Creating Effective IntelligenceChapter 3 Creating Effective Intelligence “To lack intelligence is...

Chapter 3

Creating EffectiveIntelligence

“To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded.”1

—David M. Shoup

“It is refreshing to see things in their proper order—intelli-gence driving operations, instead of operations driving intel-ligence . . . As a consequence, we have been able to maintaina constantly high tempo of productive operations.”2

—Charles E. Wilhelm

aving reached a common understanding of the nature ofintelligence and having laid out the main elements of in-

telligence theory, we can describe the characteristics of effec-tive intelligence. How do we create it within in the MarineCorps?

THE CHALLENGE TO INTELLIGENCE

Before discussing our approach to intelligence, it might behelpful to review the challenges that intelligence faces. Whatobstacles must intelligence overcome, and what must it accom-plish?

Our fundamental premise is that intelligence is not knowl-edge for its own sake, but instead knowledge for the sole pur-pose of supporting the commander’s decisionmaking needs.Knowledge that cannot be acted upon or that commanderschoose to ignore is of little value. Consequently, the MarineCorps recognizes that because intelligence is directly connectedto action, it is therefore inseparable from command and opera-tions.

Intelligence attempts to reduce uncertainty about a particu-lar hostile situation. Intelligence is fundamentally an impreciseactivity, dealing in estimates and probabilities rather than cer-

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tainties. Intelligence must extract meaning from informationthat is ambiguous, unclear, and sometimes of unknown reliabil-ity. It must synthesize disparate information, attempting to cre-ate a coherent picture of the enemy and the area of operations.Intelligence should strive to identify enemy centers of gravityand critical vulnerabilities that commanders can exploit. At thesame time, it should provide warning of threats to friendlyforces.

Intelligence not only provides knowledge of quantitative fac-tors but also, more importantly, affords insight into intangibleaspects of the enemy situation such as his goals and motiva-tions. It should not only describe existing conditions and iden-tify enemy capabilities but should also attempt to estimatelikely future conditions and enemy intentions. In addition, itshould present that knowledge in the form of coherent, mean-ingful images that are easily assimilated rather than in the formof accumulated lists or texts.

Intelligence strives to answer three basic sets of questions.The first relates to current capabilities and conditions: “Whatcan the enemy do? What conditions currently exist?” The sec-ond relates to intentions or future conditions: “What might theenemy do? What is the enemy likely to do? What is the mostdangerous thing he may do? What conditions might or arelikely to exist in the future?” And the third—and most impor-tant—relates to any implications: “What effect might all of thishave on our ability to accomplish the mission?”

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In short, intelligence must provide the commander with thepractical knowledge that offers exploitable advantages overthe opposition.

INTELLIGENCE IS A COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

Creating effective intelligence is an inherent and essential re-sponsibility of command. Intelligence failures are failures ofcommand—just as operations failures are command failures.

The Marine Corps’ approach to intelligence demands thatcommanders be personally involved in the conduct of intelli-gence activities. The commander must specify requirementsand provide guidance to ensure a timely and useful product.Commanders must develop an appreciation for the capabilitiesand limitations of intelligence. This awareness does not meanjust an understanding of concepts and theory, but an under-standing of the practical capabilities and limitations of intelli-gence personnel, systems, procedures, and products.

The commander begins the process by providing the guid-ance and direction necessary for the effective conduct of intelli-gence operations. The commander establishes the priorityintelligence requirements that drive collection, production, anddissemination operations. If a commander does not effectivelydefine and prioritize intelligence requirements, the entire effort


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may falter. The commander is also required to make the finalsynthesis of intelligence, arriving at the estimate of the situa-tion which, in turn, serves as the basis for the decision. This isthe responsibility of the commander and no one else; while theintelligence officer will provide a recommendation, it is thecommander who ultimately determines the meaning of the intel-ligence provided and how to use it. Additionally, the com-mander supervises the overall intelligence effort to ensure thatthe product is timely, relevant, and useful.

Importantly, the commander ensures that intelligence activi-ties support not just the intelligence requirements of the parentunit but the requirements of subordinate commanders as well.The commander should intervene personally when the unit’scollection requests or other intelligence support requirementsgo unsatisfied. Finally, the commander must view the intelli-gence training of all personnel as a personal command respon-sibility. This training includes the intelligence awareness of allmembers of the command as well as the professional develop-ment and training of intelligence personnel.

THE COMMAND-INTELLIGENCE CONNECTION

The relationship between the commander and the intelligenceofficer should be as close as that between the commander andoperations officer. Personal involvement in intelligence does

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not imply that the commander micromanages the intelligencesection or assumes the job of the intelligence officer any morethan involvement in operations means that the commandertakes over as operations officer. Instead, commanders mustprovide the guidance and supervision necessary for the intelli-gence officer to support them while at the same time allowingthe intelligence officer sufficient latitude for initiative.

In reality, however, the relationship between a commanderand intelligence officer is often more difficult to establish andmaintain. One reason is that the commander and operations of-ficer usually have more in common in terms of grade, militaryoccupational specialty, age, and experience. In the perspectiveof some officers, an operations billet is a prelude to command,and many commanders have previously served tours of duty asoperations officers in the very same type of unit they now com-mand. Commanders rarely have had the same sort of practicalexperience in intelligence billets. Consequently, commandersmust promote an environment of cooperation, professional sup-port, and mutual respect between themselves and their intelli-gence officers in which operations and intelligence officers canwork together to execute their commanders’ intent.

Intelligence requirements are the commander’s requirementsand not those of the intelligence officer. The commanding offi-cer must provide early and adequate guidance and revise itwhen necessary. The commander identifies what intelligence isneeded while the intelligence officer helps in stating the priorityintelligence requirements to meet those needs.


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The intelligence officer is not simply a researcher waitingfor a task from the commanding officer. An intelligence officeris an operator who understands the intelligence needs of theunit. The intelligence officer is knowledgeable of the tacticalsituation and can anticipate the commander’s intelligence re-quirements based on an understanding of the commander’s in-tent and the commander’s thought processes. The intelligenceofficer actively advises the commander on just what intelli-gence may contribute to success and aggressively carries outintelligence operations to fulfill the intelligence needs of thecommand.

While the relationship between commander and intelligenceofficer should be close, they must be careful not to lose theirobjectivity. The commander and intelligence officer may not al-ways agree on their respective estimates of the hostile situa-tion—this is natural and to be expected. Once the intelligenceofficer has provided a candid, objective estimate, the com-mander will assess it and make an independent judgment. Oncethe commander has made a decision, the intelligence officermust support it fully—while maintaining the detachment neces-sary to advise the commander if the situation changes or if newevidence indicates that the commander’s estimate appearswrong.

During planning and wargaming, the commander will ofteninstruct the intelligence officer to assume the role of an adver-sary—to attempt to think like the enemy commander—as a

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means of gaining insights into possible enemy intentions, ac-tions, and reactions. Thus, the intelligence officer often playsthe role of devil’s advocate, identifying possible ways that theenemy or the environment may interfere with or even defeatfriendly plans. In this manner, the intelligence officer helps thecommander analyze possibilities and prepare responses to pos-sible developments.

Commanders must exercise caution so as not to judge the ef-fectiveness of intelligence by how accurately it has predictedreality. Commanders must realize that intelligence is the busi-ness of estimates, not certainties. A commander harboring un-realistic expectations may discover that the intelligence officeris reluctant to risk any predictions for fear of being wrong. Thecommander must encourage the intelligence officer to estimateenemy possibilities frankly and not merely provide “safe” factsand figures. Far from being merely a provider of facts and fig-ures—or even a provider of estimates on enemy courses of ac-tion—the intelligence officer should offer trusted advice onfriendly courses of action based on knowledge of the hostilesituation.


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THE INTELLIGENCE-OPERATIONS CONNECTION

The relationship between intelligence and operations should beas close and direct as that between intelligence and command.In addition to intelligence’s influence on the conduct of opera-tions by identifying enemy capabilities and estimating enemycourses of action and possible reactions to friendly courses ofaction, intelligence also provides important support to opera-tions by helping to identify friendly critical vulnerabilities thatthe enemy may exploit. Thus, the intelligence and operationssections must function in close cooperation throughout theplanning and execution of an operation. Neither section canperform effectively without the continuous cooperation of theother.

As in the relationship with the commander, the intelligenceofficer should cooperate fully with the operations officer butshould not develop a personal stake in a particular course ofaction. Based on knowledge of the hostile situation, the intelli-gence officer must maintain the freedom to offer advice whichdisagrees with the advice of the operations staff.3

Intelligence officers are themselves operators. The intelli-gence officer does everything the operations officer does, onlyin red ink—meaning from the enemy, rather than friendly per-spective. The intelligence officer must possess an intimateknowledge of the enemy’s methods, capabilities, organizations,and tendencies. At the same time, in order to effectively plan,

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coordinate, and execute intelligence operations, the intelli-gence officer requires an in-depth understanding of friendlytactics, capabilities, and intentions.

The relationship between operations and intelligencenecessitates mutual support. Just as intelligence identifies op-portunities for exploitation through operations, so can opera-tions provide the stimulus for intelligence. Regardless of theprimary mission, all operations have an additional object ofgaining information about the enemy and the environment.Some operations possess this goal as the primary mission. Forexample, the objective of a tactical maneuver such as a recon-naissance in force may be to learn more about enemy capabili-ties and disposition or to solicit the enemy’s reaction to aspecific situation.

The importance of the intelligence-operations connection isseen in the contrasting approaches to intelligence used by theLuftwaffe and the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the Battle ofBritain. The RAF placed intelligence officers throughout theorganization down to the squadron level. Thus aircrewsreceived the latest intelligence during tailored pre- missionbriefings, and information collected during combat was imme-diately available for analysis, dissemination, and utilization. Incontrast, the Luftwaffe placed intelligence officers at the winglevel only. Intelligence support to flying groups and squadronswas marginal throughout the battle, and its lack contributed tothe German defeat.4


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The direct connection between intelligence and operationsresults in intelligence shaping or even driving the course of op-erations. Intelligence operations seek to uncover enemy vulner-abilities we can exploit. Opportunities identified by theintelligence effort are used to develop the concept of operationsduring planning and to initiate specific tactical actions duringexecution. Effective intelligence guides us towards enemyweaknesses rather than forcing us to operate against an enemystrength.

The invasion of Tinian during World War II provides an il-lustration of how intelligence shapes operations. Initial intelli-gence studies of Tinian identified only one suitable landing areafor the amphibious assault. This area was located immediatelyin front of the island’s major settlement, Tinian Town, and washeavily defended by the Japanese. The studies noted the exis-tence of two small inlets on the northern tip of the island butdiscounted their suitability for a major landing (see figure 5).As planning progressed, new intelligence identified major dis-advantages in attacking across the Tinian Town beaches. Atthe same time, additional studies indicated that a landing on theundefended northern beaches was a viable option. Preassaultreconnaissance confirmed the suitability of these beaches. Theconcept of operations called for regimental-sized landings to beconducted on two small northern beaches (White 1 and White2) that totaled in width only about 220 yards. The main landingwould be supported by an amphibious demonstration con-ducted near Tinian Town.

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The amphibious assault achieved complete tactical surprise.Landing against minimal opposition on the northern beaches,


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Figure 5.

the entire 4th Marine Division was established ashore by theend of the first day. The island was secured in 9 days withminimal casualties suffered by the landing force. The Tinianoperation was described by Admiral Raymond Spruance as,“probably the most brilliantly conceived and executed amphibi-ous operation in World War II.” Intelligence contributed sig-nificantly to the success of this operation, providingcommanders with knowledge of a critical vulnerability—theundefended northern beaches—which they exploited to achievesuccess.5

INTELLIGENCE AS A TEAM EFFORT

Intelligence is the commander’s responsibility and the intelli-gence officer’s primary duty, but it is also definitely the con-cern of every Marine. All Marines in the command contributein one way or another to the intelligence effort. Nearly everyMarine, regardless of occupational specialty, has occasion toobserve significant facts about the enemy or the environment.Units in contact with the enemy are a particularly valuablesource of information. All Marines should consider themselvesas potential intelligence sources and, equally important, ascounterintelligence assets. Everyone on the battlefield shouldbe alert for important information and bring that information tothe attention of the person who needs it by the most direct andexpeditious means available.

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INTELLIGENCE IS A PRODUCT, NOT A PROVISION

Intelligence is something generated through our own efforts,rather than something provided by some outside source. Whilewe may say that in principle we should have ready access toexternal sources like satellite imagery, basing our actions onthe timely availability of such information is dangerous. Com-manders should aim, to the greatest extent possible, to becomeself-sufficient in satisfying their own intelligence requirements.This approach is particularly important once an operation hascommenced. Before operations begin, intelligence from higherechelons may appear to be available in unlimited quantities.However, once execution starts, our organic intelligence andreconnaissance assets generally provide the most reliable andresponsive support to Marine units. Marines cannot forget thatintelligence is the result of solid headwork and legwork, and itis not provided from some omniscient source of knowledge.Requirements for critical intelligence should be satisfiedthrough organic means whenever possible.

A BALANCED APPROACH

The approach of the Marine Corps to intelligence calls for bal-ance in a number of areas. First is the capability to gather in-formation from a variety of sources. Each source provides adifferent type of information. These different sources can com-


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pensate for, complement, and confirm one another. Dependingon the situation, certain sources will be more valuable than oth-ers. Which source we most depend upon in a particular situa-tion is less a matter of our own preference than a matter of thenature and sophistication of the enemy.

Next, balance means that commanders emphasize equally allphases of the intelligence cycle. For example, an overemphasison collection may result in an overload of information thatoverwhelms processing and production capacity, thus prevent-ing rapid dissemination. Balance also means that commandersemphasize the development of both classes of intelli-gence—descriptive and estimative. Balance requires that intel-ligence personnel work at uncovering both the enemy’scapabilities and the enemy’s intentions. Balance means that wetake into account both quantitative factors—such as numbers,locations, equipment specifications—and qualitative factor-s—morale, motives, leadership, and cultural values.

Finally, our approach to intelligence should achieve balancein its support to commanders at all levels. At any particularlevel, the intelligence officer’s first duty is to serve the com-mander’s intelligence requirements. However, since questionsabout the enemy situation and area of operations are practi-cally limitless, an intelligence section can easily spend all itstime satisfying intelligence requirements of its own staff orhigher headquarters—to the neglect and detriment of subordi-nate commanders’ intelligence needs. Commanders must pro-vide the necessary guidance to ensure that balance is achieved.

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Intelligence personnel must remain conscious of the intelligencerequirements of all elements of the force with the objective ofcreating satisfactory intelligence for all supported commanders.

FOCUSING THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

Focus, as embodied in the concept of main effort, is central tomaneuver warfare. It is particularly critical for intelligencesince possible questions about the enemy situation are nearlyinfinite, while intelligence assets are limited. Commanders mustconcentrate intelligence operations on those critical require-ments upon which mission success depends and prioritize ac-cordingly. The intelligence effort must support the main effort.In fact, intelligence is responsible for identifying the enemy’scenters of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that are used todetermine the main effort.

Focus is a product of direction, which means it is a functionof command. The commander provides focus to the intelligenceeffort by prioritizing intelligence requirements. These require-ments establish priorities for all intelligence activities—notonly for collection but also for processing, production, and dis-semination. The earlier the commander establishes this guid-ance, the more focused, timely, and complete the finalintelligence product will be.


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GENERATING TEMPO THROUGH INTELLIGENCE

Tempo is central to maneuver warfare and our command andcontrol doctrine. We seek to generate a higher operating tempothan that of the enemy. Effective intelligence supports this ac-celerated tempo. We help create this rapid tempo through a va-riety of techniques.

First, we generate tempo through prioritization. We estab-lish a limited number of priority intelligence requirements thatare understood clearly throughout the force. Collection, proc-essing, production, and dissemination operations are conductedin accordance with these priorities. By concentrating on thetruly essential requirements, we avoid diluting intelligence op-erations and clogging dissemination channels with nonessentialintelligence.

Another way we use intelligence to accelerate tempo isthrough decentralization—establishing command relationshipsor task-organizing intelligence assets to directly support subor-dinate commanders. Decentralizing intelligence resources ap-plies not only to collection assets but to production anddissemination assets as well. Decentralization provides subor-dinate elements with the intelligence resources needed to recog-nize and exploit opportunities as they arise in the battlespace.It also helps ensure intelligence products are tailored to the re-

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quirements of commanders at lower echelons. However, decen-tralization does not mean that intelligence assets will be fullydispersed throughout the force or that each unit will have anequal share of the available intelligence units, systems, or per-sonnel. Since intelligence assets are limited, it is virtually im-possible to provide each unit with all the intelligencecapabilities its commander may desire. Assets will be allocatedbased on the commander’s intent, the designation of the maineffort, and the priority intelligence requirements.

The third technique by which we generate intelligence tempoentails a conscious command decision to disseminate certaininformation before it has been fully integrated, analyzed,evaluated, and interpreted—in other words, before it becomesa comprehensive intelligence product. This approach recog-nizes that at times a piece of information may be so critical andtime-sensitive that it should be disseminated immediately withminimal evaluation and analysis. In a sense, this amounts todecentralizing intelligence production by requiring subordinateunits to perform immediate intelligence production. Immediateproduction rapidly identifies, evaluates, and disseminates intel-ligence that may have an impact on ongoing operations in orderto exploit opportunities and generate tempo. For example, thecommander may establish criteria that require the immediatedissemination of any reporting on certain critical enemy tar-gets. The dilemma, which we must resolve on a case-by-casebasis, is between the desire to provide as complete and accu-rate an intelligence product as possible and the requirement tosupport the urgency of tactical decisionmaking.


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Accessibility is a fourth mechanism by which we may accel-erate tempo. Accessibility increases tempo by makingintelligence available to commanders for use in decision- mak-ing. Here we make another conscious command decision—inthis case to make intelligence more accessible to users by mini-mizing security restrictions or by relying more on opensources. We can do this by “sanitizing” classified intelligenceto protect sources without materially decreasing the value ofthe intelligence. More important, we should make a consciouseffort to ensure that intelligence is classified only to the mini-mum degree essential to the interests of security.

A fifth way of generating tempo is by ensuring that intelli-gence products take the form most readily understandable byusers. This generally means that intelligence should be pre-sented as meaningful images, rather than reports or listswhich require more time to assimilate. For example, display-ing a possible enemy course of action in a graphic with sup-porting text annotated on the graphic is generally more usefulthan providing only a text report.

Finally, we can enhance tempo through effective informa-tion management—taking advantage of all available communi-cation channels and means for disseminating intelligence.Intelligence, like any other information product, flows not onlythrough established hierarchical channels but also by alarmchannels, flowing laterally and diagonally as well as vertically(see figure 6). In other words, rather than simply forwarding

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information or intelligence via standard channels, we must askourselves, “Who really needs this information most?” andtransmit that information by the most direct and readily acces-sible means.

The ability to generate tempo through intelligence was viv-idly demonstrated in a series of combat actions during the earlyyears of the Vietnam war. A small number of documents re-covered from a Viet Cong commander killed by a Marine am-


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Figure 6.

bush patrol identified a likely enemy training base. Using thisintelligence, the next day a Marine combined arms assault sur-prised and effectively destroyed five enemy companies. Imme-diate searches of the area led to additional intelligence locatinganother enemy battalion, which was also quickly attacked,causing heavy personnel and material losses. Follow-on all-source intelligence analysis of both engagements swiftly identi-fied the most likely infiltration routes used by these enemyunits, allowing a Marine infantry company a few nights later tosuccessfully ambush a reinforced enemy battalion. A few cap-tured documents combined with rapid dissemination and utili-zation of the resulting intelligence led directly to a series ofsuccessful tactical actions.6

INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Intelligence education and training are a command responsibil-ity. Professional development programs must give all Marinesan understanding of the capabilities and limitations of intelli-gence as well as the employment of intelligence assets. Educa-tion and training should likewise provide intelligence personnelwith an in-depth understanding of operations so that they maybetter support operations with intelligence. Moreover, educa-tion and training programs should seek to strengthen the rela-tionship between intelligence officers and commanders byincreasing their mutual understanding.

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Commanders must demonstrate personal involvement in in-telligence training. They must dedicate adequate training timeto it and ensure that intelligence is realistically integrated andbalanced with other warfighting activities. The commander isresponsible for ensuring that all the unit’s Marines have a basicunderstanding of the threat and the environment in likely areasof deployment. Classroom instruction, professional reading,discussion groups, and use of wargames with realistic scenar-ios and threat forces are ways to build such knowledge.

Exercises must be used to reinforce and increase the intelli-gence awareness of the unit. Exercises should incorporate real-istic intelligence to the maximum extent possible. This providesparticipants with the opportunity to identify their intelligencerequirements, allows them to see how intelligence is collected,produced, and disseminated, and exposes them to the type andquantity of intelligence support they can expect to receive dur-ing actual operations.

The value of incorporating realistic intelligence into exer-cises was demonstrated during Operation Praying Mantis in1988. The commander of a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) based his training scenarios onactual intelligence studies of potential raid sites in the PersianGulf. For the execution of the operation, the MAGTF was di-rected to attack the “Sassan” gas-oil platform, a target the


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MAGTF had used in its training exercise the week before. Theuse of realistic intelligence during training gave the MAGTFcommander the necessary background knowledge and situa-tional awareness to rapidly complete the plan.7

Opposed, free-play exercises are especially valuable, pro-viding the opportunity to conduct intelligence operations in re-alistic conditions. To use an intelligence staff to create anexercise scenario, with all the pertinent intelligence alreadygenerated in advance, is a misuse of assets. Such a schemerobs an exercise of all-important realism in the developmentand use of intelligence to support decisionmaking. Within thepractical limitations of available resources, “scripted” exerciseintelligence should be minimized in favor of intelligence gener-ated during the actual exercise.

In the training and education of intelligence personnel, weseek to achieve a balance between specialization and general-ization. Intelligence officers must possess a broad operationalorientation—an understanding of just how intelligence sup-ports operations in general terms—while also developing thespecialized skills required by many intelligence disciplines. Weshould nurture intelligence officers who can synthesize as wellas analyze—who can answer the “So what?” question. Finally,we should stress the importance of foreign area and foreignlanguage training in order to build our understanding of poten-tial enemies and operating environments.

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A CASE STUDY: SOMALIA 1992–1993

In December 1992, lead elements of the 15th Marine Expedi-tionary Unit landed in Mogadishu, Somalia, initiating Opera-tion Restore Hope, a multinational humanitarian assistanceoperation. Remaining elements of Marine Forces (MARFOR)Somalia followed shortly thereafter. MARFOR intelligence op-erations illustrate the importance of a commander’s involve-ment in the intelligence effort and of close coordinationbetween intelligence and operations.8

The intelligence situation at the start of Operation RestoreHope was typical of what can be anticipated for most militaryoperations other than war, particularly from the tactical per-spective: outdated basic intelligence, sketchy current intelli-gence regarding the order of battle, capabilities, intentions, andvulnerabilities of potential threat forces, and limited under-standing of possible reactions from either the civilian populaceor the many nongovernmental organizations long operating inthe country.

From the beginning, the commander ensured that MARFORintelligence and operations elements worked as a team. Thecommander set the direction for MARFOR intelligence opera-tions by focusing the collection and production efforts. Duringthe initial stabilization phase of operations, intelligence require-ments were focused on the organization and leadership of the


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Somalian clans, boundaries between the clans, and the loca-tions of meeting places, weapons caches, and arms markets.Both intelligence and operations personnel worked to acquireinformation and develop understanding of the nongovernmentalorganizations, the status of the local infrastructure, and the cul-tural aspects of the local population. During the subsequentnormalization phase of the operation, intelligence prioritiesshifted to requirements in support of the civil affairs effort:preserving freedom of movement and commerce throughout thecountry, determining the effectiveness of civilian authorities,and estimating the attitudes of the clans and the average Somalito U.S. and U.N. efforts.

Collection operations reflected the unique challenges of thehumanitarian assistance mission. A considerable amount of in-formation was acquired from foot, motorized, and mech-anized patrols. Helicopter visual reconnaissance missions andpostmisson debriefs typically provided timely confirmation ofinformation acquired during patrols. The MARFOR’s principalhuman intelligence resources, its counterintelligence andinterrogator-translator teams, were exceptionally effective inthis environment.

Counterintelligence specialists and interrogator-translatorswere routinely attached to or placed in direct support of unitsdown to battalion and regimental level. Their immediate avail-ability and integration into unit intelligence collection and otheroperational activities allowed intelligence officers to rapidly de-velop pertinent tactical intelligence. In most instances, intelli-

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gence was immediately provided to and acted upon byMARFOR operational elements. When more complex targetswere identified, intelligence was used to plan and execute so-phisticated direct action missions. The effective developmentand use of intelligence led to the capture of hundreds of weap-ons and tons of ammunition and supplies. Intelligence contrib-uted directly to the establishment of a secure environment forthe conduct of relief activities.

The MARFOR commander characterized human intelli-gence operations as “providing in-by-nine, out-by-five serviceon priority intelligence requirements. As a consequence, wehave been able to maintain a constantly high tempo of produc-tive operations. The key word here is productive. Patrols,checkpoints, and direct action missions have, for the most part,been directed against clearly defined targets—there have beenremarkably few dry holes.”9


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CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps’ philosophy of intelligence recognizes thatintelligence is an inherent responsibility of command. The com-mander’s direct involvement is required to provide appropriateguidance to the intelligence effort and ensure the full utilizationof the intelligence product. Our philosophy also acknowledgesthat intelligence is inseparable from operations and that effec-tive intelligence shapes or even drives operations. Withoutclose and continuous cooperation, neither intelligence nor op-erations can function effectively.

Our intelligence philosophy relies on a variety of sources,does not emphasize one phase of intelligence activity at the ex-pense of another, and provides support to all levels of theforce. This approach recognizes the importance of qualitativeas well as quantitative information requirements. It focuses onpriority intelligence requirements, seeking to avoid diffusion ofeffort. The Marine Corps’ intelligence philosophy acknowl-edges the importance of tempo and uses effective intelligenceoperations to develop and maintain tempo. Finally, this ap-proach to intelligence recognizes that the obtaining of useful in-formation about an adversary is a team effort and requires thatall Marines see themselves as intelligence and counterintelli-gence resources contributing actively to the intelligence effort.

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