CSCE 815 Network Security Lecture 21

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CSCE 815 Network Security CSCE 815 Network Security Lecture Lecture 21 21 Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems April 8, 2003

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CSCE 815 Network Security Lecture 21. Intrusion Detection Systems. April 8, 2003. Hackers and Crackers. The Difference A hacker is a person intensely interested in the workings of the Operating System A cracker is someone who breaks into or violates system integrity - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of CSCE 815 Network Security Lecture 21

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CSCE 815 Network Security CSCE 815 Network Security Lecture 21 Lecture 21CSCE 815 Network Security CSCE 815 Network Security Lecture 21 Lecture 21

Intrusion Detection SystemsIntrusion Detection Systems

April 8, 2003

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Hackers and CrackersHackers and Crackers

The DifferenceThe Difference A hacker is a person intensely interested in the workings of

the Operating System A cracker is someone who breaks into or violates system

integrity

Tools of the TradeTools of the Trade Reconnaissance of targets systems and users Port Scanners Passive Operating System Identification

Exploits and the SANS top 20Exploits and the SANS top 20 Exploits – known ways to break into a system SANS Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security Threats

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Tools of the TradeTools of the Trade

Tools of the TradeTools of the Trade Reconnaissance of targets systems and users Port Scanners Passive Operating System Identification

Exploits and the SANS top 20Exploits and the SANS top 20 Exploits – known ways to break into a system SANS Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security Threats

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ReconnaissanceReconnaissance

Reconnaissance of targets systems and usersReconnaissance of targets systems and users Social Engineering [Corporate Espionage, Ira Winkler] E.g.

1. Call main number “I’m new employee, what the help desk number?”

2. Call help desk explain again and ask for username, a password, and how to access the system remotely.

3. Help desk worker never questions.

Dumpster diving Impersonations – “This is Dean White and I’ve forgotten my

password and I’ve got to get this email to the President before 5:00. Give me my password!”

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ScannersScanners

Port ScannersPort Scanners Programs that check the computer’s TCP/IP stack for ports

in the listen state Port ranges: www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers

1-1023 – well known e.g. on port 80 the web server is listening 1024-49151 – registered ports 49152-65535 – dynamic ports

TCP three way handshake RFC 793TCP three way handshake RFC 793 TCP packets: SYN, ACK, FIN, RST, sent and response

noted

Scanners – do not use these!!! People will infer things!Scanners – do not use these!!! People will infer things! Nmap (www.insecure.org) hping2

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Passive Operating System IdentificationPassive Operating System Identification

aka Operating System Fingerprinting – identify the type aka Operating System Fingerprinting – identify the type of Operating System from it TCP/IP stackof Operating System from it TCP/IP stack

TCP/IP parametersTCP/IP parameters ip_default TTL (time to live) (Linux=64, Windows=128) ip_forward - tcp_sack Selective Acknowledgement Std. (Linux = 1) tcp_timestamps (Linux = 1) tcp_window_scaling (Linux = 1)

Send various packets and observe fields in headers.Send various packets and observe fields in headers.

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ExploitsExploits

Exploiting weaknesses in the systemExploiting weaknesses in the system

http://www.online.securityfocus.com/archive/1http://www.online.securityfocus.com/archive/1

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SANS Top 20SANS Top 20

SANS Institute SANS Institute http://www.sans.org/top20http://www.sans.org/top20

Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security ThreatsTop 20 Most Critical Internet Security Threats

Common Vulnerabilities and ExposuresCommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures www.cve.mitre.org

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Computer SecurityComputer Security

Not a state, it’s a constant processNot a state, it’s a constant process

Configure system as securely as possibleConfigure system as securely as possible

Discover vulnerabilityDiscover vulnerability

Exploit becomes public knowledgeExploit becomes public knowledge

Vendor responds with upgrade or patchVendor responds with upgrade or patch

Stay on top of alerts/patchesStay on top of alerts/patches Learn of exploit Assess potential impact Download patch, test, install

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Information OverloadInformation Overload

Web SitesWeb Sites

Mailing ListsMailing Lists Out of 100 messages 12-15 worthwhile Rest: me-too’s and spam

Tips for System AdministratorsTips for System Administrators Set-up special “security” email account Or partition it further Perl scripts analyze email and save into directories by OS

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Computer Emergency Response TeamComputer Emergency Response Team

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon

www.cert.org

Created in response to 1988 Morris Worm incident

Issued hundreds of advisoriesIssued hundreds of advisories

Responded to more than 140,000 reports of internet break-insResponded to more than 140,000 reports of internet break-ins

Responded to more than 7000 vulnerabilitiesResponded to more than 7000 vulnerabilities

[www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats][www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats]

On call 24 hours a day for those suffering break-inOn call 24 hours a day for those suffering break-in

Others:Others: Dept of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Cap: www.cisc.org/ciac National Inst. of Standards and Tech.(NIST) csrc.nist.gov

Mailing ListsMailing Lists

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Usenet Security NewsgroupsUsenet Security Newsgroups

alt.2600.crackzalt.2600.crackz

alt.2600.hackerzalt.2600.hackerz

alt.computer.securityalt.computer.security

alt.hackers.maliciousalt.hackers.malicious

alt.securityalt.security

alt.security.pgpalt.security.pgp

comp.security.firewallscomp.security.firewalls

comp.lang.java.securitycomp.lang.java.security

comp.os.linux.securitycomp.os.linux.security

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Physical SecurityPhysical Security

Mentality “firewalls fix everything”Mentality “firewalls fix everything”

More than 50% of security breaches come from insideMore than 50% of security breaches come from inside

Types of HarmTypes of Harm Server compromise Network infrastructure compromise Workstation compromise (Trojans) Loss or theft of proprietary data Transmission of inaccurate data Denial of Service

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The Human DimensionThe Human Dimension

Dimension: least risk to mostDimension: least risk to most Members of public Temporary employees Departmental users Infrastructure Server Administrators

Scofflaw employees – that want to bypass security Scofflaw employees – that want to bypass security rules for their convenience, e.g., installing own rules for their convenience, e.g., installing own modemmodem

IT employees: logic bombIT employees: logic bomb

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Physical Security: “Do”sPhysical Security: “Do”s

Do: lock wiring closetsDo: lock wiring closets

Do: use switches rather than hubs (esp. for admins)Do: use switches rather than hubs (esp. for admins)

Do: change locks immediately when employee leavesDo: change locks immediately when employee leaves

Do: erase hard drives when you take them out of Do: erase hard drives when you take them out of serviceservice

Do: use a paper shredderDo: use a paper shredder

Do: lock the server cabinetsDo: lock the server cabinets

Do: restrict or forbid the use of modems on desktopsDo: restrict or forbid the use of modems on desktops

Do: make sure road laptops and PDAs are secureDo: make sure road laptops and PDAs are secure

Do: consider use of smart-cards rather than passwords Do: consider use of smart-cards rather than passwords for administratorsfor administrators

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Recommended ReadingRecommended Reading

Comer, D. Comer, D. Internetworking with TCP/IP, Volume I: Internetworking with TCP/IP, Volume I: Principles, Protocols and ArchitecturePrinciples, Protocols and Architecture. Prentic Hall, . Prentic Hall, 19951995

Stevens, W. Stevens, W. TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 1: The TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 1: The ProtocolsProtocols. Addison-Wesley, 1994. Addison-Wesley, 1994

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Physical Security: “Don’t”sPhysical Security: “Don’t”s

Don’t: send off-site backups to unsecured sitesDon’t: send off-site backups to unsecured sites

Don’t: give keys to vendorsDon’t: give keys to vendors

Don’t: allow adhoc access to data centerDon’t: allow adhoc access to data center

Don’t: share wire closets with printers etc.Don’t: share wire closets with printers etc.

Don’t: put servers in unsecured areasDon’t: put servers in unsecured areas

Don’t: leave server keys on back on serverDon’t: leave server keys on back on server

Don’t: let cleaning people in without escortDon’t: let cleaning people in without escort

Don’t: store sensitive data on user drives (or encrypt)Don’t: store sensitive data on user drives (or encrypt)

Don’t: discuss passwords over non-secure channelsDon’t: discuss passwords over non-secure channels

Don’t: put consoles near windowsDon’t: put consoles near windows

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Protocol ReviewProtocol Review

IP internet protocol – routing packets through networkIP internet protocol – routing packets through network

TCP – connection oriented transportTCP – connection oriented transport

UDP – UDP –

ARP – address resolution protocolARP – address resolution protocol

ICMP – internet control message protocolICMP – internet control message protocol

Application layer – FTP, HTTP, SMTP, SNMP, SSHApplication layer – FTP, HTTP, SMTP, SNMP, SSH

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Spoofing AttacksSpoofing Attacks

Spoofing means fraudulently authenticating one Spoofing means fraudulently authenticating one machine as anothermachine as another

P 131 “A Short Overview of IP Spoofing”P 131 “A Short Overview of IP Spoofing”

www.nmrc.org/files/unix/ip.exploit.txtwww.nmrc.org/files/unix/ip.exploit.txt

Preventing IP spoofingPreventing IP spoofing

have your routers reject packets with local have your routers reject packets with local addresses from the outsideaddresses from the outside

also have them reject internal packets claiming to also have them reject internal packets claiming to originate from the outsideoriginate from the outside

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ARP SpoofingARP Spoofing

Address resolution Protocol (ARP)Address resolution Protocol (ARP)

IP address IP address hardware(ethernet) address mapping hardware(ethernet) address mapping

send ARP packet “who has IP address and what is send ARP packet “who has IP address and what is your hardware address?”your hardware address?”

ARP cache – table of recent responsesARP cache – table of recent responses

ARP SpoofingARP Spoofing

1.1. Assume IP address “a” of trusted hostAssume IP address “a” of trusted host

2.2. Respond to ARP packets for address “a”Respond to ARP packets for address “a”

3.3. Sending false hardware address (I.e. the fraud’s Sending false hardware address (I.e. the fraud’s address)address)

Solution: make ARP cache static (manual updates!?!)Solution: make ARP cache static (manual updates!?!)

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DNS SpoofingDNS Spoofing

Domain Name System (DNS)Domain Name System (DNS) hierarchical name servers map FQDN IP address UDP packet sent with name to name server

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Web SpoofingWeb Spoofing

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Security MythSecurity Myth

““The only secure computer is the one that is turned off The only secure computer is the one that is turned off and unplugged”and unplugged”

Once connected to internet it becomes a targetOnce connected to internet it becomes a target

So shutdown all unnecessary services.So shutdown all unnecessary services.

Myth 2 “My firewall will stop the pesky crackers!”Myth 2 “My firewall will stop the pesky crackers!”

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The Players, Platforms and AttacksThe Players, Platforms and Attacks

The Players:The Players: The Black Hats Script kiddies The White Hats

Platforms of attackersPlatforms of attackers1. Windows2. Linux/NetBSD/FreeBSD3. OpenBSD billed as “the most secure OS freely available”

AttacksAttacks Denial of Service Viruses, Trojans, malicious scripts Web defacement

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