SPECIAL FEATURES

Creating a Smart Nation:Strategy, Policy, Intelligence, and Information

Robert David Steele-Vivas*

In an age characterized by disributed information, wher e majority of theexpertise is in the private sector, the concept of "entral intelligence'is an oxymoron.The greatest threat to both national security an4 national economic competitivenessis ignorance-uninformed dcision making. Inielligence communities are slowlydiscoverng that they should not send a spy where a schoolchild can go, and thatspie ar not harnesing the vat distributed intelligence of the private soctor.Unfortunately, the culture of intelligence in moat countries believes that itsuniqu:nes rests on secrets rather than thinking-on producing secrets rather thaninforming polcy. To survive in the 21st century, every nation must become a smartnation" and engage all of its citlzns-every citizen must be a collector, producer.and consumer of intelligence-and, thus, crate the Virtual Intelligence Community.To .tegrate and make the best use of both open-source intelligence and traditionalclisified intelligence, each nation must establish a National Information Strategywlhich addreasse connectivity, content, coordination, and computational security.

This a::icle outlines both the requirement for, and a recomm'ended approach to, thecreation of a National. Information Strategy. Despite the fact that we have leaders inboth .ae administration and the legislature who understand the critical importance ofiafrf nation as the foundation for both national security and national competitiveessat ' dawn of the 21st century, our leadership has failed to articulate a strategy anda lAicy which integrates national intelligence (spies, satellites), governmentin'.,rnation, and private-sector information objectives and resources.

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* D aft corrpondmnc to: Robet Dav Stek..Vhw. 1005 Lation Arms Cor: .O lakto fi22114.1007.

Governmnt lformadoa Quaterly, Voume 13, NuWmbe 2, p"a 15173.All rh of reprodto any form rmmad. IS8N 07444MX.

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In the Age of Information, the absence of a National Information Strategy istantamount to abdication and surrender-the equivalent of having failed to field anarmy in World War n, or having failed to establish a nuclear deterrent in the ColdWar. This article is both an orientation for citizens and bureaucrat and a call to armsfor policymakers and legislators. It is a fundamental premise of this article that in theAge of Information, the most important role of government-at the Federal, state, orlocal level-will be the nurturing of the "information commons."' National securitywill be largely a question of protecting information infrastructure, intellectual property,and the integrity of data. National competitiveness will be completely redefined-corporations and individuals are competitive in a global economy-and it is the roleof nations to be "attracive" to investon. How nations manage their informationcommons will be a critical factor in determining "national attractiveness" for investmentin the 21st century.2 This article address and defines the challenge of change; theinformation commons and information continuum; the theory and practice ofintelligence in the Age of Information: the ethical, ecological, and evolutionaryimplications of this approach; the need to reinvent and integrate national intelligence(spies and satellites) into a larger network of distributed intelligence largely accesibleto citizens; and, finally, the concrete elements which must comprise the NationalInformation Strategy.

THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

As we enter the 21st century, we arc faced with several dramatic challenges, confrontedby order-of-magnitude changes that defy resolution under our existing paradigms andorganizational or policy structures.

The most obvious challenge to government as a whole is the changing nature of thethreat. Since th: rise of the nation-tate, with its ctizenship, taxation, and standingarmies, the mc . fundamental national security issue for governments has been thesanctity of its b. rders and the safety of its citizns and property abroad. Physical securitymaintained b- threat of force was easy to understand and easy to implement. Today,we face a wv-rld in which transnational criminal gangs have more money, bettercomputers. 1 :tter information, and vastly more motivation to act and to act ruthlessly,than most tles, Perhaps even more frightening, we face a world in which we areallowing te.. nology and limited policy undersanding to create very significant massesof displss -ed and alienated populations-including sizeable elements within our ownborders; the same time, we are ignoring our government's obligations to providefor homr. eefense, for electronic civil defense, in the private sector.3

There . another important change requiring government diligence, and that is thechange :i the role of information as the "blood" of every enterprise, every endeavor.Three aspects of this change merit enumeration: first, each citizen, whether consciousof this fact or not, is increasingly dependent on accurate and timely information inorder to be fully functional; second, the "information explosion," like a major climaticchange, is making it difficult for citizens accustomed to slower times and simpler toolsto adjust to the requirements of life in the fast lane of the information superhighway;and finally, most citizens, stockholders, and business managers do not realize that wehave national telecommunications, power, and financial networks that have been

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designed without regard to security or survivability.' It is not safe, today, to work andplay in cyberspace, and we do not even have a body of law that requires communicationsand computing providers to assure their customers that their services and products aresafe and reliable 5s

In brief, we now have an information environment in which every citizen needs tobe a collector, producer, and consumer of "inrlligenoc," or docision-support; and atthe same time, we have an extraordinarily complex and fragile informationinfrastructure which can be destroyed, disrupted, and corrupted by single individualsor small groups now capable of attacking our information infrasructure nodes throughelectronic means or simple physical destruction-and able to do so anonymously.

DEFINING THE "INFORMATION COMMONS"The "information commons" can be viewed-as the public commons for grazing sheepwas once viewed in old England-as a shared environment where information isavailable for public exploitation to the common good. There are three majorinformation "industries" that must contribute their fair share to the commons if thecommons is to be robust and useful

The first, relatively unknown to most citizens, is the U.S. intelligence community,traditionally associated with spies and satellites. In fat, between 40% and 80% of theraw data going into the final products of the intelligence community comes from "opensources--from public information legally available. 6 Unfortunately, this S25 billion-dollar-a-year community buries its open source acquisitions in the "cement overcoat"of classification, with the result that most of the useful public information acquiredby the intelligence community at taxpayer expense is not, in fact, made available tothe citizen-taxpayer.

The second, well known to most citizens as a massive bureaucracy which generatesregulations and imposes taxation, is the government. The government is nor, however,known for making information available to the public, and this is an extraordinaryfailure, for it turns out that not only is the government acquiring enormous stores ofinformation at taxpayer expense on every imaginable topic, but the government alsoserves as a magnet for vast quantities of information which it receives "free" from othergovernments, from thinktanks, lobbyists, universities, and every other purveyor of aviewpoint desiring to influence the bureaucrats who comprise the government. In theAge of Information, governments must make the transition from the industrial model(vait bureaucracies attempting to deliver goods and services using a hierarchicalstructure to control resources) to the "Ihird Wave" model (small expert nodes nurturingdistributed centers of information excellence). There are some significant capabilitieswithin government intended to address this issue, including the National TechnicalInformation Service (NTIS) in the Department of Commerce and the Defense TechnicalInformation Center (DTIC) in the Department of Defense, but by and large governmentinformation is out of control. If the intelligence community is a S25-billion-a-yearindustry, then the U.S. government can safely be asumed to be at least a $250-billion-a-year industry.

The third "industry" capable of contributing to the information commons is the mostimportant, the most diverse, and the most dynamic-it is the private sector. This has

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that mostjournalists publish only roughly 10% of what they know. James Baker, formerSecretary of State, notes in his memoirs that "in terms of fine-turning our own work,staying abret of the press commentary was particularly important." 2 Colin Powell,in his book, notes that when he was Military Assistant to thenSecrary of DefenseCuper Weinberger, he preferred the Early Brd with its compendium of newspaperstories" to the "cream of overnight intelligence" which was delivered to the Secretaryof Defense by a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) courier each morning." In a directand practical example, the U.S. Southern Command, working with the Los AlamosNational Laboratory, was able-at very low cost-to exploit Latin Americaninvestigative reporting such that tactical interdiction missions could be planned andexecuted based primarily on media reporting." This is not to say that media sourcesare superior to classiied intellignce, only that they cannot be discounted and areespecially useful to those in the private sector and in much of government who do nothave authorized access to clauified information.

Finally, we have the government, including state and local governments and theirinformation holdings, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community.These are not examined in detail here. However, it bears mentioning that in the absenceof a policy supportive of information archiving and public dissemination-and themeans for implementing that policy-vast stores of information reaching the U.S.government, including information collected and processed by contractors to the U.S.government, are being "buried" each day, needlessly depriving the public of significantinformation resources. For those in government who are overwhelmed by their owninternal "information explosion" and at a loss for how to handle their archiving,Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and the complex issues of copyright,there s a solution: the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). 1"

INTELLIGENCE IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION

Having explored in general terms the elements of the information commons and theinformation continuum, we now must focus on the specifics of intelligence in the Ageof Information." Among the core concepts that government and private sectorinformation managers must adopt and promulgate are:

* Espionage, whether by governments or corporations, is less cost-effective thanintelligent exploitation of open sources. Unfortunately, most intelligenceoommunities are trained, equipped, and organized to do secrets, and they are notwell positioned to collect and integrate open sources-public information-intotheir analysis and production proceses. This needs to be changed and is discussedfurther below.

* The best target for the application of intelligence methods (requirements analysis,collection management, analytical fusion, forecasting and visualization ofinformation) is not a competitor organization but rather the customer and theenvironment.

· Decision-4upport (intelligence) is the ultimate objective of all informationproccsses. One must carefully distinguish between dwa, which i the raw text,signal, or image; iformation, which is collated data of generic interest; and

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intelligence, which is information that has been tailored to support a specificdecision by a specific penon about a specific question at a specific time and place.Most government information and so-called intelligence products are so genericu to be relatively useless in directing action. Only when information serves asthe foundation for intelligence can its cost be justified.

* Distributed information is more valuable and yet less expensive than centralizedinformation. The art of information governance in the 21st century will focus onharnessing distributed cnters of excellence rather than on creating centralizedrepositories of information.

* "Just in time" information collection and intelligence production is far lessexpensive and far more useful to the consumer of intelligence than 'just in case"collection and archiving.

* The value of information is a combination of its content, the context within whichit is being used, and the timeliness with which it is obtained and exploited. Thismeans that information which has been used by an organization declines in valuewhen taken out of context and after time has passed. This, in turn, means thatthere is every reason for an organization to barter, share, or sell information (e.g.,market research) once its "prime" value point has passed. This is especiallyimportant to an organization u a means of increasing it acquisition of newinformation which-in its own context and time-has greater value than whenit was lying fallow in the information commons.

· The new paradigm for information acquisition is the 'diamond paradigm" inwhich the consumer, analyst, collector, and source are all able to communicatedirectly with one another. The old paradigm, the 'linear paradigm" in which theconsumer went to the analyst who went to the collector who went to the source,and back up the chain it went, is not only too slow but is also unworkable whenyou have a fast-moving topic with many nuances that are difficult to communicate.Today and in the future, the information manager' greatest moment is going tobe when a consumer can be put in direct touch with exactly the right source whocan answer the question directly, at low cost. by creating new knowledge tailoredto the needs of the consumer, at that exact moment.

* The most important information resource is the employee. Every employee mustbe a collector, producer, and consumer of information and intelligence. This iscalled the "corporate hive"" model, and it is the foundation for creating a "smatnation." If every personnel description does not list as task number one: "collectand report information useful to the organization," and if organizations do notprovide a vehicle (e.g., Lotus Notes) and a protocol for sharing information amongemployees, then by definition the organization is "dumb."

* Published knowledge is old knowledge. The ar of intelligence in the 21st centurywill be less concerned with integrating old knowledge and more concerned withusing published knowledge as a path to exactly the right source or sources whocan create new knowledge tailored to a new situation, in real time.'

* The threat (or the answer) changes depending on the level of analysis. The mostfundamental flaw in both intelligence and information today is the failure toestablish, for each question, the desired level of analysis. There are four levelsof analysis: strategic, operational, tactical, and technical. These, in turn, are

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influenced by the three major contexts of inquiry: civil, military, and geographic.,A simple example from the military sphere will illustrate the importance of thisissue. Examining the capability of a specific Middle Eastern country in the missionarea of tank warfare, it was found that while the initial threat assesment (bysomeone unfamiliar with the levels-of-analysis approach) was very high becausethis country had a great many modem tanks, in fact the threat varied ignificantlydepending on the level of analyis. Only at the technical level (lethality) was thethreat high. At the tactical level (reliability), the threat was, in fact, very lowbecause the crews were not trained and had poor morale, and the tanks weregenerally in storage and not being mainined. At the operational level(availability), the threat increased to medium because there were large numbersof tanks widely scattered over the country. At the strategic level (sustainability),the threat dropped again to low because it would be almost impossible for thiscountry to carry out extended tank warfare operations, even on its own terrain.This approach can and should be applied to every question for which intelligenc-tailored information-is to be provided.

ETHICS, ECOLOGY, AND EVOLUTION

Our "Indusrial Age" concept of intelligence and information has relied heavily on acentralized, top-down "command and control" model in which the question virtuallydetermined the answer, and the compartmentation of knowledge-its restriction to anelite few-has been a dominant feature of information operations. This article suggeststhat the true value of "intelligencc" lies in its informative value, a value which increaseswith dissemination. The emphasis within our government, therefore, should be onoptimizing our exploitation of open sources, increasing the exchange of informationamong the intelligence community, the rest of government, and the private sector, andproducing unclassified intelligence. This could be called the "open books" approachto national intelligence."

As we prepare to enter the 21gt century, we must ask ourselves some fundamentalquestions. How do we define national security? Who is the customer for nationalintelligence? What is our objective? There appears to be every reason to discard oldcocepts of national security and national intelligence and to focus on developingindmrated nationwide information and intelligence networks which recognize thatnational security depends on a solid economy and a stable environment; that the centerof gravity for progress in the future is the citizen, not the bureaucrat; and that ourobjective must be to enable informed governance and informed citizenship, not simplyto monitor conventional and nuclear threats.

I am convinced that the "ethics" of national intelligence requires a dramatic reductionin government secrecy as well as corporate secrecy. After 20 year s an intelligenceprofessional, I am certain that secrets are inherently pathological, undermining reasonedjudgement and open discussion. Secrets are also abused, used to protect bureaucraticinterests rather than genuine equities. Consider the following statement by Rodley B.McDaniel, then Executive Secretary of the National Security Council:

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Everybody who's a real practitioner, and I'm sure youre not all naive in this rgard,realizes that there are two uss to which ecurity clauifLcation is put: the legitimatedesire to protect screts, and protection of bureaucratic turf. As a practitioner ofthe real world, it's about 90% buraucratic turf and 10% legitimate protecion ofsecrets a far as I'm ooncerned.

A wise man once said: "A nation's best defense is an educated citizenry." I firmlybelieve that in the Age of Information, national intelligence-unclausified nationalintelligence-must be embedded in every decision, every process, and everyorganization. The "ethics" of openness needs to apply to the private sector as well asto the government. Universities should not be allowed to hold copyrights or patentsif they are not able or willing to disseminate knowledge or commercialize technology.Corporations should not be allowed to monopolize patents solely to protect archaicproduction processes.

The environment in which we live, in which we hope to prosper and secure thecommon defense, is our most important intelligence target and our mott neglectedintelligence target. Our traditional intelligence community and our more conventionalgovernment information community both appear reluctant to take on the hard issuesof honestly evaluating the larger context within which we export munitions, keep theprice of gasoline under two dollars a gallon, permit unfettered gang warfare andexploitation within our immigrant communities, and so on. At what point are we goingto establish an architecture for integrating Federal, state, and local data about thenatural environment and for producing useful strategic analyses about specific political,economic, and cultural issues? The following paraphrased observation by EllenSeidman, Special Assistant to the President on the National Economic Council, isinstructive:

CIA reports only focus on foreign economic conditions. They don't do domesticeconomic conditions and so I cannot get a straegic nalyi that compares andcontrasts trengths and wcaknsses of the industries I am responsible for. On theother hand, Treasury, Commerce, and the Fed are terrible at the business ofintelligence-they don't know how to produce intelligence.2

Taken in combination, what we do out of ignorance to our environment each daythrough our existing energy, trade, defense, housing, transportation, and educationpolicies is far worse than a whole series of Chernobylh.

Finally, if the nation is to evolve, if it is to "harness the distributed intelligence ofthe Nation," as Vice President Al Gore has taken to saying in his many speeches onthe National Information Infrastructure, then we must come to grips with the fact thatwe are "losing our mind" as a nation and that education isthe "boot camp" for nationalintelligence. We must revitalize our educational system, including corporate trainingand continuing education programs, and realize that openness is a powerful catalystfor bringing to bear the combined intelligence of every citizen and resident. Insteadof "National Intelligence" (spies and satellites) bearing the burden for informing policy,we should rely upon "national intelligence" (smart people) and use our distributednetwork of educated scholars, workers, information brokers, journalists, civil servants,

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security in the information age, require a depth and breadth of commitment toinformation as a commodity; to information au a substitute for time, space, capital,and labor. Information-applied information-is vital to both our defense and ourprosperity.

Connectivity is but one of the four major elements of what must soon become aNational Irformation Strategy. For those counseling the incremental approach,"connectivity today, content tomorrow," one must say: it will be too late. The fragilityof our position in the world, in terms of brain drain," budget deficit, and electronicsecurity, all require that we establish a four-point integrated program, as outlined below,immediately.

* Connectivity. Such a strategy should build upon the Nl as its technicalfoundation, but provide for three additional elements:

* Content. Existing government programs, under the auspices of a NationalInformation Foundation within the White House, should provide incentives forall elements of the information continuum (K-12, universities, libraries, business,information brokers, media, government, defense, and intelligence) to put contentonline; only in this way can we establish a robust national "information commons"and give Robert Reich's symbolic analysts something other than a starvation dietIt is vital that we establish a means of nurturing distributed centers of excellencethroughout our nation in all topical areas, providing all sectors with incentivesto place encyclopedic information into the 'information commons" and, thus,stimulating productivity. Just S billion a year invested in this program could yieldenormous productivity and competitiveness gains across our entire private sector.Within government, we should dramatically acclerate NTIS involvement instructuring and digitizing information now in the possession of the governmentbut not .-vailable to the public.

· Coordi, ation. Using a body similar to those now orchestrating Nil technicalissues. focus on resource management across government and private sectorboundaries in both technical and nontechnical (content) arenas. There is no goodreason why hundreds of major organizations should be wasting approximatelyS2 billion a year creating hundreds of variations of a basic multimedia analysisworkstation. There is no good reason why hundreds of corporations and otherorganizations should be wasting enormous sums collecting and processing thesame encyclopedic information about foreign countries, companies, andcapabilities. Presidential leadership would make a difference and save the nationbillions of dollars annually, not only within government but across the privatesector.

* Communications and Computer Security, We have a house built. over ainkcholel The vulnerabilities of our national telecommunications infratructure

to interruption of services as well as destruction, degradation, and theft of dataae such that experts feel comfortable in predicting that-unless we are able toestablish a major Presidential program in this arena-we will see a series ofenormously costly electronic attacks on our major financial and industrialorganizations, generally undertaken by individuals who stand to benefit financiallyfrom degraded or interrupted performance. The current generation of systems

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engineers was not raised in an environment where security was a necessary elementof design. At every level, through every node, we are wide open-and in anetworked environment, one open house contaminates the next.

Such an integrated program could be establijhed using exiting resources. The costsavings from the elimination of redundant and counterproductive investments ininformation collection and information technology acros government departments andinto the private sector would also make a substantive difference against the defcit.2

CONCLUSIONWe are a smart people today, but a dumb nation Our national security and our nationalattractiveness as a site for international investment which permiu our citizens to prosperarc both at risk. We have no alternative but to completely redefine the role ofgovernment to emphasize its responsibility for the nurturing of our national informationcommons, and to redefine national intelligence so as to create a Virtual IntelligenceCommunity in which every citizen is a collector, producer, and consumer of intelligence.To do this, we must have a National Information Strategy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Lee Felentein of the Interval Resarch Corporation is the oriinator of the term informationcommons." He can be reched at (415) 34-0857 or <3mcintervLcom>.

L2 I am indebted Lo M. Katrina Swuon, PhL of Lurd University. who brough: to my atention thework on 'National Security & National Compedtiven: Open Source Sohtionr" Int' ti g , herviews are consisent with thoe of Secrtay of Labor Roben Reich, who define= "U.S. companie'u those that employ U.S. citzen and pay U.S. tax. See Ln Oxelheim, "Foreign Dirct Invertnentand the Liberalltion of Capital Movements in the Global Rie for Foreign Direat i mnm,' inProspctsfor the Fute, edied by Lan OxeIheim (Berin: Springler-Veri, 1993).

3. 'HEcken are not the thrat. As [ have noted on many ocaiown, hacken au a national reourO becauethy et forcing us to aeknowledge that "he emperor i naked.' Sherry Turkice in 7> Second SFeoComnpues and the Hwman Spht (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984) xmines the oriiim of hcn"t MIT and demonrate conchusivy tha the backer etic i identical to 'te riFht suf sociatd with

the early autronaut-both push the edg of the envelope trivin for exfllne The aaul "thret' toour nationl information infratuctu beg with bad engineering and culmnt primly in wthorddmn doing unauthazr thin%. David loove, lei Sep, and Wiliam Vo Storh note in ConpusCrm' A Crimwfgth' Hndbook (ebaopol, CA: O'teiy A Afoci& t, 1995) that eomic lo1.uodated with oomputers a atributed u followm: S% to human error aad 20% to physica dptidonsuch as natuna diuaem or power fauel (one could ay, poor computer degn), 10% to dkIhomnemployee; 9% to dfatuled employee; 4% to virus; and only 1-39 to outsider auiaI.

4. Tbe seinal work in th area is Winn Schwarau, fonrmatlon Werfare: Chao on the 5actrontSuprhghway (New York: Thunder Mouth Pru. 1994). Thoughtful papers on the vulnrability ofspefic networks include Maj Gerald R Rust, Taking Down Teloommunicationa (School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies, 1993); Msj Thomas E. Oriffith Jr., *Straei Attack of National ElotrcalSyftema" (School of Advanced Airpower Studie, October 1994); and H.D. Arnold, J. Hyuki, J.Keeney. and A Cameron, Tarpting Financial Systems a Cente of Gravity: 'Low inenmiy' to 'NoIntmenty' Conflict," Dfmn AWlyjis, 10(2, 1994).

S. One maor U.S. government agency, extrmelycompetent in computinintercpted all eommunicaionand computing hardwar and softwar re hing iu loading docks for a period of one yr. It found500 sparate vinues contained in ahrink.wrapped product coming straight from the factory.

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6, The Director of the Canadia Seurfy Wd Ielinec Svice, Ward Eloeck ha. ned publicl tht80W of the input for fnished intllgxence products oom from open sourou; the Candn rvicoe alsomakes it a point to publish unclasidf iwntUIgte report. Although the U.S. intalliaoe communnyoaly aknowlodge 4096 a the offkia contibWion of open sourcs, the former Drector for Sadeo& Technoloy hs nated publicly thu the i e is actally 709% h i pouible be mispoke.

7. Although everal unaon, including PNe Druncei, hav addremd rdnventon and rwngieeringimperativu in reltion to the bformaion a none have done more to help public uIderandi thanAlvin and Heidi Tofer with their books APowSh: X.owwieg, Wealt h, "d Vkne a t the *dof the 21n CiNury (New York: Buanam 1990) and War ad Ann. f': Survivea the ewn ofthe2In Conn y (Boston MA: Little Brown, 1993).

8. Poinu of coanta a , repectively, Critopher Fit u (408) 647-4193, Robet Heibcl at (814) 8L22117,Mad Gooffrey Fox t (315) 443-1722

9. Poinu of contt ut, mpectivrb', Brenda Biley a (303) 758-030, D vid Bender at (202) 234700,and Churl Baley, Jr.. u (713) 743.9t4.

10. During annua conferene of middkeged hacker, popularly know us the Lake Tahoe Confence,there was a discuion of what return on iawtcn:e one recdved from volunteering information intothe Iontnt. The geners conuens wsu tha for every piece of nformaion that one conribued tothe ommons, 100 pioc were recivd in rtrn, of which 10 were atually weful. Ten-ao-w returon inve<.t--t hiiu lrtnruive.

11. Poins of cowt ae forOxford Anaycla. Robin Porteu t (44 86) 261600; for FIhN'/SVPJoepbCoritore u (212) 64-4500; for Kroll Aociat, Tom Fedorek a (212) 593-1000; for Burwel Enwrprws,Joane Piolino u (713) 46-3500 ext. 2353; for LEX1S-NEXIS, Jcfrwy Kratttnmmker a (513) 865177; a for ISt Frank Spieker t (21S) 3860100, extrion 1374.

12. Jame A. Baker, III, The PoIrtcs of Dplomacy: Revowfon, War & Pce. 199-1992 (New York:O.P. Putnam's Sow, 1995), p. 154.

13. Colin Powet, My Amerten Journy (Random House, S19), p. 293.14. Thir excidtn story, by the princpal invtiptor at Lo Alamo N?'ionaJ Lbontory. is containd in

Jtme Holdn-Rhode, Sharng the Sccreu Open Sowur InswUltc and trh Wo on Drus(Albuquerque: Univenity of New Mexico Pre, 1994). The vrious laboatories of the Depatmrneof Eoery are, in fac, the ation' most important open sourc Lntellieoe aust, and very importaneumpl of why we can no longer afford to compartmen claified intll-gee apanr from reat ofpovtrnmtat information.

15. NTIS u a self-4utainlng rpnization under the overdiht of the Deprtment of Commece which playsa ignfLc-, t role in helping the Pederal governant incr the dieminatlon of unclauiioformtion to the privere sctor. The ening and euUy scalable global muti-sedic dis minutirncapability, including an innovative parothip with Kinko'l, i the Efn ntep in briansi 21itceaturyttandards of ocountabilty xnd aoelbily to governmnt recordi creatd t taxpayer expene. NTSi a criticl plyer in helping 1 element of the Federal government, on volutary bu, emublthaccesmabb acd coutable electronic reroon; embed bibliop!phic ructur in their record; etabliha online presce through PedWord; uad dnmuiclly imarese public at to useul iformation.

16. My keyote speech to the Asocition for Global Srtic Iaformation (AOSI) oomauid many ofthese opertionl cocepts and bu been reprinted u "Aoe Th:e Theheory and Prctic of CompetitorlatcUlien" wJowurl of GSf(Ju1y 1994). My mont developed work in ths m, funded by the Prefch

ovenument, i my white paper, "'Aom: Theory and Prctic of Intelligece ia te Age of Information"(October 26, 993).

17. Paul Evan Peters, Executive Ditor of the Coalition for Nworked Information, is the oridnaorof ths co ptept. He can be reaeod at (202) 296S5098.

18. Kevin Klly, CO of ControL te K aof fNeo.3old CivfMrtfon (Readin, MA Addson-W ,ey1994), provide a brilliant epotiton of why, in a vry complx global systm driven by information,organic wrlfbealing and relativly autonomou elementu must be accepted ad rtud-it I impossibleto control complexity in a centraied preplanned ftdhon. Th oo aonered about the frailty of owriWorma'on lafutructure would do well to red Kelyl work, u well u one predating him by 10 yer.ChUee Pwrowl Normal A cciddnts: L*M A with lfh-RIsk TechndoloW(New York: Baei Books, 1984).Simple tsytem have inge points of failure ey to dia4noe. Complex ynsem have muiple poinuof failure dr'tSlc to diarpoe. Today we have a onrtellaion of very complex information ystet.

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19. We kesp forgeting that booh were .caily wrien ua disertations or ared roughly 10 ywas beoreially appearing in print article Ire pgenlly 10 mormi or so old; and een newpaper storimest let a day if not 3-10 days okLi Withi auademc cid , it b wll-known that if ot ms 1 reodving

thb drafts of works in propes aad the preprn, it is simply not pouibbe to be a rious oampeitorin the rld.

20. At the itrategic level, cvil llies. pogrphic location, and military tainabllity am critical At theopational evel civil intabity, VoVrphkc mourm, and mity Albilitr y aety porant. At thetcal lcvl, civil psychology, pognph c trran and miltary relability datrnine outcome s At thetochnical level, vil infratruafure, pographic atmophere, and military lihUllty a the foudmtonfor planninn and employment. This 1I an oriiul analysi model developed by the author while rvinga the Deputy Dirtor and Oeior civiHan u the new Maine Corps Inteipecem Center in Quatico,Virginia At the tie, examinin al producs from the Ccnral Intclligenc Apncy and the DeeneInteliraoce Apncy then in hand, the author ditcovrd tha none of the products upported a pecif&detoion and tha none of the produc wu related to any speck level of analyti. Everything wa

eneric, topickL a *"lpeshot,' virtually usmlen to a pohcymrkw or coanader.21. Tha sction dnra on a fuU-lenth ticle, E3i: Ehi Ecology, Evolution, Lad Intellne,'ptblisb

In the hok Earth Review (FPaI 1992).22. Althoug Alvin and Heidi Toffler h called me "the Vrear enemy of secrecy' n the United Sta.e

(in their book Wia ad Ai- War), that s not quite corrt. I am an enemy of unnmuca y merecybecause it corsu a reat deal-not only in dolla but also n trm of oppomurtun s. My complet viewsarc s forth in my "Tetimony and Commenu on Executn Order 12356, 'Ntional SecuritylnformAlon.'" provided by invittion to th Preaddatil Inter-Agency Tak Forc on Ntional SecurtyInformation, Department of Jusice, June 9, 1993. believe that we hould all be trong advocatsof "no claiication without jutlctiroa."

23. He wu spekdng in 1990 to a poup of govenent employa selected for increeed reponibility andatending a Hrvard Executive Program Cited in Thomr P. Coaklcy (d.), C'I: Isuea of Commandaad Control (National Defense Universty, 1991), p. 68.

24. Seidman wau spekia to the Open Sowe Lunch Club on January 1, 1994. Her obeevation ersubeequently rported in OSS hoticu 94001 dated February 21, 1994.

25. Amon my many peches and publicatios in thi area, the followia are especially pertinet: "NationlIatellnoe Stnregy-Neded lnitiatves," speech to the Naional Deense Univenity PoundationlNatonal Industrial Security Assodtion Symposium on The Global Informaton Exploion A Thto National Security, May 16, 199S (with AMn Toffler, Bo Cutter, Emett Paip, Robert Johnson,and Bill Studenn); lNatlonl Intellipoe--The Community Tomorrow?.," speech to the SecaityAfairs Support Aodtion Spring Symposium, National Seurity Apncy, April 20, 1995; PrivateEnterprise Intelliec: lu Potential Contrbution to National Security." paper proeeted to theCanadian Intellignce Community Conference on Inteullnce Analsi and Asaument, October 29,1994; and "A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National Intelligce Capailitie" Inhnational Journal Qfhuallwc ond CoMwrintetwh n (Sumer 1993). I have also provided invited tstimony to theCommision on Intefllpne an the House Permnmt Select Committe on atellignce.

26. One authority, Paul Strassmann, etimate tht in information housekepin coU alone S22 bflioncould be saved over seven yten. This I apart from policy vintp derived from improved intelliiencetuppot. Strusmann ha been Director of Defena Informuion and Chief nformation Offer of theXerox Corporation and other major companies. Hi books, including Th PoUler of h/rorwtioManatement. Te Bwinru Value of Computr, and Information PayQff, arc all exceptionl.

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OSS '96: THE CONFERENCE Proceedings, 1996 Volume II, Fifth Internatinal

Symposium Global Security & Global Competitiveess: Open - Link PagePrevious Mr. Robert D. Steele, Open Sources and the Virtual Intelligence Community, Invited Presentation to the Annual

Meeting of the U.S. Intelligence Community's Advanced Information Processing and Analysis Steering Group, March1996

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