COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER...
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UNIVERSITEIT GENT FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE ACADEMIEJAAR 2009 – 2010 COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR Masterproef voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van Master in de Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen Dennis De Cat onder leiding van Prof. Dr. I. Vermeir
Transcript of COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER...
UNIVERSITEIT GENT
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE
ACADEMIEJAAR 2009 – 2010
COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR
Masterproef voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van
Master in de Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen
Dennis De Cat
onder leiding van
Prof. Dr. I. Vermeir
UNIVERSITEIT GENT
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE
ACADEMIEJAAR 2009 – 2010
COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR
Masterproef voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van
Master in de Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen
Dennis De Cat
onder leiding van
Prof. Dr. I. Vermeir
PERMISSION Ondergetekende verklaart dat de inhoud van deze masterproef mag geraadpleegd en/of gereproduceerd worden, mits bronvermelding. Dennis De Cat
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my promoter Prof. Dr. Iris
Vermeir. She was always prepared scheduling a face-to-face meeting to discuss the
progress of my research. Above all, I want to thank her for replying to dozens of emails
immediately. Her help in analyzing and interpreting the results of my experiment was
indispensable. I am grateful for the opportunity to have studied under her direction.
Further, I would like to thank Prof. Boonghee Yoo, Prof. Aron O’Cass, Prof. Mateja Kos
Koklic, Prof. Judy W. Spain, Prof. Elfriede Penz, Prof. Giacomo Gistri, Prof. Dr. Celso
Augusto de Matos, Prof. Dr. Judy Zaichkowsky, Prof. Ian Phau and his assistant Min
Teah for answering my questions about the papers they have written and for giving me
additional literature tips. By doing so, they gave me the opportunity to gain a very
proficient insight in the subject of counterfeiting and consumer behaviour. I also want to
mention our head of department, Prof. Dr. Patrick Van Kenhove, as he was a great help
in analyzing my research results.
I also want to thank all my closest friends who helped me gathering participants for my
online questionnaire. Especially Philippe Lescornez did a great effort in making sure I
had enough conscious respondents. Kevin De Cock was a great help in analyzing the
results of my research with SPSS.
My special and appreciative thanks must be given to Tony Van Gulck for providing me
the opportunity to have an in-depth interview with Miss. Hagenaers (Trade Mark and
Design attorney) about the legal topic of intellectual property right violation. On top of
this, as CEO of BOO! Fashion, he sponsored my research by providing me with purses
to win in order to gather participants for my online questionnaire.
Last but not least I owe my appreciation and thanks to my parents, Viviana De Letter
and Marc De Cat as well as to my girlfriend, Ine Lescornez. As this thesis is the
masterpiece after four years of hard work I would like to thank them for all emotional,
psychological and financial support during my study of Applied Economics. Without
them I would not be the person I am right now.
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SUMMARY (NEDERLANDS) Verantwoording
De grootte van de (illegale!) namaakindustrie neemt snel toe. Volgens gegevens van de
Europese Commissie stijgt het aantal namaakartikelen dat men onderschept aan de
grenzen van Europese lidstaten elk jaar. De OECD schat de waarde van de
namaakgoederen die in 2005 internationaal verhandeld werden op 200 miljard dollar.
Het aantal productcategorieën (bv. elektrische onderdelen, medicijnen, cd’s, etc.)
waarvoor men namaakartikelen op de markt vindt, kent een continue groei.
Desalniettemin is het probleem nog steeds het grootst in de mode- en
luxegoederenindustrie. Namaak wordt gezien als dé misdaad van de 21ste eeuw
omwille van de negatieve gevolgen die hieraan verbonden zijn: productrisico’s,
ondersteuning van terroristische organisaties, verlies van werkgelegenheid etc. Het is
dan ook niet verwonderlijk dat veel (academisch) onderzoek zich richt op het bepalen
van determinanten van vraag- en aanbodzijde van de (luxe)namaakindustrie, evenals
op het zoeken naar tactieken die de handel in namaakgoederen kan terugdringen. Vele
auteurs wijzen op de noodzaak om dit probleem product-, industrie- en cultuurspecifiek
te onderzoeken.
Focus
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de vraagzijde van namaakhandel. Indien er geen vraag
meer is, zal immers ook het aanbod wegebben. De context van dit onderzoek wordt
toegespitst op ‘niet bedrieglijke namaakartikelen’ nl. namaakartikelen waarvan men op
het moment van aankoop weet dat ze effectief namaak zijn.
De literatuur over het ontwikkelen van strategieën om de namaakindustrie te bestrijden,
suggereert dikwijls dat consumenten meer bewust gemaakt moeten worden van de
negatieve gevolgen die geassocieerd worden met namaakhandel. In dit onderzoek
wordt de impact nagegaan van boodschappen met negatieve gevolgen van de
namaakhandel op de attitude t.o.v. het kopen van namaak luxemodegoederen. De
onderzoeker gaat na of er een verschil bestaat in attitude tussen consumenten die
bewust gemaakt worden van persoonlijke risico’s (bv. prestatierisico, fysiek risico, etc.)
verbonden aan namaakhandel en consumenten die geconfronteerd worden met
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maatschappelijke risico’s (bv. kinderarbeid in de productie van deze items) verbonden
aan deze illegale praktijk. Verder zal ook de relatie tussen attitudes en aankoopintentie
onderzocht worden. Recente academische bronnen beweren dat de prijs en kwaliteit
van namaakartikelen zijn toegenomen. Daarom zullen we de impact nagaan van deze
elementen op de gepercipieerde kwaliteit van luxueuze modegerelateerde
namaakgoederen. De auteur onderzoekt tevens de impact van deze gepercipieerde
kwaliteit op attitudes en aankoopintentie. Het feit dat namaak steeds meer en
makkelijker beschikbaar wordt, wordt opgenomen als mogelijke determinant van de
aankoopintentie. Dit gebeurt door integratie van het construct ‘perceived behavioural
control’. Verder neemt dit onderzoek ook modebewustzijn op als factor die
aankoopintentie mogelijk beïnvloedt. Subjectieve normen en vroeger aankoopgedrag
worden eveneens onderzocht.
Onderzoeksopzet
Er wordt een pre-test opgezet die ervoor moet zorgen dat we in het echte onderzoek
‘persoonlijk risico’ en ‘maatschappelijk risico’ correct manipuleren. Met betrekking tot
het hoofdonderzoek worden de data verkregen via online vragenlijsten. De populatie
bestaat zowel uit studenten als niet-studenten. Er wordt gebruik gemaakt van een 2
(kwaliteit: laag/gemiddeld) x 2 (prijs: laag/gemiddeld) x 2 (type boodschap: persoonlijk
risico/maatschappelijk risico) ‘between-subjects’ experimenteel design. Respondenten
worden ‘at random’ aan één van de acht condities toegewezen. De onderzoeker
gebruikt bestaande meetschalen om de constructen te meten.
Resultaten
Een manipulatiecontrole geeft aan dat de manipulaties van persoonlijk en
maatschappelijk risico gelukt zijn. Bovendien werden alle boodschappen in de acht
condities als zeer geloofwaardig beschouwd. De betrokkenheid bij de boodschap was
echter hoger in het geval dat deze informatie bevatte over de maatschappelijke risico’s
van namaakhandel.
Er worden twee ‘multiple hierarchical’ regressies uitgevoerd: één op attitude en één op
aankoopintentie. De groep waartoe men behoort (student/werkend), de gepercipieerde
kwaliteit van modegerelateerde namaakgoederen (+), het type boodschap waarmee
men geconfronteerd wordt (-) en subjectieve norm (-) blijken significante voorspellers
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van de attitude t.o.v. het kopen van namaakgoederen. De negatieve invloed van het
type boodschap duidt aan dat attitudes negatiever zijn bij boodschappen over
maatschappelijke risico’s dan bij boodschappen over persoonlijke risico’s.
Modebewustzijn (+), vroeger aankoopgedrag (+), attitude (+), gepercipieerde kwaliteit
(+) en subjectieve norm (-) blijken significante voorspellers van de aankoopintentie voor
modegerelateerde luxegoederen.
Praktische implicaties
De resultaten dragen bij tot het beter begrijpen van de attitude van Belgische
consumenten t.o.v. het kopen van modegerelateerde luxueuze namaakartikelen. Er
worden ook belangrijke inzichten verworven in de determinanten van aankoopintentie.
Vooral de bevindingen betreffende de belangrijke invloed van vroeger gedrag,
subjectieve norm, gepercipieerde kwaliteit en type boodschap als determinanten van
attitude en intentie kunnen van groot belang zijn in het ontwikkelen van campagnes
tegen namaakhandel.
Beperkingen
Er werd geen controlegroep opgenomen in het onderzoek. Hierdoor kunnen we de
attitude van respondenten die geconfronteerd werden met een boodschap niet
vergelijken met mensen die niet blootgesteld waren aan dergelijke boodschap.
Bijgevolg kan dus enkel de invloed van de verschillende boodschappen relatief t.o.v.
elkaar beschouwd worden. Het onderzoek werd enkel uitgevoerd bij mensen met een
Belgische nationaliteit. Verder onderzoek is nodig in andere landen en over andere
productcategorieën om te testen of de bevindingen stand houden.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................. I SUMMARY (NEDERLANDS) .......................................................................................... II TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................V
ABBREVIATIONS .........................................................................................................VII LIST OF TABLES.........................................................................................................VIII LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................IX
1. Introduction.............................................................................................................. 1 2. Defining counterfeit trade in luxury fashion brands. ........................................... 4
3. Exploring the supply- and demand-side of counterfeiting .................................. 7 3.1. Supply side of counterfeiting ............................................................................................... 7 3.2. Demand side of counterfeiting ............................................................................................ 8
4. Determinants of purchase intention for counterfeit luxury fashion items: theories, constructs and hypothesis development.............................................. 9
4.1. Intrinsic Determinants ...........................................................................................................10 4.1.1. Attitude toward buying CLFI, and intention to purchase CLFI........................................... 10 4.1.2. Subjective norms ....................................................................................................................................... 11 4.1.3. Perceived behavioural control ............................................................................................................ 12 4.1.4. Perceived risk.............................................................................................................................................. 13 4.1.5. Perceived harm and actor-proximity ............................................................................................... 14 4.1.6. Perceived Personal harm ..................................................................................................................... 15 4.1.7. Perceived Societal harm ....................................................................................................................... 15 4.1.8. Fashion consciousness.......................................................................................................................... 16 4.1.9. Past behaviour............................................................................................................................................ 17 4.1.10. Price/quality inference ............................................................................................................................ 18 4.1.11. Perceived quality ....................................................................................................................................... 18
4.2. Extrinsic Determinants..........................................................................................................19 4.2.1. Price ................................................................................................................................................................. 19
4.3. Conceptual model for intention to purchase CLFI ....................................................21 5. Summary of the research focus........................................................................... 22
6. Pre-test ................................................................................................................... 23 6.1. Products and brands .............................................................................................................23 6.2. Perceived personal harm .....................................................................................................24 6.3. Perceived societal harm .......................................................................................................24 6.4. Price, quality, perceived harm and message credibility .........................................25
7. Main research......................................................................................................... 27 7.1. Methodology..............................................................................................................................27
7.1.1. Data collection ............................................................................................................................................ 27 7.1.2. Sample............................................................................................................................................................ 27 7.1.3. Stimuli.............................................................................................................................................................. 28 7.1.4. Measures ....................................................................................................................................................... 29
7.2. Results .........................................................................................................................................31 7.2.1. Manipulation check .................................................................................................................................. 31
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7.2.2. Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................................................ 33 7.2.3. Message credibility and message involvement......................................................................... 34 7.2.4. Development of regression models for attitude toward purchasing CLFI and for
intention to purchase CLFI ................................................................................................................... 34 7.2.4.1. Regression model for attitude toward purchasing CLFI....................................................................35 7.2.4.2. Regression model for purchase intention of CLFI ................................................................................37 7.2.4.3. Mediation................................................................................................................................................................40
7.2.5. The influence of price and quality messages on perceived quality ................................ 41 7.2.6. Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 42
8. Special topic: explorative questions about counterfeiting and its harming effects on society, businesses and individuals.................................................. 43
9. Discussion and implications ................................................................................ 45
10. Research limitations and recommendations ...................................................... 50
REFERENCES............................................................................................................... 52
ANNEX 1.1: Questionnaire used for pre-test............................................................. 60 ANNEX 1.2: Statistical analyses of pre-test............................................................... 68
1. Products and brands .............................................................................................................68 1.1 Product relevance ..................................................................................................................................... 68 1.2 Brands ............................................................................................................................................................. 68
2. Personal harm...........................................................................................................................69 3. Societal harm ............................................................................................................................70 4. Price, quality, perceived harm and message credibility .........................................71 5. Credibility ...................................................................................................................................72
ANNEX 2: Scenarios (stimuli) used in the main research........................................ 73 ANNEX 3.1: Questionnaire used in the main research............................................. 77
ANNEX 3.2: Statistical analyses of main research ................................................... 86 1. Manipulation check .................................................................................................................86 2. ANOVA and Post Hoc test to evaluate possible differences in Ad credibility88 3. T-test for identifying differences in Message involvement according to
message type ............................................................................................................................91 4. T-test for evaluating differences in attitude depending on the message one
has been exposed to. .............................................................................................................91 5. ANOVA and Post Hoc test for evaluating differences in attitude depending on
the group one finds him/herself in. ..................................................................................92 ANNEX 4: Explorative questions................................................................................ 94
VII
ABBREVIATIONS
CLFI Counterfeit Luxury Fashion Item
EC European Commission
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBC Perceived Behavioural Control
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
SN Subjective Norm
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LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1: PERCEIVED PERSONAL HARM PER RISK TYPE & GENDER DIFFERENCES ...............................................................24 TABLE 2: PERCEIVED SOCIETAL HARM PER SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCE & GENDER DIFFERENCES ..................................25 TABLE 3: MESSAGE CREDIBILITY PER PRICE AND QUALITY SITUATION & GENDER DIFFERENCES ...................................26 TABLE 4: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS .....................................................................................................................28 TABLE 5: CRONBACH'S ALPHA ANALYSIS FOR PERCEIVED SOCIETAL HARM AND PERCEIVED PERSONAL HARM ........32 TABLE 6: MANIPULATION CHECK FOR PERCEIVED HARM ................................................................................................................32 TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR OUR DATA SET .................................................................................................................33 TABLE 8: REGRESSION MODEL OF PREDICTORS FOR ATTITUDE TOWARDS PURCHASING CLFI ......................................35 TABLE 9: ATTITUDE AND MESSAGE TYPE DIFFERENCES .................................................................................................................37 TABLE 10: REGRESSION MODEL FOR PREDICTORS OF PURCHASE INTENTION FOR CLFI..................................................38 TABLE 11: PERCEIVED QUALITY AND PRICE & QUALITY CONDITION DIFFERENCES ...............................................................41 TABLE 12: SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS ...................................................................................................................................42
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LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: CLASSIFICATION SCHEME OF COUNTERFEITING AND RELATED ITEMS (STAAKE ET AL., 2009) ..................... 4 FIGURE 2: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CONSUMER COMPLICITY (CHAUDRY AND ZIMMERMAN, 2008; ADAPTED FROM
CHAUDRY AND STUMPF, 2007) ...........................................................................................................................................10 FIGURE 3: CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR INTENTION TO PURCHASE COUNTERFEIT LUXURY FASHION ITEMS ....................21 FIGURE 4: CHANCE OF ARREST INCENTIVIZING RESPONDENTS NOT TO BUY CLFI ANYMORE..........................................44
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1. Introduction
Many reports state that the overall magnitude of counterfeiting is obviously on the rise.
For instance, the Taxation and Customs Union from the European Commission (EC)
reports that the number of counterfeit articles detained in EU member states only, has
risen from 25 million in 1999 to 178 million in 2008 (European Commission, 2008). The
most frequently cited number to ‘value’ counterfeiting is the one the OECD proposes in
their analysis of international trade data. They suggest that, worldwide, up to USD 200
billion of internationally traded products could have been counterfeit in 2005. However,
one must remain critical. As the OECD report suggests itself, “available information on
counterfeiting and piracy falls far short of what is needed for robust analysis and for
policymaking”. Chaudry and Zimmerman (2008) even state it is virtually impossible to
determine the real size of the worldwide counterfeit product market as it concerns an
illegal activity. Green and Smith (2002) blame the fact that there exists no exact
standard or agreement about the factors that should be taken into account when
calculating the monetary value of counterfeiting for this non-transparency. Nevertheless,
they also suggest that product counterfeiting is significant and growing. This statement
is confirmed by previous research on the reasons of counterfeit growth by Vagg and
Harris (2000).
Not only the magnitude of counterfeiting is increasing. The same goes for the scope of
counterfeiting. Chaudry and Zimmerman (2008) state that the types of products being
counterfeited are broadening. Not only CD’s, DVD’s, computer equipment, clothes and
shoes are being counterfeited. Other product categories frequently being imitated are
toys, pharmaceuticals, automobile component parts, electrical equipment, food and
beverages, tobacco and personal care products. This is confirmed by the OECD (2008)
which even finds a shift from luxury goods to common consumer goods. These results
are also congruent with the findings of the Taxation and Customs Union from the EC.
Gentry et al. (2006) even put it more extreme: “If one can attach some value to a
consumer brand, one is likely to find counterfeit imitations of it, somewhere.” This view
is supported by Lewis (2009) who ads the aspect of the illegal profit margin that has to
be high enough before a product is attractive for being counterfeited. Despite the fact
that other product categories are on the rise, the OECD (2008) and the EC (2008)
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report that fashion items (i.e. clothing, jewellery, accessories and footwear) still account
for the largest part of counterfeit trade, e.g. the textile sector and jewellery together
make up 66,2% of all interventions by European Customs. Gessler (2009) states that
counterfeiting is the major obstacle the luxury fashion industry is facing today. These
astonishing numbers explain why the author opted for investigating non-deceptive
counterfeiting (i.e. people are fully aware of the fact they are buying a counterfeit at the
time of purchase) and consumer behaviour in the luxury fashion industry.
The consequences of counterfeiting are enormous at various levels. Gessler (2009)
divides ‘the true costs of counterfeiting’, i.e. the consequences of the phenomenon, in
six categories: the cost to brand owners, government burdens, the effects counterfeiting
has on consumers, child and forced labour issues in the production of these
counterfeits, organised crime and terrorist funding activities of counterfeiters and the
moral cost of counterfeiting. Later on in this paper the author will make a distinction on
the basis of personal and societal harm counterfeit trade causes. One thing is clear:
counterfeiting may no longer be seen as a victimless crime as it has a damaging effect
on businesses, national economies, consumers and on society as a whole (UNICRI,
2009; Santos and Ribeiro, 2006).
In the anti-counterfeiting literature many authors propose different strategies to counter
product and brand counterfeiting. These anti-counterfeiting tactics range from the use of
RFID tags (Tuyls and Batina, 2006) to the development of new legal frameworks (Bush
et al., 2001). However, Berman (2008) states also companies can contribute to the
reduction of the counterfeiting problem through the development of consumer education
programs that publicize the personal and societal dangers counterfeiting causes. A part
of this education process is that ‘marketers need to develop advertising campaigns that
focus on the significant safety, performance and financial risks associated with the
purchase of counterfeit merchandise’.
To the author’s best knowledge, no such research has been conducted before that
classifies and investigates the potential consequences of counterfeiting in such an
extensive way. Furthermore, by integrating the construct of ‘societal harm’, this research
responds to the critical remark Gessler (2009) made: ‘Unfortunately, the societal impact
of counterfeiting remains largely under researched and often neglected’. In this research
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we will assess the impact of consumers’ awareness of societal consequences on their
attitudes toward purchasing CLFI.
Altogether, the main interest of this research goes out to examining consumers’ attitude
toward purchasing counterfeit luxury fashion items (CLFI) and their intention to
purchase CLFI. More specifically, the author will be investigating if there exists a
difference in attitude toward purchasing CLFI if one is being informed about the
personal harm counterfeits cause rather than being informed about the societal
consequences bound to counterfeit trade. In addition, several factors proven important
in previous research (e.g. subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, etc.) will be
reinvestigated in a Belgian context. The relationship between the price level, the quality
level and perceived quality will be examined as well. Finally, the linkage between
attitudes and intentions is assessed in a counterfeit-related context.
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2. Defining counterfeit trade in luxury fashion brands
The author uses the ‘classification scheme of counterfeiting and related terms’ created
by Staake, Thiesse and Fleisch (2009). It provides deeper insight into the fuzziness and
buzzwords associated with product counterfeiting. Figure 1 gives a graphical
representation.
Figure 1: Classification scheme of counterfeiting and related items (Staake et al., 2009)
First and foremost, it is important to stress the fact that we find ourselves in the area of
illicit or illegal trade. Herein the distinction is made between the smuggling of arms
(contrabands), illegal trafficking of drugs (controlled goods), the trade in stolen goods
and the trade in goods that are infringing intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR are
‘rights granted to creators and owners of works that are the result of human intellectual
creativity’ (JISC Legal, 2008). There are different types of intellectual property rights, the
most important being copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs and patents. In short,
copyrights mostly serve to protect films, music, and literary and artistic works.
Trademarks are distinctive signs that identify certain goods as those produced by a
specific person or enterprise (e.g. logos). Industrial designs serve to protect the
aesthetic aspects of an article (e.g. the shape of a purse). Patents are limited in time
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and geographically bound rights that enable the patent holder to exclude unauthorised
parties from using the patented inventions (OECD, 2008; Interview with Miss
Hagenaers, 16 February 2010, Antwerp). Whereas piracy is often linked with copyright
infringement and counterfeiting with trademark infringement, the distinction between
both concepts is often not clear. Staake et al. (2009) state that IPR infringements
frequently overlap as companies often may protect their products by several IPR
simultaneously. Therefore, counterfeiting and piracy are frequently used to describe the
same phenomenon. Finally, Illicit parallel imports cannot be unequivocally classified as
counterfeits since it concerns the illegal distribution of ‘third shift products’ or ‘overruns’.
The latter are genuine products that are manufactured and sold without knowledge and
permission of the legitimate IPR owner (Gessler, 2009).
In this research we will be using the definition of counterfeit trade proposed by Staake et
al. (2009): “Counterfeit trade is the trade in goods that, be it due to their design,
trademark, logo, or company name, bear without authorization a reference to a brand, a
manufacturer, or any organization that warrants for the quality or standard conformity of
the goods in such a way that the counterfeit merchandise could, potentially, be
confused with goods that rightfully use this reference”.
Focussing on physical goods, in particular luxury fashion counterfeits, Staake et al.
(2009) propose to make a distinction with regard to consumer’s perception. Consumers
believe they may have bought a genuine article when in fact it is a counterfeit.
Consequently they are not aware of the underlying IPR infringement. This is the case in
deceptive counterfeiting (Vida, 2007; Staake et al., 2009). However, this research will
focus on non-deceptive counterfeiting in which the consumer is fully aware that the
product purchased is a counterfeit product at the time of purchase (Nia and
Zaichkowsky, 2000; Grossman and Shapiro, 1988). Gentry et al. (2006) give a more
practical definition: ‘in the case of non-deceptive counterfeiting, the buyer recognizes
that the product is not authentic according to specific information cues such as price,
purchase location or materials used.’ These goods are often also called ‘knockoffs’
(Berman, 2008). The author wishes to focus on the non-deceptive form of counterfeiting
as this is acknowledged to be particularly prevalent in luxury brand markets (Nia and
Zaichowsky, 2000). However, one must remain critical in classifying counterfeits only in
deceptive and non-deceptive products. Different authors state there exists a continuum
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of deceptiveness, rather than a dichotomy (Eisend and Schuchert-Güler, 2006; Lee and
Yoo, 2009; Bosworth, 2006; Berman, 2008). This is particularly true in the present time
frame, as the quality of knockoffs has improved dramatically recent years, even
resulting in the existence of ‘supercopies’ (Prendergast et al., 2002; Wilcox et al., 2009;
Hilton et al., 2004; Gessler, 2009).
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3. Exploring the supply- and demand-side of counterfeiting
3.1. Supply side of counterfeiting
Many authors (Chaudry and Zimmerman, 2008; Yoo and Lee, 2009; Gessler, 2009;
OECD, 2008) suggest there are several supply-side factors that make it attractive for
producers to take part in the illegal act of counterfeiting:
• The potential of attaining very high profit margins: counterfeiters benefit from the
R&D and marketing expenses invested by legitimate trademark owners. They are
in fact free riding on the economic value associated with IPR ownership.
• Low wages and almost no existing IPR enforcement in (developing) production
countries (e.g. China, South-Africa).
• Counterfeiters face far lower risks in terms of consequences than other illegal
activities (e.g. fines and prosecution). Inadequate penalties form the basis of this
phenomenon.
• The global availability of low-cost high technological equipment creates the
opportunity for counterfeiters to copy and produce nearly every product category
imaginable.
• The existence of free trade zones en free ports allows counterfeiters to engage in
origin-laundering activities by means of which the true origin of these products
can be obscured so that there exists no link towards the actual producers of
these knock-offs.
• The rise of the Internet is a major contributor toward the high availability rate of
counterfeits. Counterfeiters can easily sell their products via e-mail solicitations
(direct marketing) and it can also serve as a powerful marketing tool in reaching
customers in a more disguised way. Counterfeiters now face unprecedented
distribution opportunities.
In his book “Knockoff: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods”, Tim Phillips (2005) puts
it even more extreme: “Counterfeiting is thousands of years old, but conditions have
never been better for it.”
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The counterfeiting of luxury fashion brands is particularly attractive if one considers the
inherent characteristics of the luxury industry. As brands are considered to be the most
valuable assets these legitimate companies (e.g. LVMH Group) possess, counterfeiters
hit them right in the heart by taking advantage of the consumer’s trust that has been
established by legitimate owners who have been creating brand equity for many years
and have thus been making considerable investments in gaining a prominent position in
consumers’ minds (Green and Smith, 2002; Gessler, 2009). Gentry et al. even state the
following: “While the purchase of a counterfeit represents the consumption of the brand
(brand decision), it does not appear to represent a product decision”. As such,
counterfeiters of luxury fashion brands are able to let consumers enjoy the snob appeal
associated with the branded original without paying for it (Wee et al., 1995). On top of
this, Hilton et al. (2004) state ‘production of the (counterfeit fashion) good and copying
of designs are relatively easy (compared to counterfeiting other product categories)’.
3.2. Demand side of counterfeiting
In the present study, we will focus on the demand side of counterfeiting. After all, it is
basic economic reasoning that if no demand for counterfeit products exist, supply will
erode automatically. Thus, as consumers play a leading and growing role in the
existence of counterfeit trade (Yoo and Lee, 2009; Bian and Moutinho, 2008), it is
important to gain a deeper insight in potential determinants of consumer’s willingness to
purchase non-deceptive counterfeit products. This insight becomes even more
important if we consider the fact that consumers indicate they have a clear picture of
what they buy with the purchase of a counterfeit article. According to Penz and
Stöttinger (2008), consumer’s mental maps of counterfeit goods and their original
counterparts do not seem to overlap.
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4. Determinants of purchase intention for counterfeit luxury fashion items: theories, constructs and hypothesis development
Resulting from earlier research, there is no doubt that price plays a major role in the
appeal of fake products (Ang et al., 2001; Albers-Miller, 1999; Bloch et al., 1993; Tom et
al., 1998; Penz et al. 2009). In addition, Wee et al. (1995) were among the first
researchers to investigate the impact of non-price determinants on intention to purchase
counterfeit goods. These have been classified as psychographic (attitude toward
counterfeiting, brand status and novelty seeking), demographic (age, educational
attainment and income) and product-attribute (appearance, image, perceived fashion
content, purpose and perceived quality) variables.
In order to give the reader the opportunity to develop a more extensive understanding of
factors influencing consumer complicity to buy counterfeits, the author would like to
refer to the conceptual model developed by Chaudry and Stumpf (2007), published and
discussed in “The Economics of Counterfeit Trade” by Chaudry and Zimmerman (2008).
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation. A distinction is made between intrinsic and
extrinsic determinants influencing consumer’s complicity to purchase counterfeit goods.
The author will use this reasoning as a basis for variable classification and hypothesis
development. Although cultural values and ethical perspectives are mentioned in the
model, they will not be discussed in this paper. However, we will investigate various
intrinsic determinants proven important in other research: subjective norm, perceived
behavioural control, perceived risk, fashion consciousness, price quality inference and
perceived quality.
10
Figure 2: Conceptual model of consumer complicity (Chaudry and Zimmerman, 2008; adapted from Chaudry and Stumpf, 2007)
4.1. Intrinsic Determinants
4.1.1. Attitude toward buying CLFI, and intention to purchase CLFI
Many researchers suggest that attitudes toward behaviour are more accurate in
predicting intentions to perform that behaviour than attitudes toward a product (Ajzen,
1991; Penz et al., 2005; Smith et al. 2008). Thus, in the context of counterfeiting, the
attitude towards buying counterfeit luxury fashion brands can be used as a good
predictor for purchase intention of CLFI (Chaudry and Zimmerman, 2008; Staake et al.,
2009), which in turn can be a good predictor for the actual purchasing of CLFI.
However, many researchers (Koklic and Vida, 2009; Santos and Ribeiro, 2006) state
counterfeiting has to be examined in a country-specific way. Therefore we hypothesize:
H1: There exists a positive relationship between the attitude towards buying CLFI and
the intention to purchase CLFI.
11
4.1.2. Subjective norms
Ajzen (1991) defines ‘subjective norm’ (SN) as “the perceived social pressure to
perform or not to perform the behaviour in question”. In turn, the SN construct is
determined by normative beliefs, which are defined by Armitage and Conner (2001) as:
“underlying normative beliefs are concerned with the likelihood that specific individuals
or groups (referents) with whom the individual is motivated to comply will approve or
disapprove of the behaviour”. In short, SN serves to measure social influences. Social
influences refer to the potential effect ‘significant others’ (e.g. family, friends, teachers,
employers) have on consumer behaviour, in casu purchasing CLFI. There are two kinds
of social influences, i.e. informational and normative social influences (Bearden et al.,
1989; Ang et al. 2001). Informational social influences refer to the fact one’s decisions
might be based on the expert opinion of others. In this case, the person is ‘informational
susceptible’. Normative social influences refer to the fact one’s decisions might be
based on expectations of what would impress others. Deutsch and Gerard (1955)
describe normative social influence as the influence to conform to the expectations of
another group or person. In this case, a person is ‘normative susceptible’. Ang et al.
(2001) found that a person’s informational susceptibility was not a significant predictor
of attitude towards counterfeiting. Therefore, the author will solely focus on normative
social influences in this paper. It is particularly relevant to add this variable to our
research about CLFI as Large (2009) stresses the importance of consumer fashion
goods as a means of projecting social status within a social group. Ang et al. (2001)
also found a negative relationship between normative susceptibility and the attitude one
holds toward buying counterfeits. However, one might only expect this negative
relationship to be true if there exists a norm among one’s reference group not to buy
CLFI.
Earlier research indicates there exists not only an impact of subjective norm on attitude
towards purchasing counterfeits. Penz and Stöttinger (2005) report the SN construct
has a significant effect on purchase intention. Therefore the author expects the
disapproval of important others will have a direct negative impact on purchase intention
for CLFI if a person is normative susceptible. Reasons for disapproval could be the
belief that counterfeits are still of inferior quality, not being authentic, the potential loss
of face (Gentry et al., 2006), etc.
12
Many researchers have investigated the influence of subjective norm on counterfeiting
(Ang. et al., 2001; Penz and Stöttinger, 2005; De Matos et al., 2007; Penz et al., 2009).
However, results are mixed depending on the context in which the research is
undertaken. As already mentioned above, previous research suggests investigating the
counterfeiting phenomenon in a country-specific and product category-specific way
(Tom et al., 1998; Wee et al., 1995; Veloutsou and Bian, 2008). The current research is
undertaken in a Belgian context and is solely focussing on CLFI. For this reason the SN
construct is integrated in this research as well. Based on the discussion above we
hypothesize the following:
H2a: A person’s normative susceptibility will have a negative impact on one’s attitude
toward purchasing CLFI.
H2b: A person’s normative susceptibility will have a negative impact on one’s purchase
intention for CLFI.
4.1.3. Perceived behavioural control
Ajzen (1991) defines ‘perceived behavioural control’ (PBC) as “the perceived ease or
difficulty of performing the behaviour in question”. In turn, the PBC construct is
determined by control beliefs which represent the underlying dimensions of PBC. Ajzen
(1991) defines this dimension as: “control beliefs are a set of beliefs that deal with the
presence or absence of requisite resources and opportunities”. Meng-Hsiang et al.
(2006) define PBC as ‘perceived behavioural control reflects one’s perceptions of the
availability of resources or opportunities necessary for performing a behaviour’. As
such, ‘perceived availability’ can be seen as a part of PBC. The higher one’s perceived
availability, the higher one’s perceived ease of acquisition and the higher one’s
perceived behavioural control. Ajzen (1991) also suggests PBC is highly accurate in
predicting ‘intentions to perform behaviours of different kinds’. In addition, Mannetti et al.
(2002) found PBC is positively contributing to the prediction of purchase intentions.
Counterfeits are becoming more and more widely available in different price and quality
levels (OECD, 2008). As a consequence, the perceived ease of acquisition and thus
13
perceived behavioural control are expected to rise. Chaudry and Stumpf (2010) found
‘availability’ and the ‘ease of obtaining’ counterfeits is indeed a positive contributor
toward consumer complicity in an Australian and U.S. context. Therefore we postulate
the following:
H3: The higher the perceived availability of CLFI is, the higher the purchase intention of
consumers.
4.1.4. Perceived risk
It is widely accepted that perceived risk is a key construct in examining consumer
behaviour (Mitchell, 1999; Taylor, 1974). In the case of counterfeit purchase behaviour,
Veloutsou and Bian (2008) suggest that the experienced level of overall perceived risk
is moderate. Additionally, De Matos et al. (2007) suggest that perceived risk is the most
important variable to predict consumer attitude toward counterfeits. Bian and
Moutinhou (2009) found evidence that perceived risk is a factor that negatively
influences the purchase intention of counterfeits. In conclusion the importance of the
perceived risk construct is proven. Important to notice is that in earlier research on non-
counterfeit related perceived risk, it is suggested that the concept of risk should be
examined in a purchase-specific manner (Taylor, 1974).
Despite the fact perceived risk is defined in many different ways over the past decades
(Mitchell, 1999; Stone and Gronhaug, 1993), we will use the definition proposed by
Cunningham (1967): “perceived risk is the amount that would be lost (i.e. that which is
at stake) if the consequences of an act were not favourable, and the individual’s
subjective feeling of certainty that the consequences will be unfavourable”. Previous
research suggests a person’s overall perceived risk consists out of six different risk
dimensions: financial, performance, psychological, physical, social and time risk (Stone
and Gronhaug, 1993).
Veloutsou and Bian (2008) identified the same six risk dimensions in the context of
purchasing counterfeits. Below one can find short definitions of each risk, related to the
counterfeiting context:
14
• Social risk can be defined as the negative outcome one attaches to ‘being caught
by significant others’ when possessing or purchasing a counterfeit.
• Time risk is seen as the time one might lose in the search for a counterfeit article.
• Financial risk involves the potential loss of money when buying a counterfeit.
• Physical risk is the possibility of bodily harm.
• Performance risk refers to the chance of malfunctioning of the knockoff bought.
• In explaining psychological risk the author prefers to refer to an equivalent, but
more explicit definition given by Dholakia (2001, adopted from Perugini and
Bagozzi, 1999): “psychological risk refers to the experience of anxiety or
psychological discomfort arising from anticipated postbehavioral affective
reactions such as worry and regret from purchasing and using the product”.
4.1.5. Perceived harm and actor-proximity
Empirical and academic evidence show that counterfeiting is a harming and thus risky
business (Pollinger, 2008 and Lewis, 2009). In our research, we would like to
differentiate between two types of harm caused by the purchase of counterfeit goods:
personal and societal harm. This classification is based on actor-proximity, i.e. ‘the
proximity away from the perceived harm to oneself or to family, rather than to overall
society’ (Thompson et al., 2005). With personal harm, the individual itself is affected by
purchasing counterfeit products. With societal harm, counterfeit trade affects the society
as a whole and thus actor-proximity is less. Related to the concept of actor-proximity,
Casola et al. (2008) found that ‘respondents saw participation (in buying counterfeit
goods) as less acceptable (…) when the victim was seen as an individual rather than as
society or an organisation.’ Thompson et al. (2005) posit that ‘the average consumer
does not consider overall societal issues when faced with the option of purchasing an
original or a counterfeit product.’ Therefore the author expects perceived personal harm
to have a greater negative impact on one’s attitude toward purchasing CLFI than
perceived societal harm.
15
4.1.6. Perceived Personal harm
Veloutsou et al. (2008) indicated that western consumers rated physical risk,
performance risk and financial risk as the most important types of risks in the context of
non-deceptive counterfeiting. As already mentioned above, they also found time risk,
psychological risk and social risk contributed to the overall risk level. Informing
consumers about the personal consequences these risks might cause can be used as
negative cues to be sent to the potential consumers of counterfeit goods. As such, this
information is expected to have an impact on perceived personal harm, as the individual
itself might become affected. Important for this research is that Chakraborty et al. (1997)
suggest that negative cues about counterfeiting lead to lower purchase intentions.
To give some examples of the most frequently mentioned personal consequences that
are linked to these types of risk in a CLFI related context, the author refers to Gessler
(2009) and Phillips (2005):
• CLFI can cause heavy skin rash (cfr. physical risk).
• CLFI do not ‘function’ as promised, e.g. colours fade away very easily (cfr.
performance risk).
• There exists a high probability one pays too much for what the CLFI is actually
worth, considering its objective quality (cfr. financial risk).
4.1.7. Perceived Societal harm
In assessing societal harm the author would like to refer to Lewis et al. (2009), the
OECD report (2008), the BASCAP reports (2009), Gessler (2009) and Pollinger (2008).
The most frequently mentioned consequences counterfeiting has on society are:
• Funding of international crime. Counterfeiting is even called ‘the crime of the 21st
century’ as terrorists can get ‘easy’ money without risking a lot. The
counterfeiting activity seems extremely attractive to terrorists compared to other
illegal activities like drug smuggling and human trafficking.
16
• Job losses. Counterfeiting is held accountable for job losses at a large scale in
legitimate companies and their subsidiaries.
• Loss of sales. Legitimate owners suffer a direct loss of sales.
• Loss of taxes. The government suffer significant losses of tax revenues due to
unpaid sales tax, unpaid business taxes on production and sale of counterfeit
goods and lost customs duties.
• Decreased innovation. One argues that counterfeiting causes a disincentive for
innovation by legitimate owners as they have to fund future R&D projects with
fewer sales. This view is also supported by Miss Hagenaers (Trade Mark and
Design Attorney, 16 Feb 2010, Antwerp).
• Child and forced labour. The production of counterfeit articles is not in line with
current labour legislations. Consequently, child and forced labour are rigorously
present.
Informing consumers about the societal consequences of counterfeiting can be used as
negative cues to be sent to potential consumers of counterfeit goods. As Chakraborty et
al. (1997) suggest, negative cues about counterfeiting lead to lower purchase intentions
of counterfeit products. In addition, Penz et al. (2009) found that ‘informing consumers
about the business practices of counterfeiters may change their attitudes toward the
phenomenon’.
Based on this literature review we postulate the following:
H4: Messages provoking perceived personal harm will affect the attitude towards CLFI
in a more negative way than messages provoking perceived societal harm as actor-
proximity is closer in the case of personal harm.
4.1.8. Fashion consciousness
Fashion consciousness can be defined as the degree to which one finds it important to
be perceived as a fashionable individual or the degree to which an individual keeps his
‘styling’ and thus variety of new fashion items up-to-date. As we are investigating
consumers’ purchase intention for luxury fashion-related counterfeits, the results of Wee
17
et al. (1995) are of major importance to our research. They reveal that ‘for fashion-
related counterfeit products, purchase intention is determined by the similarities in
appearance, quality and image projected by the counterfeit version compared to the
originals.’ In addition, one must bear in mind that the quality and thus the ‘similarity-
potential’ of counterfeits are skyrocketing (OECD, 2008; Gentry et al., 2006). Gentry et
al. (2006) also found that consumers consider counterfeits as a relatively cheap way to
keep up with the latest fashion trends. Taking into account the above results of previous
research, one might expect it is not only the lower price that influences consumers’
purchase intention of fashion-related counterfeit items, but also their fashion
consciousness, as these CLFI make luxury fashion available for a much broader public
than does the original. Therefore we postulate the following:
H5: Fashion consciousness has a positive impact on purchase intentions of CLFI.
4.1.9. Past behaviour
In a recent investigation toward the role of past (buying) behaviour and its effect on
future (buying) behaviour in a non-counterfeit related context, Smith et al. (2008) found
self-reported past (buying) behaviour was a strong predictor of self-reported purchase
intentions. Also Ouelette and Wood (1998) suggest past behaviour has a significant
influence on intentions and therefore on actual behaviour. In addition they state that the
frequency of performing certain behaviour has a direct impact on future behaviour.
Ajzen (1991) already suggested the salient influence of past experience on perceived
behavioural control and thus on purchase intentions.
In the context of counterfeit buying behaviour, Yoo and Lee (2009) found past behaviour
had a significant positive influence on predicting purchase intention of luxury fashion
counterfeits in a South Korean context. However, the main limitation for their study is
that the findings may have very limited ‘generalizability’. As they suggest themselves, ‘it
would be more meaningful if the same findings hold consistent in different types of
consumers, in different regions and in different cultures’. To help improving the
generalizability potential of the ‘past behaviour’ construct in the area of consumer
behaviour and counterfeiting, we will investigate the impact it has on intention to
18
purchase counterfeit luxury goods in an individualistic Western country (Belgium).
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize the following:
H6: Past behaviour has a positive influence on purchase intention of CLFI.
4.1.10. Price/quality inference
Price is often used as an extrinsic cue to signal product quality. ‘Extrinsic attributes are
not considered to be product-specific and can therefore serve as general indicators of
quality across all types of products’ (Zeithaml, 1988). Nevertheless, many authors have
argued the accuracy of this reasoning. For example, Gerstner (1985) found that for
many products, the relationship between price and quality is rather weak and thus price
is found a poor predictor of quality. In their meta-analysis of the price/perceived quality
relationship, Völckner and Hoffmann (2007) conclude that ‘the price effect on perceived
quality has decreased’. However, Lichtenstein and Burton (1989) found that one has to
consider the price/quality relationship in a product-specific way. For this reason we
integrate the price/quality relationship in our research on counterfeiting. How do Belgian
consumers evaluate the price/quality relationship of counterfeits? To which extent do
consumers believe the price of a CLFI is a predictor for its quality and what is the impact
of this belief on their attitudes toward purchasing CLFI? Phau et al. (2008) found
price/quality inference to be a significant predictor for attitude toward counterfeiting.
However, in practice one must remain critical in assessing this price quality relationship
as Gentry et al. (2006) suggest ‘the seller’s willingness to negotiate price for a CLFI may
be the real cue for quality, rather than the initial price itself’’.
H7: One’s price/quality inference rating has an impact on one’s attitude toward
purchasing CLFI.
4.1.11. Perceived quality
Another determinant of major importance in examining consumer behaviour in the
context of counterfeit goods is perceived quality. This construct can be defined as ‘a
19
consumer’s judgment about a product’s overall excellence and superiority’ (Zeithaml,
1988). Wee et al. (1995) state that consumers’ intention to purchase counterfeits is
dominated by perceived quality. Prendergast et al. (2002) also prove the importance of
perceived product quality when consumers buy CLFI.
Although counterfeits are often seen as low quality copies of the real product, there is
an upward trend towards high quality counterfeits (Hilton et al., 2004; OECD, 2008).
‘Supercopies’ are on the rise. Over the years, counterfeits have enjoyed increased
quality levels due to the widely available, cheap and easy accessible new production
technologies. (Gessler, 2009; Alcock, 2003). Gentry et al. (2006) even state that the
ability to distinguish counterfeits from genuine items becomes less important as the
quality of many counterfeits is more and more approximating the quality of the real
product. In fact, consumers report that there might not be any noticeable difference in
perceived quality at all (Tom et al., 1998).
The following questions will be investigated in this context: “What is consumers’
perception of quality in case of CLFI? Does it influence their attitude toward purchasing
counterfeits and therefore has an impact on their purchase intentions for such articles? “
4.2. Extrinsic Determinants
4.2.1. Price
‘Low price’ is frequently mentioned as one of the major product attributes affecting
purchase intention of counterfeit goods (Penz et al., 2009; Large, 2009; Albers-Miller,
1999; Chaudry, 2008; Tom et al., 1998; Ang et al., 2001; Bloch et al., 1993; Large,
2009). The price of a counterfeit luxury fashion item is mostly set as a fraction of the
price of the matching genuine item (Penz and Stöttinger, 2005; Ang et al., 2001; Tom et
al., 1998). One can find practical examples of counterfeiters’ low-pricing practices just
by googling the word ‘replica’. Several sites will be displayed, offering cheap fakes. It is
this low-pricing strategy that attracts consumer’s attention on purchasing a counterfeit.
However, because of the rise of the so-called ‘supercopies’, prices of these high quality
counterfeits have risen too. It is interesting to investigate whether consumers use real
20
price and quality cues of CLFI as an indicator of perceived quality, as is sometimes the
case with genuine items (Völckner and Hofmann, 2007). To the authors’ best
knowledge, no research has yet been conducted that integrates the possibility of
consumers encountering relatively high prices for counterfeits.
Based on the discussion above on perceived quality and the price construct reasoning,
the following hypotheses are postulated:
H8: Messages containing a high price or a high quality cue have a positive impact on
the perceived quality of a CLFI.
H9a: The higher the perceived quality of a CLFI, the more positive one’s attitude
towards purchasing counterfeits.
H9b: The higher the perceived quality of a CLFI is, the higher one’s purchase intention
for CLFI.
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4.3. Conceptual model for intention to purchase CLFI Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the research design. A dotted line implies a
comparison is made between the connected constructs. A solid line evaluates the direct
relationship between the connected constructs.
Figure 3: Conceptual model for intention to purchase counterfeit luxury fashion items
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5. Summary of the research focus
It is many times suggested in the anti-counterfeiting literature that consumers must
become aware of the negative consequences bound to counterfeit trade (Lewis, 2009;
Thompson et al., 2005; Berman, 2008). We will investigate the impact of messages that
attract consumers’ attention on these negative consequences, both on individual and
societal level. In fact we will assess if there exists a difference in attitude one holds
toward purchasing CLFI, depending on which type of message (personal harm or
societal harm message) one is being exposed to. The relationship between attitude and
purchase intention is investigated as well. We will consider the effect of price and quality
messages on perceived quality because many authors (Gentry et al., 2006; Gessler,
2009) suggest ‘retail’ prices and actual quality of CLFI are rising. The author integrates
the higher availability of counterfeits by assessing the impact of perceived behavioural
control on purchase intention. Because we find ourselves in a fashion-related context,
we assess the impact of one’s fashion consciousness on purchase intention. Subjective
norms are often reported to be significant influencers of attitude and purchase intention.
Therefore, one’s normative susceptibility is taken into account as well. Finally, we
assess the impact of past behaviour on the intention to purchase CLFI.
23
6. Pre-test
In our main research, each participant will see one message stimulus that contains
information about a product being counterfeited, the price and the quality level of the
product in question. Above all, they are either shown a personal harm or a societal harm
message. Different messages were constructed to manipulate these variables correctly.
A pre-test was set up to test one’s perception of the constructs being manipulated. The
reader can find the questionnaire used for pre-testing in Annex 1.1. All statistical
analyses concerning the pre-test results are conducted with SPSS® 15 and can be
found in Annex 1.2.
The pre-test has been conducted with seventeen people of different ages. Ten of them
were women (58.82%), while seven of them were men (41.17%).
6.1. Products and brands
Two of the most frequently counterfeited luxury fashion items are watches and
handbags (Brandhome, 2008; OECD, 2008; BASCAP, 2009a). We investigated the
importance men attach to a (genuine) watch and the importance women attach to a
(genuine) purse on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘totally not important’ to ‘totally
important’. Results show no significant difference in importance attached by men and
women to these products (t(17)=1.385, p>0,05) (Mmen=5.57, SD=1,72; Mwomen=6.40,
SD=0,70) Thus, a watch for a man is equally important as a purse for a woman. For this
reason we can use these two products as product stimuli in our main research.
In the message, brand names of luxury fashion brands were mentioned. To make sure
we used the brands that are most likely to be purchased when counterfeited,
respondents were asked to answer the question from which brand(s) they should ever
consider buying a counterfeit version, if it were easily available at a (for them)
acceptable price and quality level. Respondents were given a list with widely
counterfeited brands, but they also had the opportunity to write some down that were
not in this list. Results indicate that Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux,
Rolex and Calvin Klein are the most preferred brands.
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6.2. Perceived personal harm
To be able to manipulate perceived personal harm correctly in our main research, we
confronted respondents with messages demonstrating the risks consumers take when
purchasing counterfeits. To find out which risks were perceived as having the highest
impact on perceived personal harm, participants were asked to indicate to which extent
each of the six risk dimensions of Veloutsou and Bian (2008) (cfr. infra) were perceived
capable of inflicting personal harm on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘I don’t think
this is worse for myself at all’ to ‘I think this is definitely worse for myself’. Results show
a pretty high mean for each dimension, ranging from 3,88 for psychological risk to 6,12
for physical risk. Table 1 shows that, except for psychological risk, there is found no
significant difference in the perceived personal harm men and women associate with
each of the different risk dimensions separately. Thus, only for psychological risk, men
and women indicate it is personally harming them differently.
Table 1: Perceived personal harm per risk type & gender differences
RISK TYPE t(17) p-value Mmen SDmen Mwomen SDwomen Moverall SDoverall Physical 1.248 >0.05 5.57 2.149 6.50 0.85 6.12 1.536 Performance 0.885 >0.05 5.00 1.639 5.60 1.174 5.35 1.367 Financial 0.515 >0.05 4.86 0.690 5.10 1.10 5.00 0.935 Social 0.656 >0.05 3.86 2.34 4.50 1.716 4.23 1.954 Time 0.603 >0.05 4.00 1.826 4.50 1.581 3.88 2.058 Psychological 2.546 <0.05 2.57 1.718 4.80 1.814 4.29 1.649
We selected the three risks that were perceived as having the most impact (i.e. having
the highest average score) on perceived personal harm to use in the message stimuli of
our main research: physical risk (M=6,12; SD=1,54), performance risk (M=5,35;
SD=1,37) and financial risk (M=5,00; SD=0,94).
6.3. Perceived societal harm
To be able to manipulate perceived societal harm correctly in our main research, we
confronted respondents with messages demonstrating the consequences society
undergoes because of the existence of counterfeit trade. To find out which
consequences were perceived as having the highest impact on society, participants
25
were asked to indicate to which extent each of the six most frequently mentioned
consequences proposed by Lewis et al. (2009), the OECD report (2008), the BASCAP
reports (2009), Gessler (2009) and Pollinger (2008) is perceived capable of harming
society as a whole on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘I don’t think this is worse for
society at all’ to ‘I think this is definitely worse for society’. Table 2 shows that, for each
of the consequences separately, no significant difference is found in the perceived
societal harm men and women associate with it.
Table 2: Perceived societal harm per societal consequence & gender differences
SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCE t(17) p-value Mmen SDmen Mwomen SDwomen Moverall SDoverall
Funding of international crime 1.552 >0.05 5.29 2.059 6.40 0.843 5.94 1.519
Loss of sales for authentic company 0.943 >0.05 4.43 1.718 5.20 1.619 4.88 1.654
Loss of government taxes -0.667 >0.05 4.14 1.952 3.50 1.958 3.76 1.921
Job loss 1.419 >0.05 5.29 1.38 6.10 0.994 5.76 1.200
Disincentive for innovation 0.911 >0.05 4.71 1.113 5.30 1.418 5.06 1.298
Child & forced labour 2.045 >0.05 5.29 2.059 6.70 0.675 6.12 1.536
We selected the three consequences that were perceived as having the most impact
(i.e. having the highest average score) on perceived societal harm to be used in the
message stimuli of our main research: child and forced labour (M=6.12; SD=1.536), job
losses (M=5.76; SD=1.200) and funding of international crime (M=5.94; SD=1.519).
6.4. Price, quality, perceived harm and message credibility
Respondents in the pre-test were shown a list with six items about personal harm and
six items about societal harm, numbered from 1 to 12. Next, they were asked to indicate
on a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from ‘not at all credible’ to ‘very credible’) the overall
credibility of all harm items at once, in combination with the information about a
counterfeit product of either moderate or high quality and that is either priced low or
moderate. Results show that all combinations are found to be credible as there is no
mean score smaller than 5.29 (SD= 1.105). Table 3 shows that overall message
credibility for each of the situations separately did not differ between men and women.
26
Table 3: Message credibility per price and quality situation & gender differences
SITUATION t(17) p-value Mmen SDmen Mwomen SDwomen Moverall SDoverall
High quality, moderate price -1.345 >0.05 5.71 0.488 5.00 1.33 5.29 1.105
High quality, low price -0.191 >0.05 6.00 0.577 5.90 1.287 5.94 1.029
Moderate quality, moderate price 0.881 >0.05 5.29 1.496 5.80 0.919 5.59 1.176
Moderate quality, low price 0.875 >0.05 5.71 1.380 6.20 0.919 6.00 1.118
As mentioned above, all items were shown at once in one list. Because the researcher
expected some items to be less credible than others in certain situations, participants
were given the opportunity to write down the number(s) of the item(s) (ranging from 1 to
12) they found less credible in combination with the above-mentioned information of
different price (low and moderate) and quality (moderate and high) levels. Many
respondents indicated that especially messages about ‘physical risk’ (item no. 1 in the
list), ‘performance risk’ (item no. 2) and ‘financial risk’ (item no. 3) could not be
combined with the ‘high quality’ condition (see annex 1.2). Therefore, in our main
research, we will not use stimuli that present moderate or high quality. Instead we will
use ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ quality stimuli.
27
7. Main research
The different stimuli used in the main research can be found in Annex 2. The full
questionnaire can be found in Annex 3.1. All scales used can be found in ‘Marketing
Scales Handbook: A Compilation of Multi-item Measures – Vol. 3’ (Bruner II, James and
Hensel, 2001). All statistical analyses concerning the results of the main research are
conducted with SPSS® 15 and can be found in Annex 3.2.
7.1. Methodology
7.1.1. Data collection
A self-administered online questionnaire was created using the Qualtrics™ software.
About four hundred people, both students and non-students, were emailed the website
address and were kindly asked to take part in the survey. In addition, a group was
created on the social networking site Facebook© where people could subscribe to take
part in this research. It was stressed that participation was totally voluntary, free of
obligations and totally anonymous. The researcher attached the possibility of winning a
price as compensation for one’s participation. Demographic details were requested
purely for statistical use. Participants who took part in the competition were also asked
to leave their e-mail address. This was only used to inform the winners. Respondents
were given about 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire. Reminders were sent via
email and Facebook© statuses about the progress of the research were updated
regularly. Four hundred and ten surveys were completed, but ninety-one were rejected
due to incomplete information. In this way, 319 responses were used in our final
analysis.
7.1.2. Sample
Many studies investigating the determinants of counterfeit purchase intention collect
data with students only. However, this research meets the proposition of Yoo and Lee
(2008) to also include financially independent respondents of a greater age range. By
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doing so, one may obtain a greater generalizability of the results. 319 Belgians (130
male and 189 female) ranging in age from 16 to 60 years (M=26.88; SD=11.46) filled
out the online survey. The majority (72.8 per cent) of the respondents were between 16
and 25 years old. 36.1 per cent of respondents reported they have an own income at
their disposal. Table 4 presents a detailed demographic profile of all respondents.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions of our 2 (perceived
harm/message type: personal versus societal) by 2 (price: low versus moderate) by 2
(quality: low versus moderate) between-subjects experimental design.
Table 4: Demographic profile of respondents
Demographics N Per cent GENDER Female 189 59.2 Male 130 40.8 AGE 16-25 230 72.1 26-35 23 7.2 36 and above 63 19.7 INCOME Yes 115 36.1 No 203 63.6 GROUP Student 218 68.3 Working 88 27.6 Jobless 2 0.6 Retired 3 0.9 Other 7 2.2
7.1.3. Stimuli
The researcher briefly describes the construction of the eight different experimental
stimuli. The first factor of the between-subjects design, personal harm versus societal
harm (i.e. message type) concerns the fact whether the harm message indicates that
society as a whole or that you yourself can be affected in a negative way by the
purchase of counterfeits. Consequently, four messages stress the fact that there are
negative societal consequences (cf. Pre-test) bound to counterfeit trade, while the other
four messages stress certain risks that may personally harm (cf. Pre-test) purchasers of
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CLFI. The second factor (i.e. price) of the message deals with the fact that one has the
opportunity to buy a ‘low priced’ or a ‘moderate priced’ CLFI. The third factor (i.e.
quality) of the communications deals with the fact that CLFI of top brands can be either
of ‘low’ or ‘moderate quality’. The eight different scenarios can be found in Annex 2.
7.1.4. Measures
Respondents indicate their purchase intention for a CLFI on a seven-point Likert scale
based on the one developed by Sweeney, Soutar and Johnson (1999). The two items
are: ‘Are you planning to buy a counterfeit luxury fashion item in the near future’, and
‘How big is the chance you will buy a counterfeit luxury fashion item in the near future’.
The responses to these two items are averaged to form an overall purchase intention
(Pearson correlation= 0.873).
The researcher opted to take into account two variables that indicate differences among
individuals concerning the impact of the messages they are exposed to. First, the
respondent’s level of message involvement is measured by means of Cox and Cox’
(1991) six-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.80). This high reliability allows us to
compute an average score. Second, message credibility is measured using a single
item ‘The information shown above is credible’. The items of the two variables were
measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘I totally don’t agree’ to ‘I totally
agree’.
The attitude toward purchasing a CLFI is assessed using a seven-item (e.g. good-bad,
rewarding-punishing, not harmful-harmful) seven-point semantic differential scale
(Cronbach’s alpha= 0.872) based on the one developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).
In fact, these items allow the researcher to gain insights in what respondents think
about the act of purchasing CLFI. Because of the high reliability, an average score can
be calculated.
Past purchase behaviour is operationalized using a single question asking whether the
respondent has ever bought a counterfeit luxury fashion item before. Answers were
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‘yes’ or ‘no’. In addition, the researcher asks to report how often per year one buys such
items (M=0.463; SD=1.141).
Respondents are asked to indicate their perceived quality level of a CLFI on a five-item
(e.g. ‘The workmanship of this product would be’, ‘The likelihood that the product would
be reliable is’) seven-point semantic differential scale (low-high) based on the one
developed by Petroshius and Monroe (1987). Reliability was high (Cronbach’s alpha=
0.760) and thus an average score across the five items is calculated.
One’s price-quality inference rating is assessed using a four-item (e.g. ‘The higher the
price of the CLFI, the better the quality’) seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘totally
not agree’ to ‘totally agree’. Reliability was again high (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.806) and
therefore an average score is computed. The scale used is adopted from Gotlieb and
Sarel (1991).
Subjective norm and thus, in the context of this research, normative susceptibility is
measured using a four-item (e.g. My friends think I should not buy counterfeit luxury
fashion items) seven-point Likert scale (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.794) ranging from ‘I totally
don’t agree’ to ‘I totally agree’. The scale used is based on the ‘Normative Interpersonal
Influence Scale’ developed by Bearden et al. (1989).
The researcher used a slightly adapted version of Lumpkin and Darden’s (1982) scale
to measure fashion consciousness. A four-item (e.g. I buy in different shops to obtain a
great variety in my clothing) seven-point Likert scale (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.903) ranging
from ‘I totally don’t agree’ to ‘I totally agree’ was developed. Item scores were averaged
to form an overall fashion consciousness score.
A single item asking how easy one finds it to buy a CLFI in the future six months,
measures perceived behavioural control. Linked to the concept of availability, the
respondent is asked to indicate where (flea markets, internet, on holidays, other) he or
she would buy a CLFI if one would buy such thing at all.
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7.2. Results
7.2.1. Manipulation check
Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two perceived harm conditions.
Consequently, respondents in condition 1 are confronted with a ‘personal harm’
message, while respondents in condition 2 are confronted with a ‘societal harm’
message. Before analyzing the data, we need to make sure respondents correctly
perceived these messages as causing harm to oneself in condition 1 or to society in
condition 2.
The researcher asks questions concerning the manipulation check at the end of the
questionnaire (see Annex 3.1). In this way the least interference between the
manipulation check and the actual manipulation is expected. Participants are asked in
two separate questions to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale to which extent each of
the risk types (physical, performance and financial risk) and each of the societal
consequences (child and forced labour, job losses and funding of international crime)
selected in the pre-test are capable of causing respectively personal harm (ranging from
‘I don’t think this is worse for me at all’ to ‘I definitely think this is worse for me’) and
societal harm (ranging from ‘I don’t think this is worse for society as a whole’ to ‘I
definitely think this is worse for society as a whole’). Before comparing mean scores, it
is interesting to investigate whether the different items of the manipulation check
questions assessing perceived personal harm indeed measure the same construct (in
casu perceived personal harm). The same goes for the items intended to measure
perceived societal harm. In order to check whether the three different risk types indeed
measure perceived personal harm and the three different societal consequences indeed
measure perceived societal harm, Cronbach’s alphas are calculated. Results in Table 5
suggest the different items of the two perceived harm constructs are internally
consistent as Cronbach’s alphas are high. In both cases item-total correlation is
acceptable because none of the items has a low correlation with the construct
measured. Therefore the researcher concludes the different items mentioned are
indeed capable of provoking personal and societal harm. Item scores are averaged for
the both constructs separately in order to create for each respondent an overall score
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for the manipulation check of perceived personal harm and an overall score for the
manipulation check of perceived societal harm. The next question to answer is whether
respondents also perceive it this way and to which extent they do so.
Table 5: Cronbach's alpha analysis for perceived societal harm and perceived personal harm
Perceived Societal Harm Cronbach's alpha= 0.790 ITEM Item-total correlation Alpha if Item Deleted Societal harm: terrorist funding 0,615 0,738 Societal harm: job losses 0,664 0,688 Societal harm: child labour 0,634 0,724 Perceived Personal Harm Cronbach's Alpha= 0.760 ITEM Item-total correlation Alpha if Item Deleted Personal harm: physical risk 0,537 0,737 Personal harm: performance risk 0,667 0,588 Personal harm: financial risk 0,571 0,700
First we split our file based on the message type (group 1: personal harm message;
group 2: societal harm message) one has been exposed to. Next we conduct two One-
Sample T-tests to test whether the mean score in the manipulation check for perceived
personal harm and the mean score in the manipulation check for perceived societal
harm is significantly different from the scale’s middle point (i.e. 4 on a 7-point Likert
scale). Results in Table 6 show that respondents who are exposed to a personal harm
message indeed perceive the risks mentioned as personally harming them because the
mean score is significantly different (in casu higher) from the scale’s middle point. In the
same way, respondents who are exposed to a societal harm message indeed perceive
the consequences mentioned as causing harm to society.
Table 6: Manipulation check for perceived harm
Message Type T-value N Manipulation check Mean SD
Personal Harm 14.286** 155 5.277 1.113
Societal Harm 31.202** 163 6.123 0.869
Test Value= 4
**: significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)
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7.2.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 7 quantitatively summarizes the measured variables in our data set and thus
gives an average idea of the investigated consumer behaviour concepts in the
counterfeiting context. As mentioned above, all variables except past purchase
behaviour are measured on 7-point Likert scales.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for our data set
N Min Max Mean SD Message Credibility 319 2 7 5,49 1,0030 Message Involvement 319 1 7 4,7837 0,9379 Purchase Intention 319 1 7 2,2382 1,5635 Attitude 319 1 5,86 3,3108 1,0574 Perceived Quality 319 1 5,75 2,2978 0,9192 Price Quality Inference 318 1 6,25 3 1,1202 Subjective Norm 318 1 7 4,0299 1,1389 Fashion Consciousness 318 1 7 4,2948 1,4632 Past Purchase Behaviour 319 0 1 0,4013 0,4909 Perceived Behavioural Control 315 1 7 4,62 1,9780 Valid N (listwise) 315
Please note that across the entire sample respondents hold a somewhat negative
attitude toward purchasing CLFI. The low dispersion (SD=1.0574) indicates
respondents’ opinions are very much alike. Purchase intentions are low. However, one
must notice a relatively high dispersion (SD=1.5635) in this case. Respondents perceive
CLFI as low quality products. In addition, they are quite unanimous about this matter as
dispersion is pretty low (SD=0.9192). Respondents’ price quality inference rating is low
too. This means they do not see a higher (lower) price as an indicator for higher (lower)
quality. Again they very much hold the same opinion about this matter (SD=1.202).
Perceived availability and thus PBC of CLFI is fairly high. This means consumers find it
relatively easy to acquire a CLFI. However, one must take into account the very high
dispersion (SD=1.9780). In this context respondents indicate that if they would purchase
a CLFI, they would do this in the first place when being on holiday. Concerning past
purchase behaviour, 40.13% of respondents indicated to have purchased a CLFI
before.
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7.2.3. Message credibility and message involvement
In order to identify if there exist individual differences in message credibility depending
on which of the eight messages or conditions (see Annex 2) one has been exposed to,
the researcher conducts an Analysis of variance test (see Annex 3.2). Results show us
there is no significant effect of ‘conditions’ on message credibility (F=0.928; p>0.05). All
messages are perceived as being equally credible. If we consider the high mean score
for message credibility (M=5.49; SD=1.003), we can conclude respondents perceived
these different messages as highly credible.
In order to identify whether there exist individual differences in message involvement
depending on which message type (personal harm or societal harm) one has been
exposed to, the researcher conducts an independent samples T-test. Results show
there indeed exists a significant difference (t(319)=-5.208; p<0.05) in message
involvement between respondents who are exposed to a personal harm message
(M=4.52; SD=0.91) and respondents who are exposed to a societal harm message
(M=5.04; SD=0.89). The latter group is thus more involved.
7.2.4. Development of regression models for attitude toward purchasing CLFI and for intention to purchase CLFI
Because there have been mixed results in past research concerning the impact of
socio-demographics on the attitude toward buying counterfeits (Yoo and Lee, 2009), we
chose to include these characteristics in our regression model as independent control
variables. Therefore, the researcher opted to conduct hierarchical multiple regression
analyses (University of Texas, 2009) for attitude toward purchasing CLFI and purchase
intention for CLFI. Two separate models are developed. There are two stages in the
development of each model. In a first stage the independent variables that we want to
control for are entered into the regression. In the second stage, the independent
variables whose relationship we want to examine after the controls are entered. A
statistical test of the change in R² from the first stage is used to evaluate the importance
of the variables entered in the second stage. For each model, the standardised beta
coefficients are reported because they can be mutually compared.
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It is important to notice that all underlying assumptions (Van Kenhove et al., 2008) to
perform a linear regression analysis have been verified in every model. Regression
model 1 for attitude toward purchasing CLFI satisfies all underlying assumptions
(standardized residuals are distributed normally, tolerance indicates no multicollinearity
problems, etc.). Regression model 2 for purchase intention of CLFI satisfies all
conditions, except the normal distribution of standardized residuals. Thus, results for
this model have to be interpreted with caution.
7.2.4.1. Regression model for attitude toward purchasing CLFI
In order to test hypotheses H2a, H4, H7 and H9a a multiple hierarchical regression is
conducted to analyse the effects of the independent variables (message type, perceived
quality, normative susceptibility and price quality inference) and the control variables
(age, income, group, gender) on the dependent variable attitude towards purchasing
counterfeits. Results generated are shown in Table 8.
It is important to mention that ‘message type’ is a dummy variable, coded 0 and 1.
Respondents assigned to the personal harm condition receive the value 0 for this
variable. Respondents assigned to the societal harm condition receive the value 1 for
message type.
Table 8: Regression model of predictors for attitude towards purchasing CLFI
Model 1a: Control Variables
Model 1b: All variables
Stand. Beta T-value Stand. Beta T-value Age -0.118 -1.363 -0.104 -1.598 Income -0.046 -0.550 -0.103 -1.640 Group -0.190 -2.419* -0.117 -1.979* Gender -0.036 -0.646 -0.005 -0.126 Message Type (Perceived Harm) -0.181 -4.367** Perceived Quality 0.322 -7.566** Price Quality Inference 0.075 1.768 Subjective Norm -0.461 -10.903** R² 0.102 0.508 Adjusted R² 0.089 0.494 F-value 8.237** 37.031** R² change 0.102 0.406 F change 8.237** 59.231** Dependent variable: Attitude *: significant at 0.05 level **: significant at 0.01 level
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F-values for both models show there exists indeed a statistically significant relationship
between the set of all independent variables and the dependent variable (attitude).
Thus, we can conclude there exists a good fit between the data and the assumed
regression model. F-change statistics for Model 1b indicate that the addition of the
independent variables (message type, perceived quality, price quality inference and
subjective norm) to the control variables indeed improves the relationship with the
dependent variable (attitude toward purchasing CLFI) significantly.
The adjusted R2 in our final Model 1b indicates that 49.4% of the variation in ‘attitude
toward purchasing CLFI’ is explained by the variation in the four independent variables
and the four control variables.
The independent variables ‘perceived quality’, ‘subjective norm’ and ‘message type’, are
found to be significant predictors of attitudes towards purchasing CLFI as their
regression coefficients appear to be significantly different from zero. This is not the case
for one’s price quality inference rating.
One’s price quality inference rating is not found to be a significant predictor of attitude
towards purchasing CLFI. Hence, Hypothesis 7 is rejected.
Perceived quality is positively influencing the attitude toward purchasing CLFI. If one
perceives the quality of a counterfeit being low (high), one’s attitude will be less (more)
positive. Hence, Hypothesis 9a is supported.
One’s normative susceptibility (subjective norm) is negatively influencing one’s attitude
toward purchasing CLFI. The more susceptible one is for the importance significant
others (e.g. friends, relatives) attach to not buying CLFI, the less positive one’s attitude
toward purchasing CLFI. Therefore Hypothesis 2a is supported.
Message type is negatively influencing one’s attitude toward purchasing CLFI. As such,
the fact that one is exposed to a message containing information about the societal
consequences associated with purchasing counterfeits instead of a message containing
information about risks that may cause personal harm, has a negative influence on
one’s attitude toward purchasing counterfeits. Hence, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. Table 9
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confirms this result as there is found a significant difference in attitude toward
purchasing CLFI between respondents confronted with a personal harm message
(higher attitude score) and respondents confronted with a societal harm message (lower
attitude score).
Table 9: Attitude and message type differences
T-value N
M personal harm
message SDphm
M societal harm
message SDshm
Attitude 2.465* 319 3.459 1.021 3.169 1.075
*: significant at 0.05 level
Regression results also show a significant effect of the control variable ‘group’. Thus,
respondents’ attitudes towards purchasing CLFI differ depending on the group they
belong to. However, further analysis is needed to examine this effect in depth as this
‘group’ variable is an ordinal one and can therefore not be interpreted properly in this
regression. Analysis of variance confirms there is indeed a significant effect (F=8.630;
p<0.05) of ‘group’ on attitude. Post hoc analysis using the Tamhane criterion for
significance indicates that students (M=3.51; SD=0.93) hold a more positive attitude
towards purchasing CLFI than respondents who reported to be working (M=2.93;
SD=1.15).
7.2.4.2. Regression model for purchase intention of CLFI
In order to test hypotheses H1, H2b, H3, H5, H6 and H9b a multiple hierarchical
regression is conducted to analyse the effects of the independent variables (attitude,
normative susceptibility, perceived behavioural control, past behaviour and perceived
quality) and the control variables (age, income, group, gender) on the dependent
variable purchase intention for CLFI. Results generated are shown in Table 10.
It is important to mention that ‘past purchase behaviour’ is a dummy variable, coded 0
and 1. Respondents indicating they have not purchased a CLFI before receive the value
38
0 for this variable. Respondents indicating they have purchased a CLFI before receive
the value 1 for this variable.
Table 10: Regression model for predictors of purchase intention for CLFI
Model 2a: Control Variables
Model 2b: All variables
Stand. Beta T-Value
Stand. Beta T-value
Age -0.045 -0.492 0.021 0.301 Income -0.115 -1.381 -0.031 -0.494 Group -0.052 -0.644 -0.036 -0.586 Gender 0.030 0.513 0.004 -0.093 Fashion Consciousness 0.121 2.525* Subjective Norm -0.100 -2.083* Past Purchase Behaviour 0.331 7.241** Availability (PBC) 0.050 1,118 Attitude 0.358 6.502** Perceived Quality 0.185 3.842** R² 0.041 0.486 Adjusted R² 0.028 0.468 F-value 3.103 26.873** R² change 0.037 0.449 F change 2.786* 41.380** Dependent variable: Purchase Intention *: significant at 0.05 level **: significant at 0.01 level
The F-value for model 2b shows there is indeed a statistically significant relationship
between the set of all independent variables and the dependent variable (attitude).
Thus, we can again conclude there exists a good fit between the data and the assumed
regression model. F-change statistics for Model 2b indicate that the addition of the
independent variables (attitude, normative susceptibility, perceived behavioural control,
fashion consciousness, past purchase behaviour and perceived quality) to the control
variables indeed improves the relationship with the dependent variable (purchase
intention for CLFI) significantly.
39
The adjusted R2 in our final Model 1b indicates that 46.8% of the variation in ‘purchase
intention for CLFI’ is explained by the variation in the six independent variables and the
four control variables.
The independent variables ‘fashion consciousness’, ‘subjective norm’, ‘past purchase
behaviour’, ‘attitude (towards purchasing CLFI)’ and ‘perceived quality’ are found to be
significant predictors of purchase intention for CLFI as their regression coefficients
appear to be significantly different from zero. This is neither the case for perceived
behavioural control nor for any of the control variables incorporated in the model.
Perceived behavioural control (availability) is not found to be a significant predictor of
purchase intention for CLFI. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is rejected.
Fashion consciousness is positively influencing one’s intention to purchase CLFI. The
more one is concerned with e.g. being in fashion with current fashion styles, the higher
one’s purchase intention for CLFI. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is supported.
Normative susceptibility (subjective norm) is negatively influencing one’s intention to
purchase CLFI. A similar reasoning as in predicting attitude can be adopted here: the
more importance significant others attach to not buying CLFI, the lower one’s purchase
intention for CLFI. As such, Hypothesis 2b is supported.
Past purchase behaviour emerged to have a significant positive relationship toward
purchasing intention for CLFI. Respondents who bought a CLFI before have a higher
purchase intention than those who did not. Hence, Hypothesis 6 is supported.
Attitude toward purchasing CLFI has a positive impact on purchase intention for CLFI.
Respondents who indicate to hold a more positive attitude toward purchasing CLFI have
higher purchase intentions. This result is in support of Hypothesis 1.
Perceived quality is positively influencing purchase intention for CLFI. The greater the
extent to which one perceives CLFI to have a great workmanship, to be sustainable or
to be reliable, the higher one’s purchase intention for CLFI. Hence, Hypothesis 9b is
supported.
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7.2.4.3. Mediation
The author uses the four Baron and Kenny (1986) steps to assess the role of the
‘attitude’ variable as a mediation variable in the relationship between its determinants
and the variable ‘purchase intention’.
We will illustrate the procedure for ‘perceived quality’. Perceived quality is the
independent variable (X) in this case. Attitude is the mediating variable (M). Purchase
intention is the dependent variable (Y). In the first step we use purchase intention as a
dependent variable in the regression equation and perceived quality as the independent
variable. The model is significant (F=49.516; p<0,05). The same goes for the beta
coefficient of perceived quality (t(318)=7.037; p<0.05). Thus, step one is passed. In the
second step we use attitude as a dependent variable in the regression equation and
perceived quality as the independent variable. The model is significant (F=58.260;
p<0.05). The same goes for the beta coefficient of perceived quality (t(318)=7.633;
p<0.05). Thus, step two is passed. In the third step we use purchase intention as
dependent variable in our multiple regression. Perceived quality and attitude are used
as independent variables. The model is significant (F=65.932; p<0.05). The same goes
for the beta coefficient of attitude (t(318)=8.447; p<0.05). Thus, step three is passed. In
step four we consider the beta coefficient for perceived quality. In this case, it is found to
be significant as well (t(318)=3.821; p<0.05). Because of the fact both beta coefficients
are significant in our third regression equation, attitude is classified as a partial
mediator. Controlling for attitude, the effect of ‘perceived quality’ on ‘purchase intention’
is thus reduced, but is still significant from zero.
The same steps are conducted for the ‘subjective norm’ variable. However, in the third
equation only the beta coefficient for attitude is found to be significant (t(318)= 8.865;
p<0.05). ‘Subjective norm’ is not found to be a significant predictor (t(318)=-1.790;
p>0.05). Therefore, in this case attitude is classified as a complete mediator. Controlling
for attitude, ‘subjective norm’ no longer affects ‘purchase intention’.
‘Price quality inference’ and ‘message type’ do not even pass step one. Therefore no
mediation effect of attitude is present.
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7.2.5. The influence of price and quality messages on perceived quality
To investigate the effect of our price and quality manipulations on perceived quality, two
independent samples T-tests were conducted. Results are shown in Table 11.
It is important to mention that we made use of dummy variables in this context. As such,
respondents can be divided in two groups: group 0 and group 1. ‘Price message’ is a
dummy variable in which ‘0’ stands for the ‘low price’ condition and ‘1’ stands for the
‘moderate price’ condition. ‘Quality message’ is a dummy variable in which ‘0’ stands for
the ‘low quality’ condition and ‘1’ stands for the ‘moderate quality’ condition.
Table 11: Perceived quality and price & quality condition differences
T-value p-value Mean low
price condition
SD lpc
Mean moderate
price condition
SD mpc
Perceived Quality -0.916 >0.05 2.248 0.87 2.343 0.96
T-value p-value Mean low
quality condition
SD lqc
Mean moderate
quality condition
SD mqc
Perceived Quality -0.520 >0.05 2.270 0.902 2.323 0.936
There is found no significant difference in perceived quality between respondents who
were exposed to a ‘low price’ message and those exposed to a ‘’moderate price’
message. The same goes for the quality messages: no significant difference is found
between respondents exposed to a ‘low quality’ message and those exposed to a
‘moderate quality’ message. Hence, Hypothesis 8 is rejected.
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7.2.6. Summary Research results are summarised in Table 12.
Table 12: Summary of research results
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable Result
H1 Attitude Purchase Intention Supported H2a Normative Susceptibility Attitude Supported H2b Normative Susceptibility Purchase Intention Supported H3 PBC Purchase Intention Not Supported H4 Message Type Attitude Not Supported H5 Fashion Consciousness Purchase Intention Supported H6 Past Behaviour Purchase Intention Supported H7 Price Quality Inference Attitude Not Supported H8 Price and quality message Perceived Quality Not Supported H9a Perceived Quality Attitude Supported H9b Perceived Quality Purchase Intention Supported
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8. Special topic: explorative questions about counterfeiting and its harming effects on society, businesses and individuals.
In exploring consumers’ insights and opinions concerning the topic of counterfeit trade
in a Belgian context, the researcher opted to include some explorative questions in the
questionnaire. Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘I totally don’t
agree’ to ‘I totally agree’. Statistical analyses can be found in Annex 4.
Is the selling of counterfeit luxury fashion items an illegal business practice?
Consumers seem to be well aware of the illegal character of selling counterfeit goods.
Over 318 respondents, a mean score of 6.06 (SD=1.448) is obtained. There are no
significant differences between men and women (t(318)=1.168; p>0.05) (Mmen=6.18,
SD=1.355; Mwomen=5.98, SD=1.507). In addition there are no differences depending
on the group (cf. demographic profile) respondents belong to (F=1.288; p>0.05).
Do you think the selling of counterfeit luxury fashion items should be penalized? Again a high mean score is obtained (M=5.65; SD=1.392) indicating that consumers
tend to agree there should be some kind of penalty bound to selling CLFI. No
differences (t(318)=1.890; p>0.05) (Mmen=5.83, SD=1.415; Mwomen=5.53, SD=1.366)
exist between the opinion men and women hold toward this issue. However, an ANOVA
test shows there are significant differences (F=5.098; p<0.05) depending on the group
respondents belong to. Post hoc analysis using the Tamhane criterion for significance
indicates that students (M=5.44; SD=1.384) hold a milder opinion about penalizing
sellers than respondents who reported to be working (M=6.02; SD=1.356).
Do you think conscious buying of counterfeit luxury fashion items should be
penalized? The general opinion is quite neutral as the mean score for this question was 3.90 (SD=
1.873). No significant difference (t(318)=1.066; p>0.05) (Mmen=4.03, SD=1.996;
Mwomen=3.80, SD=1.782) is found in the opinion men and women hold toward this
question. Again, there are significant (F=4.522; p<0.05) differences between students
and respondents who reported to be working. Post hoc analysis using the Tamhane
44
criterion for significance indicates working respondents (M=4.45; SD=2.11) indicate
more than students (M=3.61; SD=1.72) that conscious buying of CLFI should be
penalized.
Do you think the average consumer is sufficiently aware of personal and societal
consequences of buying counterfeit luxury fashion items? Respondents indicate that they are not sufficiently aware of these consequences, as the
mean score is rather low (M=2.53; SD=1.61). Men and women share the same opinion
on this matter (t(318)=1.015; p>0.05) (Mmen=2.64, SD=1.60; Mwomen=2.45, SD=1.62).
Above all, it does not matter to which demographic group one belongs (F=1.952;
p>0.05), because there are no differences between their opinions about the awareness
level concerning the consequences bound to purchasing CLFI.
Do you think people would buy less counterfeit luxury fashion items if they were better aware of the personal and societal consequences bound to purchasing CLFI? A mean score of 4.85 (SD=1.634) shows that respondents slightly indicate awareness
building could influence buying behaviour. Men and women again share the same
opinion on this matter (t(318)= -1.707; p>0.05) (Mmen=4.66, SD=1.692; Mwomen=4.98,
SD=1.585). No group differences are found (F=2.924; p>0.05).
How high should be the chance of arrest incentivizing respondents not to buy counterfeit luxury fashion items anymore? Figure 4 gives a graphical overview of the frequency of the replies.
Figure 4: Chance of arrest incentivizing respondents not to buy CLFI anymore
45
9. Discussion and implications
The linkage between attitudes and purchase intention is reconfirmed again, but this time
in a counterfeit-related (fashion) context. Belgian consumers that hold a (un)favourable
attitude toward purchasing CLFI will also have (weaker) stronger purchase intentions for
CLFI. In addition, attitude is found to be the best predictor for purchase intention of all
variables investigated. Important to mention is the fact that Penz and Stöttinger (2005)
confirm intentions to purchase CLFI are good predictors for actual purchase behaviour.
Normative susceptibility (i.e. the extent to which one is susceptible to normative social
influences, cf. infra) is a factor of major importance in predicting attitudes toward
purchasing CLFI and in a smaller degree in predicting purchase intentions for CLFI. In
fact, the more consumers perceive a normative pressure from significant others on their
attitude towards purchasing CLFI, the more negative their actual attitude will be. The
same reasoning can be applied for purchase intention. Taking into account the low
overall attitude score, the author puts forward two possible explanations for the
importance of the normative susceptibility construct. First, engaging in counterfeit trade
is an illicit practice and can thus be seen as a criminal activity or consumer
misbehaviour (Penz and Stöttinger, 2008). In this context, Tyler (2006) states “people
are reluctant to commit criminal acts for which their family and friends would sanction
them”. Studies (Tonglet, 2001; Albers-Miller, 1999) about other forms of consumer
misbehaviour (e.g. shoplifting) indicate family and friends indeed play an important role
in determining one’s attitude toward performing the illegal behaviour. So, if there exists
a norm in one’s social group (group norms are defined as ‘regularities in attitudes and
behavior that characterize a social group and differentiate it from other social groups’,
Hogg and Reid, 2006) not to take part in any illegal activity and one’s normative
susceptibility for this is high, attitude toward purchasing CLFI will be negative and
purchase intention for CLFI will be low. Second, in the context of fashion consumption
O’Cass and Frost (2002) state normative social influence is particularly important as ‘it
taps impression creation, approval and achieving a sense of belonging.’ In addition they
suggest ‘status products may be used for image portrayal to provide entry into certain
groups or to fit into different situations’. Yoo and Lee (2009) show that counterfeit luxury
fashion items do not succeed in fulfilling this status role of genuine luxury items. So, if
there exists a norm in one’s social group not to buy CLFI e.g. because they are not able
46
to project the same status as genuine items, and one’s normative susceptibility for this
is high, attitude will be negative and purchase intention will be low. Business practisers
and governments aiming at reducing counterfeit trade should take into account the
important role of normative social influences on attitude and purchase intention. In the
example given above anti-counterfeiting communications should stress the importance
significant others attach to buying genuine items and this in different buying situations,
e.g. being on holiday.
Considering the nature of the products (i.e. fashion items) used in this research, it is not
surprising that one’s fashion consciousness has a (minor) influence on purchase
intention for CLFI. The more respondents are keeping their ‘styling’ and variety of new
fashion items up-to-date, the higher their purchase intention for CLFI. However, this
might have to do with the fact that CLFI are often seen as risk-free (in terms of a small
monetary loss) trial versions of the real product (Yoo and Lee, 2009). Consumers may
in this way first want to find out if the luxury fashion item is indeed fashionable enough
to spend a lot of money on. In this context it can be useful to investigate possible
interaction effects between one’s fashion consciousness and his or her normative
susceptibility. There might exist a norm in one’s social group not to buy CLFI. But will
this norm hold in all situations? Is the buying of CLFI seen as something negative if it
serves as a product trial? If not, this might be an indication for genuine item
manufacturers to introduce some sort of cheap product trials themselves. In this way
they could counter counterfeiting not only by investing loads of precious cash flow in
anti-counterfeiting campaigns, but also by creaming-off counterfeiters’ ‘customers’.
Informing consumers about the societal consequences linked to counterfeit trade is
affecting attitude toward purchasing CLFI in a more negative way than informing them
about the personal harm (in terms of risk) counterfeits possibly entail. This conclusion is
not in line with our expectations. As such, in this context the theory based on actor-
proximity does not hold. The author gives several possible explanations for this. First, it
could be due to the product category investigated (i.e. fashion items) that respondents
see more severe harm in societal consequences than in personal consequences. After
all, Large (2009) suggests CLFI cannot be classified as safety-critical counterfeits.
Second, respondents reported to be more involved with the information received when
exposed to a societal harm message rather than to a personal harm message. This
47
higher involvement might affect one’s message processing intensity and can therefore
have a greater and more enduring impact on attitude (Maheswaran and Meyer-Levy,
1990). Third, it could be due to the fact consumers think to be fully aware of the
personal risks bound to purchasing CLFI, but are astonished when informed about the
societal consequences the buying of counterfeits entails. For example, consumers
buying a counterfeit watch may accept or expect the fact that it will not be as durable
(cf. performance risk) as a genuine item because of the lower price they pay for it.
However, they might not be aware of the much broader consequences bound to
counterfeit trade such as terrorist funding activities, job losses in authentic
manufacturing companies and their subsidiaries etc. Educating consumers about the
illicit business practices of counterfeiters and stressing the enormous societal impact
the buying of counterfeits has can be used in demand reducing campaigns (BASCAP,
2009). As such, this research is complementary to the one conducted by Chakraborty et
al (1997). Their findings indicated that sending negative cues about the personal harm
(cf. risk dimensions) counterfeits cause, indeed affects purchase intentions to knowingly
buy counterfeits. Our research indicates that informing potential customers about
societal harm even has a larger impact on attitudes toward purchasing counterfeits than
informing them about personal harm. Taking into account on the one hand that
respondents in our sample indicate not to be sufficiently aware of personal and societal
consequences bound to counterfeiting and that they on the other hand indicate
awareness-building concerning these harms could influence consumers’ purchase
behaviour, this academic research can serve as the basis for the development of an
awareness-building campaign aimed at reducing the purchasing of non-deceptive
counterfeits. Considering the great impact normative social influences have on attitude
and purchase intentions, these awareness campaigns could serve a dual role. First,
making consumers aware of the different types of consequences associated with
counterfeit trade could influence their attitude and purchase intention in a direct way.
Second, developing greater social awareness might create ‘new’ norms in social groups
and can therefore have an effect on attitude through one’s normative susceptibility.
Despite the fact that consumers indeed perceive counterfeits to be easily available, it
does not influence their purchase intention for CLFI. This can be seen as good news for
genuine item manufacturers. This is especially true if one combines our result with the
finding of Nia and Zaichkowsky (2000) that ‘the majority of respondents disagreed the
48
availability of counterfeits negatively affects their purchase intentions for original
brands’. Consequently, this reasoning indicates one must remain critical in assessing
the intensity of the direct impact counterfeits have on sales of original brand
manufacturers. This might explain why the ‘societal harm’-argument of counterfeits
stealing sales from original brands was perceived as being the second less severe
societal consequence in our pre-test.
A study conducted by the company Brand home (2008) revealed that fifty percent of the
Flemish people who took part in their survey, has already bought a counterfeit. Figures
in our sample approximate this number as forty percent of all respondents indicated to
have purchased a counterfeit item before. These results become increasingly important
if one considers past behaviour is the second largest influencer of purchase intentions
for CLFI. If one reported to have bought a CLFI, his or her purchase intention was
significantly higher compared to respondents who did not. This finding is congruent with
the research conducted by Yoo and Lee (2009). Therefore, our research increases the
generalizability of the influence past behaviour has on purchase intention for
counterfeits. This can be an indication for anti-counterfeiting campaigns to target in first
instance those who have purchased a counterfeit before.
Answers to the explorative questions about the sanctioning of counterfeit trade provide
support for the research conducted by Cordel et al. (1996) and Ang et al. (2001). Also
Belgian consumers obviously hold a double standard (i.e. ‘a situation in which
consumers do not hold themselves to the same principles as their counterparty in the
transaction’; Cordell et al. (1996)) concerning the illegal character of counterfeit trade.
They agreed on the fact that the selling of counterfeits is illegal and should be
penalized. On the contrary, they hold a much more neutral opinion toward penalizing
conscious buyers of counterfeits. This might be due to the absence of clear-cut, cross-
border international criminal penalties for the purchasing of non-deceptive counterfeits
(Yoo and Lee, 2009).
Confronting respondents with messages containing different price (low and moderate)
and quality (low and moderate) levels did not have an impact on their perceived quality
of CLFI. The author proposes two explanations. First, it could be that our manipulation
of price and quality did not succeed. After all, respondents were neither presented real
49
objects nor concrete prices. Second, we can compare this finding with one’s low overall
price quality inference rating. Respondents do not seem to use price as an indicator of
quality in the case of CLFI. In this view our manipulation of price did succeed.
50
10. Research limitations and recommendations This research investigated the impact of message type on one’s attitude toward
purchasing CLFI. There were only two conditions: respondents were shown a personal
harm message or a societal harm message. We did not integrate a control group who
did not receive any message at all. For this reason it is impossible to compare the
absolute impact of these messages on one’s attitude. We could only make a
comparison between the impact of personal harm cueing versus the impact of societal
harm cueing on attitude. Therefore the author suggests further research introducing a
control group.
Considering the fact consumers are obviously not indifferent toward informing them
about the societal consequences counterfeit trade causes, further academic research is
advised in this area. First, one has to investigate the generalizability of these results on
a European or even a worldwide level. The findings could provide the academic basis
for integrating societal harm messages in awareness-building campaigns that aim to
reduce non-deceptive counterfeit purchase behaviour. Second, it should be investigated
if the messages aimed at informing consumers about the different harms associated
with counterfeit trade, would have to be formulated as gain-framed or loss-framed
messages. This idea is based on the finding that ‘consumers respond differently to
product risk depending both on the nature of this risk and the framing of the persuasive
message’ (Cox et al., 2006).
Studies investigating attitudes toward purchasing CLFI should take into account the
difference in attitude students and working class respondents hold towards the
phenomenon. The use of students only in a research sample may cause limited
generalizability of results.
Many authors (Tom et al., 1998; Wee et al., 1995) suggest that the counterfeiting
phenomenon needs to be examined on an industry and product category-specific basis.
For example, there seems a significant difference in the non-price determinants of
counterfeit purchase intention for functional products and fashion-related items. Above
all, Large (2009) suggests fashion counterfeiting should be investigated separately from
51
other product categories as it concerns non-safety critical counterfeits. Therefore,
determinants of attitude and purchase intention that are investigated for CLFI may not
be generalizable to other product categories. Future research could assess the validity
of the determinants proven important in this context for other product categories as well.
Research has also found various cultural and country-specific differences in the
volitional purchase of counterfeit luxury goods (Koklic and Vida, 2009; Santos and
Ribeiro, 2006; Gentry et al., 2006; Veloutsou and Bian, 2008). As this research has only
been conducted with Belgians, further research is needed in other countries and
cultures to gain greater generalizability of the results mentioned in this investigation.
Hilton et al. (2004) and Chaudry and Zimmerman (2008) suggest that also the ethical
perspective toward IPR and counterfeiting is a possible contributor for purchase
intention of fashion counterfeits. In this context, Maldonado and Hume (2005) indicate
that ‘consumer ethics’ and ‘ethical relativism’ play an important role in the evaluation of
buying counterfeits. As there were no ethical considerations taken into account in this
research it might be useful to integrate these in future explorations of the purchase
intention for CLFI.
52
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ANNEX 1.1
60
ANNEX 1.1: Questionnaire used for pre-test OPENINGSBOODSCHAP
Hallo! Mijn naam is Dennis De Cat. Ik studeer Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen aan de Universiteit Gent. Momenteel ben ik bezig aan mijn thesisonderzoek. Uiteraard kan ik dit niet alleen. Daarom wordt jouw hulp enorm op prijs gesteld. Indien je deelneemt aan dit onderzoek, maak je bovendien kans op enkele leuke prijzen: Je hebt de keuze uit: - een Fnac-bon ter waarde van €25 - een handtas van het merk BOO! Bij de verschillende vragen in deze enquête zijn er geen juiste of foute antwoorden. Ik ben enkel geïnteresseerd in jouw persoonlijke mening over het ondervraagde onderwerp. Gelieve deze vragenlijst dan ook individueel en zo waarheidsgetrouw mogelijk in te vullen. Deze vragenlijst is gegarandeerd honderd procent anoniem. Als u wenst deel te nemen aan de wedstrijd, volstaat het de wedstrijdvraag te beantwoorden én uw e-mailadres in te vullen. Geen paniek! Dit e-mailadres zal enkel gebruikt worden voor het selecteren en het contacteren van de winnaars en dus zeker niet voor andere doeleinden. Klik op ‘>>’ als je wilt deelnemen aan het onderzoek. Het invullen van deze korte
vragenlijst zal ongeveer 15 minuten van jouw tijd in beslag nemen. Gelieve uw browser
te maximaliseren voor een optimale weergavegrootte.
AANDACHTSTREKKER
Bedankt om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek. U bent een zeer grote hulp voor mij! Ik zou u willen vragen deze vragenlijst zo aandachtig, zorgvuldig en waarheidsgetrouw mogelijk in te vullen. Dit is van zeer groot belang voor de resultaten van het onderzoek, aangezien er slecht weinig respondenten gecontacteerd zullen worden. De antwoorden die u geeft, zijn voor mij dus van zeer groot belang. Klik op '>>' om het onderzoek te starten.
SOCIO-DEMOGRAFISCH
ANNEX 1.1
61
Wat is uw geslacht?
-‐ Man
-‐ Vrouw
PRODUCT RELEVANCE
MAN: In welke mate betekent een horloge iets voor jou? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet’ tot ‘helemaal wel’)
VROUW:
In welke mate betekent een handtas iets voor jou? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet’ tot ‘helemaal wel’)
BOODSCHAP MET DEFINITIE NAMAAKGOEDEREN
Dit onderzoek gaat over namaakproducten. Gelieve onderstaande definitie van 'namaakproducten' zorgvuldig en aandachtig te lezen. "Namaakproducten zijn imitaties of reproducties van merkgoederen. De merknaam of herkenbare elementen, zoals het logo of de verpakking, werden zonder toelating gebruikt."
BRAND RELEVANCE
Van welk(e) merk(en) zou je overwegen ooit een namaakproduct te kopen in de
veronderstelling dat dit makkelijk verkrijgbaar is voor een voor jou aanvaardbare prijs en
kwaliteit? Je mag meerdere merken aanduiden.
• Lacoste • Diesel
• Calvin Klein • Louis Vuitton
• DKNY • Tommy Hilfiger
• Ralph Lauren • Rolex
• Tag Heuer • Bulgari
ANNEX 1.1
62
• Longchamp • Dolce & Gabbana
• Gucci • Versace
• Armani • Prada
• Andere: …
PERSONAL HARM
MAN: Voor mannen wordt de boodschap getoond met het product ‘horloge’.
VROUW:
Voor vrouwen wordt de boodschap getoond met het product ‘handtas’.
In welke mate vind je dat jij als persoon schade berokkend wordt in de volgende
situaties (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘Ik vind dit helemaal niet erg voor mezelf’ tot
‘Ik vind dit zeer erg voor mezelf’):
1. Een namaak(horloge/handtas) bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je
uitslag kan krijgen.
2. Een namaak(horloge/handtas) is vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt en functioneert mogelijks niet zoals het hoort.
3. Een namaak(horloge/handtas) is mogelijks zijn prijs niet waard.
4. Anderen zouden kunnen zien dat je een namaak(horloge/handtas) draagt.
5. Het feit dat je een namaak(horloge/handtas) zou kopen, geeft je een
ongemakkelijk gevoel. 6. Het aanschaffen van een namaak(horloge/handtas) kan je veel tijd kosten (bv.
lang zoeken op internet, lang onderhandelen met verkoper, etc.)
SOCIETAL HARM
ANNEX 1.1
63
In welke mate vind je dat de maatschappij schade berokkend wordt in de volgende
gevallen? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘Ik vind dit helemaal niet erg voor de
maatschappij’ tot ‘ Ik vind dit zeer erg voor de maatschappij’)
1. Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is
tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en verkopen van
namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische
organisaties.
2. Door het kopen van namaakgoederen verliezen de authentieke bedrijven
(wiens producten dus nagemaakt worden) hun inkomsten.
3. Door het kopen van namaakgoederen misloopt de staat belastingsinkomsten.
4. De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in
de authentieke bedrijven én hun toeleveringsbedrijven.
5. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat de namaakindustrie fungeert als een rem op de ontwikkeling van nieuwe, innovatieve producten door de originele producenten.
6. De productie van namaakgoederen verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
PRICE AND QUALITY
MAN: Voor mannen worden de vragen gesteld met het product ‘horloge’.
VROUW: Voor vrouwen worden de vragen gesteld met het product ‘handtas’.
Gelieve volgende vragen zo waarheidsgetrouw mogelijk in te vullen. U kan gewoon een bedrag noteren. Het €-teken hoef je niet toe te voegen.
-‐ Welke prijs bent u bereid maximaal te betalen voor
een namaak(horloge/handtas) van hoge kwaliteit van een luxemerk dat je zou
willen hebben?
ANNEX 1.1
64
-‐ Welke prijs bent u bereid maximaal te betalen voor een
namaak(horloge/handtas) van gemiddelde kwaliteit van een luxemerk dat je
zou willen hebben?
-‐ Wat vindt u een gemiddelde prijs voor een namaak(horloge/handtas) van hoge
kwaliteit van een luxemerk dat je zou willen hebben?
-‐ Wat vindt u een gemiddelde prijs voor een namaak(horloge/handtas) van
gemiddelde kwaliteit van een luxemerk dat je zou willen hebben?
-‐ Wat vindt u een lage prijs voor een namaak(horloge/handtas) van hoge
kwaliteit van een luxemerk dat je zou willen hebben?
-‐ Wat vindt u een lage prijs voor een namaak(horloge/handtas) van gemiddelde
kwaliteit van een luxemerk dat je zou willen hebben?
-‐ Welke prijs zou u betalen voor diezelfde horloge/handtas van het echte merk?
STIMULI PRE-TEST
Hieronder krijg je verschillende boodschappen over namaakproducten te zien. Lees deze aandachtig en antwoord daarna op onderstaande vragen.
BOODSCHAPPEN: 1. Een namaakproduct bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je uitslag kan krijgen. 2. Een namaakproduct is vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt en functioneert mogelijks niet zoals het hoort. 3. Een namaakproduct is mogelijks zijn prijs niet waard. 4. Anderen zouden kunnen zien dat je een namaakproduct draagt. 5. Het feit dat je een namaakproduct zou kopen, geeft je een ongemakkelijk gevoel. 6. Het aanschaffen van een namaakproduct kan je veel tijd kosten (bv. lang zoeken op internet, lang onderhandelen met verkoper, etc.) 7. Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en verkopen van namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische organisaties.
ANNEX 1.1
65
8. Door het kopen van namaakgoederen verliezen de authentieke bedrijven (wiens producten dus nagemaakt worden) hun inkomsten. 9. Door het kopen van namaakgoederen misloopt de staat belastingsinkomsten. 10. De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in de authentieke bedrijven én hun toeleveringsbedrijven. 11. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat de namaakindustrie fungeert als een rem op de ontwikkeling van nieuwe, innovatieve producten door de originele producenten. 12. De productie van namaakgoederen verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met
betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
VRAGEN (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet geloofwaardig’ tot ‘zeer geloofwaardig’):
-‐ Zou het geloofwaardig zijn voor een namaakproduct van hoge kwaliteit en
gemiddelde prijs om één van bovenstaande boodschappen te krijgen?
-‐ Zou het geloofwaardig zijn voor een namaakproduct van hoge kwaliteit en lage
prijs om één van bovenstaande boodschappen te krijgen?
-‐ Zou het geloofwaardig zijn voor een namaakproduct van gemiddelde kwaliteit en
gemiddelde prijs om één van bovenstaande boodschappen te krijgen?
-‐ Zou het geloofwaardig zijn voor een namaakproduct van gemiddelde kwaliteit en
lage prijs om één van bovenstaande boodschappen te krijgen?
OPMERKING: Bij elke vraag werd ook gevraagd aan te duiden (met nummers van 1 tot
12) welke boodschappen niet geloofwaardig lijken in deze situatie.
PERCEIVED QUALITY
MAN: Voor mannen wordt de boodschap getoond met het product ‘horloge’.
VROUW:
Voor vrouwen wordt de boodschap getoond met het product ‘handtas’.
ANNEX 1.1
66
Gelieve hieronder aan te duiden in welke mate jij denkt dat een namaakhorloge
van een luxemerk dat jij zou willen, volgende eigenschappen bezit: (7-punt Likert
schaal gaande van ‘heel laag’ tot ‘heel hoog’)
1. De waarschijnlijkheid dat dit product kwalitatief betrouwbaar is, is...
2. De graad van vakmanschap waarmee dit product vervaardigd is, zal
waarschijnlijk ... zijn
3. Het product zou duurzaam kunnen lijken. (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet akkoord’ tot ‘helemaal akkoord’)
4. De waarschijnlijkheid dat dit product feilloos is, is...
5. Dit product zou van ... kwaliteit moeten zijn.
WEDSTRIJDVRAAG
Wens je deel te nemen aan de wedstrijd die verbonden is aan dit onderzoek? Ter herinnering: Er zijn volgende prijzen te winnen: - een Fnac-bon t.w.v. €25 - een handtas van het merk BOO! --------- indien men kiest om deel te nemen, krijgt men de volgende vragen --------
Wat is het meest gekochte luxe modemerk ter wereld?
-‐ Calvin Klein
-‐ Diesel
-‐ Ralph Lauren
-‐ Chanel
Hoeveel procent van de deelnemers zal deze vraag correct beantwoorden?
Naar welke prijs gaat jouw voorkeur?
-‐ Fnac-bon t.w.v. €25
-‐ Een handtas van het merk BOO!
ANNEX 1.1
67
Wat is je emailadres waarop we je kunnen contacteren indien je een prijs gewonnen
hebt?
BEDANKING VOOR DEELNAME
Je hebt met succes de vragenlijst beëindigd. Nogmaals bedankt voor de deelname aan dit onderzoek! Klik op '>>' om uw antwoorden op te slagen. Daarna kan u uw browser sluiten.
ANNEX 1.2
68
ANNEX 1.2: Statistical analyses of pre-test
1. Products and brands
1.1 Product relevance
1.2 Brands
ANNEX 1.2
69
2. Personal harm Descriptives N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
PersonalHarmPhysicalRisk 17 1,00 7,00 6,1176 1,53632 PersonalHarmPerformanceRisk 17 2,00 7,00 5,3529 1,36662 PersonalHarmFinancialRisk 17 3,00 7,00 5,0000 0,93541 PersonalHarmSocialRisk 17 1,00 7,00 4,2353 1,95350 PersonalHarmPsychologicalRisk 17 1,00 7,00 3,8824 2,05798 PersonalHarmTimeRisk 17 1,00 7,00 4,2941 1,64942 Valid N (listwise) 17
Group Statistics
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
woman 10 6,5000 0,84984 0,26874 PersonalHarmPhysicalRisk
man 7 5,5714 2,14920 0,81232 woman 10 5,6000 1,17379 0,37118
PersonalHarmPerformanceRisk man 7 5,0000 1,63299 0,61721
woman 10 5,1000 1,10050 0,34801 PersonalHarmFinancialRisk
man 7 4,8571 0,69007 0,26082 woman 10 4,5000 1,71594 0,54263
PersonalHarmSocialRisk man 7 3,8571 2,34013 0,88448 woman 10 4,5000 1,58114 0,50000
PersonalHarmTimeRisk man 7 4,0000 1,82574 0,69007 woman 10 4,8000 1,81353 0,57349
PersonalHarmPsychologicalRisk man 7 2,5714 1,71825 0,64944
ANNEX 1.2
70
3. Societal harm Descriptives N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Societal harm terrorism 17 1 7 5,94 1,519 Societal harm authentic co 17 1 7 4,88 1,654 Societal harm taxes 17 1 6 3,76 1,921 Societal harm job loss 17 3 7 5,76 1,200 Societal harm innovation 17 2 7 5,06 1,298 Societal harm child labour 17 1 7 6,12 1,536 Valid N (listwise) 17 Group Statistics
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean woman 10 6,40 ,843 ,267
Societal harm terrorism man 7 5,29 2,059 ,778 woman 10 5,20 1,619 ,512
Societal harm authentic co man 7 4,43 1,718 ,649 woman 10 3,50 1,958 ,619
Societal harm taxes man 7 4,14 1,952 ,738 woman 10 6,10 ,994 ,314
Societal harm job loss man 7 5,29 1,380 ,522 woman 10 5,30 1,418 ,448
Societal harm innovation man 7 4,71 1,113 ,421 woman 10 6,70 ,675 ,213
Societal harm child labour man 7 5,29 2,059 ,778
ANNEX 1.2
71
4. Price, quality, perceived harm and message credibility Descriptives N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation CREDIBILITY high quality moderate price 17 3 7 5,29 1,105
CREDIBILITY high quality low price 17 3 7 5,94 1,029
CREDIBILITY moderate quality moderate price 17 2 7 5,59 1,176
CREDIBILITY moderate quality low price 17 3 7 6,00 1,118
Valid N (listwise) 17
Group Statistics
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
woman 10 5,00 1,333 ,422 CREDIBILITY high quality moderate price man 7 5,71 ,488 ,184
woman 10 5,90 1,287 ,407 CREDIBILITY high quality low price man 7 6,00 ,577 ,218
woman 10 5,80 ,919 ,291 CREDIBILITY moderate quality moderate price man 7 5,29 1,496 ,565
woman 10 6,20 ,919 ,291 CREDIBILITY moderate quality low price man 7 5,71 1,380 ,522
ANNEX 1.2
72
5. Credibility
ANNEX 2
73
ANNEX 2: Scenarios (stimuli) used in the main research
1. LOW price, LOW quality, PERSONAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een lage prijs, maar de kwaliteit lijkt van een laag niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat er enkele problemen verbonden zijn aan het kopen van namaakproducten: - Een namaakproduct bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je uitslag kan krijgen. - Een namaakproduct is vaak vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt én functioneert mogelijkerwijze niet zoals het hoort. - Een namaakproduct is mogelijkerwijze zijn prijs niet waard.
2. LOW price, MODERATE quality, PERSONAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een lage prijs en de kwaliteit lijkt van een gemiddeld niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat er enkele problemen verbonden zijn aan het kopen van namaakproducten: - Een namaakproduct bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je uitslag kan krijgen. - Een namaakproduct is vaak vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt én functioneert mogelijkerwijze niet zoals het hoort. - Een namaakproduct is mogelijkerwijze zijn prijs niet waard.
3. MODERATE price, LOW quality, PERSONAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een gemiddelde prijs, maar de kwaliteit lijkt van
ANNEX 2
74
een laag niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat er enkele problemen verbonden zijn aan het kopen van namaakproducten: - Een namaakproduct bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je uitslag kan krijgen. - Een namaakproduct is vaak vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt én functioneert mogelijkerwijze niet zoals het hoort. - Een namaakproduct is mogelijkerwijze zijn prijs niet waard.
4. MODERATE price, MODERATE quality, PERSONAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een gemiddelde prijs en de kwaliteit lijkt van een gemiddeld niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat er enkele problemen verbonden zijn aan het kopen van namaakproducten: - Een namaakproduct bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je uitslag kan krijgen. - Een namaakproduct is vaak vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt én functioneert mogelijkerwijze niet zoals het hoort. - Een namaakproduct is mogelijkerwijze zijn prijs niet waard.
5. LOW price, LOW quality, SOCIETAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een lage prijs, maar de kwaliteit lijkt van een laag niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat het kopen van namaakproducten kan leiden tot maatschappelijke problemen: - Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en het verkopen van namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische organisaties.
ANNEX 2
75
- De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in de authentieke bedrijven (diegenen die het originele product maken) én hun toeleveringsbedrijven. - De productie van namaakproducten verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
6. LOW price, MODERATE quality, SOCIETAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een lage prijs en de kwaliteit lijkt van gemiddeld niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat het kopen van namaakproducten kan leiden tot maatschappelijke problemen: - Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en het verkopen van namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische organisaties. - De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in de authentieke bedrijven (diegenen die het originele product maken) én hun toeleveringsbedrijven. - De productie van namaakproducten verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
7. MODERATE price, LOW quality, SOCIETAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een gemiddelde prijs, maar de kwaliteit lijkt van een laag niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat het kopen van namaakproducten kan leiden tot maatschappelijke problemen: - Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en het verkopen van namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische organisaties.
ANNEX 2
76
- De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in de authentieke bedrijven (diegenen die het originele product maken) én hun toeleveringsbedrijven. - De productie van namaakproducten verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
8. MODERATE price, MODERATE quality, SOCIETAL harm Stel je voor dat je de kans krijgt een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of horloge) van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex, Calvin Klein,... te kopen. Dit product heeft een gemiddelde prijs en de kwaliteit lijkt van een gemiddeld niveau. Uit recent onderzoek (2010) blijkt dat het kopen van namaakproducten kan leiden tot maatschappelijke problemen: - Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en het verkopen van namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische organisaties. - De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in de authentieke bedrijven (diegenen die het originele product maken) én hun toeleveringsbedrijven. - De productie van namaakproducten verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
ANNEX 3.1
77
ANNEX 3.1: Questionnaire used in the main research
OPENINGSBOODSCHAP
Hallo! Mijn naam is Dennis De Cat. Ik studeer Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen aan de Universiteit Gent. Momenteel ben ik bezig aan mijn thesisonderzoek. Uiteraard kan ik dit niet alleen. Daarom wordt jouw hulp enorm op prijs gesteld. Indien je deelneemt aan dit onderzoek, maak je bovendien kans op enkele leuke prijzen: Je hebt de keuze uit: - een Fnac-bon ter waarde van €25 - een handtas van het merk BOO! Bij de verschillende vragen in deze enquête zijn er geen juiste of foute antwoorden. Ik ben enkel geïnteresseerd in jouw persoonlijke mening over het ondervraagde onderwerp. Gelieve deze vragenlijst dan ook individueel en zo waarheidsgetrouw mogelijk in te vullen. Deze vragenlijst is gegarandeerd honderd procent anoniem. Als u wenst deel te nemen aan de wedstrijd, volstaat het de wedstrijdvraag te beantwoorden én uw e-mailadres in te vullen. Geen paniek! Dit e-mailadres zal enkel gebruikt worden voor het selecteren en het contacteren van de winnaars en dus zeker niet voor andere doeleinden. Klik op ‘>>’ als je wilt deelnemen aan het onderzoek. Het invullen van deze korte
vragenlijst zal ongeveer 15 minuten van jouw tijd in beslag nemen. Gelieve uw browser
te maximaliseren voor een optimale weergavegrootte.
AANDACHTSTREKKER EN BEDANKING
Bedankt om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek. U bent een zeer grote hulp voor mij! Ik zou u willen vragen deze vragenlijst zo aandachtig, zorgvuldig en waarheidsgetrouw mogelijk in te vullen. Dit is van zeer groot belang voor de resultaten van het onderzoek, aangezien er slechts een beperkt aantal respondenten gecontacteerd zullen worden. De antwoorden die u geeft, zijn voor mij dus van zeer groot belang. Klik op '>>' om het onderzoek te starten.
GESLACHT
ANNEX 3.1
78
Wat is uw geslacht?
-‐ Man
-‐ Vrouw
BOODSCHAP MET DEFINITIE NAMAAKGOEDEREN
Dit onderzoek gaat over namaakproducten. Gelieve onderstaande definitie van 'namaakproducten' zorgvuldig en aandachtig te lezen. "Namaakproducten zijn imitaties of reproducties van merkgoederen. De merknaam of herkenbare elementen, zoals het logo of de verpakking, werden
zonder toelating gebruikt."
STIMULI
Respondenten worden ‘at random’ toegewezen aan 1 van de 8 condities. Men kan de
verschillende scenario’s vinden in Annex 2.
MESSAGE INVOLVEMENT
Gelieve hieronder aan te duiden in welke mate je akkoord gaat met volgende uitspraken
omtrent de informatie die je net te zien kreeg. (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet akkoord’ tot ‘helemaal akkoord’)
1. De informatie deed me nadenken.
2. Ik voelde me betrokken bij wat de informatie te vertellen had.
3. De informatie was interessant. 4. De informatie bracht me op bepaalde ideeën en gedachten.
5. Ik voelde sterke emoties en gevoelens bij het lezen van de informatie.
6. Ik vond de informatie relevant.
AD CREDIBILITY
ANNEX 3.1
79
In welke mate ga je akkoord met onderstaande uitspraak m.b.t. de informatie die je net
te zien kreeg? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet akkoord’ tot ‘helemaal
akkoord’)
-‐ De informatie is geloofwaardig.
PURCHASE INTENTION
1. Ben je van plan om in de toekomst een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas of
horloge) te kopen van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci,
Armani, Delvaux, Rolex,... ? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet’ tot
‘helemaal wel’)
2. Hoe groot is de kans dat je in de toekomst een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas
of horloge) zal kopen van één van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci,
Armani, Delvaux, Rolex,... ? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘heel klein’ tot ‘heel
groot’)
ATTITUDE TOWARD BUYING COUNTERFEIT LUXURY FASHION ITEMS
Wat vind jij over het kopen van namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge) van één
van de topmerken Diesel, Ralph Lauren, Gucci, Armani, Delvaux, Rolex,... ? (7-punt
semantische differentiaal)
1. Slecht – goed
2. Onverstandig – verstandig
3. Schadelijk – onschadelijk
4. Onveilig – veilig
5. Onaangenaam – aangenaam
6. Onbevredigend – bevredigend
7. Bestraffend – belonend
PAST PURCHASE BEHAVIOUR
ANNEX 3.1
80
Hebt u ooit al bewust een namaakproduct (eender welke categorie van producten)
gekocht?
-‐ ja
-‐ nee
Hebt u ooit al een namaak luxeproduct gekocht? (bv. kleding, horloge, handtas,
juwelen, accessories)
-‐ ja
-‐ nee
Hoeveel keer per jaar koopt u gemiddeld een namaak luxeproduct? (invullen in cijfers)
PERCEIVED QUALITY
Gelieve hieronder aan te duiden in welke mate jij denkt dat een namaakhorloge (bv. handtas, horloge) van een luxemerk dat jij zou willen, volgende eigenschappen bezit: (7-punt semantische differentiaal schaal: laag-hoog)
1. De waarschijnlijkheid dat dit product kwalitatief betrouwbaar is, is...
2. De graad van vakmanschap waarmee dit product vervaardigd is, zal
waarschijnlijk ... zijn
3. Het product zou duurzaam kunnen lijken. (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet akkoord’ tot ‘helemaal akkoord’)
4. De waarschijnlijkheid dat dit product feilloos is, is...
5. Dit product zou van ... kwaliteit moeten zijn.
PRICE QUALITY INFERENCE
Geef aan in welke mate je akkoord bent met volgende uitspraken. Ter informatie: een
namaak luxeproduct kan bijvoorbeeld een handtas of een horloge zijn. (7-punt Likert
schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet akkoord’ tot ‘helemaal akkoord’)
1. Hoe hoger de prijs van een namaak luxeproduct, hoe hoger de kwaliteit.
ANNEX 3.1
81
2. Hoe meer men betaalt voor een namaak luxeproduct, hoe beter de kwaliteit.
3. Een namaak luxeproduct dat meer kost, verzekert betere prestaties.
4. Namaak luxeproducten die weinig kosten zijn van lage kwaliteit.
SUBJECTIVE NORM
Gelieve aan te duiden in welke mate je het eens bent met onderstaande uitspraken. (7-
punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal oneens’ tot ‘helemaal eens’)
1. Mijn vrienden vinden het best dat ik geen namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas,
horloge) koop.
2. Mijn familie vindt dat ik geen namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge) mag
kopen.
3. Mensen die mijn beslissingen beïnvloeden vinden dat ik geen namaak
luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge) mag kopen.
4. De maatschappij verwacht dat ik geen namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas,
horloge) koop.
FASHION CONSCIOUSNESS
Gelieve hieronder aan te duiden in welke mate je akkoord gaat met volgende uitspraken
omtrent jouw modebewustzijn. (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet akkoord’
tot ‘helemaal akkoord’)
1. Ik heb meestal één of meerdere outfits van de nieuwste mode.
2. Ik houd mijn kleerkast up-to-date met de nieuwste modetrens.
3. Modieuze en aantrekkelijke 'styling' is zeer belangrijk voor mij.
4. Ik koop in verschillende winkels en kies verschillende merken om zoveel mogelijk variëteit te bekomen.
AVAILABILITY (PBC)
ANNEX 3.1
82
In welke mate vind je dat namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge) makkelijk
beschikbaar zijn? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet gemakkelijk
beschikbaar’ tot ‘heel gemakkelijk beschikbaar’)
Als u een namaak luxeproduct (bv. handtas, horloge) zou kopen, waar zou u dit dan
doen?
-‐ Internet
-‐ Markten
-‐ Vakantiebestemmingen
-‐ Andere: …
Hoe makkelijk is het voor jou om binnen de 6 maand een namaak luxeproduct (bv.
handtas, horloge) te kopen? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet
gemakkelijk’ tot ‘heel gemakkelijk’)
PRODUCT INVOLVEMENT
MAN: In welke mate betekent een horloge iets voor jou? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet’ tot ‘helemaal wel’)
VROUW: In welke mate betekent een handtas iets voor jou? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet’ tot ‘helemaal wel’)
MANIPULATIECHECK PERSONAL HARM
In welke mate vind je dat jij als persoon schade berokkend wordt in de volgende
situaties (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘Ik vind dit helemaal niet erg voor mezelf’ tot
‘Ik vind dit zeer erg voor mezelf’):
ANNEX 3.1
83
1. Een namaak(horloge/handtas) bevat mogelijks gevaarlijke stoffen waardoor je
uitslag kan krijgen.
2. Een namaak(horloge/handtas) is vervaardigd uit materiaal dat snel verkleurt en functioneert mogelijks niet zoals het hoort.
3. Een namaak(horloge/handtas) is mogelijks zijn prijs niet waard.
MANIPULATIECHECK SOCIETAL HARM
In welke mate vind je dat de maatschappij schade berokkend wordt in de volgende
gevallen? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘Ik vind dit helemaal niet erg voor de
maatschappij’ tot ‘ Ik vind dit zeer erg voor de maatschappij’)
1. Uit wetenschappelijk én empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat er een zeer sterke link is tussen de namaakindustrie en de fondsenverzameling van terroristische organisaties. Er wordt dus beweerd dat het produceren en verkopen van
namaakgoederen dient als dekmantel voor de financiering van terroristische
organisaties.
2. De namaakindustrie is verantwoordelijk voor jobverliezen in grote aantallen in
de authentieke bedrijven én hun toeleveringsbedrijven.
3. De productie van namaakgoederen verloopt niet conform de strikte regels met
betrekking tot de arbeidswetgeving. Kinderarbeid viert hoogtij.
EXPLORATIEVE VRAGEN
-‐ Is het verkopen van namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge) illegaal? (7-
punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet’ tot ‘helemaal wel’)
-‐ Vindt u dat het verkopen van namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge)
bestraft moet worden? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet’ tot
‘helemaal wel’)
-‐ Vindt u dat het bewust kopen van namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge)
bestraft moet worden? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van ‘helemaal niet’ tot
‘helemaal wel’)
ANNEX 3.1
84
-‐ Vindt u dat de doorsnee consument voldoende op de hoogte is van de
gevolgen (persoonlijk én maatschappelijk) van het kopen en verkopen van
namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge)? (7-punt Likert schaal gaande van
‘helemaal niet’ tot ‘helemaal wel’) -‐ Denkt u dat mensen minder namaak luxeproducten (bv. handtas, horloge) gaan
kopen als ze beter op de hoogte zijn van de persoonlijke en maatschappelijke gevolgen van het kopen en verkopen van namaakproducten? (7-punt Likert
schaal gaande van ‘zeker niet’ tot ‘zeker wel’)
-‐ Hoe hoog moet de pakkans zijn opdat u geen namaak luxeproducten (bv.
handtas, horloge) zou kopen?
o kleiner dan 20 % o tussen 20 en 40 % o tussen 40 en 60 % o tussen 60 en 80 %
o groter dan 80 % SOCIO-DEMOGRAFISCHE GEGEVENS
Wat is uw leeftijd? (getal in cijfers, bv. 30)
Beschikt u over een eigen inkomen?
-‐ ja
-‐ nee
Tot welke van onderstaande groepen behoort u?
-‐ student
-‐ werkend
-‐ werkloos
-‐ gepensioneerd
-‐ andere: …
Wat is uw nationaliteit?
ANNEX 3.1
85
WEDSTRIJDVRAAG
Wens je deel te nemen aan de wedstrijd die verbonden is aan dit onderzoek? Ter herinnering: Er zijn volgende prijzen te winnen: - een Fnac-bon t.w.v. €25 - een handtas van het merk BOO! --------- indien men kiest om deel te nemen, krijgt men de volgende vragen --------
Wat is het meest gekochte luxe modemerk ter wereld?
-‐ Calvin Klein
-‐ Diesel
-‐ Ralph Lauren
-‐ Chanel
Hoeveel procent van de deelnemers zal deze vraag correct beantwoorden?
Naar welke prijs gaat jouw voorkeur?
-‐ Fnac-bon t.w.v. €25
-‐ Een handtas van het merk BOO!
Wat is je emailadres waarop we je kunnen contacteren indien je een prijs gewonnen
hebt?
BEDANKING VOOR DEELNAME
Je hebt met succes de vragenlijst beëindigd. Nogmaals bedankt voor de deelname aan dit onderzoek! Klik op '>>' om uw antwoorden op te slagen. Daarna kan u uw browser sluiten.
ANNEX 3.2
86
ANNEX 3.2: Statistical analyses of main research
1. Manipulation check Message Type: Perceived Harm
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Societal harm manipulatiecheck 155 6,1183 ,81273 ,06528
Personal harm Personal harm manipulatiecheck 155 5,2774 1,11323 ,08942
Societal harm manipulatiecheck 163 6,1227 ,86856 ,06803
Societal harm Personal harm manipulatiecheck 163 5,4376 1,06993 ,08380
Message Type: Perceived Harm
Test Value = 4
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Personal harm
Societal harm manipulatiecheck 32,449 154 ,000 2,11828 1,9893 2,2472
Personal harm manipulatiecheck 14,286 154 ,000 1,27742 1,1008 1,4541
Societal harm
Societal harm manipulatiecheck 31,202 162 ,000 2,12270 1,9884 2,2570
Personal harm manipulatiecheck 17,155 162 ,000 1,43763 1,2721 1,6031
Remark: even if we did not average the item scores in the manipulation check for each
construct, all means were significantly different from the Test Value (4).
ANNEX 3.2
87
ANNEX 3.2
88
2. ANOVA and Post Hoc test to evaluate possible differences in Ad credibility
Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: adcredibility
95% Confidence Interval
(I) condities van 1 tot 8
(J) condities van 1 tot 8
Mean Difference (I-J)
Std. Error Sig.
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
2,00 -,006 ,230 1,000 -,73 ,72 3,00 ,077 ,227 1,000 -,64 ,79 4,00 ,030 ,224 1,000 -,68 ,74 5,00 ,089 ,229 1,000 -,63 ,81 6,00 ,431 ,229 1,000 -,29 1,15 7,00 ,310 ,232 1,000 -,42 1,04
1,00
8,00 ,125 ,213 1,000 -,55 ,80 1,00 ,006 ,230 1,000 -,72 ,73 3,00 ,083 ,230 1,000 -,64 ,81
Bonferroni
2,00
4,00 ,036 ,228 1,000 -,68 ,75
ANNEX 3.2
89
5,00 ,095 ,232 1,000 -,63 ,83 6,00 ,437 ,232 1,000 -,29 1,17 7,00 ,316 ,235 1,000 -,42 1,06
8,00 ,131 ,217 1,000 -,55 ,81 1,00 -,077 ,227 1,000 -,79 ,64 2,00 -,083 ,230 1,000 -,81 ,64 4,00 -,047 ,224 1,000 -,75 ,66 5,00 ,012 ,229 1,000 -,71 ,73 6,00 ,354 ,229 1,000 -,37 1,07 7,00 ,233 ,232 1,000 -,50 ,96
3,00
8,00 ,048 ,213 1,000 -,62 ,72 1,00 -,030 ,224 1,000 -,74 ,68 2,00 -,036 ,228 1,000 -,75 ,68 3,00 ,047 ,224 1,000 -,66 ,75 5,00 ,059 ,226 1,000 -,65 ,77 6,00 ,401 ,226 1,000 -,31 1,11 7,00 ,280 ,229 1,000 -,44 1,00
4,00
8,00 ,095 ,210 1,000 -,57 ,76 1,00 -,089 ,229 1,000 -,81 ,63 2,00 -,095 ,232 1,000 -,83 ,63 3,00 -,012 ,229 1,000 -,73 ,71 4,00 -,059 ,226 1,000 -,77 ,65 6,00 ,342 ,230 1,000 -,38 1,07 7,00 ,221 ,233 1,000 -,51 ,96
5,00
8,00 ,036 ,215 1,000 -,64 ,71 1,00 -,431 ,229 1,000 -1,15 ,29 2,00 -,437 ,232 1,000 -1,17 ,29 3,00 -,354 ,229 1,000 -1,07 ,37 4,00 -,401 ,226 1,000 -1,11 ,31 5,00 -,342 ,230 1,000 -1,07 ,38 7,00 -,121 ,233 1,000 -,86 ,61
6,00
8,00 -,306 ,215 1,000 -,98 ,37 1,00 -,310 ,232 1,000 -1,04 ,42 2,00 -,316 ,235 1,000 -1,06 ,42 3,00 -,233 ,232 1,000 -,96 ,50 4,00 -,280 ,229 1,000 -1,00 ,44 5,00 -,221 ,233 1,000 -,96 ,51 6,00 ,121 ,233 1,000 -,61 ,86
7,00
8,00 -,185 ,218 1,000 -,87 ,50 1,00 -,125 ,213 1,000 -,80 ,55 2,00 -,131 ,217 1,000 -,81 ,55 3,00 -,048 ,213 1,000 -,72 ,62 4,00 -,095 ,210 1,000 -,76 ,57 5,00 -,036 ,215 1,000 -,71 ,64 6,00 ,306 ,215 1,000 -,37 ,98
8,00
7,00 ,185 ,218 1,000 -,50 ,87 2,00 -,006 ,193 1,000 -,63 ,62 3,00 ,077 ,196 1,000 -,56 ,71 4,00 ,030 ,226 1,000 -,70 ,76 5,00 ,089 ,226 1,000 -,65 ,82 6,00 ,431 ,203 ,654 -,23 1,09
Tamhane 1,00
7,00 ,310 ,203 ,980 -,35 ,97
ANNEX 3.2
90
8,00 ,125 ,176 1,000 -,44 ,69 1,00 ,006 ,193 1,000 -,62 ,63 3,00 ,083 ,217 1,000 -,62 ,79 4,00 ,036 ,244 1,000 -,75 ,83 5,00 ,095 ,244 1,000 -,70 ,89 6,00 ,437 ,223 ,789 -,29 1,16 7,00 ,316 ,223 ,993 -,41 1,04
2,00
8,00 ,131 ,200 1,000 -,51 ,78 1,00 -,077 ,196 1,000 -,71 ,56 2,00 -,083 ,217 1,000 -,79 ,62 4,00 -,047 ,246 1,000 -,84 ,75 5,00 ,012 ,246 1,000 -,79 ,81 6,00 ,354 ,226 ,973 -,37 1,08 7,00 ,233 ,225 1,000 -,50 ,96
3,00
8,00 ,048 ,202 1,000 -,60 ,70 1,00 -,030 ,226 1,000 -,76 ,70 2,00 -,036 ,244 1,000 -,83 ,75 3,00 ,047 ,246 1,000 -,75 ,84 5,00 ,059 ,270 1,000 -,81 ,93 6,00 ,401 ,252 ,968 -,41 1,21 7,00 ,280 ,252 1,000 -,53 1,09
4,00
8,00 ,095 ,231 1,000 -,65 ,84 1,00 -,089 ,226 1,000 -,82 ,65 2,00 -,095 ,244 1,000 -,89 ,70 3,00 -,012 ,246 1,000 -,81 ,79 4,00 -,059 ,270 1,000 -,93 ,81 6,00 ,342 ,252 ,996 -,47 1,16 7,00 ,221 ,252 1,000 -,59 1,04
5,00
8,00 ,036 ,231 1,000 -,71 ,79 1,00 -,431 ,203 ,654 -1,09 ,23 2,00 -,437 ,223 ,789 -1,16 ,29 3,00 -,354 ,226 ,973 -1,08 ,37 4,00 -,401 ,252 ,968 -1,21 ,41 5,00 -,342 ,252 ,996 -1,16 ,47 7,00 -,121 ,231 1,000 -,87 ,63
6,00
8,00 -,306 ,209 ,988 -,98 ,37 1,00 -,310 ,203 ,980 -,97 ,35 2,00 -,316 ,223 ,993 -1,04 ,41 3,00 -,233 ,225 1,000 -,96 ,50 4,00 -,280 ,252 1,000 -1,09 ,53 5,00 -,221 ,252 1,000 -1,04 ,59 6,00 ,121 ,231 1,000 -,63 ,87
7,00
8,00 -,185 ,208 1,000 -,86 ,49 1,00 -,125 ,176 1,000 -,69 ,44 2,00 -,131 ,200 1,000 -,78 ,51 3,00 -,048 ,202 1,000 -,70 ,60 4,00 -,095 ,231 1,000 -,84 ,65 5,00 -,036 ,231 1,000 -,79 ,71 6,00 ,306 ,209 ,988 -,37 ,98
8,00
7,00 ,185 ,208 1,000 -,49 ,86
ANNEX 3.2
91
3. T-test for identifying differences in Message involvement according to message type
Group Statistics
Message Type: Perceived Harm N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error Mean
personal harm 156 4,5150 ,91314 ,07311 message involvement societal harm 163 5,0409 ,89045 ,06975
4. T-test for evaluating differences in attitude depending on the message one has been exposed to.
Group Statistics
Message Type: Perceived Harm N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error Mean
personal harm 156 3,4588 1,02091 ,08174 attitude societal harm 163 3,1691 1,07530 ,08422
ANNEX 3.2
92
5. ANOVA and Post Hoc test for evaluating differences in attitude depending on the group one finds him/herself in.
Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: attitude
95% Confidence Interval
(I) Groep (J) Groep
Mean Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. Upper Bound
Lower Bound
Werkend ,58126(*) ,12766 ,000 ,2203 ,9422 Werkloos ,43840 ,71803 1,000 -1,5915 2,4683 Gepensioneerd 2,12888(*) ,58760 ,003 ,4677 3,7901
Student
Andere: ,79554 ,38814 ,412 -,3018 1,8928 Student -,58126(*) ,12766 ,000 -,9422 -,2203 Werkloos -,14286 ,72283 1,000 -2,1864 1,9006 Gepensioneerd 1,54762 ,59346 ,095 -,1301 3,2254
Werkend
Andere: ,21429 ,39696 1,000 -,9079 1,3365 Student -,43840 ,71803 1,000 -2,4683 1,5915 Werkend ,14286 ,72283 1,000 -1,9006 2,1864 Gepensioneerd 1,69048 ,92275 ,679 -,9182 4,2991
Werkloos
Andere: ,35714 ,81046 1,000 -1,9341 2,6484 Student -2,12888(*) ,58760 ,003 -3,7901 -,4677 Werkend -1,54762 ,59346 ,095 -3,2254 ,1301 Werkloos -1,69048 ,92275 ,679 -4,2991 ,9182
Bonferroni
Gepensioneerd
Andere: -1,33333 ,69753 ,569 -3,3053 ,6386
ANNEX 3.2
93
Student -,79554 ,38814 ,412 -1,8928 ,3018 Werkend -,21429 ,39696 1,000 -1,3365 ,9079 Werkloos -,35714 ,81046 1,000 -2,6484 1,9341
Andere:
Gepensioneerd 1,33333 ,69753 ,569 -,6386 3,3053 Werkend ,58126(*) ,13796 ,000 ,1886 ,9739 Werkloos ,43840 1,21594 1,000 -147,1139 147,9907 Gepensioneerd 2,12888 ,21701 ,054 -,0683 4,3261
Student
Andere: ,79554 ,53645 ,874 -1,4781 3,0692 Student -,58126(*) ,13796 ,000 -,9739 -,1886 Werkloos -,14286 1,22046 1,000 -138,5450 138,2593 Gepensioneerd 1,54762(*) ,24105 ,041 ,0879 3,0073
Werkend
Andere: ,21429 ,54662 1,000 -2,0256 2,4542 Student -,43840 1,21594 1,000 -147,9907 147,1139 Werkend ,14286 1,22046 1,000 -138,2593 138,5450 Gepensioneerd 1,69048 1,23190 ,993 -116,9428 120,3238
Werkloos
Andere: ,35714 1,32599 1,000 -43,7911 44,5054 Student -2,12888 ,21701 ,054 -4,3261 ,0683 Werkend -1,54762(*) ,24105 ,041 -3,0073 -,0879 Werkloos -1,69048 1,23190 ,993 -120,3238 116,9428
Gepensioneerd
Andere: -1,33333 ,57171 ,403 -3,5722 ,9055 Student -,79554 ,53645 ,874 -3,0692 1,4781 Werkend -,21429 ,54662 1,000 -2,4542 2,0256 Werkloos -,35714 1,32599 1,000 -44,5054 43,7911
Tamhane
Andere:
Gepensioneerd 1,33333 ,57171 ,403 -,9055 3,5722 * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
ANNEX 4
94
ANNEX 4: Explorative questions
An example of the statistical analyses performed to assess the answers to these questions is showed below. Other questions are analysed analogous. Descriptive Statistics N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation exploratief: verkopen illegaal? 318 1 7 6,06 1,448
exploratief: verkopen bestraft? 318 1 7 5,65 1,392
exploratief: bewust kopen bestraft? 318 1 7 3,90 1,873
exploratief: consumentkentgevolgen? 318 1 7 2,53 1,610
exploratief: mindernamaakalsgevolggekend?
318 1 7 4,85 1,634
exploratief: hoogte pakkans? (1 tot 5) 318 1 5 2,75 1,373
Valid N (listwise) 318 Is the selling of counterfeit luxury fashion items an illegal business practice? Group Statistics
Wat is uw geslacht? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean Man 130 6,18 1,355 ,119 exploratief:
verkopen illegaal? Vrouw 188 5,98 1,507 ,110
ANNEX 4
95
Test of Homogeneity of Variances exploratief: verkopen illegaal?
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
2,506 4 313 ,042 ANOVA exploratief: verkopen illegaal?
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Between Groups 10,768 4 2,692 1,288 ,274 Within Groups 653,974 313 2,089 Total 664,742 317
Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: exploratief: verkopen illegaal?
95% Confidence Interval
(I) Groep (J) Groep Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
Werkend -,223 ,183 1,000 -,74 ,29 Werkloos -,995 1,027 1,000 -3,90 1,91 Gepensioneerd 1,338 ,840 1,000 -1,04 3,71
Student
Andere: -,138 ,555 1,000 -1,71 1,43 Student ,223 ,183 1,000 -,29 ,74 Werkloos -,773 1,034 1,000 -3,69 2,15 Gepensioneerd 1,561 ,849 ,669 -,84 3,96
Werkend
Andere: ,084 ,568 1,000 -1,52 1,69 Student ,995 1,027 1,000 -1,91 3,90 Werkend ,773 1,034 1,000 -2,15 3,69 Gepensioneerd 2,333 1,320 ,780 -1,40 6,06
Werkloos
Andere: ,857 1,159 1,000 -2,42 4,13 Student -1,338 ,840 1,000 -3,71 1,04 Werkend -1,561 ,849 ,669 -3,96 ,84 Werkloos -2,333 1,320 ,780 -6,06 1,40
Gepensioneerd
Andere: -1,476 ,997 1,000 -4,30 1,34 Student ,138 ,555 1,000 -1,43 1,71
Bonferroni
Andere: Werkend -,084 ,568 1,000 -1,69 1,52
ANNEX 4
96
Werkloos -,857 1,159 1,000 -4,13 2,42 Gepensioneerd 1,476 ,997 1,000 -1,34 4,30 Werkend -,223 ,175 ,899 -,72 ,27 Werkloos -,995(*) ,096 ,000 -1,27 -,72 Gepensioneerd 1,338 1,858 1,000 -24,27 26,94
Student
Andere: -,138 ,863 1,000 -3,80 3,52 Student ,223 ,175 ,899 -,27 ,72 Werkloos -,773(*) ,146 ,000 -1,19 -,35 Gepensioneerd 1,561 1,862 ,999 -23,74 26,86
Werkend
Andere: ,084 ,870 1,000 -3,55 3,72 Student ,995(*) ,096 ,000 ,72 1,27 Werkend ,773(*) ,146 ,000 ,35 1,19 Gepensioneerd 2,333 1,856 ,983 -23,51 28,18
Werkloos
Andere: ,857 ,857 ,988 -2,82 4,54 Student -1,338 1,858 1,000 -26,94 24,27 Werkend -1,561 1,862 ,999 -26,86 23,74 Werkloos -2,333 1,856 ,983 -28,18 23,51
Gepensioneerd
Andere: -1,476 2,044 ,999 -17,22 14,27 Student ,138 ,863 1,000 -3,52 3,80 Werkend -,084 ,870 1,000 -3,72 3,55 Werkloos -,857 ,857 ,988 -4,54 2,82
Tamhane
Andere:
Gepensioneerd 1,476 2,044 ,999 -14,27 17,22 * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
