Council of Foreign Relations NWO Obama

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Global Governance Reform:

An American View of US Leadership

February 2010

Stewart PatrickStewart Patrick is senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Councilon Foreign Relations. Previously, he was research fellow at the Center for Global Development, and prior to that, he servedon the secretary of states policy planning staff. His most recent book is The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of AmericanMultilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War.

Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provokingcontributions to the public debate over peaceand security issues. The views expressed inthis brief are those ofthe authorand not nec-essarily those of the Stanley Foundation. Theauthor thanks Preeti Bhattacharji for editori-al assistance. The authors affiliation is listedfor identification purposes only.

This brief was originallypresented at a conference onLeadership and the GlobalGovernance Agenda

November 10-11, 2009China Institutes of ContemporaryInternational Relations (CICIR)Beijing, Peoples Republic of China

Co-sponsored byThe Stanley FoundationTogether with CICIR and

the Centre for InternationalGovernance Innovation

Since assuming office in January 2009, President Barack Obama hastrumpeted a new era of engagement for the United States. The centracomponents of his strategy include a world order characterized by peace-

ful accommodation between established and rising powers; the collectivemanagement of transnational problems; and the overhaul of internationalinstitutions to reflect these shifting power dynamics and the new global agenda. Obamas vision presumes an enduring US role in promoting global andregional security, but he places less emphasis than his predecessor on the pur-suit of American primacy. Instead, Obama envisionsindeed, insiststhatother global powers assume new responsibilities.

Notwithstanding its multilateral instincts, the Obama administration is limit-

ed in its practical ability to promote and embrace sweeping reforms to globagovernance. Rather than casting its lot entirely with universal organizationslike the United Nations, the United States will adopt a more pragmaticapproach to international cooperation, relying on a combination of formainstitutions and more flexible partnerships to achieve US national interests.

The balance sheet for Obamas first year in office underscores both theopportunities for, and the constraints on, global governance reform in thecurrent geopolitical environment. The United States helped replace the Groupof Eight (G-8) with the Group of Twenty (G-20) as the apex steering groupfor the world economy. At the same time, Washington has left an opening for

a continued role for the G-8, particularly in political and security mattersThe Obama administration has also supported modest reforms to theInternational Financial Institutions (IFIs), including an expanded mandate forthe International Monetary Fund and structural shifts in The World BankThe details of such adjustments, however, remain to be negotiated. At thesame time, the United States has remained notably reticent when it comes toany expansion of the United Nations Security Council to accommodate risingnations. Finally, the Obama administration has offered new US leadership onboth nuclear proliferation and climate change, but without significant gover-nance breakthroughs in the multilateral regimes governing either arena.


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Ultimately, prospects for effective global gover-nance reform (and the sustainability of US multi-lateral engagement) will depend heavily onbilateral relations between the United States andthe worlds most prominent emerging power:China. The Obama administration has showninterest in making room for China in the maininstitutions of global governance. But this willdepend on Chinas own willingness to embraceexisting global rules, provide an appropriateshare of global public goods, and reassure theUnited States and its East Asian neighbors thatits own rise will not come at their expense. Ifhandled delicately, a Sino-American concord onthe emerging world order can be a force forglobal stability.

Obamas Emerging Strategic VisionWhile the Obama administration has yet torelease its national security strategymuch less

enunciate a foreign policy doctrinethe broadoutlines of its approach to global engagement arenow apparent. They include the following themes.

A Return to Multilateralism. Since assumingthe presidency, Obama has taken a series ofsymbolic steps to return the United States tomultilateral engagement. He has rededicatedthe United States to the international rule oflaw by shutting secret CIA prisons and pledgingto close the detention facility in Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba. He has engineered US election to theUN Human Rights Council; moved the UnitedStates from a bystander to a leader on climatechange; cemented the G-20 as an ongoing, sum-mit-level forum; proposed improvements to thenuclear nonproliferation regime; and signaled hisintent to seek ratification of the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty (CTBT), the UN Convention onthe Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and other long-languishing treaties.

At the same time, Obama has emphasized the

need for other countries to share global burdens.As he said to the United Nations in September2009: This cannot be solely Americas endeav-or. Those who used to chastise America for act-ing alone in the world cannot now stand by andwait for America to solve the worlds problemsalone. Now is the time for all of us to take ourshare of responsibility for a global response toglobal challenges.1 Rather than take refuge inreflexive anti-Americanism, nations around theworld must engage in good faith give-and-take.

2 A Recognition of Security Interdependence. Theadministrations new era of engagement ispremised on the notion that we live in a world ofsecurity interdependence. For much of historythe main geopolitical game has been a competi-tion among states for relative power. Accordingto the president, that era is drawing to a closeIn an era when our destiny is shared, power isno longer a zero-sum game, he told the GeneralAssembly.2 Competition among great powers wilincreasingly be replaced by the collective manage-ment of global threatsfrom climate change tonuclear proliferationthat endanger the securityprosperity, and well-being of all nations.

To be sure, this narrative exaggerates the changesin the world and oversimplifies the United Statesactual strategy. For the foreseeable future, themanagement of great-power relations and thepromotion of regional stability will remain criti-

cal American concerns. This is particularly true inEast Asia, where relations between the UnitedStates and China will continue to combine ele-m en t s o f b o th c oo p er at io n a nd r iv al ryNevertheless, the administration believes theincentives for global cooperation have never beenclearer and the structural impediments to suchcollaboration weaker. All major centers of worldpower, whether emerging or established, have astrong stake in the largely peaceful current inter-national order, reducing the salience of the securi-ty dilemma and breaking the historical pattern ofa conflict-prone international system.

Reliance on International Institutions. Th eObama administration has made a strategic calcu-lation that working within international institu-tions is preferable to marginalizing themNotwithstanding their weaknesses, institutionsprovide useful focal points that nations can use tomodulate their differences and pursue mutual ben-efits; settings in which to socialize rising powersto existing international norms and rules; standing

technical capacities to confront complex prob-lems; opportunities for burden-sharing amongnations; and potential vehicles for legitimatingAmerican leadership while discouraging chal-lenges to the operative world order. During hispresidential campaign, Obama lionized the archi-tects of the post-World War II order, who had suc-cessfully embedded American leadership inmultilateral organizations. That generation hadunderstood that instead of constraining ourpower, these institutions magnified it.3 Candidate


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Obama pledged to rebuild the alliances, partner-ships, and institutions necessary to confront com-mon threats and enhance common security, byupdating them to reflect new actors and agendas.4

Integrating Rising Powers. Since the collapse ofthe bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union,American national security analysts have debat-ed whether the international system is unipo-lar, with strong dimensions of US hegemony, orincreasingly multipolar. The Obama adminis-tration perceives a long-term diffusion of globalinfluence toward multiple power centers and rec-ognizes the growing constraints on an overex-tended United States ability to shoulder globalburdens on its own. But the administration hasgenerally eschewed the concept of multipolarityfor what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton callsa multipartner worldin which the UnitedStates works collectively with other govern-

ments, reformed institutions, and private-sector,nongovernmental, and civil-society actors toaddress global challenges.5

A key pillar of this agenda is the integration ofrising powers into existing structures of globalgovernance. Ascendant powers like China,India, and Brazil are clamoring for influence inglobal institutions, which need to give them anincrease in both voice and responsibility. Therationale for integrating rising powers is geopo-litical and pragmatic. Historically, managinggreat-power transitions has been among themost vexing challenges in world politics, fraughtwith the threat of instability and violence.Practically speaking, few of todays globalthreats can be addressed without the involve-m e n t o f t h e m a j o r e m e r g i n g e c o n o m i e s .Accordingly, the United States and other estab-lished powers have a long-term interest in ensur-ing that rising powers become pillars of arule-based international order.

The US State Department is guided by this agen-da. Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberghas observed, Adapting to the rise of China, aswell as other emerging powers like India andBrazil, while protecting our national interests, isone of the key strategic challenges of our time.The goal is to help such nations take theirrightful place at the table without generating fearor mistrust. But, he continued, China tooneeds to demonstrate the same commitment todoing its partreassuring the United States, its

neighbors in Asia, and the rest of the world thatwe have nothing to fear from a more influentialChina, that Beijing shares our vision of a newgeopolitics of win-win solutions rather than zero-sum rivalries.6

Sovereignty as Responsibility. Like precedingpresidents, Obama has stressed that all countriesmust join in upholding and enforcing internation-al norms (or expectations of state behavior) inrealms ranging from nuclear nonproliferation tohuman rights. What is distinctive in the Obamaapproach has been its explicit articulation of theconcept of sovereignty as responsibilitytheprinciple that membership in the community ofnations confers not only sovereign rights but alsoobligations, both to a states own citizens and tothe wider international community.7 In otherwords, all countries must follow the rules andshoulder the burdens of providing global collective

goods, from controlling the spread of weapons ofmass destruction to stemming the emission ofgreenhouse gases, rather than free-riding ongoods supplied by others.

There is continuity here with the George W.Bush administrations well-known call for Chinato become a responsible stakeholderthat is,one that embraces existing international normsand institutions. What the Obama administra-tion has done, in all but name, is to extend thisconcept to all major emerging powers. In July2009, Secretary Clinton made it clear thatengaging emerging partners is part of her visionof a multipartner world. The administrationhas begun strategic dialogues with major andemerging global powers, including China,India, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, andSouth Africa.8 The desire is to commit risingpowers to the current world order by givingthem a stake in its preservation.

Wilsonianismof a Kind. Many liberal interna-

tionalists who supported President Obama havebeen perplexed by the administrations relativesubordination of human rights and democracypromotion as US foreign policy concerns.Although the president has asserted that thereare basic [human rights] principles that are uni-versal, he has also insisted that democracys evo-lution will be animated by internal pressures andtake different national forms. Democracy cannotbe imposed on any nation from the outside, heinsisted at the United Nations. Each society must


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in the West, and few nations are inclined toregard the United States as the worlds rule-maker in chief.

A Diverse Group of Stakeholders. Second, theprocess of integrating emerging countries into aworld order based on shared norms is likely to befar more difficult than the notion of a responsi-ble stakeholder suggests. Emerging powers oftenhave markedly different threat perceptions, politi-cal values, and economic visions from the UnitedStates. From a US perspective, the ideal scenariowould be for rising powers to accept existingnorms, just as entrants to the European Union(EU) internalize the acquis communautaire. AsPresident Obama mentioned at the LondonSummit of the G-20, shaping the world order wasmuch easier when it was just Roosevelt andChurchill sitting in a room with brandy.12 Thereare simply far more players today, and rising

powers are unlikely to accept the entire corpus ofWestern order without qualification or adjust-ment. So far, the Obama administration has sentmixed signals as to whether its goal is to socializerising states into an unchanged Western order orinstead, to engage in the painstaking process ofcreating a new set of norms for a new global ageAnd if it seeks to socialize emerging powers,should the United States and other establishedpowers move with dispatch, quickly accommo-dating rising powers and adapting existing hierar-chies to their aspirationson the assumption thatgiving them a stake will lead them to behave ina responsible manner? Or should they adopt amore prolonged and conditional approachextending status and privileges only graduallycontingent on rising powers willingness to acceptnew responsibilities, meet heavier commitmentsand play by the rules?

An Unclean Slate. Third, the world is not atabula rasa. There are hundreds, even thou-sands of existing institutionsglobal and

regional, formal and informal, general purposeand issue-specific. The world is one of multi-multilateralism, a crowded landscape of inter-national institutions that goes far beyond theUN-centered world order that some still equatewith multilateralism. This institutional plural-ism has many advantages. New, more flexiblearrangements or regional organizations can givevenerable yet tired organizations some healthycompetition, and provide the United States andothers with new vehicles for multilateral coop-

search for its own path, and no path is perfect.Each country will pursue a path rooted in the cul-ture of its people, andin the pastAmerica hastoo often been selective in its promotion ofdemocracy.9 The contrast with the Bush admin-istrationwhich championed the nonnegotiabledemands of human dignity and made democra-cy promotion the centerpiece of the US NationalSecurity Strategy of 2006is striking. If the Bushadministration, dominated by neoconservatism,embodied Wilsonianism without internationalinstitutions,10 the Obama administrations sup-port for multilateralism while downgradinghuman rights suggests a policy of Wilsonianismwithout the zeal to remake other nations gover-nance in our own domestic image.

The Future of Global Governance:

Obstacles to ReformObamas election, coupled with the global eco-nomic crisis, has encouraged breathless expecta-tions in some quarters that we may be in a raremoment of creation, where the world order issuddenly in flux, and major institutional renova-tion is possible. Certainly, the Obama administra-tion has advocated a renegotiated multilateralorder on the basis of genuine partnership.Nevertheless, there are important practical limita-tions that will constrain any US effort to refashionthe architecture of global governance in any sys-tematic way. These obstacles, as well as Americas

unique geopolitical interests, values, and politics,will serve as a brake on US reliance on universalmultilateral institutions and ensure continued USuse of ad hoc and la carte arrangements.

Global Constraints on US-Led

Global Governance Reform

There are several grounds for pessimism that theUnited States can lead global institutionalreform.11

Eroding US Power. First, the United States lacksanything close to the overwhelming materialpower and ideological influence it enjoyed in the1940s. Americas diplomatic and economic posi-tion has eroded over the past decade, and the USmilitary has become overstretched. The UnitedStates has also squandered much of its softpower, both in the developing and developedworld, which is something not even Obamaspersonal appeal can fully restore. Indeed, USleadership is no longer taken for granted, even

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eration. But the prevailing institutional densityalso complicates renewal of the multilateral sys-tem. It is hard to eliminate obsolete existinginstitutions, or even to reallocate power withinthem, given the vested interests of current mem-ber states and the bureaucracies themselves.Accordingly, to use a city planning metaphor,the dominant institutional pattern has been oneof suburban sprawl rather than urban renewal.

Limits of the Current Crisis. Fourth, we are notactually in a constitutional moment. The eco-nomic crisis has been punishing, but not graveenough to stimulate the sort of world re-makingthat typically follows catastrophic war. The eco-nomic slump has spurred some restructuring ofthe global financial regime, most importantly theelevation of the G-20 to serve as the main multi-lateral steering group for the global economy, thecreation of a Financial Stability Board, and some

adjustment of the governance structure (as wellas r ecapi tal i zati on) of the InternationalMonetary Fund. But outside the financial arena,there has been little movement in broader globalgovernance reform. Absent a protracted depres-sion or a cataclysm like nuclear attack, institu-tional reform will proceed incrementally,through pragmatic tweaking of existing institu-tions, rather than through wholesale abandon-ment of old arrangements. (In evolutionaryterms, the pattern will be phyletic gradual-ismnot punctuated equilibrium.)

The Trade-Off Between Size and Effectiveness.Fifth, the objectives of global governance reformare often in tensionparticularly the desire tomake institutions more representative, on theone hand, and more efficient, on the other.Enlarging the G-8 or the Security Council canmake these bodies more globally representative,but it might also make effective decision makingmore elusive. Susan E. Rice, US Ambassador tothe UN, alluded to these tensions in February

2009, declaring: The United States believes thatthe long-term legitimacy and viability of theUnited Nations Security Council depends on itsreflecting the world of the twenty-first century.At the same time, any expansion must notdiminish its effectiveness or efficiency.13 This isthe dilemma of Security Council expansion, forinstance. Rather than facilitating consensus onglobal flashpoints such as Darfur, Iran, andNorth Korea, enlargement might simply exacer-bate cacophony and gridlock.

Domestic Constraints to US-Led

Global Governance Reform

The Obama administration remains enthusiasticabout multilateral engagement, but actual USpolicy may remain ambivalent because of threedomestic factors. Despite being the primaryarchitect of the modern world order, few coun-tries have been as vigilant as the United States in

guarding their sovereign prerogatives.14

Havingtoiled to construct a multilateral world, theUnited States often perceives itself as ensnared inan increasingly dense web of international rules,commitments, and expectations, and tends tochafe at these real and imagined constraints. Thisdissonance arises from three sources: Americasmassive power; its exceptionalist political cul-ture; and its unique constitutional structure.15

The Privileges of Power. All countries resistencroachments on their freedom of action. But

rule-based cooperationbased on principles ofequal treatment and self-restraintis naturallymore attractive to smaller countries, since it con-strains great powers and provides the weak withdiplomatic leverage they lack in bilateral negotia-tions. Multilateralism holds less allure for global-ly dominant powers. Notwithstanding its recenteconomic difficulties and strategic overextension,the United States still enjoys more unilateraland bilateral options than other countries.Simultaneously, Americas continuing military

dominance arguably gives the United Statesunique responsibilities, shared not even byother members of the UN Security Council, toserve as the primary custodian of world order. Indischarging these obligations, some US leadersand analysts argue, the United States cannot besubjected to the same constraints that bind oth-ers, such as the jurisdiction of the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) or the intrusive verificationprotocols of nonproliferation treaties.

As the unipolar moment gives way to a more

multipolar (or at least unimultipolar) era,the scope and justification for US unilateralaction will presumably fade. World order willhinge on the actions and choices of a widerarray of great powersincluding China, India,and Brazil, Russia, Japan, and the EuropeanUnionboth in their immediate regions andglobally. This transition will be a protractedone, however. As long as it remains the onlytruly global power, the United States will con-tinue to insist on significant freedom of action


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the presidency for allegedly submitting US nation-al security decisions to a global test. The elec-tion of Barack Obama and the disarray of theRepublican Party temporarily muffled most sover-eignty-minded nationalists. But the future ofAmerican exceptionalism is an open question. Atrue test of its vitality will come if PresidentObama chooses to submit the Rome Statute of theICC for the Senates advice and consent, therebyaccepting (in effect) the principle that an interna-tional body has the authority to sit in judgment ofthe credibility of US legal proceedings.

The Separation of Powers. Finally, prospects forUS leadership in global governance reform wilremain constrained by the US Constitution itselfwhich makes Congress the formal coequal withthe executive branch in the conduct of US foreignpolicy. This independent legislative roleabsentin parliamentary systems of governanceposes

high hurdles for any administration seeking USaccession to an international treaty or proposingUS membership in an international institutionFrom the Senates failure to pass the Treaty ofVersailles to its rejection of the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty eighty years later, Congress hasfrequently exercised its veto prerogatives, demur-ring on obligations favored by the White HouseWhile the competition between the executive andlegislative branches often provides a creative ten-sion, it can also complicate the US commitmentto multilateralism and assumption of internation-al obligations.

Given Democratic control of both houses ofCongress, President Obama has some flexibilityin pursuing his multilateral priorities. At thesame time, the Senates advice and consent fortreaties, like CTBT and UNCLOS, will nonethe-less require a two-thirds majority, and thereforeat least a modicum of Republican support. Asthe experience of Kyoto shows, the same appliesto any major treaty commitment on globa

warming. In the trade realm, moreover, the presi-dent is likely to face significant protectionistpressures from influential constituencies in hiselectoral base, limiting US commitments to mul-tilateral commercial liberalization. Moreover, theloss of the filibuster-proof Democratic Senatemajority in the Massachusetts special electionmay presage a bigger power shift in the 2010mid-term elections that could raise the hurdlesfor US multilateral engagement sharply.

in its foreign and national security policyeven as it hopes others will submit to multilat-eral constraints.

Taking Exception. Political culture may alsoplace constraints on US leadership in renovatingglobal governance. Since the founding of therepublic, American conservatives and liberalsalike have been united in the conviction that theUnited States has a special place and destinyamong nations, by virtue of the uniqueness ofthe countrys founding political values, democrat-ic institutions, and constitutional traditions. AsSenator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) explained in1919, I want to keep America as she has beennot isolated, not prevent her from joining amongother nations for these great purposesbut Iwish her to be master of her fate.16 This unques-tioned commitment to American exceptional-ism has been a touchstone of US foreign policy

for more than two centuries, shaping the con-tent and style of US global engagement. Attimes, progressive idealists l ike WoodrowWilson have invoked the doctrine in an effort toremake the world along liberal lines. More com-monly, conservative nationalists from WarrenHarding to Jesse Helms have used it to justifyholding the United States apart from rules thatbind others, so as to protect the sanctity of theUS Constitution and the sovereignty of theAmerican peoplewhich might otherwise besacrificed on the altar of a misguided globalconsensus, haphazard trends in internationallaw, and the actions of unaccountable interna-tional bureaucrats.

As a practical matter, of course, the United Statesaccepts a little less sovereignty17 every day,often choosing to pool some sovereign functionswith other nations or to voluntarily acceptrestrictions on its policy autonomy in order tocope with deepening economic and securityinterdependence. The rise of catastrophic threats,

in particular, makes such measured and volun-tary delegations of sovereignty critical.

And yet it remains political suicide for any USaspirant to elective office to speak of movingbeyond sovereigntyor indeed to speak thelanguage of global governancegiven theundercurrent of suspicion that international insti-tutions are running roughshod over the USConstitution. A case in point was Senator JohnKerry, who was pilloried during his losing bid for

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The Challenge: Balancing Multilateral Institutions

and Ad Hoc Arrangements

The Obama administration has made a generalcommitment to strengthen and work within multi-lateral institutions. But enduring Americanambivalence and obstacles to global governancereform guarantee that the United States will con-tinue to resort to ad hoc multilateral arrangements

in pursuing its foreign policy interests. Some maylament this reality. But one must remember thatfor all states, multilateral institutions are means toforeign policy ends. Governments find them usefulto the extent that they are perceived to advancenational interests and concrete national objectives,including both short-term ends and longer-termmilieu goalslike the perpetuation of a stable,predictable system of international security andeconomic exchange.18

The George W. Bush administration, of course,

took a decidedly skeptical attitude toward inter-national institutions, regarding many multilater-al instruments as powerless to confront newthreats, particularly the dangers of terrorism,rogue states, and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction that became so salient after9/11. Bush administration officials perceivedmany standing bodies, including the UN, ashopelessly dysfunctional, unaccountable, andobsoleteprone to lowest common denominatorpolicymaking, working at cross-purposes with

American interests and ideals, and overly con-straining of US freedom of action. Most funda-mentally, they argued that multilateralism ismost successful when it reflects a true conver-gence of interests and values.

At times this skepticism was expressed in forth-right unilateralism, including acting alone oropting out of international treaties or regimesendorsed by the vast majority of other nations.The typical stance of the previous administra-tion, though, was to use a more discriminating

approach that judged proposed treaties andorganizations case-by-case. And rather than relyon formal alliances and institutionsas if onesize fit all contingenciesthe US adopted whatformer State Department Policy Planning ChiefRichard Haass termed an la carte approach,oriented toward the kind of opportunistic coali-tions of the willing that would coalesce aroundnarrower tasks and challenges, thereby preserv-ing US policy autonomy. Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld described the US approach to

the global war on terror: There is no coalition.There are multiple coalitions. Its the missionthat determines the coalition.19

By the end of its second term, the Bush adminis-tration posed the ad hoc approach as a broadlyuseful alternative to UN-based multilateralism.This approach would begin by issuing invitationsto a core group of like-minded countries anddrafting principles that narrowly define its man-date. Washington would then ask others to join,on its terms. The United States applied thismethod on numerous occasions, from the GlobalInitiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to theAvian Influenza Action Group, the Core Groupto respond to the Indian Ocean tsunami, and theProliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

The Bush critique of formal multilateral institu-tions had some merit. At the same time, though,

the administration grossly underestimated thecosts of marginalizing international institutions,particularly the United Nations: loss of legitimacyfor US global leadership, reduced opportunitiesfor burden-sharing, and erosion of world order.

Given that the United States will continue toforum shop for frameworks that best suit itsneeds, it is important to stress that an la carteapproach need not imply a fundamental rejectionof formal, UN-centered multilateralism. TheObama administration will need to calculate thetrade-offsand potential for complementaritiesbetween these two forms of collective action andmake considered choices, in contrast to its prede-cessors more firmly fixed orientation.20

Generally speaking, the case for coalitions ismost compelling when the contingency is dis-crete, no standing international frameworkexists, institutions are paralyzed by divisions,egalitarian norms threaten to undercut vital USinterests, or bureaucratic inertia prevents prompt

decisions. In contrast, standing institutions canoffer advantages when there is no time or will tocreate a new coalition, the task requires special-ized expertise available only in permanent organ-izations, the challenge is likely to outlive anycoalition, the challenge implies heavy burden-sharing over a protracted period, or the require-ments of international or domestic legitimacyrequire formal, treaty-based frameworks to givepolitical cover to wavering states.21


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spread across multiple frameworks, three pillarsof intergovernmental cooperation will be partic-ularly important.

The first is a strong and legitimate multilaterabody that can take binding decisions on mattersof peace and security. This remains the provinceof the Security Councilideally with an updatedmembership and more transparent and respon-sive working methods. The second is a set ofstanding functional institutionsincluding theInternational Monetary Fund, The World Bankand World Trade Organizationthat provide aforum to set the ground rules for the globaleconomy along with the necessary resources andtechnical expertise. Alongside such formal bod-ies, global governance also requires nimbleagenda-setting bodies where leaders can meetinformally to focus high-level attention, coordi-nate policy responses, and build momentum for

action through a range of channels.24 Untirecently, the Group of Eight (G-8) had a nearmonopoly on this role.

Engaging and Reforming the United Nations

President Obama has calculated that the UnitedNations is a deeply flawed but indispensableinstrument of US global engagement. His chal-lenge is to put US-UN relations on a more pro-ductive footing that avoids oscillating betweenoverselling and underestimating the UnitedNations.25 Obama recognizes that the UnitedNations, for all its warts, has an unmatched com-bination of international legitimacy and standingcapacity, on which the United States will continueto depend. Thus, rather than criticizing from thesidelines, in the words of US Ambassador to theUnited Nations Susan E. Rice, his administrationhas chosen to roll up its sleeves, in the hope ofbuilding political will. It seeks to do so by set-ting a tone of decency and mutual respect ratherthan condescension and contemptby abiding byrules we expect others to followand [by show-

ing itself] willing to listen, respect differences, andconsider new ideas.26 A major theme of this USstrategy is moving the United Nations beyond thelongstanding North-South divisions that have pit-ted advanced and developing countries againsteach other.27

The big question is whether Obamas faith in theUnited Nations is warranted and whether theUnited States will get returns from its invest-ments.28 The domestic sustainability of this new

Obamas challenge is to pursue a policy of lacarte multilateralism in a manner that drawson both the legitimacy and capacity of standingorganizations and the agility and flexibility ofad hoc coalitions. The trick will be to makecoalitions complement and reinforce ratherthan undermine the institutions and alliancesthe United States will really need over the longhaul. The United States should use minilater-al cooperation not simply to sidestep perma-nent frameworks, but also to drive the agendawithin them and prod them to take action.Indeed, history suggests that effective multilat-eral cooperation often rests on a prior minilat-eral agreement among a small subset of keystates, which subsequently persuade others tojoin. This process sometimes takes place withinlarge, formal membership bodies like the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) or the UN, when acaucus of influential parties serve[s] as a bro-

ker, creating a focal point for negotiating equi-librium. But minilateral cooperation can alsooccur outside of universal, treaty-based organi-zations, by creating a parallel negotiatingprocess. Such a two track model of extendinga regime allows a subset of countries to moveforward with ambitious commitments, hopingthat others will gradually opt in to the moreselective club.22

The well-established G-8 and the newer G-20(described below) are todays most importantminilateral fora, giving major states a diplomaticalternative to the inertia of universal member-ship organizations. But the minilateral model isalso useful on a more ad hoc, case-specific basis.For example, the United States has sponsored thePSI and the Major Economies Forum to addressthe particular global challenges of nuclear prolif-eration and climate change, respectively. Byembedding such forays into minilateral negotia-tion within a broader multilateral framework,the United States can simultaneously exploit the

efficiency of small group dynamics and enjoy thelegitimacy inherent in being endorsed by univer-sal membership bodies.23

The Balance Sheet: Assessing Progress in

Global Governance ReformWhat have Obamas actions to date told usabout US leadership in global governance reformand the challenges of engaging China and otherrising powers in multilateral cooperation?Although effective global governance will be

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era of engagement will depend heavily onwhether Congress and the US public perceivethat other global players reciprocate with coop-eration on issues that arise in the UN SecurityCouncil, Human Rights Council, GeneralAssembly, and other major forums. If such bene-fits fail to accrue, domestic political support forthe United Nations could sour. Indeed, in his UNGeneral Assembly speech in September 2009,President Obama cautioned that Americas mul-tilateral ardor must not go unrequited. His(implicit) warning was that spurning Americasovertures at the UN would only strengthenforces of unilateralism, both on Capitol Hill andamong the US public.

In President Obamas first year in office, the bal-ance sheet for the United States UN investmentwas mixed. His administration emphasized theSecurity Council as an important instrument in

addressing the main threats to international peaceand security, but with uneven results. It persuad-ed both China and Russia to support fairly toughsanctions on North Korea and, followingObamas historic appearance at the SecurityCouncil in September 2009, obtained a resolutionthat addressed some holes in the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Progresson other critical threats to global peace and secu-rity has been more elusive. Iran continues to vio-late its obligations under the NPT regime, butRussia and China have resisted significant tight-ening of sanctions. Likewise, the council hasstruggled to bring peace and justice to Darfur,notwithstanding the administrations more prag-matic approach to the regime in Khartoum.

Another test of Obamas strategy of engagementis the UN Human Rights Council, which theUnited States joined in 2009 after a contentiouspolicy debate. The performance of that body hasso far been disappointing. It has yet to developrigorous membership criteria to keep repressive

governments from joining, clung to archaic pat-terns of bloc voting, and let a broad range ofhuman rights abusers evade scrutiny and pres-sure. Such perceived indifference to violations offundamental liberties risks discrediting theUnited Nations in the eyes of the US public.

Security Council Reform: Now? Or Never?

Notwithstanding its rhetorical commitment toglobal governance reform, the Obama adminis-tration has been conspicuously silent on Security

Council reform. There is broad consensus withinthe administration that the council no longerreflects contemporary power realities and that alegitimacy crisis could build if its membership isnot reformed. However, there is ample skepti-cism about whether council enlargement wouldbe in US national interests and, even if so,whether it is even plausible to engineer.

Many worry that expansion of the council, farfrom improving its ability to address threats topeace and security, would instead increase grid-lock, dilute US power, and embolden regionalringleaders with antithetical visions of worldorder. An ideal enlargement, from Washingtonsperspective, would be limited to the four mainaspirants to permanent membership: Germany,

Japan, Brazil, and India (presumably withoutvetoes). This would guarantee the United Statestwo votes (Germany and Japan) in most circum-

stances and two more (Brazil and India) in manyothers. Such a limited enlargement would also beconsistent with the original purpose of the coun-cil as a privileged body of great powers withcapability to protect and sustain global peaceand security. Unfortunately, such a schemew oul d have l i tt l e s uppor t i n the G ener alAssembly, which must approve any enlargementby a two-thirds vote. In practice, any councilexpansion is likely to involve the addition of atleast 6 and likely 8-9 nonpermanent seats. Suchan expanded body would make it harder for theUnited States to build the coalitions needed toapprove council resolutionsor to block themwithout use of the veto.

Administration officials also wonder whetherany scheme for Security Council enlargement ispolitically feasible. The ongoing negotiationssuggest one plausible scenario for councilenlargement: a small increase in elected two-year seats, combined with a new interim cate-gory of renewable, longer-term elected seats.

However, even accepting this formula wouldrequire major concessions by aspirants to per-manent membership.

It is clear to all UN member states that councilreform will not occur without US leadership. Butit is by no means clear that US leadership wouldbe sufficient, and the Obama administration isunderstandably reluctant to expend US diplomat-ic energies and prestige to such a high-risk propo-sition. It is also hard for US officials to conceive


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steering committee that includes Canada (popu-lation 33 million, GDP $1.4 trillion) and Italy(58 million, $2.07 trillion) but excludes China(1.33 billion, $3.25 trillion) and India (1.15 bil-lion, $1.15 trillion) is out of date. The G-20adapts to this reality by incorporating Asia-Pacific economic powers China, India, SouthKorea, Indonesia, and Australia (as well as exist-ing G-8 members Japan and the United States).

Without a doubt, the G-20 is a better reflectionof global economic realities. Its members accountfor more than 85 percent of global GDP, 80 per-cent of international trade, and 67 percent of theplanets population. Perhaps most importantlyChina, holder of the worlds largest currencyreserves and already the worlds third-largesteconomy and second leading exporter, is now inthe tent. Obama administration officials clearlyhope that China will assume a more responsible

role in the world economydoing its part toaddress global currency imbalances and openingits markets to foreign trade. In the absence ofSecurity Council reform, the G-20 provides whatsome see as a second-best option for global gov-ernance that is more representative.

That said, it would be premature to write offthe G-8 entirely, or to imagine that the G-20will inevitably become the premier global steer-ing group for a wider range of sensitive politi-cal ( i n addi ti on to economi c) i s s ues . TheObama administration intends to retain the G-8for specific purposes, and it remains open tousing other G-x frameworks, such as theMajor Economies Forum, for a variety of glob-al challenges.

Indeed, from Washingtons perspective, the G-20is hardly perfect. There is an inevitable trade-offbetween representation and effectiveness, andthe G-20 might be too much of a lurch towardexpansiveness with the inclusion of relatively

minor players like Argentina and Turkey. Indeedthe already unwieldy G-20 has swelled beyond20, with the addition of Spain, the Netherlands,and other gate-crashers. (As the president wrylyobserved in LAquila, [W]hat Ive noticed is thateverybody wants the smallest possible group...thatincludes them.) If effectiveness were the goal, abetter case could have been made for expandingthe G-8 modestlyalong the lines of the G-8plus 5 (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, andMexico) that has been meeting since the 2007

of a negotiating position that does not alienateeither the major aspirants or the next tier of influ-ential countries (many of which are US allies).Nor is it clear that China and Russia, skeptical ofdiluting their own council prerogatives, wouldendorse any dramatic shifts in membership.

Confronting such a forbidding diplomatic land-scape, the Obama administration may well betempted to continue voicing anodyne support for arepresentative and effective United Nations,while allowing negotiations to continue on theirpresumably inconclusive path. This would allowUS officials to focus their energies on making thecurrent Security Council as effective as possible inaddressing real world problems. If the Obamaadministration adopts this stance, however, it willlikely face diplomatic fallout from those whoaccuse it of abdicating responsibility and adoptinga passive posture on a fundamental question of

world order.

The G-20, G-8, and G-x

The global economic crisis that began to unfoldin the summer and autumn of 2008 underscoredthe weaknesses of existing global governancearrangements for the world economy, particular-ly in safeguarding the stability of the worldfinancial system against systemic risk. Havingstared into the abyss, US policymakersfirst inthe Bush and now in the Obama administra-tionhave supported major innovations in mul-tilateral economic coordination. Beyond ongoingefforts to stimulate national economies, impor-tant breakthroughs in global governance includethe establishment of the G-20 as the apex forumfor multilateral economic coordination, expan-sion of the Financial Stability Board to supportsystemically important financial institutions, anda commitment to reinvigorate and update thegovernance structures of the international finan-cial institutions (IFIs) to accommodate the emer-gence of new centers of global economic power,

particularly in Asia.

Pr esi dent Obamas announcement at thePittsburgh Summit of September 2009 that theGroup of Twenty (G-20) would permanentlyreplace the G-8 as the leading forum for multi-lateral economic coordination is arguably themost profound innovation in global governances in ce t he c re at io n o f t he Wo rl d Tr ad eOrganization in 1995. This shift to the G-20 rec-ognizes an inescapable fact: any global economic

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G -8 s ummi t i n Hei l i gendamm, G er many.Obama must prevent the G-20 from fallinghostage to lowest common denominator agree-ments among a membership with different inter-ests, values, and visions of world order.

Given these limitations, President Obama andhis advisors have wisely decided not to put allof the US eggs i n one bas ket. The G -20 spurview will be confined, at least initially, toeconomic matters (broadly defined to includeclimate, energy, and health), and the G-8 is slat-ed to continue to meet annually to address asuite of more sensitive political and securityissues. Notwithstanding the complicating pres-ence of authoritarian Russia, which remains inthis smaller group, the G-8 offers a forum dom-inated by the United States and like-mindedWestern partners with a demonstrated commit-ment to defending international norms and con-

tributing to the provision of global publicgoods. Before replacing the G-8 entirely with anuntested G-20 for all issues, the Obama admin-istration must ask itself whether emergingeconomi es ar e tr ul y w i l l i ng to accept theresponsibilities of club membership, on issuesfrom trade liberalization to climate change tononproliferation. At a minimum, one shouldexpect the Obama administration to hedge itsbets and retain the G-8 as a parallel processwhile summit reform remains in flux.

Another great advantage of the G-8 is that itcan be expanded, on a flexible and ad hocbasis, to incorporate a handful of other coun-tries with special interests in a particular issuearea and the assets they can bring to bear. Suchvariable geometry has intuitive appeal as apragmatic approach to global governance.Rather than overloading any one forum withan unrealistic agenda, there can be a flexibleset of G-x groupings, with different coun-tries at the table depending on the challenge.

The United States has already embraced suchan approach in creating the Major EconomiesForum to deal with climate change and mightwell experiment with such multilateralism lacarte in other fields. The major practical ques-tion is whether the United States and potentialpartners have the political will and bureaucrat-ic capacity to support separate groupings fordifferent issue areas. To avoid transactioncosts, the most realistic near-term optionmight be to add selectively to the existing G-8

(or G-8+5), with variable configurations meet-i n g a r o u n d s p e c i f i c i s s u e s. ( T h e G - 8 h a salready moved in this direction, through theHeiligendamm-LAquila Process, involvingissue-specific policy dialogue with Brazil,China, India, Mexico, and South Africa.)

Regardless of which format emerges, the Obamaadministration should be wary of indulging inunrealistic expectations. It is implausible thatany annual summit can morph into a true deci-sion-making (much less decision-implementing)body that could substitute for the authority,legitimacy, or capacity of formal institutions likethe United Nations, World Trade Organization,International Monetary Fund (IMF), or TheWorld Bank. Going forward, a priority for theObama administration and its counterpartsabroad will be to design systematic proceduresfor linking the initiatives launched and commit-

ments made in these consultative forums withthe ongoing work streams and reform agendaswithin the worlds formal organizations.

Reforming Global Finance

The magnitude of the global economic crisis hasrevealed shortcomings in the ability of IFIsandparticularly the IMFto help ensure globalfinancial stability. In the aftermath of the crisis,there is general agreement that the fund needs abroader mandate, more robust resources, and anew governance structure reflecting recent shiftsin global economic power. The Obama adminis-tration has thus been supportive of adding to theIMFs coffers, adjusting the voting shares ofmembers, and (within limits) expanding thefunds mission.

Since its founding at the close of World War II,the IMFs primary mandate has been to assistcountries experiencing balance of paymentsdifficulties, as well as provide macroeconomicpolicy guidance and technical assistance. In

recent years, however, the fund played anincreasingly marginal role in the world econo-mythanks to its relatively modest resourcesand its often controversial conditionality poli-cy, which deterred many developing countriesfrom drawing on its services.

The financial crisis has given the IMF a newlease on life, however, stimulating demand for itsservices among countries that might previouslyhave shunned it and prompting widespread


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members agreed to redistribute voting rights toachieve an approximate 50:50 ratio betweendeveloping and developed countries.

Working out the details of this reapportionmentdeal, however, is proving contentious, given theinherently zero-sum nature of voting weightsThe United Statescurrently slightly underrepre-sented in its quota sharehas little to lose in thisdebate, but smaller European shareholders likeBelgium are vulnerable and are fighting tena-ciously to keep their quotas. Looming behind thisdifficult negotiation is a broader controversy overthe funds antiquated quota formula, which con-tinues to overrepresent Europeans via the calcula-tion of trade as a proportion of GDPevenamong countries within the EU zone.

Going forward, the United States and otherestablished powers must recognize the linkage

between governance quota reform and prospectsfor greater IMF resources.30 Capital surpluscountries like China or Saudi Arabia will be nat-urally hesitant to invest funds in the IMF so longas they have little say over fund decisionsAlthough both these countries have IMF boardseats, their quotas remain small, and they areb ei ng a sk ed t o c on tr ib ut e t o t he N ewArrangements to Borrow (NAB), which will notgive them more representation. If establishedeconomies want more resources for the fundthey must accept a governance structure thatmore accurately represents todays global distri-bution of financial and economic power.

The perceived inequity in the global financialregime also complicates efforts to address globamacroeconomic imbalances. Although theUnited States and China have begun to ease ten-sions, it remains a point of friction, and particu-larly sensitive, in US domestic politics. Theimplication for global economic governance, ofcourse, is that China will likely resist letting its

currency appreciate if it has little say in the gov-ernance of global finance. The perceived unfair-ness of the global financial system has alsoprompted proposals to diversify the worldsmenu of reserve currencies away from the USdollar. Over the past year, each of the BRICs(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has criticizedthe exorbitant privilege the United States enjoysas anchor of the global monetary system, argu-ing that the current arrangement allows theUnited States to externalize the costs of econom-

(though not universal) sentiment that the fundsmandate should expand to include surveillanceof risks in the global financial system. There is alsoa broadly held view that the fund should be givensignificantly greater resources and that the fundsgovernance and quota system should be adaptedto accommodate underrepresented emergingeconomies. But while the Obama administrationsupports all of these changes in principle, the pre-cise details remain to be worked out.

In a follow-up to Pittsburgh, the fund boardagreed to draft a new, broader mandate for con-sideration at the IMFs spring 2010 meeting inWashington. The United States and other share-holders agreed that the fund should expand fromits traditional role as a lender of last resort toassume a stronger role in surveillance and pre-vention, including by monitoring economic poli-cies in both the developed and developing world.

The G-20 has also asked the fund to studywhether it might provide more bank-like servic-es to well-run developing nations, perhaps allow-ing them to pay a fee for the right to accessquick and easy loans.29 However, member statesare deeply divided over how ambitious the scopeof the funds mandate should be. Some wouldlike to see an IMF with much larger funds,potentially becoming a depository for worldreserves. The members of the G-20 have alreadyagreed in principle to augment the funds coffersby an additional $750 billion, but concrete com-mitments have lagged. Moreover, the UnitedStates (along with Germany and several othercountries) resist the idea of seeing the fundemerge as a global central bank with massiveassets and are wary of investing the fund withtoo much authority.

Equally controversial is the proposed adjustmentof the funds governance to reflect the growingw e ig h t o f e m er g in g e c on o mi e s. P r io r t oPittsburgh, the G-20 had agreed to accelerate the

IMF quota review from 2013 to 2011 and tocarry out a modest reform to chairs and shareson the funds executive board, envisioningincreases in the small shares currently held byBrazil, China, India, Mexico, Singapore, SouthKorea, and Turkey. At Pittsburgh, the G-20 com-mitted to reform the funds governance structureby January 2011, including a 5 percent shift invoting power to underrepresented countries,especially China. Soon afterwards, at the IMFssemiannual meeting in Istanbul in October 2009,

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ic adjustment by running up enormous currentaccount deficits and forcing other nations tohold dollars.31

Beyond quota reform, both the fund and TheWorld Bank cry out for other governancereforms. For instance, there has been no changein the selection process that chooses the head ofeach institution, in the distribution of the boardchairs, in the allocation of the budgets, or in theeffective veto power of the United States. Oneurgently needed reform is to abandon the infor-mal tradition by which the Europeans select themanaging director of the IMF and the UnitedStates chooses The World Bank presidentsome-thing the Obama administration has said it iswilling to consider. Other necessary steps wouldinclude giving emerging economies a greater sayin decisions on the role and priorities of the bankand IMF; establishing clear criteria for the selec-

tion of executive directors; introducing greateropenness and transparency into the IFI boardsproceedings; and mechanisms for accountabilityof senior management to a wider range of share-holders. Finally, Washington may ultimately haveto consider a new IMF voting system that stripsthe United States of the effective veto it hasenjoyed over fund issues that require approval byan 85 percent voting share.32

For Washington, a major uncertainty is whetherupdating the International Monetary Fund andThe World Bank to accommodate emergingmarket economies will lead those nations toembrace long-established normsfor instanceon aid conditionality and good governanceorwhether those countries will seek to play bytheir own rules.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime:

The NPT and PSIThe nuclear nonproliferation regime further illus-trates the need for a mixed strategy to confrontglobal problemssimultaneously grounded in uni-versal, treaty-based institutions, while also allow-ing for narrower coalition initiatives. The regimeitself is a latticework of formal treaties, includingthe Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), theConvention on the Physical Protection of NuclearMaterial, the Strategic Arms Reduction and theStrategic Offensive Reduction treaties; selective-membership multilateral bodies such as theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, theimplementing body for the NPT), the Nuclear

Exporters (Zangger) Committee, the NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG) and the UN Conference onDisarmament. On top of this come various ad hocmultilateral initiatives such as the Global Initiativeto Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global NuclearEnergy Partnership, the Global Threat ReductionInitiative, the Missile Technology Control Regime,and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Thenthere is a whole slew of UN Security Council reso-lutions, both country-specific (e.g., North Korea,Iran) and issue-focused (such as Resolution 1540)that round out the regime.

The cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferationregime is the NPT, which is based on a bargainbetween nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states.The treaty promises the latter (under Article 4)inalienable access to civilian nuclear energy inreturn for forsaking access to nuclear weaponsthemselves. On the other side of the deal, it oblig-

es nuclear weapons states, under Article 6, totake concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament.This bargain is now fraying, as states use Article4 as a loophole to pursue clandestine nuclearweapons programs under the guise of peacefulnuclear energy, and as other nonnuclear statesbecome disillusioned by the failure of the nuclearhaves to fulfill their disarmament obligations.The resulting growth in the capability (or actualarsenals, in some cases) suggests a regime undersevere strain reeling from body blows from NorthKorea and (perhaps) Iran. Major weaknesses inthe current regime33 include:

Incomplete coverage, with three of nine currentnuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan, Israel)having never joined the NPT, and another(North Korea) having withdrawn.

Inadequate verification and enforcement mech-anisms available to the IAEA.

Incomplete progress in securing fissile material

worldwide.

Inadequate oversight and regulation of civiliannuclear programs and dual-use technologies.

Limited progress by NPT nuclear weapon stateparties toward disarmament.

Experts have proposed multiple reforms tostrengthen the pillars of the nonproliferationregime. These include bolstering the budget and


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PSI offers a potential alternative to the tradition-al, intergovernmental model of global gover-nanceand one that gives the United States avaluable multilateral cloak for what is essentiallya set of hub-and-spoke arrangements.34

The vulnerability of PSI, however, lies in itsincomplete coverage, lack of universality, andweak international legitimacy. PSI includes neitherall nuclear weapons states, such as China, Indiaand Pakistan, nor several strategic coastal nationssuch as Egypt or Indonesia. China and India havein fact questioned the legality of its interdictionsIn an effort to win greater global acceptance forthe arrangement, Obama in his April 2009 Praguespeech proposed transforming PSI, as well as theGlobal Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorisminto durable international institutions, presum-ably with legally binding commitments and for-malized decision-making processes.

While superficially appealing, the desire toinstitutionalize PSI presents potential dangersMaking PSI a formal treaty commitment or sub-jecting its activities to multilateral authorizationcould hamstring its effectiveness. A more pru-dent approach might be to seek a binding, gener-ic Security Council resolution endorsing PSI andgiving states blanket legal authorities underChapter VII to board ships both in territoriawaters and on the high seas, as well as to inter-dict airplanes suspected of trafficking. (To besure, winning Chinese assent for such a resolu-tion would be an enormous task.)

Climate Change:

The Major Economies ForumPerhaps the clearest area of need for minilateralforums to spur progress within larger treaty-based frameworks is the challenge of globawarming. Since 1992, the foundation for inter-national responses has been the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)whose parties meet annually. Such universal for-mats are less than ideal for negotiating majorbreakthroughs on the worlds most complexproblems. Thus, since autumn 2007, the UnitedStates has participated in a parallel diplomatictrack, involving the worlds main greenhouse gasemittersknown under the Bush administrationas the Major Emitters Meeting (MEM) andunder the Obama administration as the MajorEconomies Forum on Energy and Climate(MEF). The challenge for the current administra-

authority of the IAEA; mandating denucleariza-tion for any country that withdraws from theNPT; strengthening the NSG by insisting on cri-teria for trade in enrichment and reprocessingtechnology; ratifying and implementing theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty; reaching aFissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; carrying throughw i th nucl ear di s ar mament ( i ncl udi ng theGlobal Zero option); and creating internation-al fuel banks to meet growing global demand forcivilian nuclear energy. In anticipation of thecritical NPT review conference next spring,President Obama has launched several initiativesaimed at reinforcing the fraying regime. Theseinclude promoting the vision of a world withoutnuclear weapons in his Prague speech of April2009; negotiating a treaty with Moscow tolower the ceilings on US and Russian warheads;passing strong UN sanctions against NorthKorea (UNSCR 1874); chairing a Security

Council to adopt a sweeping resolution thatincludes restricting the right of enrichment onlyto those countries in good standing with theNPT; and inviting other leaders to a major con-ference on nuclear security in Washington inApril 2010.

While such steps are desirable and necessary, theinternational system also needs global interdic-tion capacity to deal with illicit trafficking innuclear weapons and related technologyathreat underscored by the scope of the A. Q.Khan network. Here, the Obama administrationwould be wise to build on the ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI), launched by the Bushadministration in 2003 as a multilateral partner-ship of eleven nations to prevent the acquisitionand trafficking of WMD materials, delivery sys-tems, and related technologies. PSI has sincegrown to 93 countries that commit themselves toshare intelligence and information about poten-tial maritime, air, and land shipments of pro-s cr i bed mater i al s and r es pond w i th j oi nt

interdiction operations in each others sovereignterritories. PSIs strength is its flexible networkformat, which permits participants to respondquickly to time-sensitive intelligence on the basisof prior arrangement and joint trainingwith-out the time-consuming encumbrances of havingto authorize, organize, and fund such operationsin the Security Council or North AtlanticCouncil. PSI commitments are political ratherthan legal, with members simply endorsing sixbroad interdiction principles. Fast and flexible,

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tion is to ensure that the MEF enhances ratherthan impedes UNFCCC negotiations, providing(even in the possible absence of a successortr eaty to Kyoto) a for um for coor di natedprogress on emissions reductions, foreign assis-tance, and mitigation efforts.

Although many observers regarded the MEM asa Bush administration gambit to undercut theUNFCCC and evade any bilateral commitmentsentailing economic sacrifices, the Obamaadministration wisely championed a minilateralbody of its ownwith assurances that it wouldcomplement rather than undermine the parallelUNFCCC process. At the first MEF gatheringi n Apr i l 2009, Secr etar y of State Hi l l ar yRodham Clinton described its members as hav-ing a special responsibility to pull togetherand work toward a successful outcome of theUN climate negotiations later in the year in

Copenhagen. In her view, the MEF was com-parable to the G-20 nations addressing theglobal economic crisis.35

Indeed, it is hard to see how the UNFCCC canmake serious progress unless major Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) members and big developing countriesfirst agree among themselves on critical issuessuch as emissions targets, conditional financing,and the terms of technology transfer. Such a mini-lateral negotiating strategy is akin to the domesticUS legislative process, wherein complex legisla-tion is often drafted first in congressional com-mittees (or in meetings between congressionalleaders and White House officials) rather than onthe House or Senate floor. Such a vehicle becomesall the more important given the enormous obsta-cles to a comprehensive and binding new treatyon global warming. As the chaotic UNFCCCconference in Copenhagen in December 2009underlined, the notion that one can collectivelynegotiate a meaningful multilateral climate agree-

ment among 192 countries borders on fantasy. Asdemonstrated at Copenhagen, forward movementwill continue to depend on US agreements with asmall number of key players. Given the resistanceof developing countries, particularly China andIndia, to agree to binding emissions capsas wellas legislative constraints on mandating ambitiousgreenhouse gas reductions in the United Statesprogress on climate change mitigation is likely torely on an ongoing pledge and review processof political commitments, with the MEF serving

as catalyst. Under this scenario, the major emit-ting countries would agree to coordinated nation-al commitments to mitigate climate change. Suchsteps would be measurable, reportable and veri-fiable but enforced by domestic rather thaninternational law.

Chinas Role in the New Era

of EngagementWhere do China and East Asia fit into the USvision of world order? Like President Bush andPresident Clinton, President Obama seeks a Chinathat plays by global rules abroad and embracespolitical (and not simply economic) liberalizationat home. Regionally, Washingtons strategic objec-tive is an East Asia that is open, whole, and free,filled with vibrant democracies and integratedinto the global economic system. To prevent theregion from being dominated by any single power,the United States will continue to serve as aregional stabilizer, strengthening bilateral securityties with its partners in the region and maintainingforward-deployed US forces.

The two core goals of the United States collide,however, with the two core goals of the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP). The United States wantsa stable balance of power in East Asia and a grad-ual transition from one-party rule to political plu-ralism in China, whereas the latter seeks continuedCCP rule and envisions Chinas emergence as the

preponderant player in East Asia. Some Chinesecommentators underline this potential conflict bydescribing the United States as pursuing a two-handed strategy, comprised of engagement topromote regime change in China and contain-ment intended to stem its regional rise.36

The Sino-American relationship is and willremain a complicated one, containing powerfulincentives for cooperation as well as enduringelements of strategic conflict. The Obamaadministration, sensitive to the lessons of history,appreciates the risks of a geopolitical clash, butby no means considers it inevitable. Americanofficials view China as neither a status quo nor arevolutionary power, but rather a modestly revi-sionist one. It is animated by a sense of destinyand entitlement, and determined to adjust globalgovernance to reflect its emerging power andpolicy preferences. Given how it has benefitedfrom globalization, though, China has no plansto overturn the Western-dominated order thathas served its purposes so well.


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erally shied from controversial topics like humanr i ghts , exchange r ates , or pr otecti oni s mNevertheless, it provides a useful forum formutual understanding and confidence building.

Strategic reassurance also has a regional dimen-sion. To persuade neighboring countries thatChinas expanding role will not come at theexpense of their interests, the Obama adminis-tration is moving to deepen US engagement inEast Asia after a period of diplomatic driftBeyond bolstering military alliances and partner-ships with key countries like Japan, South Korea,and Australia, the United States will also leadin updating and strengthening the regional andinternational institutions that shape the contextin which Chinas development occurs, so thatchange is constructive rather than destabilizing.40 As a mark of its diplomatic reengagementthe United States recently acceded to the ASEAN

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Finally, theUnited States will work to ensure that the emerg-ing regional trading and monetary system remainsopen to the global economy rather than develop-ing into a closed bloc.

The real substance of strategic reassurance, ofcourse, will come from China itself. The UnitedStates, other Western countries, and ChinasAsian neighbors are looking for indications thatChina will emerge as a responsible stakeholderand become a net provider ofnot merely a pas-sive free rider onglobal and regional publicgoods. To date, China has often resisted majorresource commitments toward the solution ofglobal problems such as climate change on thegrounds that it remains a poor, developingcountry. The Obama administration will be moresupportive of Chinas aspirations to a more sig-nificant voice in major structures of global gov-ernance when these are backed by tangibleChinese contributions to world order.

Most fundamentally, the United States will bewatching for signs of Chinas peaceful intentionsand its willingness to contribute tangibly to glob-al stability. Given the potentially destabilizingimpact of Chinas rapid military buildup, it iscritical that Beijing give greater transparency toits military doctrine, force structure, and defensebudgetssteps that will reassure its neighborsreduce regional tensions, and lower the likeli-hood of disastrous miscalculation. RegionallyChina has already taken important steps to fos-

Indeed, prospects for a broad bargain betweenChina and the United States over the shape of thefuture order are favorable, at least in the shortand medium terms. The United States and Chinasneighbors have a clear incentive to try to cementChinas support for global and regional structuresand secure its general commitment to self-restraint. China, likewise, has a near-term incen-tive to play by established rules and embrace thecurrent global and regional order, both to discour-age renewed American unilateralism (which Chinamight find unpleasant) and to ensure a continuedUS regional presence (which provides the stabilityto facilitate Chinas continued rise). By sacrificingsome measure of policy autonomy, China can lockin the international predictability it needs. Ofcourse, this calculation may change as Chinaspower expands but, for now, there is ample scopefor accord. Over the past decade, the Chinesehave articulated various conceptions of world

order, from peaceful rise to peaceful develop-ment and harmonious world. All are relativelyconsistent with Robert Zoellicks notion of Chinaas a responsible stakeholder.37

How can China rise without provoking geopo-litical conflict? The key, as the Obama adminis-tration sees it, is for Beijing to adopt a postureof strategic reassurance. This would rest ona core, if tacit, bargain among China, theUnited States, and other states in Asia. AsDeputy Secretary of State James B. Steinbergexplains, Just as we and our allies must makeclear that we are prepared to welcome Chinasarrivalas a prosperous and successful power,China must reassure the rest of the world thatits development and growing global role will notcome at the expense of the security and well-being of others.38

Bilaterally, the Obama administration is trying tofoster strategic reassurance through intensifieddialogues, designed (in Steinbergs words) to

highlight and reinforce the areas of commoninterest, while addressing the sources of mistrustdirectly, whether they be political, military, oreconomic.39 The centerpiece of this effort is theUS-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue(SED) launched in Washington on July 27, 2009,which will continue via an ongoing set of con-versations among cabinet officials and a secondsummit meeting in Beijing in 2010. The SED sawno major breakthroughs beyond a joint commit-ment to IFI reform, and the two sides have gen-

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ter multilateral cooperation and dialogue withmany of its neighbors, through actions like sign-ing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and thenonaggression pact with the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and by lead-ing the six-party talks on the Korean peninsula.Washington will look to Beijing to deepen itsengagements on the Korean peninsula, placerelations with Japan on more productive footing,and accept an ongoing role for the United Statesand its security partnerships in the WesternPacific (a presence that has the added benefit ofconstraining Japanese military ambitions).

Globally, the Obama administration will wantBeijing to assume greater responsibility for inter-national peace and security by playing a moreactive and constructive role, not only on NorthKorea but other global hot spots like Sudan,Iran, and Burma. (These issues are likely to be

particularly fraught in situations where Chinastraditional concepts of sovereignty and noninter-vention collide with the new international normof a responsibility to protect.) Washingtonalso hopes China will expand its impressive andgrowing engagement since 2000 in UN peaceoperations, an excellent outlet to show Chinaswillingness to share responsibility for globalpeace outside its narrow national interests.

Less reassuring, if not yet alarming, fromWashingtons perspective has been Chinas promo-tion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO). American officials interpret this groupingas serving two purposes for China. First, it assem-bles a group of states concerned with internal sta-bility, territorial integrity, and cross-borderthreats. Second, it provides a counterweight to theunwanted US presence in Central Asia. At thesame time, Washington is well aware of the SCOsinternal structural constraints, which will likelyprevent it from emerging as a significant securityorganization, much less an Asian NATO. Of more

practical importance for US national security offi-cials are potential Chinese contributions to region-al stability in Afghanistan and Pakistanandparticularly Beijings willingness to intercede withits longtime allies in Islamabad to influencePakistani foreign policy and domestic develop-ments in a productive direction.

In the nuclear arena, China has already takentangible steps to strengthen the nonproliferationregime. It is a member in good standing of the

NPT, has recently joined the Nuclear SuppliersGroup, and has a good record on counterterror-ism cooperation. At the same time, China couldimprove its export controls and overall stancetoward states of proliferation concern. Given itsproximity to, and special relationship with,North Korea, China has a particular responsibil-ity to counter Pyongyangs nuclear ambitions.Beijings close cooperation with the Obamaadministration on UNSC Resolution 1874 testi-fies to Chinas capacity, when determined, todefend the nonproliferation regime from deter-mined assaults. The Obama administration isseeking a similar level of Chinese determinationto confront Irans own ambitions within the P-5+1 framework.

In the economic realm, the United States will lookto China for tangible steps. First, Washington willcontinue to press Beijing to permit appreciation of

its artificially undervalued currency and to takeother domestic steps to correct the global currencyimbalances that helped facilitate the global finan-cial crisis. Second, the United States will look toChina to take a less defensive attitude towardtrade liberalization within the WTO (especially inmanufacturing and service sectors) and enforceintellectual property rights more consistently.Third, US officials will press China to shift awayfrom using bilateral trade for political and strate-gic objectives, which threatens to fragment theworld economy. Fourth, the Obama administra-tion will urge China to bring its developmentassistance policies into conformity with existingglobal norms and standards of transparency andconditionality, and abandon its no stringsattached approach to foreign aid. Finally, theUnited States will encourage China to eschewpolicies of resource mercantilism designed to lockup foreign markets. Beyond disrupting interna-tional markets, Steinberg observes, such an orien-tation leads China to problematic engagementwith actors l ike Iran, Sudan, Burma, and

Zimbabwe and undermines the perception ofChina as a country interested in contributing toregional stability and humanitarian goals.41

Lastly, the Obama administration understandsthat there will be no solution to the massiveproblem of global climate change without China,which produces 20 percent of greenhouse gasemissions today and will be responsible for halfof all emissions growth through 2030 (when itsannual share of global greenhouse gas emissions


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9 Remarks by the president to the United NationsGeneral Assembly.

10 Stewart Patrick, The Best Laid Plans, the Origins ofAmerican Multilateralism and the Dawn of theCold War, book launch at the Council on ForeignRelations, February 4, 2009 (video), http://www.cfr.org/publication/18478/best_laid_plans.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F5863%2Fstewart_m_patrick.

11 This section draws on Stewart Patrick, Prix Fixe

and la Carte: Avoiding False Multilateral Choices,The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2009).12 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House,

News Conference by President Obama, London,The United Kingdom, April 2, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/news-conference-by-president-obama-4-02-09/.

13 Susan E. Rice, Informal Meeting of the GeneralAssembly on Security Council Reform (speech,New York, February 19, 2009 ), http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2009/117617.htm.

14 Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: AmericanPolitics and International Organization, 1919-1999

(New York: Century Foundation, 1999).15 Stewart Patrick, Multilateralism and Its

Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S.Ambivalence, in Stewart Patrick and ShepardForman, eds., Multilateralism and U.S. ForeignPolicy: Ambivalent Engagement(Boulder: LynneRienner, 2001), pp. 1-44.

16 Cited in Luck, Mixed Messages, p. 63. John MiltonCooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World:Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League ofNations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2001).

17 Richard N. Haass, The Opportunity: Americas

Moment to Alter Historys Course (New York:Public Affairs, 2005), pp. 33-50.

18 The concept of milieu goals was developed byArnold Wolfers.

19 Rumsfeld interview with CNNs Larry King,September 2001.

20 Patrick, Prix Fixe and la Carte.21 Ibid.22 Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and

Large Numbers, in Multilateralism Matters: TheTheory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed.

John Gerard Ruggie (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1993), 293-326.

23 Patrick, Prix Fixe and la Carte.24 Gareth Evans, interview by author, April 2009.25 Mark P. Lagon and David Shorr, How to Keep

from Overselling or Underestimating the UnitedNations, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide, ed.By Derek Chollet, Tod Lindberg, and David Shorr(New York: Routledge, 2008).

26 Susan E. Rice, A New Course in the World, a NewApproach at the UN, speech at New YorkUniversity, August 12, 2009, http://usun.state.gov

/briefing/statements/2009/august/127953.htm.

will be one-third). Although Beijing continues toresist binding obligations and timetables foremissions reductions, it has taken significantsteps in recent monthsincluding adopting acomprehensive national climate strategy andannouncing a willingness to adopt reportableand verifiable measures to cut energy intensity.At the same time, the United States and otheradvanced economies will encourage China toimprove its uneven legal and governance capaci-ty, so that it can actually implement these ambi-tious targets.

While the US-China relationship will continue tobe a fraught one, with potential for long-termgeopolitical rivalry, particularly in East Asia,ongoing Sino-American dialogue can fosterbroad bilateral agreement on the contours ofworld order in the 21st century. It will be incum-bent on Beijing to make its own priorities for

global governance reform clear to Washingtonand other major playersand to assume a grow-ing leadership role in helping nurture and sustainan open and stable international order.

Endnotes1 Remarks by the president to the United Nations

General Assembly, September 23, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-

president-to-the-united-nations-general-assembly/.2 Remarks by the president to the United Nations

General Assembly.3 Barack Obama, Remarks, The Chicago Council on

Global Affairs, Chicago, Illinois, April 24, 2007,http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04

/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam.html.4 Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership,

Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 11.5 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Foreign Policy Address at

the Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2009,http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm.

6 Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg,Administrations Vision of the U.S.-ChinaRelationship, keynote address at the Center forNew American Security, September 24, 2009,http://www.state.gov/s/d/2009/129686.htm.

7 The concept of sovereignty as responsibility was firstdeveloped by Francis Deng. It was subsequentlyembraced by Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, andStephen John Stedman in their book, Power &Responsibility: Building International Order in anEra of Transnational Threats (Washington, DC:Brookings, 2009).

8 Secretary of State Clinton at Council on ForeignRelations.

18


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27 As the president stated to the UN General Assemblyin September 2009, The traditional divisionsbetween nations of the south and north makes nosense in an interconnected world. Nor do align-ments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a longgone Cold War.

28 Stewart Patrick, Obama at the UN: The Burden ofthe Anti-Bush, CFR Expert Brief, September 21,2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20231/.

29

Anthony Faiola, Nations Cast Plan for ExpandedIMF, The Washington Post, October 7, 2009,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content

/article/2009/10/06/AR2009100603097.html.30 Andrew F. Cooper and Daniel Schwanen, eds.,

CIGI Special G20Report: Flashpoints for thePittsburgh Summit, September 2009, http://portalfornorthamerica.org/noticeboard/2009/09/cigi-spe-cial-g20-report-flashpoints-pittsburgh-summit.

31 Cooper and Schwanen, eds, CIGI Special Report.32 Woods, Shrinking from Duty? Tasking the

International Financial Institutions, in Cooper andSchwanen, CIGI Special Report.

33

Council on Foreign Relations, Global GovernanceMonitor: Nonproliferation, www.cfr.org/ggmonitor.

34 Amitai Etzioni, Tomorrows Institution Today: ThePromise of the Proliferation Security Initiative,Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009.

35 Hillary Rodham Clinton, remarks at MEF meeting,Washington, DC, April 27, 2009.

36 Aaron Friedberg address to CFR, October 2009.37 Bates Gill and Michael Schiffer, A Rising Chinas

RisingResponsibilities, in Michael Schiffer andDavid Shorr, eds. Powers and Principles:International Leadership in a Shrinking World(Lexington Books, 2009).

38 Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg,Administrations Vision of the U.S.-ChinaRelationship, keynote address at the Center forNew American Security, September 24, 2009,http://www.state.gov/s/d/2009/129686.htm.

39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 Ibid.

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