Curtailing The Code of Silence

among The South African Police

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Ph.D., S.J.D. Michigan State University

Adri Sauerman, M.S.DHC Consult

Talk Overview■ South Africa’s Police, Corruption, and Control■ The Code of Silence■ The Code and Fairness■ Methodology Questionnaire

Respondents■ Results Contours of the Code of Silence The Code and Perceptions of Disciplinary Fairness

■ Conclusion

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South Africa’s Police, Corruption, and Control

■ 16 years of police democratization: SAPS publically perceived as 2nd most corrupt public service

department (2003 & 2007) media reports: the SAPS is fast becoming an “organisation of

criminals” (News24, 2008) historians consider corruption one of the blotches on the South

African image, upstaged only by the escalating crime wave researchers: “When it comes to tackling police corruption and

building integrity, the SAPS has yet to develop a coherent strategy” (Newham, 2004)

■ Possible reasons: amalgamation of different police agencies Sunset clause

-14% had criminal records (140 000)

South Africa’s Police, Corruption, and Control Cont.

■ Responses: Establishment of the Anti-Corruption Unit (1996)

By 2001, ACU: - investigated 20,779 allegations of police corruption - arrested 3,045 SAPS members - led to 576 convictions

In 2001/2002: - investigation of 2,370 cases of corruption

- resulted in 1,332 criminal prosecutions - 641 departmental disciplinary hearings In 2002, inexplicably closed down

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South Africa’s Police, Corruption, and Control Cont.

■ Responses: Post ACU:

- 2003/2004: 347 suspensions - 2007/2008: 192 suspensions

Financial impact: - 2008/2009 budget: civil claims = 20% 2008 - 2010: - Police commissioner charged & found guilty of corruption - National Prosecuting Authority’s investigative unit disbanded mg.co.za

The Code of Silence■ Code of silence: Informal prohibition; part of the occupational culture of policing existence of the code documented in American policing (e.g., Mollen Commission, 1994; Christopher Commission, 1991) and international policing (e.g., Klockars et al., 2004) alike■ Contours of the code vary across: police agencies (e.g., Klockars et al., 2004) units within a police agency (e.g., Mollen Commission, 1994) forms and severity of misconduct (e.g., Stoddard, 1974; Klockars et al., 2004) familiarity of the persons involved time & place (e.g., Knapp Commission, 1972 v. Mollen Commission, 1994)

The Code of Silence Cont.■ The importance of the code: determines the boundaries of informally tolerated behavior affects the socialization of recruits limits police officers’ willingness to report misconduct■ Supervisors and the code: supervisors have a crucial role in curtailing the code of silence among line officers and controlling police misconduct could participate in the code themselves■ The code and the rank: compared to line officers’ code, supervisors’ code seems to be narrower (e.g., Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars, 2000; Kutnjak Ivkovich and Shelley, 2008)

The Code of Silence Cont.■ The code and the SAPS: not studied extensively (e.g., Newham, 2004) ■ Newham’s study (2004): measured the code in one inner-city police station in Johannesburg (N=104 police officers) in 6 out of 11 scenarios describing cases of police misconduct, the majority of officers would adhere to the code the code seems to be the least protective of a bribe from a speeding motorist, bribe from a late bar close, and a crime scene theft in only 1 out of 11 scenarios the respondents indicated that their fellow officers would report; the code covered all other scenarios■ Our study: country-wide exploration of the code and the relation between the code and perceptions of disciplinary fairness

Models of the Code & Fairness■ Theoretical approach by Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars (2000)■ Model 1: simplified deterrence model the more severe discipline, the narrower the code■ Model 2: discipline indifference model no relation between the code and disciplinary fairness■ Model 3: simple justice model the fairer the discipline, the narrower the code

Too harsh

Fair Too Lenient

020406080

100

Simplified deter-renceDiscipline indif-ferentSimple justice

Methodology: The Questionnaire■ Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (1995) develop a way to measure: the contours of the code of silence views about the appropriate and expected discipline■ Questionnaire asks non-threatening questions of fact and opinion 11 hypothetical scenarios

- 10 scenarios with corruption - 1 scenario with excessive force

■ Police officer in the questionnaire: 5 years of experience good work record no discipline

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The Questionnaire Cont.■ Each scenario followed by questions about: misconduct seriousness violation of official rules appropriate discipline expected discipline willingness to report misconduct

■ This paper focuses on the code of silence and the relation between the evaluations of discipline fairness and the code of silence

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Methodology: Respondents■ Data collection: in the summer of 2005, questionnaires administered at the SAPS training centers in 7 provinces all supervisors participating in the training were surveyed & a few declined to participate (response rate 85%+) the corruption-related scandal of Jacob Zuma (deputy president) created the climate of fear data collection ended abruptly with 379 completed questionnaires

Methodology: Respondents Cont.■ Sample characteristics: assignment: - detective/investigative units (37.2%) - special operations (21.9%) - patrol (19.3%) agency size: - mostly working in medium-sized or large police agencies rank: - 21% Sergeants, 25% Inspectors, 48% Captains, & 6% Superintendents length of service: - 2 years of below: 8% - 3 to 10 years: 42% - over 10 years: 50%

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Methodology: Respondents Cont.■ Sample characteristics: positive relation between rank and length of service in prior work, we regressed both rank and length of service on the evaluations of scenario seriousness, violation of official rules, appropriate discipline, and willingness to report length of service is relevant, but rank is not

0

5

10

15

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25

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> 1year

1-2years

3-5years

6-10years

11-15years

16-20years

20+years

Sergeants

Inspectors

Captains

Superint.

Figure 1: Percent of Respondents by Rank and Length of Service

Measuring the Code of Silence

Series10

20

40

60

80

100

Contours of the Code of Silence by Scenario (% not reporting)

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11

Measuring the Code of Silence Cont.

Series10

20

40

60

80

100

Contours of the Code of Silence by Evalua-tions of Scenario Seriousness

(% not reporting)

S1 S4 S2 S8 S10 S6 S7 S9 S11 S5 S3

The Code of Silence and Experience

S1 S4 S8 S2 S10 S6 S11 S9 S7 S3 S50

102030405060708090

100

2 YEARS OR BELOW3-10 YEARSOVER 10 YEARS

% not reporting

Perceptions of Disciplinary Fairness■ Perceptions of appropriate and expected discipline: the respondents had six disciplinary options to choose from: - no discipline - suspension without pay - verbal reprimand - demotion in rank

- written reprimand - dismissal for most scenarios, officers leaned toward no discipline or mild discipline ■ Determining disciplinary fairness: disciplinary fairness= appropriate discipline – expected discipline - if the result = 0, discipline is viewed as “fair” - if the result = -1 to -5, discipline is viewed as “too harsh” - if the result = 1 to 5, discipline is viewed as “too lenient”

Perceptions of Discipline Fairness

Series10

20

40

60

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100

% evaluating discipline as fair

S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11

Perceptions of Disciplinary Fairness Cont.

■ Views on appropriate and expected discipline: in only 3 out of 11 scenarios, the majority of supervisors evaluated discipline as “fair” (Scenarios 4, 5, and 6) thus, there is a substantial minority in 3 scenarios and the majority in 8 scenarios who evaluated discipline severity as unfair

■ Perceptions of unfairness (substantial minority or majority): in many scenarios perceptions of discipline as being both “too harsh” and “too lenient” however, in such cases, “too harsh” is more dominant (higher % of respondents opting for “too harsh” than “too lenient”)

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Perceptions of Disciplinary Fairness and Experience

S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10S110

102030405060708090

100

2 YEARS OR BELOW3-10 YEARSOVER 10 YEARS

% evaluating discipline as fair

The Code and Disciplinary Fairness■ Theoretical approach by Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars (2000)■ Model 1: simplified deterrence model the more severe discipline, the narrower the code■ Model 2: discipline indifference model no relation between the code and disciplinary fairness■ Model 3: simple justice model the fairer the discipline, the narrower the code

Too harsh

Fair Too Lenient

020406080

100

Simplified deter-renceDiscipline indif-ferentSimple justice

The Code and Fairness Cont.Too Harsh v. Fair

Too harsh

Fair Too Lenient

0

20

40

60

80

100

Simplified deterrence

Discipline indifferent

Simple jus-tice Too

harshFair Too

Lenient

0

20

40

60

80

100

Simplified deterrence

Discipline indifferent

Simple jus-tice

■ 4 scenarios (Scenario 3, 5, 6, & 11) ■ 7 scenarios scenarios most likely to be adherence to the code and viewed as rule violating, most perceptions of disciplinary serious, and resulting in fairness not related discipline more serious than written reprimand

The Code and Fairness Cont.Fair v. Too Lenient

Too harsh

Fair Too Lenient

0

20

40

60

80

100

Simplified deterrence

Discipline indifferent

Simple jus-tice Too

harshFair Too

Lenient

0

20

40

60

80

100

Simplified deterrence

Discipline indifferent

Simple jus-tice

■ 1 scenario (Scenario 3) ■ 10 scenarios scenario the most likely to be adherence to the code and viewed as rule violating, most perceptions of disciplinary serious, and resulting in fairness not related harshest discipline

Conclusion■ Contours of the code among the SAPS supervisors: the existence of the strong code of silence the code varies across forms/severity of misconduct code directly related to the perceptions of seriousness

■ The code and the length of service: apartheid hires expressed attitudes associated with a lower adherence to the code, regardless of their rank, whereas the most recently hired supervisors were much more inclined to protect nearly all forms of misconduct Q: To what degree are these experienced supervisors telling the truth? - we tried to maximize this (e.g., anonymous questionnaire, dem. questions limited, ask them whether they lied)

    

Conclusion Cont.■ The code and the length of service: Q: How successful were the reforms and training of new supervisors? - research indicates that they are not as equipped as they should be to handle integrity-related challenges experienced on the job

■ The code and the perceptions of disciplinary fairness: substantial proportion views official discipline as unfair with a few exceptions, no relation between the code and perceptions of disciplinary fairness when fairness matters, it is in the scenarios in which the code of silence is narrower (the most serious scenarios) in other scenarios, the push to adhere to the code might be so strong to overpower perceptions of disciplinary fairness

    

Conclusion Cont.■ In summary: the results of our study show that the code of silence is strong among SAPS supervisors this seriously challenges the notion that the transformation was successful with respect to police tolerance of corruption at best, selective adherence to the code results in sporadic accountability and results in biased enforcement of laws and differential treatment of citizens under such conditions, democratic policing has not been achieved