COUNTRY CASE STUDY REPORT › ... › Myanmar_Country_CaseStudy_CERF_2010_ER.pdf · 2011-06-17 ·...

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR

UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND

AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION

REVIEW OF FAO IMPLEMENTED

UN CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND

(CERF) PROJECTS

COUNTRY CASE STUDY REPORT

MYANMAR

MAY 2010

Myanmar CERF Country Case Study i

Table of Contents

PROJECTS DESCRIPTION...................................................................................................... 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................ 2

1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 6 1.1 Background ..................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 CERF Evaluation............................................................................................................. 6 1.3 Approach ......................................................................................................................... 7

2 IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW .................................................................................. 7 2.1 Emergency Management Capacity.................................................................................. 7 2.2 Securing CERF Funding ................................................................................................. 8 2.3 Procurement and Delivery............................................................................................... 8 2.4 Communications.............................................................................................................. 9 2.5 Beneficiaries Results Assessment ................................................................................. 10

3 RELEVANCE................................................................................................................... 10 3.1 Intervention Design and Rationale................................................................................ 10 3.2 Targeting ....................................................................................................................... 10

4 PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION .................................................................... 12 4.1 Implementation Partners ............................................................................................... 12 4.2 Partner Performance...................................................................................................... 12 4.3 Partner Roles ................................................................................................................. 13 4.4 FAO Contribution ......................................................................................................... 13 4.5 Agriculture Cluster ........................................................................................................ 13

5 EFFICIENCY ................................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Timeliness of Preparation.............................................................................................. 14 5.2 Timeliness of Implementation....................................................................................... 15 5.3 Factors Impacting on Timeliness .................................................................................. 17 5.4 Monitoring and Continuous Learning ........................................................................... 18

6 EFFECTIVENESS............................................................................................................ 18 6.1 Impact on Beneficiaries................................................................................................. 18 6.2 Cost-Effectiveness......................................................................................................... 19 6.3 Sustainability................................................................................................................. 19 6.4 Environmental issues..................................................................................................... 20

7 CONNECTEDNESS AND PROGRAMME APPROACH.............................................. 20 7.1 Role Played by the CERF Projects in the Emergency Response .................................. 20 7.2 Linkages to Country and FAO Development Strategies ............................................... 21

8 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS................................................................................... 22 8.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................... 22 8.2 Emergency Management Processes .............................................................................. 22 8.3 Procurement .................................................................................................................. 24 8.4 Targeting ....................................................................................................................... 26 8.5 Stakeholder Interaction ................................................................................................. 26 8.6 Reporting....................................................................................................................... 27 8.7 Communications............................................................................................................ 28 8.8 Beneficiaries Results Assessment ................................................................................. 28

Myanmar CERF Country Case Study ii

Figure Figure 1 Procurement Disbursement for Nargis-related Projects List of Annexes Annex 1 Project Approval Timelines Annex 1.1 FAO TCE Timelines Annex 1.2 Activity / Decision Points Annex 1.3 Procurement Timelines Annex 2 Programme map Annex 3 Maps of project area Annex 4 Implementing Partner Roles and Experience Matrix Annex 5 Meetings and People Met Acknowledgements The evaluation team gratefully acknowledges the support and contributions of the projects’ stakeholders, particularly from the project benefiting communities and individuals in the field; the implementation partner staff in the Delta and Yangon; management and staff of the cooperating GOUM agencies; the Resident Representative and Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator, and their staff in the FAO Myanmar Office and Emergency Response Co-ordination Unit; the national and international consultants working on the emergency and recovery activities; and the management and staff of the technical departments in FAO Rome.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this document are solely those of the independent evaluation team and do not reflect the official views of the Government of the Union of Myanmar, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation or implementing partners

Myanmar CERF Country Case Study iii

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AGPS FAO Seed and Plant Genetic Resources Services AusAID Australian Agency for International Development CERF UN Central Emergency Response Fund CBO Community Based Organisation CSAP FAO Rome procurement section CTA Chief technical adviser DFID Department for International Development DOF Department of Fisheries (of GOUM) ERC Emergency Recovery / Rehabilitation coordinator ERCU Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations FAO MM Myanmar FAO Representative Office FBA Field Budget Authorisation GAA / KHH Welhungerhilfe GRET Groupe de Rechercher et d’Echanges Technologiques GOUM Government of the Union of Myanmar IP Implementing partner IPM Integrated pest management LOA Letter of agreement (between FAO and IP) LVBD Livestock Breeding and Veterinary Division MOA Memorandum of Agreement MAS Myanma Agricultural Service MSN Mangrove Service Network NGO Non government organisation NRS Northern Rakhine State OE Office of Evaluation PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal RAP FAO Bangkok Regional Office RIR Rhode Island Red (chickens) Sida Swedish Agency for International Development SRG Self Reliance Group SRI System of Rice intensification SHG Self help groups TCE FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division TWG Technical Working Group (a sub-group of the Agriculture Cluster) UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Service USD United States Dollar

Myanmar CERF Country Case Study 1

CERF COUNTRY CASE STUDY REPORT – PROJECTS DESCRIPTION

Country: Myanmar Authors: Ian Teese, mission leader, Win Win Kyi national rural development

consultant Evaluation dates: 27 February to 16 March 2010

Project code:FAO OSRO/MYA/806/CHA OSRO/MYA/903/CHA

CERF 08-FAO-019 09-FAO-008

Project title: Emergency support to restore food security in cyclone NARGIS-affected areas through the provision of agriculture inputs and technical assistance

Empower marginalized landless poor and vulnerable women headed households in Northern Rakhine state through vegetables and poultry production support.

Budget: (in country + total in case of regional projects)

US$ 2 million US$ 400,000

Crisis the project addressed:

Cyclone Nargis Continuing social disruption and food shortages in Northern Rakhine state

Overall objective: To restore and strengthen the food security of the most vulnerable farmers in cyclone-affected provinces through the emergency supply of agriculture inputs (seeds, fertilizers, farming tools, fishing gear, livestock) and to rebuild their livelihoods in a sustainable manner through technical know-how transfer.

To improve the food, nutrient and livelihoods security of the marginalized landless poor and vulnerable women headed households in four townships in Northern Rakhine State.

Planned activities and deliverables:

- 160 MT of paddy seeds and 500 MT of mixed inorganic fertilizers are delivered to 5,000 farming families

- 5,000 packs of assorted vegetable seeds - 500 MT of mixed inorganic fertilizers are

delivered to 5,000 households for increased food production

- 3,000 households are supported with draught animals and poultry

- 13,000 hard hit families recover their livelihoods and resume household food production through supply of agriculture and livestock inputs

- 5,000 packs of assorted vegetable seeds and 500 MT of mixed inorganic fertilizers distributed

- 1,600 packs of 16,000 Rhode Island Red chickens with initial chicken feed packs distributed.

- Training to develop the skills and knowledge of the households receiving the packs

Actual activities undertaken and number of beneficiaries:

- 300 families received 600 buffaloes - 5,500 families received poultry packages

(including 15,000 chickens and 60,000 ducks) - 2,380 households received 200 MT of rice

seeds - 1,947 households received 407 MT of urea

and potash fertilizers

Poor landless and women headed households included: - 3,000 households received vegetable

packs - 1,600 households planned to receive

chicken packs (when distribution can be completed)

Locations / geographic coverage

Bogale, Dedaye, Kyaiklat, Labutta, Mawlamyinegyun and Ngapudaw Townships

Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung

Project duration (planned, formal and actual)

Rapid Response Grant for 3 months Commitment period starting from disbursement date of 10 June 2008 with commitment cut off on 8 September 2008 Procurement finished February 2009

Under-funded grant for 8 months from 20 April 2009 (final LOU signature) to 31 December 2009. Procurement committed by 31 December 2009

Date and length of project completion report

Drafted Feb-Mar 2009 4 pages plus 2 x 1 page success stories.

Drafted March 2010 4 pages plus 2 x 1 page success stories


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction The FAO Office of Evaluation (OE) is conducting an in-depth evaluation of FAO Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funded interventions focusing on project results and the impact at country level using eight country case studies including Myanmar. The CERF projects evaluated in Myanmar were:

• OSRO/MYA/806/CHA - Emergency support to restore food security in cyclone NARGIS-affected areas through the provision of agriculture inputs and technical assistance (US$ 2 ml)

• OSRO/MYA/903/CHA - Empower marginalized landless poor and vulnerable women headed households in Northern Rakhine State through vegetables and poultry production support ($400,000)

Overview The donor support channelled through FAO (from FAO, CERF, SIDA and other agencies) has provided valuable support to the families affected by Cyclone Nargis and the humanitarian crisis in Northern Rakhine State. This was acknowledged by the target households met during the field work. However, the way this support was provided could be improved with more use of standard processes and better surge capacity. Through the strong linkages developed by FAO MM with GOUM through decades of cooperation in agriculture related development projects, FAO was able to respond quickly to the Nargis emergency through close links established with respective line ministries. FAO MM had weaker links with the wider development and UN community in Myanmar, which contributed to the agriculture sector not being included in the first tranche of CERF funding approved a week after the disaster. However, the allocation was later revised (end of May 2008) and funded a project submitted by FAO. The evaluation team highly commends the efforts of all FAO staff and consultants who led and contributed to the response as they worked within a difficult institutional and logistics framework. Myanmar was, until the Cyclone Nargis, a relatively small FAO country office with no Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (ERCU), as until then there had not been major emergencies in the country. In the initial few months after Nargis, FAO/TCE struggled to establish sufficient capacity in Yangon. Ways and means through which FAO could build up its “surge capacity” after a sudden disaster are recommended below. FAO relies on its implementing partners which generally demonstrated a high level of competency and commitment for field presence and experience. There was very positive feedback at field and Yangon levels on the inputs of the FAO technical specialists. IPs valued their support and advice and the manner in which the advice and guidance is provided. The implementing partners are much less satisfied with their relations with the ERCU and process of planning and implementing letters of agreement. Several indicated that they felt they were treated more as service providers rather than full partners. Most respondents appreciated the need for the Agriculture Cluster but had a range of views of its success. Some of these issues relate to way it was coordinated in the first six months. Lessons (these are numbered as in the main report) Lessons #1 Emergency Management Capacity #1.1 Country office capacity To support and, in some cases, manage, the early response to emergency situations, regular FAO country staff need to develop ‘emergency expertise’. This capacity has to be developed and supported through provision of ongoing awareness raising, documented processes (see following lesson) and related implementation training. This may require to integrate emergencies in corporate training programmes and to devote resources either from its regular programme or from a pooled trust fund such as SFERA.


#1.2 Standard processes FAO staff and consultants managing emergency programmes need documented standardised processes, proforma and proven standard accounting and procurement management software that are used from the start. Ultimately, the Oracle systems used by FAO for accounting, manage human resources and processing procurement orders should be expanded to support field operations, including accounting, LOAs tracking and the monitoring of procurement. As developing and rolling out these applications at the country level may take some time, an emergency operations management tool kit is required in the interim, including ready to use spreadsheet formats for field budget monitoring, procurement planning and tracking, monitoring of implementing partner progress against the LOAs and tracking of beneficiary numbers (planned vs. actual), plus associated operations manuals and guidelines. #1.3 Short term resources An important factor determining success or failure of a rapid response is the calibre of the emergency and rehabilitation coordinator (ERC) and the senior support staff. The ERC plays a pivotal role in driving the direction of the response and strong leadership and coordination capacities are needed in country from the outset. It is understood that a roster of experienced consultant resources is being developed by FAO TCE to provide surge capacity to support TCE’s own staff with the immediate responses to emergencies. Consultants with required skills and experience will need training in the standard processes and procedures as proposed above, so as to “hit the road running” when hired to rapidly build up capacity. Investment is also needed in building a core pool of experienced ERCs either through capacity building for HQ operations staff or arrangements like the standing agreements with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which was used effectively to strengthen coordination capacity in Myanmar in the rehabilitation/ recovery phase. TCE and regional office emergency response staff should be prepared and trained to immediately relocate to disaster areas in the field for up to two months while experienced long term consultants are being mobilised. This will require that their workload at Rome or in the regional office be temporarily covered by alternate staff. #1.4 Role of TCE Rome TCE has provided close support to the Myanmar ERCU, justifiably at first but less so nowadays. Given that an experienced ERC is now in place, TCE officers in Rome could delegate more financial and procurement authority to the ERC and ERCU in Myanmar, including using an agreed schedule for Field Budget Authorisations (FBA), while continuing to extend close supervision to less experienced (and proven) ERCs posted elsewhere. #1.5 Decentralization Emergency response is an area where there could be significant benefits in developing regional resources, as developed by FAO in Africa and by other UN emergency response units such as WFP. These would allow faster responses to local emergencies but will also assist in developing relationships, interest and skills in the regional and country offices to support emergency responses. This is being partially achieved in the Bangkok RAP but requires further development. #1.6 Dual roles of emergency response coordinator The ERC is a very demanding and important position as the face of FAO from the beginning of the response and deserves careful attention in terms of selection and training. The skill profiles required to manage an emergency response and the cluster coordination processes are quite different. For the Nargis response, the ERC was assisted by a team of experienced technical consultants to provide specialised support to the Cluster technical working groups. The mission believes that combining the roles is the preferred solution providing the ERC, beyond essential managerial, strategic and fund raising skills, also has good facilitation and relational skills, promotes active Technical Working Group (i.e. sub-groups of the Cluster) activities, delegates the chairmanship of these TWGs to the most appropriate nominee (including NGO representatives if they are interested), and is supported by strong technical specialists and administrative staff. The above attributes should be included in standard selection criteria used for all ERC recruitments.


Lessons #2 Procurement #2.1 Procurement processes As identified above, standardized tools and processes including procurement action progress reporting are needed to provide comprehensive, transparent reporting of procurement planning and progress to all stakeholders including FAO technical departments, implementing partners and government technical departments. The study being conducted by CSAP on country procurement processes could be a first step in this direction. #2.2 Limits on procurement authorisation With the need for immediate procurement of emergency supplies, particularly when they have to be purchased in-country, procurement expenditure limits for in-country procurement should be lifted to more realistic levels (for example, US$ 200,000). This would need improved procurement management and accounting systems to allow close tracking and monitoring of all the steps in the procurement process by FAO HQ (as was occurring during the Nargis response via emails). #2.3 Delegation of procurement responsibilities to implementing partners Just as FAO HQ has delegated implementation for some of larger procurement activities to the ERCU, there may be opportunities to improve the effectiveness of procurement by delegating procurement of some items to the IPs at the implementation level or directly to the beneficiaries through a voucher and fair system, especially when the type of inputs to supply varies significantly from one locality to the next, as was the case with the Nargis response. This would be particularly applicable after the initial emergency response. Most of the implementing partners are experienced in procurement. Experience from the pilot voucher-based distributions in Africa and China should be incorporated into FAO procedures and the emergency operations management tool kit proposed in recommendation 1.2. #2.4 Delegation of specification clearance After experienced FAO technical consultants (or staff) are fielded, FAO HQ should consider delegation of technical clearance of procurement specifications to these technical specialist through the ERCU with appropriate supporting documentation provided to the relevant technical department in Rome. If experienced staff or consultants are not working in the ERCU, responsibility for technical clearance should be delegated to experienced regional technical officers and/or consultants who have a more current appreciation of the local context of recommendations from the ERCU. In Myanmar, the handling of livestock clearances by the Regional Office in Bangkok was a good example of how this could work effectively. With an improved procurement scheduling / monitoring system, the clearance procedures could be modified so that if clearances for specifications are not received or rejected within the planned lead time, authority automatically defaults to the ERCU to issue the clearance based on available technical advice (a No Objection process). #2.5 Use of local varieties/breeds and equipment FAO should minimize procurement of varieties / breeds / types that are not the same as those currently used in the target areas, particularly in the emergency and early rehabilitation phases. #2.6 Animal distribution activities Livestock distribution, at all stages of an emergency response, needs an integrated package of: appropriate breeds of livestock in good health; training of recipients in animal management and use of local feed sources, and access to resourced animal health services. Distribution should be delayed until these conditions are achieved (which will vary with the type of animal – buffalos can be reintroduced much earlier than exotic small animal breeds) and the target households can access suitable and affordable feed resources within their villages. Lessons #3 Targeting #3.1 First response targeting In the immediate response to a disaster, targeting should focus at the village level (selection of most affected villages). In the interest of saving time and protecting cohesion / social capital at the community level at a time when they need it most, the targeted communities should be provided with the opportunity to decide how they want the proposed inputs distributed in a transparent way within their community.


Lessons #4 Stakeholder Interaction #4.1 Role of Government in disaster response The “humanitarian system” tends to ignore national actors, yet as the Nargis case has shown, national actors are usually the first to react to a disaster. Links with the Government also facilitate access and early response by international agencies. FAO should continue to develop and maintain working relationships with governmental and non-governmental national actors which will enhance and allow faster and more effective responses by its emergency programmes and. facilitate transition into subsequent recovery and development programmes. #4.2 Partnerships with NGOs FAO should treat its implementing partners as real partners, systematically include core implementing partners in the design and specification of proposed interventions, and when appropriate support valuable projects designed directly by NGOs themselves. FAO usually contracts its NGO partners through “Letters of Agreement”(LOAs). By nature of the instrument, this implies that the NGO performs its duties as a service provider. To equalize this relationship, more consideration is needed to either adapt the LOA or develop other forms of instruments for NGO partnerships. FAO should continue the excellent work undertaken by the ERCU technical support team and use this experience to strengthen its capacity to support IPs with relevant technical assistance and training during emergency responses. Lesson #5 Reporting #5.1 Consolidated tables of inputs distributed and households benefiting Reports from implementing partners should systematically include a standard, summary table of planned and actual inputs distributed by township, time of distribution and the number of households that benefit versus planned targets.


1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Cyclone Nargis

Cyclone Nargis (Nargis) was the worst natural disaster in the history of Myanmar. It hit Myanmar on 2-3 May 2008, affecting about 2.4 million people in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta (the Delta) and around Yangon causing severe devastation to a major area in Myanmar for rice, other crops and fisheries production. The cyclone destroyed most buildings and much of the forest and mangroves in the Delta and the accompanying storm surge washed away many of the farmers and fishermen personal and productive assets including rice and other crop seed stocks, and livestock and equipment used for land preparation. The surge of salt water across the cropping areas damaged protective levees and embankments and associated water control infrastructure, and contaminated the soils with higher salinity levels. Nargis struck at the end of the dry season rice harvest just before preparation started for planting the monsoon rice crop. The United Nations (UN) and regional organizations quickly responded to the disaster. Immediately following Nargis, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Country Representative (acting) led the initial response supported by the Regional Emergency Coordinator who arrived in Myanmar on 10 May 2008. In early June, FAO established an Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (ERCU) headed by an experienced Emergency Response / rehabilitation Coordinator (ERC) to support a rapid response through funding from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and other donors. The ERCU also supported the ERC as leader of the Agriculture Cluster established under the UN cluster initiative to coordinate immediate relief activities. The ERCU, working in cooperation with government agencies, NGOs, and implementing partners (IPs), managed distribution of necessary agriculture and livestock inputs to affected families across the Delta area. With this support, farmers in cyclone affected areas were able to grow a substantial proportion of their monsoon rice for their own consumption and income generation. A major procurement of buffalo and power tillers replaced some of the cultivation capacity destroyed in Nargis. Small scale fishing gear and some boats for small fishermen were also provided. In addition, restocking with small livestock with emergency feed assisted affected households to regain lost livelihood activities, but also contributed in increasing meat and fresh eggs in the local market.

1.1.2 Humanitarian Response in North Rakhine State

The UN with other donors has been providing support to communities in Northern Rakhine State (NRS) affected by the dislocation over the past 20 years. In 2009, CERF support to FAO through the Under-Funded (UF) mechanism was provided to complement two donor projects implemented by GRET and CARE with additional inputs focusing on the needs of poor landless and women headed households in NRS.

1.2 CERF Evaluation

The CERF, created in December 2005, provides loans and grants to UN agencies to support rapid reaction and response to alleviate the human consequences of emergencies, disasters and crises around the world. FAO is the fourth largest CERF recipient and CERF represents the third largest source of funding for FAO emergency projects. FAO’s Office of Evaluation (OE) is conducting an in-depth evaluation of FAO CERF-funded interventions focusing on project results and the impact at country level using eight country case studies including Myanmar. The case studies will be summarized to identify recurring themes, issues of global relevance and lessons for reporting to FAO Management and the CERF Secretariat.


1.3 Approach

The CERF projects evaluated were:

• OSRO/MYA/806/CHA - Emergency support to restore food security in cyclone NARGIS-affected areas through the provision of agriculture inputs and technical assistance (US$ 2 ml)

• OSRO/MYA/903/CHA - Empower marginalized landless poor and vulnerable women headed households in Northern Rakhine State through vegetables and poultry production support ($400,000)

During the mission, the evaluation team also reviewed the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of a related project funded by the Swedish Agency for International Development (Sida): SRO/MYA/902/SWE - Emergency livelihoods support to Cyclone Nargis affected farmers and fishermen in Myanmar ($1,199,041). OSRO/MYA/806/CHA and OSRO/MYA/902/SWE both respond to Nargis in the Delta area. This report combines the assessment of the two CERF funded activities which will be referred to by their FAO codes. The activities are assessed using the standard DAC evaluation areas (relevance, effectiveness, etc.) supplemented with questions specifically relevant to the CERF evaluation. The evaluation mission1 was fielded from 27 February 2010 following briefings in Rome and at the FAO Bangkok Regional Office (FAORAP). The mission met more than 250 stakeholders in the Delta area (from 2-10 March) and in Yangon during a programme of focused meetings and field discussions including 12 villages with participating households in Bogale, Mawlamyinegyun, and Labutta. Initial findings were circulated and presented in Yangon to FAO and, separately, to its implementation partners. A telephone debriefing was provided for Rome HQ staff.

2 IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW

2.1 Emergency Management Capacity

When cyclone Nargis struck, the post of FAO Representative in Yangon had been vacant for a few months since the previous FAO Representative completed his assignment in early 2008. The function was temporarily entrusted to the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) of the OPEC-funded project for development of domestic edible oils in central Myanmar. This acting FAO Representative led the initial response, supported by the Regional Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator who arrived in Myanmar on 10 May and was able to visit the Delta area, departing on 15 May (see Annex 1.2 for a more comprehensive timeline). An emergency needs assessment team was mobilised, with the team leader arriving on 17 May and the rest of the team on 26 May. Their report was approved by FAO on 11 June and presented to GOUM on 13 June. In early June, FAO established an Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (ERCU) headed by an experienced Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator (ERC) to manage a rapid response through funding from the CERF and other donors. The ERC also acted as the chairperson of the Agriculture Cluster established under the UN cluster initiative to coordinate immediate relief activities. This short term ERC was mobilised on 5 June, one month after Nargis, and provided a greater focus for the emergency response and better interaction with other agencies through the agriculture cluster process. However, even following her arrival, operational support and infrastructures in the Myanmar FAO Representative Office (FAO MM) remained weak during the first few months of the response as additional support was not yet mobilized (or did not arrive in-country)

1 Ian Teese, mission leader / evaluation specialist; Ms Win Win Kyi, national rural development consultant.

Olivier Cossee, (FAO Office of Evaluation) planned and supervised the evaluation.


quickly enough. The ERC was supported with the recruitment of an international monitoring expert fielded in June and an international field operations officer at the end of July 20082. An international Logistics Officer was fielded from beginning of August to November. This initial lack of emergency experience and capacity in FAO Yangon, combined with the omission of FAO from the first round of CERF funding (see Sections 2.2 and 5.1), meant that the first month after Nargis was mainly devoted to needs assessment. The actual response started in June with the arrival of some emergency management capacity and CERF funding. The new FAO Representative arrived in country by mid June 2008 and remained in this position to this day. A long term ERC was fielded in late July 2008 and stayed until the current ERC took over in early 2009. The reported very heavy workload for the first long term ERC may have been exacerbated by him not initiating an agriculture (agronomy) technical working group under the cluster as was done for the livestock, fisheries and forestry sub-sectors. The mission was made aware of some issues impacting on the interactions between the FAO Representation and the ERCU. The parallel reporting lines of the two units as well as cultural differences (technical assistance compared to emergency response) lead to a dichotomy in the FAO country presence. The personality and capacity profiles for country representatives may not align well with the preferred characteristics of high performance emergency response managers. FAO MM (as have other country offices) wants to see greater use made of the Regional office as part of the decentralisation of FAO emergency service delivery from Rome to provide technical clearances and other technical report supplied by Rome based departments.

2.2 Securing CERF Funding

FAO (and the food and food security area) was not included in the first round of CERF funding announced in 11 May 2008. This surprised the FAO MM managers and other rural sector agencies (also see Section 5.1). An important reason for this exclusion was the lack of strong leadership in FAO MM, due to which FAO was perceived as a weak and inefficient agency. The other important factor for the exclusion of FAO in initial round of CERF funding was that the UN community perceived agriculture as an early recovery rather than an emergency need. FAO was not invited to participate in the discussions for the first tranche of CERF funding. The UNCT could not visualize the next rice planting season knocking at the door. Only after much lobbying at both local and HQ levels did it alarm the UNCT that agriculture should be considered with the same urgency, not to jeopardize the food security of survivors. A second phase application was accepted on 23 May 2008 and included funding for the agricultural sector.

2.3 Procurement and Delivery

After securing CERF funding in the second phase application, the fielding of a senior procurement consultant with a long experience of FAO procurement processes, supported by an FAO Operations Clerk (previously worked in CSAP as Procurement Clerk) in early June 2008, allowed procurement to commence quickly with significant delegation of authority to the Myanmar team (compared to the US$50,000 limit for the Country Representative). The procurement missions had the following delegated authorities:

- 1st mission Jun – July 08: USD 300,000 - 2nd mission Sept – Oct 08: USD 500,000

2 As noted in the Agriculture Cluster Review (ACR): ‘However, the overall size of the FAO team remained for several more months significantly below the level that would have been required to fully take on the broad range of urgent tasks expected from a Cluster Lead, while developing and implementing at the same time FAO’s own disaster response programme.’


- 3rd mission Apr – May 09: USD 500,000 In addition, the mission could at any time seek approval by CSAP for direct issuance of order above the specified limits, provided justifications. Given the importance of support to planting the monsoon rice crop, FAO responded quickly, taking account of institutional constraints within Myanmar. Several procurement missions were sent, and the FAO Rome procurement section (CSAP) has been flexible in its interaction with the ERCU including delegating the procurement process for larger procurement activities to the ERCU with the final orders being placed from Rome supported by ERCU generated documentation. A weakness noted by this evaluation in the field is that there is no standard procurement planning / scheduling tool used to establish timetables and measure progress against seasonal deadlines (as were very important in 806/CHA and for the vegetable seed part of 903/CHA). Timeline data for international procurements are held in the CSAP procurement database as part of FAO standard processes, but local procurements data are not part of that database and not digitized in the field. The short term procurement missions were tasked to handle the immediate procurement needs as well as to help build local capacity and examine local processes in procurement. Unfortunately the impact of the procurement missions in strengthening local capacity in procurement processes appear limited from the mission’s findings, possibly due to the tremendous pressures to deliver the procurement actions during the emergency period. One result of unstructured scheduling processes is that IPs complained of short notice for items being delivered, even when several weeks were needed to finalise beneficiary selection and implement pre-delivery training. Also, procurement contracts often specify that suppliers should deliver directly to the IPs, leading to inputs being delivered on very short notice at inconvenient times. Another issue has been the need to obtain technical clearance for procurement specifications from the technical divisions in Rome. In the emergency response period this appears to have been handled effectively, but as the response has moved to recovery/rehabilitation, delays have occurred, slowing down procurement and the clearance of new project proposals.

2.4 Communications

The difficult political and technical environment in Myanmar, the two relief administrative levels (Yangon and district) and number of partners working with the ERCU make communications between the stakeholders more difficult. In Yangon, formal communication processes are assessed as satisfactory and are supported through informal networks, cluster meetings, other development activities and social interaction. At township level, it was reported that there were good informal linkages between FAO staff and the IPs. This is facilitated by a Hub3 Officer. The Hub Officer’s capacity to support IPs in their interaction with Township Peace and Development Committees was reported to vary, and this was confirmed by mission experience.

The main issue appears to come in communications between Yangon and the Delta townships for both the ERCU and the IPs. The Hub Officer process was partially adopted to address the problem for the ERCU / FAO but IPs also need to improve their own communication systems.

3 In the Nargis context, the term “hub” describes a district or regional coordination point or group. This system

of decentralized information sharing and coordination “hubs” was set up by OCHA and ASEAN.


2.5 Beneficiaries Results Assessment

As part of its emergency response, FAO commissioned beneficiary results assessment surveys. These were designed and managed by an experienced FAO consultant. Field work was undertaken by a local NGO, EGRESS, who had not been a field implementing partner. Other assessments were undertaken by other agencies across the same village tracts. The questionnaires were very extensive collecting much socio-economic and technical information relating to the emergency and the response inputs and activities. However, it is unlikely that the data collected has been used extensively as the report is not well presented, does not have a short focused executive summary, some key indicators are missing (measures of changes in household incomes and wealth) and the combinations of inputs provided has not been used to clarify where possible benefits have come from. There is also no evidence of longitudinal time series data on the same households so that the follow-on benefits of inputs (and other side effects) can be assessed. This would allow the survey sample to be reduced while producing more reliable data. These and other weaknesses are being addressed in the new livelihoods survey currently being developed and implemented by the ERCU.

3 RELEVANCE

3.1 Intervention Design and Rationale

In both cases, the interventions were highly relevant to the emergencies being addressed. The inputs provided through 806/CHA (seed, fertilizer, drought power, fishing gear) were high priority areas to restore the productive capacity of farmers and fisher folk in the Delta. The proposal to distribute small livestock was an attempt to address the needs of landless households excluded from agricultural input distributions. The inputs provided under 903/CHA provided additional incremental resources to respond to the needs of poor landless and women headed households in the two ongoing donor funded projects implemented by GRET and CARE, in NRS. Both interventions were appropriate uses for the CERF funding mechanisms as the inputs provided mostly had short term benefits. For 806/CHA, an immediate response was needed to support planting of the monsoon rice crop which is the largest rice crop in the Delta area and to allow the small fishermen to restart their activities to provide basic food and generate income. For 903/CHA, improvement of summer vegetable production for the target groups provided a means to quickly improve their nutrition, making use of land and labour resources not being used during the dry season. However, the poultry distribution activity was less appropriate as small animal production involves greater risks than crop production and a much longer lead time to improve nutrition and/or income for the target groups. The additional CERF funds allowed pre-existing projects in NRS to include a larger number of their target vulnerable households in their activities.

3.2 Targeting

(a) 806/CHA

The letters of agreement (LOA) prepared for 806/CHA only specified that inputs were provided for ‘distribution to Cyclone Nargis affected households….’4. There was no specific reference to preferred sub-groups within Nargis affected households. In practice, the evaluation found that the IPs had targeted communities most affected by Nargis.

4 Paragraphs I and 2 of the background paper attached to 806/CHA LOAs.


An initial proposal to focus on HHs with <2 acres of paddy was modified to take into account the large land holdings of many farmers. The criteria were increased to < 5-10 acres. A complicating factor for targeting was that there had been limited development activities in the Delta area by NGOs and other international development agencies prior to Nargis, so that initial GOUM statements on the number of rice farmers overstated the number of rice farmers and did not indicate the large number of landless labourers dependent on land owners for income generating work. As awareness developed of the number of landless households dependent on paid work, later interventions were specifically directed to activities such as small animal distributions to provide some support to that substantial group. Following formal and informal5 community consultation, the IPs distributed the inputs with processes agreed with the communities to minimise possible community tensions by aligning with local social norms for the community to work together and share inputs amongst the agreed most needy households. In some cases reported to the mission, the inputs were distributed equally amongst the agreed group of poorer households, rather than attempting to wealth rank or prioritise the whole group and only support part of the group. No examples of inappropriate allocations have been noted by the mission during the field work. Given the timeframe, field conditions and urgency to support planting of the monsoon rice crop, this mission accepts the appropriateness of the targeting mechanisms used for the short term response. Where only large items (buffaloes, piglets, power tillers) were provided, groups or livestock banks were set up to take responsibility for power tillers, buffaloes and piglet distributions so the benefits would be more widely distributed. These groups are in the early stages of development so their sustainability is not proven but feedback during the field work was positive. Many boats (and some buffaloes) were allocated by lottery amongst members of the agreed target group, as the number of boats provided was very limited compared to the entitled beneficiaries in the village. Along the same line, some IPs (including Save the Children, UNDP and GRET) are supporting development of self help groups (SHG), revolving funds for savings and credit groups, and specialized seed production, power tiller and similar technically-focused groups. There is a range of views on which should be the targeted groups during the rehabilitation phase, including on how to: (i) best assist the landless labourers, some preferring direct support while others emphasise the need to support the middle sized farmers who would then employ more labourers6; and, (ii) improve local production of quality rice seed which may be more efficiently produced by more experienced middle sized farmers. However, in the immediate response phase before planting of the monsoon rice crop, it would have been very difficult to implement more sophisticated assistance activities such as supporting specialist rice seed producers to increase improved rice seed production, as some NGOs working in the Delta are now doing.

(b) 903/CHA

The IPs for the CERF 903/CHA activities in NRS have taken a more rigorous approach to targeting poor landless or women-headed households. This is consistent with activities already being implemented and facilitated by the overall project targeting processes (wealth ranking through community meetings.

5 At this stage, immediately after the disaster, extensive community consultations as undertaken in a normal rural

development activity would have been an unjustifiable imposition on the time and priorities of the target groups. 6 This could be referred to as a ‘trickle down' process.


The documentation provided and discussions with the IPs indicate that they used their experience working in the area and with the target groups to direct the inputs and supporting capacity building to the poor landless and women headed households.

4 PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION

4.1 Implementation Partners

Annex 4 provides a matrix of the main implementing partners for both CERF grants, their roles and comments about their inputs. In all cases, the IPs main role has been to implement distribution of inputs supplied through the ERCU and provide agreed technical training and support activities. The ERCU’s role was to raise funds, specify and implement procurement, coordinate and monitor delivery of the procured items to the agreed target groups, and provide technical support. The ERCU, using mainly other donor funds (AusAID, DFID, Italy, etc.) but also some CERF funding, has provided international and local technical consultants to support the operations of the ERCU in Yangon and at township level. The IPs selected for 806/CHA were the main NGOs and agencies active at the time of Nargis with memorandums of understanding (MOU) with GOUM to operate in Myanmar and known to the FAO country office. They were: CESVI (operating in Dedaye township), IDE (Kyaiklat), GAA / KHH (Bogale), UNDP (Labutta, Mawlamyinegyun, Ngapudaw) and EGRESS (which implemented the beneficiaries’ results assessment surveys). UNDP was the only IP which FAO had worked with previously in Myanmar. Unlike some NGOs, FAO did not mobilize staff working on projects in other parts of Myanmar (such as the Dry Zone project) to support implementation in the Delta. Some senior staff from other FAO projects provided Yangon based support. For 903/CHA, the two NGOs (CARE and GRET/LIFA7) were selected because of their long term on-the-ground implementation experience in NRS. Neither NGO had worked directly with FAO but both had had close interaction with the FAO implemented European Union project in NRS undertaking similar activities across NRS and also through the NRS Food Security coordination group chaired by FAO.

4.2 Partner Performance

Discussions with stakeholders confirmed progress and completion report information that the IPs had largely achieved the targets established in the LOAs. Although not directly applying to the CERF funded activities, an issue identified during visits to two villages during the field work was that technical support and training specified in the LOAs to support crop growing inputs provided had not been adequate. In both cases8, the IPs / NGOs did not have specific expertise in agronomy or agriculture. Areas of concern with LOAs raised by IPs included:

(i) Recovery of IP costs Budgeting arrangements in the LOAs limit the ability of IPs to recover overhead technical and management costs and also administration costs.

(ii) Extensions of project and LoA durations These were raised several times as a difficult area, particularly when extensions of LoA implementing periods were requested by FAO for reasons outside the control of the IPs. Requesting extensions near the start of an LOA

7 LIFA is an NGO formed by a group of experienced national consultants who had worked for GRET in

implementing a major EU funded rural development program in NRS. When the program was reduced in size, the retrenched staff formed LIFA. GRET supported the group and allowed them to work from the GRET Maungdaw office. 8 The villages were in areas serviced by Save the Children (Labutta) and the Myanmar Baptist Convention

(Mawlamyinegyun).


must undermine IP and donor confidence in FAO / ERCU planning capacity. For activities which contain a training / extension component, unless the extra time is requested before or just after field work starts, it is very difficult for an IP to find resources within their budgets to continue farmer extension support until the inputs finally arrive. This is particularly difficult when no contingencies have been allowed in the budget so additional expenses need to be found from cost savings. Most LOAs have a very short life and their budgets have little surplus available to cover unforeseen delays.

4.3 Partner Roles

For 806/CHA (Nargis response), the IPs were not involved in the design process but were invited to participate based on their ability to service different areas of the Delta and previous experience in Myanmar. FAO designed the CERF Delta interventions in response to needs identified in the Needs Assessment undertaken in the first month after Nargis and discussed with FAO’s long term GOUM ministry partners. At that time, the agriculture cluster was in its formation stages so could not make a significant contribution to development of the proposal. The FAO managed activities were part of a much larger response program through the Delta in which IPs took responsibility for village tracts within townships to minimise the degree of duplication in supply of the same inputs (although different NGOs may have worked in the same village providing support to different sub-sectors, eg. water supply, sanitation and hygiene, health, nutrition, food, education and shelter. The Agriculture Cluster and township coordination committees provided a framework for sharing of information on where and what types of interventions NGOs were providing. During the field work, there were no indications of overlapping of roles; rather, each NGO had a clear role in agriculture and fisheries in their allocated area. For 903/CHA in NRS, the CERF proposal was developed closely with the two proposed NGO partners to deliver complementary priority activities to their ongoing projects.

4.4 FAO Contribution

The FAO role in planning and implementing the CERF activity is valued by GOUM. In the difficult social and political environment in Myanmar, FAO was the only UN agency with strong relationships with the Government in the agriculture / rural sectors (as evidenced by the invitation to join the Minister for Forests in the Delta immediately after the disaster for the first damages and needs assessment). However, the mission believes this strong relationship with GOUM was misunderstood or ill perceived by other Yangon based UN agencies in the initial response to Nargis. Discussions indicate that this may have been largely due to the low profile of FAO MM in Yangon level agency activities (outside the agriculture sector) accentuated by the significant lag between the previous FAO Representative completing his assignment in early 2008 and the mobilisation of the new FAO Representative in mid June 2008. The FAO Representative (acting) only became aware of the implications of these weak linkages with the UN country team after the disaster occurred. As noted in other parts of the report, the capacity and readiness of FAO MM at the time of the disaster was inadequate. The new Representative has addressed some of these issues.

4.5 Agriculture Cluster

A first cluster leads’ meeting took place in Yangon on 2 May 2008, during which the following clusters were activated, each with their respective chair:

- Food (WFP); - Emergency Shelter (UNHCR/IFRC); - WASH (UNICEF);


- Health (WHO); - Logistics (WFP); - Nutrition (UNICEF); - Emergency Telecommunications (WFP); and - Early Recovery (UNDP).

The activation of a stand-alone Agriculture Cluster a week later, following a request by the FAOR a.i. (supported by FAO headquarters) on 9 March 20089. Clusters started meeting in Yangon to draw sectoral response plans and, once the need for a flash appeal and an application for CERF were confirmed, developing plans and project profiles for these two instruments. The first Agriculture Cluster meeting convened on 13 May 2008. Chairmanship and animation of the Agriculture Cluster was given due priority during the Nargis response. The capacity of FAO to undertake this function was supported by a specific DfID project (OSRO/MYA/808/UK – Coordination of Cyclone Nargis Agricultural Emergency and Rehabilitation Interventions). The cluster and its two “technical working groups” on fisheries and livestock comprised all major players in the crops, livestock and fisheries sub-sectors, inter alia, donors, United Nations agencies, Government line departments and international and national NGOs. The performance of the cluster was evaluated by the cluster itself in 2009 in what become known as the Agriculture Cluster Review (ACR)10. Discussions during the mission indicate that FAO did not gain maximum benefit from its role in leading the agriculture cluster. Goodwill developed with other cluster stakeholders over the difficult early months as the initial ERC / cluster coordinator tried to balance the limited knowledge and understanding of the agricultural sector by new NGOs and actors, with the need to mobilise and deliver resources to the disaster area. Several factors may have led to cluster participants becoming less engaged with the cluster activities in the second half of 2008 (also see the agriculture cluster review report) and, possibly, seeing FAO as a competitor for fund raising rather than as a neutral coordinator maximising external funding flowing to the agriculture and fisheries sector. This may have been partially due to a crops/agronomy working group not being established (alongside the fisheries, livestock and forestry working groups) as the then ERC / cluster coordinator took direct responsibility for the coordination of agronomy issues. During implementation, IPs appreciated the technical support provided by the international and local technical consultants managed by the ERCU and funded through several donor agencies. These consultants provided technical leadership, developed specifications for procurement, led training and capacity building and contributed to development of proposals for additional donor support to the recovery process.

5 EFFICIENCY

Timelines of the key dates for planning, disbursement and reporting on the two CERF grants are provided in Annex 1. A listing of key dates of major events during the CERF implementations is also provided.

5.1 Timeliness of Preparation

The issues involved in FAO not being included in the first round of CERF funding have been well documented in email correspondence and other reports. The mission concluded that the reasons for this included: (i) the longer term underdeveloped linkages between the FAO Representative office and the broader UN, donor and development community in Yangon; and (ii) difficulties with managing relationships with one key UN humanitarian decision maker. These difficulties were largely outside of 9 Other clusters and thematic working groups were subsequently set up, including Education, Protection of Women and Children, Temporary Settlement, etc. 10

Agriculture Cluster Review and Lessons Learned, FAO/René Suter, 2009.


FAO/TCE’s control. TCE reacted quickly to being left out of the first tranche and used appropriate resources to ensure that it was included in second round of funding approved by the end of May and released by early June.

5.2 Timeliness of Implementation

The main activity was procurement of high priority inputs so this discussion focuses on the efficiency of procurement. Analysis of the timeliness of the procurement processes was somewhat difficult because only limited information pertaining to international procurements was available for the FAO Rome procurement database and no systematic database was found in the ERCU to track the procurement process. In both cases, no or limited information is available on when items were finally delivered to the townships for distribution to affected villages. Only one (of 4) NGO completion report (GAA/WHH11) specified actually delivery dates to villages. Another issue was that most procurement was funded by a package of funds from FAO TCP, 806/CHA and donor funds so it is impossible to attribute specific items to the CERF funding only. FAO accounts show that the CERF project paid for 67% of all items procured during the first two months on the response (June and July 2008). Figure 1 compares the amount of procurement charged on 806/CHA with that of other projects implemented during the period.

(a) 806/CHA

CERF resources were made available before any other donor’s funds and allowed early orders to be placed and early delivery to occur during the rice planting season in the Delta. Most delays were caused by the need to work within a controlled supply environment where there was limited access to and restrictions on directly imported supplies (which also may have taken longer to deliver). With two significant exceptions (hand tools and superintendent contract, see below), FAO HQ worked very effectively to support and implement the procurement program. The request for technical clearance for most crop inputs was received at TCE on 4 June 2008 (i.e. before the procurement consultant arrived in Myanmar) and cleared by 13 June. Therefore technical

11

GAA/WHH provided a very comprehensive completion report including details on deliver times and when the items were delivered to villages.

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

2008-06 2008-07 2008-08 2008-09 2008-10 2008-11 2008-12

Figure 1: Procurement Disbursement for Nargis-related Projects (initial months only)

OSRO/MYA/804/UK

OSRO/MYA/806/CHA Others (802/ITA + 805/SWE + 808/UK + TCP/MYA/3103)


clearance did not cause any delay to the procurement process12. Buffalo procurement procedures were developed with the RAP livestock specialist and agreed to by GOUM on 6 June, 2008. The constraints to earlier delivery of goods were the slow mobilisation of specialist emergency response, procurement and logistics resources to undertake the basic procurement activities which were well beyond the capacity of FAO MM staff. Earlier mobilisation may have allowed the country-specific issues of procurement through government controlled supply chains to be addressed sooner. Once the specialist procurement and technical specialists were mobilised, innovative ways were found to address procurement of rice seed and buffalos. The delivery lags were a reflection of the time needed to work through negotiations so that orders could be placed and rice seed and buffalos to be purchased and delivered. Once the processes were agreed, delivery occurred quickly. The high priority procurement activities were the rice seed, power tillers and buffalos to support planting of the monsoon rice crop which is planted by mid July (this varies slightly across the Delta). The deadline was met. However, other parts of the procurement activity were significantly slower. Rice Records provided to the mission indicate that 643 MT of local and high yielding varieties of rice were delivered to the target townships for distribution between 2 and 21 July with the majority delivered by 11 July so that it was available for sowing at the appropriate time. This was within 4-5 weeks of the procurement activity being launched and, as with the buffalo procurement, is a credit to the ERCU and FAO emergency response team in developing processes to source the seed locally within FAO procurement guidelines. Delivery was undertaken without full support and supervision of a superintendant organisation as FAO had not been able to complete a contract with the preferred supplier (SGS) before the rice was delivered. The mission received feedback that some of the rice seed provided had low germination rates. The suppliers replaced several batches of low germination seed. Simple tests could have been implemented by the ERCU (or in Bangkok or by MAS) to test samples of the rice seeds shipments, if required. One IP reported that, when it followed up reports of poor germination, it found that the issue was mainly one of sowing techniques as the seed had been directly sown on poorly prepared rice fields. This poor preparation could be expected with the limited ground preparation capacity after Nargis. Buffalo Under guidance of the FAO RAP livestock adviser, a procurement process was developed to quickly source buffalo from outside the Delta (in Bago Division) as required under the GOUM livestock replacement policies. From 19 June to 12 July, FAO staff and LBVD specialists visited eight animal markets where 605 buffalos were bought. They were delivered by mid July so were able to be used for ploughing, at least where farmers could access cultivation equipment to suit the buffalo. A small complication was that due to the holding and transport times required for purchasing and delivery, some buffalo were not in optimum conditions for working on arrival. Power Tillers The other major procurement was in power tillers with 275 units being purchased. This was achieved very efficiently with the orders placed for a preferred brand (Dong Feng) by 9 July to be delivered within two weeks. Complications arose in the purchasing of necessary diesel and oil supplies to support the equipment. The ERCU was able to develop processes to access diesel supplies in the Delta within a Government controlled supply chain. However due to the time needed to develop the understanding and linkages, machines were delivered without the necessary fuel and oil supplies. In most cases, groups allocated the supplies were able to access alternative sources and often arranged exchanges of fuel and oil which were returned when the CERF funded diesel and oil could be accessed.

12

With one major exception, the hand tools procurement where the technical specifications prepared in FAO Rome could not be met by local suppliers.


Small animals There have been some major losses (more than 40 %) during distribution of chickens and ducks, particularly during the emergency response phase when ducklings that were too young were distributed (possibly to maximise the no. of beneficiaries). Ducklings died after they were transported to the villages because of unfavorable weather condition, long trip and stress during transportation. In some areas, animals suffered from dehydration because of a lack of water after arrival or long distance transportation. The young birds also needed special feed in the first few weeks, which was not always available. Fertiliser Fertiliser is not normally used extensively on the monsoon rice crop apart from in the nursery phase which would have been in June before shipments could commence. The first orders were placed from Rome in mid July 2008 with the second orders being placed later in the year (after the planned three month CERF period). All the fertilisers supplied were mineral fertilisers unlike the later enriched compost fertilisers procured under later contracts. Hand Tools Procurement of hand cultivation tools was not timely. Technical specifications13 for the tools prepared by the relevant FAO technical division (AGST) could not be tested by local suppliers so local suppliers could not comply. FAO HQ then implemented international procurement (value US$ 132,753) for the tools sourced from China through an Indian supplier, who finally delivered them in early 2009. Feedback from the field was that the tools had some differences from locally made tools usually used. The mission is not convinced the delay greatly improved the procurement outcome as households had lost their basic tools and could have made good use of locally sourced tools earlier.

(b) 903/CHA

The grants were applied for, secured and disbursed in a timely way which did not impact on effectiveness. Vegetable Seed Procurement for vegetable seeds specified for the dry season commenced on 14 September 2009 with a planned delivery date of 15 October. The actual delivery to NRS was late October which just met the requirements of the IPs and their target households. It is unclear why this procurement had such a short lead time (starting one month before the planned delivery date) when the grant had been approved in April 2009. Poultry packages The initial stage of procurement of the poultry packages was implemented in a timely way to suit the requirement for delivery during the dry season and the lead time needed to hatch the required chickens. The planned delivery date in the request for quotation (RFQ) of 14 October was changed on the purchase order to 30 December which was one day before the nominated activity completion date in the LOA with GRET. Due to suffocation and air pressurization during the first consignment, 46 % of the chickens sent by airfreight to Sittwe died. These were replaced at supplier’s expense and the replacements sent by road arriving in Maungdaw on 10 January 2010 with a loss 1-2% due to death. By this time, an avian influenza alert had been initiated so further movements of the chickens has been stopped and the planned recipients are now reluctant to receive any poultry from outside their villages. After lifting movement restrictions, transportation and distribution of chickens in NRS was completed by 28 March 2010

5.3 Factors Impacting on Timeliness

Once received, both CERF grants were largely applied for, secured and disbursed in a timely way which did not impact on effectiveness. The grant related to Nargis was received one month after the

13

The specifications included detailed analysis of the steel used which required access to specialised testing laboratories.


disaster because FAO was not included in the first allocation, as explained above. However, a more important constraint to delivery times during the first few months, after the magnitude of the disaster became clear, was the slow mobilisation of surge capacity in terms of emergency specialists and procurement officers. This limited personnel dispatched to Myanmar worked tirelessly to achieve timely delivery. The documentation and procurement information provided to the mission indicates that, apart from the tools procurement example above, there were no systematic problems that hindered timeliness during the two CERF activities. No examples have been observed of delayed response requiring changes to the planned procurement activities. However, there is evidence that later procurement activities implemented through the ERCU for other donor grants (including 902/SWE) had more significant delays.

5.4 Monitoring and Continuous Learning

The ERCU and donors have monitored CERF activities in the field. This has been facilitated by the placement of FAO national technical consultants in some townships to provide technical support to the IPs. The HUB officer positions have allowed more regular field monitoring and closer interaction with the IPs providing informal feedback. HUB officers met during the field work reported visiting a significant proportion (up to 50 %) of villages that had received inputs through the ERCU (these inputs were funded through different donor grants). The main area of concern raised during the field visits was in the feedback loop in the specifying of items for procurement. There are indications of good informal feedback from IPs on their local experience but this can be difficult to translate into village specific procurement across an area with different local needs (eg. rice varieties tolerant to saline soils and also maturity period to fit in with following dry season crops). Centralized procurement makes a precise fit between local needs and the provided items almost impossible to achieve.

6 EFFECTIVENESS

6.1 Impact on Beneficiaries

As indicated above, the beneficiary selection criteria specified in the LOAs for the CERF funded projects have been largely applied and have succeeded in delivering the inputs to the target groups.

(a) 806/CHA

Information collected during the field work indicated that the productive inputs provided through 806/CHA were an important input to the target families in the months after the emergency. In most cases, beneficiary households received enough seed for about 2 acres of monsoon paddy. Most households had 5- 10 acres of paddy land so still had to source additional seed from other sources including borrowing additional money to buy seed. Based on the information provided in surveys in 200814, 50 %-60 % of paddy land was planted so most households had to obtain extra seed for 4-6 acres (2-3 times the seed supplied through FAO) These families had to purchase or borrow their basic crop production requirements as most of their assets had been washed away. Interest rates in the Delta area were reported to be 8% to 10 % per month which make borrowing extremely expensive so households were very reluctant to borrow for crop inputs. Each basket of seed (and associated inputs) distributed reduced the amounts that households had to borrow.

14

The report of the draft Beneficiaries’ Results Assessment Survey, May 2009, (Table 16) indicated an average paddy area of 11.6 acres.


(b) 903/CHA

The 3,000 landless families in NRS targeted by the vegetable seed activity had planted their seed and were about to start harvesting their crops in early March when the evaluation took place. Anecdotal information from the CARE and GRET field teams indicated that most of the households who planted vegetables would harvest more than enough vegetables for their own use and would have small surpluses for sale. Unfortunately the problems caused by the avian influenza outbreak delayed transportation and distribution process to beneficiaries. The project however completed chicken distribution to the planned 1,600 beneficiary households by 28 March 2010.

6.2 Cost-Effectiveness

In the initial immediate response phase to provide inputs to the monsoon growing season, the approach used by TCE and the ERCU with centralised procurement supporting IPs at field level was appropriate. However, after this stage, more flexibility and tailoring of inputs to localised needs may improve the distribution of items such as seed, fertiliser and livestock procurement by devolving more procurement responsibility down to the IPs at township level. In addition to facilitating closer alignment of village level needs with items procured, this would provide the IPs with more control over the supply chain. Anecdotal information indicates that centralised procurement does not always guarantee the lowest cost. Most of the IPs used have experience in large procurement activities (and some undertook them during the emergency) for international donor agencies.

6.3 Sustainability

(a) 806/CHA

The FAO responses to the Nargis emergency was largely through the supply of inputs, with some associated technical assistance. Although not explicitly stated in the design documents, the main contribution to sustainability was through the use of locally available seed and inputs that reduced the learning curve for communities using the inputs and meant that the same (or similar) inputs would be available in the local markets for purchase when input distribution ceased. The power tillers provided were appropriate technology for the area and were already being used (to a much lesser extent than now).

(b) 903/CHA

The CERF inputs formed an integrated part of the development projects which the IPs were implementing and added value to the ongoing activities. However, the proposed inputs for 903/CHA raise more sustainability issues. Most of the vegetable seeds provided were hybrids which meant that new seed would have to be purchased each season. The mission acknowledges that highly productive non-hybrid vegetable is more difficult to source and is difficult to find in NRS. However, given the seed was to be provided to the poorest families, they would have great difficulties purchasing more hybrid seed for the next season. Also, as already noted by the IPs, the quantities of seed supplied will not provide a significant surplus for sale to generate cash to buy more seed next season. The poultry package distribution has more fundamental weaknesses with the suitability of the Rhode Island Red breed15 selected and distributed to survive (and multiply) in the subsistence environment in a poor family house yard.

15

Rhode Island Red is a layer chicken breed for egg production which is much larger size than traditional village chickens.


6.4 Environmental issues

Most of the inputs provided had limited potential to create any adverse environmental affects if they were used in the normal way. One IP reported issues with a broad spectrum insecticide (Deltamethrin) supplied under 806/CHA. Discussions with ERCU staff and review of the correspondence indicate that a decision to supply insecticides in the first procurement (as emergency relief) was made even though it was not clear what the specific pest problems could be. A broad spectrum insecticide was recommended by the ERCU technical staff (seconded high level MAS technical managers who also consulted with their field technical colleagues). Their recommendation received prompt technical clearance by the technical division in Rome (AGPP) which had understood the chemical was for use in other crops apart from rice. A later email from the technical division indicates that clearance would not have been given if it was known the chemical could be applied to rice crops especially early in their growing season. This is because, if used early in a rice crop growing cycle, Deltamethrin can remove natural predators of the Brown Plant Hopper which then would become a problem later in the growth cycle. The insecticides had been released to IP / MAS storage when this issue arose, and instructions were given that the chemical should only be distributed to farmers if an outbreak of the pest occurred. No other problems with the chemical have been reported. The mission believes that the issue was dealt with effectively. However, this issue highlights the difficulties faced by FAO technical divisions providing technical backstopping to a large number of emergency projects, generally with insufficient information on the specific agro-ecological conditions in the area where the projects will operate.

7 CONNECTEDNESS AND PROGRAMME APPROACH

7.1 Role Played by the CERF Projects in the Emergency Response

A programme map is attached in Annex 3.

(a) 806/CHA

The first CERF proposal was well integrated with the two FAO TCF grants (TCP/MYA/3103 and TCP/MYA/3203), as well as the DFID and Italian funded emergency projects (OSRO/MYA/804/UK and OSRO/MYA/802/ITA) provided and used to fund the initial needs assessment and then some specific emergency inputs. The CERF project paid for 67% of the inputs procured during the first two months of the response. As the ERCU was mobilised and resourced, it became a focal point for other donor funding (DFID, Italian, Japan, Sweden, Australian and Austrian) to be directed to food security activities across the Delta to IPs working in all the affected areas. Without the CERF funding and support to the ERCU through DFID, FAO may not have been able to maintain its position as the lead food security agency, and donors may have moved more quickly to working directly with the stronger NGOs. FAO probably did not gain best advantage from its role in leading the agriculture cluster because of the perceive conflicts of interest, particularly in the crops / agronomy area where a working group was not formed to allow the IPs and other stakeholders to readily contribute to development of new funding proposals and the sharing of experiences and future needs. This weakness made the work of the agronomy consultants to link with partners in the field even more valuable.


FAO has been able to ensure that funds from one donor could be distributed across all or many affected areas, thus improving coverage of needs. If donors supported only one or a few NGOs, the spread would have been less. Also channelling funds through FAO brought economies of scale in procurement and financial management, and allowed for coordination across NGOs operating in the agriculture sector. Access to FAO technical support would also reassure donors that less experienced NGOs could gain the support they needed. This technical support was also useful for the technical NGOs by providing a sounding board for development and scheduling introduction of new NGO initiatives for rehabilitation and development. The training resources to complement these activities were valued by IPs. FAO’s contracting of GOUM technical agency staff as consultants also provided a mechanism for IPs to access GOUM technical services. Discussions during the field work indicate that these advantages are now less important, as during the rehabilitation and possible development phases, experienced NGOs and UNDP may be perceived as providing a more effective delivery mechanism.

(b) 903/CHA

The CERF funding has linked strongly into the ongoing crisis response programs in NRS but has mainly provided incremental rather than catalytic funding to these activities as the initiatives funded (vegetable production and poultry raising) are already being implemented in the area by the EU funded and FAO implemented project (GCP/MYA/009/EC).

7.2 Linkages to Country and FAO Development Strategies

The main longer term benefits flowing from the initial CERF funding secured by FAO is that it provided the catalyst for additional funding to support recovery and rehabilitation being channelled through the ERCU. This also provides a link to the medium term development framework that FAO has assisted the GOUM to develop and disseminate amongst development partners in Myanmar. The focus of the ERCU on central procurement from Yangon (for governance and accountability reasons) implies that the response has not contributed substantially to re-establishing and, more importantly, further developing the agriculture supply chains in the Delta. This was further reinforced by the emphasis of providing in-kind support with minimal use of vouchers or cash to stimulate linkages between the target households and local suppliers. Other agencies working in the Delta16 made more extensive use of alternative delivery mechanisms which would contribute to stronger supply chains post-emergency. The same issues apply to implementation of the NRS CERF activity where inputs were provided from outside the area rather than positively trying to use existing supply chains in or adjoining NRS17 (as introduced by GRET with its input supply shops) to stimulate their development. A weakness of the approach followed by the ERCU is that there were limited structured processes to develop awareness and capacity in disaster management and transfer management systems and process to GOUM agency staff.18 However, the policy of contracting experienced senior technical agency staff as national technical consultants and the strong linkages developed with the MAS, LBVD and the Department of Fisheries (and the Department of Forestry – although their role was not as important in the Delta) have ensured a strong transfer of experience and knowledge to senior local technical managers which they will be able to use in future emergencies.

16

For example: GRET with a focus on developing rice seed production and distribution and IDE providing immediate cash grants to rice farmers so they could employ labour. 17

An alternative, possibly lower risk way to supply poultry to NRS could have been to arrange to purchase (or hatch) chicks near Sittwe where they could then be grown out before transporting to the three target townships. 18

This also possibly applies to FAO Representative office staff as the ERCU and FAO Representative office did not have formal links and have different reporting processes.


In the second half of 2008, the ERC and FAO consultants attached to the ERCU provided inputs to the development of the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP), which laid out the ongoing development needs for all sectors, including livelihoods, affected by Nargis up until 2011 with more detailed requirements for three periods leading to the end date. This was a long and protracted process and it is yet unclear whether the PONREPP will succeed in guiding and buttressing resource mobilisation during the recovery phase. In connection with the PONREPP, it should also be mentioned that FAO continued its Coordination Leadership under a new structure as the Chair of the Delta Livelihoods Recovery Working Group (DLRWG), after the Cluster system was called to an end by the UNRC/HC on 30 June 2009.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

8.1 Overview

The donor support channelled through FAO (from FAO, CERF, SIDA and other agencies) has provided valuable support to the families affected by Cyclone Nargis and the humanitarian crisis in Northern Rakhine State. This was acknowledged by the target households met during the field work. However, the way this support was provided could be significantly improved with more use of standard processes and better surge capacity. Thanks to the strong linkages developed by FAO MM with GOUM through decades of cooperation in agriculture related development projects, FAO was able to respond quickly to the Nargis emergency through close links established with respective line ministries. FAO relies on its implementing partners with field implementation presence and experience to deliver this support at field level cost-effectively. The partners met during the evaluation (supported by reviews of documentation) generally demonstrated a high level of competency and commitment. The evaluation team highly commends the efforts of all those who led and contributed to the response, including the FAO Representative (acting), the new FAO Representative, the successive FAO emergency response / rehabilitation coordinators (ERC) and regional and Rome based emergency response resources, who all worked within a very difficult institutional and logistics framework in the initial response period.

8.2 Emergency Management Processes

Immediately after Nargis, FAO had to rely on staff in FAO MM to manage the emergency response, supported by TCE from Rome. Without standardized response systems and staff trained in emergencies in country, this initial phase was made more difficult than necessary. The lag of four weeks in mobilising an experienced short term ERC after Nargis, combined with the failure to secure Round one CERF funding, contributed to a slower than desirable response. From end of July 2008 to early 2009, the fielding of a relatively inexperienced long term ERC was compensated by TCE Rome keeping the “budget holding” responsibility and engaging in constant supervision of field staff. The first long term ERC should probably have been replaced sooner. TCE Rome continues to closely manage ERCU activities even though an experienced ERC is now in place and much of the responsibility for day to day operational and financial management control could be delegated to him.


Lessons #1 Emergency Management Capacity #1.1 Country office capacity To support and, in some cases, manage, the early response to emergency situations, regular FAO country staff need to develop ‘emergency expertise’. This capacity has to be developed and supported through provision of ongoing awareness raising, documented processes (see following lesson) and related implementation training. This may require to integrate emergencies in corporate training programmes and to devote resources either from its regular programme or from a pooled trust fund such as SFERA. #1.2 Standard processes FAO staff and consultants managing emergency programmes need documented standardised processes, proforma and proven standard accounting and procurement management software that are used from the start. Ultimately, the Oracle systems used by FAO for accounting, manage human resources and processing procurement orders should be expanded to support field operations, including accounting, LOAs tracking and the monitoring of procurement. As developing and rolling out these applications at the country level may take some time, an emergency operations management tool kit is required in the interim, including ready to use spreadsheet formats for field budget monitoring, procurement planning and tracking, monitoring of implementing partner progress against the LOAs and tracking of beneficiary numbers (planned vs. actual), plus associated operations manuals and guidelines. #1.3 Short term resources An important factor determining success or failure of a rapid response is the calibre of the emergency and rehabilitation coordinator (ERC) and the senior support staff. The ERC plays a pivotal role in driving the direction of the response and strong leadership and coordination capacities are needed in country from the outset. It is understood that a roster of experienced consultant resources is being developed by FAO TCE to provide surge capacity to support TCE’s own staff with the immediate responses to emergencies. Consultants with required skills and experience will need training in the standard processes and procedures as proposed above, so as to “hit the road running” when hired to rapidly build up capacity. Investment is also needed in building a core pool of experienced ERCs either through capacity building for HQ operations staff or arrangements like the standing agreements with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which was used effectively to strengthen coordination capacity in Myanmar in the rehabilitation/ recovery phase. TCE and regional office emergency response staff should be prepared and trained to immediately relocate to disaster areas in the field for up to two months while experienced long term consultants are being mobilised. This will require that their workload at Rome or in the regional office be temporarily covered by alternate staff. #1.4 Role of TCE Rome TCE has provided close support to the Myanmar ERCU, justifiably at first but less so nowadays. Given that an experienced ERC is now in place, TCE officers in Rome could delegate more financial and procurement authority to the ERC and ERCU in Myanmar, including using an agreed schedule for Field Budget Authorisations (FBA), while continuing to extend close supervision to less experienced (and proven) ERCs posted elsewhere. #1.5 Decentralization Emergency response is an area where there could be significant benefits in developing regional resources, as developed by FAO in Africa and by other UN emergency response units such as WFP. These would allow faster responses to local emergencies but will also assist in developing relationships, interest and skills in the regional and country offices to support emergency responses. This is being partially achieved in the Bangkok RAP but requires further development. #1.6 Dual roles of emergency response coordinator The ERC is a very demanding and important position as the face of FAO from the beginning of the response and deserves careful attention in terms of selection and training. The skill profiles required to manage an emergency response and the cluster coordination processes are quite different. For the Nargis response, the ERC was assisted by a team of experienced technical consultants to provide specialised support to the Cluster technical working groups.


The mission believes that combining the roles is the preferred solution providing the ERC, beyond essential managerial, strategic and fund raising skills, also has good facilitation and relational skills, promotes active Technical Working Group (i.e. sub-groups of the Cluster) activities, delegates the chairmanship of these TWGs to the most appropriate nominee (including NGO representatives if they are interested), and is supported by strong technical specialists and administrative staff. The above attributes should be included in standard selection criteria used for all ERC recruitments.

8.3 Procurement

Given the importance of support to planting the monsoon rice crop, FAO responded quickly, taking account of institutional constraints for procurement within Myanmar and FAO procurement systems.

FAO Rome procurement section (CSAP) has been flexible in its interaction with the ERCU including delegating the procurement process for larger procurement activities to the ERCU with the final orders being placed from Rome supported by ERCU generated documentation. A weakness identified in the field (and noted by this evaluation) is that there is no procurement planning / scheduling tool used to establish timetables and measure progress against procurement milestones and seasonal deadlines (as were very important in 806/CHA and for the vegetable seed part of 903/CHA). Timeline data for international procurements are held in the CSAP procurement database as part of FAO standard processes, but local procurements data are not part of that database and not digitized in the field. This information would be useful for improving internal control and accountability and planning regular transfers of FBAs but, just as importantly, could be used to keep implementation partners informed on procurement activities. Lessons #2 Procurement #2.1 Procurement processes As identified above, standardized tools and processes including procurement action progress reporting are needed to provide comprehensive, transparent reporting of procurement planning and progress to all stakeholders including FAO technical departments, implementing partners and government technical departments. The study being conducted by CSAP on country procurement processes could be a first step in this direction. #2.2 Limits on procurement authorisation With the need for immediate procurement of emergency supplies, particularly when they have to be purchased in-country, procurement expenditure limits for in-country procurement should be lifted to more realistic levels (for example, US$ 200,000). This would need improved procurement management and accounting systems to allow close tracking and monitoring of all the steps in the procurement process by FAO HQ (as was occurring during the Nargis response via emails). #2.3 Delegation of procurement responsibilities to implementing partners Just as FAO HQ has delegated implementation for some of larger procurement activities to the ERCU, there may be opportunities to improve the effectiveness of procurement by delegating procurement of some items to the IPs at the implementation level or directly to the beneficiaries through a voucher and fair system, especially when the type of inputs to supply varies significantly from one locality to the next, as was the case with the Nargis response. This would be particularly applicable after the initial emergency response. Most of the implementing partners are experienced in procurement. Experience from the pilot voucher-based distributions in Africa and China should be incorporated into FAO procedures and the emergency operations management tool kit proposed in recommendation 1.2. #2.4 Delegation of specification clearance After experienced FAO technical consultants (or staff) are fielded, FAO HQ should consider delegation of technical clearance of procurement specifications to these technical specialist through the ERCU with appropriate supporting documentation provided to the relevant technical department in Rome. If experienced staff or consultants are not working in the ERCU, responsibility for technical clearance should be delegated to experienced regional technical


officers and/or consultants who have a more current appreciation of the local context of recommendations from the ERCU. In Myanmar, the handling of livestock clearances by the Regional Office in Bangkok was a good example of how this could work effectively. With an improved procurement scheduling / monitoring system, the clearance procedures could be modified so that if clearances for specifications are not received or rejected within the planned lead time, authority automatically defaults to the ERCU to issue the clearance based on available technical advice (a No Objection process). #2.5 Use of local varieties/breeds and equipment FAO should minimize procurement of varieties / breeds / types that are not the same as those currently used in the target areas, particularly in the emergency and early rehabilitation phases. With seed and livestock, the only reason for using new varieties not known to the target groups should be that known local varieties are not available. In this case, it may be better (and improve stakeholder relations) if other inputs can be offered or the procurement delayed until development support resources are in place to support introduction of new or improved technologies. The following table outlines the possible differences in technology requirements at different stages of a disaster response.

Emergency Stage

Appropriate Technology Identified by Goal

Initial response

Immediately available. Locally proven and understood, requiring no or minimal technical advice.

Farmers, township level extension staff. Agency technical manuals

Replace the most urgently needed lost assets

Recovery / rehabilitation

Locally proven and understood, with a few innovations decided in consultation with users (based on experience of technical specialists, timeliness of supply and available technical support and inputs)

Line ministry (MOAI, LBVD and DOF) technical specialists, farmers

Replace or rebuild - and at times improve upon - lost assets

Development Innovative, identified through adaptive research and supported by structured extension and market chain support processes

Line ministry (MOAI, LBVD and DOF) supported by FAO technical specialists

Improve upon existing assets and practices

#2.6 Animal distribution activities After a disaster, the remaining animals are much more susceptible to diseases, particularly if lacking feed, and may need animal services including emergency feed, treatment and vaccination to remain alive. Livestock distribution, at all stages of an emergency response, needs an integrated package of: appropriate breeds of livestock in good health; training of recipients in animal management and use of local feed sources, and access to resourced animal health services. Distribution should be delayed until these conditions are achieved (which will vary with the type of animal – local, hardy species and races can be reintroduced much earlier than exotic animals or breeds) and the target households can access suitable and affordable feed resources within their villages. Animals distributed should be old enough and of a breed that can survive on local feeds without the need to purchase special feeds. Distribution activities usually target poorer households who have no or very limited resources to purchase special inputs. Quarantine periods are useful for providing rest and recuperation periods for animals moved long distances before they are finally distributed to the less favourable conditions in the beneficiary households. Training is needed for beneficiaries who receive animals from all response activities. Effectiveness and outcomes are reduced if training (and ensuring the beneficiary has access to basic shelter and feed resources) are not provided so funds need to be included in animal packages for initial training.


#2.7 Animal banks The animal bank concepts being promoted for buffalo and pig distribution activities are relatively complex and have a relatively long repayment cycle. Alternative ways to moneterize the process may make the processes easier to understand and manage and reduce the impact of unexpected deaths (also see recommendation #3.2).

8.4 Targeting

Both CERF grants have achieved good targeting of poorer households taking account of local social norms. There is a range of views on which should be the targeted groups during the rehabilitation phase, including on how to: (i) best assist the landless labourers; and, (ii) improve local production of quality rice seed which may be more efficiently produced by more experienced middle sized farmers. However, in the immediate response phase before planting of the monsoon rice crop, it would have been very difficult to implement more sophisticated assistance activities such as supporting specialist rice seed producers to increase improved rice seed production, as some NGOs working in the Delta are now doing. Lessons #3 Targeting #3.1 First response targeting In the immediate response to a disaster, targeting should focus at the village level (selection of most affected villages). In the interest of saving time and protecting cohesion / social capital at the community level at a time when they need it most, the targeted communities should be provided with the opportunity to decide how they want the proposed inputs distributed in a transparent way within their community. More focused targeting (taking account of factors such as food insecurity or the need to redevelop the capacity to multiply good quality seed) can be developed as communities have recovered sufficiently to have time and be motivated to participate in community based needs assessment and wealth ranking exercises. #3.2 Distribution of significant assets If significant assets such as boats or large animals are to be allocated (particularly by lottery), consideration should be given to making part or all of the grant into a loan with interest free repayment to an agreed village based revolving fund. This could apply to an increasing proportion of inputs provided as the recovery process continues. This concept aligns with the development of savings and credit groups being encouraged and supported by some IPs.

8.5 Stakeholder Interaction

Government The close links with GOUM allowed rapid fielding of a joint FAO/Government assessment team. Senior technical managers from MAS, LBVD and Department of Fisheries been contracted by FAO as national consultants to lead field interaction with IPs and work alongside international technical consultants. At field level, GOUM township technical staff have worked with the IPs. Senior GOUM technical agency managers met during the evaluation stressed the importance of the FAO support. Technical support There has been very positive feedback at field and Yangon levels on the inputs of the FAO technical specialists. IPs valued their support and advice and the manner in which the advice and guidance is provided. ERCU operations The IPs are much less satisfied with their interaction with the operations part of the ERCU and the process of planning and implementing letters of agreement. Several indicated that they felt they were treated more as service providers rather than full partners19. For some IPs, the ERCU

19

Sometimes, NGOs have succeeded in re-aligning this relationship. For instance, the ERCU and ACTED worked together on a DfID proposal in mid 2009. After securing the funding, the arrangements needed to be


was a less preferred source of project resources unless it offered inputs aligned closely with the IP’s own field program (as happened with the NRS 903/CHA activity). Agriculture Cluster Implementation of the agriculture cluster was reviewed and reported in May 2009. Most respondents appreciated the need for the cluster but had a range of views of its success. Some of these issues relate to way it was coordinated by in the first six months. Another complication was the very mixed field experience of agencies wanting to participate in the agriculture sector response (and their changing representation at the cluster meeting). Lessons #4 Stakeholder Interaction #4.1 Role of Government in disaster response The “humanitarian system” tends to ignore national actors, yet as the Nargis case has shown, national actors are usually the first to react to a disaster. Links with the Government also facilitate access and early response by international agencies. FAO should continue to develop and maintain working relationships with governmental and non-governmental national actors which will enhance and allow faster and more effective responses by its emergency programmes and facilitate transition into subsequent recovery and development programmes. #4.2 Partnerships with NGOs FAO should treat its implementing partners as real partners, systematically include core implementing partners in the design and specification of proposed interventions, and when appropriate support valuable projects designed directly by NGOs themselves.20 FAO usually contracts its NGO partners through “Letters of Agreement”(LOAs). By nature of the instrument, this implies that the NGO performs its duties as a service provider. To equalize this relationship, more consideration is needed to either adapt the LOA or develop other forms of instruments for NGO partnerships. FAO should continue the excellent work undertaken by the ERCU technical support team and use this experience to strengthen its capacity to support IPs with relevant technical assistance and training during emergency responses.

8.6 Reporting

The implementing partners were required to provide interim, progress and completion reports in a standard formats provided by the ERCU. This format did not suggest a simple summary table of planned compared to actual inputs distributed benefiting and households benefiting from the inputs. The reports reviewed by the evaluation team had a wide range of information provided, analysis and reporting of the distribution process. The ERCU has detailed tables on the allocation of inputs to implementing partners and townships but does not collate information on the actual deliveries from the completion reports as the information is either not aggregated in one table in the implementing partner’ reports or is not provided. Lesson #5 Reporting #5.1 Consolidated tables of inputs distributed and households benefiting Reports from implementing partners should systematically include a standard, summary table of planned and actual

renegotiated to reflect changes in responsibilities and roles which gave more responsibility to ACTED. After initial difficulties in the renegotiation, an acceptable working arrangement has been reached. 20

FAO has involved all concerned NGO partners within the Delta Livelihoods Recovery Working Group (DLRWG) in the preparation of the PONREPP and in the formulation of joint programmes. Examples of these include the ACTED-FAO DFID project (OSRO/MYA/905/UK) as well as the most recent Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) project (OSRO/MYA/002/UNJ) for the Delta. Such commendable NGO involvement in planning was less evident during the emergency period.


inputs distributed by township, time of distribution and the number of households that benefit versus planned targets.

8.7 Communications

The main issue appears to come in communications between Yangon and the Delta townships for both the ERCU and the IPs. The Hub officer system was partially adopted to address the problem for the ERCU / FAO but IPs also need to improve their own systems.

8.8 Beneficiaries Results Assessment

The survey process implemented by the ERCU required substantial inputs and has not provided much relevant information to assist the ERCU and its partners improve delivery of services and inputs to the target households. The evaluation mission is concerned that the impost on household’s time required to collect the information soon after the disaster was not compensated by improved support services flowing from information collected. The assessment did not appear to be well integrated with other information being formally and informally collected during the immediate response period. These and other weaknesses will hopefully be addressed in the new livelihoods survey currently being developed and implemented by the ERCU.


ANNEXES ANNEX 1 TIMELINES ANNEX 1.1 PROJECT APPROVAL TIMELINES

Project Symbol OCHA Code

Project Title Budget Window Area EOD NTE First submission

Final submission

USG Approval

LoU Signed by FAO

LoU signed by OCHA

Disbursment by OCHA

Disbursement value date

OSRO/MYA/806/CHA 08-FAO-019 Emergency support to restore food security in cyclone NARGIS-affected areas through the provision of agriculture inputs and technical assistance

$2,000,000 Rapid Response

Delta 1-

Jun-08

31-Aug-

08

21-May-08

21-May-08

23-May-08

28-May-

08

29-May-08

3-Jun-08 10-Jun-08

OSRO/MYA/903/CHA 09-FAO-008 Empower marginalized landless poor and vulnerable women headed households in Northern Rakhine State through vegetables and poultry productions support

$400,000 Under-Funded

Northern Rakhine State

1-May-

09

31-Dec-09

16-Mar-10

8-Apr-10

9-Apr-09

20-Apr-09

28-Apr-09

4-May-09 7-May-09


ANNEX 1.2 ACTIVITY / DECISION POINTS

Date Activity / Decision Point Comment 2-3 May Cyclone Nargis Mr Gouw as FAO Representative a.i.

leads response. 5 May FAO Emergency Assessment team mobilised 10 May Mr Aryal, Regional Emergency Coordinator arrives in MYA 8 May FAO media release 11 May FAO not included in first CERF allocation 13-18 May Consultations, lobbying and preparation of second CERF

proposal

17 May Needs Assessment Team leader ( Mr Lieberg) arrives in MYA 19 May Mr Aryal returns to Bangkok 21 May Second CERF proposal submitted to UNRC 23 May

FAO advised $2 million provided in second round of CERF funding

24 May Arrival in Bangkok of Pedro Figueredo, Senior Logistics Officer

He did not continue to Myanmar.

26 May Rest of Needs Assessment team arrives

28-29 May Three month LOU signed 5 June Ms Chaya mobilised as emergency coordinator in MYA 5 June Mr Politis mobilised as procurement consultant Joined by Ms Blasotti 11 June Needs Assessment approved by FAO HQ / RAP 13 June Wrap-up meeting with GOUM 15 June Dr Shin Imai takes up position as FAO Representative Late June 2008

First IP LOAs signed. CESVI (Dedaya) no LOA sighted), IDE (Kyaiklat) 27 June, GAA / KHH (Bogale) 27 June, UNDP (Labutta, Mawlamyinegyum, Ngapudaw) 7 July, EGRESS (beneficiaries results assessment) 26 August

These LOA covered inputs provided through 806/CHA and other donors including UK, Italy,

Early July (5-10)

Deliveries of rice seed commence.

Mid July 29 July

Mr Suter takes up emergency coordinator / cluster chair position Mr Mulepaty recruited as International Field Operations Officer

31 July Ms Chaya completes her assignment

2009 January Mr Ghermazien, takes up position as senior emergency

rehabilitation coordinator

9 April Second CERF for Northern Rakhine state approved 20 July CERF 903/CHA LOA signed with GRET 14 August CERF 903/CHA LOA signed by CARE November First deliveries of seed.

2010

March Poultry distribution under GRET not completed


ANNEX 1.3 PROCUREMENT TIMELINES Based on information from FAO Procurement Department, records of first procurement mission and implementing partner records.

Procurement Item

Funds Available Request for Quotation or Tender (RFQ)

Purchase order issued

Delivery dates Comment

806/CHA 3 June 2008

Rice seed Arrangements to purchase through Rice Miller Association completed by mid June

3-11 July most 21 July for GAA / WHH Bogale

This late delivery at Bogale was partly because three earlier batches had been rejected with low germination.

Urea, muriate of potash

6 June 18 July Mid September In Bogale by GAA

Phosphate fertilisers

18 July 3 October Mid September In Bogale by GAA

Buffalos Negotiations with livestock association (NGO under LBVD) completed in mid June

Buying from markets started in mid June 2008

10 July

Power tillers 1 July 4 July 9 July

11 July Bogale 23 July other townships

Complications due to problems arranging fuel and oil supplies

Vegetable seed 25 June 7 July Early August Bogale

Chickens / ducks 18 September 30 October 2008 2910 packages Dec 2008 2610 packages Jan-March 2009

Hand tools 12 September 2008

28 November January 2009

903/CHA 4 May 2009 Vegetable seed 14 September

2009 29 September 2009

Due mid October Arrived late October 2009

Chicken kits Early August 2009

13 August 2009 Delivery specified for 1 Jan 2010

First batch 30 December – high mortality rate

Delayed to allow hatching of chicks and more suitable weather


ANNEX 2 PROGRAMME MAP


ANNEX 3 MAPS OF PROJECT AREA 3.1 MYA 806/CHA


3.2 MYA 903/CHA


ANNEX 4 IMPLEMENTING PARTNER ROLES AND EXPERIENCE MATRIX MYA 806/CHA Partnership Table

Interventions Actors Roles and

responsibilities

Budget CERF /

FAO (US$)

Locations (districts)

Targets (in LOA)

Selection Criteria Achievements

(includes inputs from other donors)

Motivating factors

Problems, issues, demotivating factors

Reporting

1. Inputs distribution

CESVI

(i) storage and distribution of input kits

(ii) Seed rice

24,810 Dedaya 1750 fertiliser kits

All registered farmers in 13 most affected village tracts (VT)

All seed distributed

Provided some agronomic inputs to rice farmers

Delayed supply led to rapid distribution (impact?) to suit monsoon crop season. CESVI were unaware of input’s quantities and quality until few hours or days before distribution. This also increased IP distribution and storage costs.

Basic

GAA / WHH


(ii) Seed rice

24,073 Bogale

63 MT HYV Farm HHs with < 5-10 acres

1050 HHs received HYV seed 1000 HHs received fertilizer kits

HYV seed had good germination.

Initial supplies of requested local seed had very low germination. Fertiliser arrived too late for monsoon crop. Used for dry season rice.

Excellent Very comprehensive listing and discussion

IDE


(ii) Seed rice

19,946 Kyaiklat

300 kits 126 MT HYV

Universal coverage of most affected VT

Not specified. IDE distributed >10,000 MT rice seed and > 12,000 MT fertiliser

Used transparent distribution process

Issue of chemical for pest control. Small allocation compared to overall IDE response

Basic

UNDP


(ii) Seed rice

NC

Bogale, Kyaiklat Labutta

Mawlgyun Ngapudaw

157 MT HYV 149.4 T local rice 1900 fertiliser kits

All paddy farmers who were permanent residents. (In LOA, < 2 acres paddy)

Not clearly identified except for detailed listing by village of items supplied.

HYV seed had good germination. Power tillers supplied in 2008 were ready for preparing for 2009 monsoon crop.

One local variety of rice seed had germination problems. Pumps supplied were not large enough

Very good Report covered all distribution activities to May 2009. Limited Discussion and analysis


Interventions Actors Roles and

responsibilities

Budget CERF /

FAO (US$)

Locations (districts)

Targets (in LOA)

Selection Criteria Achievements

(includes inputs from other donors)

Motivating factors

Problems, issues, demotivating factors

Reporting

Inputs distribution

GRET


(ii) Seed rice (iii) Distribution

of chickens (iv) Training of

HHs

49,955 Maungdaw Buthidaung Rathedaung

2,000 vegetable kits

1,600 poultry kits (16,000 chickens)

Women headed HH and landless families with back yard gardens Women headed HH and landless families with chicken raising capacity Minimise duplication Visit each HH

Seed kits delivered by 23 Oct 2009

Provided opportunity for local NGO (LIFA) to begin field operations. Vegetable activities appreciated.

Seed kits delivered by 23 Oct 2009 (due end of Sept – mid Oct – delayed by seed availability – see below) Some missing radish seed FAO offered unacceptable substitutes (chilli and mustard) No-cost extensions raised within one month of contract start. Due to delays in chicken delivery (avian influenza), further NCE requested by FAO when supply issues outside control of NGO.

Good

CARE

(i) Mobilisation of groups

(ii) Distribution of vegetable seed kits

(iii) Distribution of fertilizers and pesticides

(iv) Training of HHs

3,200 Maungdaw Buthidaung

1000 vegetable kits and supporting fertilizer and

pesticide inputs

Already involved in CARE project groups Women headed HHs Landless HHs Have family labour Must fence garden

1,000 HH provided with training and inputs from CERF and CARE resources. Post training assessment showed 60 % increase in technical knowledge. Enough vegetables for HH production Estimated sale income of Kyat 30-50,000

Good seed germination and growth indicating potential good yields

Some varieties of crop not appropriate for growing on borrowed land Quantities of seed did not provide a surplus for sale

Average


ANNEX 5 PROGRAM AND PEOPLE MET Date Location Activities Meetings with

18 February Thursday Melb - Rome

Travel

19 Feb Friday Rome Meetings. FAO.

Olivier Cossee Hunt Lacascia, CSAP Phillipe Le Coent, Lucio Olivero, AGPS

20 Feb Sat Rome Own time

21 Feb Sunday Rome Own time

22 Feb Monday Rome Meetings Olivier Cossee, mission briefing Richard China, TCDD Ms Hildegard Niggeman-Pucella, TCE, Ms Victoria Sun, TCE Ms Mona Chaya former emergency coordinator MYA

23 Feb Tuesday Rome Meetings David Brown, Fisheries Division Ms Pierra Blasotti, TCE (formerly procurement clerk for MYA response)

24 Feb Wednes Rome Meeting, Travel

Olivier Cossee Ms Suzanne Raswant, TCE

25 Feb Thursday Bangkok Meetings Arrange visa David Kahan, Senior Agribusiness Officer Mr Hiroyuki Konuma, DRR

26 Feb Friday Bangkok Meetings Rajendra Aryal, Senior Regional Emergency Coordinator Hans Wagner, Senior Animal Production and Health Officer

27 Feb Saturday Yangon Travel, Meeting

Tesfai Ghermazien, Senior Emergency Coordinator Saw Lah Paw Wah, ERCU national fisheries consultant Rick Gregory, ERCU Fisheries adviser

28 Feb Sunday Yangon Reading, drafting

1 March Monday Yangon Meetings Dr Shin Imai, FAO Representative Mr Hridayashwar Lal Mulepaty, ERCU operations officer Bernard Cartella, agronomy consultant, ECRU Thanawat Tiensin, livestock consultant, ERCU

2 March Tuesday Bogale Travel, meetings

Aquaculture Dedanaw village, KunGyanGone. EGG staff Meeting with UNDP. U Kyi Oo, Fisheries specialist U Htain Soe, acting town project manager Meeting with MSN Meeting with GRET. Pierre Ferrand, project manager; U Hla Min, technical coordinator

3 March Wednes AM

Bogale Field visits Dhama Thu Kha village. Pyin Boe Gyi village tract (VT) 15 ?? villagers

VT 6 villagers PM Kyan Khin village, Mya, Thein Tan VT 15 ?? villagers Myit Tan village, Hay Man, VT 10 ?? villagers

4 March Thursday Bogale Field visits Sein Tone village, Kyun Thar Yar VT 7 HHs AM Ar Ma Khan village 14 HHs EGG NGO staff PM Mangrove nursery at Kyein Chaung Gyi village. 2 leaders

5 March Friday AM

MawGyun Travel, meetings

Meet with UNDP Mawgyun. UNDP agronomist. Hla Din, FAO HUB officer Mawgyun Wae Daung village Bo te Loat village tract. Ywa Ma village 26 villagers, 9 farmers. U Ko Oo, CDC chairman, farmer; U Mya Soe, farmer; U Win Mg, CDC patron, farmer

PM Tha Htay Gone. 12 villagers

6 March Saturday Labutta Travel

7 March Sunday Labutta Meetings AM Wae Chaung village, Myint VT. 24 people, 7 farmers. U Ba

Shwe, group leader; U Ktaw Myint, group member

PM Ka Nyin Kon. 5 participants in 2008 duck distribution. One beneficiary in 2009 JICA duck distribution


Date Location Activities Meetings with 8 March Monday Labutta 8 am ACTED. Ms Christina Paptheodorou, Area Coordinator 9.30 am Triangle GH. Sebastien Naissant, project manager; Aung Bo

Htike, project officer. 11 am Save the Children Dr. Myo Myint Han, Area Manager

(Labutta). U Min Min Zaw, Program Coordinator (Livelihood), Zar Zar Mya Min Livelihood Project Officer (Labutta)

1.15 pm UNDP Dr Thein Tun Hla 2.30 pm Mercy Corps. Bintang Siahaan, operations manager

9 March Tuesday Labutta Field visits Thigangone VT, Middle Island

10 March Wednes Yangon Travel

11 March Thursday Yangon Meetings AM OCHA, Mr. Thierry Delbreuve – Head of Mission AUSAID. Ms. Jillian Ray – Humanitarian Assistance Officer PM Mr. Leon Gouws, CTA – Oil Crop Development Project, FAO

Representative (acting) May-September 2008 GRET. Ms. Nang Ohnmar Than – Country Representative CARE. Mr. Nay Myo Zaw – Programme Coordinator

12 March Friday Yangon Report writing

13 March Saturday Yangon AM Mercy Corps Michael Gabriel, Country Director PM Meeting at IDE (cancelled after waiting)

14 March Sunday Yangon Drafting initial findings and draft reports

15 March Monday Yangon Debrief Dr Shin Imai, Tesfai Ghermazien, AM Meeting with LBVD. Dr. Dr. Aung Gyi LBVD Deputy

Director General, Dr. Ohn Kyaw LBVD Director, Dr. Khin Maung Latt LBVD Staff Officer

PM Meeting with MAS. Mr. Aye Tun, Deputy General Manager Plant Protection Department

Meeting with DOF Khin Ko Lay, Director General

16 March Tuesday AM

Yangon Debrief NGOs Ms.Ryoko Lizuka UNDP Programme Manager Mr. Jifeudra P. Jaisural UNDP Livelihood Team Leader U Aye Kyaing UNDP Dy. Project Manager

PM Travel Myanmar IDE Mr. James Taylor – Country Director, Brent Rowell, Agricultural Program manager

17 March Wed Melbourne Arrive Australia Tele-conference with FAO Rome OE, TCE and technical division staff

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