Crimpro2 Cases

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,vs.HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, FourthJudicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal

ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of OrdinanceNo. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by theOffice of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with theMunicipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion wasdenied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the

following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, theMunicipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4.All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does notexceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arisingtherefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx


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Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Ruleshall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a priorpreliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in MetropolitanManila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further,That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signedand sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for ViolationsPenalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," readingas follows:

Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe inaccordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall

prescribe after two months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution ofjudicial

proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, andshall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations oflaw not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond thetwo-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her shouldhave been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaintagainst her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor Generalalso invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special

cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filingthe complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting therequisite preliminary investigation therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts andMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts,or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and otherchartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offensecharged. (Emphasissupplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases,without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court ofAppeals: 5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, thisCourt has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion


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that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filingof the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examinationor investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, indeclaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary

examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where thecomplaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations alreadyrepresent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive theinjured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. Allthat the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisitecomplaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of theRule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having beenincorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the lastparagraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure inspecial cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary

procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by theSection, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to thecanon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discoverthe true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations ofmunicipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipalordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courtsand Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceedingfour years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and

imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liabilityarising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amountthereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminalnegligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceedtwenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in courtwithout need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provisiondoes not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shallbe deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actuallyfiled in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescriptionshall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they includeadministrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matterof fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflictbetween Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this


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Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformableto Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Codewith arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccionalin its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution inthe instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is

thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filedseasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicialproceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyondtheir obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaningof the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its allegedcommission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of

Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was thefiling of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, afterthe crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. CriminalCase No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground ofprescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 18.

2 Ibid.

3 Id., p. 19; Through Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

4 Id., p. 21

5 122 SCRA 538

6 The phrase "filed directly in court without need of prior preliminary examination or preliminaryinvestigation" was deleted under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure effective on November15, 1991.

7 People vs. Castro, 95 Phil. 463.

8 Section 447, Local Government Code.


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SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

- versus -

MA. THERESA PANGILINAN,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 152662

Present:

CARPIO,

Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES,JJ.

Promulgated:

June 13, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ,J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for

certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision[2] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa

Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C.

Malolos.

Thefallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the

assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, isREVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against

petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]
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Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an

affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22

against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor

of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with

an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five

Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which

were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery

of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific

performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to

Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of

the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action

she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended

the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action

respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela

City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of

Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the

resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of

informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her

issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and

RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling

the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 chargesinvolving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16

September 1997 were, however, dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18

November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3

February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court


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(MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June

2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the

Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch

31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by

reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion

in an Order dated 5 October 2000.

On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The

criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent

portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February

2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June

2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest

amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had,

therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the courta quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having

been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed

with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme

Court a petition for review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution

[6]

dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition tothe CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring

respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
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In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001

Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case

Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had

already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for

violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter

part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the

private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5)days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had,

pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the

latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before

the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic)

against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of QuezonCity only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.

xxx

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be

interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the

proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicialproceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the propercourt. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the

date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in

consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this

Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computationof the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of

the Supreme Court inZaldivia v. Reyes[8]likewise applies to special laws, such as

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[9]

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for

review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by

Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930,

governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution

of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City
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Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. [10] It

submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia

C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the

subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on

the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case ofZaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the

filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial

proceeding that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying

onZaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence

superseding the aforesaid ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,[13] the Supreme Court ruled that

the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary investigationsuspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the

filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was

still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal

cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the

petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the

mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision

of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly

fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint

before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive

period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored

on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner

involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore

covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) [14] and Section 1, Rule 110of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [15] Respondent pointed out that the

crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a

special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits

that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal

ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
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The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-

complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period

of prescription of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to

the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002

decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A

perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a

certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the

petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversivelyerred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already

prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for

Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When

Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22

cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise

provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b)

after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but

less than two years; (c) xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its

investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are

dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of

not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for itsviolation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited

law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the

institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case ofPeople v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the

filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of
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preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of

prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or

information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened

by the Court in the case ofFrancisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17] when it

held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the

running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases

involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between

cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the

interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling inZaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is

not controlling in special laws. InLlenes v. Dicdican,[19]Ingco, et al. v.

Sandiganbayan,[20]Brillante v. CA,[21]and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings

for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period ofprescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources

Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the

Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act

and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period

because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in

criminal cases.

In fact, in the case ofPanaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in

all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of

the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City

Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had

been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not

sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to

suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control,

like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating

agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of

1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations ofBP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by

private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace

period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on

16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
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February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for

accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of

proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before

the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend

proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the

informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon

City.

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal

proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that

caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right

to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only

thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file therequisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice

is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the

respondent.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson
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ARTURO D. BRION MARIA LOURDES P. A.

SERENOAssociate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts

Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)


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[1] Rollo, pp. 33-66.[2] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola

and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 162-170.[3] Id. at 169.[4] Rollo, p. 133.[5] Id. at 134-167.[6] Id. at 169.[7] G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277.[8] Id.[9] CA rollo, pp. 167-168.[10] Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure[11] Supra note 7 at 284-285.[12] Supra.[13] Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, 1 October

1993, 227 SCRA 56;Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, 30 May 1983, 122 SCRA 538;Ingco

v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112584, 23 May 1997, 272 SCRA 563.[14] Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run

from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and

shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such

proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped forany reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.[15] Section 1.Institution of criminal actions.Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:

xxx

xxx

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense

charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.[16] G.R. No. L-22465, 28 February 1967, 19 SCRA 494, 500.[17] 207 Phil 471, 477 (1983).[18]

Supra note 7.[19] 328 Phil. 1272 (1996).[20] Supra note 13.[21] 483 Phil. 568 (2004)[22] G.R. No. 168662, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 303.[23] G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 354, 415-416.[24] G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 549, 562.[25] Supra note 16.
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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 October 19, 2004

ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord,Is the immediate jewel of their souls:

Who steals my purse steals trash; tisSomething, nothing;But he that filches from me my good nameRobs me of that which not enriches him,

And makes me poor indeed.

- Shakespeare: Othello, III, iii, 155.

Every man has a right to build, keep and be favored with a good name. This right is protected by lawwith the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses ortortious conduct.

In these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Roberto Brillante (Brillante), alsoknown as Bobby Brillante, questions his convictions for libel for writing and causing to be publishedin 1988 an open letter addressed to then President of the Republic of the Philippines Corazon C.

Aquino discussing the alleged participation of Atty. Jejomar Binay (Binay), then the "OIC Mayor"2 anda candidate for the position of Mayor in the Municipality (now City) of Makati, and Dr. NemesioPrudente (Prudente), then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in anassassination plot against Augusto Syjuco (Syjuco), another candidate for Mayor of Makati at thattime.

On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a pressconference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course ofthe press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further

accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante alsocirculated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed indetail his charges against Binay.3

Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same. AngelGonong, a writer for the Peoples Journal, wrote a news article entitled "Binay Accused of PlottingSlays of Rivals." It was cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino),Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the Peoples Journal. Gloria Hernandez(Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled "Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco" which was cleared for


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publication by Augusto Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel), Editor-in-Chief andNews Editor, respectively, of the News Today.4

The open letter was subsequently published under the title "Plea to Cory--Save Makati" innewspapers such as thePeoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.5 The pertinentportions of the open letter read:

4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination ofMr. Augusto "Bobby" Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race.

These reports are:

1. On December 14, 1987, Atty. Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, president of thePolytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with,among others, a Commander Luming, a Major Rafael Nieva, and a commanderFrancis Baloloy. Subject of the meeting was "Winning the Election at all Costs."

x x x x x x x x x

3. On December 17, 1987, Dr. Prudente, Atty. Binay and others including someunidentified government officials discussed operation "Dirty Fingers" after the

ASEAN Summit Meeting. The operation involves terrorism, the use of public schoolteachers, the threat to kill or hurt political ward and precinct leaders not supporting oropposed to Atty. Binay, and to use these as samples to show rivals that his group iscapable of doing so, the planting of his squads in places close to potential targets,the mobilization of "marshals" who will bring firearms and to ferry hitmen to targetpoints. The "marshals" will also be used as "pointers" and to shelter the hitmen afteraccomplishing or performing their missions.

x x x x x x x x x

4. On December 8, 1987, a certain Emilio Anecito, tagged as a hitman in the group of Dr.Prudente, has been specifically assigned to assassinate Mr. Syjuco, Aniceto has beendescribed as Iranian mestizo looking, about five (5) feet in height, fair complexioned curlyhaired, sporting a mustache, and fairly built bodily. He is said to be a silent person andsupposedly has a perfect score in hit missions assigned to him.

x x x x x x x x x

5. On December 10, 1987, it was reported that Major Rafael Nieva had been assigned towork with Mr. Aniceto, Nievas background report is that he:

x x x x x x x x x

c. Was hired by Dr. Prudente as security officer and personal bodyguard.

d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his employer can control orstop him.6

As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscals office fourcomplaints for libel against Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino for


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writing and publishing the news article on Brillantes accusations against him in the PeoplesJournal;7Hernandez, Villanueva and Manuel for writing and publishing a similar news article inthe News Today;8 and for publishing the open letter, Buan and Camino of thePeoples Journal;9and

Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising agency.10

Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open letter as among the persons who

attended the meeting organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of Syjuco, likewisefiled a criminal complaint for libel against Brillante, Domingo Quimlat(Quimlat), Publisher and Editor-in-Chief ofBalita, and Sison as President of A. Sison and Associates.11

Subsequently, five Informations for libel against Brillante were filed with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Makati.

Similarly, on January 15, 1988, Prudente filed four complaints for libel against Brillante and theeditors and publishers of the newspapers where the open letter was published. On January 16,1989, fourInformations for libel were filed against Brillante and several co-accused with the RTC ofManila. Brillantes co-accused in these cases were: (i) Buan, Editor-in-Chief of the PeoplesJournal;12 (ii) Amado P. Macasaet (Macasaet), Publisher, and Noel Albano (Albano), Editor, of

the Malaya;13

(iii) Sison, Public Relations Officer and Federico D. Pascual (Pascual), Publisher andExecutive Editor of the Philippine Daily Inquirer;14 and (iv) Sison, Public Relations Officer andQuimlat, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief ofBalita.15

Buan was not included in the trial of the cases in the RTC-Manila because he eluded arrest and wasnot arraigned. The charges against Pascual and Quimlat were dropped upon motion of the AssistantProsecutor. The charges against Macasaet and Albano were also eventually dismissed upon motionof the prosecution. Only Brillante and Sison remained as accused.16 Both pleaded not guilty to thecharges against them.

On January 25, 1993, the RTC-Manila acquitted Sison but found Brillante guilty of libel on fourcounts. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision in the consolidated cases reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused Bobby Brillante, also known asRoberto Brillante, guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4) counts, as author or writer, ofLIBEL defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Article 355of the same code, and sentencing him in each count to the indeterminate penalty of FOUR(4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS of prision mayor, asmaximum, and to pay a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyat the rate of ONE (1) DAY for every P8.00 that he is unable to pay, but which subsidiaryimprisonment shall not exceed EIGHT (8) months.

Accused Bobby Brillante is ordered to pay the private offended party, Dr. Nemesio Prudente,the total sum of P1,000,000.00 in these four (4) cases for moral damages which the lattersuffered.

Accused Arcadio Sison is acquitted in the two cases against him, his guilt of the chargesagainst him not having been established beyond reasonable [doubt].

Two-third (2/3) of the costs is assessed against accused Bobby Brillante while the remainingone-third (1/3) is charged de oficio.17


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Subsequently, Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Manila to the Court of Appeals.18 Brillantecontended that when the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614 to 17 were filed by theprosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense had already prescribed because more than one yearhad elapsed since the publication of the open letter on January 10, 11 and 12, 1988. He alsoaverred that the open letter which he wrote and caused to be published was not defamatory and waswithout malice. Brillante also claimed that the publication is considered privileged communication.

Finally, he argued that he is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should be acquitted of theoffenses charged like his co-accused.19

On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. No.14475affirming the decision of the RTC-Manila. The appellate court held that the offense of libel hadnot yet prescribed because the one-year prescription period should be reckoned from the time thatthe private complainant Prudente filed his complaint with the fiscals office on January 15, 1988 andnot when the Informations were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appealsadded that under Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect during the pendency of the cases againstBrillante, the institution of the complaint before the fiscals office or the courts for preliminaryinvestigation interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense charged. It held that being a proceduralrule, Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the cases against Brillante.20

The Court of Appeals further held that the RTC-Manila did not err in finding that Brillante hadcommitted libel against Prudente. It explained that the open letter, when read in its entirety, gives theimpression that Prudente is part of a purported criminal conspiracy to kill Syjuco. According to theappellate court, the open letter is a malicious defamation which produced in the minds of the readersBrillantes intent and purpose to injure the reputation of Prudente, thereby exposing him to publichatred, contempt and ridicule.21 The Court of Appeals rejected Brillantes argument that the openletter may be considered privileged communication because the evidence does not show thatBrillante wrote and published it out of a legal, moral or social duty.22

The appellate court also debunked Brillantes allegation that he was denied the equal protection ofthe laws because while the charges against his co-accused were dropped, those against him werenot. According to the appellate court, he and his co-accused are not similarly situated because he

was convicted of libel upon a finding that there existed evidence beyond reasonable doubt to sustainhis conviction. In contrast, the charges against his co-accused were dismissed and their guilt wasnot proven beyond reasonable doubt.23

Brillantes contention that his conviction for libel on four counts gave rise to double jeopardy becauseunder our jurisdiction protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offenseor identical offenses was also overruled by the appellate court. It held that each and everypublication of the same libel constitutes a separate distinct offense and the charge for one instanceof publication shall not bar a charge for subsequent and separate publications. 24

Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, but the motionwas denied in aResolution dated January 19, 1995.25

In the meantime, Brillante was likewise convicted for libel on five counts by the RTC-Makati inCriminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721. The dispositive portion ofthe Decision dated March 22, 1993 of the RTC-Makati reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721, findingaccused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, GUILTY beyond


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reasonable doubt of the offense of libel charged in each of these five (5) cases, andsentencing him in each of the cases to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHSof arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS prision correccional, asmaximum, and to pay fine, likewise in each of these (5) cases, of Four Thousand(P4,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, with subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency pursuant to Article 39, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

2. As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, JejomarC. Binay, the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, in allthe four (4) charges (Crim. Cases Nos. 88-410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721),considering the latters professional and political standing in society, he being alawyer and former Governor of the Metro Manila Commission as well as director ofvarious government agencies.

3. As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, FranciscoBaloloy, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, inCriminal Case No. 88-3060.

4. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410 and 88-1412, ACQUITTING accused Max Buan,Jr., Angel Gonong and Louie Camino, of the two charges against them on the groundthat their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

5. In Criminal Case No. 88-1411 (except for accused Brillante) ordering the sameARCHIVED on the ground that the other accused herein, Gloria Hernandez, AugustoVillanueva and Virgilio Manuel, have not been brought to the jurisdiction of this Court;let alias warrant issue for their arrest.

6. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-3060 and 89-721, likewise ordering the sameARCHIVED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO accused Arcadio Sison, who has not beenbrought to the jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant issue for his arrest.

7. In all these cases, ordering accused Bobby Brillante, also known as RobertoBrillante, to pay the proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.26

Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Makati to the Court of Appeals,27 raising essentially thesame arguments in his appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475.

On February 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 15174affirming the decision of the RTC-Makati. It held that the filing of the complaint before the fiscalsoffice interrupts the period of prescription because Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code did notmake any distinction whether the complaint is filed in court for preliminary investigation or for trial onthe merits, because the filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation is the initial step ofcriminal proceedings. It added that it would be unfair to deprive the injured party of the right to obtainvindication on account of delays which are not within his control.28

The appellate court also ruled that the open letter cannot be considered privileged communicationbecause it contains libelous matter and was circulated to the public. Citing U.S. v. Galeza,29 it heldthat while it is the right and duty of a citizen to file a complaint regarding a misconduct on the part of


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a public official, such complaint must be addressed solely to the officials having jurisdiction to inquireinto the charges.30

Lastly, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts observation that unlike Brillante, his co-accused editors and publishers could not be held liable for libel because the news reports regardingthe January 7, 1988 press conference which were published in their respective newspapers

sufficiently informed the readers that the reference to Binays involvement in the assassination plotwere allegations made by Brillante during the press conference and that said allegations werereported for the sole purpose of informing the public of the news regarding the candidates advertedto in the report.31

Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, but the motion wasdenied in aResolution dated August 17, 1995.32

Thereafter, Brillante filed the present Petitions for Reviewon March 13, 1995 in G.R. No. 118757and on October 10, 1995 in G.R. No. 121571. In G.R. No. 118757, he raises the followingarguments:

I

THE OFFENSE OF LIBEL CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION (sic) HAD ALREADYPRESCRIBED WHEN THE SAID INFORMATION (sic) WAS FILED.

II

HE IS NOT GUILTY OF LIBEL HE IS CHARGED WITH, BECAUSE THE LETTER HECAUSED TO BE PUBLISHED WAS WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED WITHOUT ANY MALICE[N]OR MALICIOUS INTENT TO MALIGN THE PERSON, HONOR AND REPUTATION OFTHE COMPLAINANT [PRUDENTE/BINAY] BUT SOLELY FOR THE JUSTIFIED ANDHONEST PURPOSE OF BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL AUTHORITIES

CONCERNED THE REPORTS THEREIN MENTIONED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.WHERE THERE IS NO MALICE, THERE IS NO LIBEL.

III

IN TRUTH, PUBLICLY KNOWN PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES OF COMPLAINANT, DR.NEMESIO PRUDENTE, ALREADY IN OPERATION LONG BEFORE JANUARY 12, 1988,INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT INCAPABLE OF NOURISHING VIOLENT INTENTIONS

AGAINST THE POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF MAYOR BINAY.

IV

MOREOVER, CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER REFERRED TO IN THE LETTERINDUBITABLY RELATES TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THEN GOING ON AS WELL ASTHE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AND COMPLAINANT THEREIN, WHATEVER ISCONTAINED IN SAID LETTER CAN AT MOST BE NO MORE THAN A POLITICAL LIBEL,WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE.

WE EARNESTLY URGE THAT THIS PROPOSITION BE ENUNCIATED AS AFUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW ON LIBEL.


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V

IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY PERCEIVE ANYCRIMINAL LIBEL IN THIS CASE, THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER ISCRUEL AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY, AS TO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES

AWARDED TO COMPLAINANT.33

In G.R. No. 121571, he makes the following assignments of error:

I

THE OFFENSE HAD PRESCRIBED

II

THE PUBLICATION WAS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

III

THE PUBLICATION WAS MADE WITHOUT MALICE

IV

IT MAY, AT MOST, ALSO BE CONSIDERED A POLITICAL LIBEL WHICH IS NOTPUNISHABLE

V

THE DECISION VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THELAWS

VI

THE PENALTY IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE34

With respect to the issue of prescription, Brillante anchors his claim on the Courts ruling in People v.Tayco35 that the prescriptive period of a crime is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint incourt and not the filing thereof with the fiscals office. According to Brillante, the ruling in People v.Olarte36 did not modify the doctrine inTayco because in Olarte, the Court referred to a complaint filed"in court," not in the "fiscals office." The ruling inFranciscov. Court of Appeals37 that a complaint filedwith the fiscals office also interrupts the prescriptive period of a criminal offense allegedly cannotoverturn the ruling in Olarte because the latter was decided by the Court EnBancwhile Francisco was decided by a mere division of the Court.38

It is further asserted by Brillante that the rule in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure that the filingof the criminal complaint with the fiscals office interrupts the prescriptive period, cannot be appliedretroactively to the cases against him because it impairs his vested right to have the cases againsthim dismissed on the ground of prescription.39 In addition, he claims that Section 6(b), Rule 3 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that "[t]he pendency of a petition for suspension ofthe criminal action still undergoing preliminary investigation in the fiscals office shall interrupt theprescriptive period for filing the corresponding complaint of information" supports his position that


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prior to the amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in 1985, the prevailing rule was that onlythe filing of the complaint or information in court tolls the prescriptive period for a criminal offense.40

Brillante denies that he is liable for libel for causing to be published his open letter implicating Binay,Prudente and their associates in a planned assassination of Syjuco as well as election-relatedterrorism, and in uttering remarks against Binay and his associates during the January 7, 1988 press

conference. According to Brillante, his statements and utterances were privileged communicationbecause he made them public out of a legal, moral and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of theelections to be held on January 18, 1988, and to avoid the unnecessary loss of life. 41 Since hisstatements were privileged communication, malice cannot be presumed from them.42 Brillante addsthat at the time he made the statements, he honestly believed that they were true. Citing an

American case, Bays v. Hunt,43 he contends that where there is an honest belief in the truth of thecharges made, and the publication is in good faith, one is not responsible even for publishing anuntruth.44

It is further asserted by Brillante that since Binay, the subject of the allegedly defamatory statementsis a public figure, his (Brillantes) comments affecting Binays reputation is constitutionally protectedspeech.45

Brillante also urges the Court to reverse his convictions, reasoning that at most, what he may havecommitted is "political libel" which should exempt him form criminal liability, considering that electioncampaigns can become very heated and candidates from rival camps often make charges andcountercharges which are offensive to the name, honor and prestige of their opponents. Hecontends that statements made by a candidate against his rivals, although derogatory, are for thepurpose of convincing the electorate to prevent suspicious characters from holding public office. Inessence, he posits the view that "political libel" should be deemed constitutionally protectedspeech.46

Brillante likewise argues that the multiple publication rule, i.e., that each publication constitutes oneoffense of libel, should not have been applied to him, considering the factual background of the openletter and the statements uttered by him during the press conference.47

Anent the issue of equal protection, Brillante contends that he should have been acquitted like hisco-accused Angel Gonong who wrote the news article in the Peoples Journalregarding the January7, 1988 press conference and Buan and Camino who were the editors of that publication.48

The Solicitor General filed a Commenton each of the petitions.

The Solicitor General insists that the one-year prescriptive period for libel should be reckoned fromthe date of filing of the complaints with the office of the prosecutor as clarified by the Courtin Olarte and Francisco and as stated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in1988, which applies to the complaints filed against Brillante as of October 1988. 49

On the issue of libel, the Solicitor General insists that Brillantes statements in the open letter clearlyimpute upon Prudente and Binay a criminal conspiracy to assassinate Syjuco.50 The SolicitorGeneral also maintains that contrary to Brillantes claims, the open letter cannot be consideredprivileged communication because it was published without justifiable motives and it was circulatedfor the information of the general public instead of addressing the letter solely to the authorities whohad the power to curb the dangers alleged by Brillante in the letter.51

The Solicitor General disagrees with Brillantes contention that his statements are constitutionallyprotected because they are criticisms of official conduct and deal with public figures. According to


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the Solicitor General, the record shows that Brillante did not have enough basis to pass off hisaccusations as true considering that he admitted to relying on unnamed "intelligence sources."52

It is also argued by the Solicitor General that Brillantes statements cannot be exempt from criminalliability on the ground that such statements were "political libel." Brillantes claim, the SolicitorGeneral asserts, has no basis in law or jurisprudence.53

With respect to the issue of equal protection, the Solicitor General avers that Brillante cannot beacquitted like his co-accused publishers, editors and writers because their alleged participation in thecommission of the libel are different from Brillante who is the author of the libelous statements. Thewriters of the news reports were only narrating what took place during the January 7, 1988 pressconference, and wrote the news articles to inform the public of Brillantes statements. In the case ofthe editors and publishers who published the open letter, they indicated in their respectivepublications that the open letter was a paid advertisement. The publication of the news reports in thenewspapers was also done to inform the public of what transpired during the January 7, 1988 pressconference.54

The Solicitor General further argues that the penalty imposed upon Brillante is not excessive but is in

accordance with law, which considers one publication of a libelous statement as a distinct offensefrom another publication of the same statement.55

Thus, the Solicitor General prays that Brillantes petitions be denied.56

Brillante thereafter filed a Replyto each of the Solicitor Generals Comments. The replies reiterateBrillantes arguments in his petitions.57

The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the offense of libel had alreadyprescribed when the Informations were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati; (2) whetherBrillante is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of libel; (3) whether Brillante was denied the equalprotection of the laws; and (4) whether the penalty imposed upon him is excessive.

Save for the issue on the amount of moral damages, there is no merit in the petitions.

With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of Article 90 of the Revised PenalCode provides that the "crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." Indetermining when the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to

Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods ofoffenses:

Computation of prescription of offenses.The period of prescription shall commence to runfrom the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or theiragents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shallcommence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused beingconvicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The aforequoted provision expressly states that prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filingof the complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase "shall be interrupted by the filing of thecomplaint or information" in Article 91 has been settled in the landmark case ofPeople v.Olarte,58 where the Court settled divergent views as to the effect of filing a complaint with theMunicipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of the


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offense. The Court therein held that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminaryinvestigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. It explained thus:

the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes ofpreliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period ofprescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information

is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, thetext of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shallbe interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether thecomplaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for actionon the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may onlyproceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of theproceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right toobtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of theoffense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shallcommence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being

convicted or acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or informationis filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on themerits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the courtconducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate withoutconviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because noprimafacie case had been shown.59

Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals60 clarified that the filing of the complaint withthe fiscals office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a crime:

As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation, aproceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.

As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:

To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overrulingalso of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint ordenuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law toconduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. Inchartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint ordenuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals,besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, theymay even reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts ofFirst instance . . ..61

There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in Olarte and Francisco as Brillanteerroneously suggests.Olarte laid down the doctrine that a complaint filed for purposes of preliminaryinvestigation tolls the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. The criminal complaintfor libel in that case was filed, for the purpose of preliminary investigation, with the Justice of thePeace Court in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Hence, in setting the doctrine, the Court referred to the"filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court."62 The question of whether the doctrine laid downin Olarte also applies to criminal complaints filed with the prosecutors office was settled inFrancisco.Specifically, the Court in Francisco amplified the Olarte doctrine when it categorically ruled that the


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filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of acriminal offense.

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in ruling that the offense of libel had not yetprescribed when the informations against Brillante and his co-accused were filed in the RTC-Manilaand RTC-Makati.

Neither did the appellate court err in sustaining Brillantes conviction for libel.

Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as "a public and malicious imputation ofa crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, orcircumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, orto blacken the memory of one who is dead."

To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of adiscreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of theperson defamed; and (d) existence of malice.63

There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar.

An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latterthe commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act,omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him incontempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.64 Brillantes statements duringthe January 7, 1988 press conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible actsallegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their associates, such as the use of goons to threatenBinays opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjucos assassination.

The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory materialis communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory

statement refers.65

In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statementsduring the press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to bepublished in several newspapers, namely,News Today, Peoples Journal, Balita,Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as thepersons who participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination ofSyjuco not only in his open letter but also during the press conference.

Thus, the determination of Brillantes culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether hisstatements were made with malice.

Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite andspeaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it impliesan intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.66 It is present when it is shown that the author of thelibelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard asto the truth or falsity thereof.67

Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every defamatory imputation ispresumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown.68


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As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatoryimputation qualifies as privileged communication.69

Privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. The Courtin Orfanel v. People of the Philippines70 differentiated absolutely privileged communication fromconditionally privileged communication in this manner:

A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if itsauthor acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress inthe discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by public officers inthe performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or theircounsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well asthe answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course ofsaid proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, andthe answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses.Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are thosewhich, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless madewith malice or bad faith.71 (Emphasis supplied.)

Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those mentioned in, Article 354 of theRevised Penal Code, to wit:

1. A private communication made by a person to another in the performance of any legal,moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of anyjudicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of anystatement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by publicofficers in the exercise of their functions.72

Brillante claims that he wrote the open letter and uttered the statement complained of during theJanuary 7, 1988 press conference out of a social duty to disclose to all concerned the dangers towhich he and his fellow candidate Syjuco were exposed in view of the concerted actions of Binayand Prudente.73 In effect, he argues that his defamatory statements and utterances fall under Article354, No. 1 and are in the nature of privileged communication; hence, malice cannot be presumedbut must be established beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court is not convinced.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged communicationunder Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made thecommunication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had aninterest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the

communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in thematter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in thecommunication are made in good faith and without malice.74

With respect to the first requisite, the Court in U.S. v. Caete75 clarified that the interest sought to beprotected by the person making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interestshared by the other members of society.


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It may therefore be argued that Brillantes statements, which according to him were made in order toprotect himself and Syjuco as Binays rivals in the 1988 elections, as well as to protect the electoratefrom possible acts of terrorism by Binay, Prudente and their associates and from casting their votesfor undeserving candidates, satisfy the first requisite.

However, as the Solicitor General noted, Brillantes statements were based merely on unconfirmed

intelligence reports. His belief in such intelligence reports hardly justifies the publication of suchserious imputations against his political rivals. As a journalist and as a candidate for public office,Brillante should have known that it is necessary to further verify the truth or at least the reliability ofthe intelligence reports before making them public. His hasty publication thereof negates theexistence of good faith and justifiable motives.

The pronouncement of the Court in U.S. v. Galeza76 is enlightening:

Every communication is privileged which is made in good faith with a view to obtainredress for some injury received or to prevent or punish some public abuse. The privilegeshould not be abused. If such communication be made maliciously and without probablecause, the pretense under which it is made, instead of furnishing a defense, will aggravate

the case of the defendant. And a party will be taken to have acted maliciously if he eagerlyseizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and without any inquiry into the merits, withouteven satisfying himself that the account of the matter that has reached him is correct, hastilyconcludes that a great public scandal has been brought to light which calls for the immediateintervention of the people. (Citations omitted.)77

It is, however, the absence of the second element of a privileged communication that unequivocallynegates the characterization of Brillantes statements as privileged communication. The law requiresthat for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, suchstatement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty inthe matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of thestatement.

In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, thecommunication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers ofgeneral circulation and was thus made known to the general public. Even if the interest sought to beprotected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general public doesnot have the power to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante in publishingthe open letter or in uttering similar statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference.Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the information which essentially destroyedthe reputations of the complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema tohis claim of privileged communication.

In Daez v. Court of Appeals,78 Daez was charged with libel for publishing a letter which accused theMayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan of corruption. The letter addressed to the Mayor was sent not only to

him but also to the Municipal Court, Municipal Council and Chief of Police of Meycauayan, Bulacan.Daez contended therein that he was not guilty of libel because he was not motivated by malice or ill-will in publishing the letter, but rather, he did it out of good intentions and a social duty to bring aboutreforms in the administration of the municipal government of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The Courtaffirmed his conviction for libel and held:

The goodness of the intention is not always sufficient by itself to justify the publication ofan injurious fact; thus the goodness of the end is not a sufficient motive to warrant theemployment of illicit means to obtain it. The existence of justifiable motives is a question


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which has to be decided by taking into consideration not only the intention of the author ofthe publication but all the other circumstances of each particular case. A communicationmade bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest,or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having acorresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without thisprivilege would be slanderous and actionable. However, a written letter containing libelous

matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among thepublic.As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconducton the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervisionover them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel.The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints shouldbe addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or powerto redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith. Inthe instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter was sent, was vested with the powerof supervision over the mayor or the authority to investigate the charges made against thelatter. (Citations omitted.)79

Thus, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the statements made by Brillanteduring the press conference and in the open letter do not qualify as privileged communication.

Indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all interestedpersons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who couldfurnish the protection asked for. However, to shield such privilege from abuse, the law itself requiresat all times that such petitions or communications shall be made in good faith or with justifiablemotives. If it is established that the communication was made maliciously or to persons who couldnot furnish the protection sought, then the author thereof cannot seek protection under the law. 80 Aswas explained by the Court in Caete:

The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmostpossible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removingand appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into

contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religiousorganization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authoritiesthe misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must beexercised in good faith, and may not with impunity be made the occasion for the venting ofprivate spite. It is subject to the limitation and restriction that such complaints must be madeto a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of; that they must be madein good faith and that they must not be actuated by malice.81

The Court in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui82clarified that the fact that a communication is privilegeddoes not mean that it is not actionable; the privileged character of the communication simply doesaway with the presumption of malice, and the plaintiff has to prove the fact of malice in such case.

However, since the open letter and the statements uttered by Brillante during the January 7, 1988press conference are defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally privileged communication,malice is presumed and need not be proven separately from the existence of the defamatorystatement.83

Considering that all the elements of libel are present in the cases against Brillante, the Court findsthat no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming his convictions by theRTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.


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Neither does the Court find any basis in law to uphold Brillantes proposition that his statementsmade during the January 7, 1988 press conference and those in his open letter constitute

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