Cuba Oil - Venezuela Advantage - HSS 2013

8/12/2019 Cuba Oil - Venezuela Advantage - HSS 2013

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Venezuela AdvantageBidirectional File


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1AC


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US-Venezuelan Relations

Advantage # __ is US-Venezuela

Ties are low because US leads-from-behind. That vacuum causes launderingand Iran

prolif. Kickstarting ties key.

Noriega 12Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He

is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise InstituteAfter Chvez, the Narcostate April 11th

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/after_chavez_the_narcostate?page=0,0

Venezuelan leader Hugo Chvez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he is losing his bout

with cancer, determined to appear in command of his revolutionary regime and the nation's future. This past Holy Week, however,television cameras captured him pleading for his life before a crucifix in his hometown church, his mother looking on without the slightest glint

of hope on her face. Chvez's raw emotion startled his inner circle and led some to question his mental health. As a result, according to my

sources inside the presidential palace, Minister of Defense Gen. Henry Rangel Silva has developed a plan to impose martial law if Chvez'sdeteriorating condition causes any hint of instability.Pretty dramatic stuff. So why isn't anyone outside Venezuela paying attention? Some

cynics in that country still believe Chvez is hyping his illness for political advantage, while his most fervent followers expect him to make a

miraculous recovery. The democratic opposition is cautiously preparing for a competitive presidential election set for Oct. 7 -- against Chvez or

a substitute. And policymakers in Washington and most regional capitals are slumbering on the sidelines.In my estimation, the

approaching death of the Venezuelan caudillo could put the country on the path toward a political and

social meltdown.The military cadre installed by Chvez in January already is behaving like a de facto regime determined to hold onto

power at all costs. And Havana, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are moving to protect their interests. If U.S. President Barack Obama

were to show some energetic engagement as Chvez fades, he could begin to put the brakes on Venezuela's

slide, reverse Chvismo's destructive agenda, and reclaim a role for the United States in its own

neighborhood. But if he fails to act, there will be hell to pay. Sources close to Chvez's medical team tell me that for

months, his doctors have been doing little more than treating symptoms, trying to stabilize their workaholic patient long enough to administerlast-ditch chemo and radiation therapies. In that moment of Chvez's very public prayer for a miracle, he set aside his obsession with routing

his opposition or engineering a succession of power to hardline loyalists. Perhaps he knows that his lieutenants and foreign allies are behaving

as if he were already dead -- consolidating power, fashioning a "revolutionary junta," and plotting repressive measures.One of them is

longtime Chvista operator and military man Diosdado Cabello, who was installed by Chvez to lead the ruling party as well as the National

Assembly in January. Cabello's appointment was meant to reassure a powerful cadre of narcomilitares -- Gen. Rangel Silva, Army Gen. Cliver

Alcal, retired intelligence chief Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and half a dozen other senior officers who have been branded drug "kingpins" by the U.S.

government. These ruthless men will never surrender power and the impunity that goes with it -- and they have no illusions that elections will

confer "legitimacy" on a Venezuelan narco-state, relying instead on billions of dollars in ill-gotten gain and tens of thousands of soldiers under

their command.Chavismo's civilian leadership -- including Foreign Minister Nicols Maduro, Vice President Elas Jaua, and the president's

brother, Adn Chvez, the governor of the Chvez family's home state of Barinas -- are eager to vindicate their movement's ideological agenda

at the polls this fall. Maduro is extraordinarily loyal to the president, and is considered by Venezuelan political observers as the most viable

substitute on the ballot. Above all, these men crave political power and will jockey to make themselves indispensable to the military leaders

who are calling the shots today.Cuba's Fidel and Ral Castro are desperate to preserve the life-blood of Venezuelan oil that sustains their

bankrupt regime. According to a source who was briefed on conversations in Cuba, Ral has counseled Chvez to prepare to pass power to a

"revolutionary junta"; Venezuelans who are suspicious of the Castros expect them to pack the junta with men loyal to Havana. Cabello does not

trust the Castros, but with thousands of Cuban intelligence officers and triggermen on the ground in Venezuela, the Castro brothers are a forceto be reckoned with.The Chinese have provided more than $20 billion in quickie loans to Chvez in the last 18 months, which are to be repaid

by oil at well below the market price. Most of these funds were paid into Chvez's slush funds before the Chinese knew of his terminal

condition. Another $4 billion is being negotiated now, but my sources in the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry say the Chinese are demanding new

guarantees. Beijing also is angling to ensure that any post-Chvez government will honor its sweetheart deals. However, these predatory

contracts are being scrutinized by leading opposition members of the National Assembly. Iran is more dependent than ever

onits banks and other ventures in Venezuela as a means to launder billions in funds to evade tightening

internationalfinancial sanctions. Companies associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force,

and illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs have invested millions in infrastructure in shadowy facilities


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throughout Venezuela. Tehran will struggle to keep its beachhead near U.S. soil, which is vital to its survival strategy in the criticalmonths ahead.Russia is considering making $1-2 billion in payments in the weeks ahead to lock in natural gas and oil deals signed with

Chvez. Some in Moscow, however, are weary of the Venezuelan shakedown, particularly because they know that Chvez's days are numbered.

Russian firms are deciding now whether to double down on the Chvez regime, which has been a reliable customer of more than $13 billion in

Russian arms, or wait to see if a successor government will honor its agreements in the oil and gas sector.The Soviet-style succession that

corrupt Chavistas and their Cuban handlers are trying to impose on the Venezuelan people is anything but a done deal. There is room and time

for friends of democracy to play a constructive role.Cabello and company, my sources tell me, are far more likely to resort to unconstitutional

measures and repression if they can count on support from Moscow and Beijing. The Chavistas intend to promise continued cheap oil andsweetheart contracts to leverage this support. Discreet U.S. diplomacy -- working in concert with like-minded allies -- can help scuttle these

plans. The Chinese and Russians may not be eager to defend yet another violent pariah regime, and Washington should rally Latin American

leaders to draw the line against a Syria scenario in the Western Hemisphere.At the heart of the Chavista strategy is a narco-state, led by men

with well-documented ties to narco-trafficking. The White House should instruct U.S. law enforcement agencies to smash the foundations of

this regime. One Venezuelan general or corrupt judge in a witness box in a U.S. federal courthouse will strike the regime at the very top and

destroy any illusion of legitimacy or survivability.U.S.intelligence agencies have been virtually blind to the Iranian

presence in Venezuela. If they were instructed to kick over the rocksto see what is crawling underneath, I am

convinced that they would discover agrave and growing threat against the security of the United States and

its allies in the region. Such evidence will help motivate Venezuela's neighbors to take a stand against an

even more unaccountable regime taking shape in Caracas.Venezuela's military is not a monolith, and Chvez hasundermined his own succession strategy by giving the narco-generals such visible and operational roles. The fact that the narco-generals will be

more willing to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression to keep power and carry the "narco" label sets them apart from the rank-

and-file soldiers and institutionalist generals. The United States military still carries a lot of weight with these men. A simple admonition to

respect their constitution and serve their people may split the bulk of the force away from the narcos and deny them the means to impose theirwill. (Institutionalist generals may react in a similar way to news that Iran is conducting secret operations on Venezuelan territory that are both

unconstitutional and a dangerous provocation.)There is much the United Statesand the international community

can do without interfering in Venezuela's internal politics. Although the leaders of the democratic opposition aredetermined to keep their distance from Washington, they must at least show the flag in the United States and other key countries to elicit the

solidarity they deserve. Moreover, anyone who thinks the opposition can take on Cuba, China, Russia, Iran, drug traffickers, and Hezbollah

without international backing is just not thinking straight.Unfortunately,the career U.S. diplomats in Washington

responsible for Venezuela have spent the last two years downplaying the mess thereand the three years

before that neglecting it altogether. So if there isany hopefor U.S. leadership, it will require the attention of Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton or President Obama.Alas, in our own neighborhood, " leading from behind" is not an option .

Nows a key time for the kick start US engagement can break Venezuelan-Iran nexus.

Noreiga 13Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He

is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise InstituteWashington TimesMarch 07, 2013 http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-

defense-policy/regional/latin-america/igniting-the-post-chavez-explosion/

The next fewdays and weeks stand as a signal moment for the United States to re-seize its traditional

leadership role in the Americas on behalf of democratic and free-market development. An abdication of that leadership

would mean the continuation of a lawless Venezuelan government in cahoots withCuba, Iran and drug

traffickersto the detriment ofall decent people in the region

Plan kick-starts tiesno embargo, more refineries, and better Venezuelan transit

routes.

Benjamin-Alvarado 10Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to

Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resourcespage 122


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secretly in the 1980s, few in the US intelligence community would be surprised . Given Saudi Arabias

role as the major financier of Pakistans clandestine nuclear programin the 1980s, it is not out of the

question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. Such a multi-party

nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette dramatically increasing the

likelihood of a regional nuclear war. Other nightmare scenarios for the region include an accidental or

unauthorized nuclear launch from Iran, theft of nuclear warheadsfrom an unstable regime in Tehran, and possible

Israeli preemptionagainst Irans nuclear facilities, which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has implied, threatening, Under nocircumstances, and at no point, can Israel allow anyone with these kinds of malicious designs against us to have control of weapons of

destruction that can threaten our existence.

Iranian-sponsored attack will hit US soil. Iran-Venzuelan ties key.

Noriega 12Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He

is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign RelationsIran's influence and

activity in Latin America February 16, 2012 http://67.208.89.102/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/irans-

influence-and-activity-in-latin-america/

Since you announced your inquiry, the Director of National Intelligence, James R.Clapper, testified earlier this month that

Iranian officialsat the highest levelsare now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States.

General Clapper also reported that Iransso-called supreme leader AliKhamenei wasprobably aware of thebizarre

plot discoveredlast October to conspire with supposed Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in the

heart of our Nations capital. Only because American law enforcement officials were willing to set

aside conventional wisdomabout how and where Iran would wage waragainst us were they able to thwart

that attack.Iranian officials have made no secret ofthe regimes intention to carryits asymmetrical

struggle to the streets of the UnitedStatesand Europe. For example, in a May 2011 speech in Bolivia, Irans Defense MinisterAhmad Vahidi promised a tough and crushing response to any U.S. offensive against Iran. In the same week in early January that Iran caught

the worlds attention by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and brandishing shore-to-sea cruise missiles in a 10-day naval exercise,

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing through Latin America aimed at advancing its influence and operational capabilities on

the U.S. doorstep.To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional wisdom about its ambitions, strategies and tactics and

follow the evidence where it leads. General Clappers public statement represents a dramatic break with the skeptics in the foreign polic yestablishmentincluding too manyU.S. diplomatswho have failed to appreciate the breadth and depth of Irans

activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Intelligence Communitys fresh assessment of Irans willingness to

wage an attack on our soil leads to the in escapable conclusion that Teherans activities near our

homeland constitute a very real threat that can no longer be ignored.The next logical question is, Whatis thathostile regimedoing with the supportof its trustedalliesveryclose to our borders?In my capacity as a Visiting Fellow at theA

merican Enterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research (AEI), I amcoordinating anongoingeffortto answer that very question. I

cooperate with a team of experiencedexperts who are committed tomonitoring and exposingIrans activities in Latin Americain order

to inform the public as well aspolicy makers who areresponsible forprotectingour national security.To date, we have conducted

dozens ofinterviewswithexperts from throughoutthe world andwitheyewitnesseson the ground inthe region. We also have

obtainedreams ofofficial Venezuelan and Iranian documents, onlyafewof which we havepublished to support our conclusions.

Our exhaustive workleadsusto the following conclusions:Venezuelan strongmanHugo ChvezandIranian leader Mahmoud

Ahmadinejadare conspiringto wageanasymmetrical struggle against U.S. securityand toabet Irans illicit nuclear program.Their

clandestine activities pose a clear andpresent danger to regional peace and security.Iran has providedVenezuela conventional

weaponsystems capable of attackingthe United Statesand our allies inthe region.Iran has used $30 billion in economic ventures inVenezuela as means to laundermoney andevade international financial sanctions.Since 2005,Iranhas founduranium in

Venezuela, Ecuadorand othercountriesin the region and is conducting suspicious mining operations insomeuranium-rich areas.

Twoterroristnetworksone home-grown Venezuelan clan and anothercultivated by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the

Qods Forceof the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corpsproselytize, fund-raise,recruit, and train operativeson behalf ofIran and

Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networksin South America as ameans of

raising resources and sharing tactics.The Venezuelanstate-ownedairline, Conviasa, operates regular servicefromCaracasto

Damascus and Teheranproviding Iran, Hezbollah, and associatednarco-traffickers asurreptitiousmeans to movepersonnel,

weapons,contraband and other materiel.Mr. Chairman,our project has sharedsubstantial informationabout theseaforementioned

threatswith U.S. government officialseither directly or throughMembers of Congress. Quite frankly, too often the attitude we have

encountered hasbeen one of skepticism or indifference.To offer just twoexamples, we understand that U.S. executive branch


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officialshave continued to misinform Members of Congress about the existence of Conviasaflights between Venezuela and the terror states

of Syria and Iran. Many months ago, weprovided U.S. officials the name andcontact informationof areliableVenezuelan sourcewith

privileged information about thoseongoingflights. Unfortunately, that source wasnever contacted. And Congressional staff members

tells us that executive branchofficials continueto provide vague or misleading answers to direct questions on thisrelatively simplesubject

of whether those Conviasa flights continue.Another example of this official indifference: Almost seven years after the firstreports that Iran

was seeking uranium in Venezuela, U.S. officials arestillunable orunwilling to state clearlywhether Iran is mining uranium in

Venezuelanotwithstandingdocumentation revealed by ourproject over a year agoregarding Iranian mining in theuranium-rich

Roraima Basin in eastern Venezuela. That U.S. officials do not knowwhetherIran is supporting its illicit nuclear program with uranium

from Venezuela isincomprehensible. That they do not care enough to find out is unacceptable.I believe that the Executive branchbeginning in the waning days of the lastadministration and continuing todayhas been slow to recognize or respond to this

multidimensional threat. At long last, it is time for our national security agencies to getsmart and get busy.Mr. Chairman, I am convinced

that Congressional attention, such as this hearing,is essential to encourage Executive branch agenciesto act. For example, sanctions last

year against Venezuelas state-owned petroleum company for transactions with Iran werethe direct result of pressure by the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in part oninformation provided by my project. Representative Jeff Duncan (R-SC) has introduced

H.R. 3783, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, which will require theExecutive branch to report to Congress on

Irans activities in a host of areasand to provide a strategy for countering this threat.I believe that such a thorough, Congressionally-

mandated review will require theExecutive branch to apply additional needed intelligence resources to collect on subjectmatters in

Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and beyond. Once they understand the scope anddepth of the problem, I hope for a whole-of-government

response to protect our security,our interestsand our allies against the threat posed by Iran, Hezbollah and their supportnetwork in the

Americas.Of course, my project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this policy review byproviding the Subcommittee documents and

analysis regarding suspicious transactions and installations operated by Iran in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and elsewhere in theregion.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSIONIrans push into the Western Hemisphere is part of a global strategyto break its

diplomatic isolation, develop new sources ofstrategic materials, evade internationalsanctionsand undermine U . S . influence.

To these ends, Iran expanded the number of its embassies in the region from sixin 2005 to tenin 2010.iv

The real game -changer, however, has been the alliance developed between Iran s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

and Venezuela s Hugo Chvez. In the last seven years, Iran has begun to take full advantage of its Venezuelan

partner . Chvezs petro-diplomacy has paved the wayfor Ahmadinejad to cultivate partnerships with anti-U.S.

regimesin Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua et al. Today, a shadowy network of commercial and industrial enterprises in several countries

affords Iran a physical presence in relatively close proximity to the United States. Iran is well positioned to use its relationships with

these countries to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory, strategic waterways and American allies. Iran also has

provided the Venezuelan military with weapon systems thatgive Chvez unprecedented capabilities to threatenits

neighbors and the United States.

That causes the U.S. lash out, precipitating global war

Schwartz-Morgan 1Nicole, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10/10/2001, Wild Globalization and Terrorism,

http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which driveus to gather around clan chieftans.

Nationalistic sentimentre-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each

group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the

moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against

Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." Butthe word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the

issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human

emotions. Because the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become

emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack,coming on top of an economic recession could easily

radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close

to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness

becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions,

and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good willand charity toward

the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these


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benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will

reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatredin the land of the free,

flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other

side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nationsand tribes may be, they will

be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they bethemselves merchants or terrorists.


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2AC Backlines


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***A-to No US Leverage/ Maduro wont engage

( ) US hasleverage on Iran issuesMaduros slim victory proves.

Crdenas 13Jos R. Crdenas is an associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas, based in Washington, D.C. From 2004-2009, he served in various

senior positions in the U.S. Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he

served as Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the CaribbeanVenezuelas contested election is an opportunity for U.S.

policy Foreign PolicyTuesday, April 16, 2013

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/16/venezuela_s_contested_election_is_an_opportunity_for_us_policy

A surprising thing happened on the way to the coronation ofVenezuelan Vice PresidentNicolas Maduro as

the designated heir to chavismo, the movement created by the obstreperous former President Hugo Chvez, who succumbed tocancer last month. Evidently, a good number of the Venezuelan people decided that bread-and-butter issues like inflation, shortages of basic

goods, electricity blackouts, and soaring street crime were more important to them than the circuses Chvez regularly supplied.Challenger

Henrique Capriles, who lost the presidential election to Chvez last October by some 11 percentage points, narrowly missed an

epic upset , losing this time to Chvez's chosen successor by a count of 50.7 to 49.1 percent of the vote.Capriles has rejected the officialtally and demanded a recount of the paper receipts of each Venezuelan vote. "We are not going to recognize the result," he said, "until every

vote is counted, one by one." He has also called for peaceful street demonstrations outside the electoral council offices. In welcome

developments, both the Obama administration and the Organization of American States have backed the call for an audit of the election

results.Maduro's reaction was predictable, rejecting any recount and accusing Capriles of "coup-mongering." He has no doubt calculated that

a recount is more dangerous to the continuation of chavismo than trying to tackle Venezuela's myriad post-Chvez challenges while dogged

with questions about his legitimacy. Not only must he address declining socio-economic conditions -- including soaring inflation, a bloated

public sector, a crippled private one, electricity blackouts, shortages of basic goods, and one of the highest homicide rates in the world -- he

must also deal with a reinvigorated opposition while attempting to manage a movement that is splintering under the weight of corruption and

competing interests. Already, Maduro has been put on notice that he is under scrutiny from his own side. Diosdado Cabello, the powerful

head of the National Assembly and long-seen as a Maduro rival within chavismo, said of the election: "These results require deep self-criticism

... Let's turn over every stone to find our faults, but we cannot put the fatherland or the legacy of our commander [Chvez] in danger."What is

clear is that Venezuela's contested electionlikely presages a period of political turmoil not seen in the country since 2002, when

Chvez was briefly ousted from power. But it also presents an extraordinary opportunity for the United States to

actively defend its regional interests. No one is advocating that the Obama administration engage in mud-slinging contests withHugo Chvez wannabes, but neither should we remain silent on matters of principle and U.S. security.For example, the Iranian

presence in Venezuela, including the existence of a number of suspicious industrial facilities, and the prodigious use of Venezuelan

territory for drug shipments to the United States and Europe have been tolerated for too long without any effective

U.S. response . (Several high-ranking associates of the late President Chvez have been designated as "drug kingpins" by the U.S. Treasury

Department.Maduro's shaky standing today within Venezuela means there is increased leverage for the

United States to hold the government accountable for its threats to regional stability . It is not likely

Maduro will be able to withstand the pressure coming not only from the opposition and his own coalition,

but from the United States as well. That can come in the form of more designationsand indictments of

Venezuelan officials involved in drug trafficking and violating sanctions against Iran, but alsorepeated public calls to

disassociate his government from these criminal activities.


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Yes, Iran = threat in Venezuela

( ) Iran isa threatNeg cites a report thats flawed.

Crdenas 13Jos R. Crdenas is an associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas, based in Washington, D.C. From 2004-2009, he served in various

senior positions in the U.S. Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he

served as Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the CaribbeanSoft-Pedaling the Iranian Threat in the Americas Foreign

Policy Magazines Blog: Shadow Government June 28th

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/12823

Three months after Southcom commander Gen. John F. Kelly told the House Armed Services Committee that the United States needs to be

"extremely concerned" about Iran's expanding presence in the Western Hemisphere, the State Department has just informed

Congress that Iran's regional influence is "waning." Indeed, even though around the same time Kelly told an audience atthe Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that he is constantly approached by his regional counterparts requesting any

information he can provide them on I ranian activities in the hemisphere, the State Department is reporting to Congress that it "will work closely

with and inform our partners in the hemisphere about malign Iranian activities."The State Department's assertions come in

a two-page unclassified annexto a long-awaited classified report to Congress mandated by the bipartisan Countering Iran in theWestern Hemisphere Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama late last year. It directs the secretary of state to "conduct an assessment

of the threats posed to the United States by Iran's growing presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the relevant

congressional committees the results of the assessment and a strategy to address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western

Hemisphere."Granted, the bulk of the reportis classified, but it is not difficult to conclude that its tone is unlikely to diverge

much from theunclassified annex -- and that is deeply disturbing. Especially whenjust last month an

Argentine prosecutor added to the growing paper trail on Iran's nefarious activities in the Americas by

releasing a500-page report detailing how Iran has systematically built a clandestine intelligence network

throughout the region "designed to sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks." The prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, who investigatedthe notorious 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, provides compelling evidence of covert Iranian activity in

numerous countries, including Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname.Undoubtedly, the

Nisman report will be a focus of attention when the House Homeland Security Committee holds a hearing on July 9 on the State Department

report. Already, Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.), who sponsored the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act and is chairing the hearing, has

expressed his displeasure with the unclassified annex. He said in a statement, "I believe that the Administration has failed to consider the

seriousness of Iran's presence here at home."Ironically, one of the objectives of Duncan's legislation was to foster better interagencycooperation on addressing the Iranian presence in the hemisphere. I attended the CSIS forum with General Kelly and can unequivocally say he

gave no impression that his concerns about Iran in the hemisphere were "waning." He quite rightly pointed out how easy it is for anyone

wishing to do the United States harm to meld with the criminal networks that can move anything to the United States' borders within days or

hours: drugs, people, contraband, anything....By this time, the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by Iran-- and its

proxy, Hezbollah -- should be a subject beyond debate, especially after the assessment by the director of national

intelligence, James Clapper, following the 2011 Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C.,"that some Iranian officials -- probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- have changed their calculus and are now more willing to

conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime."In this light, there

remains no defensible reason for the State Department to continue to soft-pedal the issue, whether the

department believes for some reason that it complicates negotiations over Iran's illegal pursuit of nuclear weapons or because it offends the

sensitivities of some Latin American governments. Congress is right to demand accountability on the matter. Iran is playing for the

highest stakes; it is high time the United States did as well.

( ) Iran isa threat in Latin AmericaNegs report flawed.

Goodman 13


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Internally critiquing a report from the US State Department cited by the NegJoshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering

Latin America for Bloomberg NewsIrans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg NewsJune 26th

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

The findings disappointed someRepublican lawmakers who sayPresident Barack Obamas administration is

underestimating the threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait-and-see approach to President-elect Hassan

Rohani, who has vowed to seek more dialog with the U.S.I believe the Administration has failed to consider theseriousness of Irans presencehere at home, said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the

legislation requiring the State Department report. I question the methodology that was used in developing this

report .


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Internal Links to Prolif advantage

***Caracas-Tehran-led anti-US alliance key to Iran Prolif.

Noriega 12Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. Heis a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign RelationsIran's influence and

activity in Latin America February 16, 2012 http://67.208.89.102/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/irans-

influence-and-activity-in-latin-america/

Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program and emboldened byinattention from Washington in Latin America,

Iran has sought strategic advantagein ourneighborhood.It also is preparing toplay the terrorism card

exploit ing its new ties with Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a decades-old

network in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.Even as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affirmed in a recentreport that

foreign support is crucial to Iranscapability of developing a nuclear weapon ,xviU.S.diplomatic,

intelligence and security agenciesapparently are in the dark on whether Iran is extracting ore from vast

uranium basins in Venezuela,EcuadororBoliviaor whether Argentina has resumed nuclear technology-sharing withTeheran.


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A-to Iran Prolif not bad/no domino

( ) Iran Prolif causes war and does cause domino effect.

Cirincione 6Joseph Cirincione is the director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceThe Continuing Problem of NuclearWeapons Issues in Science & TechnologySpringhttp://www.issues.org/22.3/cirincione.html

The world would be a more dangerous place with nuclear weapons in Iran. A Persian power with a keen sense of

its 2,500-year history, Iran occupies a pivotal positionstraddling the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The country hasthe

largest population in the Middle East, the worlds third largest oil reserves, the second largest natural gas reserves, and aspirations to

again become the regions major power. Add nuclear weapons, and this mixture become highly

combustible.There is no evidence that Iran currently possesses any nuclear devices or even enough fissile material (highly enricheduranium or plutonium) to produce such weapons. But for the past two decades Iran has been engaged in a secret, multifaceted program to

assemble the equipment and facilities necessary to make these nuclear materials.Iranian officials have justified this effort as part of an

ambitious plan to build 20 nuclear reactors. Though controversial enough in and of itself, Irans activities also include the pursuit of several

nuclear material production technologies that, if mastered, could provide Tehran with the ability to enrich uranium for fuel rods and to process

these fuel rods for disposal. If these facilities are completed, Iran would become only the s ixth nation in the world able to convert uranium into

gas commercially and only the ninth to be able to enrich that gas for fuel. These same facilities could be used to enrich uranium and to extract

plutonium for weapons use. That is the crux of the issue: Do other nations trust that Irans program is, as they claim, entirely peaceful?In2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed that the countrys nuclear program was much more extensive than Tehran had previously declared

to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA inspections have provided a clearif still incompletepicture of the program.

However, after three years of intensive investigations, the IAEA reported in September 2005 and reaffirmed in February 2006 that it is still not

in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. Irans failure to cooperate fully with inspections

and to disclose all of its past activities caused the IAEA Board of Governors on February 6 to vote overwhelmingly to report Iran to the UN

Security Council.Iran maintains that all its nuclear activities, even those previously hidden from the IAEA, are intended for peaceful purposes,

and it has agreed to place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, in 2003 Iran signed and pledged to implement the IAEAs

Additional Protocol, which includes expanded inspection rights and tools. Iran suspended these more intrusive inspections in February 2006,

after the IAEA vote.Within Iran, the program is now fused with passionate nationalism. Irans program is a source of national pride across the

political spectrum, with both conservatives and reformers supporting development of full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities as an inherent right

accorded by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Irans radical new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, now addresses rallies of tens of

thousands of followers chanting for nuclear power. This potentially explosive domestic political dynamic greatly complicates efforts to convince

Iranian officials to end the pursuit of these sensitive nuclear programs.The danger is not that Iran would build and use a nuclear weapon

against the United States or its allies. Iranian leaders know that such an act would be regime suicide, as a powerful counterattack would follow

immediately. This is not a nuclear bomb crisis, but a nuclear regime crisis. The danger is that a nuclear-armed Iran would leadother states in theGulf and Middle East, including possibly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Turkey, to

reexamine their nuclear options.This potential wave of proliferation would seriously challenge

regional and global securityand undermine the worldwide effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. If the internationalcommunity is unable or unwilling to impose penalties on Iran, and if Tehran continues its nuclear development unconstrained, the nuclear

chain reaction from the region could ripple around the globe.

( ) Iran prolif causes instability and nuclear conflict.

Inbar 6(Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan Un iversity and the Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic StudiesThe Need To Block A

Nuclear Iran, MERIA Journal, March, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html)

Iran's nuclear program coupled with long-range delivery systems,in particular,threatens regional

stability in the MiddleEast.Iran's possesses the Shehab-3 long-range missile(with a range of 1,300 kilometers) that canprobably

be nuclear-tipped and isworking on extending the range of its ballistic arsenal. American allies, such as Israel, Turkey, Saudi

Arabia, and Gulf States are within range,as well as several important U.S. bases.The Chief of the IDF IntelligenceDepartment, Maj.Gen. Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) reported that Iran has also acquired12 cruise missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers

andwith anability to carry nuclear warheads.[14] Further improvements in Iranian missiles would initially put

most European capitals, and eventually, the North American continent, within range of a potential

Iranian attack. Iran hasan ambitious satellite launchingprogrambased on the use of multi-stage, solid propellant launchers, with


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intercontinental ballistic missile properties to enable the launching of a300-kilogram satellite within two years.If Iran achieves

this goal, it will put many more states at risk of a future nuclear attack.


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Yes, US Lashout

U.S. lashout will kill hundreds of millions

Easterbrook 1(Greg, Fellow at the Brookings Institute, CNN, America's New War: Nuclear Threats, 11 -1-2001,

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html)

EASTERBROOK: Well, what held through the Cold War, when the United States and Russia had thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each

other, what held each side back was the fact that fundamentally they were rational. They knew that if they struck, they would be struck in turn.

Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave

you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the

world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in

Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it,in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million

Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen

Muslim countries.And that -- it is very much in the interest the Muslim peoples of the world that atomic weapons be kept out of thehands of Islamic terrorists, in addition to being in our interests.


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1NC Frontline


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[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez

never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money.""Most criminalized

elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't

be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. U.S. officials might try to engage the new

Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries. But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely

adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian

elites."Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I

don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."

( ) Iran Prolif not dangerousand wouldnt cascade.

Hobbs& Moran 12Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at

King's College London. Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War

Studies at King's College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship betweennuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy-making. Guardian: Julian Borgers Security Blog 12-19-12

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/dec/19/iran-nuclear-middle-east-arms-race

Inevitably, Iran's nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent

commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that,at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a

'proliferation cascade' in the Middle East.If Iran acquires nuclear weaponswhatever form that scenario may take - its regional

rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, we findthat

the counter-argument is more compelling.The idea that 'proliferation begets proliferation' is not new. Dire forecasts on theseemingly inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states have been made since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1963, for example,

US President JF Kennedy predicted that there might be up to twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within the next decade. However,

proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in

2006 following North Korea's nuclear test.The flawed logic of 'proliferation begets proliferation' is clearly

demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea'snuclear weapons have not provoked Japan orSouth Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatilerelations. In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role

in dissuading these countries from going nuclear.Ironically, the Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear

proliferation is not inevitable. Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israel

acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s andover four decades later still remains the only nuclear power in the

region.Now the threat posed by Iran to its neighbours is arguably greater given Tehran's aggressive posturing and regional ambitions.However our research finds that those states deemed most likely to go nuclear due to their proximity to Iran and their suspected past interest

in acquiring nuclear weapons (namely Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), would have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down

such a route.Take Saudi Arabia, for example. Iran has long been at political and ideological odds with the kingdom across the Gulf. And at

first sight, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran down the nuclear path.In February, Saudiofficials were reported as claiming that Riyadh would launch a "twin-track nuclear weapons programme" in the event of a successful Iranian

nuclear test. An article published in the London Times in February [] described a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia would attempt to purchase

warheads from abroad while also adding a military dimension to its planned civil nuclear programme at home.Look more closely,however, and there is a much stronger case to be made against Saudi nuclearisation. Beyond the Kingdom's

primitive nuclear infrastructurethe country lacks sufficient experienceand expertise in practically all areas of the nuclear fuel

cycleSaudi Arabia's political and strategic context does not favour the acquisition of nuclear weapons.From a securityperspective, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has held firm since the 1940s, despite a number of challengesmost

notably the participation of a number of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The relationship barters Saudi oil for US conventional arms

and an implicit commitment to Saudi's defence.In recent years, the role of Washington as the silent guarantor of Riyadh's security has grown

apace with the structural changes in the Middle East. The fall of the pro-Saudi Mubarak regime in Egypt; protests and instability in Bahrain and

Yemen; the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon; and civil war in Syria have upended the established regional order and made

Riyadh's position less secure.In this context, and given the determination of the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region, a


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move by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons holds few positives for Riyadh's security calculus.From and economic perspective, Saudi

Arabia's policy outlook exemplifies Etel Solingen's seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalism and nuclear restraint.

Solingen argues that political coalitions favouring the reduction of state control over markets and increased privatisation and foreign

investmentare less likely to adopt a nuclear posture that would endanger their economic interests.In this regard, Saudi Arabia's emphasis

on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. Riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international powers,

keen to attract foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local

population (population growth of almost two percent equates to a need for some 200,000 new jobs per year), and reinvigorating the Saudi

private sector.The acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economic

isolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom's international trade relations. Saudi's interests are best served by nuclearrestraint.In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear

restraint in the cases of other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons - in

December 2011, following the United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia's Patriot missile defence system, for example

to facilitating increased integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear

weapons.Ultimately, many see a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation. But when the

stakes are this high, it is important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there is substantial evidence to

suggest that regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.

( ) US wont respond with nuclear lash-out.

Washington Post 7(Thursday, August 2, 2007Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama saidThursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight

terrorismin Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a

profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians."

Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."


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2NC-1NR Backlines


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ExtensionsIrans activities arent dangerous

( ) Irans activities in Venezuela arent profitable or dangerous.

Goodman 13Internally citing a report from the US State DepartmentJoshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America forBloomberg NewsIrans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg NewsJune 26

th


Under Ahmadinejads watch, Iran added embassies in Latin Americaand more than doubled trade with Brazil, the

regions biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support everythingfrom a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as atomic two-

wheelers.The two countriesalso established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which

together with its main Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle forthe Ahmadinejad

governments fundingof the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah.Yet with Irans economy crippled by

sanctions, many of the projects havent gotten off the ground. For example, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help builda $350 million deep-water port off Nicaraguas Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a huge embassy in Managua.That hasnt prevented the Obama administration fromtrying to curb Irans influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on

Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabias ambassador to Washington.

( ) Irans influence in Latin America decreasingand not supporting terror.

Goodman 13Internally citing a report from the US State DepartmentJoshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for

Bloomberg NewsIrans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg NewsJune 26th


Iran isnt actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region

after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report.While Irans interest in Latin America is a

concern,sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand itseconomic and political

toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterdays report. As a result ofdiplomatic outreach,

strengthening of allies capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Irans

poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin Americaand the Caribbeanis waning,according to the report.


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arise.Besides al-Khilewis obvious motives for fabricating this story, its doubtful Islamabad would uphold its end of the alleged bargain. After

all, in the wake of 9/11 Washington gave Islamabad $22 billion to fight terrorism and later found Osama bin Laden living amongst Pakistans

military cadets. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are exceedingly paranoid their nuclear arsenal would not withstand an Indian or U.S. first strike.

Its therefore difficult to imagine them willingly parting with any nuclear warheads.Even if Islamabad did have some to spare, Riyadh would be

an unlikely recipient. Given the worlds dependence on Saudi crude, Pakistan would be the target of exceptionally harsh and unrelenting

international condemnation, including from its all-weather friend China, which has recently been getting 20 percent of its oil supplies from

Riyadh. Iran would also be outraged and almost certain to respond by aligning itself squarely with India. Pakistani leaders have gone to great

lengths to avoid this outcome, and they wouldnt suddenly invite it just to keep a promise their predecessors might have made.If Iran

does acquire nuclear weapons, theres no reason to think a regional nuclear-arms race would follow.

Washington and its allies have avoided this outcome in the past, and nothing suggests this time would

be different.


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ExtensionsUS wont respond with nuclear lash-out

( ) Obama wont retaliate with nuclear weapons

Crowley 10(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, Obama and Nuclear Deterrence, Jan 10thhttp://www.tnr.com/node/72263)The Los Angeles Times ran animportant story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review,

which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside theadministration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of

possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should

shedits long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain

circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nucleararms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a

biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would

never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight

on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it

literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to

see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The

questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groupsand rogue states. Would we, for

instance, actually nuke Pyongyangif it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it inAmerica?That implied

threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt thata President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go

through with it.

( ) Nuclear retaliation wont happen.

Bremmer 4(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political

science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia

University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, Suppose a new

9/11 hit America)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004?Howwould it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to

President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the

original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension.

Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps,

inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in

terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond

would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how theBush administration could focus its response on

an external enemy.Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks

three years ago. The president would face intensified criticismfrom those who have argued all along that Iraq was a

distraction from 'the real war on terror'.Andwhat if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were againSaudis? The Bushadministration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when

crude-oilprices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit.While the Saudi royal family mightsupport a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have

concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised

Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report

noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over

the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of

an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, thedomestic opposition to such a war and the
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,2198537,full.storyhttp://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,2198537,full.story


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international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iranunthinkable.In short, a decisive

response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic.Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defencesecretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an

anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience

stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects.

Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the

government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

( ) The U.S. wontretaliate with nuclear weaponsit makes no sense

Spring 1(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20,

http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)

Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missiledefense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the

homeland. But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States considerthe use of nuclear

weapons in response tothe horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the U nitedStates,

the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States

needs to be able to resort to defensive options.

Cuba Oil - Venezuela Advantage - HSS 2013

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