Crim Pro Finals Set 1

8/17/2019 Crim Pro Finals Set 1

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Respondent.

April 14, 2008

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D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by John

Hilario y Sibal (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated August 19, 2003[1]

and November 28 2003[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75820.The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts[3] of Murder in the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de

parte, pleaded not guilty.

During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over

representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.

On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[4] finding petitioner and his co-accused Alijid

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer

imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight

(8) months of reclusion temporal in each count.

On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a Petition for

Relief[5] from the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his

petition, petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the judgment, he was already

confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed to the National Penitentiary in

Muntinlupa; that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed hislawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and confidence to his

lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice

of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa

City and learned from the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan;

that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated December

5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his representative to get a copy of

the notice of appeal from the RTC; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his

clear instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his counsel on

February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon.


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Petitioner claimed that he had a meritorious defense, to wit:

1. The Decision dated December 5, 2001, on page 16 thereof states an imprisonment term

of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of

Reclusion Temporal - a matter which ought to be rectified;

2. The undersigned is a first time offender;

3. No ruling was laid down on the stipulated facts (Decision, p. 3) relative to the (1)

absence of counsel during the alleged inquest, and (2) absence of warrant in arresting the accused

after ten (10) days from the commission of the crime;

4. Absence of a corroborating witness to the purported lone eyewitness, as against the

corroborated testimony of accused-petitioner's alibi;

5. The Commission on Human Rights investigation on the torture of the accused-petitioner;

6. and others.[6]

Petitioner argued that he was meted a total of 16 years imprisonment or almost equal to the

previous capital punishment of 20 years which was given an automatic review by the Supreme

Court, thus it is of greater interest of justice that his case be reviewed by the appellate court; and

that no damage will be sustained if the appeal is given due course since he continues to languish

in jail while the Petition for Relief is pending.

The Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for Relief where he contended that

the petition should no longer be entertained; and that perfection of appeal in the manner and within

the period permitted by law was not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the

appeal rendered the judgment final and executory.

The records do not show that the RTC required petitioner's counsel to whom petitioner attributed

the act of not filing the notice of appeal to file his comment.

On September 30, 2002, petitioner's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Appearance[7] from the case

with petitioner's consent. Again, the documents before us do not show the action taken by the RTCthereon.

In an Order[8] dated December 13, 2002, the RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for relief with the

following disquisition:

After a careful study of the instant petition and the arguments raised by the contending parties, the

Court is not persuaded by petitioner/accused's allegation that he was prevented from filing a notice

of appeal due to excusable negligence of his counsel.


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Accused's allegation that he indeed specifically instructed his counsel to file a notice of appeal of

the Decision dated [sic] and the latter did not heed his instruction is at best self-serving and

unsubstantiated and thus, unworthy of credence. At any rate, even if said omission should be

considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on the client.

x x x Besides, nowhere does it appear that accused/petitioner was prevented from fairly presenting

his defense nor does it appear that he was prejudiced as the merits of this case were adequately

passed upon in the Decision dated December 5, 2001.

It must also be pointed out that in his petition for relief, he stated that he instructed his counsel to

file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal of the Decision dated December 5,

2001, whereas in his affidavit of merit, he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of

appeal thereof.[9] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, again by himself, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC

committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition for relief. He claims that the delay in

appealing his case without his fault constitutes excusable negligence to warrant the granting of hispetition for relief.

In a Resolution dated August 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition in this wise:

It appearing that petitioner in the instant petition for certiorari failed to attach the following

documents cited in his petition, namely:

1. The December 5, 2001 Decision;

2. Comment of the City Prosecutor;

3. Manifestation of petitioner's counsel de oficio signifying his withdrawal as petitioner's

counsel.

The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure and as prayed for by the Solicitor General.[10]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2003 for

having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, in violation of Section 1, Rule 52 of the

Rules of Court and for failure to attach to the petition, the relevant and pertinent documents. The

CA also stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled simply because their non-observance

may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.

Hence, herein recourse filed by petitioner, still unassisted by counsel, raising the following issues:

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's

counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle

the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?

Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and

executory judgment?

Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the

latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between

counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot

easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO,


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x x x x

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient

ground for the dismissal of the petition.

The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and pertinent to the

petition rests on the petitioner. If, upon its initial review of the petition, the CA is of the view that

additional pleadings, documents or order should have been submitted and appended to the

petition, the following are its options: (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of

the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents,

or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition

appending thereto the required pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period.[11]

The RTC Decision dated December 5, 2001, finding petitioner guilty of two counts of homicide, theComment of the City Prosecutor as well as the counsel's withdrawal of appearance were

considered by the CA as relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari, thus it dismissed the

petition for failure to attach the same. However, the CA failed to consider the fact that the petition

before it was filed by petitioner, a detained prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is

not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced

lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as

much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal

system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights

not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such

right.[13] This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we held in Telan v.

Court of Appeals:

The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as

a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is

immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment

had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity

to be heard by himself and counsel.

x x x x

Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as much

from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal

system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights

not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such

right.


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The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-

going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully

keeping his client company.

No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel

exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.[14]

(Emphasis supplied)

The filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the CA and

should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel. Although the

petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC Order dismissing the

petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner was to be given the chance to file an

appeal from his conviction, thus the need for a counsel is more pronounced. To repeat the ruling in

Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to

counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of theappeal.[15] It is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he

filed his petition for relief from judgment with the RTC.

It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an accused

person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave

denial of due process.

Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their

causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the

ends of justice would be served better.[16]

The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed late. It appears that the

CA Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari was received at the address written in the

petition on September 1, 2003, and that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on

September 18, 2003, or two days late.

While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-

day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some

occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla[17] we held:

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)

matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,

(c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party

favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely

frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment

of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate

rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects


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this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling

as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.

In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J.

Francisco, had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of

justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere

slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in

rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the

balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.

Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the

realities of the situation.

Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints oftechnicalities.[18]

Moreover, in Basco v. Court of Appeals,[19] we also held:

Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent

application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the

former must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically

provides that:

SECTION 2. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object

and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action

and proceeding.[20]

Petitioner claims that he actually received the CA Resolution dismissing his petition for certiorari

only on September 4, 2003 even as the same Resolution was earlier received on September 1,

2003 at the address written in his petition, i.e., c/o Robert S. Bacuraya, No. 9 Iris St., West

Fairview, 1118, Quezon City, by a certain Leonora Coronel. Apparently, Bacuraya is not a lawyer.

Ordinarily, petitioner being detained at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, the CA should have

also sent a copy of such Resolution to his place of detention. Considering that petitioner onlyreceived the Resolution on September 4, 2003, we find the two days delay in filing his motion for

reconsideration pardonable as it did not cause any prejudice to the other party. There is no

showing that petitioner was motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings or obstruct the

administration of justice. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the

procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner.

Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and

other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would result in

technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided.[21]


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In dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it, the CA clearly put a premium on technicalities

and brushed aside the issue raised before it by petitioner, i.e., whether the RTC committed grave

abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition for relief thus preventing him from taking an

appeal from his conviction.

Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused

afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.[22] However, instead of remanding

the case to the CA for a decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not to further

delay the final disposition of this case.

The RTC denied the petition for relief as it found petitioner's claim that his counsel did not heed his

instruction to file an appeal to be unsubstantiated and self serving; and that if there was indeed

such omission committed by the counsel, such negligence is binding on the client.

Petitioner insists that the failure of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his judgment ofconviction despite his explicit instruction to do so constitutes excusable negligence and so his

petition for relief should have been granted.

We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition for

relief from judgment.

Petitioner was represented in the RTC by Atty. Rivera of the PAO. Section 1, Article IV of PAO

Memorandum Circular No.18 series of 2002, the Amended Standard Office Procedures in

Extending Legal Assistance (PAO Memorandum Circular), provides that all appeals must be made

upon the request of the client himself and only meritorious cases shall be appealed; while Section

2, Article II of PAO Memorandum Circular provides that in criminal cases, the accused enjoys the

constitutional presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven, hence cases of defendants in

criminal actions are considered meritorious and therefore, should be appealed, upon the client's

request.

In this case, petitioner claims he had instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal. Under the PAO

Memorandum Circular, it was the duty of the latter to perfect the appeal. Thus, in determining

whether the petition for relief from judgment is based on a meritorious ground, it was crucial to

ascertain whether petitioner indeed gave explicit instruction to the PAO lawyer to file an appeal but

the latter failed to do so.

To determine the veracity of petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have required the

PAO lawyer to comment on the petition for relief. However, it appears from the records that the RTC

only required the City Prosecutor to file a comment on the petition.

The RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief did not touch on the question whether the PAO

lawyer was indeed negligent in not filing the appeal as it merely stated that even if said omission,

i.e., not filing the appeal despite his clients instruction to do so, should be considered as

negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on the client.


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While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be condoned and should bind the client,

[23] the exception is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the

client is deprived of his day in court.[24] In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:

x x x Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the fiction

that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The established jurisprudence holds:

x x x x

The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and

binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance the

ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule desert its proper office as an aid

to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit

exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

x x x x

The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the

purposes of justice require it.

x x x x

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a

result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and

denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present

his case. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented because of counsel's

error or incompetence, the defendant in order to secure a new trial must satisfy the court that he

has a good defense and that the acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of

the omitted evidence. What should guide judicial action is that a party be given the fullest

opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty,

honor or property on mere technicalities.[26]

The PAO lawyer, Atty. Rivera, filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on September 30, 2002, almost

three months before the RTC rendered its assailed Order dated December 13, 2002, dismissingthe petition for relief. The RTC had ample time to require the PAO lawyer to comment on the

petition for relief from judgment, before issuing the questioned Order. Had the RTC done so, there

would have been a factual basis for the RTC to determine whether or not the PAO lawyer was

grossly negligent; and eventually, whether the petition for relief from judgment is meritorious. If

there was no instruction from petitioner to file an appeal, then there was no obligation on the part of

the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as stated in the PAO Memorandum Circular and negligence could

not be attributed to him. However, if indeed there was such an instruction to appeal but the lawyer

failed to do so, he could be considered negligent.


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Thus, there was no basis for the RTC to conclude that the claim of petitioner that he instructed the

PAO lawyer to file an appeal as self-serving and unsubstantiated. The RTC's dismissal of the

petition for relief was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an undue denial of the

petitioner's right to appeal.

The RTC faulted petitioner for claiming in his petition for relief that he instructed his counsel to file

the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; while in his affidavit of merit, he

claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal. We do not find such circumstance

sufficient ground to dismiss the petition considering that he filed the petition for relief unassisted by

counsel.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by

law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v.

Court of Appeals[27] where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and

trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appealand instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper

and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While this right is

statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a

right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss

of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.

However, we cannot, in the present petition for review on certiorari, make a conclusive finding that

indeed there was excusable negligence on the part of the PAO lawyer which prejudiced petitioner's

right to appeal his conviction. To do so would be pure speculation or conjecture. Therefore, a

remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition for relief

from judgment is just and proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 19, 2003 and November

28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated December 13,

2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, is SET ASIDE. The RTC is hereby

ordered to require Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office to file his comment on the

petition for relief from judgment filed by petitioner, hold a hearing thereon, and thereafter rule on

the merits of the petition for relief from judgment, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.


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Present:

CORONA, J.,

Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 17, 2010

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RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated August 13, 2008, affirming the Regional

Trial Court[2] (RTC) Decision[3] dated June 9, 2003, finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape.

Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape, as defined and punished

under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in separate Informations, which read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899

That sometime on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of force and

intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with hisdaughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659).

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900

That sometime on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City, Philippines, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of force and


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intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his

daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659).[4]

Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he changed his earlier plea

to one of guilt. As such, the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellants plea of guilt to

the charges.

Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of private complainant

herself, AAA, her mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established the

following:

1. Documento started sexually molesting his daughter, AAA, in 1989 when she was ten (10) years

old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and gave birth in 1993.2. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses of Barsilisa Morada,

Documentos relative, and Aida Documento, both located in Butuan City. During each incident,

Documento hit and hurt AAA physically. He likewise threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the

rape.

3. AAAs mother, BBB, who was working in Manila from 1994 to 1996, went to Barsilisa and asked

for help in locating Oscar and AAA. BBB testified that she had not seen nor heard from the two

since April 7, 1994, when Documento brought their daughters AAA and CCC to Tubod, Lanao del

Norte, for a vacation. Thereafter, Documento left CCC in Tubod and brought AAA with him to

Santiago, Agusan del Norte.

4. When BBB found out from their relatives that AAA got pregnant and gave birth, she suspected

that Documento was the culprit. Upon learning that Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she

went to the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in securing custody of AAA. As soon

as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the police that Documento raped her.

5. Dr. Hugo testified on the genital examination he conducted on AAA, and affirmed the medical

certificate he issued with the following findings:

Physical exam: HEENT with in normal limits.C/L with in normal limits.

CVB with in normal limits.

ABD Soft; NABS

GU (-) KPS

Genitalia - Parrous

- Healed vaginal laceration

- Vaginal introitus; admits 2 finger[s]

with ease

- Hymen with pemnants caruncula

multiforma


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Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for Spermatozoa.[5]

Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the

crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Hector B. Salise convinced him to do so. Documento

contended that he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual, sexual

relationship. He further alleged that the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin,

Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross-examination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he

had supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their forgiveness.

The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of Rape, to wit:

WHEREFORE, as a consequence of the foregoing, this Court finds accused Oscar M. Documento

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of rape and correspondingly sentences

him:

1. To suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of the two (2) rape cases filed against him - Criminal

Case No. 6899 and Criminal Case No. 6900;

2. To indemnify the victim, AAA, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as

moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, respectively, for each count of rape in

accordance with recent jurisprudence.

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused Oscar M. Documento from Butuan

City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

Let the records of these cases be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory

review.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Consistent with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[7] Documentos appeal was remanded to the CA.

Ruling on the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction, but changed the penalty imposed onDocumento from death penalty to reclusion perpetua, and increased the award of moral damages

from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count of Rape. The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of two counts of the crime of rape and ordering him to indemnify the victim for each count of

rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00

for each count of rape and that in lieu of the death penalty, appellant Oscar Documento is hereby

sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape without possibility of

parole.


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SO ORDERED.[8]

Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING

ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED AS THE PROSECUTION

FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE WERE PERPETRATED IN

BUTUAN CITY.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRYINTO THE VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL COMPREHENSION BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.[9]

We find no cogent reason to disturb Documentos conviction. We affirm the CA, but with

modification.

On the issue of the trial courts territorial jurisdiction over the crime, we completely agree with the

appellate courts ruling thereon. Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed

to establish that the two (2) counts of Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed to

specific parts of the records which show that, although AAA did not specifically mention Butuan

City in her testimony, the incidents in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on

Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City.

First. AAA in her Sworn Statement dated April 24, 1996 answered the prosecutors question in this

wise:

15. Q : Right after you arrived [in] Butuan City, did your father molest you or rape you?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : When was that?A : From the month of October 15, 1995 when we stayed [in] Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City,

and the last happened in the evening of April 22, 1996 [on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City.

Second. The Resolution dated May 3, 1996 of Hector B. Salise, Second Assistant City Prosecutor,

states that:

There were many places they stayed and several sexual intercourse that took place which this

office has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation but only on the incidents of rape that

took place [in] Antongalon, Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and [on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City

on April 22, 1996.


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Third. The two (2) Informations dated May 8, 1996, clearly state that the crimes charged against

appellant were perpetrated in Barangay Antongalon and Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City on October

15, 1995 and April 22, 1996, respectively.

Fourth. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial

notice by the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the

introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms

of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of

the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of

the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the

measure of time, and the geographical divisions.[10]

Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed because the trial court did not

properly conduct a searching inquiry on the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of

guilt.

We disagree.

It is true that the appellate court noted the trial courts failure to conduct the prescribed searching

inquiry into the matter of whether or not Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently made.

Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant proper. Its disquisition on Documentos plea of

guilt is in point.

Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines

[set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases] after appellants re-arraignment and guilty

plea. The questions propounded to appellant during the direct and cross-examination likewise fall

short of these requirements. x x x.

x x x x

The questions propounded were clearly not compliant with the guidelines set forth by the High

Court. The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as

argued by appellant, the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not affect

or reduce the imposable penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed that under

Article 63, the death penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court

regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might have attended the commission of the deed.

Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the

guilty plea.


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With the trial courts failure to comply with the guidelines, appellants guilty plea is deemed

improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious.

This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This course of

action is appropriate only when the appellants guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction. As

held in People v. Mira, -

Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea, we are not inclined to

remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident

plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied

on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained,

because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence

proving his commission of the offense charged.[11]

On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no reversible error in affirming the trial

courts ruling convicting Documento.

Lastly, on the matter of the appellate courts award of exemplary damages, we increase the award

from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 13, 2008 in CA-

G.R. CRHC No. 00285 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary

damages is hereby increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The Decision is affirmed in all other

respects.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


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Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versus-

ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 186228

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

BRION,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, and

PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-

year old daughter.


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Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the real name and the personal

circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her

identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this

decision.

The Facts

In an Information dated 21 September 2000,[2] the appellant was accused of the crime of

QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,

province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation,

did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter

AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.[3]

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[4] During the pre-trial conference, the

prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated

in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13)

years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the

appellant.[5] On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA;[6] her

brother BBB;[7] and one Moises Boy Banting,[8] a bantay bayan in the barangay. Their testimonies

revealed the following:

In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.[9] AAAs father, the appellant, was

having a drinking spree at the neighbors place.[10] Her mother decided to leave because when

appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.[11] Her only brother BBB also went

out in the company of some neighbors.[12]

At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;[13] removed his pants, slid inside

the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;[14] warned her not to shout for

help while threatening her with his fist;[15] and told her that he had a knife placed above her head.

[16] He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside her

vagina.[17]

Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.[18] Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying

out late.[19] BBB decided to take AAA with him.[20] While on their way to their maternal

grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.[21] Upon reaching

their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,[22] after which,

they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.[23]

Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.[24] He invited

appellant to the police station,[25] to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to

him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.[26]


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The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.[27] Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula,

Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:

hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody

discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident[28]

On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him

was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after

engaging in a heated argument,[29] and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.[30] He went

further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.

He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.[31] Shortly

after, AAA arrived.[32] She answered back when confronted.[33] This infuriated him that he kickedher hard on her buttocks.[34]

Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the afternoon.[35] Finding

nobody at home,[36] he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.[37]

Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the Bantay Bayan headed by Moises

Boy Banting.[38] They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.[39] He later learned

that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape.[40]

On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its

decision[41] in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship

and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[42] It also ordered him

to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with

exemplary damages of P25,000.00.[43]

On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS[44]

by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.[45] The appellate court found that

appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from

P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[46]

On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of appeal.

[47] This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs,[48]

but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.[49]

The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding

him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt,[50] because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;

[51] (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a

counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;[52] and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.[53]


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Our Ruling

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a bantay bayan and

the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.

Admissibility in Evidence of an

Extrajudicial Confession before

a Bantay Bayan

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, theconfession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was

no valid waiver of such requirement.[54]

The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided

for under Article III, Section 12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant

questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a

neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may

be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of

the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2

January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several

houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed

by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-

appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made

by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the

Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-

appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag areinadmissible in evidence against her x x x.

[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during

custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their

agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the

case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of

the private complainant].[58] (Emphasis supplied)


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Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a

bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III,

Section 12 of the Constitution.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a

bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of

keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.[60]

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued

on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be

organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the

Barangay level.[61] The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong

Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the

Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing

Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government OrganizationRepresentative well-known in his community.[62]

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of

watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to

perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,

without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of

duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a

custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective

insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,

Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,

inadmissible in evidence.

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not

deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence

showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[63]

Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution

Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified

that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her

relatives, proceeded to look for a bantay bayan. On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought

her sister to the house of their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.

Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that where the testimonies of two key

witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie,

and their story a mere concoction.[65]


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The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could

not simply stand together because:

On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking

incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the

testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she

was with Vicente at that time.

Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the

help of a bantay bayan. Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,

which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of

AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.

At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to

affect the veracity of the testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial orinconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase

doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.[67]

Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is

likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a

minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.[68] As correctly pointed out by the

Court of Appeals:

Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family

invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but

also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.[69] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it

is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal

and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous

crime was not in fact committed.[70] No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of

cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she

naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.[71] Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a

certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put

her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including

herself to a lifetime of shame.[72] It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexualperversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In

fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a

close relative.[73]

Elements of Rape

Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the

applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997[74] to the case at bar.


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The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, [b]y a man who shall have carnal

knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation.[75] The death penalty shall be

imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, [w]hen the

victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent.[76]

The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the

penetration of appellants penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal

knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is

necessary to show that rape was committed.[77] Further, when such testimony corresponds with

medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal

knowledge have been established.[78]

The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the

accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence

substitutes for violence and intimidation.[79] At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellantwith his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head.[80]

It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and

straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, alibi is an inherently weak defense that is

viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate.[81] Alibi and denial must be supported by

strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility.[82] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to

prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the

offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time

of its commission.[83] Appellant failed in this wise.

Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the

instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were

specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference,

and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission,

as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are

judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the

proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by

showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Penalty


26/78

Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to

P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that

where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances

warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity

ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00 as moral damages.[85] However, the award of exemplary damages

should have been increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.[86] Also, the penalty of reclusion

perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty

upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No.

9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further affirm

the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No.

9346 clearly provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible

for parole.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HCNo. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without

eligibility for parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,

and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 131799-801. February 23, 2004]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional

Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 finding appellant

Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape.[2] In the

same decision, the appellant was convicted of two counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each count

of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for each count

of acts of lasciviousness, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years,

eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15)

years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as


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maximum. The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano, the

amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for each count of acts of lasciviousness.

The Indictments

Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were filed against her

uncle, the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of each Information reads:

Criminal Case No. 97-385

That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a

place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of

the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence, her relative by consanguinity within the third

civil degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLESERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her

damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]


That sometime in the month of February 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a

place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of

complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence her relative by consanguinity within the third civil

degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO

y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and

prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]


That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a

place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design

by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year

old girl, by then and there kissing her and touching her sexual organ, without her consent and

against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]



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That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a

place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design

by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year

old girl, by then and there dragging her inside a bathroom and repeatedly kissing her on her checks

[sic], without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the

cases ensued.

In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General Hospital.

On May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first witness.

On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986.[7] In November

1996, her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the prosecution asked her what

happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she wanted to continue with her testimony, again,

she did not respond. The trial was reset to June 2 and 9, 1997. When trial resumed on June 9,

1997, Lucelle was questioned by the prosecution on direct examination, but still, she gave no

answer. She cried profusely in open court. When asked by the court if she wanted to proceed with

the trial, she remained silent. The trial was reset anew to July 9 and 14, 1997.

In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and psychological

examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr. Rochelflume Samson

examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated August 29, 1997 with the following remarks and

recommendation:

Based on clinical history, mental status examination and psychological evaluation, this patient is

suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This illness is characterized by intense fear and

feeling of helplessness whenever she recalls her traumatic experience of being raped. It causes

her intense psychological distress whenever asked to talk about the rape scene or incident. Thus,

she avoids recollections of the trauma.

At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above. She would be having difficulties

testifying in court because of this. She requires psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Section.[8]

During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial was reset to

July 21, 1997.

During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew to continue with

her testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant raped her in November 1996

and many other times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Makati City.


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Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and circumstances before and during the commission

of the crimes, the prosecutor asked Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn statement[9] and

to affirm the truth of its contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then marked the sworn

statement in evidence as Exhibit H, and then manifested to the court that he had no more

questions for the witness on direct examination.

On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986.

The appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her and threatened her.[10]

On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mothers older brother. In

November 1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working at a construction firm,

the appellant was employed at the Department of Environment and Sanitation in Makati City, while

her grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a maid in Bel Air Subdivison. Her mother worked

for one of her fathers cousins. On re-direct examination, the prosecution elicited from Lucelle that

the appellant raped her in November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside the room of her aunt Marina in hergrandmothers house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City, and that her aunt,

Marina, and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where her aunt and Ate Sharon

were when she was being raped in her aunts room, Lucelle did not respond. When asked why she

did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the previous hearings and why she had

been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her uncle, the appellant.

In her sworn statement,[11] Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she was sleeping in

a room in the house. It was about 6 oclock in the evening. She was awakened when she felt

someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncle, the appellant,

armed with a bladed weapon (balisong). He poked the weapon on the left side of her neck. He

warned her that if she told her parents, he would kill her. He removed her panties, undressed

himself and mounted her. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her private

part and cried. The appellant, thereafter, left the room. Also during the month of November 1996,

the appellant continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the house.

In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed her and

mashed her private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused her (sinalbahe)

while she was in the same room. It was about 11 oclock in the evening. He again warned her not to

divulge to her parents what he did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, Lucelle urinated in thebathroom and when she was about to go out, the appellant entered, pushed her inside and kissed

her on her cheeks several times.

Celso Serrano, Lucelles father, testified that sometime in November 1996, at dawn, he was in bed

and noticed that the appellant was in the bedroom of his cousin-in-law. Sometime later, he went to

the bathroom. He then heard his wife ask the appellant where he had come from and the latter

replied that he just came from the roof of the house. On another occasion, one early Sunday

morning, he noticed blood stains on Lucelles short pants. When she declared that she had her

monthly period, he gave her P5.00 with which to buy sanitary napkins. Lucelle refused to accept

the money. He suggested that she wash herself but she just nodded her head. When he asked her


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why she refused to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell him because she

might be killed.

Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelles mother. Lucelle was born on February 19, 1986.

[12] She and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle resided with her mother,

Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City. Her sister Marina and the

appellant, her brother, also resided in the same house. The family slept together in the evenings in

the sala of the house while Marina slept in her bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece Lucelle

to sleep in her bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes noticed that Lucelle was not

at her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was not there either. Lourdes went to

Marinas bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a blanket. Beside her was the

appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. When the appellant saw Lourdes,

he slid down from the bed, went under the papag, and furtively left the room. When Lourdes

removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying sideways with her knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot).

Lucelle was trembling with fear. When Lourdes asked Lucelle what happened, she did not respond.Lourdes left the room and went back to the sala. She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided

against it when she saw him seated in the sala, playing with his balisong.

Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband were having

dinner when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked for her daughter in the

house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if she had seen Lucelle. Nita replied in

the negative. When Lourdes asked Nita if Lucelle was inside the bathroom, Nita responded that the

appellant was using it. Momentarily, Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from the bathroom. He was

in his short pants and his shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring profusely. Lourdes was

flabbergasted when she saw Lucelle come out of the bathroom after the appellant. Lucelle was

crying and looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was crying, she told her mother that

she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes that he did not do anything to

Lucelle.

Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes brought Lucelle

on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way, Lucelle adamantly refused

to tell her parents what the appellant did to her. However, when they reached the barangay

headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay chairman that the appellant sexually abused her.

Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the barangay chairman against the appellant for sexuallymolesting Lucelle.

Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay chairman ordered

him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant to the barangay hall.

The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A

Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the appellant

admitted that he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance,

and that he threatened to kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her parents.[13] The

appellant signed his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.


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From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City Police

Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape and acts of

laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit took the sworn statements of Lourdes

and Lucelle.[14] She conducted a custodial investigation of the appellant who was without counsel

during which the latter admitted having raped the victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a report on

her investigation of the victims complaint.[15]

On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that on March 12,

1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and submitted Living Case

Report No. MG-97-355 which contained the following findings:

GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

Height: 141 cm. Weight: 78 lbs.

Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject.

Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light-brown, 2.6 cms. in diameter. Nipples, light-brown,

protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter.

No extragenital physical injuries noted.

GENERAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax.

Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube

2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities, shallow.

CONCLUSIONS

1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of

examination.

2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete

penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any

genital injury.[16]

When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay before the

barangay chairman[17] as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando David, the appellantobjected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was not assisted by counsel and that, he

was forced and coerced into signing the same. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement

as part of Davids testimony. The appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of

Lucelles sworn statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same because of her

mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in evidence as part of her

testimony.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to November 5, 1997 for

the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for trial on that date, his counsel

manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385


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and 97-387 from not guilty to guilty. He also manifested that he would no longer adduce any

evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution failed

to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial court

suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer with his counsel.

When trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court that

he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his decision to

plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer present any evidence in

his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385

and 97-387 with the assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges.

On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes

charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution has proven beyond

reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in the two

counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended. He is hereby declare[d] CONVICTED in each of the cases. Accordingly he is sentenced

to suffer the supreme penalty [of] DEATH in each of the two cases; and indemnify the victim

LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages for each of the cases;

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution has proven

beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two

counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and

penalized under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of the two

cases; and, accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison

term from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period,

as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its

medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim, LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of

P20,000 as moral damages for each of the cases.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the prosecutor

adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified rape in Criminal

Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386. The trial court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the

contents of her sworn statement[19] the same were admissible in evidence as part of the res

gestae.

The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and 97-388. In view

of the trial courts imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385

and 97-386, the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal.


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The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of error, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FELICIANO ULIT WITH A DEATH

PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION OF GUILT.[20]

The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386,

and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however, that he

be spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful for the crimes he committed

and that he pleaded guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387; he no longer presented any

evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-388 so that the proceedings before the court would be shortened

and simplified. Nevertheless, the appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not

limited to the assigned errors.[21] An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the

appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the

decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.[22]

Appellants Plea of Guilty in


was Imprudently Made.

In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape of his

niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital

offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of not guilty

to guilty, it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full

comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay,[23] this Court enumerated the

following duties of the trial court under the rule:

1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by

the accused] of the consequences of his plea;

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and

precise degree of his culpability; and

3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so

if he desires.[24]

The raison detre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care where the

imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.

Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident pleas

of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be averted since by admitting his guilt

before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood

the meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his plea.[25]


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There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching inquiry. It has

been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and the

full or complete comprehension by the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that it

is based on a free and informed judgment. In People vs. Aranzado,[26] we formulated the following

guidelines as to how the trial court may conduct its searching inquiry:

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)

whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary

investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the

investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has

been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming

from malevolent or avenging quarters.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and

completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic

status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give

a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and

the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in

the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or

parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to

Crim Pro Finals Set 1

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