CSIR Research Report

Research Report Legacy of an Exile:

How Al-Shabaab Was Inspired by and Learned from

Osama bin Laden Kris Inman, PhD

October 2015

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CSIR Research Report

Legacy of an Exile: How Al-Shabaab Was

Inspired by and Learned from Osama bin Laden Kris Inman, PhD

Africa Research Initiative

October 2015

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

National Intelligence University

Dr. Kris Inman is the director of the Africa Research Initiative at the Center for Strategic Intelligence

Research, National Intelligence University. This research report is the product of independent scholarly

investigation and is not finished intelligence. It has not been coordinated with U.S. Intelligence Commu-

nity agencies. The opinions expressed in this report are solely the author’s and are not those of the Na-

tional Intelligence University, Defense Intelligence Agency, or Department of Defense. An expanded dis-

cussion of these findings is available upon request to: NIU_Research@dodiis.mil. This report has been

approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Corporate Communications, Defense Intelligence

Agency, case #15-430.

On the cover: photo by Oleg Zabielin.

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Introduction. This report examines the motivations behind al-Shabaab attacks on Kenya

and the implications of these motivations for Kenyan national security strategy. Based on

evidence gathered from a comparative document analysis of al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab public

statements, the main argument of this report is that al-Shabaab is targeting Kenya because of its

status as a major political and economic power in East Africa. The group hopes its attacks will

draw Kenya into a perpetual cycle of conflict that drains Kenya’s coffers and turns citizens

against the government. Al-Shabaab is confident it can outlast Kenya in such a conflict because it

sees itself as having a higher will to fight and an ability to rally Muslims behind its cause. The

group believes that the successful implementation of this strategy will have a ripple effect that

extends far beyond Kenya and Somalia.

Al-Shabaab’s strategic vision, as this report details, draws inspiration from a similar approach

that Osama bin Laden developed for confronting the United States—a strategy he developed as

an exile in the Sudan. This strategy involved starting a cycle of jujitsu politics, characterized as

using the enemy’s strengths (in this case, economic strength) against him in order to win the

war.1 Considering the motivations that shape al-Shabaab strategy, it is essential that Kenyan

leaders respond to al-Shabaab attacks in a measured manner that avoids: 1) bogging their

military down in a war with al-Shabaab, and 2) harsh responses that produce collateral damage

that could be used against Kenya in the larger war for public support. In other words, military

means will not solve the al-Shabaab problem for Kenya.

NAIROBI, KENYA:

Central business

district and sky-

line of Nairobi,

the capital and

largest city of

Kenya. August 11,

2013. By Steven

Bostok

I This research report is based on a larger study on the legacy of exiles that I developed after attending the Conable Con-

ference in International Studies at the Rochester Institute of Technology in April 2015. I would like to thank Ms. Phu-

ong Hoang and Mr. Andrew Chadwick for their outstanding assistance in drafting this report from the larger study.

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CSIR Research Report

The Rise in al-Shabaab Attacks on Kenya. In 2006, battle-hardened jihadists came together to form al-Shabaab

amid the anarchy of the Somali civil war. Since its early days as a

terrorist organization focused on attacks inside Somalia, al-Shabaab has

evolved into a group with larger regional ambitions. This strategic shift

became apparent in 2010, when the group dispatched suicide bombers

who struck civilian targets inside Ethiopia, killing 74 people and

injuring 100 others. Since 2010, the group has conducted over 200 attacks

outside Somalia. The vast majority of the attacks, as Illustration 1

highlights, occurred in Kenya, to include the horrific 2013 attack on the

Westgate Mall in Nairobi.2

Publically, al-Shabaab has declared that these attacks are in response to

Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi (ONL, Kiswahili for “protect the

nation”). Kenyan leaders authorized this operation to block al-Shabaab

attacks by establishing a 100-kilometer buffer zone between Kenya and

Somalia.4 Al-Shabaab leaders have characterized this operation as an

invasion of the Muslim land of Somalia. The problem with linking al-

Shabaab attacks to this operation is that Ethiopia invaded Somalia in

2007, and Uganda has deployed troops into Somalia as part of the

ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Yet, as

Illustration 1 shows, al-Shabaab has limited its attacks on these

countries.

One popular explanation for al-Shabaab’s targeting focus is that Kenya

is somehow a “soft target” in terms of military strength or socioeconom-

ic conditions. Kenya, however, has the second strongest military in East

Africa, behind only Ethiopia.5 Kenya does suffer from some “deep-

seated structural state weaknesses and challenges” like unemployment

and marginalized communities.6 Historically, these conditions can create

a favorable environment for terrorists to operate. But Kenya is not the

only East African state that faces these challenges. Similar conditions

exist to the same degree—if not worse—in Ethiopia and Uganda. In fact,

Kenya ranks higher on the Human Development Index (HDI) than

Ethiopia and Uganda.7 Perhaps, the real motivations behind al-

Shabaab’s attacks on Kenya are found in strategic theories it may have

inherited from its associated organizations, like al-Qaeda.

Illustration 1

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Al-Qaeda’s Strategic Playbook. Osama bin Laden was the chief architect of al-

Qaeda’s strategic playbook, which he developed primarily during his four years as a Saudi

political exile living in the Sudan during the mid-1990s.8 As an exile, living relatively free from

observation by Saudi intelligence services, bin Laden gained the space to develop a new al-

Qaeda strategy that aimed to use U.S. military and economic strength against itself. In other

words, he embraced a jujitsu politics-styled military strategy. This strategy envisioned an al-

Qaeda-led insurgency provoking the United States into committing its military and economic

might to a protracted war in the Muslim world that would ultimately end in its defeat and set the

conditions for a new golden age in Islamic history.

Bin Laden’s new strategic vision, as articulated in his fatwas, rested upon three assumptions.9

First, he believed that terrorist attacks against the United States would provoke it into deploying

ground forces into the Middle East. Second, the presence of U.S. troops on Muslim lands

engaged in a war against Islamist fighters would convince the greater Muslim world to unify

against a common threat. And, finally, determined Islamist fighters could protract a war with the

United States that would eventually cause the collapse of the U.S. economy, forcing U.S.

policymakers to withdraw their military and economic support to their allies in the region, like

U.S. Army convoy

on patrol in Eastern

Afghanistan. By Ben

Mitchell.

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“

the Saudis and the Israelis. With the United States vanquished, al-Qaeda and its allies could

topple the existing Mideast political order and re-establish a unified Islamic empire. Bin Laden

believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union, which he attributed to the mujahedeen’s victory in

Afghanistan, proved that this strategy was feasible. In his mind, the United States would

collapse in a similar manner, as the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 following the Black

Hawk Down incident seemed to suggest. Bin Laden set his strategy in motion with a series of

attacks against U.S. targets, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and

Washington.

An Alternate Explanation for al-Shabaab Strategy in East

Africa. Until his death in 2011, bin Laden was a strong supporter of al-Shabaab; and his

intellectual influences, specifically his preference for jujitsu politics, are evident in the group’s

actions and public statements. Like bin Laden, al-Shabaab has decided to focus its military

efforts on a major economic power: Kenya, which is East Africa’s investment and financial hub.10

And also like bin Laden, al-Shabaab is attempting to defeat its preferred target by dragging it

into a bloody war of attrition aimed at destroying its economic strength and will to fight. Recent

statements released by Shabaab leaders following the commencement of ONL highlight their

strategic reasoning:

Turning this vision into reality against an economically powerful state like Kenya, moreover,

would demonstrate the power of al-Shabaab, while altering the regional balance of power in a

manner that favored al-Shabaab’s strategic goals.

To rally support for its cause, al-Shabaab has followed bin Laden’s strategic playbook by

attempting to unite Muslims against a foreign adversary. The main way that they have pursued

that goal is by characterizing the Kenyan military as a force of infidels invading a Muslim land.

In response to Kenyan actions inside Somalia, Sheikh Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair (also known as

Godane) has implored Muslims to “attack them [Kenya, Ethiopia, and AMISOM contributors]

”T

he Kenyan public must understand that the impetuous decision by their troops to cross the border into Somalia

will not be without severe repercussions. The bloody battles that will ensue as a result of this incursion will most

likely disrupt the social equilibrium and imperil the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians; and with war

consequently comes a significant loss of lives, instability, destruction to the local economy, and a critical lack of security.11

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”

successively and continue your raids, prevent them from rest, storm their headquarters, target

their routes, eradicate them by explosives, terrorize them by martyrdom, and do not be

concerned of their numbers.”12 Al-Shabaab leaders have also called attention to past incidents of

violence between Kenya and Muslim communities. For instance, statements released in April

2015 following the Garrisa University attack recall cases in which Kenyan forces have committed

atrocities against Muslims in Somalia, such as the Bulla Karatasi Massacre of 1980 and the

Wagalla Massacre of 1984.13

Al-Shabaab’s messaging tactics, combined with its decision to focus attacks on Kenya, suggest

that the group has fully embraced a jujitsu politics-styled strategy for increasing its power in

Somalia and beyond. Thus, it is not some inherent weakness or some specific action by its

leadership that has brought Kenya into al-Shabaab’s crosshairs. Rather, Kenya’s economic

strength and influence is what has made it al-Shabaab’s preferred target.

Conclusions and Implications. Viewing al-Shabaab’s attacks in Kenya through

the lens of jujitsu politics implies a different response than what the common wisdom suggests.

First, bleeding the enemy dry economically by forcing him to divert more resources to armed

forces is a specific terrorist strategy. To date, Kenya’s military spending has been at consistent

levels since 2005 (between 8 and 9 percent of government expenditures).14 Second, al-Shabaab

thrives when Kenya responds militarily. Regardless of the facts, al-Shabaab casts its war in terms

of oppression toward Muslims. This creates a perception of hostility toward Islam that has

proven to be a powerful unifying factor and recruitment tool, perpetuating the cycle of violence.

To counter this rhetoric, Kenya should work with its Muslim leadership to provide a unified

counter-point to al-Shabaab, one that is based on a moderate and orthodox interpretation of Holy

Muslim texts. To counter any Islamophobic tendencies within the non-Muslim Kenyan

populations, Kenya should engage the interfaith community. A Council of Religions who work

with marginalized communities to bring social services and education would provide a much

stronger antidote to al-Shabaab than a military response.

Finally, Kenya should convene a public relations campaign that details the atrocities that al-

Shabaab has committed against Muslims. It frequently kills and injures Muslims during its

attacks in Kenya and elsewhere. Many of the people that the al-Shabaab militants murdered at

the Westgate Mall were Muslims. Survivors of such atrocities have struggled to understand how

adherents to their faith, the name of which means “Peace,” could perpetrate such heinous attacks

on innocents and innocence.15 Scholars have cataloged the killing of Muslims as one of the

reasons why people have defected from al-Shabaab.16 Therefore, if the Kenyan government or

civil society highlighted al-Shabaab’s targeted brutality toward fellow Muslims, it would likely

go a long way in countering the group’s recruitment, sympathy, and ability to operate inside

Kenya. Most importantly, these non-militaristic responses would break the cycle of jujitsu

politics in which al-Shabaab currently has Kenya engaged.

“ Kenya’s economic

strength and in-

fluence is what

has made it

al-Shabaab’s

preferred target.

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CSIR Research Report

Notes.

2 Dan Reed, Terror at the Mall, HBO Documentary (2014). 3 Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism

(START), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 4 Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Emmanuel Kisiangani, “Implications of Kenya’s Military Offensive Against

al-Shabaab,” Institute for Security Studies, (October 25, 2011). 5 Staff Writer, “Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2015)”, Global Firepower, http://

www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 6 Andrews Atta-Asamoah, “East Africa Report: Responses to Insecurity in Kenya. Too Much, Too Little, Too

Late?” Institute for Security Studies, 3 (April 2015): 12. 7 Gross Domestic Product is a World Bank Indicator, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/ET?page=1&display=default 8 Some of the notable volumes about Osama bin Laden include: Peter Bergen, The Longest War: The

Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda (New York City: Free Press, 2011); Jonathan Randal, Osama: The

Making of a Terrorist (London: Vintage, 2004); Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An Arabian family in the American

Century (New York City: Penguin Press, 2008); Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin

Laden (New York City: Free Press, 2001); Michael Scheuer, Osama bin Laden (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2011); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (London: Vintage, 2006); Seth G.

Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York City: W. W. Norton &

Company, 2009); and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden,

from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York City: Penguin Press, 2004). 9 This paper draws its information on Osama bin Laden’s strategy primarily from his fatwas issued in the

late 1990s, such as his 1996 Declaration of Jihad against the Americans and his 1998 Jihad Against Jews and

Crusaders. 10 Jeff Otieno, “East Africa: Nairobi Termed ‘Hub of Impact Investment’ as Region Attracts U.S. $9 Billion,”

The East African (August 8, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201508102161.html. 11 “The Kenyan Public Must Think About Their Safety and Security and Urge Their Government to

Immediately Withdraw Their Troops from Somalia,” Al-Shabaab Press Release, (October 17, 2011). 12 Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Al-Zubair, “Amir of the Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen About the Recent

Developments in the Country,” (April 2012), www.azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/shaykh-mukhtar-

abc5ab-al-zubayr-22about-the-situation-in-the-country22-en.pdf; Sheikh Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair, “Amir of

Harakat Al-Shabab Mujahideen Regarding the Second London Conference and the Situation of the Somali

Government,” (May 2013), https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/shaykh-mukhtar-abc5ab-al-zubayr-

22regarding-the-second-london-conference-and-the-situation-of-the-somali-government22-en.pdf 13 “Garissa Attack: Burying Kenya’s Hopes,” Al-Shabaab Press Release, (April 4, 2015), http://

worldanalysis.net/14/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/GarissaEng.pdf. These massacres are documented in the

Kenyan Report of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission , available at http://

kenyastockholm.com/2013/05/23/full-tjrc-final-report-download/. 14 Military expenditure data are a World Bank Indicator, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

MS.MIL.XPND.ZS/countries/KE-ET-UG?display=graph 15 The events in Kampala, Uganda, and Nairobi, Kenya, that are described here are well documented in the

international media, so I do not provide copious citations here. 16 John C. Amble and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “Jihadist Radicalization in East Africa: Two Case

Studies,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37 (2014): 523–40.

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