cousinwho was identified as one of the gunmen inthe trial. The judgement from Lewis’ failedappeal states, ‘although his role was lessprominent, Lewis did spend much of thevideo in close proximity to [his cousin]’. Onelyric refers to a ‘0.44’ and ‘Phantom’ (Lewis’nickname, or as the prosecution referred toit, his ‘street-name’). When this lyric comesup in the video, Lewis mimics a shootingaction. On Lewis’ phone, a downloadedpicture of the emblem of the ‘Raiders’ alongwith the word ‘menace’ was found.Downloaded pictures of guns were also onhis phone, as well as one of a hooded manpointing a handgun.

In Lewis’ appeal it states, ‘[he] had nosignificant criminal history but…he was anactive member of the ‘Raiders’ gang whichhad used firearms in the past. The videomaterial and that from his phonedemonstrated his attitudes to guns and thepolice. It was pointed out, on his behalf, thathe did not have any gun or use any gun.’

Lewis received a sentence of 23 years inprison.

Case Study 2 Jermaine Lewis and the Birmingham riots

Research findings

The ethnic profile of the gang: data analysis in Manchester, London and Nottingham

Chart 1 illustrates the ethnic profile of those registered tothe police gangs lists within three geographic locations.The Manchester data gathered from the Xcalibre Task Forceas part of the Manchester EGYV problem profile developedin 2012/2013 is presented alongside the analysis by Bridges(2015) drawn from a FoI request examining the ethniccomposition of the Metropolitan Police’s Trident ‘GangMatrix’. This found that, similar to Manchester, the vastmajority (87%) of nominals on the Metropolitan Police’s‘gang matrix’ were Black, Asian or minority ethnic.30

Furthermore, data from Nottingham reflects that thepolice’s Vanguard team also identify 64% of Urban StreetGang members (USGs) as being from a minority ethnicbackground, against 36% who were categorised as ‘white’.31

It is clear that the gang label is disproportionatelyattributed to BAME people, when compared to both thesize of the BAME populations within each of the cities

presented and the numbers of white British people flaggedor registered as involved with gangs. From Manchester,through to Nottingham and London, the gang construct isracialised to Black and Brown men. Placing this data incontext, narratives regarding the creation of police team’ssuch as Xcalibre, Trident and Stealth reveal how theresponse to ‘gangs’ was racialised from their inception.The Metropolitan police’s Trident unit, like Xcalibre inManchester, was conceived as being a response to ‘blackon black crime’ within BAME communities. They wereestablished on the basis that the police perceived that theywere unable to engage with ‘communities’ in theirresponse to violent crime.32 Yet, the gang databasescreated by such police units have a policy and operationalsignificance that develops over time, potentially failing torespond to the changing nature of the defined problem.This is revealed in Manchester, where the significantreduction in the levels of ‘gang related’ firearmsdischarges and fatalities (between 2004/2005 and2012/2013) has not been accompanied by a reduction inthe resourcing of gang units. Paradoxically, the reductionin ‘gang-related’ firearms discharges and fatalities has



100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%Manchester (171) London (3422) Nottingham (369)

Chart 1: Gang membership by ethnicity

BAME

White

89% 87%

64%

36%

13%11%

Manchester population by ethnicity

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

66%

33%

London population by ethnicity

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

58%

42%

Nottingham population by ethnicity

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

65%

35%

Sources: Office of National Statistics, Census 2011: Manchester City Council (2015), 'Manchester Factsheet. Public Intelligence (PRI)', Chief Executive’s Department (2014 Mid-year Estimate ofPopulation), date accessed, 6th January 2016; Nottingham Insight (2012), 'Population by Ethnic Group (2011 Census) Nottingham City', Nottingham County Council, www.nottinghaminsight.org.uk/f/85976/Library/Community-and-Living/Population-and-Migration/Ethnicity/) date accessed 6 January 2016; GLA Intelligence (2014), 'London Borough Estimates'. Opinion Research andGeneral Statistics (GLA). http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/london-borough-profiles/resource/80647ce7-14f3-4e31-b1cd-d5f7ea3553be date accessed 6 January 2016.

been accompanied by an increase in the number of(police) reported gangs.33

Comparative analysis of gang and seriousyouth violence cohorts

If these police ‘gang’ lists increasingly fail to map ontoserious youth violence incidents in the same location, wecannot assume that their construction is an objectiveresponse to violence occurring within particularcommunities. As established earlier, the value of the initialproblem profile in Manchester is the revelation that the‘gang’ and youth violence cohorts were distinct. The analysisillustrated a stark disconnect between the two groups, andpointed to the significance of ‘race’ and ethnicity in explainingthis disconnect. It has not been possible to conduct a similarmatching of individualised data of persons registered on the

Metropolitan Police’s ‘Gang Matrix’. Aggregate data obtainedfrom MOPAC provides a comparison of the pan-Londonethnic profiles of individuals accused of involvement in thoseflagged as gang related offences, with those accused ofinvolvement in serious youth violence over a given period(not specified in the data returned). The information forManchester and London are presented in the charts below,reflecting that whilst each police area develops differentrecording practices and timescales, the data displaysconsistent features in respect of ethnicity.

Therefore, within Manchester and London as illustratedthrough charts 2 and 3 below, it is BAME people who areoverwhelmingly identified and registered to ‘gangs’ lists,although they make up a much smaller proportions ofthose perpetuating youth violence.

There is a danger that the representation of ‘race’ andethnicity to BAME may conceal the attribution of the



Gangs(n =161)

Serious Youth Violence(n =296)

Chart 2: Gang and serious youth violence cohorts by ethnicity for the Manchester area – BAME and ‘white’ groupings

BAME

White

11%

89% 77%

23%

Gangs(n =202)


Chart 3: Gang and serious youth violence cohorts by ethnicity for the London area – BAME and ‘white’ groupings

BAME

White

20%

80%50% 50%

‘gang’ label to specific BAME groups. Further analysisbelow reveals that the ‘gang’ label is particularised to the‘Black’ group - those categorised as belonging to the‘Black British’, ‘Black Caribbean’, ‘Black African’ and/or‘Black Mixed’ groups.

Charts 4 to 5 demonstrate that where the ‘Black only’group is compared to ‘non-Black’ groups (including ‘White’individuals and those classified in the police data as beingfrom other minority ethnic groups) we can conclude thatthe gang label is particularly attributed to Black men, whilsta significantly reduced proportion of Black individuals arelocated within the serious youth violence cohorts. Thesefindings, focusing as they do on young ‘Black British’,‘Black Caribbean’, ‘Black African’ and ‘Black Mixed’ men,provide an opportunity through which we can begin toconsider the problematic nature of the ‘gang’ and its use asa resource to criminalise racialised groups.

Gangs discourse: its relationship to thecollective punishments of joint enterprise

The third and final section of this study focuses on therelationship between the discourse of the gang and its usein collective punishment in JE cases. Here data derivedfrom the JENGbA prisoners’ survey will be analysed. Wewill explore how far there is further evidence of ethnicdisproportionality in the impact of JE sentencing as shownby the survey responses of prisoners themselves.

Figure 1 (on the next page) confirms the broadgeographical origins of the survey respondents, suggestingthat the practices of JE prosecution they had experiencedwere widespread.

Over half of all respondents (53.1%) self-disclosed asbelonging to a BAME group and 45.6% self-disclosed as‘white British’. Placing this sample in context, the majority



Gangs(n =161)


Chart 4: Gang and serious youth violence cohorts by ethnicity for the Manchester area – ‘Black’ only and ‘All non-black’ groupings

Black

All NonBlack

19%

81%94%

6%

Gangs(n =202)


Chart 5: Gang and serious youth violence cohorts by ethnicity for the London area – ‘Black’ only and ‘All non-black’ Groupings

Black

All NonBlack

28%

72%73%

27%

‘These findings provide an opportunitythrough which we can begin to consider theproblematic nature of the 'gang' and its use asa resource to criminalise racialised groups’

of the prison population of England and Wales self-disclose as white British (74%) with 18% of the prisonpopulation identified as belonging to a BAME group. Thesurvey population having been drawn from individuals

engaged with JENGbA implies that respondents are peopleimpacted by JE and motivated to communicate about itsimplications. Even if it is accepted that the populationassociated with JENGbA is motivated to question their



Chart 6: Age profile of JE prisoners

Under 18 18-21 years 22-25 years 26-35 years 36+ years

White(n =113)

BAME(n =128)

10% 32% 20% 29% 9%

6% 16% 19% 33% 25%

Figure 1: Number of JE questionnaire responses by Police area

10

1

1

1

1

7

5

5

2

2

1

1

1

14

3

Police area Number

Missing

Avon and Somerset

Bedfordshire

British Transport Police

Cambridgeshire

Cheshire

Cleveland/Teesside

Derbyshire

Devon and Cornwall

Dorset

Dover

Durham

East Yorkshire

Greater Manchester

Hampshire

4

5

4

5

2

13

70

4

2

1

2

3

5

1

Police area Number

Hertfordshire

Humberside

Kent

Lancashire

Leicester

Merseyside

Metropolitan Police

Norfolk

North Wales

Northamptonshire

PSNI

Northumbria

Nottingham

Plaistow

2

1

1

10

2

1

2

4

2

4

17

1

16

2

Police area Number

Reading

Shropshire

South Wales

South Yorkshire

Staffordshire

Suffolk

Surrey

Thames Valley

Warwickshire

West Mercia

West Midlands

West Sussex

West Yorkshire

Wiltshire

sentence, it would be remarkable if there was such anethnic disproportion in this motivation: why should whiteBritish prisoners be any less concerned? It is more likelythat the profile of survey respondents thereforedemonstrates the disparity in the use of JE against BAMEpeople. Our findings replicate a study undertaken by theInstitute of Criminology at the University of Cambridgewhich found that of young people serving lengthy prisonsentences, for those convicted under JE, 38.5% were whiteas compared with 57.4% who were BAME (37.7%Black/Black British, 4.7% Asian and 15.5% mixed race).34

Chart 6 reflects that those JE prisoners who identify asBlack, Asian or minority ethnic are significantly youngerthan their white counterparts.

All but ten individuals (4%) are serving JE sentences formurder, with this very small remainder imprisoned forGBH (Section 18) and other violent offences. The criminalhistories of the prisoners are extremely varied. Nearly onequarter (23%) of the prisoners report having no previousconvictions.

Three-quarters of the sample are serving prisonsentences greater than 15 years, with all sentences in thissurvey ranging between 3 and 37 years.35 It has beenargued elsewhere that there has been an increase insentence lengths for serious offences due to bothlegislative changes on minimum sentences and the

emergence of JE in the prosecution of murder offences.36

We found that the BAME group were serving longersentences on average (22.3 years) when compared to thewhite group (19.6 years).

Almost half of respondents (48%) were under 25 yearsof age. This younger group were on average servingsentences of 20 years. It is noteworthy that 53 young peoplewere serving sentences greater than 20 years in length,including ten young adult prisoners serving JE sentences ofover 30 years. For those prisoners aged 17 years of age andunder (n=21) the average prison sentence was 14 years,with one individual serving a sentence of 26 years inlength. Given the contested nature of JE, these severepunishments for young people must be cause for alarm.

An oft-cited merit of JE is its capacity to secure multipleconvictions of individuals for the same offence, despitetheir level of involvement or their role. Within our sample,the average number of co-defendants prosecuted for eachcase was four, rising to a maximum of 26 individuals. Wecan therefore calculate that upwards of 600 individuals areimplicated in the JE offences for the prisoners within oursample.37 It is notable that BAME prisoners had onaverage 4.11 co-defendants compared to a figure of 3.19 forwhite British prisoners.

The cumulative effects of JE prosecutions, and theconsequent criminalisation and detention of so manyprisoners, stretches far beyond the individual. Wholefamilies and communities suffer when an individual isimprisoned for such extended periods, especially when inmany cases there remain questions regarding thelegitimacy of the conviction. The extensive literature on the



Chart 7: JE prisoners reporting the gang being invoked at trial by ethnicity

Yes

No

Don’t Know

White(n =109)

BAME(n =123)

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

78.9% 17.1% 3.3%

38.5% 48.6% 12.8%

We found that the BAME group wereserving longer sentences on average

It is noteworthy that 53 young people wereserving sentences greater than 20 years inlength, including ten young adult prisonersserving JE sentences of over 30 years

‘pains of imprisonment’ attest to the debilitating financialand emotional effects of imprisonment upon both familymembers and the incarcerated individual.38 Our sample ofprisoners further reveals the significant number of lovedones also ‘serving time’ with most prisoners reportinghaving dependents, either children (38%) or adult (38%).

The ‘gang’ as a prosecution resource in jointenterprise casesHitherto we have sought to establish the problematicnature of the construct of the ‘gang’, and found furtherevidence to support the emerging concern of a racialisedapplication of JE. It is claimed that there has emerged apowerful discourse that stereotypically associates youngBAME people with violent criminal and problematicbehaviours.39 According to the Young Review, it is suchattitudes that contribute to the perennial over-representation of BAME people throughout the criminaljustice system of England and Wales. Moreover, assuggested by Dr Ben Crewe of the Institute of Criminologyat the University of Cambridge in evidence to the JusticeSelect Committee:

… there were probably two main reasons for thedisproportionate impact of joint enterprise on youngBlack men, the first being that “BME men may be over-represented in the kinds of communities where youngmen typically hang around in groups that are labelledby outsiders as gangs” and the second that “anassociation may exist unconsciously in the minds of thepolice, prosecutors and juries between being a youngethnic minority male and being in a gang, and thereforebeing involved in forms of urban violence”

A key concern then for the remainder of this report isthe extent to which the ‘gang’ discourse and application ofJE are associated phenomena. Specifically how is theconcept of the ‘gang’ deployed in the context of policing?And does prosecution result in the disproportionateapplication of JE to young Black men?

To this end, JE prisoners were asked to reflect uponwhether the term ‘gang’ was raised during their courtcases. In response, 59% of the sample indicated that the‘gang’ was cited, while 31% said the term was not used intheir case. A further 7.5% of prisoners ‘did not know’ were‘unsure’ or ‘could not remember’ if ‘gang’ terminology wasused. Of significance, only five prisoners within the sampledisclosed as being a gang-member. With this in mind, thefollowing evidences the significant relationship between

the use of a ‘gangs’ discourse in court for the prosecutionof JE cases for Black, Asian and minority ethnicindividuals.

Thus in JE cases where gangs were introduced withinthe court arena, 69% involved BAME prisoners and 30%white British prisoners.

Indeed, over three quarters of the whole BAME group(78.9%) reported that ‘gangs’ were introduced within thecourt arena. Comparatively, 38.5% of the ‘White’ groupacknowledged the use of the ‘gang’ within the court arena.This finding provides new evidence to the hithertoanecdotal belief that the ‘’gang’’ is statistically more likelyto be employed in JE cases involving young BAME men.40

For the overwhelming majority (97%) of those reportingthat ‘gangs’ were introduced at their trial the gang labelwas contested and dismissed as untrue, a ‘made up’feature of the prosecution’s argument. These quotes beginto illustrate the contested nature of the ‘gang’ discourse.

‘I have never been in a gang. I was a family man whohad a good job.’

‘No, I have never been in a gang and I have no previousconvictions of being in a gang and there is no proof thatI am in a gang. It’s all made up.’

‘Do not agree. I was the only female, I was a motherstudying to be a midwife. My partner was an electrician,we had a life, we did not ‘’hang around’’ with anyone.’

‘I was not a gang member. The offence was not pre-planned, it was spontaneous. I know both of theintended victims and I had and do not have any conflictwith them.’

In some instances, respondents acknowledged historicinvolvement or understood the application of the term‘gang member’, but deny its relevance to themselves.Most challenged the prosecution statements of arelationship between ‘gangs’ and the offence committed.This was evident through attempts to clarify the nature



Within our sample, the average number ofco-defendants prosecuted for each casewas four, rising to a maximum of 26individuals

Whole families and communities sufferwhen an individual is imprisoned for suchextended periods, especially when in manycases there remain questions regarding thelegitimacy of the conviction

and context of their association with their co-defendants.For example, some prisoners disclose childhood,friendship or familial relationships but categorically statethat these were not gangs.

‘I don’t agree with the prosecution constantly using theword gang because we were not a gang. One was afriend and the other my customer.’

‘I disagree with this description. This is because only[two] people out of the group of nine I was in were gangmembers. I have never classed myself as a gangmember.’

‘I went to prison at 18 and got out at 23 for robbery andduring that time I realised the so-called gang wasn’twhat I thought it to be. You find out who’s your realfriends when you go jail. So when I got out I was nolonger involved.’

‘We are a group of young lads who smoke weed andfuck around, and we get labelled a gang!’

‘We were just friends, normal working teenagers.’‘The prosecution and the judge said me and my [co-defendant] (principle) offend together.’

‘I was brought up with the same group of peoplethrough school to holidays with family, we were veryclose and always together so the prosecution found iteasy to call us gang members.’

‘One of my [co-defendants] was an active ‘gangmember’ but I was not. I was a friend of a gangmember so I was also judged to be a gang member.’‘There was no gang, it was just two people from thesame area.’

‘I don’t agree as we’re just neighbours! I have a littlebond with the brothers as they helped me out in schoolfrom bullies, etc., and one was going out with my cousinfor a short period.’

‘My 3 [co-defendants] I grew up with and that is whatthe prosecution described as a gang. We were friends.’

‘To me a gang is a group of mates but the prosecutormade it sound as if we are a gang walking around withweapons protecting the area.’

In the Christie case study, there was one defendant forwhom no evidence had been presented that he knew theother five co-defendants with whom he received aminimum sentence of 30 years, on the basis of thisapproach to establishing possible foresight. Similarly, wefound that a number of prisoners responding to thequestionnaire did not personally know some or all of theirco-defendants or other secondary parties, with whom theywere alleged to have committed the offence.

‘They said we were a drugs gang but I only knew one ofmy [co-defendants].’

‘I didn’t even know the alleged shooter before my arrest.No link to him whatsoever.’

‘We knew each other from school and two of my [co-defendants] I’d never met.’

The multiple accounts captured represent differentindividual JE cases, yet the similarity in the experience andthe language used to describe the reality reflects a strikingcommonality. These accounts begin to reveal how theethnically imbalanced discourse of the gang emerges in JEcases, yet is a discourse that remains contested byindividual prisoners.

Use of the ‘gang’ discourse in court

In light of the clear limitations and the imprecise nature ofboth academic and policy definitions of the ‘gang’established in the first half of this report, the problematicapplication of the ‘gang’ discourse as a prosecutionstrategy is reliant upon a ‘common-sense’, racialised andstereotypical discourse that links BAME men with aninvolvement with gangs, drugs and violence. This strategyis illustrated clearly by the Christie case study, where suchclaims to the affiliation of a local ‘gang’ are dismissed bythe Judge in his summing up of the case. Yet by this stagethe inference is made and the signifiers have arguablytaken effect. The repeated use of such narratives wasrevealed in the questionnaire responses from the JEprisoners.

Populist signifiers included the use of synonymous‘gang’ names’:

‘They said we was Gooch, but I ain’t no Gooch memberand I wasn’t even there.’

‘Apparently we were all Gooch’



‘I was the only female, I was a motherstudying to be a midwife. My partner wasan electrician, we had a life, we did not‘’hang around’’ with anyone’

‘Burger Bar Boys’

‘Kray Twins’

Frequently, language is used to elicit images of street-based or violent collectives such as ‘crew’, ‘hoodlums’,‘click’, ‘soldiers’, ‘troops’ or ‘posse’:

‘A group of young hoodlums’

‘Telling the Jury I sent out my soldiers for revenge’

In some cases, there was reference to a particularracialised neighbourhood, or more broad references togeography such as ‘turf’ or ‘territory’ often associated withdrug dealing, again conjuring the popular discourse of‘gangs’:

‘Just because we are from the same area and are of acertain colour does not make us a gang’

‘St Anns where we are from has this reputation. Theterm ‘St Anns’ was used to group us together’

The ultimate signifier used in six different cases togroup the accused was to dehumanise:

‘Animals baying for blood’

‘A pack of wolves’

‘A pack of animals’

What emerges then are a number of linguistic cues andsignifiers, which serve to link the accused to the construct ofthe ‘gang’ and thus neatly demonstrates common purpose.For example, in the Lewis case study the police were calledas experts and provided an account of elaborate networks of‘gangs’ and rather than being used to clearly establish themembership of the defendant, this narrative served as a‘backstory’ to the event. In addition, a number of (criminal)behaviours were routinely inferred to prosecute JE cases. Forexample, the above reference to ‘drug dealing’ and ‘turfwars’ presents a powerful signifier precisely related to thestereotypical construct of the Black gang.

The successful prosecution of JE cases necessitates ademonstration of possible ‘foresight’ - that other(secondary) parties could have predicted the committal ofthe eventual offence. As in the Christie case study wherethere was ‘no sure proof’ of the identity of the killer, the

prosecution argues that each defendant ‘must have known’what was going to happen. Establishing foresight thereforerequires prosecution teams to present evidence of aconnection, relationship or association between co-defendants as a driver to their group offending. Cruciallythen, there is a need to further unpick the strategies usedto make associations which link the principal andsecondary parties in order to secure JE convictions. Withinthe questionnaires we found a series of repeatedly reportedmechanisms, adopted to demonstrate relationshipsbetween individuals (principles and secondary parties) andin this way ‘place’ (be it virtual or physical) the individual atthe scene. The questionnaires reveal how differentstrategies are adopted for different groups.

Making association(s) – establishing possible‘foresight’ Chart 8 reflects the 144 JE cases where respondentsconfirmed that the gang was invoked at trial, examining therelationship between ethnicity and the type of evidence usedat trial. This information reveals personal accounts regardingthe evidence provided by the prosecution, in some casesdrawing on expert witnesses including police officers, facemapping and cell-site analysts. These strategies are also allevident in the two case studies presented of Michael Christieand Jermaine Lewis. This evidence, used to create anassociation, is a key step in connecting the individual to theevent and establishing possible ‘foresight’.

This report is particularly concerned with thedisproportionate impact of JE upon BAME groups,importantly then the processes and strategies throughwhich association or common purpose is establishedshow differences between the BAME and white group.White prisoners were almost twice as likely to express thatwhilst the gang had been invoked at the trial there was ‘noevidence’ brought by the prosecution to demonstrateassociation (32% vs. 17%).

A number of sources which we classify here as ‘policeintelligence’ such as CCTV, Stop and Search information, andtelephone and text messages ‘cell site’ data, was used to trackthe movements of individuals and construct their associationsor proximity to the event or individuals at the event. Suchmethods were reported as having been used in half of casesinvolving BAME prisoners, compared to their use in just onequarter of white cases. As illustrated in the case studies thecell site evidence is used to both establish connection andpiece together the movements of the defendants. In the Lewiscase, even when there is an absence of cell site data this wasstill used to infer the movements of the group.



‘Just because we are from the same areaand are of a certain colour does not makeus a gang’

Further, prosecution teams were reported as beingmore likely to appropriate discourses of ‘gang insignia’(tattoos, colours and gang names) and music videos orlyrics, particularly ‘hip hop’ and ‘rap’ genres, as a way ofbuilding a JE case against BAME prisoners. Such strategieswere used in 11% of BAME cases, compared to less than2% of cases of white prisoner cases. The Lewis caseprovides a clear example of how a range of assumednegative sub-cultural traits are called upon by theprosecution. In this case, such characteristics were thencoupled with reference to negative attitudes to the policeand bad character, so even where there is no significantevidence of criminal history the inference of a criminalcharacter is drawn. For white prisoners relationships withfriends were more likely to be cited to make associations(27% of cases involving white prisoners, compared to 11%of BAME prisoners). Arguably, the ‘friend’ link is less likelyto be disputed, which may then explain the reduced use ofelaborate methods and intelligence to prosecute JE casesagainst white prisoners.

The case studies further reveal the lengths to whichcriminal justice system (CJS) protagonists deploy newtechnologies in some instances, to ‘place’ the individual atthe scene or in contact with others at the time of theoffence. In Michael Christie’s case, a number of facemapping experts were called on as prosecution witnesses,yet none could prove that Christie was at the scene.

Similarly, in the case of Jermaine Lewis, the defendantmaintains that he drove away from the scene, and noevidence was presented to the court which categoricallyproved that he was at the scene as events unfolded. Wefound that 45% of our sample reported not to have beenat the scene of the offence. That there are people servinglong custodial sentences for offences, which may haveoccurred in their absence, is perhaps one of the mostnoteworthy features of these JE convictions.

They have cellsite evidence going back months beforethe incident and I am never with my [co-defendant] andI don’t have the number or have been in contact withthe other co-accused. This defeats the purpose of beinga stereotypical gang they tried to sell to the jury.

There was only a slight difference in proximity figuresbetween the white (42%) and BAME (47%) groups whoreported not being present at the crime scene.

Placing the individual at the sceneExamining the self-report narratives from the prisoners,individuals were particularly candid in their responses toJENGbA’s questionnaire. Their accounts allows us to seefrom their perspective if or how the basis for anassociation to the crime was constructed. There were



Chart 8: Evidence used to establish ‘foresight’ by ethnicity (percentage responses)41

No Evidence (33)

Gang Insignia (3)

Videos/Rap Lyrics (7)

PoliceIntelligence (29)

Relationship –Friends (25)

Relationship –Family (8)

Social Media (11)

Tel/Text (28)

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

White (60)

BAME (84)

‘A range of assumed negative sub-culturaltraits are called upon by the prosecution ...so even where there is no significantevidence of criminal history the inferenceof a criminal character is drawn.’

cases where individuals confirm they were at the scene atthe time of the offence. Yet 45% (n=100) of individualssaid they were not at the scene of the crime for which theywere convicted. Of those saying they were not at thescene, the overwhelming majority (70%) also reportedthey had no contact with co-defendants ahead of or duringthe events.

Further, the data reveals some important differencesbetween the types of evidence used to support theinvocation of the gang for those either ‘at the scene’ or ‘notat the scene’. In the case of individuals who were at thescene there was a higher proportion of cases where noevidence was presented to support the gang discourse.However, those cases where evidence included ganginsignia, music videos or telephone / text evidence theindividual was more likely to report not being at the scene,hence, the use of the gangs discourse potentially requiredmore elaborate link making between the individual and theevent. JE simplistically, yet powerfully, draws upon fluidconnections between individuals to demonstrate the‘common purpose’ of the principal and secondary parties ina case. Our findings demonstrate that JE allows prosecutionteams to construct associations, which in some casestranscend the individual’s proximity to the offence.

Discussion of findingsThis research project sought to examine the extent towhich ‘gang’ discourses influence processes ofcriminalisation for BAME individuals. Prior to presentingthe substantive findings from this report, it is necessary toacknowledge the wider context within which the datapresented has been both collected and understood.

Challenging to the strategic silenceThe understanding presented has been inhibited by anumber of obstacles which exist in relation to the officialdata sources capturing information on ‘gangs’ and JE.Data protection, data-monitoring and data ownershipissues all pose organisational barriers to accessing thatinformation which would inform our understanding of thecomplex relationships between ‘race’, ethnicity andcollective punishment.

Central to the barriers are the lack of transparentdefinitions and an absence of accountability in theattribution of the gang-label and particularly theidentification, registration and deregistration of people topolice ‘gang lists’. The inclusion of individuals in bothLondon and Manchester who have no proven convictions

and of those who have been assessed by criminal justiceprofessionals as posing minimal risk further demonstratesthe unreliable use of the gang label. Remarkably, aFreedom of Information request undertaken for thisproject revealed that Job Centres pan-London haveregistered almost four thousand (3,934) of their clientswith a ‘gang’ flag (as ‘being in a gang or at risk of ganginvolvement’). Yet we cannot unearth and examine thetensions underlying such attributions, as the processesdriving them remain hidden.

Beyond these definitional challenges, there are alsodifficulties in requesting and receiving data with sufficientcontextual understanding of the process through whichthe data has been collated (by who and driven by whatjudgement or understanding) and the time or geographicalparameters that they cover. Multiple organisations, bothlocal criminal justice agencies and centrally placedanalytical teams, hold information on different ‘cohorts’.For example, some capture data on the ‘accused’, whilstother on those ‘convicted’, and in the probation contextconvicted groups are now split into the regional NationalProbation Service and the local Community RehabilitationCompanies. With central teams lacking the resource toextract data, and local team holding only a partial picture,the ability to undertake analysis that is reliably connectedto place and time is challenging. The strength of theManchester Problem Profile data was the ability to accessindividual level data which enabled precise data merging,manipulation and analysis to take place.

A similar lack of access to data informed by clear andtransparent definitions inhibits our ability to examine theapplication of JE, whether at charge or conviction. In theinterests of challenging the application of the doctrinethere is an urgent need for the publication of official dataon the charge and prosecution processes for JE cases.Given the findings of this report, this information mustalso include the demographic profiles of those peoplesubject to JE prosecutions.

Summary of the key findingsThe key findings from the analysis will now be summarisedin relation to the research questions identified at theoutset of the project.

What is the relationship between the ‘gang’ and thoseconvicted of serious youth violence?

Finding 1: The ethnic profile of those identified on policedata lists as ‘gang nominals’ in Manchester,



45% of individuals said they were not at the scene of the crime for which they were convicted

Nottingham and London confirms that this label isdisproportionately applied to young BAME men.

Finding 2: In contrast to this, a comparison of the ethnicprofile of those individuals accused or convicted ofserious youth violence in both Manchester andLondon reveals a disconnect between the racialcomposition of these individuals and those labelledas ‘gang involved’ in the same geographic locations.

Finding 3: By grouping individuals differently according toethnicity, focusing on young Black British, BlackCaribbean and Black Mixed Race individuals, theanalysis reveals a more stark disproportionalitybetween those engaging in violence and thoselabelled as ‘gang involved’.

How is the ‘gangs’ discourse used to support prosecutionwithin joint enterprise cases?

Finding 4: The ethnic profile of the 241 prisoners whoresponded to the questionnaire provides support forthe emerging evidence of a disproportionate use ofthe JE doctrine against BAME individuals. Further,the sample indicates that those JE prisoners whoidentify as BAME are significantly younger than theirwhite counterparts.

Finding 5: The number of individuals involved in the JEcases was alarming, on average there were four butin one case there were 26 co-defendants. Thiscoupled with the sentence lengths for the JEprisoners, with almost half of the sample under 25years old and for these young men an averagesentence length of 20 years, reveals anintensification of collective punishment.

Finding 6: The sample indicates that those individuals whoidentify themselves as BAME serve both longer averagesentences and the cases involve a greater number ofco-defendants than their white counterparts.

Finding 7: Fifty-nine percent of the prisoners responding tothe survey reported that ‘gangs’ had been cited bythe prosecution during their court case.

Finding 8: The ‘gangs’ discourse was significantly morelikely to be cited in the prosecution of BAME JEdefendants.

Finding 9: Whilst some individuals recognisedconnections to their co-defendants, be those throughfamily or friendship ties, the overwhelming majoritycontest that such associations reflect ‘gang’involvement.

Finding 10: The making of associations to establishforesight is key in cases of JE. The questionnaires

reveal in detail the reality of the relationshipsbetween individuals and their co-defendants, whichin some cases includes no previous contact with orknowledge of others involved in the case.

Finding 11: The qualitative responses within thequestionnaire reveal the use of a range of powerfulsignifiers in court. These include reference tosynonymous crime family or gang names, referenceto racialised neighbourhoods and dehumanisingcomparisons e.g. to ‘packs of animals’.

Finding 12: The questionnaires point to a number ofdifferent evidence strategies used by the prosecutionto ‘place’ the individual at the scene, and thusestablish foresight. With almost half of thequestionnaire respondents reporting not being at thescene of the offence, such strategies are particularlyrelevant in the process of collective punishment.

Finding 13: The data reveals some key differences in themechanisms used by criminal justice protagonists,with greater use of police intelligence strategies suchas ‘cellsite’ evidence and reference to music lyrics orvideos in the case of BAME defendants.

Conclusion[T]oo often groups of Black and Asian men are seen as‘gangs’, criminalised and then dealt with on this basis,by the police, in schools, in their communities and onthe streets.42

A persistent feature of the criminal justice practice inEngland and Wales is the overrepresentation of BAMEpeople throughout all agencies of the CJS.43 There remainsan absence of studies to explain the precise processes ofdifferential treatment and disproportional practices, whichcontribute to this overrepresentation of BAME groups. Thisstudy was undertaken in response to emerging evidence ofthe latest representation of this disparity, the use of the JEdoctrine against young BAME people. The above findingsoffer a troubling insight into the complex processes ofcriminalisation of young Black men, indicating the systemis more flawed than we might imagine.

However, the prosecution of serious violence through a‘gang’ construct that appears un-evidenced has the veryreal consequence of undermining justice and furtherraising the question of procedural (un)fairness with BAMEcommunities.44 The Young Review further highlights thecontinuities in stereotypical and negative assumptions ofyoung Black and/or Muslim men engaged in extremeforms of violence. In light of the ambiguous nature of





‘gang’ definitions, the lack of transparency in theattribution of the gang-label and the declared (over)punishment as deterrence, of those who are defined asgang-involved or associated with the gang, we believe itimperative that there are both research and policyresponses to the above findings.

The Metropolitan Police’s letter to alleged gang membersreproduced on page 6 in this report is the latest, andperhaps the ultimate conflation of the strategies, whichhave been the focus of this report – the deployment of boththe ‘gang’ discourse and JE doctrine in the police’sresponse to alleged involvement in serious youth violence.45

A serious response to the violence and harmexperienced by individuals and communities is not underquestion within this report. However, we conclude thatresponding to serious youth violence through the 'gang'construct is deeply flawed and likely to be unsuccessful.The perpetration of violence is not aligned to 'race' orethnicity in ways that are imagined by the currentstrategies deployed to identify, police and prosecuteviolent individuals. The findings point to a need toexamine and respond to the drivers of violence and harmoutside of the contemporary UK 'gangs' discourse.



1 Joint Enterprise: Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA) is a grass rootscampaign launched in 2010 by families wanting to highlight theabuse of the Joint Enterprise doctrine.The sample was drawn from those prisoners either directly engagedwith the JENGbA organisation, or through an association with suchprisoners. In the context of no formal mechanism for counting oridentifying JE prisoners this sample (241 direct responses, reflectingover 800 individuals connected to these JE cases) is clearly valuablein facilitating an understanding of the experiences and circumstancesof JE prosecutions. The survey took place between May and July2015, with questionnaires sent to prisoners previously registered tothe JENGbA database. The questionnaire was distributed to 550prisoners in England and Wales, to which 241 prisoners haveresponded. This represents a respectable response rate of 44%.

2 Eady, D. (2013), ‘Perceptions of People Maintaining Unjust Convictionunder Joint Enterprise Law’, University of Cardiff.

3 Smithson, H., Ralphs, R. and Williams, P. (2013), ‘Used and abused:the problematic usage of gang terminology in the United Kingdomand its implications for ethnic minority youth’, British Journal of

Criminology, Vol. 53,. 1,, pp. 113−28.4 Fraser, A. and Atkinson, C. (2014), ‘Making up gangs: looping,

labelling and the new politics of intelligence led policing’, Youth

Justice, Vol. 14, 2, p. 2.5 Medina, J. and Shute, J. (2013), ‘‘‘Utterly appalling”: why official review

of UK gang policy is barely credible’, Manchester Policy Blogs,University of Manchester, http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/featured/2013/12/utterly-appalling-why-official-review-of-uk-gang-policy-is-barely-credible. Shute, J., Aldridge, J. and Medina, J. (2012), ‘Loading the policyblunderbuss’, Criminal Justice Matters, Vol 7, (1).

6 Hallsworth, S, (2014), ‘Gang talking criminologists: a rejoinder to JohnPitts’, Youth and Policy, 112, pp. 35−43. Pitts, J. (2012), ‘Reluctant criminologists: Criminology, Ideology and theviolent street gang’, Youth and Policy, 109, pp. 27−45. Joseph, I. and Gunter, J. (2011), What’s a Gang and What’s Race Gotto Do With it? London, Runnymede Trust. Hallsworth, S. and Young, T. (2008), ‘Gang talk and gang takers: acritique’, Crime Media and Culture, Vol 4, pp. 175 – 195.

7 Fraser, A. and Atkinson, C. (2014), ‘Making up gangs: looping,labelling and the new politics of intelligence led policing’, Youth Justice, Vol. 14, 2.

8 www.gov.uk/government/publications/ending-gang-and-youth-violence-cross-government-report

9 HM Government (2011), ‘Ending Gangs and Youth Violence: A CrossGovernment Report’, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97861/gang-violence-summary.pdf

10 Clarke, R., Crossley, C. and Williams, P. (2012), ‘Gang and YouthViolence in Manchester City: a partnership problem profile’,unpublished report, Manchester City Violent Gangs Board.

11 Serious Violence is defined through the offence categories of Murder,Attempted Murder, Manslaughter, Wounding, Actual Bodily Harm andGrievous Bodily Harm by the Home Office ‘Ending Gangs and SeriousYouth Violence’ agenda, (web link).

12 Generic term adopted by the police to describe those suspected ofgang involvement or association.

13 Mayor of London (2014), ‘Strategic ambitions for London: Gangs andSerious Youth Violence, London: MOPAC.

14 Smithson, H., Ralphs, R. and Williams, P. (2013) ‘Used and abused:the problematic usage of gang terminology in the United Kingdomand its implications for ethnic minority youth’, British Journal of

Criminology, Vol. 53, 1, pp. 113−28.15 Medina, J. and Shute, J. (2013),’‘‘Utterly appalling”: why official

review of UK gang policy is barely credible’, Manchester Policy Blogs,University of Manchester, http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/featured/2013/12/utterly-appalling-why-official-review-of-uk-gang-policy-is-barely-credible

16 New Economy (2013), Integrated Greater Manchester Assessment,

New Economy: Manchester, April.17 Williams, P. (2015), ‘Criminalising the Other: challenging the race

and crime nexus’, Race and Class, Vol. 56(3), pp.18–35. Katz, J. and Jackson-Jacobs, C. (2004), ‘The criminologists gang’, inC. Sumner, C. (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Criminology, Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 91−124.

18 Smithson, H., Ralphs, R. and Williams, P. (2013), ‘Used and abused:the problematic usage of gang terminology in the United Kingdomand its implications for ethnic minority youth’, British Journal of

Criminology, p. 117.19 www.gov.uk/government/news/changes-in-legislation-reflected-in

-new-gang-definition20 HM Government (2015), Ending Gangs and Youth Violence Annual

Report 2014/15, London: The Stationery Office. 21 Williams, P., Kinsella, R. and Crossley, C. (2013), ‘Gang and Youth

Violence in Manchester City: revisiting the problem profile’,unpublished report, Greater Manchester Probation Trust.

22 Crown Prosecution Service (2012), ‘CPS Guidance on Joint

Enterprise Charging Decisions’, December.23 McClenaghan, M., McFadyean, M. and Stevenson, R. (2014), ‘Joint

Enterprise: An investigation into the legal doctrine of joint enterpriseand criminal convictions’, Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

24 Ibid 25 Ibid 26 Crewe, B., Hulley, S. and Wright, S. (2014), ‘Written submission on

joint enterprise’, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge,available at: www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/ltp_from_young_adulthood/evidence_to_justice_committee.pdf

27 Crewe, B., Hulley, S. and Wright, S. (2014), ‘Written submission onjoint enterprise’, Institute of Criminology: University of Cambridge,available at: www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/ltp_from_young_adulthood/evidence_to_justice_committee.pdf

Notes

28 Ibid29 Birmingham Evening Mail (2005), ‘Gang six jailed for 30 years’,

3 December.30 Bridges, L. (2015), ‘The Met Gangs Matrix: Institutional racism in

action’, London: Institute of Race Relations. www.irr.org.uk/news/the-met-gangs-matrix-institutional-racism-in-action

31 Nottingham Crime and Drugs Partnership (2012), Ending Gangs andYouth Violence in Nottingham City: Strategic Profile.

32 http://content.met.police.uk/Article/History-of-Trident/1400014986671/1400014986671

33 Williams, P., Kinsella, R. and Crossley, C. (2013), ‘Gang and YouthViolence in Manchester City: revisiting the problem profile’,unpublished report, Manchester City Violent Gangs Board. Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (2013), ‘IntegratedGreater Manchester Assessment: policing and crime evidence base,http://neweconomymanchester.com/stories/1986-2014_ integrated_greater_manchester_assessment (particularly p. 81).

34 Crewe, B., Hulley, S. and Wright, S. (2014), ‘Written submission onjoint enterprise’, Institute of Criminology: University of Cambridge,available at: www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/ltp_from_young_adulthood/evidence_to_justice_committee.pdf

35 This analysis of sentence length excludes four responses where thequestion of sentence length was responded to with ‘life’.

36 Crewe, B., S. Hulley, S. and Wright, S. (2014), ‘Written submission onjoint enterprise’, Institute of Criminology: University of Cambridge,available at: www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/ltp_from_young_adulthood/evidence_to_justice_committee.pdf

37 This finding is based upon the calculation of the number of co-defendants reported in all questionnaires (n= 860), minus thenumber of respondents to the questionnaire (n=241) in order toremove the potential for double counting.

38 Scott, D. (2008), Penology, London: Sage.39 Alexander, C. (2008), ‘Re-Thinking “Gangs”’, report prepared for the

Runnymede Trust, available online at www.blackeducation.info/upload/docs/RethinkingGangs-2008.pdf

40 This result was analysed using a Chi-squared test and wasstatistically significant at the .000 level.

41 Percentages represent proportions of the base total for the BAMEgroup and for the White group respectively.

42 Alexander, C. (2008), ‘Re-Thinking “Gangs”’, report prepared for theRunnymede Trust, available online at www.blackeducation.info/upload/docs/RethinkingGangs-2008.pdf

43 The Young Review, 2014, released 10 December.44 Medina, J. and Shute, J. (2013), ‘‘‘Utterly appalling”: why official

review of UK gang policy is barely credible’, Manchester Policy Blogs,University of Manchester, http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/featured/2013/12/utterly-appalling-why-official-review-of-uk-gang-policy-is-barely-credible

45 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/03/met-police-criticised-over-gang-call-in-letter



www.crimeandjustice.org.uk

At the Centre for Crime and Justice Studieswe advance public understanding of crime,criminal justice and social harm. We areindependent and non-partisan, thoughmotivated by our values. We stand withthose most vulnerable to social harm. We believe that the United Kingdom’s overreliance on policing, prosecution andpunishment is socially harmful,economically wasteful, and prevents usfrom tackling the complex problems oursociety faces in a sustainable, socially just manner.

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