Criteria Criteria 1.2.11.2.1 I&C and Inherent Characteristics
Transcript of Criteria Criteria 1.2.11.2.1 I&C and Inherent Characteristics
0Init
ial
Pr
e-a
pp
lic
ati
on
Me
eti
ng
Criteria Criteria Criteria Criteria 1.2.11.2.11.2.11.2.1
I&C and Inherent CharacteristicsI&C and Inherent CharacteristicsI&C and Inherent CharacteristicsI&C and Inherent Characteristics
IAEA INPRO DF-7
Vienna, November 19-22, 2013
Jong Tae Seo
1Init
ial
Pr
e-a
pp
lic
ati
on
Me
eti
ng
1. INPRO Criteria 1.2.1
2. APR1400 I&C Design
Characteristics
3. INPRO Evaluation
• EP 1.2.1.1 Continuous Monitoring of
Plant Health
• EP 1.2.1.2 Dynamic Plant Analysis
4. Summary
2 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
User Requirements and Criteria
INPRO Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and Inherent
Characteristics
Basic PrincipleBasic PrincipleBasic PrincipleBasic Principle BPBPBPBP1 1 1 1 (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced defencedefencedefencedefence----inininin----depth as a part of their depth as a part of their depth as a part of their depth as a part of their fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in defencedefencedefencedefence----inininin----depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.
User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR) Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)
URURURUR1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 (Detection and (Detection and (Detection and (Detection and interception):interception):interception):interception):Installations of an INS Installations of an INS Installations of an INS Installations of an INS should detect and should detect and should detect and should detect and intercept deviations from intercept deviations from intercept deviations from intercept deviations from normal operational states normal operational states normal operational states normal operational states in order to prevent in order to prevent in order to prevent in order to prevent anticipated operational anticipated operational anticipated operational anticipated operational occurrences fromoccurrences fromoccurrences fromoccurrences fromescalating to accidentescalating to accidentescalating to accidentescalating to accidentconditions.conditions.conditions.conditions.
Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN) Acceptance Limits (AL)Acceptance Limits (AL)Acceptance Limits (AL)Acceptance Limits (AL)
CRCRCRCR1.2.1 1.2.1 1.2.1 1.2.1 I&C and inherent characteristicsI&C and inherent characteristicsI&C and inherent characteristicsI&C and inherent characteristics
ININININ1.2.11.2.11.2.11.2.1: Capability of: Capability of: Capability of: Capability ofcontrol and control and control and control and instrumentation systeminstrumentation systeminstrumentation systeminstrumentation systemand/or inherent and/or inherent and/or inherent and/or inherent characteristics to detect characteristics to detect characteristics to detect characteristics to detect and intercept and/or and intercept and/or and intercept and/or and intercept and/or compensate deviations compensate deviations compensate deviations compensate deviations from normal operational from normal operational from normal operational from normal operational states.states.states.states.
ALALALAL1.2.11.2.11.2.11.2.1: Key system: Key system: Key system: Key systemvariables relevant to variables relevant to variables relevant to variables relevant to safety (e.g., flow, safety (e.g., flow, safety (e.g., flow, safety (e.g., flow, pressure, temperature, pressure, temperature, pressure, temperature, pressure, temperature, radiation levels) do not radiation levels) do not radiation levels) do not radiation levels) do not exceed limits acceptable exceed limits acceptable exceed limits acceptable exceed limits acceptable for continued operation for continued operation for continued operation for continued operation (no event reporting (no event reporting (no event reporting (no event reporting necessary).necessary).necessary).necessary).
3 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
Defense-in-Depth
INPRO Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and Inherent
Characteristics
DID
LevelINSAG ObjectivesINSAG ObjectivesINSAG ObjectivesINSAG Objectives Innovation Direction (INPRO)Innovation Direction (INPRO)Innovation Direction (INPRO)Innovation Direction (INPRO)
1111
Prevention of Prevention of Prevention of Prevention of abnormalabnormalabnormalabnormaloccurrences andoccurrences andoccurrences andoccurrences andaccidentsaccidentsaccidentsaccidents
Enhance prevention by increased emphasis onEnhance prevention by increased emphasis onEnhance prevention by increased emphasis onEnhance prevention by increased emphasis oninherently safe design characteristics and passiveinherently safe design characteristics and passiveinherently safe design characteristics and passiveinherently safe design characteristics and passivesafety features, and by further reducing humansafety features, and by further reducing humansafety features, and by further reducing humansafety features, and by further reducing humanactions in the routine operation of the plant.actions in the routine operation of the plant.actions in the routine operation of the plant.actions in the routine operation of the plant.
2222
Control of abnormalControl of abnormalControl of abnormalControl of abnormaloperation and operation and operation and operation and detection of failuresdetection of failuresdetection of failuresdetection of failures
Give priority to advanced control and monitoringGive priority to advanced control and monitoringGive priority to advanced control and monitoringGive priority to advanced control and monitoringsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormalthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormalthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormalthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormaltransients.transients.transients.transients.
3333Control of Control of Control of Control of accidents within the accidents within the accidents within the accidents within the design basisdesign basisdesign basisdesign basis
Achieve fundamental safety functions byAchieve fundamental safety functions byAchieve fundamental safety functions byAchieve fundamental safety functions byoptimized combination of active & passive designoptimized combination of active & passive designoptimized combination of active & passive designoptimized combination of active & passive designFeatures.Features.Features.Features.
4444
Control of severe Control of severe Control of severe Control of severe plant conditionsplant conditionsplant conditionsplant conditions
Increase reliability and capability of systems toIncrease reliability and capability of systems toIncrease reliability and capability of systems toIncrease reliability and capability of systems tocontrol and monitor complex accident sequences;control and monitor complex accident sequences;control and monitor complex accident sequences;control and monitor complex accident sequences;decrease expected frequency of severe plantdecrease expected frequency of severe plantdecrease expected frequency of severe plantdecrease expected frequency of severe plantConditions.Conditions.Conditions.Conditions.
5555Mitigation ofMitigation ofMitigation ofMitigation ofradiologicalradiologicalradiologicalradiologicalconsequencesconsequencesconsequencesconsequences
Avoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationAvoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationAvoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationAvoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationmeasures outside the plant site.measures outside the plant site.measures outside the plant site.measures outside the plant site.
4 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
Evaluation Parameters and Acceptability
INPRO Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and Inherent
Characteristics
� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.1: Continuous monitoring of
the plant health
� Acceptability of EP1.2.1.1: Evidence is available to the
INPRO assessor that the INS design includes systems
for continuous monitoring of plant health and
computerized aids for the operators.
� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.2: dynamic plant analysis
� Acceptability of EP1.2.1.2: Evidence is available to the
INPRO assessor that a deterministic and probabilistic
plant analysis has been performed for the INS and the
results confirm that key system variables relevant to
safety do not exceed limits acceptable for continued
operation and do not result in any short term
consequences affecting normal operation.
5 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Systems
Compact
Workstation
PLC(WEC)
PLC(WEC)
Spec200 AFS100/ECS1200(HFC)
Ulchin 5,6Mark V
(GE)Hybrid
Mark V(GE)
Wolsong 1,2,3,4Relay Logic
(AECL)Relay Logic
(AECL)Analog/PDC
(AECL)
DCC X/Y(Computers
Control)
Analog/Relay(AECL)
Hybrid
Relay Logic(ABB-CE)
Relay Logic(ABB-CE)
Spec200m/PLC(Foxboro)(Omron)
PCS(Eaton)
Mark V(GE)
Ulchin 3,4
YGN 5,6Hybrid
Relay Logic(ABB-CE)
Relay Logic(ABB-CE)
Spec200(Foxboro) Spec200m
(Foxboro)
ILS(Forney)
Mark V(GE)
YGN 3,4 Conventional
SSPSRelay Logic
(WEC)
SSPSRelay Logic
(WEC)
7300Analog
7300Analog
7300Analog
Mark V(GE)
Kori 2,3,4
YGN 1,2Conventional
Relay Logic(WEC)
Relay Logic(WEC)
Spec200Spec200m(Foxboro)
Spec200Spec200m(Foxboro)
Spec200Spec200m(Foxboro)
DCSKori 1
(Upgrade) Conventional
Kori 1Relay Logic
(WEC)Relay Logic
(WEC)Foxboro
H-lineFoxboro
H-lineFoxboro
H-lineDCS Conventional
Reactor TripSystem
ESFASSystems
ProtectionProcess
NSSSControl
PCS TBN Control Main Control
Shin Kori 1,2
Shin Wolsong 1,2Hybrid
Shin Kori 3,4
(APR1400)
Compact
Workstation
Plants
(Foxboro)
PLC
(WEC)
PLC
(WEC)
PLC
(WEC)
PLC
(WEC)
Spec200
(Foxboro)
PLC
(WEC)
Spec200(Foxboro)
PLC
(Omron)
PLC
(Omron)
Spec200
DCS
(WEC)
HFC6000
(HFC)
DCS
(WEC)
Mark VI
(GE)
Mark VI
(GE)
Shin Ulchin 1,2
(APR1400)
PLC
(DOOSAN)PLC
(DOOSAN)PLC
(DOOSAN)
DCS
(DOOSAN)
DCS
(DOOSAN)Mark VI
(GE)
I&C Platform History
6 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
I&C System Overview of APR1400
ProgramServer
GatewayServer
Control & Monitoring Network
QIAS-N(C, D)
Non-safety Components
(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)
FIDAS NIMSALMSIVMSLPMS
RCPVMS
P-CCSBOP
Controls
NPCSPP&LCSFWCSSBCS
DPS PCSRRS
RPCSDRCS
Remote I/O
ICI Sensors
ENFMSStartup/Control
Safety
Fission
Chamber
Data LinkServer
Dedicated H/W switches
ESFASInitiation
RTInitiation
MinimumInventory
DMASwitches
DISQIAS-P
PPS/CPCS OM QIAS-N
Operator Console
Safety Console Large Display Panel
Protection System
PPS(4 Ch)
ESF-
CCS(4 Ch)
QIAS-P(A, B)
CPCS(4 Ch)
Safety Components
(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)
Channelized Safety Bus
MTP ITP
CIM
AlarmServer
DBServer
APC-S : Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety, CIM : Component Interface Module, CPCS : Core Protection Calculator System, DIS : Diverse Indication System,
DMA : Diverse Manual ESF Actuation, DRCS : Digital Rod Control System, ENFMS : Ex-core Neutron Flux Monitoring System, FIDAS : Fixed In-core Detector
Amplifier System, ICI : In-Core Instrumentation, NIMS : NSSS Integrity Monitoring System, NPCS : NSSS Process Control System, OM : Operator Module,
P-CCS : Process Component Control System, PCS : Power Control System, QIAS-P/N : Qualified Indication & Alarm System - PAMI / Non-safety
APC-S(4 Ch)
DIS
Safety
Soft ControlNon-safety
Soft ControlCh. Confirm
Switches
Control & Monitoring
System
APC-S
Common platform for Safety I&C
Common platform for Non-safety I&C
Dedicated equipment for its function
Computer server, monitor & peripherals
Conventional H/W components
Legend
Safety related network
Non-safety network
Hardwired Connection
7 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
I&C Platform HistoryMain Control Room
Large Display Panel
Safety
Console
Compact Operator Console
EO : Electrical Operator, SS: Shift Supervisor, STA: Shift Technical Advisor, RO : Reactor Operator, TO: Turbine Operator
8 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
I&C System Overview of APR1400
� Microprocessor based digital I&C technology
- common PLC platform for safety I&C
- common DCS platform for non-safety I&C
� Four (4) channel redundancy for safety I&C
- installed in separate channelized I&C equipment room.
� Multiplexed I/O and redundant communication network
- from field areas to I&C equipment rooms and MCR
� Diverse Actuation System to cope with the CMF of safety I&C
� Complete electrical, physical and communication isolation
− between redundant safety channels
− between safety system and non-safety system
9 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
I&C System Overview of APR1400
� Protection System
– Plant Protection System (PPS)
– Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS)
– Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS)
– Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety (APC-S)
� Diverse Actuation System
– Diverse Protection System (DPS)
– Diverse Indication System (DIS)
– Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Control Switches (DMA switches)
10 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
I&C System Overview of APR1400
� Control & Monitoring System
– Power Control System (PCS)
– NSSS Process Control System (NPCS)
– Process-Component Control System (P-CCS)
– Qualified Indication and Alarm System (QIAS) – PAMI
– Qualified Indication and Alarm System (QIAS) – Non-safety
– Neutron Flux Monitoring System (ENFMS / FIDAS)
– NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (ALMS / IVMS / LPMS / RCPVMS)
– T/G Control & Monitoring System
11 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (NIMS)
12 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (NIMS)
Items OPR1000 APR1400
H/W � PC: Alarm Unit, LPAP, DAD � AlphaServer: LPMS-AC � STD Bus: LPMS-AU
� Industrial PC (All Alarm Unit & NOS)
OS & S/W
� MS-DOS: LPMS-AU � Win-98: LPAP � Win-XP: RCPVMS/ALMS-AU,
NOS/IVMS Computer � OpenVMS: LPMS-AC
� OS : Windows � Application : NI LabVIEWTM
based S/W
Remote Control
All subsystem excluding LPMS All subsystems
Cabinet � 2 Cabinets : AUC & ACC
� AUC : MCR � ACC : Computer Room
� 1 Cabinet : AUC (I&C E.R) � 1 Console : ACC (Computer
Room)
13 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Plant Control System
14 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA)
Win-NPA(Windows-based Nuclear Plant Analyzer)Windows based desk-top engineering simulator
Engineering/training tool for operators/designers
CharacteristicsReal-time, best-estimate simulation for NPP
Accurate, easy-to-use & easy-to-understand analysis tool
Dedicated tools for development & customization
Supports external interfaces (DB, I&C devices)
15 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA)
16 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA)
RCS Mimic
17 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA)
Secon-dary
Mimic
18 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics
Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA)
Plots
19 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
INPRO Evaluation
Continuous Monitoring of Plant Health
� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.1: Continuous monitoring of
the plant health
� Acceptability of EP1.2.1.1: Evidence is available to the
INPRO assessor that the INS design includes systems
for continuous monitoring of plant health and
computerized aids for the operators.
� APR1400 Design has advanced Plant Health Monitoring
Capability over OPR1000 :
� Full computerized I&C System
� Improved NSSS Integrity Monitoring System
� Other computerized plant monitoring systems are
available
20 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
INPRO Evaluation
� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.2: dynamic plant analysis
� Acceptability of EP1.2.1.2: Evidence is available to the
INPRO assessor that a deterministic and probabilistic
plant analysis has been performed for the INS and the
results confirm that key system variables relevant to
safety do not exceed limits acceptable for continued
operation and do not result in any short term
consequences affecting normal operation.
� APR1400 utilized advanced Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA) for
dynamic plant analysis
� Real-time, best-estimate simulation for NPP transients
under normal, abnormal and accident conditions
� Accurately model plant control systems to simulate
abnormal operation conditions
Dynamic Plant Analysis
21 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
Dynamic Plant Analysis
Load Rejection to House Load
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SG
1 N
R L
evel, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
EF
WC
V 1
Po
sitio
n D
em
an
d, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
20
40
60
80
100
FW
1 F
low
DP
, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
20
40
60
80
100
SG
1 S
team
Flo
w D
P, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
INPRO Evaluation
22 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
Dynamic Plant Analysis
Loss of a main Feedwater Pump
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SG
1 N
R L
eve
l, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
EF
WC
V 1
Po
sitio
n D
em
an
d, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
20
40
60
80
100
SG
1 S
team
Flo
w D
P,
%
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
20
40
60
80
100
FW
1 F
low
DP
, %
Time, seconds
Win-NPA
Win-NPA+H/W
INPRO Evaluation
23 APR1400
IAE
A I
NP
RO
Dia
log
ue
Fo
ru
m-7
Summary
� APR1400 I&C utilize full-digital technology and is designed
to detect and intercept deviations from normal operational
states
� Integrated plant monitoring system and control systems
prevents unnecessary safety system actuations
� Dynamic simulation tool was utilized to verify APR1400
design capabilities
� For a full loss of load and loss of a main feedwater pump
events, all safety related variables can be controlled within the
limit allowing a continued operation with event reporting
� Therefore, APR1400 Design satisfies Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and
Inherent Characteristics
24
Initial Pre-application Meeting