O

Oe

ES

a

ARRA

KEPLE

1

aedahiiRpopUioawtst

h2

Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 1–11

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Research & Social Science

jo ur nal homepage: www.elsev ier .co m/locate /erss

riginal research article

pening the black box of energy security: A study of conceptions oflectricity security in the United Kingdom

mily CoxPRU (Science Policy Research Unit), University of Sussex, 72 Baden Road, Brighton BN2 4DP, UK

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 11 January 2016eceived in revised form 17 June 2016ccepted 21 June 2016

eywords:nergy securityerceptions

a b s t r a c t

Despite much literature on energy security, the term continues to resist a commonly-accepted definition.Nevertheless, policy decisions are frequently made on the basis of ‘improving energy security’, despite thelack of any clear understanding of what improving energy security actually means. Therefore this paperexplores the meaning of energy security for key experts in the UK energy sector, with a particular focuson the security of electricity systems in the context of a low-carbon transition. A set of 22 energy securityissues is discussed with 25 experts from across the energy sector in the UK, in order to get a grasp onwhich aspects of energy security are felt to be most important, and to discover the underlying concepts

ow-carbon transitionlectricity

which are used by experts when making or justifying these choices. The results from the interviewsshow that there is a real need to attempt to take into account multiple competing and context-specificviews on energy security, instead of trying to close the discussion down around a small number of simplequantifiable indicators or metrics. The results also show that there is no clearly discernible alignmentbetween experts’ perspectives and the type of organisation for which they work.

Crown Copyright © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

The term ‘energy security’ has become commonplace in bothcademic and policy discussions. However, there exists a consid-rable array of overlapping and competing conceptualisations, andespite much literature on the subject the term resists a commonly-ccepted definition [2,13,24,50,97]. Nevertheless, energy securityas become a key driver and justification of much energy policy

n recent years, driven by concerns over resource nationalism andnstability in key export regions such as the Middle East, China andussia, concerns over fossil resource concentration, and increasingressure on energy systems to undergo a fundamental transition inrder to reduce carbon emissions [12,13,21,47,68]. Therefore thisaper explores the meaning of energy security for key experts in theK energy sector, with a particular focus on the electricity system

n the context of a low-carbon transition. The aim is to get a graspn what aspects of energy security are felt to be most important,nd to discover the underlying concepts which are used by expertshen making or justifying these choices. This paper thus aspires

o generate an in-depth and transparent discussion which does noteek to close down the diversity of views, but instead seeks to openhem up to debate and to policy attention.

E-mail addresses: e.cox@sussex.ac.uk, emcoxsax@hotmail.com

ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.06.020214-6296/Crown Copyright © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

As shall be elaborated in the following section, energy securityissues are often context-specific, therefore it makes sense for theanalysis to focus on one specific country [13]. The UK is chosen forthe focus of this paper because its energy system is in a major periodof transition, driven by a number of factors. The UK is entering anew phase of net fossil fuel imports due to declining domestic pro-duction, which has increased policy concerns regarding resourcenationalism and resource concentration globally [68,74]. The elec-tricity supply infrastructure is ageing and will require a significantproportion of electricity supply capacity to be replaced by the mid-2020s; the retirement of older fossil fuel power plant capacity hasled to an erosion of capacity margins in the power sector [89,94].Additionally, the UK is under pressure to decarbonise its energysystem: the 2008 Climate Change Act established the world’s firstlegally-binding climate change target [32]. These multiple issueshave meant that energy security has risen extremely rapidly up thepublic and policy agenda in the UK in recent years, and unlike manyother European countries, the UK has a specific energy securitystrategy [34]. Nevertheless, many other industrialised countries,both in Europe and further afield, are experiencing similar pres-sures on their energy systems, meaning that the UK can act as auseful basis for exploring energy security in other national contexts.

The following section of the paper introduces the literature onenergy security, with a focus on conceptualisations and the evolu-tion of the term in recent years, and also introduces the focus on the

2 Socia

stftfqtvcwar

2

2

[csaIraKdcs[

as(oiawweu“tatatgseet

aaeaiHu

3. Methodology

E. Cox / Energy Research &

ecurity of electricity systems in a low-carbon context upon whichhis paper is based. Section 3 then outlines the methodology usedor conducting and analysing interviews with energy experts. Sec-ion 4 presents the results from the interviews in two parts: firstlyocusing on seven central themes which were identified from theualitative interview data, and secondly focusing on the quanti-ative results and the degree of alignment between respondents’iews and the organisation for which they work. Section 5 dis-usses and analyses the results in more detail and in relation to theider literature, and also outlines some limitations of the study and

reas for further research. Finally, Section 6 concludes and offersecommendations for policy.

. Literature review

.1. Conceptualising energy security

Energy security is a politicised and multifaceted topic22,24,25,97]. There is a considerable array of overlapping andompeting conceptualisations, and despite much literature on theubject the term resists a commonly-accepted definition. Therere some widely-cited definitions available, including that of thenternational Energy Agency (IEA) which states that energy secu-ity denotes “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources atn affordable price” [57: 1]. However, as pointed out by Müller-raenner [82], when it comes to such definitions the devil is in theetails: for instance, what exactly does ‘affordable’ mean? The con-ept of energy security is frequently used to justify various policiesimultaneously, even if these policies appear to be contradictory73]. As pointed out by Joskow:

There is one thing that has not changed since the early 1970s. Ifyou cannot think of a reasoned rationale for some policy basedon standard economic reasoning then argue that the policy isnecessary to promote ‘energy security’ [63: 10].

Because of the challenges that this creates for both academicnd policy discussions, multiple approaches for defining energyecurity have been proposed. For example, several earlier paperse.g. [5,53,67]) proposed analytical frameworks based around a setf core goals of ‘secure’ energy systems, often highlighting the

mportance of dimensions such as availability, affordability andccessibility. However, soon numerous similar yet distinct frame-orks existed, with no real means of reaching consensus on whichas deemed most useful [97]. An inductive attempt to identify key

nergy security indicators by asking experts came up with a rathernmanageable total of 372 possible indicators [98]. Despite thesegrowing pains”, Cherp and Jewell [22: 420] suggest that concep-ual and practical attempts should still be made to move towards

useful universal definition. Meanwhile, others have argued thathe complex and contested nature of energy security means that

universal definition is probably not a practical goal [24,97]. It ishis latter view which informs this paper, the aim of which is not toenerate an agreed-upon definition of energy security, but rather tohed more light on the diversity of perspectives amongst key energyxperts. In doing so, this paper aims to demonstrate not only thatnergy security means different things to different people, but alsoo show what it means and to whom.

As pointed out by Cherp and Jewell [22], vital energy systemsnd their vulnerabilities are not just objective phenomena; they arelso political constructs which are defined and prioritised by differ-nt social actors. It has been shown that energy security concerns

re dynamic and evolve as circumstances change over time, reflect-ng dominant discourses and political economic trends [2,25,29,74].owever, it is important to emphasise that despite differentnderstandings, there still exist certain physical, geographical and

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11

system characteristics which somewhat constrain the socially andpolitically constructed nature of what we understand by ‘energysecurity’. To use the phraseology of Stirling [103,104], a complexand contested topic such as energy security does not necessarilymean that ‘anything goes’. Because of such constraints, concep-tions of energy security tend to be highly context-dependent, andare strongly correlated with national energy policies and stateimperatives [2,12,100]. As stated by Ciuta [25], we now need toconsider the manner in which different actors and assumptionscluster around different meanings of energy security.

2.2. The security of low-carbon electricity systems

The security of electricity systems is important because of thecentral nature of electricity systems to society, not only in the UKbut everywhere in the world. The energy security literature stilltends to display a prevalent focus on securing supplies of oil andgas [22,24]; this is largely due to the fact that the literature address-ing energy security in the sense that we know it today first appearedas a response to the second oil shock in 1979 [37,38,96]. However,electricity now represents an equally significant (and growing)proportion of energy use [24]: projections suggest that electric-ity will be the fastest growing energy sector in the future [56], andelectricity and heat production is the largest single source of green-house gas emissions globally [58]. Efforts are already underway toelectrify heating and transport systems in order to make deepercuts to emissions from these sectors in the future, meaning thatfindings relating to electricity security could eventually becomea key component of efforts to decarbonise heating and transport.The need for second-by-second balancing of electricity supply anddemand means that electricity security operates on extremely shorttimescales, usually addressed in the physical sciences and engi-neering literature; however, electricity is simultaneously subjectto longer-term risks such as resource concentration and climatechange, usually addressed in the social sciences literature [21].Electricity is therefore an interesting case in that it encompassesthe range of disciplines within which energy security is rooted, aswell as the full range of timescales across which energy securityoperates.

Conceptions of energy security have recently become linkedto environmental issues, in light of an emerging new paradigmof environmental and social concerns, and numerous conceptionsof energy security now include an ‘environmental sustainabil-ity’ dimension [42,55,67,83]. Emerging normative and legislativeimperatives to cut carbon emissions are having a fundamentalimpact on the context in which energy security is now viewed, andunderstandings of energy security in the future will likely need toexist within this emerging new paradigm. It is also widely under-stood that there may be certain synergies and trade-offs betweenvarious objectives when attempting to move towards energy sys-tems which are low-carbon, secure and affordable [28,47,59,91,99].However, there have been few attempts to explore conceptualisa-tions of energy security in a low-carbon context, and to attemptto identify which aspects of ‘security’ are prioritised by energyexperts when considering the imperative to meet affordability andlow-carbon objectives.

Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with25 experts from the UK energy sector. Experts were selected fromsix different types of organisation within the UK energy sector:

Socia

eewpprrpikits

ais[rdibaabteieu[eTfaabtudbb

wactUwrafMsat2nm

edfc

E. Cox / Energy Research &

nergy utilities, NGOs/civil society,1 think tanks, policy/regulation,lectricity network companies, and academia. The intervieweesere selected using a combination of purposive and snowball sam-

ling (see Ref. [108]). The vast majority of the interviewees holdositions relating to either research or policy and strategy in theirespective organisations (see Appendix A in Supplementary mate-ials for details); all have specific expertise on energy security. Theurpose of interviewing experts rather than simply energy users

s an attempt to explore the views of those who a) have existingnowledge of energy systems and energy security and the complex-

ties therein, and b) may have some influence on policy processes,hrough direct involvement or participation in research and con-ultations.

The interviews asked the participants to give their opinions on set of pre-defined topics relating to the security of an electric-ty system in the context of a low-carbon transition, following aimilar methodology to Knox-Hayes et al. [66] and Sovacool et al.100]. To set up the pre-defined topics, 22 key issues for the secu-ity of electricity systems were selected from an in-depth review ofimensions and indicators used in the existing energy and electric-

ty security literature (beginning with the 372 indicators identifiedy Sovacool and Mukherjee [98], and narrowed down considerablyccording to issues which primarily relate to electricity systemsnd a low-carbon context). The topics were chosen to reflect a veryroad understanding of ‘security’, including aspects of environmen-al sustainability and societal concerns, in order to interrogate thextent to which the experts agreed with this broader understand-ng. Therefore participants were asked to comment on issues ofnvironmental sustainability such as carbon emissions and watersage, and societal issues such as public acceptability (see e.g.44,78,100]), as well as some of the more common indicators ofnergy security such as diversity and fuel availability (e.g. [59,67]).opics relating to affordability were also included, to reflect theact that the majority of widely-cited definitions include an afford-bility dimension (e.g. [12,54,67,117]). Table 1 shows the issuesnd indicators discussed during the interviews, and the rationaleehind their inclusion. The purpose of using pre-defined topics waso attempt to tease out definitions of energy security from concretenderpinnings; if asked simply to define energy security, respon-ents may return answers based on common definitions which mayear little relation to their complex, nuanced and potentially veryroad views.

During the hour-long semi-structured interviews, participantsere asked to discuss each of the 22 energy security issues in turn,

nd to state how important they felt each is for the security of a low-arbon electricity system, and why. Interviewees were also askedo talk more generally about what they see as the main risks forK electricity security in the short, medium and long-term, andhat measures they feel are most important for maximising secu-

ity in a low-carbon context. The purpose of the interviews is not tottempt to generate an agreed-upon definition or set of indicatorsor measuring energy security (which as shown in Sovacool and

ukherjee [98] runs the risk of generating an unmanageably largeet of issues and indicators). Rather, the purpose is to recognisend clarify the preferences and priorities of different actors ando explore their implications. As stated by Cherp and Jewell [22:

20], “The point of conceptualizing a difficult political concept isot to eliminate different interpretations but rather to enable theireaningful analysis, comparison and dialogue”.

1 Energy co-ops could technically be viewed as either ‘NGOs’ or ‘utilities’. How-ver, in light of the fact that employees of energy co-ops are often ideologicallyriven, and frequently work as volunteers for many years without earning a wage

rom the organisation, it was decided that they have more in common with otherivil society actors than with the utilities.

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11 3

After the interviews, the transcripts were coded in accordancewith recognised methods for thematic coding analysis, which is amethodology for identifying key cross-cutting themes and issuesfrom a set of interview transcripts: transcripts are first codedaccording to an unrestricted number of key words and topics;which are then grouped to find areas of commonality; contentionor repetition; and finally the main topics are grouped together intoa manageable number of core themes (see Burnard et al. [18]). Thecore themes identified from the interviews are presented in Sec-tion 4.1. Furthermore; during the interviews the respondents wereasked to rank each topic on a scale from 1 to 5; with 5 denot-ing ‘critical importance’ and 1 denoting ‘minimal importance’; inorder to elicit quantitative as well as qualitative data. The rank-ings are used to generate visual representations of the responses ofeach participant to each energy security issue (see Appendix A inSupplementary materials). Representing the responses in this wayenables an overview of the extent to which stakeholders from thesame types of organisation hold similar views. The small samplesize means that statistical tests of correlation should not be used;therefore this analysis is best carried out using visual representa-tion.

4. Results

4.1. Qualitative results: seven major themes

Seven key themes emerged from the thematic coding analysisof the interview transcripts. These themes were identified becausethey were mentioned by several interviewees (usually from a num-ber of different types of organisation), and because they werementioned in relation to a number of different topics. The firstfour themes discussed here (Sections 4.1.1–4.1.4) represent areasin which the majority of the respondents were in agreement witheach other on a particular issue. The last three themes (Sections4.1.5–4.1.7) represent areas in which there was lots of contentionbetween different respondents on a particular issue.

4.1.1. Energy security depends on securing adequate investment,which depends on political stability

One of the most common cross-cutting issues amongst therespondents was the importance of securing adequate investment.A majority of respondents noted this as one of the most criticalaspects of ensuring energy security on all timescales, and therewere concerns that the UK (and in fact much of the EU) is currentlyat risk of a lack of investment in energy infrastructure. There wasgeneral agreement that in order for this to happen, investors mustbe given long-term assurances that their investments will pay off.There was a common perception amongst respondents that thereis currently a lack of political certainty, especially over whether toprioritise certain parts of the ‘energy trilemma’2; and the fate ofthe UK’s decarbonisation targets as the transition becomes morechallenging. As stated by two respondents:

There has to be a conversation about it, and it really needs tocome from the top down, it needs to be made clear that we’ve gotto do something about climate change and this is what we aredoing, take it or leave it. (Respondent F, head of policy, energysupplier)

The plan. . . There isn’t technically a plan. The carbon target,that’s 2050 as we know, but there will need to be plans in orderto achieve the transition because right now we don’t really have

2 The ‘energy trilemma’ posits that energy should be physically secure, affordableand low-carbon.

4 E. Cox / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 1–11

Table 1Energy security issues discussed, rationale for their inclusion, and relevant literature.

Topic Reason for inclusion

Public approval Constraints upon system transitions are often related to socio-political issues, such as theacceptability of various technological options [6,90,92].

Levels of public participation and engagement Increasing people’s participation in energy projects can reduce opposition, because people are morelikely to object if they feel that energy solutions are being ‘imposed’ on them from outside [10,45,61].

Likelihood of disruption due to direct opposition High levels of general public support don’t always mean that specific projects are approved of, andmany installations which have high national approval ratings fail to gain support at the local level,sometimes resulting in the failure of the project [9,23,26,118].

Diversity of fuel types in the energy mix Diversity is a common indicator of energy security; diversity can act as a hedge against unpredictabledisruptions [51,71,91,102].

Import dependence Import dependence is a common indicator of energy security (see e.g. [59,67,70,91,111].Diversity of import routes and suppliers This is another aspect of diversity, also linked to improving the security of imported fuels (see e.g.

[6,59,86].Stability of major export countries and routes This is a common indicator of energy security in a geopolitical sense (see e.g. [72,86].Annual electricity bills to consumers This relates to ‘affordability’, to reflect the fact that the majority of widely-cited definitions of energy

security include an affordability dimension (e.g. [12,54,67,117].Cost of electricity generation Another aspect of affordability, often used to compare the affordability of electricity systems (e.g.

[67,81,91].Cost of upgrades to the distribution networks The vast majority of actual supply shortfalls occur due to problems on the networks [15,16]. Networks

will need to be upgraded if the electricity system is to undergo a low-carbon transition, which couldbe expensive [84,93,106].

Cost of upgrades to the transmission networks As above.Impact on levels of fuel poverty A key aspect of affordability is equity, to which fuel poverty is highly connected. Fuel poverty is an

issue which pushes to the broader edges of what is commonly meant by ‘energy security’, in order toexplore broader societal and equity issues.

Carbon emissions This is an aspect of long-term environmental sustainability; such aspects are included to interrogatethe extent to which experts agree with broader understandings of energy security. Climate changecaused by carbon emissions could generate multiple risks to energy systems [42,77,119,107].

Depletion of major fuels (gas, coal etc) This is a commonly-cited security issue, especially when viewing energy security a long-term context(see e.g. [6,19,67,78]. Also an important aspect of long-term environmental sustainability.

Depletion of secondary materials (metals, rare earths etc) This is an emerging security issue, particularly relevant for a low-carbon context due to the increasinguse of rare earth elements and metals for low-carbon technologies (see e.g. [49,80,101].

Water usage Water is crucial for cooling power generation. Water requirements for power generation may comeincreasingly under strain in a long-term context, due to pressure on water resources and impacts ofclimate change (see e.g. [30,64,69,109].

De-rated capacity margins This is a common indicator of electricity security (see e.g. [33,85,89,94].Oversupply Oversupply could be a security risk, because it risks making initial investments in generation capacity

economically unviable because of the economic unattractiveness to generators of operating theirplants at low capacity factors [7,8].

Response and Reserve for Grid balancing This is an indicator of flexibility and resilience. No matter how secure the system, unexpected changesin the supply/demand balance may still occur, and it is important that the system is able to respondquickly to mitigate the impact of such shocks [65,105].

Flexible demand This is another indicator of flexibility and resilience; demand-side as well as supply-side flexibilitymay be important for balancing electricity systems (see [39,40,65].

Electricity storage This is another aspect of electricity system flexibility. Storage can provide responsive electricity, andmay be especially important in a low-carbon transition as a back-up to intermittent renewable supply[52,105].

Electricity interconnection This is another aspect of electricity system flexibility. Interconnection can provide responsiveay b

ly [88

icwcs

4d

oi

electricity, and mrenewable supp

one beyond 2020. (Respondent U, department head, regulatorybody)

Some respondents went a step further and stated that this polit-cal feasibility would only be achievable in the context of a ‘socialontract’ for the transition (in other words, shared norms and idealshich underlie broad public acceptance for a transition to a low-

arbon electricity system). Respondent O (strategy director, NGO)aid:

I do think that this social contract aspect of sustainability isimportant, which is that if you want to maintain security youwill need to invest and if you need to invest than you do needto have the confidence that the public will come with you, andI think your risk of not having that buy-in becomes quite core.

.1.2. What is important depends on the spatial context and the

egree of decentralisation

Another major cross-cutting theme which emerged was thatf the importance of context. Spatial context was felt to be very

mportant by many of the respondents, because some measures can

e especially important in a low-carbon transition as a back-up to intermittent,105].

be highly beneficial for electricity security in certain locations, butcan generate insecurity if located in the wrong places. The nationalcontext was also perceived to be important. Furthermore, a largenumber of respondents felt that the level of decentralisation is crit-ical for security and for the relative importance of the issues. Assuggested by respondent W (department head, network company):

You can conceive of a radically different vision of the future; avery decentralised world where most energy is being generatedlocally with local storage and lots of local micro grids with looseinterconnection. What determines local security of supply inthat world?

It was noted by three respondents that the distinction betweencentralised and decentralised energy security could create chal-lenges for designing a generic framework for comparing thesecurity of different scenarios, because it could be that many issues

or indicators are better suited for assessing the security of one orthe other. It was also noted that this could be the case for comparingthe security of different national contexts.

Socia

4d

dooe

pocSasoirwb

4e

mbtmTesbpp

baei

ceadqar

E. Cox / Energy Research &

.1.3. Realising the potential co-benefits of flexible demand andemand reduction is crucial

A large number of respondents mentioned the importance ofemand reduction and demand flexibility in relation to a numberf topics. In particular, demand-side response was seen as a pri-rity for ensuring electricity system flexibility and resilience. Forxample, respondent M (consultant, advisory body) said:

We’ve had this very active supply side since the beginning of theutility industry; what’s been idle is the demand side. If manage-ment of demand gets more involved, I think that’s the key.

The most important issue to the respondents seemed to be theotential co-benefits of measures to reduce demand. A majorityf respondents suggested that reduction of overall energy demandan in theory improve availability, affordability and sustainability.ome respondents also saw increased action on the demand-sides a potential means of improving public acceptability of the tran-ition. However, concerns were also raised about the challengesf realising widespread demand flexibility, in particular regard-

ng how to increase engagement on the part of consumers; someespondents argued that “better” engagement would be necessary,hereas others argued for increased automation of demand flexi-

ility.

.1.4. Difficult decisions must be made over which part of thenergy trilemma to prioritise

It was frequently noted by the respondents that several of theeasures for improving the security of an electricity system would

e unviable or more complicated in the event of a low-carbonransition. Thus respondents felt that the transition will involve

aking difficult choices, both for policy-makers and the public.here was no consensus on whether one particular side of thenergy ‘trilemma’ should be prioritised; however, it was frequentlyuggested that the biggest risk from a political perspective woulde the cost of achieving the transition, and whether or not peo-le would accept those costs. As stated by respondent N (associateartner, regulatory body):

If supply costs get so high that people can’t pay their bills thenthat is going to have a negative impact on security of supplyand you will also end up with political things happening thatwill then destabilise things.

Many respondents suggested that the political reality woulde that decarbonisation would probably be sacrificed first, beforevailability and affordability, especially in the event that there wasither a serious risk of the ‘lights going out’ or a noticeable increasen costs. One respondent said:

. . .ultimately when people make decisions about the trilemma,this [carbon emissions] is the one that gives up in preferenceto security of supply. But this is the one that we actually havea legal obligation to do, whatever that means. (Respondent W,department head, network company)

Another area in which many respondents noted the difficulthoices ahead was regarding the UK’s high reliability standard forlectricity. Although electricity security is commonly conceptu-lised as supply continuing to meet demand at a at all times of theay (the ‘predict-and-provide’ model), a number of respondentsuestioned whether this is realistic or desirable in the context of

highly challenging low-carbon transition. Respondent B (senioresearcher, University) said:

I just think that you can organise your electricity system in dif-ferent ways, so that you don’t have to have that peak, so youdon’t have to be so far in excess of that peak. . . But govern-ments have to be concerned about the public’s response, and

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11 5

the public is not used to power cuts anymore. We’re all spoilt,aren’t we?

Several respondents also suggested that politicians are currentlytoo accountable for losses of supply, which makes them err on theside of caution, and makes it highly unlikely that they will be willingto broach the subject of changing the way in which consumers inthe UK use electricity.

4.1.5. Disagreement over ‘affordability’ and ‘sustainability’dimensions

The interview discussions highlighted the fact that there aremajor challenges in assessing the security of an energy systembecause of high levels of disagreement over what is important forensuring energy security. This factor is further complicated by theaddition of the carbon reduction imperative. There was consider-able disagreement amongst the respondents as to what actuallyconstitutes energy security, with roughly half of the respondentsbelieving that affordability and environmental sustainability areintegral to security, whilst others believed that these are separateissues and should be thought of as trade-offs.

This disagreement manifested itself noticeably in considerablecontention over the majority of the issues discussed. The transcriptsrevealed that different participants seemed to be using differentcriteria for basing their responses. The two main viewpoints were:

a) The important issues are those which we have an imperative toaddress, either for normative reasons or because they representa current or future risk (according to the subjective viewpointof the respondent)

b) The important issues are those which are simple, direct and/orquantifiable.

A good example of this can be found in the responses regard-ing the most contentious topic, ‘fuel poverty’. Respondents whofelt that fuel poverty is critically important for energy securitymostly felt that it represents a real problem in the UK, and thereforefelt that improving energy security will necessitate mitigating fuelpoverty. For example:

You need to be affordable. Fuel poverty itself is a bit of a move-able feast how you assess it, but you can’t really run an energysystem where the poorest in the country can’t afford to access.(Respondent Q, civil servant, government department)

Fuel poverty I would put that as pretty important, because that’swhere you see the most potential to engage the public andthere’s a lot more of a moral argument. (Respondent M, Con-sultant, Advisory body)

On the other hand, several respondents stated that fuel povertyis too indirect and complex to act as a material part of a conceptu-alisation or assessment of energy security. For example:

I don’t think that there is a connection between fuel poverty andenergy security. I mean, you could stretch it I suppose. . . ButI’m going to say that it’s not a part of energy security, it’s partof something different. (Respondent K, research fellow, Univer-sity)

Well the thing about fuel poverty is, it’s actually shown almostno ability to influence the politics of energy over quite sometime. I suspect it’s because a lot of those people who are gen-uinely fuel poor don’t vote. (Respondent C, Scientist, NGO)

This split between different criteria being used as the basis for view-points was also apparent in discussions regarding a large number ofother issues, particular those relating to affordability and environ-mental sustainability. Meanwhile, simplicity and directness were

6 Socia

cid

4‘

tetaawai

ri

td

scale according to how important they felt each to be for electricitysecurity in a low-carbon context, with 1 denoting minimal impor-

Fi

E. Cox / Energy Research &

ommonly given as key reasons for the importance of traditionalndicators such as de-rated capacity margins, diversity and importependence.

.1.6. Respondents don’t agree about the importance oftraditional’ indicators

This theme also relates to respondents’ views regarding howo conceptualise energy security. Respondents did not agree withach other on the importance of some indicators which are tradi-ionally used to assess energy security such as import dependencend diversity. Several respondents stated that import dependencend diversity are some of the major things which spring to mindhen they consider energy security, and spoke of the need to hedge

gainst unpredictable risks by reducing dependence or by increas-ng diversity. For example:

To me, this is the nub of the debate. We can’t plant the whole ofthe decarbonisation agenda on one technology, only to find outit can’t be deployed or we’ve misunderstood public acceptabil-ity, or we can’t get cost reduction. (Respondent V, civil servant,government department)

You can’t control what another country’s going to do. So you’reincreasing risk by relying on imports. (Respondent T, director,energy co-op)

However, there was much disagreement on this point, and someespondents were very sceptical about the usefulness of these twondicators; for example:

It’s one of these dogmas at the minute, that everyone says,“future system—diverse, diverse, diverse”. I’m less sure aboutthat. I look at France for example, that has what seems to be avery secure system, has been for years and years, and it’s aboutas un-diverse a system as you could get. You need a mix thatworks. . . (Respondent A, head of policy, advisory body)

To say ‘we can’t rely on those pesky foreigners’ is an attitudethat’s kind of dodgy anyway, it assumes every other country inthe world is ganging up against us, basically paranoia. (Respon-

dent Q, civil servant, government department)

It is interesting to note that both these aspects primarily relateo physical supplies of electricity and/or fuels. A number of respon-ents suggested that there is a need to look beyond this aspect

0 0.5 1 1.5 2

Fuel dep le�onMaterials deple� on

Water usageImport dependence

OversupplyTransmiss ion upgr ade cost

Fuel povertyElectricity genera�on costs

Distribu�on upgrade costImpo rt stability

Impo rt diver sityPublic par�cipa�on

Carbon emissionsDirect opposi�on

Fuel type diversityHousehold electricity bills

Public approval ra �ngsElectricity storage

Flexible demandInterconnec�on

Respon se an d reserve capabilit yDe-ra ted capacit y marg ins

Score: 5= hig h imp

ig. 1. Mean and standard deviation of scores across all respondents, ranked according to immportance; 5 = critical importance).

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11

of energy security, for instance towards issues relating to flexibil-ity: as well as being able to meet demand under normal operatingconditions, the electricity system also needs to be able to respondin a timely manner to unexpected changes in the supply/demandbalance. This is reflected in the ‘demand’ theme in Section 4.1.3.

4.1.7. Are the lights going out?Finally, a common recurring theme arose regarding current risks

to electricity security, and whether or not the UK really is in dangerof a serious supply disruption in the near future. On this, there wasquite a lot of disagreement, with some arguing that the UK systemis not currently resilient enough to certain risks such as storms,whilst others argued that risks have been overplayed by politicianswho are nervous about the idea of the lights going out. However,there was consensus that a big unplanned interruption could havea major impact on energy policy, and possibly on the legitimacyof the transition. Respondent S (head of policy, network company)said:

If there are more outages, if the lights go out, the public won’taccept the policies going forward. They’ll say that’s a failure ofpolicy, and then you’re gonna have to change radically, and someof those changes could fundamentally contradict the directionyou’re currently taking.

Several respondents agreed that the most important outcomein the event of a major disruption would be who got the blame:if the public perceived that low-carbon energy was to blame, thiscould seriously derail attempts to decarbonise the electricity sys-tem. Many respondents also noted that energy security as a termor concept is utilised by many different stakeholders as part oftheir negotiating or influencing position, even if they don’t actuallybelieve that the lights are going to go out.

4.2. Quantitative results

Respondents were asked to rate each pre-defined issue on a 1–5

tance and 5 denoting critical importance.3 Fig. 1 shows the mean

3 Note: only 24 of the 25 participants returned quantitative answers.

2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5ortan ce, 1=m inimal impo rtan ce

Mean

portance for electricity security in a low-carbon context on a 1–5 scale (1 = minimal

Socia

sTioome4eIptbttmbtda

ttrieiArgscierwrttppfsgttgascnbs

5

5

imotts

E. Cox / Energy Research &

core and standard deviation for each issue across all respondents.he graph shows that the issues relating to availability, flexibil-

ty and society were felt to be the most important, whereas mostf the ‘environmental sustainability’ issues received lower scoresn average. This may be linked to the fact that some experts have aore narrow understanding of energy security which does not nec-

ssarily include environmental dimensions, as discussed in Section.1.5. The standard deviations also illustrate that the areas of great-st contention generally relate to affordability and sustainability.n particular, fuel poverty and carbon emissions stand out as beingarticularly contentious. The reasons for this were discussed in Sec-ion 4.1.5, where it was suggested that interviewees appeared to beasing their responses on differing criteria for deciding what mat-ers for energy security. The ‘annual bills’ and ‘generation costs’opics were also fairly contentious, illustrating general disagree-

ent over whether ‘affordability’ should be viewed as part of aroad conceptualisation of energy security. Fig. 1 also confirms thathere is disagreement over the importance of some of the more tra-itional indicators of energy security such as imports and diversity,s discussed in Section 4.1.6.

As stated in the methodology, the purpose of asking respondentso give rankings was not to generate detailed mathematical maps oro attempt to aggregate preferences. However, a comparison of theesults from stakeholders from each type of organisation (e.g. util-ty, academia, NGO etc.) can provide a preliminary overview of thextent to which different stakeholders from the same type of organ-sation generally agreed or disagreed with each other. Appendix

in Supplementary materials illustrates this with graphical rep-esentations of the scores given by each individual respondent,rouped according to type of organisation. There was found to beignificant spread amongst responses for most of the issues dis-ussed, no matter which type of organisation. The most contentiousssues (i.e. those with high standard deviations) provided the clear-st examples of this; for all the most contentious issues, individualesponses within the same type of organisation tended to be veryidely spread, and no clear patterns emerge. For example, the

esponses regarding ‘fuel poverty’ were often ranked 1 by one orwo respondents from each type of organisation, and 5 by one orwo other respondents from the same type of organisation. Similaratterns can be observed for other contentious issues, for exam-le ‘annual bills’, ‘generation costs’, and ‘carbon emissions’. Issues

or which there was lower spread between respondents within theame type of organisation were generally those for which there wasenerally higher agreement overall; for example, aspects relatingo flexibility (which were generally perceived to be highly impor-ant) and aspects relating to network upgrade costs (which wereenerally perceived to be of medium importance). Clearly, therere limitations in this quantitative analysis, mainly caused by themall sample size which means that it is not possible to infer whichontextual factors may be most influential over their preferences;evertheless, this is an interesting preliminary finding which wouldenefit from further research, for instance by carrying out largerurveys.

. Discussion

.1. How broad is too broad?

The results from the interviews show that there are signif-cant differences between experts in what issues they feel are

ost important or material for electricity security. Roughly half

f the respondents believed that a broad view of security should beaken encompassing aspects such as affordability and environmen-al sustainability, whilst roughly half felt that these broader aspectshould be seen as separate objectives, trade-offs or complicating

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11 7

factors. It is interesting to compare this to debates in the litera-ture: opinions are somewhat divided over whether environmentalsustainability should be viewed as an aspect of energy security (seee.g. [2,29,42,55,67,83]), but the majority of widely-cited definitionsinclude the affordability dimension (e.g. [12,67,54,117]). There wasalso considerable contention over some of the more ‘traditional’indicators of energy security such as import dependence and diver-sity. Again, this disagreement is echoed in the literature: numerousstudies rely on diversity and import dependence as core metrics formeasuring energy security (e.g. [34,48,51,59,67,91,111]), yet thereis also scepticism in the literature about whether these are neces-sary or sufficient indicators (e.g. [46,50,113]). It appears that someof the differences in responses may be explained by the differentways in which different experts judge what is important. Somerespondents focused upon what they perceived to be current risksto the system or areas in which policy has an obligation to act,leading to a preference for aspects such as public acceptability andfuel poverty. Meanwhile, others focused on issues which are sim-ple and direct or more easily quantifiable, leading to a preferencefor aspects such as diversity and capacity margins. This is a ratherpreliminary finding which would benefit from further research.

In the face of such disagreement from respondents over suchcore questions as the importance of affordability, sustainability,diversity and import dependence for the security of low-carbonelectricity systems, the results from the interviews therefore raisequestions over the extent to which it is desirable or practical toattempt to create generalisable frameworks for assessing the secu-rity of energy systems, especially when attempting to achievegeneralisability on a global scale. This is strengthened by the resultswhich emphasise the fact that what is perceived to be impor-tant for energy security is highly dependent on spatial and systemcontext. It is interesting to compare this to a tendency in the lit-erature to attempt to make security assessment frameworks asuniversal as possible (see e.g. [31,50,54,59,116]). In the presenceof competing (and potentially intractable) perspectives on energysecurity, this paper therefore suggests that energy security assess-ments should be explicit about which perspective they follow (forexample, whether to include affordability and sustainability), andshould also acknowledge the impact that opposing perspectivescould have on the results. Whilst specific suggestions for improvingenergy security might vary amongst different countries and differ-ent sets of actors, this recommendation (as well as the methodsoutlined in this paper for exploring such perspectives) is applicableto energy security assessments in any context.

5.2. Areas of agreement

Despite the array of different perspectives and the challengesthat this presents for assessments of energy security, there wascommonality evident in the strong emphasis placed by respondentson measures of flexibility on both the supply-side and the demand-side (i.e. the ability to increase or decrease supply or demandin a timely manner in order to balance the system, in responseto expected or unexpected perturbations in the supply/demandbalance). In this way, experts can be seen to be placing empha-sis on responses to insecurity, rather than focusing on minimisingpossible causes of insecurity; this is highly interesting, because asystematic literature review by Jonsson et al. [62] found that theexisting energy security literature tends to focus overwhelminglyon causes rather than responses. This raises the possibility that pre-vious attempts to assess the security of electricity systems mayhave been giving preferential treatment to systems which perform

badly for flexibility but well for things like import dependence.Respondents felt that flexibility on both the supply-side and thedemand-side should be prioritised when assessing system secu-rity, and therefore it could be argued that realising the potential

8 Socia

bwantlamsttrtttt

empat(rritbttwklpffiii

tttsassmeta[aotuwamrep

5

b

E. Cox / Energy Research &

enefits of improved flexibility should be a policy priority. It isorth noting that this is not necessarily a UK-specific finding: in

context of a challenging low-carbon transition (which may entailumerous uncertainties), the potential benefits of flexibility for sys-em balancing and hedging against unexpected disruptions wouldikely apply to any low-carbon pathway (especially for industri-lised nations). It is worth noting that diversity could also be aeasure of flexibility, because of the ability to switch from one

ource of power to another if one fails. It is therefore interestinghat respondents were more divided on the question of the impor-ance of diversity than they were on flexibility measures such asesponse-and-reserve, flexible demand, storage and interconnec-ion (as shown in Fig. 1); the reason for this may be connected tohe question of moving energy security discussions beyond tradi-ional indicators such as diversity and imports, which was a coreheme identified from the interviews (Section 4.1.6).

Further agreement amongst respondents was found in themphasis placed on the importance of securing adequate invest-ent in infrastructure, including stressing the importance of

olitical stability in order to increase investor confidence. Concernsbout a possible lack of sufficient investment in energy infras-ructure are echoed in the energy systems and security literaturee.g. [14,31,79]). In order to generate the kind of political stabilityequired to meet the challenges facing the UK electricity system,espondents discussed the need for long-term planning and a guid-ng ‘vision’ for the future, including improving political clarity onhe level of commitment to the UK’s medium- and long-term decar-onisation targets. Some respondents went even further and statedhat this political feasibility would only be achievable in the con-ext of a ‘social contract’ for the transition, another idea which isell grounded in the existing literature (see e.g. [41,75,76]). These

inds of issues are clearly important for security, but they are chal-enging to assess and even more challenging to quantify, whichrobably explains their lack of inclusion in security assessment

rameworks thus far. Again, this is not necessarily a UK-specificnding: many other industrialised countries, especially elsewhere

n Western Europe, are experiencing similar pressures on energynvestment and infrastructure.

Discussions of ‘political feasibility’ are highly linked to theheme of ‘difficult choices’ for policy-makers and the public (Sec-ion 4.1.4). It is well-recognised in the energy security literaturehat there may be unavoidable trade-offs between various energyystem objectives, especially in a low-carbon context due to thedditional complications for energy security caused by the inclu-ion of the carbon reduction imperative (e.g. [47,60]). It has beenuggested by some that the decarbonisation agenda is becomingore problematic and divisive for UK policy-makers [20,27]; how-

ver, the policy literature continues to talk of achieving a ‘balanced’rilemma and tends to play down the idea of difficult choices, prob-bly because of the legally-binding nature of the carbon targets34–36]. If, as suggested by several respondents, politicians are tooccountable for losses of supply which makes them err on the sidef caution (Section 4.1.7), they may be highly unwilling to broachhe subject of changing the way in which consumers in the UKse electricity [87,95]. This could impact several aspects of securityhich were felt to be important by many of the respondents, such

s maximising flexibility of demand and participation and engage-ent on the part of consumers. This particular finding is essentially

ooted in the specific UK policy context; therefore it would be inter-sting for further comparative work to compare this with otherolicy contexts.

.3. Does ‘where you stand depend on where you sit’?

As shown in Section 4.2, the results show no clear alignmentetween experts’ perspectives and the type of organisation for

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11

which they work. The idea that perspectives are usually alignedwith the organisation for which people work is often referred to as“where you stand depends on where you sit”, or Miles’ Law. Influ-ential work by Allison suggested that “for large classes of issues, thestance of a particular player can be predicted with high reliabilityfrom information concerning his seat” [1: 711]. Several empiricalstudies corroborate Miles’ law, with reference to a diverse rangeof fields (see e.g. [11,110,112,114]). However, it is also necessary toconceptualise where people ‘sit’ as not just an expert’s professionalposition but also the wider context, which could include previousor personal affiliations [17]. The fact that the experts interviewedfor this study did not conform to Miles’ law suggests that therewere other contextual factors which were having a more control-ling influence over their decisions than the organisation for whichthey work. It may be because all the experts chosen for this studypossess extensive experience and in-depth knowledge of energyissues, and therefore possess complex, nuanced and widely differ-ing opinions; the qualitative data outlined in Section 4.1 supportthis. This result suggests that individuals aren’t being co-opted bythe ‘party line’ of their various organisations, and also suggests thatmeasures targeted to appeal to specific types of organisation maybe doomed to failure. Clearly, the small sample size means that itis difficult to interrogate these findings in more depth, and it is notreally possible to infer which contextual factors may be most influ-ential over their preferences; nevertheless, this is an interestingpreliminary finding which would benefit from further research.

5.4. Limitations and areas for further research

This paper has interviewed UK energy experts to elicit opinionson what matters for electricity security in the UK context, becauseit has been shown that conceptions of energy security are highlycorrelated with national contexts. The small sample size and thesingle-country focus generate some limitations to the extent towhich the results of this study can be generalised to larger popu-lations or to other national contexts, meaning that the topic wouldbenefit from further research involving a much larger sample size inorder that statistical tests of correlation or clustering may be used.However, whilst some of the specific empirical findings may not begeneralisable, the general approach and methodology would be;therefore comparisons with other national contexts (for instance,by carrying out similar studies with energy experts from otherindustrialised nations) would potentially yield interesting compar-ative results, as would a cross-national study.

This study interviewed energy experts using a pre-defined setof topics, following methods used in other studies designed to elicitopinions on energy security (e.g. [13,100]). However, this method-ology leaves the responses vulnerable to potential framing effects,in which some of the pre-defined topics may have sparked inter-est from the respondents which would not have been apparentif the questions had been framed in a more open-ended manner.Therefore it would be beneficial for further research to elicit expertopinions using more open-ended questions, for instance by askingsimilar sets of experts to define energy security in their own words.Finally, it would be interesting to explore in more depth some of thefindings from these interviews: in particular, whilst experts gener-ally agreed that infrastructure investments are needed in order torealise a secure low-carbon transition, this paper has not exploredwhether experts agreed on the types of investments which wouldbe needed. It would therefore be interesting to interrogate experts’

views on the desired balance between supply-side and demand-side measures, support for mature versus emerging technologies, orthe potential tension between centralised and decentralised infras-tructure options.

Socia

6

dtapiaoa2laic

atotoa(pbwatrar

laHifaroflbciiaaaeee

A

bnaaFM

E. Cox / Energy Research &

. Conclusions

Energy security is a complex and multifaceted topic, whichespite the blossoming literature on conceptualisations continueso resist a commonly-accepted definition. Therefore this paper is anttempt to open up this discussion, actively exploring and incor-orating the perspectives of multiple stakeholders (who may be

nfluential in policy processes), in order to get a grasp on whatspects of energy security are felt to be most important, with a focusn the security of the electricity system in the context of the imper-tive to reduce carbon emissions. Interviews were carried out with5 experts from the UK energy sector. Participants were offered a

ist of electricity security issues drawn from the existing literature,nd asked to discuss how important they felt these are for assess-ng electricity security, with a particular focus on security in theontext of a transition to a low-carbon electricity system.

The results from the interviews show that there is a need toccept the existence of multiple perspectives and to at least attempto take them into account when discussing energy security, insteadf focusing down on a small number of simple quantifiable indica-ors or metrics. This paper has demonstrated that the challengesf attempting to create generalisable energy security indices orssessment frameworks are huge. In the presence of competingand potentially intractable) perspectives on energy security, thisaper therefore suggests that energy security assessments shoulde explicit about which perspective they follow (for example,hether to include affordability and sustainability), and should

cknowledge the impact that opposing perspectives could have onhe results. Whilst specific suggestions for improving energy secu-ity might vary amongst different countries and different sets ofctors, this recommendation is broadly applicable to energy secu-ity assessments in any context.

This paper has revealed an array of conceptualisations and aack of any clear pattern determining experts’ perspectives, as wells some competing worldviews which are potentially intractable.owever, despite the challenges that this clearly creates for pol-

cy, certain measures were widely suggested as being sensibleor improving energy security by a majority of participants from

range of organisations. Energy security policy should incorpo-ate measures which can respond to threats or insecurity, insteadf focusing on reducing causes of insecurity; therefore a focus onexibility on both the demand-side and the supply-side would beeneficial. There should also be increased focus on measures whichan bring about co-benefits in multiple areas, such as reductionn overall energy demand. Finally, it is critical to ensure adequatenvestment in infrastructure, which may require political stabilitynd long-term planning; these aspects are challenging to measurend therefore have received a lack of attention in energy securityssessments in the past. Although the focus of this paper was onnergy security in the UK, these findings echo the pressures thatnergy systems in many other industrialised countries are experi-ncing.

cknowledgments

This research was supported under a CASE award, funded jointlyy EPSRC and E.on Technologies (Ratcliffe) Ltd. The sponsors hado involvement in the design or delivery of this paper. I would

lso like to thank all the anonymous reviewers, whose constructivend insightful comments helped enormously to improve this paper.urther thanks go to Jim Watson (UKERC), Florian Kern (SPRU) andatt Copeland (E.on) for their insights and continued support.

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11 9

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, inthe online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.06.020.

References

[1] G. Allison, Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Am. Polit. Sci.Rev. LXIII (3) (1969) 689–718.

[2] B.W. Ang, W.L. Choong, T.S. Ng, Energy security: definitions, dimensions andindexes, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 42 (2015) 1077–1093.

[5] APERC, A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century: Resources andConstraints, Institute of Energy Economics, Tokyo, 2007.

[6] C. Axon, R. Darton, C. Winzer, Measuring energy security, in: C. Mitchell, J.Watson, J. Whiting (Eds.), New Challenges in Energy Security: the UK in aMultipolar World, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2013, pp. 208–237.

[7] M. Barnacle, E. Robertson, S. Galloway, J. Barton, G. Ault, Modellinggeneration and infrastructure requirements for transition pathways, EnergyPolicy 52 (2013) 60–75.

[8] J. Barton, S. Huang, D. Infield, M. Leach, D. Ogunkunle, J. Torriti, M. Thomson,The evolution of electricity demand and the role for demand sideparticipation, in buildings and transport, Energy Policy 52 (2013) 85–102.

[9] S. Batel, P. Devine-Wright, T. Tangeland, Social acceptance of low-carbonenergy and associated infrastructures: a critical discussion, Energy Policy 58(2013) 1–5.

[10] D. Bell, T. Gray, C. Haggett, Policy, participation and the ‘social gap’ in windfarm siting decisions, Environ. Polit. 14 (2005) 460–477.

[11] D.R. Berman, L.L. Martin, L.A. Kajifez, County home rule: does where youstand depend on where you sit? State Local Gov. Rev. 17 (2) (1985) 232–234.

[12] J. Bielecki, Energy security: is the wolf at the door? Q. Rev. Econ. Finance 42(2002) 235–250.

[13] Y.B. Blumer, C. Moser, A. Patt, R. Seidl, The precarious consensus on theimportance of energy security: contrasting views between Swiss energyusers and experts, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 52 (2015) 927–936.

[14] W. Blyth, R. McCarthy, R. Gross, Financing the UK power sector: is themoney available? UK Energy Research Centre Working Paper, 2014.

[15] R. Bolton, A. Hawkes, Infrastructure, investment and the low carbontransition, in: C. Mitchell, J. Watson, J. Whiting (Eds.), New Challenges inEnergy Security: the UK in a Multipolar World, Palgrave MacMillan,Basingstoke, 2013, pp. 137–160.

[16] A. Boston, Delivering a secure energy supply on a low-carbon pathway,Energy Policy 52 (2013) 55–59.

[17] T. Bryan, Context in environmental conflict: where you stand depends onwhere you sit, Environ. Pract. 5 (3) (2003) 256–264.

[18] P. Burnard, P. Gill, K. Stewart, E. Treasure, B. Chadwick, Analysing andpresenting qualitative data, Br. Dent. J. 204 (8) (2008) 429–432.

[19] I. Capellan-Perez, M. Mediavilla, C. de Castro, O. Carpintero, L.J. Miguel,Fossil fuel depletion and socio-economic scenarios: an integrated approach,Energy 77 (2014) 641–666.

[20] N. Carter, The politics of climate change in the UK, Wiley Interdiscip. Rev.Clim. Change 5 (3) (2014) 423–433.

[21] A. Cherp, J. Jewell, The three perspectives on energy security: intellectualhistory, disciplinary roots and the potential for integration, Curr. Opin.Environ. Sustain. 3 (2011) 1–11.

[22] A. Cherp, J. Jewell, The concept of energy security: beyond the four As,Energy Policy 75 (2014) 415–421.

[23] T.L. Cherry, J.H. Garcia, S. Kallbekken, A. Torvanger, The development anddeployment of low-carbon energy technologies: the role of economicinterests and cultural worldviews on public support, Energy Policy 68(2014) 562–566.

[24] L. Chester, Conceptualising energy security and making explicit itspolysemic nature, Energy Policy 38 (2010) 887–895.

[25] F. Ciuta, Conceptual notes on energy security: total or banal security? Secur.Dialogue 41 (2) (2010) 123–144.

[26] J.J. Cohen, J. Reichl, M. Schmidthaler, Re-focussing research efforts on thepublic acceptability of energy infrastructure: a critical review, Energy 76(2014) 4–9.

[27] A. Corner, Climate Silence (and how to break it). Climate Outreach andInformation Network (COIN) Briefing Paper No. 1, 2013.

[28] P. Criqui, S. Mima, European climate—energy security nexus: a model basedscenario analysis, Energy Policy 41 (2012) 827–842.

[29] R. Dannreuther, Energy security and shifting modes of governance, Int. Polit.52 (2015) 466–483.

[30] E.G.R. Davies, P. Kyle, J.A. Edmonds, An integrated assessment of global andregional electric water demands for electricity generation to 2095, Adv.Water Resour. 52 (2013) 296–313.

[31] J.P. Deane, F. Gracceva, A. Chiodi, M. Gargiulo, B.P.O. Gallachoir, Assessingpower system security: a framework and a multi model approach, Electr.

Power Energy Syst. 73 (2015) 283–297.

[32] DECC, The Climate Change Act, The Stationary Office, London, 2008.[33] DECC, Planning Our Electric Future: a White Paper for Secure, Affordable

and Low-carbon Electricity, Department of Energy and Climate Change,London, 2011.

1 Socia

0 E. Cox / Energy Research &

[34] DECC, Energy Security Strategy, Department of Energy and Climate Change,London, 2012.

[35] DECC, Electricity Market Reform: Policy Overview, Department of Energyand Climate Change, London, 2012.

[36] DECC, Annual Energy Statement 2014, Department of Energy and ClimateChange, London, 2014.

[37] D.A. Deese, Energy: economics, politics, and security, Int. Secur. 4 (3) (1979)140–153.

[38] D.A. Deese, L.B. Miller, Western Europe, in: D.A. Deese, J.S. Nye (Eds.), Energyand Security, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1981.

[39] B. Drysdale, J. Wu, N. Jenkins, Flexible demand in the GB electricity sector in2030, Appl. Energy 139 (2015) 281–290.

[40] C. Dudeney, G. Owen, J. Ward, Realising the Resource: GB ElectricityDemand Project Overview, Sustainability First, London, 2014.

[41] P. Ekins, M. Winskel, J. Skea, Putting it all together: implications for policyand action, in: J. Skea, M. Winskel, P. Ekins (Eds.), Energy 2050: Making theTransition to a Secure Low-carbon Energy System, Earthscan, London, 2011.

[42] J. Elkind, ‘Energy security: call for a broader agenda&rsquo, in: C. Pascual, J.Elkind (Eds.), Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies andImplications, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 2010, pp.119–148.

[44] J. Falk, Rethinking energy security in a time of transition, in: L. Anceschi, A.Symons (Eds.), Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change: the Asia-PacificExperience, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, pp. 240–254.

[45] S. Fast, W. Mabee, Place-making and trust-building: the influence of policyon host community responses to wind farms, Energy Policy 81 (2015) 27–37.

[46] G.E. Francés, J.M. Marín-Quemada, E.S.M. González, RES and risk: renewableenergy’s contribution to energy security: a portfolio-based approach,Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 26 (2013) 549–559.

[47] A. Froggatt, M. Levi, Climate and energy security policies and measures:synergies and conflicts, Int. Affairs 85 (6) (2009) 1129–1141.

[48] M. Frondel, C.M. Schmidt, A measure of a nation’s physical energy supplyrisk, Q. Rev. Econ. Finance 54 (2014) 208–215.

[49] E. Gholz, Rare Earth Elements and National Security, Council on ForeignRelations, New York, 2014.

[50] F. Gracceva, P. Zeniewski, A systemic approach to assessing energy securityin a low-carbon EU energy system, Appl. Energy 123 (2014) 335–348.

[51] M. Grubb, L. Butler, P. Twomey, Diversity and security in UK electricitygeneration: the influence of low-carbon objectives, Energy Policy 34 (2006)4050–4062.

[52] P. Grünewald, Electricity storage in future GB networks: a market failure?in: Paper Presented at the BIEE 9th Academic Conference, 19–20 September2012, Oxford, 2012.

[53] L. Hughes, The four Rs of energy security Energy Policy 6 (2009) 2459–2461.[54] IEA, Energy Security and Climate Policy: Assessing Interactions,

OECD/International Energy Agency, Paris, 2007.[55] IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011, OECD/International Energy Agency, Paris,

2011.[56] IEA, World Energy Outlook 2014, OECD/International Energy Agency, Paris,

2014.[57] IEA. What is energy security? Available at: https://www.iea.org/topics/

energysecurity/subtopics/whatisenergysecurity/, 2015 (accessed 23.09.15).[58] IPCC, Summary for policymakers, in: O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y.

Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P.Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T.Zwickel, J.C. Minx (Eds.), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of ClimateChange: Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report ofthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2014.

[59] J. Jewell, A. Cherp, K. Riahi, Energy security under de-carbonizationscenarios: an assessment framework and evaluation under differenttechnology and policy choices, Energy Policy 65 (2014) 743–760.

[60] B. Johansson, D. Jonsson, A. Månsson, L. Nilsson, M. Nilsson, Transition to alow carbon energy system and energy security: synergies and conflicts, in:Paper Presented at the BIEE 10th Academic Conference, 17–18 September2014, University of Oxford, 2014.

[61] C.R. Jones, J.R. Eiser, Identifying predictors of attitudes to local onshore winddevelopment with reference to an English case study, Energy Policy 37(2009) 4604–4614.

[62] D.K. Jonsson, A. Månsson, B. Johansson, Energy security and climate changemitigation as combined areas of analysis in contemporary research, EnergyStud. Rev. 20 (2) (2013) 90–113.

[63] P. Joskow, The U.S. energy sector: prospects and challenges, 1972–2009, USAssoc. Energy Econ. ‘Dialogue’ 17 (2) (2009) 1–42.

[64] C.W. King, A.S. Holman, M.E. Webber, Thirst for energy, Nat. Geosci. 1 (2008)283–286.

[65] E. Kiriyama, Y. Kajikawa, A multi-layered analysis of energy securityresearch and the energy supply process, Appl. Energy 123 (2014) 415–423.

[66] J. Knox-Hayes, M.A. Brown, B.K. Sovacool, Y. Wang, Understanding attitudestowards energy security: results of a cross-national survey. GeorgiaTech/Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy Working Paper Series, No. 74,

2013.

[67] B. Kruyt, D.P. vanVuuren, H. deVries, H. Groenenberg, Indicators for energysecurity, Energy Policy 37 (2009) 2166–2181.

[68] C. Kuzemko, Politicising UK energy: what ‘speaking energy security’ can do,Policy Polit. 42 (2) (2014) 259–274.

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11

[69] P. Kyle, E.G.R. Davies, J. Dooley, S.J. Smith, L.E. Clarke, J.A. Edmonds, M.Hejazi, Influence of climate change mitigation technology on globaldemands of water for electricity generation, Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control 13(2013) 112–123.

[70] C. Le Coq, E. Paltseva, Measuring the security of external energy supply inthe European Union, Energy Policy 37 (11) (2009) 4474–4481.

[71] U. Lehr, More baskets? Renewable energy and energy security, GWSDiscussion Paper 2009/8, 2009.

[72] J. Lilliestam, S. Ellenbeck, Energy security and renewable electricity trade:will Desertec make Europe vulnerable to the energy weapon? Energy Policy39 (6) (2011) 3380–3391.

[73] A. Löschel, U. Moslener, D. Rübbelke, Energy security: concepts andindicators (editorial), Energy Policy 38 (2010) 1607–1608.

[74] G. MacKerron, Lessons from the UK on urgency and legitimacy in energypolicymaking, in: I. Scrase, G. MacKerron (Eds.), Energy for the Future: ANew Agenda, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009, pp. 76–88.

[76] D. Messner, A social contract for low carbon and sustainable development:reflections on non-linear dynamics of social realignments and technologicalinnovations in transformation processes, Technol. Forecasting Soc. Change98 (9) (2015) 260–270.

[77] C. Mitchell, J. Watson, J. Whiting, New Challenges in Energy Security: the UKin a Multipolar World, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2013.

[78] C. Mitchell, J. Watson, New challenges in energy security: the UK in amultipolar world—conclusions and recommendations, in: C. Mitchell, J.Watson, J. Whiting (Eds.), New Challenges in Energy Security: the UK in aMultipolar World, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2013, pp. 238–257.

[79] C. Mitchell, A. Froggatt, R. Hoggett, Governance and disruptive energysystem change, in: Paper Submitted to the International Workshop onIncumbent-Challenger Interactions in Energy Transitions, 22–23 September2014, University of Stuttgart, 2014.

[80] R.L. Moss, E. Tzimas, P. Willis, J. Arendorf, L.T. Espinoza, Critical Metals in thePath Towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector: Assessing RareMetals as Supply Chain Bottlenecks in Low-carbon Energy Technologies, JRCScientific and Policy Reports, European Commission, Brussels, 2011.

[81] Mott MacDonald, UK Electricity Generation Costs Update, Mott MacDonald,Brighton, 2010.

[82] S. Müller-Kraenner, Energy Security, Earthscan, London, 2007.[83] K. Narula, B.S. Reddy, Three blind men and an elephant: the case of energy

indices to measure energy security and energy sustainability, Energy 80(2015) 148–158.

[84] National Grid, Operating the Electricity Transmission Networks in 2020,National Grid Plc, London, 2011.

[85] National Grid, Electricity 10-year Statement 2012: UK ElectricityTransmission, National Grid Plc, London, 2012.

[86] A. Neumann, How to measure security of supply? EU Energy Policy blog,September 9th, 2007.

[87] D. Newbery, M. Grubb, The Final Hurdle? Security of supply, the CapacityMechanism and the role of interconnectors. Cambridge EPRG WorkingPaper No. 1412, 2014.

[88] D. Newbery, G. Strbac, D. Pudjianto, P. Noël, Benefits of an IntegratedEuropean Energy Market, Booz and Company, Amsterdam, 2013.

[89] Ofgem, Electricity Capacity Assessment Report 2012, Ofgem/Ofgem E-Serve,London, 2012.

[90] K. Parkhill, C. Demski, C. Butler, A. Spence, N. Pidgeon, Transforming the UKEnergy System: Public Values, Attitudes, and Acceptability—SynthesisReport, UK Energy Research Centre, London, 2013.

[91] S. Pfenninger, J. Keirstead, Renewables, nuclear, or fossil fuels? Scenarios forGreat Britain’s power system considering costs emissions and energysecurity, Applied Energy 152 (2015) 83–93.

[92] N. Pidgeon, C. Demski, From nuclear to renewable: energy systemtransformation and public attitudes, Bull. At. Sci. 68 (4) (2012) 41–51.

[93] D. Pudjianto, P. Djapic, M. Aunedi, C. Kim Gan, G. Strbac, S. Huang, D. Infield,Smart control for minimising distribution network reinforcement cost dueto electrification, Energy Policy 52 (2013) 76–84.

[94] RAEng, GB Electricity Capacity Margin, Royal Academy of Engineering,London, 2013.

[95] RAEng, Counting the Cost: the Economic and Social Costs of ElectricityShortfalls in the UK, Royal Academy of Engineering, London, 2014.

[96] I. Smart, European energy security in focus, in: C. Gasteyger (Ed.), The Futurefor European Energy Security, Frances Pinter, London, 1985.

[97] B. Sovacool (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, Routledge,London, 2011.

[98] B. Sovacool, I. Mukherjee, Conceptualising and measuring energy security: asynthesised approach, Energy 36 (2011) 5343–5355.

[99] B. Sovacool, H. Saunders, Competing policy packages and the complexity ofenergy security, Energy 67 (2014) 641–651.

[100] B. Sovacool, S. Valentine, M. Bambawale, M. Brown, T. Cardoso, S. Nurbek, G.Suleimenova, J. Li, Y. Xu, A. Jain, A. Alhajji, A. Zubiri, Exploring propositionsabout perceptions of energy security: an international survey, Environ. Sci.Policy 16 (2012) 44–64.

[101] J. Speirs, R. Gross, M. Contestabile, C. Candelise, Y. Houari, B. Gross, Materials

Availability for Low-carbon Technologies: an Assessment of the Evidence,UK Energy Research Centre, London, 2014.

[102] A. Stirling, On the economics and analysis of diversity. SPRU ElectronicWorking Paper Series, No. 28, 1998.

Socia

[

[

[

[

[

[

[

[118] P. Devine-Wright, Beyond NIMBYism: towards an integrated framework for

E. Cox / Energy Research &

103] A. Stirling, Precaution, foresight and sustainability: reflection and reflexivityin the governance of science and technology, in: J. Voß, D. Bauknecht, R.Kemp (Eds.), Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, EdwardElgar, Cheltenham, 2006, pp. 225–272.

104] A. Stirling, Freeman seminar series, The direction of progress? Old refrains,topical chimes, new riffs (lecture), 22nd March 2013, Freeman Centre,University of Sussex, 2013.

105] G. Strbac, M. Aunedi, D. Pudjianto, P. Djapic, S. Gammons, R. Druce,Understanding the Balancing Challenge, Imperial College/NERA Consulting,London, 2012.

106] G. Strbac, M. Pollitt, C.V. Konstantinidis, I. Konstantelos, R. Moreno, D.Newbery, R. Green, Electricity transmission arrangements in Great Britain:time for change? Energy Policy 73 (2014) 298–311.

107] A. Symons, Introduction: challenges to energy security in the era of climatechange, in: L. Anceschi, A. Symons (Eds.), Energy Security in the Era ofClimate Change: the Asia-Pacific Experience, Palgrave Macmillan,Basingstoke, 2011, pp. 1–12.

108] O. Tansey, Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probabilitysampling, Polit. Sci. Polit. 40 (4) (2007) 765–772.

109] M.T.H. van Vliet, J.R. Yearsley, F. Ludwig, S. Vögele, D.P. Lettenmaier, P.Kabat, Vulnerability of US and European electricity supply to climatechange, Nat. Clim. Change 2 (2012) 676–681.

l Science 21 (2016) 1–11 11

[110] J.R. Vest, J.N. Bolin, T.R. Miller, L.D. Gamm, T.E. Siegrist, L.E. Martinez,Medical homes: where you stand on definitions depends on where you sit,Med. Care Res. Rev. 67 (4) (2010) 393–411.

[111] N. Victor, C. Nichols, P. Balash, The impacts of shale gas supply and climatepolicies on energy security: the U.S. energy system analysis based onMARKAL model, Energy Strategy Rev. 5 (2014) 26–41.

[112] C. Von Borgstede, L.J. Lundqvist, Organizational culture, professional roleconceptions and local Swedish decision-makers’ views on climate policyinstruments, J. Environ. Policy Plann. 8 (4) (2006) 279–292.

[113] J. Watson, UK Gas Security: Threats and Mitigation Strategies, Sussex EnergyGroup, Brighton, 2010.

[114] M.E. Wilcher, The acid raid debate in North America: where you standdepends on where you sit, Environmentalist 6 (4) (1986) 289–298.

[116] World Energy Council, Time to Get Real: the Case for Sustainable EnergyPolicy, World Energy Council, London, 2012.

[117] D. Yergin, Ensuring energy security, Foreign Affairs 85 (2) (2006) 69–82.

understanding public perceptions of wind energy, Wind Energy 8 (2005)125–139.

[119] B. Sovacool, M. Brown, Competing dimensions of energy security: aninternational perspective, Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 35 (2010) 77–108.