d2012 Administrative Law Reviewer

Administrative Law Finals Reviewer

AY 2009-2010 2nd Semester

Dean Salvador Carlota D2012

Buenaventura, Deveraturda, Esperas, Flores, Gervacio, Go, Mancao, Manotoc, Oposa, Orbeta, Prado, Refran,

Santos, Santos

I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS

A. DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A DISTINCT FIELD OF PUBLIC LAW

1. Factors responsible for the

emergence of administrative agencies

Past: NO need for regulatory agencies because problems were simple and straightforward. Modern Age: Government was NO longer able to employ its powers under the doctrine of separation of powers, hence, there was a NEED for delegation of powers. BIRTH of ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES FACTORS (according to Justice Laurel in the Pangasinan case):

o Growing complexity of modern life o Multiplication of subjects of

governmental regulation o Increased difficulty of

administering laws FACTORS (according to Stone):

o Lack of TIME - On the part of government, to

respond to problems - Trichotomy can no longer cope

with complexities - Obvious solution: create admin

agencies and delegate powers o Lack of EXPERTISE

- New problems require expertise to solve technical and specific issues (i.e. pollution, energy, labor)

o Lack of ORGANIZATIONAL APTITUDE for effective and continuing regulation of new developments in society - Trichotomy too unwieldy to be

able to concentrate on specialized areas

Administrative agency proliferation rather than stagnation/decline

2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER Dean Salvador Carlota

2. The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of administrative agencies

Doctrine of separation of powers

o 3 branches of government not encroaching on the powers of each other

o Not ABSOLUTE separation o System of checks and balances

More hospitable interpretation of the doctrine (according to Stone) The trichotomy can no longer take care of the problems because society has become too complex thereby preventing the 3 branches from responding to the problems effectively. Delegation of powers emerged because of the necessity under the modern conditions (Dicey)

o Administrative agencies became the catch basin for the residual powers of the 3 branches

o Without the agencies, the system will COLLAPSE and there would be chaos, confusion and anarchy

Agency v. Trichotomy

o Agency has expertise and time o Trichotomy lacks expertise, time and

organizational aptitude therefore delegates to admin agencies

Aim of delegation to prevent absolutism/tyranny

Admin agencies

o Fuses legislative (rule making), administrative (implementing rules) and judicial functions

o Hybrid functions do not endanger separation

B. DEFINITION OF TERMS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY; TYPES OF AGENCIES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies including specially the law governing judicial review of administrative actions

o Powers: corresponding to executive, legislative and judicial

o Procedures: in adjudication, licensing, rule making

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY any governmental authority other than the court

and other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making (Davis)

o Any governmental authority: other than a court or a legislative body; can assume many labels (commission, board, authority, office) - Based on the constitution - Sovereignty resides in the

people and all governmental authority emanates from them

TYPES: o Statutory agencies created by

law/Congress (NLRC, SEC) o Constitutional agencies created by the

Constitution - COMELEC, COA, CSC - Insulated from the influence of the 3

branches; cannot be abolished by Congress

- Independent, can only be abolished or modified through a constitutional amendment

- Protective devices: security of tenure, impeachment as method of removal, fiscal autonomy, prohibited from holding other office

C. CASES: PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 1940: Administrative function, involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the legislature (National Assembly in this case) can be delegated to admin agencies like the PSC.

o The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of power, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism.

o With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO., 1932: SC exercises judicial, NOT administrative, functions.

o The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial function.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER D2012

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NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE, 1968: Investigating and disciplining court officials are executive functions which the Constitution placed under the Presidents supervision and control, NOT the SC.

o If the legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of privileges or rank and privileges of Judges of the CFI the right to be investigated by the SC, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violated the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

GARCIA v. MACARAIG, JR., 1971: The practice of judges collaborating with other offices should be discontinued.

o Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

IN RE: RODOLFO MANZANO, 1988: SC is not allowed to perform administrative functions.

o Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

o Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN, 1982: Members of the National Assembly are prohibited by the Constitution to appear as counsel before any administrative body.

o A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.


II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE

EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

Art. 7, Section 1. Executive Power The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Art. 7, Section 17. Control over admin agencies The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Executive power: To promulgate or execute laws Control: Power to alter, modify or overturn the judgment of the subordinates

o See to it that subordinates are doing their jobs

o Limited to executive departments, bureaus, offices

Supervision: Ensure that laws are faithfully executed

o More encompassing than control no qualification

Can the President control ALL admin agencies? It depends on whether the enabling statute has given power of review to the President

o Under Sec. 17, Art 7, President has control over agencies created by statutes

- Power of legislature over agencies must be subordinate to Sec. 17

o If the law is silent, theres a presumption that the Congress intended for the President to have control. No need to put it in the law.

o Constitutional agencies (i.e. Comelec and CoA) are NOT controlled by the President because they are independent constitutional creations

B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER

o Seeing to it that the agencies follow legislative intention

o Part of Congress prerogative in delegating powers of Congress to agencies

o Scrutiny, investigation, legislative supervision

MACALINTAL v. COMELEC (DISSENT AND CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE PUNO), 2003: The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.

o Oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

o Categories of congressional oversight functions:

Scrutiny primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. Based primarily on the power of appropriation and power of confirmation

Investigation recognized under Sec 21, Art. 6 of 1987 Consti

Supervision connotes a continuing and informed awareness regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. Exercised thru the veto power.

C. ARTICLE: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING (CARLOTA)

Legislative control over Admin agencies:

Power of creation, appropriation and investigation

o Creation congress creates rather than abolishes as society becomes more complex. State is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems brought by social and economic change.

o Appropriation Congress has the power to withhold funds for the agencies but at the end of the day it is reluctant in wielding such power because is recognizes that is it does, it will affect public interest.

o Investigation limited tool to provide as effective regular control of improper exercise of admin power.

Non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards

o The more specific the standards are, the greater are the chances of confining administrative discretion within proper limits. If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is virtually left to his own devices, thereby allowing him to exercise discretion in the performance of his functions.

o A review of the cases decided by the SC shows that in many instances of delegation, the legislature is unable


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to provide definite of specific standards.

Administrative procedure as a mode of control

o There are certain factors to be considered in prescribing rules: (a) admin agencies are not bound by the same technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts; (b) agencies are created to deal with specific problems.

o Even if it is possible, which is not, to impose uniform rules of procedure in all levels of all agency operations, such a move is clearly unsound

o Legislature should only provide minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed by all agencies in the performance of their rule making and adjudicative functions. This will assure sufficient room for the agencies to come up with supplementary rules that may be needed from time to time, while at the same time, it will provide adequate protection to the individuals constitutional right to due process.

Judicial review of Admin decision making:

o The purpose of judicial review is to keep the admin agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestall arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

o Class notes: o Judicial review is the most effective

form of control provides immediate relief to complainant - Part of police power - Channel for adversely affected

parties to vindicate constitutional rights

o Judicial review is limited or restrained: - For policy choices: court does

not interfere with agencies - Discretion: no interference

UNLESS there is grave abuse of discretion

D. ARTICLE: THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY (CARLOTA)

Essential characteristics of an Ombudsman:

o Political independence fiscal autonomy, prohibition to practice

profession, removable only by impeachment, can appoint all officers and employees of his office

o Accessibility and expedition within the reach of ordinary citizens; as opposed to the courts which are not easily within reach of poor

o Investigatory power the Ombudsman not only has the power to investigate but also the power to prosecute on his own initiative or upon complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

o Absence of revisory jurisdiction Ombudsman cannot modify or overturn decisions of admin agencies performing rule making or adjudicative functions. He may not exercise the function for an appellate or reviewing court.

Is the Ombudsman institution workable in the Philippines? NO

o The perception that the Ombudsmans role as Protector of the People has not been satisfactorily performed can be reversed by adopting measures designed to correct perceived shortcomings.

E. CASES: Absence of Revisory Power CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE MWSS v. VASQUEZ, 1995: The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act DID NOT INTEND to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.

o In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS.

What are Covered by the Investigatory Power of the Ombudsman LASTIMOSA v. VASQUEZ, 1995: The Ombudsmans power to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by public officials covers those acts and omissions which are related to AND those NOT related to the performance of the public officials duties. It is enough that the act or omission was done by a public official.

o The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on


complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty.

o It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

BIR v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 2002: The power of the Ombudsman to investigate encompasses ALL kinds of acts or omissions committed by any public official

o The power to investigate and to prosecute which was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employeeduring his tenure of office.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ENOC, 2002: The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan AND also those cognizable by regular courts.

o The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Sec 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutors power is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutor power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.

Those NOT covered by Ombudsmans power to investigate FUENTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, 2001: Under the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman has NO power to initiate or entertain criminal or administrative complaints against the Judiciary (i.e. judges). SC has the power to investigate such complaints.

o Sec 21, RA 6770: Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions - except over officials who may be removed only by

impeachment or over Members of Congress and the Judiciary.

o Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officials. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the SC, for appropriate action.

o Sec 6, Art. 8 of the Consti exclusively vests in the SC admin supervision over all courts and court personnel. Hence, it is the SC that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper admin action against them if they commit any violation of the laws.

Extent of Ombudsmans Investigatory and Disciplinary Powers LEDESMA v. CA, 2005: The Ombudsmans decision in admin investigations is not merely advisory but in fact has a BINDING effect upon the officer to which the decision is directed to.

o The case involved the interpretation of the word recommend as used in Sec 13(3), RA 6770.

o The Ombudsman has the authority to determine administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed.

o By stating that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, provisions in the Consti and RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case is the BID.

ESTAJIRA v. RANADA, 2006: The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory.

o Through the enactment of RA 6770, specifically Sec 15, par 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Thus, under RA 6770 and the Consti, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MASING, 2008: The law gives the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority over erring officials.

o The manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full


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administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberationsthe Ombudsman under the Consti and RA 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.

III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

1. Non-delegation Doctrine

Potestas delegate non delegare potest cannot delegate delegated power Completeness Test:

o Policy already clearly enunciated o Standard to be observed already

fixed delegate must follow

Requirements for Valid Delegation PEOPLE v. VERA, 1937: Requirements for proper delegation (1) clear policy and (2) fixed standards. Act 4221 does not meet these 2 requirements therefore there was undue delegation of legislative power.

o In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. CLEAR POLICY

o As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. FIXED STANDARDS

o In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves whether the Probation law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

PELAEZ v. AUDITOR-GENERAL, 1965: Requirements for proper delegation (1) clear policy and (2) fixed standards. Sec 68 of Revised Admin Code does not meet both requirements hence there was undue delegation.

o Although Congress may delegate to another branch of Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of law, it is essential to forestall


a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

o Sec 68 does not meet these well settled requirements for valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

o If the validity of the delegation of powers in Sec 68 was upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or interest. Such grant would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of Executive.

Valid Delegation PHILPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION v. ALCUAZ, 1989: There is NO undue delegation of power since the law fixes a standard for the exercise of power conferred.

o In case of delegation of rate fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.

o NTC, in the exercise of its rate fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

o In Vigan Electric v. Public Service Commission, the SC made a categorical classification as to when the rate fixing power of admin bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative:

When such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to ALL enterprises of a given kind throughout the Phils LEGISLATIVE function NO need for NOTICE and HEARING unless the law requires otherwise (i.e. the Admin Code)

When the rate fixing applies to one entity only QUASI-JUDICIAL function there should be NOTICE and HEARING to allow the party to introduce evidence to disprove findings of admin agency

CHIONGBIAN v. OROBOS, 1995: There was a standard provided for by the law.

o With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in RA 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, 2005: The law is complete theres a clear policy and there are standards.

o Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what it the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

o In this case, there is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President.

FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION v. AL GONQUIN, 1976: There are sufficient standards provided for by the law.

o It establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action Inter alia, A finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an "article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the extent "he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security." And 232(c) articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the President in exercising his authority under 232(b).

Implied Standards EDU v. ERICTA, 1970: Standards could be implied from the policy and purpose of the law considered as a whole.


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o To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,

there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

o The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, the legislative objective is public safety.

AGUSTIN v. EDU, 1979: There is NO undue delegation of power since a standard has been set.

o The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the States police power intended to promote public safety.

o Quoted the ratio in Edu v. Ericta Undue Delegation No Fixed Standards CIA. GENERAL DE TOBACCO v. BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY, 1916: There was undue delegation of legislative power to the Board. There was no standard fixed by the law and the Board was left to its own judgment and discretion.

o The provision complained of does not lay down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed, nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board which is unrestrained as when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what shall it act upon.

o The legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its power and functions in favor of the Board with respect to matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress.

US v. ANG TANG HO, 1922: There was undue delegation of power when Act 2868 authorized the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.

o By Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the legislature and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else.

o The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of

things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action to spend.

o The Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the GG to say what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, 1997: There was undue delegation of power because RA 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements for a valid delegation.

o COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have the power under RA 6735.

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, 1931: There was no undue delegation of powers.

o BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same the NLRC is not on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.

o It must be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor.

PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN, 1935: There was no standard provided for by Sec 9(c).

o Sec 9(c) leaves to the states and to their authorities the determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the Presidents authority by reference to the basis or extent of the states limitation of production. It does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum produced in excess of states permission.

o It gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.

o Class Notes:


The dissent of Cardozo is the more persuasive opinion it considered what was the power delegated to the President

According to Cardozo there are standards (i.e. natural resources limitation)

View the statute as a whole A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTRY CORP. v. US, 1935: There are no standards provided for by the law regarding the power given to the President.

o Sec 3 of the Recovery Act supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate admin procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe the.

o In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered.

WHITE v. ROUGHTON, 1976: Personal standards cannot be used to determine w/n to terminate welfare assistance.

o Defendant Roughton as administrator of the general assistance program has the responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application of such requirements requires that Roughton establish written standards and regulations. At the hearing in the district court on the preliminary injunction, defendant Roughton admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon their own unwritten personal standards. Such a procedure, vesting virtually unfettered discretion in Roughton and his staff, is clearly violative of due process.

2. Permissible Delegation

a. Ascertainment of Fact

PANAMA REFINING CO v. RYAN, 1935: Leaving to administrative agencies the determination of facts is not unlawful delegation of legislative power.

o The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying

down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.

o Authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed, have constantly been sustained. Moreover, the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy, that is, to fill up the details under the general provisions made by the legislature.

LOVINA v. MORENO, 1963: Determination of findings of fact may validly be delegated to administrative agencies.

o It is true that the exercise of the Secretarys power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are validly conferrable upon executive official provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard.

o Delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers. It is not in violation of the separation of powers nor is it in violation of due process.

b. Filling in of Details

ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, 1929: The authority to fill in details in carrying out the law is not legislative power and may thus be validly delegated to administrative agencies.

o Board and commissions now play an important part in the administration of our laws. The great social and industrial evolution of the past century, and the many demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation of these administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers. Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute and various


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governmental powers for the more efficient administration of the laws.

o The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp and by whom and how it should be done, and creates the Fiber Board with power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. That is not a delegation of legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law.

c. Administrative Rule-Making

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, BOOK VII,

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SECTION 1: SCOPE This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole and state universities and colleges. SECTION 2: DEFINITIONS As used in this Book: (1) Agency includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2) Rule means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3) Rate means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage, and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4) Rule making means any agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5)Contested case means any proceeding, including

licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. (6) Person includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) Party includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8) Decision means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. (9) Adjudication means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10) License includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11) Licensing includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12) Sanction includes the whole or a part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13) Relief includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14) Agency proceeding means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. (15) Agency action includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. SECTION 3: FILING


(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any part or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. SECTION 4: EFFECTIVITY In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. SECTION 5: PUBLICATION AND RECORDING The University of the Philippines Law enter shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. SECTION 6: OMMISSION OF SOME RULES (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. SECTION 7: DISTRIBUTION OF BULLETIN AND CODIFIED RULES The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified

rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. SECTION 8: JUDICIAL NOTICE The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. SECTION 9: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

i. Limits on Rule-Making Power

OLSEN & CO, INC v. ALDENESE, 1922: The authority of administrative agencies to make rules and regulations is confined to the specific purpose provided in the law.

o The power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules and regulations is confined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only that the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make any rules or regulations.

o Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that the provisions of the legislative act are not limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no limitation as to the place where the tobacco should be grown in the Philippine Islands.

SY MAN v. JACINTO, 1953: Administrative regulations must not be inconsistent with the law.

o The Revised Administrative Code provides that every chief of bureau shall prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law to carry into full


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effect the laws relating to matters within the bureaus jurisdiction.

o A form or regulation promulgated by a Bureau Chief must not be inconsistent with law. Therefore, if the law does not give the Commissioner the power to review and revise unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved and published in the Official Gazette, would equally have no effect for being inconsistent with law.

PEOPLE v. MACEREN, 1977: An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law.

o Administrative regulations should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

o Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended.

o The regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.

TOLEDO v. CSC, 1991: Administrative regulations cannot amend an act of Congress.

o The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules cannot be accorded validity. As already pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect.

o It was therefore an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of the CSC, it cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect.

o By its administrative regulations, the law itself cannot be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CA, 1995: Administrative issuances must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply.

o The authority of the Minister of Finance, in conjunction with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of

internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental than either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.

o The conclusion is unavoidable that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA, 1995: Administrative regulations cannot extend or amend the law.

o The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.

o The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power when it issued the Administrative Circular. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account because the law is very specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.

GMCR INC v. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC, 1997: Administrative regulations derive their validity from the law that they were intended to implement.

o Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were intended to implement. The Memorandum Circulars are null and void ab initio for being contrary to the law that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body. The fact that implementation of these


illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS v. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, 1998: Administrative agencies cannot dismantle a legislative policy.

o By limiting the purpose of registration to merely monitoring volumes of production and administration of quality standards of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop.

o Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.

o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

OPLE v. TORRES, 1998: Administrative orders should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

o The Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

o It cannot be simplistically argued that the Administrative Order merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987, for the AO establishes a National Computerized Identification Reference System, which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 1999: Administrative issuances should remain consistent with the law they seek to apply.

o By changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years, the circular created a clear inconsistency with the provisions of the law. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.

o Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings which are

issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, 1999: Administrative rules and regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature.

o It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.

o If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT & DEVT. CORP. v. PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVT. CORP., 2004: An Administrative order, to be valid, must conform to the provisions of the enabling law.

o The period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is 15 days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15 of PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 2 of PD 1344. The Court ruled that the 30- day period to appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure, is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as PD 957 and PD 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure.

o [Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987] allows the aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within 30 days from the receipt of the decision complained


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of. Nonetheless, such 30-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the 30-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that in an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.

ii. Publication and Affectivity

PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY, 1954: As a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

o However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code equally provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

o It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, AS A RULE, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

o But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

o Class notes: the circular in this case is not a statute or law but issued in the

implementation of the law therefore, it has the force and effect of law.

o In general, rules must not provide penal sanctions, UNLESS

o Agency is given rule-making authority

o Law itself provides that the act is criminal

Law defining crimes must essentially be from the legislature

Function of defining crimes is essentially legislative; therefore, it cannot be delegated.

PHIL. BLOMING MILLS CO., INC. v. SSS, 1966: Publication of laws in the OG is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.

o These rules and regulations were promulgated to provide guidelines to be observed in the enforcement of the law. As a matter of fact, Section 3 of Rule I is merely an enumeration of the "general principles to (shall) guide the Commission" in the determination of the extent or scope of the compulsory coverage of the law. One of these guiding principles is paragraph (d) relied upon by appellants, on the coverage of temporarily-employed aliens. It is not here pretended, that the amendment of this Section 3(d) of Rule I, as to eliminate the provision granting to these aliens the right to a refund of part of their premium contributions upon their departure from the Philippines, is not in implementation of the law or beyond the authority of the Commission to do.

o It may be argued, however, that while the amendment to the Rules may have been lawfully made by the Commission and duly approved by the President on January 14, 1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958 issue of the Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment had already ceased. Suffice it to say, in this regard, that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.

o In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President.


***TANADA v. TUVERA, 1986: Publication is indispensible in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.

o The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

o We have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

o Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

o It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

o We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of

the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

o The term "laws" should refer to ALL LAWS and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

o We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

o COVERED BY THIS RULE are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

o Accordingly, even the charter of a city MUST BE PUBLISHED notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

o However, NO PUBLICATION is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

o We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is


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to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

o Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

o Class notes: administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce of implement existing law, EXCEPT

o Interpretative regulations (Sir said that it was wrong to except interpretative rules as this may have an adverse impact on private rights)

o Internal rules o Centerpiece of this decision: due process

PHIL. ASSOC. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. TORRES, 1992: Circulars issued by an administrative agency, though a valid exercise of police power as delegated to the executive branch of the government, may be held legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register.

o It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land-based workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power.

o The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

o Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

DE JESUS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, 1998: An administrative circular issued to enforce or implement an existing law and affects the rights of certain people must comply with the publication requirement.

o On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

o In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.

REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC., 2002: Publication in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The fact that rules or regulations were filed and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register does not cure the defect related to its effectivity.

o The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states:

Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it. Rules in


force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain or disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

o The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. In a similar case, we held: This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

"Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. x x x"

o The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS v. ENERGY REGULARTORY COMMISSION, 2006: Publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether. Publication in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect.

o In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was

never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that the parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation on the ERCs proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon.

o However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of PUBLICATION OF IMPLEMENTING RULES OF STATUTES IS MANDATORY and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.

o The public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments were procedures prior to the adoption of the GRAM Implementing Rules. In fact, at the time, the ERCs proposed implementing rules were denominated Implementing Rules for the Recovery of DCOR and DICER. These procedural steps (public consultation and submission of comments) are entirely different from the publication of statutes mandated by law, which occurs after their promulgation or adoption.

o The obvious purpose of the preliminary procedures of public consultation and submission of comments is to give the parties the opportunity to air their views and express their concerns on particular subject matters before legislative measures or implementing rules and regulations addressing these matters are promulgated. On the other hand, the avowed rationale for the requirement of publication of statutes is to apprise the public of the contents of the laws or rules and regulations that have already been promulgated or adopted.

GMA NETWORK, INC. v. MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW & CLASSIFICATION BOARD, 2007: Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register are ineffective and may not be enforced.

o MTRCB issued an order of suspension against GMA for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it.


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o While MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.

REPUBLIC v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., 2008: Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that the parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned.

o This Court in Taada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force.

o Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers AND as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

o Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned.

o Class notes: non-compliance with the 2 mandatory requirements would not give effectivity to the rules:

o Publication o Filing with the ONAR

Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 3-8: Section 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.


iii. Penal Regulations PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY, 1954, supra. (similar doctrine as above) PEOPLE v. MACEREN, 1977: Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.

o This case involves the validity of a 1967 regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that penalized electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. The Court held that the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority in issuing said regulation because the Fisheries Law did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing was not banned under the law, the Secretary and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.

o The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of penalty provided for in the law itself.

o Administrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

o Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

o The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

o Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law. As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the law-making body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bonds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly

exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

o Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

o A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statue. An administrative agency can have only the administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.

iv. Interpretative Rules

HILADO v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS, 1956: A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity.

o The Secretary of Finance is vested with authority to revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office because the construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if thereafter the latter become satisfied that a different construction should be given.

o General Circular V-123, having been issued on a wrong construction of the law, cannot give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by a taxpayer. A vested right cannot spring from a wrong interpretation.

o An administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes nullity. Article 2254 provides that No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. v. SSS, 1962: A rule which purports merely to advice the people of amendments of the law does not require presidential approval and publication in the OG for its effectivity.

o There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with


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the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.

o A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

o Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows:

(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:

(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.

o It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or

exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enfor

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