Cutler Concept of Ground Rent 1975

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DOI: 10.1177/0308275X75001004031975 2: 72Critique of Anthropology

Antony CutlerThe Concept of Cround-Rent and Capitalism in Agriculture

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THE CONCEPT OF CROUND-RENTAND CAPITALISM INAGRICULTURE

byAntony Cutler

In the advanced capitalist countries the period of capitalist

industrialisation has been,whatever the specific variants that

this process has taken, one where the position of landovmers as

a specific social class has consistently declined. On the other

hand, in those nation-states subject to the domination of the

advanced capitalist countries landowners flourish, land ownership

is highly concentrated, rack-renting is the order of the day.

Can the concept of gound-rent as it is elaborated in Capital

elaborate the basis for the explanation of this contrast? To

answer thic question it is necessary to approach the andmalies

and ambiguities which haunt 1!,,-trxs own analysis.

The ConceDt of Ground-Rent in CaDitall

The concept of ground-rent is used in relation to two modes

of production in Capital, thc feudal and the capitalist. In

relation to the feudal mode of production ~round-rnt is a relation

of production, i.e., it defines the mode in which the surplus-

product is extracted by the ruling clans and more generally sets

limits to the character of the labour process under the feudal

mode. In contrast, in the capitalist mode pf production the mode

of extraction of surplus-product is surplus-value and rent is a

form of surplus-value.

In the feudal mode of production ground-rent is a relation

between the hicrarchised ruling class, the feudal nobility and the

peasantry whereby the latter owe a portion of their surplus-product

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to the former. This relation is crucially characterised by

an absence of any separation between the direct producers and the

means of production. This is the case whatever form of rent is

in operation for in the cases of rent in kind or in money the

peasant remains the controller and supervisor of production, while

in the case of labour rent the peasant uses his own means of

production on the lords land. An important correlate of this

relation is that rent under feudalism cannot by definition bo

governed by any general mechanism of determination, there is no

reason, for example, why the levels of rent in terms of surplus-

product need be comparable in different areas. Furthermore, rent

cannot be referred to any direct economic mechanism since while

the reproduction of the peasantry would put an abstract limit on

the levels of surplus-product extracted in the form of rent no

economic mechanism could define the precise extent of rent.

The conception of rent in the case of the capitalist mode of

production is necessarily quite distinct. l1arx discusoes two forms

of rent under the capitalist mode of production; form I, the only

form of rent

recognised byclassical

economics,he follows the

classical writers in calling differential rent, the second form

which is specific to Marxs own argument he calls absolute ground-

rent. Differential rent arises in any situation where there is

an unequal product from two equal applications of capital where

the organic composition io constant. Hero Marx explicitly echoes

Ricardos formulation: Ricardo is right in the following observation:

Rent is always the difference between the produce obtained by the



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employment of two equal quantities of capital and labour ..... (I~

Differential rent then io not limited to any particular sphere

of operationbeing applicable

for

exampleto raw

materials,sources

of energy and urban locations as well ag to agriculture. Equally,

differential rent can take a plurality of distinct forms; it can

go directly to a landlord, here the whole of the surplus-profit

derived from conditions which allow for above average* productivity

accrues to the landlord end the tenant is left with the average

profit determined by capitalict competition; it can be directly

appropriated by the owner of land insofar as the owner undertakes

capitalist production, in this case the rent only appears as

separate from profit in the formation of the purchase price of the

land (2); finally the state can appropriate differential rent

through exertinga

monopolyoi

landoi-nier~;hip (3).Under

competitiveconditions only state or private lando~l!1ership have the effect of

eqtialising profit rates and it is the case of private landovrnership

which is assumed in Capital. What is thus clear concerning

differential rent is that it is diametrically opposed to feudal

ground-rent. Differential rent does imply a relation to an average

rate of profit which will allow a consistent rate of rent in

agriculture governed by the differential fertility of the soil and

equally that this differential fertility will fom the basis for

the capitalisation of rent as a form of revenue. In this :ense,

differential ground-rent and the price of land do not fundamentally

differ from the

holdingof

equities (4).Differential rent is for

this reason not a relation of production but depends upon the

formation of capitalist relations of production.



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The Classical economists had limited the concept of rent to

differential rent but Marx introduces the concept of absolute

ground-rent. Absolute ground rent is seen to derive from two

heterogeneous sources, private land ol!1ers!p establishes a

monopoly which enables an additional rent to be charged over and

above differential rent which represents a monopoly price for

agricultural commodities. The monopoly price, however, iR not subject

simply to an extra-economic determination since it is equally

based on the conditions of production in agriculture. Here Marx

argues that the organic composition of capital is lower in

agriculture than in the average of the other capitalist sectors

of production. This means that the value of agricultural commodities

exceeds their price of production. Under conditions of capitalist

competition the above average profit generated in agriculture bythis low organic composition should be wiped out but as there is a

monopoly in l:u1o !1ership the lanc~ov:~ner if able to retain this

surplus-profit. The difference. between the value of agricultural

commodities and their price of production is thus absolute ground-

rent.

In this analysis Marx seeks to outline a theory of monopoly

pricing in the sphere of,a~riculture. However, the precise mode

of application of this concept must be regarded as fallacious. The

central problem in LSarxs argument concerns the determination of the

limits of the monopoly price, i.e. why it should be set at the

value of agricultural commodities. By being a monopoly in the sense

in which Marx implies the term agriculture is not subject to constraints



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of economic competition. For this reason it is difficult to see

why for example, agricultural commodities cannot be sold above

their value. 14arx argues that the limit to absolute ground-rent

must be found in the constraint exerted by foreign co.^~petition:

But it may be asked: If landed property gives the poi:er to nell

the product above its cost price, at its value, why does it not

equally well xive the power to sell the product above its value,

at an ::~bitrary monopoly price? On a small island, ,....hr~re there

is no foreign trade in corn, the corn, food like every other

product,could unquestionably be sold at a monopoly price, that is,

at a price only limited by the state of demand, i.e., of demand,

bac!~re~ by ability to pr,v, and according to the price level of the

product supplied the magnitude and extent of this effective demand

can very creatly.1 (5). The recourse to foreii7n competition, .

hoi:ever, solves nothing; if there is to be free import of foreign

agricultural commodities the result of competition will always be

to set tht, market price of agricultural commodities at their value.

Paradoxically the only way in which this argument could follow would

be if import of foreiy agricultural commodities were limited to

set the market price at the value of agricultural commodities in the

home country. This, however, would push the determinant from the

economic to the exercise bf state-power. (6)

Croz.^.::-^e-a ar.~1 the Ca-~ital is To~_e of Production..

The crucial distinction between nround-rent under the f eudal

and capitalist modes of producticn is, therefore, that ground-rent

is displaced from a relation of production to a form of surplus-

value. The implications of this are that as ground-rent is a



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revenue it is necessarily subject to the regulation of state power.

This situation, however, must be qualified with reference to the

conditions of agricultural production prevailing within the advanced

capitalist countries.

The formation of a world market for agricultural commodities

is a progressive effect of the penetration of capitalism in

agriculture. National markets are protected by an element of

differential rent applying on a worldscale,

the location of land.

Transport costs, therefore, clearly enter into the retarding effects

on the formation of a world market. However, the development of

a world market has the effect of increasing competition and lowering

the price of agricultural commodities. This means that he retention

of a monopoly price for agricultural commodities can only be effected

by artificially maintaining a price above the world market price

foragricultural commodities. Clearly, this does have various

deleterious effects on the development of the capitalist mode of

production in nation states.cadoPtin~ policies favouring landowners.

The major effect will be that if agricultural commodities are sold

at a price in excess of the competitive price the effect will be a

rise in wages. As labourpower is reproduced with referenco to a

set of commodities of which certain agricultural commodities are a

key component (7) any increased price must be treated as a deduction

from profits. Equally, the protection of the agricultural sphere

involves the retention of a higher proportion of the work-force

in agriculture which equally has the effect of tending to raise wages.



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It is clear, of course, that advanced capitalist countries have

protected home agricultural production but this has not been accomp-

anied by the protection of landowners. It has derived from attempts

by the ruling class to cement anti-proletarian class alliances. (8).

The dominance of industrial and latterly finance capital have

thus made it impossible to retain the position of lando~~er3hip

which characterised earlier phases of capitalist development.

The L.oour-Froc^s^ in Capitalist A~-riculture

A key aspect of the argument advanced by ~~arx on the question

of absolute ground-rent concerns the consistent technical backward-

ness w!1ch characterizes agricultural production,. However, if any

meaningful ccntrast between the conditions of agriculture in the

advanced capitalist countries and there dominated by imperialism

is to be effected it i3 necessary to demonstrate the mode in which

the development of capitalism in agriculture has led to certain

crucial transformations in the labour process.

The ccncepts analysing the labour process are developed by

Varx in Part IV of Volume I of Capital. Here Marx counterposes

in the sphere of industrial production the artisan labour process

to that of capitalist industry. The labour processes differ crucially

in that in the artisan labour process the constant position of the

artisan results in the fact that transformations in the means of

production are limited to those which reproduce the position of

the artisan. For example, improvements in tools are compatible

with the artisan labour process, the displacement of artisan labour

by machinery combined with unskilled labour is not (9). The break



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with the artisan labour process has two crucial effects, the possibility

is established of continuous entry of the fruits of scientific and

technical research into production and equally the mechanisation of

the labour process enables the labour to become continuous.

This transformation is led by the induRtrial rphere since

agriculture presents much greater intrinsic problems for the develop-

ment of a capitalist labour process. The major problem is that

certain key aspects of agricultural production remain given. For

example, the character of the soil and weather conditions are

obvious inescapable constraints. However, capitalist production in

agriculture continuously tends to minimise this givenness, the

giveneBB of the soil and weather being attacked by fertilizers, crop

sprays and irrigation, tendencies towards the establishment of a

continuous process being represented by the development of factory

farming.

From this point of view the artisan labour process remains totally

dominant inthe Third World countries with the effect that agricultural

yields remain far behind those prevalent in the advanced capitalist

countries, the major contribution to greater yields being preciselyby those elements which transform the giveneso of the soil, irrigation

and chcnical fertilizers. (10)

The Peasantry within a Capitalist Mode of Production.

If artisan production remains dominant within the agricultural

sector of Third 3.!orld cou.!1tries they are equally characterized byan absence of complete separation between the direct producers



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and the means of production, in a broad sense the peasantry remains

a crucial social class. The absence of this separation has the

effect of limiting thesource

of labouron

the peasant farms to

members of the family. Certain key effects follow from this

situation.

As the family is the source of labour, production is based not

on the reproduction of labour-povser but on the reproduction of the

labour of the unit of production.This,

in

particular,has a

crucial effect on the level of ground-rent. In the case of capitalist

agriculture wage-labour has to be remunerated at the current rate of

reproduction of labour-potier, therefore if it is employed for any

period beyond the normal working day the expenditure of capital

must necessarily augment itself incrementally. Peasant production,

on the other hand, because it utilises family labour and because

its object is the reproduction of the labour of this unit makes

no separation between necessary and surplus-labour. For this reason

it is generally the case that the effective rate of remuneration

of peasant labour is substantially beloa that of labour-power

under comparable conditions. The family labour basis, therefore,

is technically regressive since if the rate of remuneration is

based on the fact that family labour costs nothing then the

peasant producer must necessarily fall behind the capitalist farmer

for whom rises in the rate of remuneration of labour-power constitute

an incentive to displace labour-power with means of production.

However, it is important to stress that peasant farming does

not constitute a mode of production nor that it is intrinsically

inimical to capitalism. In this respect, for example, authors

following Chavanovs theory of pe:>..Ga.nt economv ~_1) have tended to



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see peasant farming as characterised by a cyclical differentiation

rather than the differentiation between capitalist farmer and

proletarian. (12) This is because following Chayanovs argument,

the subsistence level and the amount of land cultivated is seen to

depend on the ratio of working adults and children to dependent

adults and children within the family. The position of a peasant

unit of production would thus-depend upon a demographic cycle which

would peak at the maximum ratio of dependents to non-dependents.

However, in itself this arguments cannot be sufficient for an analysis

of the peascntry. Chayanov correctly argues that the means of

calculation are distinct in the case of the peasant unit so that

for example, given that the labour of workers on the unit is the

primary free resource, crops will be selected on the basis pf

labour-intensity and particularly from the point of view of spreading

labour over the whole year. (13) ChaSanovs object, however, is

the analysis of the labour process in peasant agriculture. The

retention of non-capitalist calculation precisely depends upon whether

the object of reproduction of subsistence can be achieved without

reference i,o the domination of the capitalist sector. The increasing

entrance into the capitalist market has the effect that the peasants

beoome dependent not on peasant calculation and the conditions of

production on the peasant unit but rather on the relative prices

of subsistence to cash crops. If it is impossible for the peasants

to meet their own subsidence by labour devoted to tho production

of subsistence crops then cultivation of cash crops is the necessary

alternative, the higher the relative price of the subsistence crop

the greater proportion of peasant labour has to be expended on the

cash crop. In this context the demographic cycle can work to



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facilitato internal means of differentiation within tho peasantry

since the development of capitalist competition with the peasant units

will tend to provide conditions for the peasant unit at the pe!~kof the demo,,-raphic cycle to acquire more land and equally to exhaust

the possibilities of peasant production thus combining peasant

production with the hiring of ;.:ape-labour as a tr:msitional

capitalist form. For this reason the internal analysis of the

peasant labcur process is insufficient to draw any conclusion on the

speed and character of differentiation of the peasantry.

However, where peas;nt production survives the effect of the

~-plu8-1abcl~tiDe expended above that appropriate to capitalist

conditions i7 to push up levels of rent. Of course, as Chayanov

points out this statement must be qualified with reference to the

relative scarcity of land; In areas where there is a vast amount

of land, where net labour payment on peasant farms is no lower than

i.tp.!,-r-s and where farms operate at optimal intensity, the peasant farm

will, if it has to pay rent~ pay no more than capitalist farms, and

more probably will take land only at lower amounts. In overpopulated

arc:.s, however,in order to establish its internal equilibrium the

peasant farm is obliged to force up intensification far above the

opt i.rmlr.1, where payment in the peasant farms usual sectors is lower

than the capitalist farms wages, the peasant farm will consider it

worth,ihile to pay a much higher rent than the capitalist rent .....

~1C~ The excess rent derives from the capitalisation of the surplus-

labour of the peasant over and above average capitalist conditions.



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It is clear that in the majority of Third World countries

conditions of excess labour and of over-population do prevail,

the

problemremains as to

whythe road taken

bythe advance

capitalist countries has not been taken. One crucial area here

is the formation of the world market in industrial commodities.

This has led to the transfer of the organic composition of capital

prevailing in the advanced capitalist countries to the countries

of the Third rlorld and consequently a tendency to raise the minimum

levels of capital required to carry on capitalist production in

various key industrial sectors. This statement must, horrever, be

qualified in the sense that the industrial sector is not based upon

a neo-classical search for optimal alternatives but is carried on

on the basio of an advantage to individual units of the hieh rates

of urban and rural an and

~1de:--e~pl(lYL1ent. (Capitalistindustrial-

isation ic necessarily carried on by enterprises, therefore, there

is no guarantee that the conditions of reproduction of the enter-

prise will in any sense be equivalent to the conditions of expanded

reproduction of industrial capital at the level of the total social

capital where the limitation on the home market io clearly an

obstacle.) (15) For this reason the conditions of relative over-

populaion are sustained in the rural areas and these are precisely

the conditions which tend to force sp rents.

FO&dquo;l!!3 of Tc:~:we .

The dominant forms of tenure emphasise the limitations on

the separation between the direct producers and the means of

production. On one hand, the existence of large estates is combined

with the retention of peasant plots in particular used as a



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mechanism to keep sources of labour on the soil. Again the effect

of peasant agriculture is to depress wages below the level of that

necessary for the reproduction of labour-power andequally

as

peasant production is based on the reproduction of labour, engenders

mnano of payment in kind which both increase levels of exploitation

and limit the development of the home market.

Share cropping, or what Marx calls metayage, exhibits another

form of partial separation which 11?x:< treats as a transitional form

of capitalist agriculture. ns a transitory form from the original

form of rent to capitalist rent we may consider the metayer system,

or share―cropping, uneer which the manager (farmer) furnishes

labour (his ov;n or anot?1er! s), and also a portion of working capital

and the landlord furnishes, aside from land, another portion of

working capital (e.g. cattle), and the product is divided between

tenant and landlord in definite proportions which vary from country

to country. On the one hand, the share here appropriated by the

landlord does not bear the pure form of rent. It may actually

include interest on the capital advanced by him and an excess rent.

It may also absorb practically the entire eurplus-labour of the

farmer, or leave him a greater or smaller portion of this surplus-

labour. But, essentially, rent no longer appears here as the normal

form of surplus-value in general. On the one hand, the sharecropper

whether he employs his oim or anothers labour 13 to lay a claim

to a portion of the product not in his capacity as labourer, but

as possessor of part of the instruments of labour, as hisown

capitalist. On the other hand, the landlord claims his share not

exclusively on the basis of his landownership, but also as lender



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of capital. (16) ,

Althouch !(arx treats metayace as a transitional form this is

in part because of his assumption that the tenant isa

proto-

capitalist tenant on the English lines. However, where metaya~e is

the form of tenure and peasant production and calculation survives

the result is an increase in the levels of rent for the reasons

stated above and equally a form of tenure which encourages maximum

exploitation. Under these conditions of metayage the landlord is

able both to extract a surplus-product which could not be obtained

under capitalict conditions of production with equal employment

of capital and is equally able to extract the maximum price for

subsistence products under conditions of surplus-population.

Under these conditions then, metayage would tend to repraduce

itsclf.

Conclusion

It is now possible to return to the question por-ed at the

beyi;=in3 and. surest a tentative solution. The concept of absolute

ground-rent was deployed in capital to analyse the conditions

under which agricultural commodities could be exoluded from the

formation of an average rate of profit under conditions of comp-

etitive capitalism and how this surplus was appropriated by the

landlords,. It iias demonstrated that the economic argument

adduced by Marx were untenable for the General reason that the result

of competitive conditions on a world scale would have to produce

the same result continuously: viz~the sale of agricultural commodities

at their value which was equally assumed to be consistently in

excess of the price of production. The development of agriculture

in the advanced capitalist countries is accompanied by a progressive



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weakening of the position of landlords (at least in the sphere of

agriculture),and continuous increases of productivity of labour

in agriculture.

In advanced capitalist countries although tho pace and extent

differed from one natiorr-Gtate to another the eradication of the

peasantry was effected. In contrast the Third World* countries

exhioit a quite distinct picture. Although separation from the

meanr; of production remains incomplete, feudalism is also essentially

eradicated. In respect of the nroblem of cround―rent, therefore,

we C&dquo;L1!10~ be said to be dealing with feudal rent, for the conditions

of tenure in general preclude a rir;ht to surplus-product of a

1~~~1 kind other than that defined by capitalist contractual relations.

On the other hand, it ic clear that peasant production is distinct

from capitalist conditions of production both in term,; of the

labour-process and the conditions of calculation. It is this

distinction which forms the basis for an ecuivalent to Tiarxs

absolute ground-rent thc landlord who rents land to a peasant is

able to appropriate the sur;lus-labour-time that a peasant is willing

to work for the same remuneration in use-values as a wa~e―labourer.

This rurplus can be capitaliseci in the case of iiagc labour and

expressed as a differential rent in the classical sense. For example,

if the landlord under a metayage system provides capital to a peasant,

the capitalisable surplus-labour could be compared vrith the return

he could get from employinc labour-power using the sane capital:

the la.1dlor. share of the crop would purchase a certain amount of

labour-power. If, as we have argued, the product of this labour is

below the price of the surplus product it constitutes a rent

provided by the combination of the private ownership of land



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and partial separation of the direct producers from the means

of production. The source of a rent distinct from that deriving

from the differential fertility of the soil derives from the

combination of capitalist relations of production dominating the

reproduction of the mode of production with the limitation of the

separation of the direct producers from the means of production.

This tabsolutel rent thus derives from the comparison of the two .

note of conditions.

The domination of capitalist relations of production derive

from the conditions imposed on the Third World* nations by the

development of a capitalist world market in industrial and

c.^ical tL~xal co^.r.~od_ tics, The conditions of surplus population

created by this structure continually force up the prices of.

arJricultural commodities and ecrually push up the surplus rent we

have discussed, for the more the peasants enter into exchange with

the landlords the more the surplus-labour time conditioned by the

peasant node of organisation of the labour process can be appropriated.

This obstacle to the development of a capitalist labour process is

not in this sense distinct from the conditions under which peasant

agriculture foujht a rearward action in the advanced capitalist

countries,. The distinction lies in the fact that the conditions

of capitalist production on a ,,;orld scale have accelerated the

uneven development between the advanced capitalist nation-states

and the subordinate bourgeois remimes of the Third ilorld. It

is this uneven development which paradoxically counterposes the

organic composition of capital of the advanced capitalist countries

to pre-capitalist labour processes as means of extracting the bounty

of peasant surplus-labour.



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Notes

1. Karl Marx; Capital

,

Vol. III ( Foreign Languages Publishing

Houre: Moscow 1962) P. 634.

2. In this case profits are not equalised, an example of this is

the operation of land grants in 19th centuryAmerica.

3. On this point see V.I Lenin TheAgrarian Programme of Social

Democracy in the First Russian Revolution

1905-1907.Collected Works Vol. 13 and B. Hindess Lenin and theAgrarian

Question in the First Russian Revolution Theoretical Practice

No. 6 May 1972.

4. The price of land will be equal to theAnnual Rent 100 Rate ofInterest

5. Karl Marx: Tneories of Surplus-Value Part Two (Lawrence andWishart: London 1969) P. 332.

6. See on these points the critique of absolute rent presented

byA. Emmanuel in Unequal Exchange (New Left Books London 1972)

Ps218-9.

7. Clearly only those commodities which figure in the reproduction

of labour-power are relevant here, i.e. luxury commodities

are excluded.

8. The clearest examples are France and Japan.

9. It is for this reason that distinctions between skilled and

unskilled labour are necessarily ideological under the

capitalist mode of production.

10. Yields inAmerican agriculture for food grain crops (wheat and

rice) are approximately six times the level attained in India,



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Notes

see R. Revelle Food and Population ScientificAmerican Sept 1974,

the authors estimate of the contribution to yield of differing

elements appears on P. 165 of the article, irrigation gives

the greatest contribution and chemical fertilisers come second.

11. A.V. Chayanov: On the Theory of Peasant Economy (Edited by

D. Thorner, B. Kerblay and R.E.F. Smith, R.D. Irwin Homewood

Illinois 1966)

12. For an attempt to apply Chayanovs theory in a Narodnik fashion

see T. Shanin TheAwkward Class (Oxford University Press, 1972),

13. Chayanov P. 40

14. Ibid P. 235

15. On this point see G. Kay Development and Underdevelopment

(Maemillan London 1975) P. 130.

16. Capital,

Vol. III, P. 783.

Cutler Concept of Ground Rent 1975

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