Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism

CSIS TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM 1

A REPORT OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIESTRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM

April 2006

CURRENTS andCROSSCURRENTSof RADICAL ISLAMISM

2 CURRENTS AND CROSSCURRENTS OF RADICAL ISLAMISM


TABLE of CONTENTS

CURRENTS and CROSSCURRENTS of RADICAL ISLAMISMA REPORT OF THE CSIS TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM April 2006

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES1800 K STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006PH: (202) 887-0200 FAX: (202) 775-3199 WWW.CSIS.ORG

DESIGN: BILLY SOUNTORNSORN

4 INTRODUCTION

6 STILL IN THE DARK: THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGE

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

11 LOCAL GRIEVANCES, GLOBAL JIHAD

14 RECOMMENDATIONS

15 AL QAEDA’S SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFILIATE: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

16 TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET

18 RECOMMENDATIONS

19 LITTLE UNDERSTOOD AND PROFOUNDLY FEARED: SUICIDE BOMBING 21 THE COMING THREAT? THE RETURN OF IRAQ’S JIHADISTS

22 OUT OF THE SHADOWS: THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

25 RECOMMENDATIONS 26 THE EU’S ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR

27 APPENDIX A > DIALOGUE PARTICIPANTS


INTRODUCTION

The second phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Transatlantic Dialogue on Terror took place against a backdrop of rapid change. When the first conference in this series took place in Berlin in the spring of 2005, scholars and practitioners were still absorbing the details of the previous year’s attacks against the Madrid light rail system, the murder of Dutch artist Theo van Gogh and a host of other attacks and foiled plots. Global radicalism continued to be shaped by the deepening insurgency in Iraq, in which radical Islamists from inside and outside that country play a pivotal role. In the months following the Berlin meeting, the bombing of the London Underground, the attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh and Amman, and a stream of revelations about radical Islamist activity from Europe to the Middle East to South Asia and Australia — where a group of conspirators were arrested for plotting an attack against that country’s sole nuclear facility — had also to be taken into account.

Complicating the picture was increasing evidence of the decline of the core al Qaeda group. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other senior leaders were apparently contained in the forbidding border region of Pakistan; other senior leaders were in Iran, where they seemed to be largely, if not completely, restrained. Top operatives were being hunted and captured with considerable efficiency, preventing the organization from reviving its network and carrying out terrorist strikes.The juxtaposition of a weakened al Qaeda and continued terrorist activity — and a seemingly thriving radical milieu — has compelled observers to think hard about the state of terrorism today, which little resembles anything in the past half century of non-state violence.

In the course of Transatlantic Dialogue conferences in Berlin, Washington and The Hague, participants explored conceptions of this new terrorism as being the product not of traditional extremist, hierarchical organizations but rather a burgeoning social movement. Networks have loosened and, in some cases, atomized. But the activism continues, fueled by the spread of jihadist ideology. Increasingly, we see that the key actors are not the established radical organizations, which are under severe pressure from police and intelligence services, but “self-starter” cells, which operate largely without outside direction. The emergence of such small groups from the grass roots forces us to examine more closely the phenomenon of radicalization, the means of transmission of ideas as well as


tactics, and the conditions that may trigger a handful of individuals to commit their lives to a cause with which they have had little previous formal contact.

These issues provided the basis for a set for enormously rich exchanges between distinguished European and American researchers and officials, who were joined by some of world’s foremost experts from such other parts of the world as the Middle East and Australia. Running through the sessions of the last year have been two shared, overarching understandings: First, that the transformation of the terrorist threat from one that emanated from a network of organizations to one that is rooted in a social movement indicates the durability of the phenomenon. If individuals are turning to violence without the familiar blandishments and psychological seduction of traditional terrorist recruitment, then the ideas of the global jihad must have a dangerous resonance in the Muslim world. Second, while important progress has been made in exploring the pathways of radicalism, we are still very much in the early stages of understanding the challenge before us. The field of terrorism studies, which was small and under-developed before September 11, 2001, is expanding rapidly and finding its balance. But the agenda of topics for future examination is lengthening, and the boundaries of the field are nowhere in sight.

The Transatlantic Dialogue owes many debts. In the last year, our principal funding came from the Robert Bosch Foundation and the U.S. National Intelligence Council,

which have supported us generously and shared our belief that the work of the Dialogue is essential both for exploring key areas of the new terrorism and for building bridges between leading researchers and institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. We are grateful as well to our conference partners: the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the German Foreign Ministry, which hosted the Dialogue’s meeting last spring in Berlin, and Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, and TNO, which hosted our December conference in The Hague. Both conferences surpassed our expectations, both in terms of the liveliness of exchange and the fruitfulness of ideas because of these partners’ superb preparation and substantive contributions.

At CSIS, we have also benefited from the strong support of our president and CEO, John Hamre, Executive Vice President Robin Niblett, who, as director of the Europe Program, has been an invaluable help in coordinating and strengthening our transatlantic activities, and Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program Kurt Campbell, within whose ambit this program falls and who has been its most dedicated champion. More members of the CSIS staff have contributed to the Dialogue than could possibly be mentioned, but two whose involvement has been critical are Andrew Tabler, whose research, writing and logistical support have been heroic, and Billy Sountornsorn, who has been designer-in-chief of our publications and a tremendous help in a wide variety of other areas. We greatly appreciate all their assistance.

Daniel BenjaminSenior Fellow

Aidan KirbyResearch Associate

Julianne SmithSenior Fellow


STILL IN THE DARKthe integration challenge

Over the last few decades, immigration has transformed the demographic landscape of Europe. The result has been the creation of parallel societies that, up until recently, did not appear to pose much of a problem for European governments. Clashes between these two societies, however, have grown in the last few years both in frequency and severity, taking many Europeans by surprise. While the arrival of large numbers of Muslims in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to fill the postwar labor shortage was no secret, few Europeans expected the newcomers to stay. As such, governments did little to integrate these individuals, especially as many of the immigrant communities seemed reluctant to embrace European lifestyles and values.

For a time, ignoring the growing cleavages in European societies suited both sides. But as many of the economic opportunities that drew the original generation of immigrants to Europe dwindled, due in part to technological advances, and the disappearance of low-wage jobs, the socio-economic status of most immigrants failed to improve significantly. Today, Muslims in Europe, many of them now citizens, frequently live in ghettos, receive second-rate schooling and suffer much higher un- and under-employment than the general population. Unemployment is 10% higher among British Muslims than the national average and, in the case of the Netherlands, the figure has reached 60%.

The bombings in Madrid and London as well as the murder of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, in the Netherlands raised new questions about the security threats European governments may have inadvertently helped


create in ignoring their alienated and isolated Muslim communities for so long. The attacks, together with the spreading recognition that elements of the immigrant communities had embraced radical sentiments, revealed fundamental questions about issues of coexistence and integration.

European nations have taken different approaches to the challenge of integrating Muslims into their societies for a variety of reasons. First, the Muslim community in Europe is far from monolithic. Germany’s Muslims are predominantly Turkish, France’s Muslims come primarily from North Africa and those in the United Kingdom originated predominately in South Asia. Second, each country’s distinctive history and political culture has shaped its policy choices. France, for example, has long stressed secularism while Britain has favored multiculturalism. Third, legal systems differ as well, determining at least in part how far a government can go in terms of promoting integration and assimilation.

Until recently, conventional wisdom held that Britain’s model of inclusive, pluralistic multiculturalism had been among the most successful: There is a high rate of political participation among British Muslims and, for the most part, patterns of settlement have been more diffuse than in other European nations. But the suicide attacks by four British Muslims last July have generated concerns about the dangers inherent in Britain’s traditionally tolerant approach to radical preaching by local imams and left many wondering about the prospects for multicultural coexistence. Had the focus on tolerance glossed over a number of pressing social problems? Had good intentions produced bad policy?

Similar debates were ignited by the murder of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, in 2004. The Netherlands — home to a sizable Muslim minority for decades — had long been viewed as a bastion of tolerance and a hospitable environment for those of all faiths. Other Europeans countries have looked at the Netherlands as a successful case study. But both incidents — the murder of van Gogh and the London bombings — involved young Muslims who appeared, prior to their descent into violence, to be reasonably well integrated into their societies. In reality, they were quietly becoming radicalized and ultimately embraced violence as a way to act on their grievances.

Most experts agree that integration is a complex political and social issue because it addresses the question of identity. Integration depends on fostering an identity in which one feels a connection to or a stake in the country

of residence. Oftentimes attempts to measure the extent of integration focus on outwardly visible symbols such as style of dress and the consumption of other products of popular culture, which may not accurately reflect identity conceptions at a deeper level. Even community involvement and residential settlement patterns are limited in their value as indices of integration. As a result, the fundamental challenge in seeking to promote integration is that the most important qualities — those that relate to identity — are the hardest to measure.

From a transatlantic perspective, it seems clear that Europe faces the more profound integration challenge. This is true for a number of reasons: First, Europe has a much larger Muslim minority than the United States.1 Second, in contrast to the European experience, Muslim immigrants in the United States have historically been better educated than the norm, and, in fact, Muslims in the United States typically earn more than the average American. Third, there is the issue of political culture and identity formation. The United States, a nation of immigrants, has made it easier for Muslims to forge a hybrid identity (“Muslim-American”), something that is far more challenging for Muslims living on European soil. (This is not to say that the United States does not face its own problems with Muslim discontent, as we shall see below. However, thus far, it is fair to say that the Muslim community has been a bulwark against the spread of radicalism in the United States.)

There is a two-fold problem in dealing with immigration. In pursuing policies aimed at assimilating minorities, governments must deal with both the desire of immigrant communities to retain their culture and traditional practices, and the level of receptivity on the part of the native culture, which may see elements of the newcomers’ culture as antithetical to Western values — gender

“The real issue is not structural assimilation — we’re interested in identity assimilation: do immigrants identify with the country of residence as being their own?”

— Robert LeikenDirector, Immigration & National SecurityProgram, The Nixon Center


issues are a good example. As Robert Leiken discussed during his participation in the Transatlantic Dialogue: an immigrant community that is very retentive and a local culture that is less than receptive make successful integration difficult. But even if desire for integration is strong on one side, progress can be painful. Based on his research on immigration patterns, Leiken has found that alienation can be most acute when individuals are ready and willing to adopt a new identity, but they continue to be regarded as immigrants. Some analysts regard American culture, with its privileged place for religion — the Christian roots notwithstanding — as inherently more compatible with the orientation of most Muslim

immigrants than more secular European societies.

The generational dimension of integration presents an interesting question in the context of radicalization. Undoubtedly, the sense of limitations on educational and economic opportunity that European Muslims possess — witness the French riots of 2005 — are a central cause of alienation and, by extension, contribute to radicalization. Both European and American experts also seem to agree that the failure of many younger, European-born Muslims to integrate more fully than their parents results from their sense of freedom to explore their religious identities. In a period in which young Germans, Britons, Italians and Spaniards are “identity-shopping” as never before, considering themselves at times to be more European than anything else, young Muslims are doing the same. Instead of turning either to a European identity with which they feel little affinity, they often gravitate towards a more religion-based identity. This stands in contrast to their immigrant parents or grandparents, who typically focused on seeking economic security and fundamental acceptance and downplayed their religious and cultural affiliations.

Although the United States has since 9/11 been spared further violence, and the Muslim community has generally decried terrorism, the assumption that the U.S. Muslim community is untroubled and satisfied with its hybrid identity is not held by all. In her research about the American-Muslim community, Geneive Abdo has described a climate of suspicion that has affected how some Muslims’ view their identity. She observes a trend towards the pursuit of a more pronounced Islamic identity, though this alone does not imply a growing radicalism. This trend has manifested itself in many forms; employees requesting accommodation for prayer time, more girls wearing head-scarves and students lobbying for mosques on university campuses.

One of the challenges in assessing the success of integration of American Muslims is the diversity of the community. There is a much greater ethnic heterogeneity among American Muslims than is found in the communities of individual Europe states. However, according to journalist Paul Barrett, who has also done extensive research into the Muslim communities in the United States, a handful of consistent themes seem to animate many of the debates. First and foremost, there is concern over American policy towards Israel, especially in the context of American policy toward the rest of the Middle East. There is a sense that Israel and Jewish interests play an outsize role in shaping


American foreign policy. And there is an acute sense of victimization based not so much on direct experience but the plight of Muslims elsewhere in the world.2

Just as overly optimistic assumptions about the American Muslim community need to be guarded against, so too is it a mistake to conclude that Europeans are doing nothing to better integrate their Muslim minorities. It is clear that this problem has rapidly become a higher priority — albeit often a political difficulty — for European governments. More European media outlets are addressing the issue and a growing number of politicians are willing to openly discuss the integration challenge. While turning well-intentioned rhetoric into practice is not easy, a number of initiatives have been launched in recent years, including some that promote the local training of imams, which is designed to better attune the religious leadership to local concerns instead of distant grievances. According to Dialogue participant Jytte Klausen of Brandeis University, who conducted extensive interviews with Muslim elites across Europe, the issue of the imams is a high priority. Many fear their children being exposed to radical sentiments, and it is clear that imams play a key role in determining what Islam is and what values should be promoted in a European context. Other initiatives include the promotion of Muslim Councils that aim to give Muslims a stronger voice in dealing with the state, fighting discrimination, creating educational programs that teach the basics of Islam in public schools and, more broadly, seeking educational and economic opportunity. Non-governmental organizations have also been very active in the integration arena.3

France’s approach towards the integration challenge — what has been called an “aggressive secularism” — has probably received the most attention to date. The decision of December 2003 to ban overt religious symbols from the classroom was controversial, and many believed it would invite a backlash. Although the protests petered out, the riots of last October and November (although not explicitly inspired by religious

grievances) confirm that France, like all of the countries in Europe, continues to face a profound challenge in the effort to better integrate its growing Muslim minority.

Although there are significant differences between the situations in Europe and the United States with respect to integration policies, the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism has highlighted both the need to continue examining this issue as partners and the value of sustained exchange. To date, the United States has not faced the clash of cultures seen in Europe in recent months, but as immigration patterns shift and political contexts change, it is not unreasonable to assume that American policymakers may be faced with similar issues in the years to come.

“After 9/11, Muslims began creating their own subculture in America as a response to the increase in hostility toward them. This ef for t is taking many forms, including the increase in mosques, Islamic schools, and social, political and religious organizations. The result will be a well-defined Muslim-American identity. It is an open question whether this will lead to more or less integration of Muslims in American society.”

— Geneive Abdo, Liaison for the Alliance of Civilizations at the United Nations, author of forthcoming, “Mecca and Main Street:Muslim Life in America after 9/11.”

1 Estimates of the Muslim of the Population in France: 5-6 million (8-9% of the total population), Netherlands: 945,000 (5.6%), United Kingdom: 1.6 million (2.8%) and Ger-many 3 million (3.6 %). The estimated population of the Muslim community in the Unites States is somewhere between 5 and 7 million (or between 1.7 and 2.4%).2 Paul M. Barrett, who is writing a book on American Islam that will be published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux in January 2007, discussed these themes at the meeting of the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism in Washington, September 23, 2005.3 Some of the more innovative initiatives have been carried out by non-governmental institutions. During a visit to The Hague in late 2005, the Transatlantic Dialogue on Ter-rorism participants visited SPIOR, an organization based in Rotterdam that promotes the integration of Muslims into Dutch society and combats radicalism. SPIOR, founded in 1988, has developed a wide variety of programs to undertake its mission including: integration courses, the translation of religious services into the Dutch language, education for parents about forced marriage, homework support and educational guidance, various programs to encourage youth community involvement and education about religious and ethnic discrimination in employment.


I Political elites, particularly those in Western European countries, should actively promote national dialogues on integration issues.

At a time when European citizens are increasingly worried about rising unemployment, shrinking demographics, national identity, and crime — which is often associated with Muslims — political leaders have been hesitant to promote multiculturalism, costly integration policies and interfaith dialogues. But recent attacks and outbreaks of violence across the European continent have shown the consequences of continuing to ignore integration issues. Public opinion surveys — both in Europe and the United States — suggest growing alienation and fear among Muslims, as well as strong anti-Muslim sentiment in the non-Muslim communities. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must engage their publics in a constructive discussion aimed at breaking down stereotypes, promoting coexistence and identifying new ways to improve the socio-economic opportunities for Muslims. Much more debate is also needed on the delicate balance between respecting cultural traditions and preserving the basic values of western society.

II European nations should establish a forum for sharing best practices with one another.

In addition to opening up the channels of communication between Americans and Europeans, the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism has enabled a considerable amount of intra-European exchange on a wide variety of terrorism-related issues. It has become clear that few opportunities exist for European practitioners and policymakers to compare notes with one another. While the integration challenges that each individual country faces differ, greater exchange on such questions as the best way to provide multicultural training for police officers, broaden youth participation in integration initiatives or identify bilingual teachers for educational programs would be valuable for any European country. European governments, either through the European Union or a more informal forum, should create opportunities for integration experts to share best practices and learn from one another’s successes and failures.

III Governments should actively support community-based non-governmental organizations that have demonstrated success in promoting integration.

Throughout Europe, non-governmental organizations are tackling the integration challenge, some of which have been working on promoting integration and cross-cultural exchange for many years. As national governments strive to create new integration initiatives, they should consult with and support existing NGOs that have already established their effectiveness. Such organizations often employ local community leaders, and as a result, usually have a more nuanced understanding of the community’s needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS


LOCAL GRIEVANCESglobal Jihad

A central and recurrent theme of the Transatlantic Dialogue has been the relationship between the local and the global. Before Osama bin Laden’s appearance as a global figure, Islamist violence was characterized overwhelmingly by a focus on local grievances and local responses. The radicals of the Egyptian al-Jihad group, which assassinated Anwar Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood activists of Syria, who were crushed by the Assad regime in the early 1980s, the Algerian extremists who carried out the atrocities in that nation’s civil war in the 1990s — all these and many other groups directed their opposition against the “near enemy,” as the theorists of al-Jihad termed the secularist autocracies of the Muslim world.

Bin Laden’s strategic revolution was to turn radicals away from the local struggles, in which the mukhabarat (domestic security service) of these countries routinely out-numbered these extremists. The Saudi’s notion of turning against the “far enemy” — principally the United States but also its allies in Western Europe and Israel — and employing catastrophic violence, changed all that. The stunning events of September 11, 2001 to a significant degree recast the Islamist challenge along the lines of bin Laden’s vision of a global conflict between Islam and the West.

Bin Laden’s strategic revolution forces scholars to assess some key questions today: To what extent has al Qaeda’s reorientation been reflected in the thinking of ordinary Muslims around the world? How can we describe the matrix of global and local motivations among those who have turned to violence or support those who commit terrorist acts? Almost four years after 9/11, the crosscurrents between local and global grievances and local and global activism have still only been sketched out in a preliminary fashion. Hard data remains scarce and confusing, if not downright opaque.

At the broadest level, many researchers are cautious

about the degree of mobilization in Muslim communities that has been achieved by emphasizing the global grievances. Alison Pargeter of Kings College has found in her extensive research on North African diasporic communities in Europe that there is still a considerable emphasis on national concerns. Specifically, in Pargeter’s view, radicals’ “primary motivation seems to be rooted in discontent or anger with the situation in their countries of origin” and the focus on these national discontents is probably even stronger among more moderate immigrants….It is questionable whether these North Africans aspire to the same political goals of bin Laden. Rather, these extremists tend to have more specific national concerns; national, and to a lesser extent, regional issues drive them. North African extremists in Europe may make common cause with al Qaeda, but they don’t necessarily have the same vision or goals. There are many political grievances shared between moderates and radicals.” She adds that: “Although some motivations transcend national priorities, they do not all appear to be part of the ‘new transnational movement.’” To be sure, many share the canonical view of radical Islamists that much of the blame for dismal conditions in home countries lies with Western nations that are seen to be propping up repressive Maghreb regimes. But for many, that has not yet translated into a belief in an all-consuming and necessarily violent struggle between the West and the Muslim world.

Among individuals who actually do commit violence or seek to do so, there appears to be a greater sense of the inseparability of global and local grievances. Many Dialogue participants have echoed the generalization of former German Chancellory counterterrorism official Guido Steinberg’s assessment that “Local motivations are key in what we call the global terrorist threat, but these local factors have diminished in recent years and are being replaced by international inspirations, by the international jihad.” As one European participant put it, “recruitment takes place at a local level, but the


motivations that guide the group can be both local, such as unemployment, discrimination, etc., and global, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo.” In Steinberg’s formulation, the intermingling of local and global was reflected in “the cell from 9/11, for example, which was actually a combination of the Hamburg cell — educated, sophisticated individuals — and Saudi muscle (tribal, disenfranchised individuals).” As a functional matter, moreover, this mixture is essential because “members of the Diaspora are key to the success of terrorist operations, their education is necessary

for the preparation and organization of attacks.”

An oft-cited example of how local and global grievances merge, the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, the young Dutch Muslim who murdered Theo van Gogh is frequently cited. In the manifesto-cum-poem that Bouyeri pinned to the chest of his victim, outrage was expressed at the United States, for the invasion of Iraq, and Israel for the plight of the Palestinians, and, interestingly, comparable animus was directed against the Dutch state for considering a proposal to screen Muslim applicants for public sector jobs for radical leanings.

It is noteworthy that those who have been drawn to Islamist violence in recent years tend to be younger than their predecessors, particularly among pre-9/11 al Qaeda activists and those from related groups. The increased importance of the global jihad for these younger activists may partially be explained by the growing importance of the Internet, which has become a key vector of transmission for fundamentalist Islam, and, in particular, salafi thinking. With its strong emphasis on Muslim universalism and the existence of the “new Umma” that scholars such as Olivier Roy have described, salafism inculcates a sense of solidarity among geographically disparate believers. The American scholar Marc Sageman summed up this chain of developments by observing:

In the Berlin district of Neukölln, the number of Internet cafes in the neighborhood is amazing, one on every block. But the mosques are not as visible. Most people read just the headlines on the Internet, but few articles at length. Reading just the headlines necessarily leads to a superficial, “sound byte” view of the world. The risk is the same for understanding Islam and Muslim politics, leading to a “sound byte” version of Islam. The Internet has now become the ideological battlefield of radical Islam. Different people from different countries will project their social views and backgrounds in their interpretation of events and news. This type of view, available all over the Internet, distorts one’s view of the world and can lead to extremist opinions.

French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar took this analysis a step further with his analysis of the emotional makeup of suicide bombers with his description of the radical’s “humiliation by proxy” and sense of a “globalized, imagined humiliation.” These feelings are powerfully informed by a psychological immersion in such distant arenas as Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir. The belief in a “total denial of dignity and


recognition” culminates in a determination to “impose oneself on the West” through an act of terror.

Interest in the connections between the global and local jihads has not been confined in the Transatlantic Dialogue to the motivations of Muslim immigrants in the West. In a series of sessions spread out over several conferences, the question of how the global jihad has affected conflicts such as those in the Caucasus, Kashmir, Afghanistan and various parts of Southeast Asia — and vice versa — has been examined (see page 15). Mark Kramer of Harvard described in depth how the instability that began in Chechnya and is spreading through much of the region has been exacerbated by the increasingly religious nature of a conflict that was principally ethno-nationalist in its origins. So much is evident not only in the rhetoric of Muslim combatants but also in tactics. Thus, Kramer noted a staggering rise in the number of suicide attacks carried out by militants, something absent from the first phase of the conflict in the mid-1990s, and a growing inclination to attempt “spectaculars” that kill large numbers of innocents – the examples of the Moscow theater attack and the Beslan school disaster are cases in point. Although the actual number of fighters from outside the region remains relatively small — as does the overall number of militants — their influence has been sizable in an area that has been subject to unimaginable destruction and trauma. Another example of the nexus between local and global is the evidence that Chechen fighters have turned up in the Pakistani tribal regions. Chechens were present in fairly small numbers among the foreign fighters in Afghanistan before 2001. But the possibility that more will migrate out of the Caucasus to participate in the global jihad remains an ominous possibility.

In Pakistan, it was observed by a number of participants, jihadists have increasingly sought to achieve greater mobilization through frequent reference to events outside of South Asia — the American invasion and occupation of Iraq above all. In this sense, the global jihad has become a more important part of Pakistani Islamist discourse. And while reports of the actual participation of Pakistani radicals in fighting in Iraq remain at best apocryphal, Pakistan continues to play a role as a source of training and indoctrination for radicals from outside the country. (An example of this is the case of Willy Brigitte, who was born in Guadeloupe, converted to Islam in France, trained in a Pakistani terrorist camp and apprehended in Australia, where he was preparing an attack.) This point was underscored by one expert, who emphasized that the nature of Pakistani radicalism has been more conditioned by

unacknowledged state support, particularly from the nation’s military intelligence agency, ISI, than is the case anywhere else. The provision of funding and other resources to organizations such as Lashkar-e-Tayba ensures both the continued existence of such groups and their availability to the state as proxies for combat in Kashmir and Afghanistan, though they also provide some restraint. In addition to these semi-official groups, others that view most of the historic jihadist groups as insufficiently ardent have appeared, including some that have targeted U.S. and other Western facilities.


I Strengthen diplomatic efforts to resolve local conflicts.

As with so many other areas, globalization — especially in communications — is changing individual sensibilities in ways that policymakers will find extraordinarily difficult to influence. The way in which Muslims in the Western diaspora identify their own sense of alienation from their environment with perceived injustices done to other Muslims thousands of miles away is a case in point.

Nonetheless, more concerted diplomatic efforts to resolve some of the conflicts that feed this sense of universal grievance could help reduce the sense that the West conducting a war against Islam. These conflicts — in Israel’s Occupied Territories, the Caucasus, Kashmir and the southern Philippines, are old and intractable. Some — like Chechnya — pose a further difficulty insofar as they take place within a single sovereign country, and therefore new outside initiatives will face concerns about meddling in internal affairs. Still, the case needs to be made that in the era of globalization, local conflicts can have global consequences, and therefore the West has a stronger interest than ever in achieving peaceful resolutions. Progress in this area would undoubtedly help ameliorate the sense of embattlement that some individual Muslims feel, and therefore reduce the likelihood that they would turn to violence. It would also help eliminate training grounds that are helping to provide tomorrow’s soldiers in the global jihad.

II Advance a democratization and reform agenda in the Muslim world.

Democratization and reform will not end terrorism any time soon, and pressing these goals is a perilous activity that could bring to power hostile groups. Nonetheless, over the long term, pursuing these goals will be essential. How strong democracies serve to contain and diminish dissent is a subject for others. But it should not be forgotten that a central tenet of the jihadist argument is that the West uses the autocracies of the Muslim — and especially Arab — world to undermine and destroy Islam.

As we have seen above, many who are not jihadists today have similar feelings and resent the West for its support of these governments. Pushing for reform and democratization in a careful, measured way — one that does not mistake elections alone for democracy — will help over the long term to erode those sentiments and reduce the terrorist threat.

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AL QAEDA’S SOUTHEASTASIAN AFFILIATE:

Jemaah IslamiyahIn Southeastern Asia, we are confronted with a patchwork of conflicts in which local and global concerns are inextricably bound. The best known of the regional groups, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), is a group that grew out of longstanding local grievances, had close ties with al Qaeda long before 9/11. The leadership and senior members of JI trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. (JI has also been strongly influenced by members who studied in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.) Veterans of the Afghan jihad then went on to groom a new generation of mujihideen when they set up their first camp in Mindanao in 1996. The group, which is most famous for the Bali bombings of 2002, signed on so wholeheartedly with bin Laden’s global agenda that it has, in the view of participating experts, undermined its viability and elicited a crackdown from which it has not recovered. Over 300 of the organization’s leadership were arrested and a looser more autonomous structure was left as a result. But, despite significant advances by law enforcement and intelligence, JI has staged a number of major attacks since the Bali bombing including at the Marriott in Jakarta in August 2003 and the Australian Embassy in Indonesia in September 2004. It is worth noting that the ties that bind the JI network are varied, and this helps to reinforce its strength. Beyond the ideological affinity, JI is united by an intricate web of inter-marriage and reinforced by extensive financial networks. JI’s ranks are supplemented with recruits from a number of pesantren (Muslim boarding schools).

JI apparently continues to benefit from ties to the Moro Islamic Liberation Force, which has — despite efforts to distance itself rhetorically from JI — allowed the primarily Indonesian group to train on Mindanao, its major redoubt. The connection hints at a growing tie between the traditionally focused MILF and the global jihad. Similarly, in southern Thailand, tensions between minority Muslims and non-Muslims and the authorities on the other side, have been taking on an increasingly jihadist hue. Although this classic conflict over inequitable distribution of resources and discrimination is locally rooted, there has been a growing adoption by some local activists of global Islamist rhetoric. An increasing number of reports of opportunistic involvement by radicals associated with JI and even al Qaeda suggest that if poorly managed, Southern Thailand could become a “field of jihad” that the global movement could effectively exploit.


TERRORIST USEof the internet

The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism devoted multiple sessions to the issue of terrorist exploitation of the Internet because of the central role that this tool plays in terrorism related activity. Although there are a limited number of experts working on this issue, we were fortunate to secure the participation of those at the cutting edge of research in this area, and their multimedia presentations and insights had a powerful impact on other Dialogue participants who do not work directly on Internet-related research. A number of different trends have characterized the presence of terrorist networks on the Internet in recent years. Perhaps the most dramatic has been the sheer proliferation of terrorist-related websites. All major terrorist organizations, including both religious and nationalist movements, are now represented on the Internet, the largest complement of these belonging to al Qaeda. After losing its sanctuary in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has utilized the World Wide Web so extensively that analysts describe the phenomenon as a migration from physical space to cyberspace.

Experts have observed the further trend of “segmentation” — the movement away from indiscriminate broadcasting to the focus on specific audiences. Many terrorist websites are now crafted carefully to target a particular demographic. For example, Hamas and Hezbollah have created numerous websites designed specifically to attract children. Homepages are adorned with cartoons and children’s stories, but by following the links provided, the visitor is ultimately led to graphic pictures of maimed bodies and glorified images of suicide bombers. As Gabriel Weimann pointed out, executions carried out by radicals, especially in Iraq, have routinely been posted online and “only days after the posting of one such video, a video of Arab children imitating the execution appeared online.” The precise posing of the children to match the actual execution was nothing less than astonishing.

Internet use by terrorists has become much more wide-ranging as more sophisticated technology has become available. Where they once accessed the Internet for purposes of communication or financial transactions, international networks now conduct every aspect of the global online jihad, including presenting


targeting guidance, propaganda, psychological warfare, recruitment, networking, fundraising, data-mining and intelligence collection, the distribution of instruction manuals and even highly sophisticated Web-based training in bomb-building techniques. Chat rooms allow individuals around the globe to converse, air grievances and transmit radical ideologies. As one participant pointed out, Internet exchanges allow for the development of a surprising degree of intimacy. In addition, some online ‘gatherings’ serve as virtual mosques, which are led by a new breed of self-appointed imams, who are often self-educated and dismissive of mainstream Muslim tradition. The various tools of Internet communication allow extremists to circulate their ideology instantly and widely, reaching an exponentially growing audience with the click of a button. And, as noted above, the Internet has had a profound effect in creating a new sensibility that fuses local and global grievances — the plight of the Chechnyans, for example, with the indignity of unemployment in the Parisian suburbs – thus heightening the possibility of radicalization.

One of the most remarkable uses to which the Internet has been put in this regard has been in Iraq, where it has become an essential ideological and operational tool for the insurgency. Militants have carried out a sophisticated media strategy through the use of video cameras, laptops and other wireless technologies. As one expert pointed out in the course of presenting footage from Iraq in a Dialogue session, it is routine now for an insurgent attack to include not only forces to carry out an ambush after, say, a roadside bombing but also to deploy multiple cameramen to record the event. Consequently, there is a vast amount of graphic material available online that documents the daily horrors of Iraq. For those who cannot travel to participate in the actual ‘jihad’ taking place there, a virtual experience is readily available. Videos of humvees exploding and gruesome executions are paired with carefully selected music and captions to create a heroic drama for viewers. These materials ensure that the radicalizing impact of the war in Iraq will reach far beyond its borders.

The spread of jihadist material on the Web begs the question of whether the fight against terror needs to be taken into cyberspace, but formulating an approach has been a daunting task. Within the scholarly and the intelligence communities, there is considerable debate about the policy goals for dealing with the exploitation of the Internet by terror groups. Efforts to simply shut down terrorist-

related websites have proven difficult, labor intensive and frustrating. Typically, once sites are removed, they reappear elsewhere, sometimes within hours.

Some analysts, such as Dialogue participant Aimee Ibrahim David, believe that greater benefits can be derived from vigilant monitoring of radical sites, rather than attempting to remove them, because of the vast amount of information that can be extracted.

“In 1998 there were 12 known terrorist websites, today there are more than 4,800 terrorist websites or sitessuppor ting terrorists.”

— Gabriel WeimannProfessor, Haifa University


Those who have the necessary language skills and technological expertise can track important advances in terrorist tradecraft and changes in strategy. For example the patterns of development and innovation in the construction of Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq have been discerned from the sites that post online training videos. At the tactical level, sometimes key evidence becomes available as in the case where a perfect fingerprint was captured on the lens of the camera being used to film an attack. Whatever area of specialization Internet counterterrorism analysts are involved in, however, a high degree of training is required. As Gabriel Weimann, points out, “It is not enough to just know Arabic and it’s not just Arabic speakers we need. The numerous dialects of Arabic are an issue, and even then it’s not enough to just know the dialects. We also need to know and understand the culture. We need to understand the people and their

practices and their traditions.”

“The most ef fective method of determining terrorist targeting

strategies and evolving tactics is to read their materials. In fact, terrorist

online communications often reveal operational means and methods that can assist us in our counter terrorist ef for ts, such as the steps they take to

conceal their identities online, the techniques by which they transfer

funds, the methods they use to obtain raw materials to build improvised

devices, and even safe routes across international borders.”

— Aimee Ibrahim David, Principal, DFI Government Services

I Training for monitoring and extracting information must become a priority.

Given the degree to which radical Islamists depend on the web, Western governments must find ways to cultivate the specific technological and linguistic expertise to better penetrate these valuable intelligence sources. Training new experts in this field is not easy. It can take years even for native speakers to acquire the necessary online fluency to understand and interpret chat room vernacular. Experts also need an unusually high degree of technical know-how in order to find information that is hidden in concealed, fragmented, and encrypted files. Therefore, training programs should be viewed as a long-term investment. In addition, every effort needs to be made to advance development of electronic translation tools.

II Europe and the United States should foster greater exchange in this area.

Very few forums exist where European and American can exchange information on the role of the Internet in combating terrorism. Greater efforts should be made to share information across the Atlantic on this complex challenge.

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L ITTLE UNDERSTOODAND PROFOUNDLY FEARED

suicide bombing

Few aspects of the new terror have had the unnerving effect on observers, whether ordinary citizens or high government officials, of suicide bombings. The spectacle of an individual turning himself into a weapon without regard for the preservation of his own life suggests a level of commitment — and an undeterrability — that is hard for most Westerners to comprehend.

The tactic of suicide bombing, of course, predates the attacks of September 11. It has been used to considerable effect by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, Hezbollah and various Palestinian groups. But since the coordinated suicides of the 19 hijackers, the tactic has taken on an iconic quality and immediacy for Americans — shared by Europeans after the Madrid and London bombings — that it did not have before. The urgency of the issue of suicide bombings has been heightened by the spectacular rise in recent years of the incidence of such attacks due to the spread of jihadist terror, above all in Iraq.

Much time has been devoted to the subject of suicide bombing in various sessions of the Transatlantic Dialogue. It has become clear in the course of these exchanges that every effort at creating a profile of the suicide operative has failed. Analyses that try to explain the phenomenon on the basis of such factors as gender, marital status, age, economic background and social status have proved incorrect. Many factors may play a role, but there is no single type of the suicide bomber. This finding makes efforts by law enforcement and intelligence to prevent such attacks forbiddingly difficult.More fruitful, however, has been the work on group dynamics pioneered by Dialogue participants Marc Sageman, who has focused on radical Islamists, and Ami Pedahzur, whose research has dealt primarily with Palestinian terrorists. In their presentations, they have demonstrated the importance of ties of


kinship and friendship, and thus underscored the value of network analysis in this area both for scholars and, ultimately, for counterterrorism efforts.

Pedahzur has discussed how the valorization of martyrdom has led to the emergence of “cultures of death,” and, within these communities, “hubs” emerge which drive terrorist — and especially suicidal — activity. (For instance, motivated by the death of a teammate, a soccer team in a Palestinian neighborhood was recruited, trained and assisted by their coach to commit seven suicide bombings.) Sageman, moreover, has addressed at length how members of a particular circle of radicals motivate themselves to perform acts that might

otherwise be inconceivable if contemplated without any peer intervention. The admixture of in-group love and out-group hate has a powerful explanatory value.

The inner life of suicide operatives has also been illuminated in the Dialogue from another perspective by Farhad Khosrokhavar, who has discussed how a profound perception of personal humiliation can drive an individual to see his only chance for self–realization is through death. Here, the sense of the personal and the communal — the feeling that the entire community of Islam is under attack — combine and prompt the individual to carry out an act that is felt to have a transcendent, global impact.

The rate of suicide bombings shows little sign of slowing down

1982 1984 1985 1988 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003

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40

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Source: Ami Pedahzur University of Haifa


THE COMING THREAT? the return of Iraq’s Jihadists

Amidst discussions about Iraq and how the war there has affected the global jihadist movement, the future of insurgents causes considerable anxiety. Intelligence services throughout the West have already devoted significant resources to the question of how to cope with those foreign fighters who survive combat in Iraq and return to their native countries afterward. Although the presence in Iraq of foreign fighters is well known, hard data on the number of foreigners remains elusive. The largest group of these militants comes from Saudi Arabia, with other significant cohorts coming from Muslim countries. Western government officials believe that the actual numbers of jihadists of European origin present are small, but there are no reliable statistics, and, in any case, a terrorist threat can be increased dramatically when only a few more capable operatives are added to a cell or organization. Instructions for those interested in waging jihad in Iraq are easily available on the Internet. Online magazines and bulletin boards post everything from optimal travel routes to tips on ways to dress inconspicuously and spend money discreetly. Although some European Muslims involved in the Iraqi insurgency are likely motivated by the prospect of martyrdom, it is reasonable to assume that some will survive the war and seek new opportunities elsewhere. A worst case scenario envisions an individual who travels to Iraq to take part in the jihad, absorbs the ideological zeal and the instruction in operations and returns to European states with a network of contacts, positioned to assume a leadership role. The circumstances under which the “returnees” arrive home will undoubtedly also make a significant difference: If the coalition forces are seen as having been defeated by the insurgency, the returnees will be imbued with a dangerous triumphalism and grand ambitions – much as the founding generation of al Qaeda emerged after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

A series of arrests over the last year suggests that even before hostilities in Iraq diminish, the heat of the events there may be felt far afield. In Spain, more than a dozen radicals said to be affiliated with insurgent leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi have been apprehended, and in Germany, there have been number of arrests of members of Zarqawi’s Ansar al-Islam network.

This issue is likely to remain a key concern for European security officials for a long time to come, but it is also a looming problem for the United States. In a real sense, much of Europe is within America’s security perimeter. Visa waiver programs and other measures designed to enhance the ease of travel between Europe and the United States clearly make this threat a transatlantic challenge.


OUT OF THE SHADOWSthe transatlantic relationship and the fight against terrorism

Three years ago, differences over the central characteristics of catastrophic terrorism were casting a dark shadow over the transatlantic relationship. Europeans questioned Iraq’s relevance to the broader fight against terrorism, accused the United States of unilateral action and called for a greater transatlantic focus on root causes and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In return, Americans pointed their collective finger at Europeans for inaction and underestimating the risk that terrorism poses to Western society. Americans also cautioned their European friends against blind allegiance to multilateralism in the face of pressing security challenges. Today, debates over leadership, mission and tactics in the fight against terrorism still hamper the transatlantic relationship, but the evidence indicates that some gaps are narrowing.

The frank and open exchanges during the Transatlantic Dialogue have made it clear that many Europeans and Americans in the respective policy communities see the threat of terrorism in much the same way. Both sides of the Atlantic agree that combating terrorism is one of the biggest – if not the biggest – foreign policy challenges of our time. As Dr. Klaus Scharioth, then State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry and now German Ambassador to the United States, said in opening of the Berlin session of the Transatlantic Dialogue, “The target is not the U.S., it is not Spain — it is the open society we jointly stand for. It is human rights, respect for life, religious and cultural tolerance, the equality of all human beings, of men and women, the rule of law and democracy.” Europe and the United States also generally share the same goals vis-à-vis the threat: pursue terrorists and prevent attacks in the short term and address the factors that contribute to terrorism in the long term.

“Terrorism is a common and urgent threat for both Europe and America.

We are in it together. It will be a long and painful struggle for all of us.

All the more reason to work closely together.”

— Gijs de VriesEU Counterterrorism Coordinator


To be sure, differences still exist on the best means to combat terrorism. Many European participants in the Dialogue place a heavy emphasis on prevention, diplomacy and other non-military instruments while urging their American counterparts to use force as a last resort. But even in this well-trodden area of disagreement, there is an increasing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that fighting terrorism requires a full range of tools and wise choices on which to base their use. If Iraq has provided a painful lesson in the limitations of military power, the attacks in Madrid and London brought with them a unwelcome wake-up call alerting Europeans to the need for tighter surveillance, stronger counterterrorism legislation and greater focus on the continent’s alienated Muslim minorities.

Equally potent now is the recognition that the transatlantic partners cannot afford to allow their disagreements to derail their cooperation. As the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries put it, “Both sides have learned that it pays to work directly together.” The two sides may not concur on all aspects of strategy. But with enormous and enduring challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, a continuing wave of terrorist attacks around the world, and growing anti-Western sentiment in much of the Muslim world, Europe and the United States have a more pragmatic, results-oriented relationship than was possible just three years ago.

Several examples, including NATO’s new role in Afghanistan, deepened law enforcement cooperation, EU-U.S. joint efforts on container security and extradition, demonstrate just how much has been achieved. Much of this transatlantic counterterrorism relationship remains out of public view. Few French or American citizens know, for example, that in Djibouti, U.S., French, and British troops are working together to disrupt terrorist activity and promote regional stability. Even fewer know anything about the multinational maritime task force positioned off Somalia’s coast to thwart terrorist activity or the joint U.S.-French counterterrorism intelligence analysis center, Alliance Base, based in France.

Cooperation has been deepest where there are well-functioning institutions through which to structure responses and in which there has been sustained high-level political buy-in and significant resources devoted to common initiatives. Some Dialogue participants also stress the importance of keeping transatlantic cooperation “below the radar,” outside intense media and public scrutiny. In a period of highly charged public opinion, the best results are attained when there is a

“In order to reverse this trend, the transatlantic community needs to focus on its relations with the Muslim world. What is needed is a “Partnership for Progress and Reform,” a par tnership that seeks to intensify cooperation and dialogue with the countries of the region in the economic, social, political and cultural fields with the aim to help these countries reform and modernize and to promote the ideals of political pluralism and democracy.”

— Dr. Georg WitschelCommissioner, International Cooperation Against Terrorism, German Foreign Ministry


shared sense that too much is at stake for bombast or an insistence on marginal tactical differences.

There are a number of reasons, though, why cooperation sometimes fails. Transatlantic cooperation has faltered when Europeans have felt they are being handed diktat instead of being genuinely consulted. Style, European Dialogue participants tell their American partners, matters. In addition, because the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular with ordinary Europeans, any perceived link with the U.S. agenda in Iraq can make joint undertaking difficult or impossible. For example, U.S. calls for deeper transatlantic cooperation in the area of democratization have been interpreted by Europeans as a cloaked U.S. effort to gain more support for missions like Iraq.

Undoubtedly, the greatest damage has been caused by recriminations over cases of torture and abuse as U.S. facilities and the continued existence of the Guantanamo detention camp, which Europeans, along with many Americans, perceive as inconsistent with the rule of law. Press revelations about secret U.S. prisons in Europe and subsequent investigations by national and European institutions have also cast a pall over relations. While transatlantic intelligence remains robust and the unsung success story of the period since September 11, European political leaders are coming under increasing pressure to distance themselves from the United States. Over time, this poses a considerable threat to joint intelligence activity.

“Terrorists are not subject to the bureaucratic liabilities that we are;

they exploit all of our freedoms to destroy them and then want them all back once they are caught. There are no easy answers on how to treat these

individuals.”

— Professor Bowman H. MillerJoint Military Intelligence College


I Europe and the United States should hold a transatlantic strategic dialogue on counterterrorism.

The transatlantic partners currently lack a forum to conduct a comprehensive and strategic dialogue on terrorism. The EU-U.S. Summits have tried to serve in this capacity but these half-day gatherings, which are usually pre-scripted, light on content and emphasize economic issues. NATO has been prohibited from conducting such a dialogue because some members oppose turning the defensive alliance into a political debating society. Some have suggested that the EU and NATO jointly host such a dialogue, but their relationship has traditionally been limited to discussions of the Balkans and military capabilities, with some modest exchanges on Darfur and energy issues. This begs the question: Do the transatlantic partners have the institutions they need to discuss their differences on threat perceptions, international law, democracy promotion and the use of force? Where can they discuss the role of the Internet, how to counter terrorists’ technical innovations or how to best prevent suicide bombings? What is urgently needed is a forum where policymakers can continue to increase their understanding and initiate more decisive policy initiatives.

II Act now to prevent damage to the transatlantic intelligence relationship.

The United States should take seriously international concerns about Guantanamo and other questionable practices. At minimum, it should begin evaluating ways of closing the facility and releasing those prisoners who pose little threat of future terrorist activity and it should avoid the perpetuation of existing legal “gray zones” or the creation of new ones. European leaders should resist exploiting the issue of human rights abuses for political gain.

III Americans and Europeans should share best practices as partners.

What works in one country may very well not work in another. As a number of government officials in the Dialogue noted, legal, security, political and historical frameworks vary considerably both within Europe and between Europe and the United States. But most countries working to combat the threat of international terrorism have spent the last few years learning lessons from which their neighbors and partners could no doubt learn a great deal. As such, American and Europeans should make greater efforts to share best practices especially in the areas of, integration of minorities, law enforcement and crisis response.

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THE EU’S ROLE IN THE

fight against terrorWithin the space of five years, the European Union has launched a number of initiatives designed to prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorism. The results of those initiatives to date have been mixed. On the positive side, the EU has introduced a European wide arrest warrant, strengthened legislation that cracks down on terrorist financing, appointed an EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, launched an action plan to fight terrorism and negotiated agreements with the United States on container security, passenger data, extradition and legal assistance. It has also done much to improve the security of airports and maritime facilities throughout Europe.

Despite these achievements, the EU faces tough challenges. First, member states (as well as a number of partner countries, including the United States) have an almost schizophrenic attitude about the EU’s role in the fight against terrorism. One day, members call for the EU to take on a greater

operational role; the next they cry foul, accusing the EU of infringing on national sovereignty. The end result, as Daniel Keohane of the Centre for European Reform put it at the Dialogue in The Hague, has been the creation of a shopping list but no strategy.

Second, legal systems vary considerably among the EU’s 25 members, making it politically, logistically and/or financially difficult for some to implement the commitments they have made on paper. Third, most EU initiatives in this area, including the office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator, are woefully underresourced. To date, the EU has invested 15 million euros in security-related research, a paltry sum for a continent of over 500 million people. Finally, EU decisions are taken by consensus, meaning, as is the case for many large organizations, statements and declarations, particularly on terrorism-related issues, are often watered down and tepid.

As a number of Dialogue participants stressed in their exchanges, the EU will ultimately need to make a choice. Is it willing to radically alter its structures, culture, processes and budget to fight terrorism effectively? Or will it wait for another terrorist attack to dislodge the current political blockages?


Morten AaslandEmbassy of Norway in the United States

Geneive AbdoLiaison for the Alliance ofCivilizations, United Nations

Mahan AbedinJamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor

Zachary AbuzaSimmons College

Nick AlexanderEmbassy of the United Kingdom in Germany

Jon AltermanCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Haizam Amirah-FernándezElcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies

Susanne BablGerman Federal Criminal Police Office

Shmuel BarInstitute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya in Israel

Nikica BardekGerman Federal Intelligence Service

Paul BarrettBusiness Week

Daniel BenjaminCenter for Strategic and International Studies

LeeAnn BormanCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Glenn CarleU.S. National Intelligence Council

Jocelyne CesariHarvard University

Sarah ConnollyUK Foreign Commonwealth Office

Rik CoolsaetUniversity of Gent

David CrawfordThe Wall Street Journal

Aimee Ibrahim DavidDFI Government Services

Roger DaviesHazard Management Solutions Ltd.

Stephan de SpiegeleireTNO/Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies

Ulrich de TaillezMinistry of Interior, Bavaria

Gijs de VriesEU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Council of the European Union

Rob de WijkClingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Studies

Paul DerconDutch Ministry of Internal Affairs

Twan ErkensDutch Office of National Terrorism Coordinator

Philippe ErreraFrench Foreign Ministry

Christine FairUnited States Institute of Peace

Jose FernandoFernandez-AguayoRoyal Spanish Embassy in Germany

Ralf FücksHeinrich Böll Foundation

The Hon. Baltasar GarzonNYU Law Center on Law and Security

Reuel GerechtAmerican Enterprise Institute

Anne GiudicelliTERRORISC

APPENDIX A > PARTICIPANTS


Karen GreenbergNYU Law Center on Law and Security

Gabriela GuellilGerman Foreign Ministry, Dialogue with The Islamic World

John HamreCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Christian HänelRobert Bosch Foundation

Patrick HeinzGerman Foreign Ministry, Dialogue with The Islamic World

Mathias HellmannGerman Federal Ministry of Justice

Jamaluddin HoffmanIslamic Supreme Council of America

Toby JonesInternational Crisis Group

Daniel KeohaneCentre for European Reform

Muqtedar KhanUniversity of Delaware

Farhad KhosrokhavarL’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales

Aidan KirbyCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Jytte KlausenBrandeis University

Jan KortekaesDutch Office of National Terrorism Coordinator

Holger KrämerGerman Foreign Ministry, Office of International Cooperation Against Terrorism

Mark KramerHarvard University

Robert LeikenThe Nixon Center

David LowU.S. National Intelligence Council

Marla LutherArab Western Summit of Skills

Volker MabmannGerman Federal Criminal Police Office

Nemanja MalisevicOSCE

Rob MalleyInternational Crisis Group

Ted McNamaraGeorge Washington University

Maria MerklinGerman Federal Intelligence Service

Bowman MillerJoint Military Intelligence College

Sascha Müller-KraennerHenrich Boll Foundation

Peter NesserNorwegian Defense Research Establishment

Robin NiblettCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Lidewijde OngeringDutch Ministry of Justice

Alison PargeterKings College

Priya PatelUK Joint Terrorism Analyst Centre

Ami PedahzurUniversity of Texas

Elaine PressmanUniversity of Massachusetts

Michel RademakerTNO/Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies

Tilo ReicheltGerman Federal Intelligence Service

Ambassador Dennis RichardsonEmbassy of Australia in the United States

Ewald RiksDutch Ministry of Justice

Marc SagemanForeign Policy Research Institute

APPENDIX A > continued. . .


Tom SandersonCenter for Strategic and International Studies Ambassador Klaus SchariothEmbassy of Germany in theUnited States

Kirsten SchulzUK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mark SellGerman Federal Intelligence Service

Emmanuel SivanThe Hebrew University

Julianne SmithCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Matthias SonnGerman Foreign Ministry

Paul StaresUnited States Institute of Peace

Guido SteinbergGerman Federal Chancellery

Jonathan StevensonNavy War College

Jürgen StorbeckGerman Federal Ministry of Interior

May-Britt StumbaumGerman Council on Foreign Relations

Michael TaarnbyThe Danish Institute for International Studies

Andrew TablerCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Jean TillieUniversity of Amsterdam, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies

Mustapha TliliNew York University, Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West Yaroslav TrofimovAuthor, Faith at War

Tonya UgoretzFBI

Dirk van de WielDutch Office of National Terrorism Coordinator

Lousewies van der LaanDutch Parliament

Joos van EttroDutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terrorism and New Threats Department

Ran van Reedt DortlandEU Council Secretariat

Jaap van TillHAN University

Karin von HippelCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Katharina von KnopLeopold-Franzens University

Martin von SimsonGerman Federal Ministry of Interior

Hans-Josef VorbeckGerman Federal Chancellery

Gabriel WeimannUniversity of Haifa

Marvin WeinbaumMiddle East Institute

Susanne WelterGerman Foreign Ministry, Office of International Cooperation Against Terrorism

Cees WiebesUniversity of Amsterdam

Peter WilkitzkiGerman Federal Ministry of Justice

Georg WitschelGerman Foreign Ministry, Office of International Cooperation Against Terrorism

Philip ZelikowU.S. Department of State

Marianne ZeppHeinrich Böll Foundation

Doron ZimmermanCenter for Security Studies

Klaus ZuchBerlin Senate


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Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism

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