Crim Compilation of Cases 3rd Exam

8/10/2019 Crim Compilation of Cases 3rd Exam

1/23

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

FRANCISCO VS. PP (ANTI-FENCING LAW)

FACTS:Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita Rodriguez.Pacita, through her brother Macario, sold to petitionerErnesto Francisco several pieces of jewelry stolen fromRodriguez. The RTC found petitioner guilty of violating PD

1612.

The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to provehis guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. Heavers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stolethe jewelry, and that the same was sold to him by Macario.

ISSUE:W/N petitioner is guilty of violating PD 1612

HELD:No. One of the elements of fencing is that the accusedknew or should have known that the item was stolen. In thecase at bar, there was an absence of evidence as to theknowledge of the accused regarding the item. Because ofthis, the proof that was left was Macario's testimony.However, Macario's testimony was not sufficient in proving

that Francisco knew that the jewelries were stolen.

DIMAT V. PEOPLE (2012) ANTI FENCING LAW

FACTS:

Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a NissanSafari from Mel Dimat. Spouses Delgado where driving alongE. Rodriguez Ave. when they were apprehended by theTraffic Management Group(TMG), afterwards they foundout that the vehicle was a stolen property. Mantequilla, theregistered owner of the vehicle, filed charges against MelDimat for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. On his defensehe claims that he did not know Mantequilla, and that hebought it in good faith for value. The RTC found him to guiltyand which the CA affirms with modification.

ISSUE:

Whether Dimat guilty of fencing.

RULING:

Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has

been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in therobbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,

conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in anymanner deals in any article or object taken during thatrobbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should haveknown that the thing derived from that crime ; and (4) heintends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for

another.

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday InnCasino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him ascollateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him theold certificate of registration and official receipt of thevehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate ofregistration and official receipt already in his name. ButTolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists thatTolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not

prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could notproduce any certificate of registration or official receipt.Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the NissanSafari he bought was not properly documented. He said thatTolentino showed him its old certificate of registration andofficial receipt. But this certainly could not be true because,

the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had nodocuments to show. That Tolentino was unable to makegood on his promise to produce new documentsundoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari camefrom an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to SoniaDelgado who apparently made no effort to check the paperscovering her purchase. That she might herself be liable forfencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused inthe case.

PP V. DUNLAO (ANTI-FENCING LAW)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused ofviolating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known asthe Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner is a duly licensed retailerand wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the businessname Dunlao Enterprise.

On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. FortunatoMariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of LourdesFarms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, togo to petitioners premises together with police officers Pfc.

Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verifyinformation received that some farrowing crates and G.I.pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.

Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group

saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside thecompound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipesinside a cabinet in petitioners shop and another pile outside

the shop but within the compound.

After he was informed by the police operatives thatsaid pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and had beenstolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered theitems. These were then taken to the police station.

On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 wasfiled in the Regional Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 9,accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.

On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleadedNOT GUILTY. RTC rendered judgment holding petitionerguilty. Petitioner appealed to CA, which affirmed thejudgment of the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the factthat, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he wasmotivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles.

HELD:

No, thus, he is guilty of violating the anti-fencing law.

Under Presidential Decree 1612, fencing is the actof any person who, with intent to gain for himself or foranother, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any othermanner deal in any article, item, object or anything of valuewhich he knows, or should be known to him, to have beenderived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

There is no question that the farrowing crates andassorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises ofpetitioner. The positive identification by FortunatoMariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that theseitems were previously owned by it gave rise to apresumption of fencing under the law:

Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of anygood, article, item, object, or anything of value which hasbeen the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie

evidence of fencing.

In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlaosucceed in rebutting this presumption?

We hold in the negative.

First of all, contrary to petitioners contention,

intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by aspecial law such as P.D. 1612.


2/23


1 Wigmore

The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong inthemselves called acts mala in se, and acts which wouldnot be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,called acts malaprohibita. This distinction is importantwith reference to the intent with which a wrongful act isdone. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, theintent governs, but in acts malaprohibita, the only inquiry is,has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intentof the offender is immaterial. Secondly, the law does notrequire proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner,as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to apresumption of fencing.

It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow thispresumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but hefailed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal,was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a personaboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of hisestablishment and left them there. The Court notes that thestolen articles were found displayed on petitioners shelvesinside his compound. If petitioner were merely keeping thefarrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep,

why did he display them? When a storeowner displaysarticles, it is assumed that he is doing so with the intentionof selling them.

Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner didnot even bother to ascertain the identity of the person orpersons who deposited the articles with him. Petitionershould pay Lourdes Farms, Inc. represented by its ownerMrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value ofthe pipes and farrowing crates recovered and in the custodyof the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency.

PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA

[G.R. NO. 116736. JULY 24, 1997]

FACTS:On October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the

afternoon, Diosdado Quitlong, the victim Andre MarMasangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto SanAndres were having a drinking spree in the compound nearthe house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. While they were drinking,accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who werealready drunk arrived and joined them. The victim AndreMar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to theback portion of the house. Then, the accused BenjaminOrtega, Jr. followed him and later the the participants in thedrinking session heard the victim Andre Mar shouted,Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) Diosdado

Quitlong and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion ofthe house and saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top ofAndre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal withhis face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladedweapon. Quitlong went to Romeo Ortega in the place wherethey were having the drinking session for the latter to pacifyhis brother Benjamin, Jr. Romeo Ortega went to the place ofthe stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. andManuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canaland brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latterinside the well. Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. andManuel Garcia then dropped stones to the body of AndreMar Masangkay inside the well. Upon reaching home, his(Quitlong) conscience bothered him and he told his motherwhat he witnessed. He then went to the residence of Col.Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. Col. Origaccompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and somepolice officers went with them to the crime scene. Accused

Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehendedand were brought to the police station.

The NBI Medico Legal Officer testified after conducting anautopsy that the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,contributory, asphyxia by submersion in water. There were13 stab wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part of thebody, 2 at the back and there were contused abrasionsaround the neck and on the left arm. The large airway is

filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim wasalive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles.

The RTC ruled that the crime committed by the accused isMurder with conspiracy and the taking advantage ofsuperior strength.

ISSUE:

WON Manuel Garcia should be acquitted for thecrime charged.

HELD:

Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide.Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal. The drowning was thedirect, natural and logical consequence of the felony thatAppellant Garcia had intended to commit; itexemplifiespraeter intentionemcovered by Article 4, par. 1,of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a personmay be convicted of homicide although he had no originalintent to kill. In spite of the evidence showing that AppellantGarcia could be held liable as principal in the crime ofhomicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring

his conviction, even as an accessory.

First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia andAppellant Ortega of attacking, assaulting, and stabbing

repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts ofthe body of one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA Theprosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing

to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated byAppellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to theattempted concealment of the crime and the resultingdrowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine inour jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of anoffense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint orinformation. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informedof the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Toconvict him of an offense other than that charged in the

complaint or information would be a violation of thisconstitutional right.

Second. Although the prosecution was able to provethat Appellant Garcia assisted in concealing the body of the

crime, in order to prevent its discovery, he can neither be

convicted as an accessory after the fact defined underArticle 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The recordsshow that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of AppellantOrtega, the latters sister, Maritess, being his wife. Such

relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liabilityas provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinityof the principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally

entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of theRevised Penal Code. This Court is thus mandated by law toacquit him.

PEOPLE VS SALLE JR.

Where the judgment of conviction is

still pending appeal and has not yet

therefore attained finality, as in

the instant case, executive clemency

may not yet be granted to the

appellant.

The acceptance of the pardon shall

not operate as an abandonment orwaiver of the appeal.

FACTS:

Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guiltybeyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to sufferthe penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity.The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On


3/23


1 Wigmore

24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an UrgentMotion to Withdraw Appeal.

They were granted a conditional pardon that with theiracceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will bereleased from confinement, the appellants impliedlyadmitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence,the appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged fromthe New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. Lao

further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengoteleft for his province without consulting her. She then praysthat the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appealand consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of theconditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion towithdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during thependency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction bythe trial court is enforceable.

HELD:

No pardon may be extended before a judgment ofconviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appealis seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commencesto serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal isexpressly waived in writing, except where the death penaltywas imposed by the trial court, and (d) when theaccused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right toappeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pendingappeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as inthe instant case, executive clemency may not yet be grantedto the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grantof pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused duringthe pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial

court.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as anabandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of anaccused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, orparole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render thoseresponsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly,those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on thepardon as a basis for the release of the accused fromconfinement.

WHEREFORE,counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengotey Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereofwithin which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of hisappeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardongranted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effectonly upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureauof Corrections must exert every possible effort to take backinto his custody the said appellant, for which purpose hemay seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police orthe National Bureau of Investigation.

RAMON C. TANVS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of BuenoMetal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St.,Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturingpropellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez wasone of the employees working for her. Sometime inFebruary 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of thecompany. Complainant Lim noticed that some of thewelding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such asbronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were

missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered thatpropellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less,were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy,uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently,Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and headmitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stolefrom the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts

such as bronze and stainless propellers and brassscrews. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainantsforgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as theone who bought the stolen items and who paid the amountof P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they splitthe amount with one another. Complainant did not file acase against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of havingcommitted the crime of fencing

HELD:

Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain

items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole thoseitems and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Limnever reported the theft or even loss to the police. Sheadmitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her formeremployee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, sheforgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a publiccrime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without aprivate complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. Ascomplainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold forcertain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, thefirst element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, acrime of robbery or theft has been committed.

There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful takingof anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in anextra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had

pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, anadmission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offensemay be given in evidence only against the person admittingor confessing.[15]Even on this, if given extra-judicially, theconfessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise,the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against theperson so admitting.[16]Here, the extra-judicial confession ofwitness Mendez was not given with the assistance ofcounsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neithermay such extra-judicial confession be considered evidenceagainst accused.[17]There must be corroboration byevidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding ofguilt.[18]Corpus delictimeans the body or substance of thecrime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that thecrime has been actually committed.[19]The essentialelements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2)

the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away wasdone with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was donewithout the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away isaccomplished without violence or intimidation againstpersons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil.1000).

[20]In theft, corpus delictihas two elements,namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2)that it was lost by felonious taking.[21]In this case, the theftwas not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did notcomplain to the public authorities of the felonious taking ofher property. She sought out her former employeeManuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certainarticles from the warehouse of the complainant and soldthem to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient toconvict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]

What is more, there was no showing at all that theaccused knew or should have known that the very stolenarticles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to knowa particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness orawareness thereof, or is aware of the existence ofsomething, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he hassomething within the minds grasp with certitude and

clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular factis an element of an offense, such knowledge is established ifa person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn15


4/23


1 Wigmore

he actually believes that it does not exist. On the otherhand, the words should know denote the fact that a

person of reasonable prudence and intelligence wouldascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another orwould govern his conduct upon assumption that such factexists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awarenessabout a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind ofan accused and state with certainty what is containedtherein, it must determine such knowledge with care fromthe overt acts of that person. And given two equallyplausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the

court should choose the one which sustains the

constitutional presumption of innocence.[23]

Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolenarticles, he can not be guilty of fencing.

[24]

Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establishthe essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner isentitled to an acquittal.

PEOPLE V. YANSON-DUMANCAS

FACTS:

Acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses Jeanette and

Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and

undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas Torres, taking

advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the

PNP, with the direct participation and cooperation of other

Police Inspectors, concurring and affirming in the said

criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,

kidnap and detain Rufino Gargar Jr., with evident

premeditation and treachery, nocturnity, and the use of

motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said

victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that

accused did then and there secretly bury the corpse in ashallow grave or the purpose of concealing the crime of

murder in order to prevent its discovery.

In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accusedcharged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer thepenalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of thelaw; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of RufinoGargar Jr.

In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accusedcharged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer thepenalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of thelaw, indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of DaniloLumangyao.

Accused Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Pahayupan andCadunay Jr. are hereby acquitted of the crime charged forfailure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyondreasonable doubt. On the case of accused-appellantJeanette Yanson-Dumancas, the information charged her ofthe crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as principalby induction together with her husband, Charles, who wasfound by the trial court not guilty of the crime.

ISSUE:WON Jeanette is principal by Inducement

HELD: No

Why?

Requisites of PBI

Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides: The following areconsidered principals: (i) Those who take a direct part in theexecution of the act; (ii) Those who directly force or induceothers to commit it; and (iii) Those who cooperate in thecommission of the offense by another act without which itwould not have been accomplished.

There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit acrime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) bycausing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimonyof all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing toconclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or causeduncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.

Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another tocommit a crime, namely: (i) by giving aprice, oroffering reward orpromise, and (ii) by using words ofcommand. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trialcourt, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, orpromise to the rest of accused-appellants should theyabduct and later kill the victims in this case.

In the Present Case

What the Court now has to examine is whether or not

sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to provebeyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performedany of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers tocommit the crime, or (b) directly inducingthem to committhe crime. (verbatim)

The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show thatJeanette directly forced the participants of the said meetingto come up with such plan, by either using irresistible forceor causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis relied upon bythe trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette isguilty of the crime as principal by inducement, is thesupposed commands or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche.

By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to takecare of the twodoes not constitute the command requiredby law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal byinducement.

Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act ofinducement, should precede the commission of the crimeitself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar,the abduction, which is an essential element of the crimecharged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has alreadytaken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellantGeroche to take care of the two. Said utterance could,therefore, not have been the inducement to commit thecrime charged in this case. (emphasis supplied)

Note: In short, nagsabi lang sya na kayo na bahala whichthe SC did not rule as a command.

PEOPLE VS. BACANG

July 30, 1996

FACTS:

On December 1, 1993, William Casidoand Franklin Alcorin,together with the other co-accused(s), were found guilty ofmurder by the RTC, sentencing each of them to reclusionperpetua plus damages.

William and Franklin filed a supplemental notice of appeal tothe Supreme Court, which was accepted on December 7,

1994. However on January 11, 1996, the SC received anUrgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal from appellants whichdid not state the reason therefor. The SC first required thecounsel of the appellants to comment on the urgent motion.

On 22 March 1996, the SC received a 1stIndorsement fromSuperintendent Venancio Tesoro informing the Court thatWilliam Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released onConditional Pardon on January 25, 1996."
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134298.htm#_edn23


5/23


1 Wigmore

Upon direction by the SC, Tesoro submitted certified truecopies of the conditional pardons separately granted toaccused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorinshowing that they were released from confinement onJanuary 25, 1996 in view of the grant of conditional pardon.

ISSUE:

Whether the conditional pardons were valid.

HELD:

No. It is clear that the conditional pardons separatelyextended to the accused-appellants were issued during thependency of their instant appeal.

In a prior resolutions, the SC categorically declared the"practice of processing applications for pardon or paroledespite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law."The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grantof pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during

the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trialcourt. Any application therefor, if one is made, should notbe acted upon or the process toward its grant should not bebegun unless the appeal is withdrawn. The acceptance ofthe pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiverof the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of apardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before thewithdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsibleadministratively liable.

It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in thiscase to accused-appellants William Casido and FranklinAlcorin are void for having been extended on January 19,1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.

PEOPLE VS TADULAN

(PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY)

FACTS:

Complainant B owns a house in Metro Manila, where sheresides with her common-law husband and their minordaughter A. Beside their house is an apartment buildingwherein one unit was rented by accused Irvin Tadulan alongwith his family.

One morning, when Complainants minor daughter A wasplaying outside the apartment, accused Tadulan broughtcalled her and brought her upstairs where he eventually hadintercourse with the child. Initially, A did not inform hermother about the incident, and it was only when the laundrywoman discovered bloodstains on the panty of A that theyknew of the said incident. When accuseds wife returned to

the apartment, Complainant B told her of her husbands

sexual advancement towards her her daughter A, and thatshe would not take legal action against the accused if hewould vacate the apartment unit right away. Accuseds wife

promised to uphold the condition, but her husband was stillcoming home to the apartment every night.

Days later, Complainant B heard a commotion in theapartment unit of the accused, where she saw the accusedarguing with his wife. B called the police, and when theycame, the accuseds wife denounced him and told the police

that he raped the minor daughter of Complainant B, inwhich he was thereafter arrested. The trial court found the

accused guilty of rape, and upon appeal, raised thecontention that he was pardoned by the mother of thevictim.

ISSUE:

W/ N pardon granted by the mother of the minor offendedparty without the concurrence of the offended minor is valid

HELD:

Pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an

offended minor but also by the minor herself to be effectiveas an express pardon.

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accusedwas allegedly granted only by the mother B, without theconcurrence of the minor A. Hence, for the sake of

argument, even if said mother B initially pardoned theaccused, it is clear that such pardon is ineffective withoutthe express concurrence of the minor victim A.

PEOPLE VS NERY

FACTS:

Accused Soledad Nery received 2 diamond ringsfrom Federico Matillano to be sold by her on commission onNov 15, 1954. In their agreement, Nery should deliver Php230.00 to her principal, to whom she represented having aready buyer, and whatever excess money obtained by herbe retained as her commission. She failed to comply withtheir agreement, and was thus brought to the police station

where she promised to pay the price of the rings.

After failing to pay, a complaint was filed againsther. This was however withdrawn/dismissed following herpartial payment of Php 40.00. After failing again to pay thebalance of Php 190.00, an estafa case was filed against her.During the pendency of the case, she paid Php 50.00, butthe remaining balance was never paid. She was eventuallyconvicted for estafa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the agreement made betweenthe accused and Matillano (with partial payments) novatedher criminal liability into a simple civil liability.

HELD :

NO. the court held that novation does not applyin the case at bar, wherein a criminal information hasalready been filed by the complainant. Furthermore, saidliability cannot already be novated since this is a publicoffense, and the offended party may not waive or extinguishthe criminal liability that the law imposes for thecommission of the offense.

DEGANOS VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Office of provincial prosecutor of Bulacancharged Brigida/Aida Luz and Narciso Deganos with estafa.

They allegedly received from spouses Atty. Jose and LydiaBordador gold and jewelry amounting to 438,702 to sell oncommission and remit the proceeds or return the unsoldpieces of gold and jewelry. However, the accused misappliedand use for their own benefit the said merchandise and/orthe proceeds thereof. RTC held Narciso guilty but acquittedBrigida/Aida. CA affirmed trial courts decision with

modification.

On appeal, Narciso contented that thetransaction between him and spouses Bordador wasconverted from agency to sale on credit when he madepartial payments thereby converting his liability fromcriminal to civil.

ISSUE: W/N Novation converted liability of Narciso to acivil liability

RULING: The court ruled that the transaction betweenNarciso and the spouses was an agency and not a sale oncredit. The Kasunduan at Katibayan, document covering

the transaction expressly states that the accused receivedthe items to sell it in behalf of the complainants. It was aconsignment and Narciso was under obligation to accountfor the proceeds. The court denied Narcisos contention that

their contract was novated from agency to loan when he


6/23


1 Wigmore

paid partial payments to the spouses. Novation must beclear and express. Furthermore, even if there was Novation,the court held that. . . .

Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed bythe Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminalliability. It is well settled that criminal liability for estafa isnot affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it isa public offense which must be prosecuted and punished bythe Government on its own motion even though completereparation should have been made of the damage sufferedby the offended party. A criminal offense is committedagainst the People and the offended party may not waive orextinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for thecommission of the offense. The criminal liability for estafaalready committed is not affected by the subsequentnovation of the contract.

In short, Novation is not a ground to extinguishcriminal liability. Therefore, Narciso is guilty.

ROMUALDEZ VS MARCELO (July 28, 2006)

FACTS:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsmangravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 ofRepublic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act:

A.) that the Ombudsman cannot revive theaforementioned cases which were previouslydismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolutionof February 10, 2004;

B.)

that the defense of prescription may be raisedeven for the first time on appeal; and thus there

is no necessity for the presentation of evidencethereon before the court a quo.

Prayer of Petitioner: This Court may accordingly dismisscriminal cases pending before the Sandiganbayan and theRTC, all on the ground of PRESCRIPTION.

The Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of theinformations in the criminal cases does not mean thatpetitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution.

A.) that the filing of the complaint with thePresidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the informationwith the Sandiganbayan in 1989 INTERRUPTEDthe PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD ;

B.)

that the ABSENCE OF PETITIONER from thePhilippines from 1986 until 2000 alsoINTERRUPTED the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD basedon Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being

charged have already prescribed

RULING: We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the

AFFIRMATIVE.

PROVISIONS ON PRESCRIPTION AS PROVIDED IN RA NO

3019(the law which petitioner violated)

Petitioner is being charged with violations ofSection 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements ofAssets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during histenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiaryand for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as TechnicalAssistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offensespunishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly,

the Court already declared in a previous jurisprudence thatfor offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committedby the petitioner during the period from March 16,1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.

As to when these two periods begin to run, referenceis made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation ofprescription of offenses defined by and penalized underspecial laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shallbegin to run from the day of thecommission of the violation of thelaw, and if the same be not known atthe time, from the discovery thereofand the institution of judicialproceedings for its investigation andpunishment.

The prescription shall be

interrupted when proceedings areinstituted against the guilty person,

and shall begin to run again if the

proceedings are dismissed for

reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In view of the nullity of the proceedings initiatedby then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG andby the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989, noproceedings exist that could have merited the suspension ofthe prescriptive periods.

ABSENCE OF PETITIONER IN THE COUNTRY : Should Art 91

apply when the special law is silent on this matter?

Both respondents in the instant case aver that,

applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily,the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for thealleged offenses from running.The Court disagrees.

Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as towhether the absence of the offender fromthe Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period.The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean thatSection 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruptionof the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that theprescription shall begin to run from the day of thecommission of the violation of the law, and if the same benot known at the time, from the discovery thereof and theinstitution of judicial proceedings for its investigation andpunishment. The running of the prescriptive period shallbe interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the

guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the

proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting

jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did notprovide that the absence of the accused from

the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive

period.Thus, the only inference that can be gathered fromthe foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.3326, did not consider the absence of the accused fromthe Philippines as a hindrance to the running of theprescriptive period. Had the legislature intended to includethe accuseds absence from thePhilippines as a ground for

the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws,the same could have been expressly provided in Act No.3326.

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastilyconclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 issupplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and allcases.

In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevailover Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies


7/23


1 Wigmore

to special lawswhile the Revised Penal Code shall applyto special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter donot provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules ofstatutory construction dictate that special legal provisionsmust prevail over general ones.

LIBERAL APPLICATION OF PRESCRIPTIVE LAWS

Indeed, there is no reason why we should denypetitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal constructionof prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescriptionemanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to orcause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periodscannot simply be implied nor derived by mereimplication. Any diminution of this endowment must bedirectly and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, theState. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor ofthe grantee thereof, the accused.

EUGENIO DAMASCO VERSUS JUDGE HILARIO LAQUI

FACTS: Atty. Damasco on July 1987 threaten RafaelSumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong

amounting to crime. The petitioner pleaded not guilty.Respondent Judge Laqui found that the evidence presenteddid not establish the crime of grave threats but only lightthreats. Petitioner filed a motion to rectify and set aside thedispositive part of Respondent Judge contending that hecannot be convicted of light threats necessarily included ingrave threats charged in the information as the lighteroffense prescribed in the information filed.

The crime was committed on July 8, 1987, it was filedon September 17, 1987. Light threats prescribes in 2 monthswhich means 60 days. The complaint was filed after 71 days.The trial court holds on to the principle that the allegation inthe information confers jurisdiction and that jurisdictiononce acquired cannot br lost. The information was filedwithin prescriptive period. Grave threats cannot be lost by

prescription if after trial what has been proven is merelylight threats.

The Office of Solicitor General agreed with the trialcourt that the allegations in the information conferjurisdiction and once acquired cannot be lost but this is notapplicable in the case. The jurisdiction of lower court wasnever questioned, instead the legal dispute is whether ornot the Judge was right to convict the petitioner afterfinding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats buthas already prescribed.

ISSUE:Whether or not the offense of light threats alreadyprescribed.

RULING: Yes, the Petition is granted.

Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of acrime or offense as a loss or waiver by the state of its rightsto prosecute an act prohibited or punishable by law. Hence,while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move toquash pleading is deemed to waive all objections but thusrule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, Article 69of the Revised Penal Code to apply such rule contravenesArticle 89 of the Revised Penal Code which is a part ofsubstantive law. Further strengthened by Section 8 Rules117 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which addedextinction of offense as one exception to the General ruleregarding the effects of a failure to assert a motion to quash.

YAPDIANGCO V. BUENCAMINO (122 SCRA 713)

FACTS:

On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slightphysical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner onDecember 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after theprescribed 60-day period, petitioner moved to quash thecriminal prosecution on the ground of prescription.Respondent contended that it was filed within theprescriptive period since the last day fell on a Sunday orlegal Holiday, therefore, should not be counted.

ISSUE:

Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays orLegal Holidays.

HELD:

No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stopthe running of the prescriptive period as a matter ofstatutory articulation. According to Article 91, the onlyexception is the offenders physical absence and no other

cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription.The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file

information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-dayperiod cannot be extended up to the next working day.Prescription has automatically set in.

The fiscal cannot file the information on the next followingworking day as it would tantamount to extending theprescriptive period fixed by law.Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecutionwas granted on the valid ground of prescription.

CABRAL V. PUNO 1976

70 SCRA 606

FACTS:

Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification ofPublic Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948the signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in adeed of sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash theInformation on the ground of prescription of the crimecharge, since the said document of sale was notarized onAugust 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds ofBulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization causedthe cancellation of the original certificate of title and a newtransfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25,1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground ofprescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion forreconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according

to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longerintervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil actionagainst the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the samefactual averments contained in the criminal information. TheFiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submittedhis comment expressing the view that the crime, has notprescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he onlydiscovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that inthe interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper toventilate the respective evidence of both parties in theirtotal meaning.

Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant ofmotion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved forreconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "thejudgment of acquittal which became final immediately uponpromulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled forcorrection or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil CaseNo. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right tointervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. Thismotion was denied, as well as the second motion forreconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975(granting the motion to quash and dismissing theInformation) based on prescription is a bar to anotherprosecution for the same offenseHELD:

YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing theInformation on the ground of prescription of the crimebecame a bar to another charge of falsification, including the

revival of the Information. This is more so, because saidResolution had already become final and executory. Whenthe Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, orabout two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order ofdismissal, the same had already long been final.The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining amotion to quash based on prescription is a bar to anotherprosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the RevisedPenal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" isone of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."


8/23


1 Wigmore

Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification underArticle 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised PenalCode, which carries an imposable penalty of prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fineof not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10)years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive noticeof the alleged forgery after the document was registered inthe Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.

While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, throughthe private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsiderationwithin the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move didnot stop the running of the period for appeal. He (privateprosecutor) did not have the legal personality to appeal orfile the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diegos)behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through theprivate prosecutor is under the direction and control of theFiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appealfiled by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period forappeal.

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal

case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and EugeniaAlcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that SanDiego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was aforgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against EugenioCabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of FirstInstance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of thesame property and damages. It appearing, therefore, fromthe record that at the time the order of dismissal was issuedthere was a pending civil action arising out of the samealleged forged document filed by the offended party againstthe same defendant, the offended party has no right tointervene in the prosecution of the criminal case andconsequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of theorder of dismissal, or appeal from said order.

SERMONIA v CA

Petitioner: Jose SermoniaRespondent: Court of Appeals, RTC

FACTS: Jose Sermonia entered into a subsequent marriage in1975 during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Uponthe knowledge of a second marriage, his first wife filed aninformation charging Sermonia with bigamy.

Sermonia moved to quash said information contending thathis criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished byprescription, since bigamy is punishable by an afflictivepenalty, it prescribes in 15 years. The information had beenfiled only in 1992, seventeen years after he contracted the

said marriage.

The RTC denied the motion to quash, as well as theconsequent motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the appellate court, however, dismissed hispetition for lack of merit, hence the present recourse.

Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract wasduly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public recordand thus constitutes notice to the whole world. Theoffended party therefore is considered to have hadconstructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975;hence, prescription commenced to run on the day themarriage contract was registered. For this reason, the

corresponding information for bigamy should have beenfiled on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.

ISSUE: whether the prescriptive period is deemed to havetaken place from the time the offended party actually knewof the second marriage or from the time the documentevidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with theCivil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

RULING: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed bycontracting a second or subsequent marriage before the firstmarriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absentspouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of ajudgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Bigamycarries with it the imposable penalty ofprision mayor. Beingpunishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes infifteen (15) years. The fifteen-year prescriptive periodcommences to run from the day on which the crime isdiscoveredby the offended party, the authorities, or theiragents.

Moreover, the Court is of the view that the principle ofconstructive notice should not be applied in regard to thecrime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the factthat a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by theoffender in secrecy from the spouse of the previoussubsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generallyentered into in a place where the offender is not known tobe still a married person, in order to conceal his legalimpediment to contract another marriage.

The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principleof constructive notice is not contrary to the well-entrenchedpolicy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favorof the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for theoffense of bigamy from registration thereof would amountto almost absolving the offenders thereof for liabilitytherefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriagemay be said to be open and made of public record by itsregistration, the offender however is not truthful as heconceals from the officiating authority and those concernedthe existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He doesnot reveal to them that he is still a married person. Helikewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamousmarriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamousmarriage in a place where he is not known to be still amarried person. And such a place may be anywhere, under

which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriageis rendered quite difficult and would take time. It istherefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for thecrime of bigamy should be counted only from the day onwhich the said crime was discovered by the offended party,the authorities or their agency (sic).

Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage bythe offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense ofbigamy were to be counted from the date of registrationthereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offensewould almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by thepetitioner would encourage fearless violations of a socialinstitution cherished and protected by law.

G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MIZPAH R. REYES

FACTS:

Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a land. Bothare now deceased. Julio died on September 6, 1970 and hiswife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the followingchildren: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes (Petitioner) and thecomplainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara andAurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.

In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered fromthe records of the Register of Deeds that the property hadalready been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, theconveyance was allegedly effected through a notarized deed

of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by theirparents Julio and Patricia. The deed of sale was registeredwith the ROD on May 26, 1961. The complainants found outthat the signature of their parents were allegedly falsifiedand that Reyes also made an untruthful statement that shewas single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyeson May 2, 1950. The document was examined by the NBIexperts, and a report was returned with the finding that thesignature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of PatriciaPampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the


9/23


1 Wigmore

accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscalfiled with the RTC on October 18, 1984 2 informations bothfor falsification of public document and for making anuntruthful statement by stating that accused was single.

Before arraignment, Reyes filed a motion to quash bothinformations on ground that the action has prescribed

The trial court granted the petition, stating that:

...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. x x xIf registration is a notice to the whole world, thenregistration is in itself a notice and therefore, theprescriptive period of registered document must start to

run from the date the same was annotated in the Register

of Deeds.

The CA affirmed the RTCs decision, further stating that:

The rule on constructive notice has been applied in theinterpretation of a provision in the Civil Code on theprescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is

parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Codeprovision states:

Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought withinfour years. This period shall begin:

x x xIn case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery ofthe same[Emphasis supplied].

InArmentia v. Patriarca, x x x the Court, interpreting thephrase "from the time of the discovery" found in theaforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legalcontemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have takenplace from the time the document was registered in theRegister of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration isa notice to the whole world . . ."

Petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Codewhich states that "the period of prescription shallcommence to run from the day the crime is discoveredbythe offended party, the authorities, or their agents. . .cannotbe construed in the same manner because the ruleon constructive notice is limitedin application to landregistration cases.

ISSUES:

(1)

W its discovery may be deemed to have taken place fromthe time the document was registered with the Register ofDeeds. YES(2) W the rule on constructive notice may be applied tocriminal cases. YES

RULING:

The crime of falsification of a public document carries with itan imposable penalty ofprision correccionalin its mediumand maximum periods and a fine of not more thanP5,000.00. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, thiscrime prescribes in ten (10) years. The ten (10) yearprescriptive period commences to run "from the day onwhich the crime is discovered by the offended party, theauthorities, or their agents . . ."

Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10)years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructivenotice of the alleged forgery after the document wasregistered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.

The rule is well-established that registration in a publicregistry is a notice to the whole world. The record isconstructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,legal and equitable, included therein.

The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that thepresumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law onprescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructivenotice, can not be applied in criminal actions.

The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suitsare based mainly on practical and equitable grounds. Thelapse of a considerably long period of time obscures thesurrounding circumstances of a particular claim or right anderodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be presentedin support of an action to enforce or contest such claim orright. Moreover, where a particular right has accrued infavor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot foreverbe left on a precarious balance, always susceptible topossible challenge by an adverse party.

In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes,that which is most favorable to the accused is to beadopted. The application of the rule on constructive noticein the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Codewould most certainly be favorable to the accused since theprescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckonedwith earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of salewas recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case,the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961.The criminal informations for falsification of a publicdocument having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or

more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime forwhich the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court ofAppeals, therefore, committed no reversible error inaffirming the trial court's order quashing the twoinformations on the ground of prescription.

CABELIC VS JUDGE GERONIMO

FACTS:

Loreto Cabelic charges Judge Geronimo of MTCCwith Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Cabelic avers that he was manhandled at hisformer employer in Antipolo, hence he filed a criminal casefor slight physical injuries and grave coercion before theProsecutors Office which referred it to the barangay

authorities of Antipolo (for settlement of the case). Nosettlement happened thus it was returned to theProsecutors Office. A criminal case for slight physical

injuries was filed before MTCC Antipolo (in JudgeGeronimos court). On February 29, 1990, respondent Judgedismissed the case on the ground of prescription. SlightPhysical Injuries is a light offense which prescribes in twomonths (Art. 90, RPC). It was filed only on February 14, 2000,it happened on October 9, 1999- more than sixty days.

MR was denied by Judge Geronimo. He said thefiling of criminal action with office of public Prosecutors

Office did not stop the running period of prescription.

Here (this administrative case), complainantcharges respondent with gross ignorance of the law. Hecontends that the filing of his criminal case to theProsecutors Office on November 3, 1999 tolled the running

of prescriptive period.

Judge contendsthat the criminal case in questionfalls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and thereforethe interruption of the prescriptive period under Section 1,rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not apply.

Court Administrator recommended the

dismissal of the administrative case. The filing to theProsecutors Office did not interrupt the running of theprescriptive period. It would have interrupted the period ifthe information was filed with the MTCC Antipolo, Rizal onFebruary 20, 1999.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the administrative case against

Judge Geronimo should be dismissed?

2.

Whether the filing of the criminal action with the

Public Prosecutors Office suspended the running

of the period of prescription?


10/23


1 Wigmore

DECISION:

1.

Yes, it should be dismissed.

2.

Yes, it suspended the running of the period of

prescription.

HELD:

The Supreme Court agrees with the courtadministrator only in so far as the dismissal of the instantcase is concerned. The respondent judge was correct instating that Slight Physical Injuries is a light offense (arrestomenor- one day to thirty days), being a light offense, thecrime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.

Article 91 of RPC provides the period ofprescription shall be interrupted by filing the complaint ofinformation. In the case of Reodica vs CA, filing of thecomplaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running

of the statute of limitations (citing Fransisco vs CA and Pp vsCuaresma).

In the Reodica case, Section 9 of Rule onSummary Procedure which provides that cases coveredthereby, the prosecution commences by filing thecomplaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC orMTCC cannot be taken to mean that prescriptive period is

interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or informationdirectly with said court. In case of conflict between Rule onSummary Procedure and RPC (which is a substantive law),latter prevails.

Respondent Judge erred in declaring the crime ofslight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing ofthe complaint before the Prosecutors Office did not toll or suspend the running of the prescriptive period.

The matter however is judicial in nature and therule is that a partys remedy (if prejudiced by the orders of ajudge given in the course of trial) is the proper reviewingcourt and not with the Office of the Court Administrator bymeans of administrative complaint.

An administrative complaint is not theappropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemedaberrant or irregular. Administrative liability for ignorance ofthe law does not arise from the mere fact that a judgeissued an order that may be adjudged to be erroneous.

Rule: Only when a Judge acts fraudulently or

with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are

called for.

Wherefore, administrative case is dismissed.

REPUBLIC VS COJUANGCO ET AL

Facts:

On April 25, 1977 respondents incorporated theUnited Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM).

On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended itscapitalization by (1) increasing its authorized capitalstock to three million shares without par value; (2)converting the original subscription of 200,000 to onemillion shares without par value and deemed fullypaid for and non-assessable by applying the P5 million

already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning thesubscription receivables of P15 million.

On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased itsauthorized capital stock to 10 million shares withoutpar value. On September 18, 1979 a new set ofUNICOM directors, approved another amendment toUNICOMs capitalization.

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint forviolation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)3019 against respondents.

The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM

was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to thegovernment since UNICOM had a capitalization ofonly P5 million and it had no track record of

operation. About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the

Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued aMemorandum, stating that although it foundsufficient basis to indict respondents for violation ofSection 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has alreadyprescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents alleged violation of

Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.

Held:

Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that theoffenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years.Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 onMarch 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period foroffenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10years. Since the acts complained of were committed before

the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for suchacts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, asoriginally enacted.

Assuming the offense charged is subject toprescription, the same began to run only from the date itwas discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution.Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.

Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-yearprescriptive period should be computed in accordance withSection 2 of Act 3326, which provides:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same

be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof andthe institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation

and punishment.

Two rules for determining when the prescriptiveperiod shall begin to run: first, from the day of thecommission of the violation of the law, if such commission isknown; and second, from its discovery, if not then known,and the institution of judicial proceedings for itsinvestigation and punishment.

The Court reckoned the prescriptive period from thediscovery of such loans.The reason for this is that thegovernment, as aggrieved party, could not have known thatthose loans existed when they were made. Both parties to

such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud againstthe government. They could only have been discovered afterthe 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people oustedPresident Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, noperson would have dared question the legality or proprietyof the loans.

PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

FACTS:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP)Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respondent) with theOffice of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint

alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with anaggregate amount of P9,658,592.00 in favor of privatecomplainant which were dishonored upon presentment forpayment. Consequently the case was modified, and only onFebruary 3, 2000 that two countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan intheMetropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000,respondent filed anOmnibus Motion to Quash the

Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest

before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her


11/23


1 Wigmore

criminal liabilityhas been extinguished by reason ofprescription. In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said thatthe prevailing law that governs theprescription of specialpenal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An ActToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For Violations PenalizedBy Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a propercourt and not to merely to prosecution office forB.P. 22,

prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime.The imputed violation occurred sometime in 1995, and onlyon February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in theMetropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action alreadyprescribes. RTC granted the motion.On the other hand, thecomplainant argued that the filing with the office ofcityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to theprescription.

ISSUE:Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considereda judicial proceeding that can interrupt prescription of

crime under B.P. 22?HELD: YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that,there is no more distinction between cases under theRevised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws

with respect to the interruption of the period ofprescription; that the institution of proceedings forpreliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor againstaccused interrupts the period of prescription. Following thefactual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995,the filing of complaint on September 1997, two (2) yearsfrom the commission of the crime validly interrupts therunning of precription. Therefore the action against therespondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

GARCIA VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Guevarra spouses seeks recovery of one (1) ladys

diamond ring 18 cts. White gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05cts. Diamond. Solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. Total

weight which she brought on October 27, 1947 from R.Rebullida, Inc. Mrs. Guevara lost her ring on February 1952.On October 11, 1953, while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia,owner of La Bulakena restaurant recognized her ring in thefinger of Mrs. Garca and inquired where she bought it,which the defendant answered from her Comare. SpousesGarcia together with Lt. Cementina and their Attorneyproceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida who examined thering, Rebudilla confirmed that indeed it was her ring. Mrs.Garcia refuted that the said ring was purchased by her fromMrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who inturn got it from the owner , Aling Petring who was boardingin her house; that the ring might be similar but not the samewith that she bought from Rebudilla.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Garcia is liable for the lostring of Mrs. Guevara

HELD:

Yes, according to Article 559 of the Civil Code,recovery of the lost possession even though the one whogot it is in good faith. But in the case at bar, Mrs. Garciacannot invoke good faith since she ought to know that thesaid ring is a property in question. The Court found out thatAling Petring is a mysterious and ephemeral figure. Thetestimony of Mr. Rebullida was reliable. Therefore, Mrs.Garcia will pay Attorneys fee and Exemplary damage.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PERCIVAL GECOMO y

OSIT

FACTS:

Complainant Regina Rapuzon alleges that she has beenraped twice by the accused-appellant Percival Gecomo thefirst instance being on June 20, 1994 and the second on July3, 1994.

Regina and Percival were co-employees at Kim HiongRestaurant located near Gil Puyat Street, Sta. Cruz, Manilawhere the former worked as a waitress and the latter, a

mami steamer. Both worked in the 7:00 P. M. to 5:00 A.

M. shift of said restaurant.

According to the complainant, on June 20, she was walkingtowards her workplace when the accused suddenly placedhis left arm over her shoulder and poked a knife at her. Shewas threatened of being killed if she wouldnt come wit hhim. Scared and intimidated, the victim went with him andshe was brought to Mansion Hotel where she was hit in thestomach twice leaving her unconscious. When she woke up,she found blood on her genitalia. The accused slapped herand then again had carnal knowledge of her and wasthreatened that she would be killed if she told anyone aboutit.

On July 3, Regina went to her workplace to inform heremployer about her resignation. As she was going home, theaccused again intercepted her as he did on June 20 and tookher to his house where the second instance of rapehappened.

Upon arriving home in the morning of the following

day, July 4, 1992, complainants mother noticed herwounded and blackened right cheek and asked her how shegot those injuries. It was then that she told her mothereverything that happened to her. They then went to theJose Abad Santos Police Station in Tondo to report thecrimes committed by appellant.

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) medico-legal officerDr. Louella I. Nario conducted a physical examination ofRegina. Genital findings compatible with sexual intercoursewith man on or about the alleged date of commission.

For his defense, appellant vehemently denied thecharges of rape. He claimed that the complainant was hisgirlfriend and that the sexual intercourses on June 20 andJuly 3, 1992 were with the voluntary will of complainant. Headded that the second carnal intercourse occurred in thePension Hotel, and not in his house as alleged bycomplainant.

Appellant posits that under ordinary situations, if theaccusations were true, complainant should have shoutedand cried or screamed for help from the time she wasaccosted in the street up to the time that they checked outfrom the hotel.

Also, appellant holds it against complainant for failingto immediately tell her mother or the police authoritiesabout her ordeal on June 20, 1992. He postulates that theeffects of his supposed threats should have ceased to existafter the June 20 incident and said complainant being freefrom the clutches of her transgressor, no amount of threatscould have prevented her from reporting the crime to her

mother or to the police authorities thereafter

ISSUE:

W/ N the failure of complainant to disclose her defilementwithout loss of time to persons close to her or to report thematter to the authorities destroys the contention that shewas sexually molested and that her charges against theaccused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated

HELD:

Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indicationof a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complainor file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer tobear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shameto the world or risk the offenders making good their threats

to kill or hurt their victims.

The failure of herein complainant to report theincident immediately does not discredit her credibility, herhesitation being attributable to the death threats made byappellant, not to speak of the natural reluctance of a womanhaving to admit in public her having been raped. It is notuncommon for young girls to conceal for some time theassault on their virtue because of the rapists threat on their

lives. Not every victim of a crime can be expected to act


12/23


1 Wigmore

reasonably and conformably with the expectation ofmankind. One persons spontaneous or unthinking, or eveninstinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus maybe aggression, while anothers may be cold indifference.

The law on prescription of crimes would bemeaningless if we were to yield to the proposition that delay

in the prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the State andto the offended parties. In fixing the different prescriptiveperiods on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribedtherefor, the law takes into account or allows reasonabledelays in the prosecution thereof. In a number of cases, wehave ruled that a delay of seventeen days, thirty-five days,or even six months,by a victim of rape in reporting theattack on her honor does not detract from the veracity ofher charge.

PANGAN v GATBALITE

GR No. 141718 January 21, 2005

Petitioner : Benjamin Pangan y Rivera

Respondents : Hon Lourdes F. Gatbalite Col. James D.Labordo

FACTS

The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in acriminal case in Angeles City MTC.During the trial of thecase, Atty. Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the casefor decision without offering any evidence, due to thepetitioners constant absence at hearings.

On September 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the

offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty oftwo months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, theRTC on October 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of theMTC.

On August 1991, the case was called for promulgation of thedecision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, counselfor the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner wasreturned unserved with the notation that he no longerresided at the given address. As a consequence, he alsofailed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court oforigin issued an order of arrest against the petitioner.

The petitioner was detained at the Mabalacat DetentionCell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus and contended that his arrest wasillegal and unjustified on the grounds that:

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day ofarresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93of the RPC

(b) having been able to continuously evade service ofsentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has longbeen totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the RPC

Petitioner claims that:

The period for the computation ofpenalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code beginsto run from the moment the judgment of convictionbecomes final and the convict successfully evades, eludes,

and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.

ISSUE

Whether or not the crime charged with a penalty of arrestomayor has already prescribed.

HELD

NO. The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the

petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decisionadverted to above had already prescribed, hence, hisdetention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised PenalCode:

Article 93. The period of prescription of penalties shall

commence to run from the date when the culprit shouldevade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted ifthe defendant should give himself up, be captured, shouldgo to some foreign country with which this Government hasno extradition treaty, or should commit another crimebefore the expiration of the period of prescription.

The elements of prescription are:

1. That the penalty isimposed by final judgment;

2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence byescaping during the term of his sentence;

3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has notgiven himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign

country with which we have no extradition treaty, orcommitted another crime;

4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of timefrom the date of the evasion of the service of the sentenceby the convict.

In this case, the essential element of prescription which isthe evasion of the service of sentence is absent. It was citedin the case of Infante v. Warden that There was no evasionof the service of the sentence in this case, because suchevasion presupposes escaping during the service of thesentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an

essential element, the convict must serve at least a fewseconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentenceand then escapes before the computation of prescription ofpenalties begins to run.

The period for prescription of penalties begins only whenthe convict evades service of sentence by escaping duringthe term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffereddeprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escapingduring the term of his service, the period for prescriptionnever began.

Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served hissentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor and

should forthwith be released unless he is being detained foranother offense or charge.

TORRES V THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS

FACTS:

In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardonedby the president with the condition that if he shall violateany penal law again, his sentence will be carried out.Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and wasreleased from prison. However, by 1982, the Board ofPardons and Parole recommended to the President thecancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torresbecause Torres had been charged with twenty counts ofestafa before, and convicted of sedition. His pardon wascancelled. He appealed the issue before the Supreme Court.

He contended that his pardon should not have beencancelled since the judgment on the new estafa cases werestill on appeal. Through his wife and children, he petitionedto be released from prison alleging that he was denied dueprocess, and that his constitutional rights to be presumedinnocent and to a speedy trial were violated upon hisrecommitment to prison.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by finaljudgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can


13/23


1 Wigmore

be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of theterms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve thebalance of his original sentence.

RULING: Where a conditional pardonee has allegedlybreached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts toproceed against him under Section 64 of the RevisedAdministrative Code need not wait for a judicialpronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for hisconviction therefore by final judgment, in order toeffectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison.

It did not matter that Torres was allegedly been acquitted intwo of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequentto his conditional pardon, and that the third case remainspending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of hisright to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person'sliberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful.The incarceration of Torres is legal since he would have

served his final sentence for his first conviction untilNovember 2, 2000, had he not violated the conditions of thepardon and had thus had it revoked.

Lastly, only the President has the prerogative to reinstatethe pardon if in his own judgment.Courts have no authorityto interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to aconvicted criminal.A final judicial pronouncement as to theguilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President todetermine whether or not there has been a breach of theterms of a conditional pardon.

MONSATO VS FACTORAN

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.

Monsanto (assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and threeother accused, of the complex crime of estafa thrufalsification of public documents and sentenced them toimprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) yearsand one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay afine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly andseverally indemnify the government in the sum ofP4,892.50.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction which wasgranted. She then filed a motion for reconsideration butwhile said motion was pending, she was extended by thenPresident Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog Citytreasurer requesting that she be restored to her former postas assistant city treasurer since it was still vacant.

Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry ofFinance for resolution in view of the provision of the LocalGovernment Code. The Finance Ministry ruled thatpetitioner may be reinstated to her position without thenecessity of a new appointment not earlier than the dateshe was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed thecity treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified infav

Crim Compilation of Cases 3rd Exam

Documents

Transcript of Crim Compilation of Cases 3rd Exam