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Bibliografia delle opere di Elinor Ostrom[le opere sono elencate in ordine cronologico inverso, ove disponibile è stato incluso l'abstract.Fonte: Database Econlit consultazione del 13/10/2009]Per l'accesso ai documenti è possibile contattare l'ufficio reference.

<1>. 1056271Autori: Janssen, Marco A; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Adoption of a New Regulation for the Governance of Common-Pool Resources by aHeterogeneous Population.Sta in: Recent Developments in Ecological Economics. Volume 2.. Martinez-Alier, Joan. Ropke, Inge,eds., Elgar Reference Collection. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 320-56.2008. Previously Published: 2007.Update Code 200908

<2>. 1055993Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Developing a Method for Analyzing Institutional Change.Sta in: Alternative Institutional Structures: Evolution and Impact. Batie, Sandra S. Mercuro,Nicholas, eds., Economics of Legal Relationships series. London and New York: Taylor andFrancis, Routledge. p 48-76. 2008.Update Code 200908

<3>. 1035626Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies.Sta in: World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), Working Papers:DP2005/01. p 10 pages. 2005.Update Code 200907

<4>. 1040620

Autori: Schwab, David; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Vital Role of Norms and Rules in Maintaining Open Public and Private Economies.Sta in: Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy. Zak, Paul J., ed., Foreword byMichael C. Jensen. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. p 204-27. 2008.Update Code 200905

<5>. 1010498Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.Sta in: Environmental Planning. van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M. Button, Kenneth. Nijkamp, Peter,eds., Elgar Reference Collection. Classics in Planning, vol. 8.. Cheltenham, U.K. andNorthampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 278-99. 2007. Previously Published: 2000.Update Code 200904

<6>. 0980123Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Hess, Charlotte.Titolo: A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons.Sta in: Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. Hess, Charlotte. Ostrom,Elinor, eds., Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. p 41-81. 2007.Update Code 200904

<7>. 0980121Autori: Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons.Sta in: Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. Hess, Charlotte. Ostrom,Elinor, eds., Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. p 3-26. 2007.Update Code 200904

<8>. 0965184Autori: Poteete, Amy R; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management:Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research.Sta in: World Development. Vol. 36 (1). p 176-95. January 2008.Abstract

Many debates exist among social scientists that relate to the "best" way of collecting dataabout important theoretical questions. As scholars, who conduct individual case studies as wellas participate in large-N studies combining qualitative and quantitative data, we recognize thevalue of each research strategy and trade-offs in choosing between them. We support thecombination of qualitative and quantitative methods to build on the strengths of each. A meta-analysis of the scholarly literature indexed during 1990-2004 on collective action related tonatural resource governance yielded strong evidence that small-N studies are still thedominant empirical method. The continued reliance on research designs with limitedcomparative scope reflects practical challenges that limit the quantity and geographic breadthof data that any one researcher can collect using field-based research. We discuss the relativemerits and shortcomings of two strategies for overcoming those challenges: Meta-databasesconstructed from existing qualitative studies and large-N field-based studies. Resourceconstraints, career incentives, and, ironically, collective action problems among researcherscurrently limit adoption of these strategies.Update Code 200904

<9>. 0942297Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Nagendra, Harini.Titolo: Tenure Alone Is Not Sufficient: Monitoring Is Essential.Sta in: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. Vol. 8 (3). p 175-99. 2007.Abstract Many scholars call for the establishment of one kind of formal tenure--government ownership,privatization, or community control---as the way to solve problems associated with high levelsof deforestation. This will not work without extensive and consistent monitoring of forest use.In this article, we draw on analyses of time-series remote images, on-the-ground social-ecological surveys of local stakeholders and their forests, and experimental laboratory studiesto show that "protected" forests may not be protected in practice when tenure alone is deemedto be the "solution." When users themselves consider the rules in place to be legitimate, theyare frequently willing to engage themselves in monitoring and sanctioning of uses consideredillegal, even when related to government-owned property. When users are genuinely engagedin decisions about rules affecting their use, the likelihood of users to follow the rules andmonitor others is much greater than when an external authority simply imposes rules. Simpleformulas focusing on formal ownership, particularly ones based solely on public ownership offorested lands, will not solve the problems of resource overuse.Update Code 200904

<10>. 0775044Autori: Gibson, Clark C; Williams, John T; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Local Enforcement and Better Forests.Sta in: World Development. Vol. 33 (2). p 273-84. February 2005.Abstract Current studies of local resource management examine many factors thought to be associatedwith good resource conditions. Despite the number of studies and the importance of suchresources to millions of people worldwide, a lack of theory and hypothesis testing beyond thecase level limits the lessons empirical studies offer. We argue that regular monitoring andsanctioning of rules--rule enforcement--is a necessary condition for successful resourcemanagement. We test our theory using data regarding 178 user groups and by pairing ruleenforcement with other important factors: social capital, formal organization, and dependenceon forest products.Update Code 200904

<11>. 0793515Autori: Cardenas, Juan Camilo; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Que traen las personas al juego? Experimentos de campo sobre la cooperacion en los recursosde uso comun. (With English summary.)Sta in: Desarrollo y Sociedad. Vol. 0 (54). p 87-132. September 2004.Update Code 200904

<12>. 0540942Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.Sta in: Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 14 (3). p 137-58. Summer 2000.Abstract I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators"and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionaryapproach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemmasituations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist inexplaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are typesof goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, Ireexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination ofextensive case materials.Update Code 200904

<13>. 0851099Autori: Tucker, Catherine M; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Multidisciplinary Research Relating Institutions and Forest Transformations.Sta in: Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems.Moran, Emilio F. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p 81-103. 2005.Update Code 200904

<14>. 0851096Autori: VanWey, Leah K; Ostrom, Elinor; Meretsky, Vicky.Titolo: Theories Underlying the Study of Human-Environment Interactions.Sta in: Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems.Moran, Emilio F. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p 23-56. 2005.Update Code 200904

<15>. 0768006Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Study of Human-Ecological Systems in the Laboratory.Sta in: Sustainable agriculture in Central and Eastern European countries: The environmental effectsof transition and needs for change. Gatzweiler, Franz W. Judis, Renate. Hagedorn, Konrad,eds., Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources, vol. 10. Aachen, Germany:Shaker. p 99-113. 2002.Update Code 200904

<16>. 0790482Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Ahn, T. K.Titolo: The Foundations of Social Capital: Introduction.Sta in: Foundations of social capital. Ostrom, Elinor. Ahn, T. K., eds., Elgar Reference Collection.Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, vol. 2. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.:Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p xi-xxxix.2003.Update Code 200904

<17>. 0784822Autori: Walker, James; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research: Conclusion.Sta in: Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Ostrom, Elinor.Walker, James, eds., Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 381-87.2003.Update Code 200904

<18>. 0784819Autori: Ahn, T. K; Ostrom, Elinor; Schmidt, David; Walker, James.Titolo: Trust in Two-Person Games: Game Structures and Linkages.Sta in: Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Ostrom, Elinor.Walker, James, eds., Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 323-51.2003.Update Code 200904

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0784809Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation.Sta in: Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Ostrom, Elinor.Walker, James, eds., Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 19-79.2003.Update Code 200904

<20>. 0601781Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?Sta in: Social capital: A multifaceted perspective. Dasgupta, Partha. Serageldin, Ismail, eds.,Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p 172-214. 2000.Update Code 200904

<21>. 0821823Autori: Moran, Emilio F; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.Titolo: Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems.Sta in: Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p xiii, 442. 2005.Abstract Twelve papers present the results of research into land-use/land-cover change, particularlyhuman-forest interactions, conducted at the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population,and Environmental Change, Indiana University, and provide insight into why some forests arethriving while others are declining and becoming degraded. Papers focus on theoriesunderlying the study of human-environment interactions; useful concepts and approaches forland-cover change studies; multidisciplinary research relating institutions and foresttransformations; forest ecosystems and the human dimensions; retrieving land-cover changeinformation from Landsat satellite images by minimizing other sources of reflectancevariability; human-environment research, spatially explicit data analysis, and geographicinformation systems; modeling land-use/land-cover change; intraregional analysis of land-usechange in the Amazon; processes of forest change at the local and landscape levels inHonduras and Guatemala; comparison of aboveground biomass across Amazon sites; theopportunities and challenges of research in Africa and Asia as compared to research in theAmericas with respect to land tenure, land-cover change history, population characteristics,and other factors that impact human-environment interactions; and a meta-analysis ofagricultural change. Contributors include geologists, anthropologists, and environmentalscientists. Moran is at Indiana University and its Center for the Study of Institutions,Population, and Environmental Change and its Anthropological Center for Training andResearch on Global Environmental Change. Ostrom is at Indiana University and with its Centerfor the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change. Index.Update Code 200904

<22>. 0665779Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Ahn, T. K., eds.Titolo: Foundations of social capital.Sta in: Elgar Reference Collection. Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, vol. 2. Cheltenham, U.K.and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International DistributionCorporation, Williston, Vt.. p xxxix, 590. 2003.Abstract Twenty-three previously published papers represent foundational and contemporarycontributions to the concept of social capital and the social capital research paradigm. Containsvery early contributions, published between 1840 and 1961; provides contemporary conceptualand philosophical foundations in the form of papers published between 1973 and 1988; andpresents more recent work dealing with forms of social capital, social capital and development,and social capital and democracy. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Ahn is at Florida StateUniversity. Name index.Update Code 200904

<23>. 0658287Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James, eds.Titolo: Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research.Sta in: Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p xiii, 409. 2003.Abstract Thirteen papers, resulting from a series of meetings on trust held at the Russell SageFoundation, examine the foundations for trust and trustworthiness. Papers discuss stepstoward a behavioral theory linking trust, reciprocity, and reputation; gaming trust; thebiological foundations of reciprocity; the chimpanzee's service economy; a cognitive theory ofreciprocal exchange; conflict, interpersonal assessment, and the evolution of cooperation;experimental studies of cooperation, trust, and social exchange; trust and reciprocity insequential games; strategic assessment in games; trust in children; trust in two-persongames; cross-societal experimentation on trust; and what nonexperimentalists can learn fromexperimentalists. Ostrom and Walker are at Indiana University. Glossary; index.Update Code 200904

<24>. 0998940Autori: Blomquist, William; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Symposium in Honour of Viktor Vanburg: Deliberation, Learning, and Institutional Change:The Evolution of Institutions in Judicial Settings.Sta in: Constitutional Political Economy. Vol. 19 (3). p 180-202. September 2008.Abstract Institutional change entails institutional design, assessment, and modification, whichnecessarily take place within the constraints and opportunities afforded by existing institutionalarrangements. Viktor Vanberg has made major contributions to our understanding of howinstitutions evolve. We wish to contribute to this symposium in honor of Vanberg by analyzinghow institutions for the management of water institutions in Southern California evolvedprimarily through the use of the courts as settings for deliberation, learning and institutionalchange.Update Code 200811

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. 0976344Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of InstitutionalAnalysis.Sta in: Journal of Institutional Economics. Vol. 3 (3). p 239-64. December 2007.Abstract This article briefly describes some of the intellectual challenges during the last half-century tothe traditional fields of economics and political science: the public choice approach, the tragedyof the commons debate, the 'new' institutional economics, and behavioral game theory. Then,the components of a basic institutional analysis framework are presented that provide ageneral method for analyzing public economies and diverse forms of collective action. Empiricalresearch related to metropolitan public economies, common-pool resources, and behavioralgame theory is summarized that has contributed to the field of institutional analysis. The lastsection concludes that the macro foundations of institutional analysis appear firmer than themicro foundations related to the model of the individual to be used and discusses this puzzle.Update Code 200806

<26>. 0969410Autori: Andersson, Krister P; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a Polycentric Perspective.Sta in: Policy Sciences. Vol. 41 (1). p 71-93. March 2008.Abstract This article seeks to shed new light on the study of decentralized natural resource governanceby applying institutional theories of polycentricity--the relationships among multiple authoritieswith overlapping jurisdictions. The emphasis on multi-level dynamics has not penetratedempirical studies of environmental policy reforms in non-industrial countries. On the contrary,many of today's decentralization proponents seem to be infatuated with the local sphere,expecting that local actors are always able and willing to govern their natural resourceseffectively. Existing studies in this area often focus exclusively on characteristics andperformance of local institutions. While we certainly do not deny the importance of localinstitutions, we argue that institutional arrangements operating at other governance scales--such as national government agencies, international organizations, NGOs at multiple scales,and private associations--also often have critical roles to play in natural resource governanceregimes, including self-organized regimes.Update Code 200805

<27>. 0966110Autori: Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb; Kanbur, Ravi; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Beyond Formality and Informality.Sta in: Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies. Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb.Kanbur, Ravi. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics series.Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p 1-18. 2006.Update Code 200804

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. 0966100Autori: Janssen, Marco A; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Adoption of a New Regulation for the Governance of Common-Pool Resources by aHeterogeneous Population.Sta in: Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability. Baland, Jean-Marie. Bardhan,Pranab. Bowles, Samuel, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press. p 60-96. 2007.Update Code 200804

<29>. 0946365Autori: Cox, James C; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M; Castillo, Jamie; Coleman, Eric; Holahan,Robert; Schoon, Michael; Steed, Brian.Titolo: Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments.Sta in: Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia StateUniversity, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series: 2007-11. p 28. 2007.Abstract We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate behavior in twosettings that are frequently posited in the policy literature as generating different outcomes:private property and common property. The experimental settings closely parallel earlierexperimental studies of the investment or trust game. The primary research question relates tothe effect of the initial allocation of property rights on the level of trust that subjects willextend to others with whom they are linked. We find that assigning the initial endowments ascommon property of each of N pairs of a first mover and second mover leads to marginallygreater cooperation or trust than when the initial endowments are fully owned by the twoindividual movers as their, respective, private property. Subjects' decisions are also shown tobe correlated with attitudes toward trust and fairness that are measured in post-experimentquestionnaires.Update Code 200712

<30>. 0603467Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Evolution of Norms within Institutions: Comments on Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H.Ehrlich's, 'Population, Development, and Human Nature.'.Sta in: Environment and Development Economics. Vol. 7 (1). p 177-82. February 2002.Update Code 200710

<31>. 0926382Autori: Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.Titolo: Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice.Sta in: Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. p xiii, 367. 2007.

Abstract Eleven papers, originally presented at the "Workshop on Scholarly Communication as aCommons" held in the spring of 2004, consider historically the concept of the knowledgecommons in the digital era and offer an analytical framework for understanding knowledge as ashared social-ecological system. Papers discuss the growth of the commons paradigm (DavidBollier); a framework for analyzing the knowledge commons (Elinor Ostrom and CharlotteHess); countering enclosure--reclaiming the knowledge commons (Nancy Kranich);Mertonianism unbound--imagining free, decentralized access to most cultural and scientificmaterial (James Boyle); preserving the knowledge commons (Donald J. Waters); creating anintellectual commons through open access (Peter Suber); how to build a commons--whetherintellectual property is constrictive, facilitating, or irrelevant (Shubha Ghosh); collective action,civic engagement, and the knowledge commons (Peter Levine); free/open-source software as aframework for establishing commons in science (Charles M. Schweik); scholarly communicationand libraries unbound--the opportunity of the commons (Wendy Pradt Lougee); and EconPort--creating and maintaining a knowledge commons (James C. Cox and J. Todd Swarthout). Hessis Director of the Digital Library of the Commons at Indian University. Ostrom is Arthur F.Bentley Professor of Political Science, Codirector of the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis, and Codirector of the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, andEnvironmental Change at Indiana University. Glossary; index.Update Code 200709

<32>. 0904314Autori: Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb; Kanbur, Ravi; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.Titolo: Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies.Sta in: UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics series. Oxford and New York: OxfordUniversity Press. p xvii, 294. 2006.Abstract Fourteen papers, originally presented at a conference organized by the Expert Group onDevelopment Issues and held in Helsinki in September 2004, explore issues in formality andinformality in developing countries. Papers discuss bureaucratic form and the informaleconomy; the global path--soft law and nonsovereigns formalizing the potency of the informalsector; the relevance of the concepts of formality and informality--a theoretical appraisal;rethinking the informal economy--linkages with the formal economy and the formal regulatoryenvironment; formal and informal enterprises--concept, definition, and measurement issues inIndia; the impact of regulation on growth and informality--cross-country evidence; financialliberalization in Vietnam--impact on loans from informal, formal, and semiformal providers;blocking human potential--how formal policies block the informal economy in the Maputocorridor; microinsurance for the informal economy workers in India; turning to forestry for away out of poverty--whether formalizing property rights is enough; voluntary contributions toinformal activities producing public goods--whether these can be induced by government andother formal sector agents--some evidence from Indonesian Posyandus; social capital, survivalstrategies, and their potential for postconflict governance in Liberia; enforcement andcompliance in Lima's street markets--the origins and consequences of policy incoherencetoward informal traders; and formalizing the informal--whether there is a way to safely unlockhuman potential through land entitlement--a review of changing land administration in Africa.Guha-Khasnobis is Research Fellow and Project Director at UNU-WIDER. Kanbur is T. H. LeeProfessor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and Management, andProfessor of Economics at Cornell University. Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of PoliticalScience at Indiana University. Index.Update Code 200706

<33>. 0879352Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo: The Value-Added of Laboratory Experiments for the Study of Institutions and Common-PoolResources.Sta in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Vol. 61 (2). p 149-63. October 2006.Abstract This article provides an overview of the effects of communication on experimental studies ofbehavior and outcomes in common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas. Aggregate outcomes in CPRdilemmas without communication approximate predictions of non-cooperative game theory,but allowing cheap talk results in higher outcomes. When exogenous rules are monitored atrealistic levels, subjects cheat even though following the rule would generate optimaloutcomes. If given the opportunity, experimental subjects will devise their own rule systemsand impose sanctions on each other. These findings complement field research on morecomplex resources and communities by confirming the critical importance of communicationand endogenous rule formation.Update Code 200612

<34>. 0873639Autori: Gibson, Clark C; Andersson, Krister; Ostrom, Elinor; Shivakumar, Sujai.Titolo: The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid.Sta in: Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p xx, 264. 2005.Abstract Introduces a new approach to the study of development aid that puts the institutionalincentives at the center of the development process. Discusses what's wrong with developmentaid; the theoretical foundations for the study of development aid; better development throughbetter policy--development aid's challenges at the collective-choice level; incentives acrossaction situations in development aid; a formal analysis of incentives in strategic interactionsinvolving an international development cooperation agency; the incentives of different types ofaid; applying the Institutional Analysis and Development framework--the incentives inside adevelopment agency; incentives for contractors in aid-supported activities; SwedishInternational Development Cooperation Agency aid in electricity and natural resource projectsin India and Zambia; and what we have learned about aid. Gibson is at the University ofCalifornia, San Diego. Andersson is at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Ostrom is at IndianaUniversity. Shivakumar is with the United States National Academies' Board on Science,Technology, and Economic Policy. Bibliography; index.Update Code 200611

<35>. 0865275Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Janssen, Marco A.Titolo: Multi-level Governance and Resilience of Social-Ecological Systems.Sta in: Globalisation, poverty and conflict: A critical 'development' reader. Spoor, Max, ed.,Dordrecht; Boston and London: Kluwer Academic. p 239-59. 2004.Update Code 200609

<36>. 0860578Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo: Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies.Sta in: Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Menard, Claude. Shirley, Mary M., eds., Dordrechtand New York: Springer. p 819-48. 2005.Update Code 200608

<37>. 0821537Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Understanding Institutional Diversity.Sta in: Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. p xv, 355. 2005.Abstract Articulates the components of institutions and how they can be used to generate explanationsof human behavior in diverse situations. Discusses the action situation as a focal unit ofanalysis and describes the basic working parts of an action situation. Provides a brief overviewof two action situations that have been studied extensively in the experimental laboratories inmany countries: the trust game and the commons dilemma. Discusses how to animate theinstitutional analysis by specifying key assumptions about the individual actors holdingpositions in the situation. Develops a grammar of institutions, elucidating a syntax thatillustrates the similarities and differences between shared strategies, norms, and rules.Introduces an approach to classifying rules. Describes seven generic rules that individuals usewhen establishing or changing action situations they confront in everyday life. Applies thesetools, and the framework developed, to a focused study of common-pool resource problemsand discusses robust governance in polycentric institutions. Ostrom is Arthur F. BentleyProfessor of Political Science and Codirector of the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis and the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change atIndiana University. Index.Update Code 200600

<38>. 0822440Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Response to Zakir Husain and Rabindra Bhattacharya's "Common Pool Resources andContextual Factors: Evolution of a Fishermen's Cooperative in Calcutta".Sta in: Ecological Economics. Vol. 55 (2). p 139-42. November 2005.Update Code 200600

<39>. 0827060Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.Sta in: The Foundations of the New Institutional Economics. Menard, Claude, ed., Elgar ReferenceCollection. International Library of the New Institutional Economics, vol. 1. Cheltenham, U.K.and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 429-51. 2004. Previously Published: 1986.Update Code 200600

<40>. 0830902Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: PresidentialAddress, American Political Science Association, 1997.Sta in: Transaction Costs and Property Rights. Menard, Claude, ed., Elgar Reference Collection.International Library of the New Institutional Economics, vol. 2. Cheltenham, U.K. andNorthampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 110-31. 2004. Previously Published: 1998.Update Code 200600

<41>. 0764471Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Achieving Progress in Solving Collective-Action Problems.Sta in: Making progress: Essays in progress and public policy. Anderson, C. Leigh. Looney, Janet W.,eds., Lanham, Md. and Oxford: Lexington Books. p 165-90. 2002.Update Code 200500

<42>. 0763595Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory.Sta in: Handbook of agricultural economics. Volume 2A. Agriculture and its external linkages.Gardner, Bruce L. Rausser, Gordon C., eds., Handbooks in Economics, vol. 18. Amsterdam;London and New York: Elsevier Science, North-Holland. p 1315-39. 2002.Update Code 200500

<43>. 0763330Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.Sta in: Water resources and economic development. Saleth, R. Maria, ed., Elgar Reference Collection.Management of Water Resources, vol. 3. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar;distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p 308-21. 2002.Previously Published: 1972.Update Code 200500

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0780402Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.Sta in: Property rights and environmental problems. Volume 2. Larson, Bruce A., ed., InternationalLibrary of Environmental Economics and Policy. Aldershot, U.K. and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.p 445-50. 2003. Previously Published: 1993.Update Code 200500

<45>. 0780366Autori: Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis.Sta in: Property rights and environmental problems. Volume 1. Larson, Bruce A., ed., InternationalLibrary of Environmental Economics and Policy. Aldershot, U.K. and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.p 165-78. 2003. Previously Published: 1992.Update Code 200500

<46>. 0778732Autori: Dolsak, Nives; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Challenges of the Commons.Sta in: The commons in the new millennium: Challenges and adaptation. Dolsak, Nives. Ostrom,Elinor, eds., Politics, Science and the Environment series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.p 3-34. 2003.Update Code 200500

<47>. 0791141Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Reformulating the Commons.Sta in: Environment in the new global economy. Volume 1. Analytic approaches to the IPE of theenvironment. Haas, Peter M., ed., Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of Writingson the New Global Economy, vol. 1. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 118-42. 2003. Previously Published: 2001.Update Code 200500

<48>. 0674573Autori: Ahn, T. K; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M.Titolo:

Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action.Sta in: Public Choice. Vol. 117 (3-4). p 295-314. December 2003.Abstract In recent years, scholars have turned to alternative representations of utility to capturemotivational heterogeneity across individuals. In the research reported here, we examine twomodels of heterogeneous utility--linear-altruism and inequity-aversion--in the context of two-person, social dilemma games. Empirical tests are conducted drawing on data fromexperiments and surveys. We find that the model of inequity-aversion accounts for asubstantial proportion of the preference types and behavior that are not explained by thestandard model of self-interested preferences. In contrast, the altruism model does not providea significant increase in explanatory power over the inequity-aversion model.Update Code 200400

<49>. 0680503Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Ostrom, Vincent.Titolo: The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice.Sta in: American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Vol. 63 (1). p 105-47. Special Issue January2004.Abstract The logical foundations of constitutional government are of basic importance if people are tobe self-governing. All forms of political order are Faustian bargains subject to numerous risks.If constitutional choice applies to all patterns of human association, the complexity ofassociated relationships and the potential threats to the viability of associated relationships inthe aggregate exceed the limits of human cognition. The development of analytical capabilitiesdepends on using frameworks, theories, and models for formulating hypotheses aboutconditions and consequences, undertaking diagnostic assessments, and conceptualizing anddesigning alternative possibilities. The relationship of ideas to deeds in an experimentalepistemology is necessary to achieve a warrantable art and science of association.Update Code 200400

<50>. 0743009Autori: Poteete, Amy R; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in ForestManagement.Sta in: Development and Change. Vol. 35 (3). p 435-61. June 2004.Abstract Collective action for sustainable management among resource-dependent populations hasimportant policy implications. Despite considerable progress in identifying factors that affectthe prospects for collective action, no consensus exists about the role played by heterogeneityand size of group. The debate continues in part because of a lack of uniform conceptualizationof these factors, the existence of nonlinear relationships, and the mediating role played byinstitutions. This article draws on research by scholars in the International Forestry Resourcesand Institutions (IFRI) research network which demonstrates that some forms of heterogeneitydo not negatively affect some forms of collective action. More importantly, IFRI research drawsout the interrelations among group size, heterogeneity, and institutions. Institutions can affectthe level of heterogeneity or compensate for it. Group size appears to have a nonlinearrelationship to at least some forms of collective action. Moreover, group size may be as muchan indicator of institutional success as a precondition for such success.Update Code 200400

<51>. 0640152Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 472-521. 2000. Previously Published: 1998.Update Code 200300

<52>. 0640151Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James.Titolo: Neither Markets nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Areas.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 427-71. 2000. Previously Published: 1997.Update Code 200300

<53>. 0640150Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy.Titolo: Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 399-420. 2000. Previously Published: 1993.Update Code 200300

<54>. 0640149Autori: Weissing, Franz J; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement on Government- andFarmer-Managed Systems.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 366-98. 2000. Previously Published: 1993.Update Code 200300

<55>.

0640140Autori: Crawford, Sue E. S; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: A Grammar of Institutions.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 114-55. 2000. Previously Published: 1995.Update Code 200300

<56>. 0640139Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 89-113. 2000. Previously Published: 1986.Update Code 200300

<57>. 0640138Autori: Kiser, Larry L; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 56-88. 2000. Previously Published: 1982.Update Code 200300

<58>. 0640137Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration.Sta in: Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and PolicyAnalysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 34-55. 2000. Previously Published: 1971.Update Code 200300

<59>. 0647110Autori: Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource.

Sta in: Law and Contemporary Problems. Vol. 66 (1-2). p 111-45. Winter-Spring 2003.Update Code 200300

<60>. 0658668Autori: Dolsak, Nives; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.Titolo: The commons in the new millennium: Challenges and adaptation.Sta in: Politics, Science and the Environment series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p xxiv,369. 2003.Abstract Nine papers, presented at the 2000 International Association for the Study of CommonProperty conference held in Bloomington, Indiana, analyze new challenges that owners,mangers, policymakers, and analysts face in managing natural commons such as forests, waterresources, and fisheries. Papers discuss change in the territorial system of the Maine lobsterindustry; transition in the American fishing commons; the implications of scale for forestdefinition and management; fishers' experiences with New Zealand's market-based fisheriesmanagement; individual transferable quotas in Icelandic fisheries, 1991-2001; multilateralemission trading; how local forest tenure is shaped by national politics, with special referenceto Indonesia; a framework for analyzing the physical, social, and human-capital effects ofmicrocredit on common pool resources; and whether local communities can use the socialcapital formed for communal-resource management to create political capital, focusing on thecase of devolution in Thailand's forestry sector. Dolsak is at the University of Washington,Bothell. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Index.Update Code 200300

<61>. 0664810Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Private and Common Property Rights.Sta in: Encyclopedia of law and economics. Volume 2. Civil law and economics. Bouckaert,Boudewijn. De Geest, Gerrit, eds., Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar;distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p 332-79. 2000.Update Code 200300

<62>. 0592866Autori: Parks, Roger B; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Complex Models of Urban Service Systems.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 355-80. 1999. Previously Published: 1981.Update Code 200200

<63>

. 0592862Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Parks, Roger B.Titolo: Neither Gargantua nor the Land of Lilliputs: Conjectures on Mixed Systems of MetropolitanOrganization.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 284-305. 1999.Update Code 200200

<64>. 0592861Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Parks, Roger B; Whitaker, Gordon P.Titolo: Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 265-83. 1999. Previously Published: 1974.Update Code 200200

<65>. 0592860Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Size and Performance in a Federal System.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 232-62. 1999. Previously Published: 1976.Update Code 200200

<66>. 0592859Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Whitaker, Gordon P.Titolo: Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in BlackNeighborhoods.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 203-31. 1999. Previously Published: 1974.Update Code 200200

<67>. 0592858Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Whitaker, Gordon P.Titolo: Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 176-202. 1999. Previously Published: 1973.Update Code 200200

<68>. 0592857Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Why Do We Need Multiple Indicators of Public Service Outputs?Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 163-75. 1999. Previously Published: 1977.Update Code 200200

<69>. 0592856Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 139-60. 1999. Previously Published: 1972.Update Code 200200

<70>. 0592854Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations.Sta in: Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 107-18. 1999. Previously Published: 1965.Update Code 200200

<71>. 0592853Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Public Goods and Public Choices.Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 75-103. 1999. Previously Published: 1977.Update Code 200200

<72>. 0613142Autori: Ostrom, Elinor, et al., eds.Titolo: The drama of the commons.Sta in: Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. p xii, 521. 2002.Abstract Thirteen papers examine what has been learned over decades of research into how the dramaof commons plays out. Papers address common resources and institutional sustainability;heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research; a review ofexperimental psychological research of factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas;a theoretical explanation for appropriating the commons; the tradable permits approach toprotecting the commons; comparing community-based management to tradable environmentalallowances; the environmental consequences of cross-scale interactions; perspectives from thebottom-up of cross-scale institutional linkages; scientific uncertainty, complex systems, andthe design of common-pool institutions; emergence of institutions for the commons; anevolutionary theory of commons management; and knowledge and questions after fifteenyears of research. Co-editors include Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, SusanStonich, and Elke U. Weber. Ostrom is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science andco-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and of the Center for theStudy of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Index.Update Code 200200

<73>. 0577227Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Norms and Efficiency.Sta in: Recasting egalitarianism: New rules for communities, states and markets. Bowles, Samuel.Gintis, Herbert., With contributions by Harry Brighouse et al. Edited and introduced by Erik OlinWright. Real Utopias Project, vol. 3. London and New York: New Left Books, Verso. p 113-20.1998.Update Code 200100

<74>. 0549121Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Institutional Analysis and Development Approach.Sta in: Designing institutions for environmental and resource management. Loehman, Edna Tusak.Kilgour, D. Marc, eds., New Horizons in Environmental Economics. Cheltenham, U.K. andNorthampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation,Williston, Vt.. p 68-90. 1998.Update Code 200100

<75>. 0569404Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development.Sta in: Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 346-74. 1999. Previously Published: 1996.

Update Code 200100

<76>. 0569394Autori: Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Property Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An Empirical Analysis.Sta in: Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 87-113. 1999. Previously Published: 1993.

Update Code 200100

<77>. 0569393Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.Sta in: Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 74-86. 1999. Previously Published: 1993.Update Code 200100

<78>. 0569392Autori: Blomquist, William; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma.Sta in: Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 60-73. 1999. Previously Published: 1985.Update Code 200100

<79>

. 0569391Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.Sta in: Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press. p 42-59. 1999. Previously Published: 1972.Update Code 200100

<80>. 0574343Autori: Levi, Margaret; Ostrom, Elinor; Alt, James E.Titolo: Competition and Cooperation: Conclusion.Sta in: Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and politicalscience. Alt, James E. Levi, Margaret. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., New York: Russell SageFoundation. p 331-37. 1999.Update Code 200100

<81>. 0574319Autori: Alt, James E; Levi, Margaret; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Competition and Cooperation: Introduction.Sta in: Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and politicalscience. Alt, James E. Levi, Margaret. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., New York: Russell SageFoundation. p xv-xix. 1999.Update Code 200100

<82>. 0576481Autori: Varughese, George; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from CommunityForestry in Nepal.Sta in: World Development. Vol. 29 (5). p 747-65. May 2001.Abstract The role of heterogeneity in affecting the likelihood of collective action is strongly debated inthe theoretical literature. We present evidence from a study of 18 forest user groups in Nepal.Heterogeneity is not a strong predictor of the level of collective activity. Rather, heterogeneityis a challenge that can be overcome by good institutional design when the interests of thosecontrolling collective-choice mechanisms are benefited by investing time and effort to craftbetter rules.Update Code 200100

<83>. 0518715Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Investing in Capital, Institutions, and Incentives.Sta in: Institutions and economic development: Growth and governance in less-developed and post-socialist countries. Clague, Christopher, ed., Johns Hopkins Studies in Development. Baltimoreand London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p 153-81. 1997.Update Code 200000

<84>. 0516379Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James.Titolo: Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue.Sta in: Understanding strategic interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten. Albers, Wulf_et al.,eds., Edited with the help of Martin Strobel. Heidelberg and New York: Springer. p 386-93.1997.Update Code 200000

<85>. 0516049Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James.Titolo: Neither Markets nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas.Sta in: Perspectives on public choice: A handbook. Mueller, Dennis C., ed., Cambridge; New York andMelbourne: Cambridge University Press. p 35-72. 1997.Update Code 200000

<86>. 0514647Autori: Alt, James E; Levi, Margaret; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.Titolo: Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and politicalscience.Sta in: New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p xix, 347. 1999.Abstract Twelve papers, with responses, represent a conversation between political scientists andNobel Prize-winning economists concerning the contribution of economics to political science.Papers by political scientists assess the influence on their discipline of each of six Nobel Prize-winning economists--Kenneth J. Arrow, Herbert A. Simon, James M. Buchanan, Gary S. Becker,Douglass C. North, and Reinhard Selten--and the Nobelists respond to the assessments of theirpersonal influence. Five additional papers and comments by some of the Nobelists discussresearch programs in constitutional political economy; the coming marriage of political andeconomic theory; political science; and discovery and verification in the methodology ofscience. Also includes biographical sketches of the Nobel economists. Alt is with the Center forBasic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University. Levi is at the University of

Washington Center for Labor Studies. Ostrom is with the Center for the Study of Institutions,Population, and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Index.Update Code 200000

<87>. 0526278Autori: Gibson, Clark C; Ostrom, Elinor; Ahn, T. K.Titolo: The Concept of Scale and the Human Dimensions of Global Change: A Survey.Sta in: Ecological Economics. Vol. 32 (2). p 217-39. February 2000.Abstract Issues related to the scale of ecological phenomena are of fundamental importance to theirstudy. The causes and consequences of environmental change can, of course, be measured atdifferent levels and along multiple scales. While the natural sciences have long understood theimportance of scale, research regarding scale in the social sciences has been less explicit, lessprecise, and more variable. The growing need for interdisciplinary work across thenatural/social science divide, however, demands that each achieve some commonunderstandings about scaling issues. This survey seeks to facilitate the dialogue betweennatural and social scientists by reviewing some of the more important aspects of the concept ofscale employed in the social sciences, especially as they relate to the human dimensions ofglobal environmental change. The survey presents the fundamentals of scale, examines fourgeneral scaling issues typical of social science, and explores how different social sciencedisciplines have used scale in their research.Update Code 200000

<88>. 0469163Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Schlager, Edella.Titolo: The Formation of Property Rights.Sta in: Rights to nature: Ecological, economic, cultural, and political principles of institutions for theenvironment. Hanna, Susan. Folke, Carl. Maler, Karl-Goran, eds., Washington, D.C.: IslandPress. p 127-56. 1996.Update Code 199800

<89>. 0463558Autori: McGinnis, Michael; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Design Principles for Local and Global Commons.Sta in: The international political economy and international institutions. Volume 2. Young, Oran R.,ed., Elgar Reference Collection. Library of International Political Economy, vol. 10.Cheltenham, U.K.: Elgar; distributed by Ashgate, Brookfield, Vt.. p 464-93. 1996. PreviouslyPublished: 1992.Update Code 199800

<90>.

0460561Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development.Sta in: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995. Bruno, Michael. Pleskovic,Boris, eds., Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p 207-34. 1996.Update Code 199800

<91>. 0447526Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity.Sta in: Property rights and the environment: Social and ecological issues. Hanna, Susan.Munasinghe, Mohan, eds., Stockholm: Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics;Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p 33-45. 1995.Update Code 199800

<92>. 0453880Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: PresidentialAddress, American Political Science Association, 1997.Sta in: American Political Science Review. Vol. 92 (1). p 1-22. March 1998.Update Code 199800

<93>. 0473390Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: The Comparative Study of Public Economies.Sta in: American Economist. Vol. 42 (1). p 3-17. Spring 1998.Update Code 199800

<94>. 0383596Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Self-organization and Social Capital.Sta in: Industrial and Corporate Change. Vol. 4 (1). p 131-59. 1995.Update Code 199600

<95>. 0393807Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development.Sta in: World Development. Vol. 24 (6). p 1073-87. June 1996.Abstract Coproduction is a process through which inputs from individuals who are not "in" the sameorganization are transformed into goods and services. Two cases are presented--one fromBrazil and one from Nigeria--where public officials play a major role. In Brazil, public officialsactively encourage a high level of citizen input to the production of urban infrastructure. InNigeria, public officials discourage citizen contributions to primary education. The third sectionof the paper provides a brief overview of the theory of coproduction and its relevance forunderstanding the two cases. The last section addresses the implications of coproduction inpolycentric systems for synergy and development.Update Code 199600

<96>. 0323631Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.Sta in: Water Resources Research. Vol. 29 (7). p 1907-12. July 1993.Update Code 199400

<97>. 0322518Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy.Titolo: Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work.Sta in: Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 7 (4). p 93-112. Fall 1993.Update Code 199400

<98>. 0343778Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James.Titolo: Rules, games, and common-pool resources.Sta in: With Arun Agrawal et al. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p xvi, 369. 1994.Abstract Uses both experimental and field data to test models of behavior in common-pool resourcesituations that are based on the theory of N-person, finitely repeated games. Tests the formalmodels in the controlled environment of an experimental laboratory to examine more closelythe conditions under which the theoretical results predicted by noncooperative game theory aresupported and where the theory fails. Reports on experimental studies dealing with

appropriation behavior; probabilistic destruction of the common pool resource; communicationin the commons; and sanctioning and communication institutions. Considers regularities fromthe laboratory experiments and possible explanations, focusing on why there was so muchcooperation in the communication experiments. Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, Arun Agrawal,and William Blomquist each present findings from four field settings--fisheries, irrigationsystems, forests, and groundwater basins--to assess the generality of the findings fromcontrolled experiments, and examine the institutional and physical variables that affect self-organization among common pool resource appropriators. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker are atIndiana University. Bibliography; index.Update Code 199400

<99>. 0275191Autori: Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis.Sta in: Land Economics. Vol. 68 (3). p 249-62. August 1992.Abstract The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer toproperty owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by acommunity of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policyanalysis. In this paper, the authors develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rightsregimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, toclaimant, to proprietor, and to owner. They apply this conceptual schema to analyze findingsfrom a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.Update Code 199300

<100>. 0286752Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James; Gardner, Roy.Titolo: Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible.Sta in: American Political Science Review. Vol. 86 (2). p 404-17. June 1992.Update Code 199300

<101>. 0386137Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James; Gardner, Roy.Titolo: Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible.Sta in: The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem..Anderson, Terry L. Simmons, Randy T., eds., The Political Economy Forum series. Lanham,Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. p 127-56. 1993. Previously Published: 1992.Update Code 199300

<102>. 0386131

Autori: Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Property-Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An Empirical Analysis.Sta in: The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem..Anderson, Terry L. Simmons, Randy T., eds., The Political Economy Forum series. Lanham,Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. p 13-41. 1993.Update Code 199300

<103>. 0273086Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Crafting institutions for self-governing irrigation systems.Sta in: San Francisco: ICS Press. p xiv, 111. 1992.Abstract Outlines an approach to designing irrigation institutions. Contends that the crafting ofinstitutions is an ongoing process that must directly involve the users and supplier of anirrigation system throughout the design process. Stresses the significance of viewinginstitutions as "rules-in-use" rather than as paper organizations created by formal legislationwithout participation of those affected. Discusses crafting rules for varying environmental andcultural traditions; crafting rules to counteract opportunistic behavior; crafting monitoring,sanctioning, and conflict resolution mechanisms; and crafting rules in ongoing processes.Presents design principles derived from an intensive study of several long-enduring self-organized irrigation systems. Discusses the problems of applying these design criteria in effortsto improve both government-owned and farmer-owned irrigation systems, and presentsproposals for reform. Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science at IndianaUniversity. No index.Update Code 199300

<104>. 0292024Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Schroeder, Larry; Wynne, Susan.Titolo: Institutional incentives and sustainable development: Infrastructure policies in perspective.Sta in: Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy series. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. p xxi, 266.1993.Abstract Discusses the problem of insufficient maintenance of rural infrastructure facilities anddescribes a method for conducting a systematic comparison of alternative institutionalarrangements for the development and maintenance of rural infrastructure facilities indeveloping countries. Examines the role of infrastructure in development; the problem ofsustainable infrastructure; the problems of information, coordination, and control; and theprovision and production of rural infrastructure. Presents overall and intermediate performancecriteria against which alternative institutional arrangements can be evaluated and uses thecriteria to evaluate centralized, decentralized, and polycentric institutional arrangements.Discusses the policy implications of an institutional approach to sustainable development.Ostrom and Wynne are at Indiana University. Schroeder is at Syracuse University. Index.Update Code 199300

<105>.

0262359Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action.Sta in: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series Cambridge; New York and Melbourne:Cambridge University Press. p xviii, 280. 1990.Abstract Analyzes empirical examples of successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern and managenatural resources, critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to many naturalresources. Introduces the institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in common-pool resource situations. Focuses on cases of successful, long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed management of common-pool resources,examining the organization of mountain grazing and forest common-pool resources inSwitzerland and Japan, and some irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines. Analyzesinstitutional change in the case of a set of institutions to manage a series of groundwaterbasins located beneath the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Investigates cases of institutionalfailure and fragility involving extreme rent dissipation, unresolved disagreements leading tophysical violence, or resource deteriorations. Discusses, in this context, fisheries in Turkey;groundwater in San Bernadino County, California; and fisheries and irrigation systems in SriLanka. Considers the implications for the design of self-organizing and self-governinginstitutions. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Index.Update Code 199200

<106>. 0242593Autori: Walker, James M; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence.Sta in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Vol. 19 (3). p 203-11. November1990.Abstract This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel theconditions specified in noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Usingexperimental methods, we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict thatusers of such resources will appropriate units at a rate at which the marginal returns fromappropriation are greater than the marginal appropriation costs. Our results confirm theprediction of suboptimal accrual of rents and offer evidence on the effects of increasinginvestment capital available to appropriators.Update Code 199100

<107>. 0246793Autori: Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Rules and Games.Sta in: Public Choice. Vol. 70 (2). p 121-49. May 1991.Abstract This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. Theauthors develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibriapoints. They then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, includingexamples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. The authors show that reforming agame is conceptually akin to reforming an economy.Update Code

199100

<108>. 0337679Autori: Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M.Titolo: Communication in a Commons: Cooperation without External Enforcement.Sta in: Laboratory research in political economy. Palfrey, Thomas R., ed., Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press. p 287-322. 1991.Update Code 199100

<109>. 0336981Autori: Walker, James M; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources:Experimental Evidence.Sta in: Game equilibrium models II. Methods, morals, and markets. Selten, Reinhard, ed., Withcontributions by D. Abreu et al New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo: Springer. p 337-67.1991.Update Code 199100

<110>. 0336977Autori: Weissing, Franz J; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement without Guards.Sta in: Game equilibrium models II. Methods, morals, and markets. Selten, Reinhard, ed., Withcontributions by D. Abreu et al New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo: Springer. p 188-262.1991.Update Code 199100

<111>. 0342962Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Public Goods and Public Choices: The Emergence of Public Economies and IndustryStructures.Sta in: The meaning of American federalism: Constituting a self-governing society. Ostrom, Vincent.,San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies; distributed by National Book Network,Lanham, Md.. p 163-97. 1991. Previously Published: 1977.Update Code 199100

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. 0191532Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.Sta in: Public Choice. Vol. 48 (1). p 3-25. 1986.Update Code 198600

<113>. 0081576Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Exclusion, Choice and Divisibility: Factors Affecting the Measurement of Urban Agency Outputand Impact.Sta in: Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 54 (4). p 691-99. March 1974.Update Code 197400

<114>. 0070146Autori: Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions.Sta in: Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 53 (3). p 474-93. December 1972.Update Code 197200

<115>. 0065812Autori: Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.Titolo: Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.Sta in: Land Economics. Vol. 48 (1). p 1-14. February 1972.Update Code 197200