Course 3 Learning Plan Architecture Physical and link layer Network layer Transport layer ...
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Transcript of Course 3 Learning Plan Architecture Physical and link layer Network layer Transport layer ...
Course 3 Learning Plan Architecture Physical and link layer Network layer Transport layer Application layer: DNS, RPC, NFS Application layer: Routing Wireless networks More secure protocols: DNSSEC, IPSEC, IPv6
Application-Level Attacks Name-space Protocols
DNS NIS NetBios (and friends)
Remote Procedure Calls RPC DCOM
Network File System (NFS) Routing Protocols
RIP BGP OSPF
Learning objectives Understand how name-to-IP (and reverse)
mapping issues can result in vulnerabilities Understand how SSL is useful Be aware of some general, high-level issues in
Remote procedure calls Network file systems
DNS Motivation: DNS Attacks make news
“Al Jazeera Web Site Faces Sustained DoS Attack and DNS Attacks” (2003)
Hillary2000.com (Hillary Clinton’s campaign) Nike (2000) Ricochet Networks (1999) AOL (1998)
Domain Hijacking: A step-by-step guide www.securiteam.com (10/2/2000)
What are DNS attacks, and how do we defend against them?
Outline Review of DNS Protocol vulnerabilities and exposures
Recon Cache poisoning Access control based on host names
Implementation vulnerabilities Review of vulnerabilities in BIND Code examples
Review of DNS Domain Name System
Well-known implementation: BIND Purpose: translate names that humans understand
to IP addresses e.g., www.cerias.purdue.edu => 128.10.252.9 Allows changing IP addresses of servers Information is stored in "RR"s: Resource Records
Many RFCs (complex) Distributed system
Not one server knows all the answers Recursive requests may be needed
Can use either TCP or UDP
Organization "Root" servers point to top level domain servers,
like .com, .org, .edu, etc... Those point to more specific servers. Eventually a server will know the answer “nslookup” is an interactive tool to explore the
dns hierarchy deprecated
Equivalent on some systems is “dig”, "host"
Example DNS Lookup % host www.google.com
www.google.com is an alias for www.google.akadns.net.www.google.akadns.net has address 64.233.167.104www.google.akadns.net has address 64.233.167.99
Note how a DNS name may resolve as several different IP addresses
DNS Is Not Bidirectionally Equivalent % host www.purdue.edu
www.purdue.edu has address 128.210.11.200% host 128.210.11.200200.11.210.128.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer mortar.cc.purdue.edu.
A different tree is used for IP to host name queries! Not as well-maintained (usually) Note the "IN-ADDR.ARPA" domain
Domain name for IP address lookup RFC 1035 Section 3.5
Note the IP address was reversed Who controls the data?
Zones and Domains DNS servers are organized by zones DNS name has domains: domain1.domain2.com
".com" is a "top-level domain" What is the relationship between zones and
domains? A zone may include subdomains
Fancy way to say that a server will authoritatively answer queries for specified subdomains as well
Who Controls Data in "IN-ADDR.ARPA"? Hierarchical distributed database
Data in different zones Example query to find out for 128.10.0.0:
"dig 0.0.10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA PTR IN" ";; ANSWER SECTION:
0.0.10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA. 86400 IN PTR purdue-cs-en.cs.purdue.edu."
";; AUTHORITY SECTION:10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA. 43269 IN NS harbor.ecn.purdue.edu.10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA. 43269 IN NS pendragon.cs.purdue.edu.10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA. 43269 IN NS ns.purdue.edu.10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA. 43269 IN NS moe.rice.edu.10.128.IN-ADDR.ARPA. 43269 IN NS ns2.purdue.edu."
Host Name Lookups From IP Conclusion:
The returned host name is under the control of the zone where the host with that IP address is located
Scenario: Name-based authentication mechanism (.rhosts, rlogin,
etc...) Attacker controls the remote zone
Says 128.10.242.11 is "innocent.victim.com" Victim's DNS trusts remote zone server
"innocent.victim.com" is within "victim.com" so access is allowed
Ref.: Bellovin 1995 "Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins"
Fix Attempt Do two lookups, using both trees, and refuse
access if names are inconsistent Example:
Let's say host "resources.benign.org" allows access from "*.benign.org"
Possible attack: It would be suspicious if "resources.benign.org"
received a request from 198.210.35.192, whose DNS records pointed to "www.benign.org" but no DNS entry for "www.benign.org" included 198.210.35.192
DNS API a.k.a. "resolver" OS support
Handles DNS transparently for application gethostbyname returns the IP address gethostbyaddr returns the host name
same names on Windows Same function names for PHP, .NET, etc... Handling of results is opportunity for buffer
overflows There could be a malicious (or compromised,
poisoned) DNS server in the chain
Resolver Attacks Host resolvers have caches for efficiency
e.g., "ns.purdue.edu. 6619 IN A 128.210.11.5" Caches may be poisoned First Attack:
UDP packets with spoofed source IP address, pretending to come from the authoritative server
Especially combined with a DoS attack on the server DNS uses query numbers to keep track of requests
DNS cache poisoning via BIND by predictable query IDs. CVE-1999-0024
Send UDP packet with the IP-domain pair you want the client or server to think is correct, with sniffed or guessed query ID
Additional Cache Poisoning Attacks With DNS replies:
Spurious (malicious) record returned in answer to another query
In addition to requested information Malicious record returned as a normal part some answer
Get Alice to query Malory's DNS server somehow (web bug, link, etc...)
With DNS queries: Malory sends a query that contains a spurious reply;
Alice’s server believes it and caches it No need to trick Alice Similar to ARP poisoning and gratuitous ARP replies
(replies without receiver having sent a request)
Conclusion You can't authenticate based on host names
You can't rely on DNS as per the original RFCs DNS is more vulnerable if hosted outside your
network Some attacks (IP spoofing) prevented by ingress filtering
Don't accept packets from outside, pretending to originate from inside the network
Except if DNS server is hosted outside the network! No defense then
DNS Masters and Slaves a.k.a. Primary and secondary servers Two kinds of DNS servers for:
Load sharing Redundancy
How do you keep slaves up-to-date?
Zone Transfers Get RRs (list of host-IP address pairs) for the zone Uses TCP for reliability Used by slaves to query master for information
Polling mechanism (e.g., every 15 minutes) Example:
"dig -t AXFR vulnerable.com > zone.txt"
Attacks on Zone Transfer• Lower protocol vulnerabilities can be exploited to
load desired information into secondary servers/slaves1. TCP session hijacking2. ARP poisoning (if on same network segment)3. VLAN attacks
• Desirable recon information (attacker requests zone transfer to own machine) Should restrict it with IP address restrictions
Not critical, but an exposure nonetheless This is blocked from outside Symantec or CERIAS
DNS Notify Notification to slaves/secondary servers when
zone changes occur RFC 1996 Uses UDP or TCP
All servers getting the notice: Acknowledge the notice Check with the server that the new zone version ("SOA
RR") is indeed more recent than theirs If so, initiate zone transfers
Attack on DNS Notify With a UDP packet, a notice can be sent
Other packet to tell slave the new version number ("SOA RR")
Zone transfer still uses TCP Lower protocol vulnerabilities can then be exploited
to load desired information into secondary servers/slaves TCP session hijacking ARP poisoning (if on same network segment) VLAN attacks
As previous attacks, but now the timing can be controlled by the attacker thanks to notify function
Other DNS Attacks Administrative attacks against registrar (see
Domain Hijacking: A step-by-step guide, akin to social engineering attacks)
SSL as a Defense Server has matched private and public keys Public key along with the domain name (e.g.,
cerias.purdue.edu) is signed by a certificate authority (Verisign, Thawte); this is the SSL certificate The signature is verified by using the CA's public key Every browser has the public keys for CAs
You know that you are talking to the correct web server, and that the DNS system was not corrupted, because only that server knows its own private key, and the server’s private key is necessary for the encryption.
Question Which access control rule is preferable?
a) allow from 128.10.240.0/20b) allow from cerias.purdue.educ) allow from all
Question Which access control rule is preferable?
a) allow from 128.10.240.0/20b) allow from cerias.purdue.educ) allow from all
Discussion Which DNS problems would you try to fix first?
a) Authentication of serversb) Complexity of the protocolc) Implementation errorsd) Integrity of the datae) Availability of the servers
Discussion Which DNS problems would you try to fix first? a) Authentication of servers
UDP allows IP spoofing and injection of malicious data b) Complexity of the protocol
c) Implementation errorsd) Integrity of the data Cryptographic mechanisms for integrity also provide
authenticity (e.g., signatures) e) Availability of the servers
• Important, which is why there is a redundant server architecture
Question Why should you consider SSL in your next client-
server program? a) it’s faster b) it replaces DNS c) it guarantees that you are talking to who you
should be d) it provides reliability and guarantees that the
DNS system hasn’t been corrupted
Question Why should you consider SSL in your next client-
server program? a) it’s faster b) it replaces DNS c) it guarantees that you are talking to who
you should be d) it provides reliability and guarantees that the
DNS system hasn’t been corrupted
Mini-Lab Explore DNS
Can you get a zone transfer? Do you understand the various types of records?
Hint: "IN" stands for "internet" DNS can store information about lots of things
How much information can you get? Are there exposures?
Why do some DNS names have dots at the end? e.g., "www.benign.com."
Hint: think about relative vs absolute paths Suggested time: 15-20 minutes
NIS (Network Information Services) SUN technology "NIS clients download the necessary username
and password data from the NIS server to verify each user login" How much can you trust the client?
Doesn't encrypt the username/password information sent to the clients with each login
All users have access to the encrypted passwords stored on the NIS server Crack at leisure
NIS+ Completely different from NIS More secure Domain namespace Credentials checked every time a NIS+ object is
accessed DES credentials must be generated by an administrator
for each "principal" A principal is a user or a machine (process with root
privilege) Client machines (processes) are authenticated
More difficult to manage
NetBIOS Network Basic Input/Output System
Session level protocol NetBIOS over TCP
For the purposes of this tutorial, we consider it at the same level as DNS
Used almost exclusively by Windows Major worm propagation vector
Three services: NetBIOS Name service NetBIOS Datagram service NetBIOS Session service
NetBIOS Name Service NetBIOS name identifies computer for file sharing
and domain authentications UDP port 137 Name resolution in a network segment Map NetBIOS names to IP addresses
NetBIOS Names Domain names Computer names User names Workgroup names Special
e.g., "\\–__MSBROWSE__" Types of names
Unique Group
Spoofing NetBIOS Names nbtdeputy
http://www.securityfriday.com Registers a NetBIOS computer name on the network Responds to NetBT name-query requests Resolves IP address from NetBIOS computer name Legitimate use:
Help access servers on different segments/networks Hacker use:
Impersonate trusted server (while server is under DoS) Collect usernames/passwords Distribute trojans
Other NetBIOS Issues "Browser elections"
A malicious machine can be elected as "Browse Master" Maintain list of "shares"
Shares (jargon) Anything "shared" over NetBIOS
Disks Printers Hidden
IPC$ (Inter-Process Communication) Malicious Browse Master could in theory:
Intercept confidential documents when they get printed Fake trusted file systems so people use trojans or save
their confidential documents there etc...
Access Control for Shares Active Directory can specify mechanism Authentication mechanisms
Kerberos (requires infrastructure support) LM (old, insecure) NTLM
drops back to LM in some occasions Cryptanalyzed, has exploitable weaknesses
Schneier and Mudge 1998 "Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's Point-to-PointTunneling Protocol (PPTP)"
Exploit by Urity (2004), securityfriday.com NULL sessions (no passwords)
Guests etc...
Listing Account Names Anonymous users (NULL sessions) can:
List domain user names Enumerate share names
Exposure Prevention
Set the registry RestrictAnonymous to 1 Still permits a remote anonymous logged in user to call
the function NetUserGetInfo Acquire detailed account information
Exploit: "GetAcct" (www.securityfriday.com) RestrictNullSessAccess to 2 Can be set through the LSA (Local Security Policy)
XP, 2000
Worms Exploiting "Weak Shares" "Share level access" for the File and Print Sharing
service (TCP port 139) Passwords in Windows 95/98/ME are easily retrieved
Normally, if a password has N characters, and each character has 64 possible values, then the password space is 64^N
Windows password characters can be guessed one at a time, so the space is 64*N instead
Because the server assumes that the length of the password sent from the client is correct
References Tereman (2000) securityfriday.com Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS00-072)
Recon Tools nbtdump.exe, winnbtdump.exe
dumps NetBIOS information from Windows NT, Windows 2000 and *NIX Samba servers such as shares, user accounts with comments, etc, and the password policy
Note that port 445 also provides direct access to NetBIOS Attacks against port 139 can also use port 445 Windows 2000 and later
References RFC 1001, 1002 Northrup 1998 "NetBIOS: Friend or Foe?"
http://www.windowsitlibrary.com/Content/386/10/1.html "NetBIOS is highly vulnerable but we must live with it
for some time"
Mini-Lab (20 minutes) Use the Nessus vulnerability scanner to find NetBIOS
issues on the class server Right-click the desktop
Under "vulnerability assessment", select "Nessus" That will start the Nessus daemon Note the user name and password
Login to the Nessus client window Tab for tests
Unselect all the tests (button) Select the Windows tests
Tab for machines to be scanned Enter the IP address of Windows server
Start the scan Click on the network icon and computer in the results
Discussion Can the server be compromised through
NetBIOS? By guessing the administrator password, Nessus can
access the registry remotely to scan for vulnerabilities Disable remote registry access Choose a good administrator password
Win 95/98/ME should disable NetBIOS or install a firewall What else could an attacker do? What would you do to secure the server?
Are the NetBIOS services needed?
Remote Procedure Calls Sun's rpc Microsoft's RPC 92 entries in ICAT ("rpc") as of May 2004 Example:
saned in sane-backends 1.0.7 and earlier does not check the IP address of the connecting host during the SANE_NET_INIT RPC call, which allows remote attackers to use that call even if they are restricted in saned.conf.
CAN-2003-0773 And we know how insecure IP-based restriction can be
anyway!
RPC Use Port 111 (TCP and UDP) "portmapper" to know
on which port services are provided (port 135 on Windows) NIS NFS mount sadmin etc...
Utility: rpcinfo Exposure if accessible from the internet Most of these services are not needed from the
internet and contain vulnerabilities and exposures
DCOM (Microsoft) Runs on top of Microsoft RPC
Allows writing distributed applications Remotely control software components with
account name and password e.g., Internet Explorer
Exploit: "IE'en" ("Soap" securityfriday.com) capture user ID and password in plain text, even on SSL
sites
NFS: Network File System Root on a client machine could be trusted as root
on the server! Remote user ID is trusted as correct use the root_squash option in exports
Replaces "root" with "nobody" On by default in RedHat 9+
Root on a client machine can assume the identity of any other user (su) and change that user's files Solution: Share ("export") only directories where
everything belongs to root (with the above squash option) other squash options available
Setuid programs: blocked by "nosuid" option
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