PEOPLE vs. TY263 SCRA 746

FACTS: Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.

In November 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her seven-month old daughter, Arabella, to Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic which was owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea and was confined for three days. Sombong could not pay the hospital bills and since no one could take care of her daughter at home, she left her at the nursery of the hospital, which she was charged P50.00 per day. Arabella was transferred to the clinic extension and she was taken care of by a yaya hired by her mother. Nothing was heard from the complainant so Dr. Ty notified the barangay captain of the child’s abandonment. After two years, Arabella was entrusted to a guardian, Lilibeth Neri. After five years, Sombong came back to claim her daughter. She filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-appellant with the RTC of Quezon City but was summarily dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the alleged detention was perpetrated in Caloocan City. Then, a criminal case was filed against accused-appellants and an administrative case was filed against Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of PRC. The case was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Then on October 13, 1992, Sombong filed a petition for habeas corpus against the alleged guardians of her daughter and the petition was granted and ordered the immediate delivery of Cristina Grace Neri having found that she was the daughter of Sombong. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said decision was reversed on the ground that Cristina and complainant’s daughter are not one and the same person.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor?

RULING: No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.

The said failure or refusal must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. The word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant’s child to her.

PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA175 SCRA 743

FACTS: At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of September 28, 1982 spouses Ernesto and Eugenia Policarpio along with their two children, Ferdinand and Edward, seven years old and one year and three months old respectively, were at the Luneta Park. near the Rizal Monument in Manila. Having just arrived from Nueva Ecija, the family was resting at the park. Then and there, a woman who turned out to be accused Angelina Mendoza, but who had introduced herself as 'Rosalinda Quintos' accosted them. She struck a conversation with the spouses and even offered them food particularly to Edward. Mr. Policarpio, a Pampango, recognized the accused. He recalled having seen her at a club in Angeles City. During their conversation, the accused gave the spouses her address at 2526 Dallas Street, Makati, Metro Manila. At one point, she even half-seriously asked the spouses to give the boy Edward to her. They of course did not take the request seriously. Then while Mr. Policarpio had apparently gone somewhere away from the group and while Mrs. Policarpio was not looking the accused began playing with Edward and, offering him food, lured him away from his mother. Shortly, the accused carried Edward and took him away with her.

It developed that from the Luneta the accused brought the child to Tramo Street, Pasay City where she claimed before some residents that the child was that of a hostess friend of hers who being gravely ill of leprosy was in dire need of money, and that she was asked to sell the child for P 250.00. This unusual sales offer happened to take place in front of the house of Mrs. Delia Navarette, a barangay councilwoman whose attention was attracted by the number of people who had gathered outside her house. The accused offered to sell the child to Mrs. Navarette. The latter felt the proposition distasteful, saying that it was not right that a child should be sold and that what accused was doing was illegal. Nonetheless, the accused insisted on momentarily leaving the child with Mrs. Navarette. Intending to have the child returned to his mother, Mrs. Navarette asked her sister to go with the accused to the National Orthopedic Hospital where according to the accused the boy's mother was confined. But when Mrs. Navarette's sister and the accused were on their way to the hospital, the latter changed her story. She said that the boy's mother was at the Philippine General Hospital instead. So they proceeded to the PGH and went up to the third floor where the accused said the boy's mother was. But it turned out that all the patients on that floor were males. To make the long story short, the accused had given Mrs. Navarette's sister the run around. And when the latter finally got fed up she phoned Mrs. Navarette to report what had happened. Mrs. Navarette instructed her sister to bring the accused to her as she had now decided to report the matter to the police. While the accused and Mrs.

Navarette's sister were waiting for a taxi at PGH, the former disappeared. Since the child had been left with her, Mrs. Navarette felt obliged to take care of him. She also made it a point to report the incident to the police to alert them in case there should be reports of a missing child.Sometime later, the accused reappeared at the Luneta Police Station obstensibly to visit a detainee thereat. It was then that the police officer on duty recognized her. She was questioned regarding the whereabouts of the boy. Threatened with arrest, she revealed that she had left the boy with Mrs. Navarette in Pasay City. That led to the recovery of Edward Policarpio and his eventual return to his parents twenty days after the accused took him away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention Kidnapping instead of Failure to Return a Minor, which is the crime charged?

RULING: Yes, it is well-settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.   Only recently, this principle was reiterated in People v. Torres & Salas, G.R. No. 76711, September 26, 1988, wherein this Court again held that it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the Information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that accused can be convicted of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention instead of "kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor", and that there is no variance between the crime charged and the crime proven, which would fall under Sections 4 and 5 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The accused was convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

PEOPLE vs. SANTOS378 SCRA 157

FACTS: On or about the 10th day of December, 1996, in the morning, at Bgy. Resurreccion, municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, the above-named accused, including three (3) Does whose identities have not yet been established, being a private individual and without any legal justification and simulating public authority, and by means of force, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and handcuff both hands of one Leonida Dela Pena, then load her to a passenger jeepney and brought her to a public cemetery at Naguillan Road, Baguio City, thereby depriving her of her liberty by detaining inside a passenger jeepney and threatening her with death but was able to escape, to the damage and prejudice of said Dela Pena.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellants are guilty of art. 286 instead of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING: The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation.  Its elements are: 1. that the offender has prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such display of force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party; and, 3. that the offender who has restrained the will and liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law.  Where there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved and the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the accused can be convicted of the offense proved. The judgment of conviction under review is modified.  Appellants Santos and Baltazar are acquitted of the crime of Kidnapping but instead, said appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion.

PEOPLE vs. VILLAMAR298 SCRA 398

FACTS: Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder in an information dated November 9, 1993. That in or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 to 9:00 a.m. of the same day, in Barangay Cabalantian, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga, Marilyn Villamar, suspecting that Maria Luz Cortez would not return her daughter Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted to said Maria Luz Cortez, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously surreptitiously enter the house of Maria Luz Cortez and by means of force and intimidation and with threats to kill take said Maria Luz Cortez, a woman of 20 years old as the latter entered her house whom said accused detained and kept locked inside the house from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a period of two (2) hours, more or less, under restraint and against the will of the said Maria Luz Cortez and said accused during the period of detention maltreated and refused to release the latter until her demand for a sum of money and a getaway vehicle was given to her and on the occasion thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and strike with a deadly weapon: a knife and a chisel, Maria Luz Cortez who as a result thereof, suffered various lacerated wounds on the head which ordinarily would cause her death. Thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely arrival of the authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez which prevented her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Under the law, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. In this case, there is no showing that the accused wanted to extort money from the plaintiff prior to their confrontation. When accused-appellant coerced the plaintiff to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: 1. that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; 2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and 3. that the person who restrains the will and

liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention.  Still, when Villamar was erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for the crime of grave coercion. The appeal is partially granted.  Appellant is convicted only for grave coercion. Unless she is being held for some other lawful cause, her immediate RELEASE is hereby ordered, considering that she has served beyond the maximum penalty imposed by law.  

PEOPLE vs. ASTORGA283 SCRA 420

FACTS: Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions;2. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty;3. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya; and4. Should the accused-appellant be convicted of grave coercion?

RULING: From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon Bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no

"lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

BALEROS vs. PEOPLE483 SCRA 10

FACTS: On December 1991, at about 1:50am in Celestial Bldg. in Manila, Baleros, a medical student, forcefully covered the face of Albano, another medical student, with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects and laid on top of her. Albano wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with wet cloth and chemicals were very tight. Still Albano continued fighting her attacker by kicking until her right hand got free. With this opportunity, she grab hold of his sex which she squeezed. The man let go of her. Albano roused Marvilou, her maid and over the intercom of the building complaining that someone went inside her room and attempted to rape her. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) found the accused guilty of attempted rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of attempted rape.

RULING: No. The accused is guilty of unjust vexation. The series of acts committed by the petitioner constitutes unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Art. 287 of the Revised Penal Code. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which although not productive of some physical or material harm would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. The attempt that the RTC punishes is that which has logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by the overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing the act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not of judicial standpoint of the Revised Penal Code.

ONG CHIU KWAN vs. PEOPLE345 SCRA 586

FACTS: On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Bayona filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong. On April 24, 1990, at around 10am in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Infante to relocate the telephone, electric and water lines of Crazy Feet because said lines posed a disturbance. Ong Chiu Kwan however failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment. The MTC found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of unjust vexation.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainant’s business establishment because said lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to re and locate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of the electric, water and telephone services during operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant.

PEOPLE vs. REYES399 SCRA 628

FACTS: On October 12, 1997, at 2:00 a.m., PO1 Eduardo C. Molato of Station 4, Western Police District, Sampaloc, Manila was on his way home on board a passenger jeepney. When he alighted at the corner of Lapu-lapu Street and Northbay Boulevard South he saw the victim being held up by two persons. The one in front of the victim forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired one warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He chased them but when he saw the victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the driver to bring the victim to the nearest hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to Phase II until he reached Agora, but the suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly but PO1 Molato had a good look at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was about 8 to 10 meters away from them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of Robbery?

RULING: Yes, in robbery by the taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code employs the phrase "belonging to another" and this has been interpreted to merely require that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held that robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter’s will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

PEOPLE vs. SUELA373 SCRA 183

FACTS: On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant Director Nilo L. Rosas was at the master’s bedroom located at the second floor of his townhouse residence at #95 B-5 A. Melchor Street, Xavierville Subdivision, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. He was watching television thereat, together with his adopted son, Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo ‘Gerry’ Gabilo, who at that time was engaged in the real estate business. Suddenly, three persons sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a knife, barged into the room. The tallest of the three, with a height of about five feet and five inches, reached for the light switch and turned it off. The three intruders then shouted ‘dapa, dapa.’ So Director Rosas, Gerry Gabilo, and Norman Rosas dropped to the floor with their faces facing the bed. Two of the malefactors turned off the television set, and tied their hands at their backs, with the use of hankies and telephone cord. The room remained illuminated by the light coming from a walk-in closet and from the lamp post outside fronting the room, and from the lights of the neighboring townhouses.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in considering the extra-judicial confessions of Edgar Suela and Nerio Suel[a] are admissible against them.2. Whether or not the court a quo erred in considering the letter of Nerio Suela to Director Nilo Rosas as evidence against him.3. Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela for simple robbery under Art. 294, no. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.4. Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela and Nerio Suela of robbery with homicide.

RULING: 1. With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school. Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the prosecution as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave his confession -- for only around “five minutes.” After this initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure that he had explained to appellant the consequences of his extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous’ attention was divided while attending the custodial investigation as he was also looking over another paper work on his desk.

In view of these proven circumstances, we are not convinced that counsel had fully explained to Batocan his constitutional rights and what they entailed or the nature and the consequences of an extrajudicial confession -- explanations that would have enabled him to make an informed judgment on whether to confess; and if so, on what matters. There is no showing that Atty. Rous properly explained the choices or options open to appellant, a duty expected of any counsel under the circumstances. In sum, he did not turn out to be the competent and independent counsel envisioned by the Constitution.

2. This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation when he wrote it. In open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary to his contention, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities. Hence, the letter is admissible in evidence.

3. Edgardo Batocan’s confession to Rosas who is not a police officer is admissible in evidence. The Rules state that “the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.” Batocan’s verbal declarations are not covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution,[40] because they were not extracted while he was under custodial investigation.

4. On the trial court’s sentence of robbery in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618, we agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General that Edgar Suela should be acquitted. The OSG explained:

“Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons as distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or intimidation does not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code) [p. 175, Criminal Law, Book II, Vol. IV, Ambrosio Padilla, 1990].

PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO359 SCRA 166

FACTS: On September 26, 1992, Emelita Paragua left their house at Balic-Balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City to go to her stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old niece of Paragua, was left behind as she had no classes that day, a Saturday Notified of the news that their house was on fire, Paragua went home.Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise and the cassette were burned. When she entered the kitchen, she saw her niece lying on her stomach with a raincoat covering her head and her neck and arms tied with CATV wire. Parts of her hand and her thigh were burned. Raquel Lopez was already dead when her aunt discovered her. She likewise discovered that six pieces of her jewelries were missing it was also found that the sala was set on fire and he found the items therein burned. Police located the body of Raquel Lopez in the kitchen. Her head was covered with a pink raincoat and around her neck was a CATV wire. She was lying face down, her hands behind her back. On October 2, 1992, the Olongapo City police received a call from the Subic police that a certain Donato del Rosario surrendered to police officer Fernando Morales, the brother-in-law of his common-law wife, Ruby Tan. Del Rosario, even without being asked, told them that he really surrendered to Morales because he was being bothered by his conscience and that he was very willing to accompany them to recover the stolen items. He also volunteered the information as to where he sold the jewelries that he took from the house of Emelita Paragua.

Thereafter the policemen from Olongapo and Donato del Rosario proceeded to the places mentioned by the latter Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City, where the "Lovely Kahael Pawnshop" was located, and Barangay Magsaysay, Iba, Zambales. Del Rosario was not even handcuffed at the time. At the Lovely Kahael pawnshop del Rosario pointed out the jewelry that he had pawned. He also signed the pawnshop ticket in order that a wedding band and a diamond ring with the letter "E" could be redeemed. At the pawnshop he was identified by Florencio Gamboa, the OIC/appraiser therein. Afterwards they proceeded to Magsaysay, Iba, Zambales to the shop of Rogelio Adriano. They were not able to immediately recover a bracelet and a 7-day ring that were sold to Adriano, a watch repairer and a buyer/seller of second hand jewelry, as he had given them to his son for safekeeping. However, his son, Rogelio Adriano, Jr., returned the jewelry to the police some days later. Both Adriano’s identified del Rosario as the person who sold them the jewelry. After the jewelry was recovered, the police

called Emelita Paragua who positively identified the jewels as hers.Del Rosario was then brought to the Olongapo police station. A lawyer, Atty. Norberto dela Cruz, was called in to assist del Rosario. During the custodial investigation, Atty. dela Cruz was present the whole time. He informed del Rosario what was stated in the waiver/confession. It was only when del Rosario said that he fully understood its contents that Atty. dela Cruz signed it as counsel. Police brought the accused and Atty. dela Cruz to Assistant City Prosecutor Martinez for subscription.

As to be expected, Donato del Rosario’s account of the day in question, September 26, 1992, was different. Accused-appellant relied on alibi as a defense to belie the accusation against him. However, nobody was presented to corroborate his statements as to his whereabouts on the day when the robbery, homicide, and arson took place. The trial court then decided to convict the accused of the crime of robbery with homicide. Del Rosario contends that it is essential to prove the intent to rob and that the intent to rob must come first before the killing transpired. He is of the impression that not all the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide were proven.

ISSUE: Whether or not the essential requisites of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are present?

RULING: Yes. In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b)the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.

The court concluded that accused-appellant went to the house of Emelita Paragua because he intended to rob her. Lamentably, Paragua’s niece, Raquel Lopez, was in the way and she had to be dealt with in the direct manner possible. And the means resorted to by the accused-appellant was to strangle her until her very last breath. Raquel Lopez was killed on the occasion of the robbery because she was the only one in the house at that time and the only witness to the crime that accused-appellant committed. Her autopsy report revealed that she was already dead before the fire started, thus eliminating any inference that arson was committed to finish her off. The arson was but a ruse to cover up the theft. It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before or after the robbery. In the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the

latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.

In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;(b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.

PEOPLE vs. HIPONAG.R. No. 185704, February 18, 2010

FACTS: AAA was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her house in Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City.  She was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which eventually led to her death.  Her furniture and belongings were found strewn on the floor.  AAA’s necklace with two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing.             Upon investigation, the local police discovered a hole bored into the lawanitwall of the comfort room inside AAA’s house, big enough for a person of medium build to enter.  The main electrical switch behind a “shower curtain” located at the “back room” was turned off, drawing the police to infer that the perpetrator is familiar with the layout of AAA’s house.           SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a meeting of AAA’s relatives during which AAA’s sister BBB, who is appellant’s mother, declared that her son-appellant had told her that “Mama, I’m sorry, I did it because I did not have the money,” and he was thus apologizing for AAA’s death.  BBB executed an affidavit affirming appellant’s confession. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime Robbery with Homicide?

RULING: Yes, for circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  

The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of appellant, and AAA’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof.  Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead.

PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ432 SCRA 104

FACTS: At about 7:00 a.m. on December 19, 1994, Cesar Yuzon, a forty-four-year-old sweepstakes ticket vendor, went to the Rural Health Center of Banoyo, San Luis, Batangas, to seek medical treatment for his ailment.  After receiving his daily medication from the nurse, he left the health center and went to a nearby store to wait for a ride back to his house in Barangay Mahabang Parang, San Luis, Batangas.  When no public utility jeepney passed by, he started walking towards the direction of Barangay Mahabang Parang. It was about 11:00 a.m. Upon reaching the boundary of Banoyo and Mahabang Parang at around 12:00 noon, he saw his cousin-in-law, the appellant, and Catapang dragging his seventy-two-year-old auntie, Natividad Yuzon Mendoza, in the direction of a forested area where there were also mango and coconut trees.

Cesar shouted, “Hoy, bakit ninyo kinakaladkad ang aking tiya?” Catapang and the appellant approached and told him not to interfere.  Then Catapang pointed a knife at Cesar and, with the appellant, warned him not to reveal what he saw to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him and his family, including his children.

The appellant and Catapang then returned to the place where Natividad was.  Cesar followed them and concealed himself behind a mango tree about ten arm’s length away, and saw them forcibly taking money, a pair of earrings and a necklace from the bag of his aunt, who was lying prostrate on the ground.  Catapang and the appellant positioned themselves at Natividad’s right and left side, and strangled her with the use of a white rope made of buri or vine string. She pleaded, “Huwag po, huwag po,” to no avail.

Cesar hurriedly left the place on foot and went home.  He kept the gory incident to himself for fear of retaliation from the accused and the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime Robbery with Homicide?

RULING: Yes, in robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.  It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence.  The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.  As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.

PEOPLE vs. REYES427 SCRA 48

FACTS: Dr. Aurora Lagrada, a spinster of about seventy years old, lived alone in her two-storey house located at General Luna Street, Barangay Balimbingan, Lumban, Laguna.  The doctor was the sole proprietor of the Neal Construction and Supplies located at No. 90 General Luna Street, Lumban, Laguna. The appellant’s house was about four to five meters away from the doctor’s house. He lived with his mother and brother.

At around 11:00 p.m. on June 11, 1998, Barangay Captain William Magpantay received a radio report from barangay kagawad that someone managed to gain entry into the house of Lagrada, and that she had shouted for help.   Magpantay, a barangay councilman and a barangay tanod responded and proceeded to the house of the doctor.  When they knocked on the door, no one responded. The barangay captain then proceeded to the Lumban Police Station and reported the matter to the policemen. SPO2 Maximo Gonzales and SPO1 Pedro Nacor, Jr. responded to the report and, accompanied by Magpantay, proceeded to the house of Lagrada.

When they arrived at the house, the policemen passed by the garage and opened the door.  They saw the bloodied Lagrada, naked from the waist up, sprawled sidewise on the floor opposite the sink near the kitchen. Near the cadaver was a bolo (itak).  Gonzales took custody of the bolo. Magpantay noticed that Lagrada’s neighbors, anxious to know what had happened, were in the vicinity. The appellant, however, was nowhere to be found.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime Robbery with Homicide?

RULING: Yes, Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim’s age is applied only to crimes against persons and honor. The bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of sex.  For this circumstance to be properly considered, the prosecution must adduce evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused had particularly intended to insult or commit disrespect to the sex of the victim.  In this case, the appellant killed the victim because the latter started to shout. There was no intent to insult nor commit disrespect to the victim on account of the latters sex.

Second. The fact that the crime was committed in the victim’s dwelling, without provocation on the part of the latter, is aggravating in robbery with homicide. However, such circumstance was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rule should be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellant.

PEOPLE vs. DANIELA401 SCRA 619

FACTS: On March 28, 1996, Manuel and Jose Baylosis arrived in Cebu City and stayed in the house of Joel Colejara in Pardo. Manuel and Jose went to the market and met Maria Fe. The latter informed Manuel where she and Ronito lived. Since then, Manuel and Jose had been to the house of the couple and Manuel was able to borrow money from them in the amount of P800. On March 30, 1996 Manuel told Ronito that he wanted to borrow money from him and Maria Fe. The latter refused to lend Manuel the money but she was prevailed upon by Ronito. Manuel, Jose and Ronito then had a drinking spree in the sala. Maria Fe and Julifer went to sleep in the former’s bedroom while Leo slept in the sala. Then, at around 2:00 a.m. of March 31, 1996, Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and holding a fluorescent lamp, entered the bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe. Thereafter took some of their possession and rape the latter and kill the former. When arraigned on October 17, 1996, both accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Nevertheless, after due hearing, on March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision convicting both of the accused of the crime of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before, during or after the commission of the robbery?

RULING: A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The animo lucrandi must precede the killing. If the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, that of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, a single and indivisible offense.  It is the intent of the actor to rob which supplies the connection between the homicide and the robbery necessary to constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide. However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. In People vs. Tidula, et al., this Court ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In People v. Damaso , this Court held that the fact that the intent of the felons was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the victim killed, does not negate the conviction of the accused and punishment for robbery with homicide. A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper

even if the homicide is committed before, during or after the commission of the robbery. The homicide may be committed by the actor at the spur of the moment or by mere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and a woman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted on another, on the occasion or by reason of robbery, there is only one special complex crime of robbery with homicide. What is primordial is the result obtained without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime. Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.  It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the malefactor intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime.

PEOPLE vs. NAPALIT

396 SCRA 887

FACTS: At about 4:00 p. m. of April 3, 1996, a group of more than six armed men including accused barged into the Tondo General Hospital in Honorio Lopez Boulevard, Balut, Tondo, Manila. Security guard Eric Santos who was posted at the hospital emergency room had just finished talking to a person who was asking about the location of the x-ray room when one of the armed men pointed a gun at him, announced that there was a holdup, and instructed him to keep still as he took his firearm.  Simultaneously, accused pointed a gun at, and grabbed the firearm of, another security guard, Benjamin Saclolo, who was seated in front of a desk at the emergency room.Santos grappled with his assailant for the possession of the latter’s gun in the course of which Santos’ other firearm, a service revolver, was accidentally pulled out of its holster, resulting to a gunshot.  This caught the attention of accused who pointed his gun at Santos and warned him that he would shoot him should he make one false move.Santos then pushed his assailant in the direction of accused, causing the former to fall at which instant Santos ran but not before he was dispossessed of his service revolver.

In the meantime, about 20 meters away, four members of the group entered the cashier’s office of the hospital and ordered the employees to lie down on the floor.   One of them pointed a gun at cashier Rodrigo Alonzo and ordered him to open the vault. Before Alonzo could do as instructed, he was searched for weapons in the course of which his wallet containing P450.00 in cash was taken. Alonzo then opened the vault which the four emptied of P1,010,274.90 in cash.  While the four malefactors were at the cashier’s office, another security guard, Pio Gomez who was manning the hospital gate and conversing with maintenance plumber Cesar Rosella, was disarmed of his service pistol, pushed outside the hospital premises, and shot twice by one of the armed men. 

The four armed men who emptied the vault then rushed out of the hospital and one of them also shot Gomez who had by then collapsed on the ground.  Two of them headed toward a Toyota Tamaraw vehicle driven by Numeriano Castor which was on a stop position, due to heavy traffic, in front of the hospital at San Rafael Street.  One of the duo ordered the passenger at the front seat to get off the vehicle.   The other, after forcing Castor to alight from the vehicle, drove it and fled with his companion.  

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?

RULING: In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution needs to prove these elements: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is

characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, here used in its generic sense, is committed.

In a long line of cases, this Court has ruled that whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it is clearly shown that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is clear and leaves no room for any other interpretation.  For, for robbery with homicide to exist, it is sufficient that a homicide results by reason or on the occasion of robbery. The law of course exculpates a person who takes part in the robbery from the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and punishes him only for simple robbery when there is proof that he tried to prevent the homicide.   No such proof, however, was offered. As an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, it becomes the duty of this Court to correct errors it may find in the appealed judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.

PEOPLE vs. CAMPOS

361 SCRA 339

FACTS: Felicidad Alfaro and Mercelina Alfaro Jacobe resided inside Maxim's Mini Mart at Cefel's Park Subdivision, Tala, Novaliches, Caloocan City.  Beside the mini mart was Cefel's General Merchandise, a hardware store owned by Felipa Jacobe, the mother-in-law of Mercelina Alfaro Jacobe. On August 16, 1989, at around 10:00 in the evening, Felicidad and Mercelina prepared to sleep.  Their bedroom and the kitchen were located inside the mini mart.  Felicidad turned off all lights in the store except the kitchen light.  Mercelina laid on the bed with her two-year old son, Christopher, while Felicidad laid on the floor beside them.

At around midnight, Felicidad roused from her sleep and stood up.  Suddenly, someone stabbed her on her left arm.  She started to shout as her assailant continued to stab her.  She was hit on her abdomen, left arm, and left side.  She fell to the floor in a sitting position and she looked at the person who stabbed her.   She recognized accused Alejandro Campos, who worked at the neighboring gravel and sand area and frequented their store to buy gas.  She also noticed accused Renato dela Cruz standing near the door of the room.  She knew accused dela Cruz because they used to work together in the Cefel's General Merchandise Store, a hardware store adjacent to the mini-mart.

Suddenly, accused Campos moved towards Mercelina and started stabbing her.  Mercelina, still lying on the bed, woke up and shouted for help.  Accused Campos kept stabbing her. Thereafter, the two accused left hurriedly, exiting through the storeroom of the minimart. At around midnight of August 17, 1989, Barangay Captain Federico Hallig was inside the Barangay Hall at Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City together with Barangay Tanods Romulo Meglares, Jesus Sienda, Marcos Manalo and Maximo Baylon.  Suddenly, they saw a man running outside the barangay hall with blood on his chest and on his short pants.  The man was holding a kitchen knife about eleven inches long.  After questioning the man, who identified himself as Alejandro Campos, the barangay officials brought him to the police station.

Meanwhile, Felicidad, though wounded, managed to call for help from her mother-in-law, Felipa Jacobe, who resided beside the store.  Felicidad was brought to Tala Hospital but was later transferred to Quezon City General Hospital.  Mercelina was taken to Tala Hospital.  She was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Amancio Angustia of the Quezon City General Hospital found that Felicidad Alfaro had several stab wounds on the chest and a fractured left arm. Two teams of surgeons immediately operated on Felicidad, thereby saving her life. Dr. Dario Gajardo of the medico-legal unit of the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory conducted an autopsy on the body of

Mercelina Alfaro Jacobo. He found eight stab wounds on different parts of the body of the deceased.  He also found internal injuries in the heart, right lung, liver, stomach and the diaphragm.  The cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds.

On August 17, 1989, Felicidad, still in her hospital bed, asked her father, Ramon Alfaro, to look for a bag containing money, amounting to ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, from the store.  Ramon Alfaro went to the store and found the bag on the floor, empty. That afternoon, policemen brought accused dela Cruz and accused Campos to Felicidad.  Felicidad identified accused Campos and accused dela Cruz as the persons who entered the room in the early morning of August 17, 1989 and stabbed her and her sister.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?

RULING: No, in robbery with homicide cases, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things. ] In this case, all that the witness Felicidad saw that night was the stabbing of her sister, not the taking of personal property.  The taking cannot be assumed from the actions of accused-appellant as seen by Felicidad.  She saw him at the doorway and then noticed him running out the store after the stabbing occurred.  Felicidad claimed that the bag purportedly containing money was recovered empty the next day.  However, it was undisputed that various persons had entered the store of the victims after the incident, including investigators and onlookers.  The bag was not conclusively shown to contain money nor was the money ever recovered.  Further, there was no substantial link from the loss of the contents of the bag to the accused, for the money was never seen in the possession of the accused.

           

PEOPLE vs. VERCELES

388 SCRA 515

FACTS: On October 18, 1996, the five accused boarded a tricycle owned by Mario Verceles to visit his cousin in barangay Goliso, located at the boundary of Urbiztondo.  At 8:00 in the evening, they proceeded to barangay Malibong to visit Pepe, a compadre of Mamerto Soriano.  Before reaching Pepe’s place, they stopped at the house of Jerry’s grandmother, Rosita Quilates.  Jerry sensed that his companions had an evil plan, so he and Pablo Ramos tried to leave.  However, Mamerto Soriano poked a gun at Jerry and told them not to leave.  Then, they tied Jerry and Pablo under a mango tree.  The three proceeded to the house of Rosita Quilates.  While waiting for the three, Jerry and Pablo fell asleep.  When they woke up at 2:00 a.m., they saw the three accused carrying a TV set, VHS and other things.  They helped the three load the items in the tricycle.  Then they went home to San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Several days later, they sold the items and Jerry was given three hundred pesos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime Robbery with Rape?

RULING: Yes, Accused were one in design with accused Mamerto Soriano in taking personal properties belonging to others without the latter’s consent by breaking one of the windows to be used as their ingress.  In the course of the robbery, one of them, particularly Mamerto Soriano, succumbed to lustful desires and raped Maribeth Bolito while accused-appellants just stood outside the door and did nothing to prevent Mamerto Soriano.  We have previously ruled that once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.