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RETHINKING WORLD SOCIETY AND COSMOPOLITANISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND

POLITICAL MODELS

Caterina Garca Segura

Professor of International Relations Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Barcelona, Spain

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyses the contemporary debate between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in international society. This is a key theoretical and political debate within all reflections on the reconfiguration of the model of international order and the articulation of mechanisms for managing global problems. It is linked to a context in which new forms of human and social relationships are taking place. As a result, the traditional international society is evolving into a world society whose form and structure are yet to be fully defined.

Since the early nineties, the ever-present tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces within international society1 has taken on new forms, as is manifested by the contrasting phenomena of globalisation-regionalisation, homogeneity-heterogeneity, and unity-pluralism (or universalismpluralism)2. This paper focuses on the unity-pluralism contrast, with the aim of setting out an initial approach to the

analysis of cosmopolitan models for the governance of international society which, after several lethargic decades, saw a resurgence in the nineties and continue to generate a central strand of academic debate in the social sciences3. In addition to its current

1 Arenal, C. del (2005), En torno al concepto de sociedad internacional, in Rodrguez Carrin, A. J. and

E. Prez Vera, (coord.), Soberana del Estado y Derecho Internacional. Homenaje al Profesor Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, pp. 453-464. Arenal, C. del, (2002), La nueva sociedad mundial y las nuevas realidades internacionales: un reto para la teora y para la poltica, Cursos de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2001, Bilbao: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del Pas Vasco, pp. 19-85; (2010), Homogeneidad y heterogeneidad en la sociedad internacional como bases hacia la integracin y la fragmentacin, in Rodrigo, A. and C. Garca (2010), Unidad y pluralismo en el derecho internacional pblico y en la comunidad internacional, Madrid: Tecnos. (forthcoming) 2 The terms of this contrast (unity-pluralism) are the same of those of universalism-pluralism.

3 The nineties saw a resurgence in cosmopolitan models as a response to the changes that had taken place

within the system and as a result of the theoretical renewal that accompanied these. See the information on symposia and academic publications on cosmopolitanism in the nineties in Hollinger, D.A. (2002), Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way, in Vertovec, S. and R. Cohen (2002), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. Theory, Context and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 227-239 (pp. 227-228).

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relevance, there is another reason behind the selection and specified aims of this topic, namely the need to profile the various forms of the terms cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in order to advance in the way that these are conceptualised. These concepts are ambiguous and imprecise, as they attempt to express the dynamics and processes of a complex reality which is in transformation, and they are used in different ambits, disciplines and linguistic registers.

Cosmopolitan ideas have seen a resurgence due to the transformations that have taken place in international order and society following the end of bipolarity, as well as the intensification of the effects of globalisation, especially the growing recognition that the global nature of risks and threats creates a collective future conscience that brings with it the need to rethink the international political community and global governance mechanisms4. In other words, society perceives global risks and this leads to the laying-out of a potential global public domain, thereby driving forward international cooperative institutions5. All this, in short, is the result of attention paid to changes in the social sphere, right through from market expansion to new patterns of personal

loyalty and advances in new forms of governance6. The strong resurgence of cosmopolitan positions has brought forth criticisms

from those who support communitarian standpoints and who also aim to reflect upon, and respond to, the needs of contemporary international society. Cosmopolitan approaches to international order stress the need to focus on the common aspects and elements of convergence which, according to this perspective, predominate in international society and which should form the basis for cooperative management of common problems and for the future articulation of world society. Communitarians, on the other hand, emphasise the different aspects which spring from the idiosyncrasy of distinct socio-political groups, defending the need for an order which protects these, assuming that the homogenising elements of cosmopolitan approaches would lead to their disappearance.

4 Vertovec, S. and R. Cohen (2002), Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism, in Vertovec, S. y R.

Cohen (2002), Op. cit., pp.1-22. 5 Beck, U. (2002, first ed. in English. 1999), La sociedad del riego global, Madrid: Siglo XXI de Espaa

Editores, p. 30. Also see Ruggie, J.G. (2004), Reconstituting the Global Public Domain Issues, Actors and Practices, European Journal of International Relations, 10, 4, pp. 499-531. 6 Nowicka, M. and M. Rovisco (2008), Cosmopolitanism in Practice. Global Connections, Farnham:

Ashgate.

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The hypothesis put forward here in this respect is that discussing international society and order creates a false debate with communitarian pluralism and cosmopolitanism which is set forth in mutually exclusive terms. The aim of this paper is

to overcome this divergence, striking out from the position that both standpoints represent an ideological stance and that this must be recognised rather than denied under supposed academic objectivity. The stance set out in this paper in no way inhibits a rigorous analysis; in fact, it allows us to better understand some of the key factors in the false debates and the exaggerated extrapolations. Furthermore, it enables us to highlight the points of convergence between both approaches and, by extension, enhance their applicability to global governance.

1. THE ORIGINS OF COSMOPOLITAN IDEAS: TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND ORDER

The specific norms and institutions of the current international order were created after World War II in response to the needs of international society and the political will of the principal international actors, reflecting the existing power relations.

The constitutional and institutional elements of this order have held up over time, adapting to the various changes that international society has undergone. However, the nineties saw some profound transformations, which meant it was necessary to rethink these elements and to create new mechanisms for managing global problems. Whilst these changes within international society were intensified by the end of the bipolar order and by globalisation, they were in fact the result of long processes which dated back way beyond the nineties. This notwithstanding, the importance of the decade of the nineties in the processes of change can be explained by three factors: firstly, it is during this decade that the consequences of these changes manifest themselves most intensely; secondly, this is when we most clearly observe the inability of the international order to meet the needs of a society which is different to the one it was created to serve; and, thirdly, it is during this period that proposals for governing these issues, which are still at the centre of academic debate today, were first being developed.

Following on from these reflections, we can lay out four transformations in

international society that are crucial to understanding the need to adapt the order and its mechanisms for managing global problems. The first of these factors affects the State: regardless of its power within the international system, the limits of the State are becoming more apparent in terms of its ability to unilaterally guarantee the security and

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well-being of its citizens due to the breakdown of the State-territory-economy relationship and the emergence of global challenges and threats that travel freely across State borders7. Consequently, as the expression of authority that derives from the political community, we see a reduction in the capacity of the State to exclusively hold sway over the loyalties of its citizens, as there are other actors and authorities which are more present and relevant in their lives; these other actors and authorities participate actively in the distribution of power and provide competing claims for the loyalties of citizens8. A second transformation is that of democracy, insofar as that many of the decisions that affect security and well-being, especially in the economic sphere, are adopted by actors which have no democratic link to the citizens who are affected by them9. This fact calls into question the action and purpose of the democratically elected political authority, as citizens place their political trust in a set of authorities which are

distinct from those which really affect their futures. Thirdly, globalisation also causes, permits and facilitates the emergence of civil society; though this civil society may still be incipient and unevenly established, it is highly aware of the reality of global problems and is willing to move forward in the search for joint solutions and to participate in the mechanisms of global governance10. The fourth transformation, which is related to the previous ones, is the shift in focus from the State to the individual that has taken place in contemporary international relations in the realms of security and development11. As a consequence of these factors, international society is being substituted by a broader and more complex world society.

7 Bislev, S. (2004), Globalization, State, Transformation and Public Security, International Political

Science Review, 25, 3, pp. 281-196; Shaw, M. (1997), The state of globalization: towards a theory of state transformation, Review of International Political Economy, 4, 3, pp. 492-513; Buzan, B. (1991), New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century, International Affairs, 67, 3, pp. 431-451; Buzan, B. (1997), Rethinking security after the Cold war, Cooperation and Conflict, 32, pp. 5-28; Davis, L.E: (2003), Globalizations Security Implications, Rand Issue Paper, Washington: Rand Corporation. 8 Cuttler, C., Haufler, V. and Porter, T. (eds.) (1999), Private Authority and International Affairs, Albany:

State University of New York Press; Smith, D.A: (1999), State and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, London: Routledge. 9 Eckersley, R. (2004), The green state: rethinking democracy and sovereignty, Cambridge (Ma):

Massachussetts Institute of Technology; Held, D. (1997), La democracia y el orden global. Del Estado moderno al gobierno cosmopolita. Barcelona: Paids, (first ed. in English 1995). 10

Carter, A. (2002), The Political Theory of Global Citizenship, London: Routledge; Linklater, A. (1996), Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State, European Journal of International Relations, 2, 1, pp. 77-103. 11

Barkin, J.S. and B. Cronin (1994), The state and the nation: changing norms and rules of sovereignty in international relations, International Organization, 49, 1, winter, pp. 107-130; Paris, R. (2001), Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air, International Security, 26, 2, pp. 87-102.

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The context characterised by base-level transformations with systemic consequences and the resultant disfunctionality of the current order create the need to reflect on global governance. From this context emerge ideas on the role of different actors, as well as on the principles and the institutions which are necessary to form an international order suitable for the new requirements of international society. Through analysing these ideas it is possible to advance in our explanations on the direction in which international society and order are evolving in both an empirical aspect (what are the existing ideas?) as well as in a normative dimension (how does change come about and in which direction should it be focused?) The great diversity of stances regarding governance of contemporary international society and the normative features of these compel us to select those approaches which tie in with our initial premises and guiding normative framework. It is thus possible to rule out the following: the study of the various versions of hegemonic stability theory or ideas and criticisms of benevolent hegemony12; theories inspired by economic liberalism which advocate the disintegration of the public sphere into a network of public and private actors and relations based on the market, these representing authentic networks of governance13; the more classical

theories which are based on Carl Schmitts organisation of large spaces14; and the ideas of world government, in which all humanity would be united under a common political authority15. This paper sets out to investigate those ideas which are based on the aforementioned changes and which take on two premises. The first of these is the acceptance of the individual as the new referent object of security and development and, by extension, of the responsibilities that this creates for the State and the Community of

12 Kindlerberger, Ch.P. (1981), Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy. Exploitation,

Public Goods and Free Riders, International Studies Quarterly, 25, 2, pp. 242-254; Snidal, D. (1985), The limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, International Organization, 39, 4, pp. 579.614; Webb, H.C. and S.D. Krasner (1989), Hegemonic Stability Theory; an empirical Assessment, Review of International Studies, 15, pp. 183-198. 13

Slaughter, A-M. (2004), A New World Order. Governments, Networks and the Disaggregated State, Princeton: Princeton University Press; (2003) Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated Democracy, Michigan Journal of Law, 24, pp. 1041-1075). 14

See recent revisions of Schmitt's works: Giraldo, J. and J. Molina (eds.), (2008), Carl Schmitt: Derecho, poltica y grandes espacios, Murcia: Sociedad de Estudios Polticos; Villacaas, J.L. (2008), Poder y poltica: ensayos sobre Carl Schmitt, Granada: Editorial Comares. 15

The authors who support this option consider it to be the definitive solution to the problems of humanity. In general, International Relations theorists have rejected the idea of a global government. Recently, however, this option has been defended from constructivist positions. Wendt, A. (2003), Why a World State is Inevitable?, European Journal of International Relations, 9, 4, pp. 491-542. Also in this line, some authors from the field of critical theory propose a post-sovereign model of global governance which would be defined by democratic, decentralised and diverse federalism. Young, I.M. (2002), Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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States. The second is the recognition of the existence of a set of general interests of the international community (peace, life, human dignity, sustainable environment) which must be collectively managed and protected.

2. COSMOPOLITAN MODELS AND THEIR CRITICS

Starting out from the transformations in international society and order, which from the perspective of this paper are considered to be fundamental, and on the basis of the normative stance outlined, the analysis here centres on cosmopolitan visions. This doesnt mean that the role of the state as the primordial actor in international relations is rejected, and neither does it deny the importance of the inter-state system. On the contrary, the central role of the State is defended as a fundamental characteristic of international relations and as the centre of the current international system. This notwithstanding, the line taken here strikes out from intellectual positions that represent the cosmopolitan turn16, which leaves behind it the limitations of the horizons of nationhood, and we examine political developments which bring into question the supremacy of the State over human rights and which reveal the tensions between human rights and the rights of States. The standpoint presented here is located firmly within the camp opened up by the concept of human security17 and by the reports on shared security and the responsibility to protect18. Additionally, as indicated above, the perspective being put forward takes on board the existence of the general interests of the international community which must be collectively protected by the various actors and authorities of international society. All this leads us to understand cosmopolitanism as a political-philosophical position as well as a concept of global governance19. The stance outlined in this analysis is in line with approaches such as that defended by Thomas Pogge, for whom cosmopolitanism is an instrument to promote moral progress through

global institutions which disperse authority, diminish the intensity of power struggles,

16 Beck, U, (2002, first ed. in English, 1999), El manifiesto cosmopolita in Beck, U. (2002), Op. cit.,

pp. 1-28. 17

For a general approach to the concept see Prez de Armio, K. (2006-2007), El concepto y el uso de la seguridad humana: anlisis crtico de sus potencialidades y riesgos, Revista CIDOB dAfers Internacionals, n 76, pp. 59-77. 18

Report of the International Comission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, available at: http://www.iciss.ca/spanish-report.pdf; Report of the UNs High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. U.N. Doc. A/59/565, 2 December.

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and reduce war, poverty and oppression20. However, there isnt a unique cosmopolitan focus. As Harvey posits, the reconstruction of cosmopolitanism has been undertaken from different viewpoints which, on occasion, have served more to confuse than clarify the political-economic and scientific-cultural agendas. In the opinion of Harvey, cosmopolitanism has taken on so many meanings and nuances that it is impossible to identify a central strand of thought beyond its opposition to the parochialism that comes from extreme loyalty to a national, racial, ethnic or religious identity. He points out that the differences also derive from the division of academic labour: the standpoints concerned with moral imperatives and principles come from philosophy, the focus on hybrid cultural identities and criticism of multiculturalism is pushed forward by cultural theorists, and the approach that reflects on the rule of law and global governance systems is adopted by social-science specialists21. In an initial attempt at classification, four perspectives of cosmopolitanism are established here, which are a simplification of those used by Vertovec and Cohen, which, in turn, are a subdivision of the aforementioned categorization. The different models will thus be placed within the four perspectives, though it should be noted that these are not hermetically sealed categories and that some elements are shared between them22.

2.1. Cosmopolitanism as a cultural perspective and its critics Cosmopolitanism can be understood as a socio-cultural condition which is

expressed in the conception of an open and cosmopolitan world. This condition is created from the base of processes linked to globalisation, such as greater access to information and the development of communications and telecommunications. These processes facilitate a multiplication of social exchanges including migrations as well as cultural contacts which bring us closer to places and cultures which are physically and, sometimes, psychologically distant. In short, the central feature highlighted by

19 Delanty , G. (2006), The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory,

British Journal of Sociology, 57, 1, pp. 25-47. 20

Pogge, T. (1992), Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, Ethics, October, pp. 48-75. 21

Harvey, D, (2009), Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom, New York: Columbia: University Press, p. 78. 22

The denominations used are of the author of this paper, though they do correspond with the spirit of Vertovec and Cohens classification. Other authors use a classification system according to three possible meanings of cosmopolitanism: a) an individual lifestyle, b) a universalist morality and c) global political institutions. Baubck, R. (2002), Political Community Beyond the Sovereign State, Supranational Federalism and Transnational Minorities in Vertovec, S. and R. Cohen (2002), Op. Cit., pp.110-136.

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cultural visions of cosmopolitanism is the progressive formation of a culture which is

disassociated from political-social space and characterised by the opening-up of the world; in fact some authors go further and posit that rather than being in formation, this culture already exists. This culture emerges from interest in cultural alterity and can be expressed in a cooperative and integrating rapprochement of elements and values which until now had been marginal or peripheral with respect to those which are dominant. For cosmopolitan authors this new and culturally vibrant reality provides cause for celebration, as it is an avenue for change in that cultural diversity represents a political challenge for traditional eurocentric and national narratives23. Nevertheless, this vision of the cultural conceptions of cosmopolitanism is not accepted without reservations. On the contrary, criticisms abound, linking this view to ethnocentrism and cultural hegemony as a form of power24. The first group of critics cast doubt on the capacity of cultural cosmopolitanism as a means to overcome Western cultural predominance; this group points to the fact that, as the proponents of cultural cosmopolitanism themselves

maintain, cosmopolitanism benefits from greater access to new information and communication technologies, and that this limits its cosmopolitan character, as geographical and social access to these technologies is highly unequal. This notwithstanding, without wishing to ignore the digital divide and other differences between societies, and taking on board the reduced socio-geographic origins of the models, from the stance taken here it does not automatically follow that this line of analysis is ethnocentric. In order to be ethnocentric, cultural cosmopolitans would have to either implicitly or explicitly use their own culture to exclusively interpret social

and cultural behaviour, which is exactly what most of them work to avoid. The second group of critics refer to the low level of consolidation of cultural cosmopolitan reality, which they claim is nothing more than a rootless, consumerist, hybrid culture that has no transformative capacity 25. These authors do not deny the existence of common cultural elements but they consider that, in reality, the only elements which are shared are those that are linked to the expansion and homogenisation of certain consumerist habits from the West; as examples of this they point to the planet-wide success of fast-

23 Appadurai, A. and C. Beckenridge (1988), Why Public Culture?, Public Culture, 1, 1, pp- 5-9

(available at http://publicculture.org/issues/view/1/1).; Geertz, C. (1986), The Uses of Diversity, Michigan Quarterly Review, 25, 1, pp. 105-123 (available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu). 24

Robbins, B. (1992), Comparative Cosmopolitism, Social Text, 31/32, pp. 169-196. 25

Smith, A. (1995), Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press.

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food (Mac-foodism), the wearing of jeans and the predominance of the Hollywood film industry. Finally, a third group of critics call cultural cosmopolitanism into question from the point of view of protecting minorities, arguing that the key is to defend the internationalisation of multiculturalism via the creation, by international organisations, of international norms which guarantee public support and recognition of non-dominant ethnocultural groups26.

2.2. Cosmopolitanism as a philosophical perspective and its critics Cosmopolitanism can be understood as a cosmovision which ties in personal

positions with political programmes and projects. This cosmovision maintains that we live in a world governed by fundamental principles of law and justice and calls for the articulation of a world community in various senses that is committed to common values27. Pogge distinguishes between a moral and juridical cosmovision28. Whilst the view taken in this paper is that these are highly interrelated and can be understood as two sides of the same coin, the former belongs to the sphere of individual conduct and involves a personal stance or a moral aspiration29 which is expressed as a call for people to mutually respect each other, whilst the latter has a more social dimension with a political commitment and is defined in a defence of human rights and freedoms. This perspective comes into conflict with the communitarian critics who, in a wide sense, hold that moral principles and obligations are based on specific groups and contexts30.

26 Kymlica, W. (2009, first ed. in English, 2007), Las odiseas multiculturales, Las nuevas polticas

internacionales de la diversidad, Barcelona: Paids. Though this position stems from cultural reflections, it implies a political project. 27

Cohen, M. (1992), Rooted Cosmopolitanisms: Thought on the Left, Nationalism and Multiculturalism, Dissent, autumn, pp. 478-483, Waldron, J. (1992), Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25, 3, pp. 751-793; Hollinger, D.A. (1995), Postethnic America: Beyond Multculturalism, New York: Basic Books; Bellamy, R, and D. Castiglione (1998), Between Cosmopolis and Community: Three Models of Rights and Democracy within the European Union, in Archibugui, D., D. Held and M. Khler (eds.) (1998), Re-imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Oxford: Polity, pp. 152-178. 28

Pogge, T. (1992), Op. cit. 29

Heater, D. (2002), World Citizenship. Cosmopolitan Thinking and Its Opponents, New York: Continuum. 30

Though not an exhaustive list, among the communitarians of the nineties it is worth noting William Galston, Michael Walzer, Benjamin Barber, Charles Taylor, Robert Putnam and Alexander Lee. The publications of Amitai Etzioni are representative of the United States perspective. Etzioni is the director of the Institute for Communitarian Studies (a think tank devoted to the defence of communitarian ideas) at George Washington University and founder of the Communitarian Network (an independent, non-profit-making association with the same aim. See: The Responsive Community http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/articles1.html. )

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Furthermore, from this perspective the cosmopolitanism-communitarianism conflict has

given rise to a rich and intense debate that in our opinion has, however, excessively polarised both positions, presenting them as irreconcilable. In political theory and political philosophy this debate focusing on values has developed in terms of monism and pluralism. Pluralist thinkers consider that monism is the source of all extremisms. Isaiah Berlin, for example, regards the consequences of monism as highly negative and, in his opinion, they are more worrying on the moral than on the epistemological plane. According to Berlin, moral monism has been largely responsible for most of the authoritarian, violent and even criminal social processes that have taken place in the history of humanity31. In the same vein, Requejo posits that although there are universal evils to be avoided (slavery, torture, genocide, oppression) there is no positive moral concept that can defend true human good. Conscious of the political consequences of his posture, he states that although pluralism of values isnt a moral

option to settle for, it is at least a concept to go through if we wish to wake from our

dogmatic slumber32. In contemporary international society, the risk that comes with monism is dogmatism, whilst the danger from pluralism comes from inhibition in dealing with universal evils that require an urgent solution.

From a more general perspective, the manifestation of this debate that has received most attention has been that borne from Martha Nussbaums essay Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism and the twenty-nine replies it received33. Nussbaum starts out from a conception of cosmopolitanism as an ideal of commitment from every individual to the entire community of human beings, capable of transcending divisions and recommendable for everyone. Though the author maintains that cosmopolitans shouldnt relinquish their local identities which she conceives as a series of concentric circles her critics accuse her of designing to impose a moral vision which arises from a social context and political culture which may not necessarily be extendable to humanity as a whole. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to distinguish between different communitarian postures. In their defence of a national community some authors hide

31 Ramrez, M.T. (1999), Monismo, relativismo y pluralismo. Isaiah Berlin y la teora de la cultura,

Revista internacional de filosofa poltica, 14, pp. 125-145. 32

Requejo, F. (2009), El pluralismo de valors dIsaiah Berlin. Refinar la teoria per millorar la prctica democrtica, in VIA, 10, September pp. 7-20. 33

Nussbaum, M.C (1999, first in English , 1994), Compiled by J. Cohen, Los lmites del patriotismo. Identidad, pertenencia y ciudadana mundial, Barcelona: Paids. This publication only includes five of

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conservative thought, with this being no more than a strategy to rail against the welfare state and against the ceding of power to centralised, bureaucratic organisations and structures that control its functioning, thereby putting limits on State sovereignty in favour of citizen rights; other authors, on the other hand, do not fall into this category at all. From the perspective of this paper, the most interesting communitarian contributions are those which attempt to build bridges between both postures, drawing attention to both their strengths and weaknesses, such as the arguments put forward by Appiah, Barber and Falk34. Antonio Kwame Appiah sets out his stall in the title of his essay Cosmopolitan Patriots, transmitting the idea that it is not necessary to give up cultural roots and particularities in order to argue in support of the existence of universal rights, and vice versa. According to Appiah, cosmopolitanism and patriotism should be understood more as sentiments than as ideologies and, therefore, it is necessary to recognise that the most important actor is the emerging civil society. In this line, he

supports the existence of smaller political communities rather than a global State (which cosmopolitan models do not defend either, although it is often attributed to them) and argues that different forms of social and cultural life are not incompatible with the idea we have of common rights35. Richard Falk36 opposes the polarised and exclusive vision (either cosmopolitanism or communitarianism) as, in his opinion, which is shared by the vision put forward in this paper, this is out of line with current reality (he was writing at the end of the twentieth century and his views are valid for the twenty-first). An extreme form of patriotism which ignores the challenges faced by the State and brings the autonomy of the self-same State into question will be functionally inefficient. And a version of cosmopolitanism which remains uncritical of the global power of markets will be ethically inefficient. Falk thus proposes a positive dialogue between both postures based on the premise that the current world order must not simply reflect the interactions between States, but must also consider the transnational agents and processes that are committed to both local and global actions. When these actions are brought together they create what Falk refers to as neocosmopolitanism. This breaks

the twenty-nine replies and five new contributions. It was originally published in The Boston Review, October-November 1994. Available at http://bostonreview.net/BR19.5/BR19.5.html 34

See Appiah, K.A. (1999), Patriotismo y Cosmopolitismo, pp. 33-42; Barber, B. (1999), Fe constitucional, pp, 43-53; Falk, R. (1999), Una revisin del cosmopolitismo, pp. 67-76, all in Nussbaum (1999), Op. Cit. 35

See also Appiah, K.A. (2007, first in English , 2006), Cosmopolitismo. La tica en un mundo de extraos, Buenos Aires/Madrid: Katz editores

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with the traditional State-society link and dynamises other forms of interaction between people and the various structures of authority, thus promoting a version of globalisation conceived in terms of people (bottom-up globalisation) and not in terms of markets (top-down globalisation). Benjamin Barber37 argues persuasively against the false debate between patriotism (as a version of communitarianism) and cosmopolitanism, although the analysis centres on the case of the United States, which is not necessarily extrapolable to other contexts. Barber starts out by pointing out the problems which he sees as affecting Nussbaums reasoning, which he breaks down into two main categories. Firstly, he notes how the success of the United States in incorporating its sense of patriotism into a constitutional framework defined by substantive values of law and justice has been undervalued. Secondly, he points to the lack of consideration given to the weakness of cosmopolitanism and humanising processes key to identity politics in a rootless world of contrasts. Barber posits that both postures have strengths and weaknesses. In a tribalised world cosmopolitanism could serve as a useful counterpoint. On the other hand, if we look at a world disillusioned with bureaucracy, then local systems of governance and a healthy, democratic, civic, patriotism that can bring institutions and citizens together could be more useful than abstract, universalist positions. What is especially interesting is the consideration of identity as the assumption of a set of constitutional principles, thats to say, the linking of identity to a set of political ideas rather than to race, religion or culture. At the international level this approach links in with the idea of constitutionalisation of international law38. In this

36 See also Falk, R. (2008), Achieving Human Rights , London: Routledge.

37 See also Barber, B. (2000, first in English 1998), Un lugar para todos. Como fortalecer la democracia

y la sociedad civil, Barcelona: Paids. Barber combines his research work with political activism: he is the president of CivWorld @ Demos. Demos is an NGO devoted to strengthening democracy in America. CivWorld is a project that seeks to advance in a more democratic system of global governance, as well as in a more inclusive economy, new approaches to citizenship and political representation, and control of US foreign policy through public opinion in order to avoid its excesses. http://www.civworld.org. 38

Constitutionalisation can be understood as a process which aims to organise and regulate the world system via a set of fundamental norms which correspond with a triple objective: limiting the power of States, acknowledging the rights and freedoms of people and therefore demanding that responsibility be taken where these are violated and crimes against humanity are committed and, finally, protecting the general interest of international society. The need for the constitutionalisation of international and/or global society comes from the observation that the world in its current form is not governable through resort to the classic system of international law and from the inability of the United Nations Charter to respond to current challenges (here we could mention international terrorism, for example). See Macdonald, R.S-J. and D.M. Johnston (2005) Introduction, in Macdonald R.S-J. and D.M. Johnston (comp. and eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism. Issues on the Legal ordering of the World Community, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp.xiii-xviii. Dunoff and Trachtman look at constitutionalism in terms of functionality: on the one hand, the demand for constitutionalism comes from globalisation and the fragmentation of international society and international law, and on the other hand

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line, cosmopolitanism can be identified as a sentiment linked to a series of international ideas, principles and norms. Although constitutionalism can vary in its focus, in line with Johnston, the analysis in this paper understands that constitutionalism should not only affect inter-state relations but also relations within the global society39. Another fundamental aspect outlined by this author which is shared by this paper is that the objectives of juridical uniformity and universality must be reconciled with cultural-identity values, thats to say, with pluralism. The ability to transform an ideal into reality will depend on the persuasive capacity of the project. From a political-science perspective, constitutionalisation has been linked to the cosmopolitan democracy project, which presents constitutionalisation as a mechanism for solving problems relating to competences that arise from the existence of different levels of governance in the contemporary international order40. Archibugi joins in recognising the ideal or, as he puts it, visionary nature of constitutionalisation to which Johnston alludes. This is not incompatible with defending the possibility of its achievement, as reality shows that norms can be respected even in the absence of coercive power of last resort41. By the same token, work by Habermas42 has established links between cosmopolitanism and the constitutionalisation of international law in an attempt to provide an intermediate solution between the utopianism of world government and the modest ambition of labelling certain advances in transnational regulation of human rights and in the

constitutionalism has three functional dimensions: to benefit, enforce and complement international law. See Dunoff, J.L and J.P. Trachtman (2009), A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization, in Dunoff, J.L and J.P. Trachtman (eds.) (2009), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-35. 39

This author defines constitutionalism as a type of idealism in institutional and ethical terms for international society which should compete with other models and which requires a collective effort to achieve a universal order through the development of a constitutional structure and a procedure which regulates inter-state relations. From this definition it could be inferred that the author positions himself in an inter-state universe; however, in the development of his model, Johnston openly states that it is not enough to restrict constitutionalism to inter-state relations, rather that constitutionalism should echo the voices of civil society. Johnston, D.M. (2005), World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law, in Macdonald, R.S-J. and D.M. Johnston (2005), Op.cit. pp. 3-29. 40

Archibugi establishes five levels of governance, between which there is a functional rather than hierarchical relationship and which correspond to Manns five socio-spatial interaction networks: local, State, inter-state, regional and global. See Mann, M. (1997), Has Globalisation Ended the Rise of the Nation State?, Review of International Political Economy, 4, 3, pp. 472-496; Archibugi, D. (2004), Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, European Journal of International Relations, 10, 3, September, pp.437-473. 41

Kratochwil, F.V. (1989), Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and in Domestic Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 42

Habermas, J. (2006, first in German 2004), El oriente escindido , Madrid, Trota; (2008); El derecho internacional en la transicin hacia un escenario posnacional, Buenos Aires: Katz.

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institutional structure of the United Nations as constitutional 43. Habermas sets out the possibility of various levels which, put together, wouldnt be state-like in nature. At the supranational level, a reformed global organisation (UN) would carry out functions of vital importance (guaranteeing peace, protecting human rights). At the intermediate level (transnational), the great actors capable of acting globally States would take care of problems related to economics and the environment. In this system the constitutionalisation of international law is an alternative to hegemonic international

law44.

Finally, and also within the group of authors who view cosmopolitanism as a cosmovision, we need to mention the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, who has proposed that politics be reinvented on the basis of the observation that the global-local dialectic does not fit in with national politics 45. The term risk society, which he coined in 1986, reflected an era which was leaving traditional ways of life behind and which was unhappy with the consequences of modernisation (the danger and insecurity which affect everyone and which nobody can protect us from)46. Faced with this situation, Beck put forward the opportunity for a cosmopolitan look; this involves having a sense of the world and the absence of borders, a vision which is historically aware and reflective in the face of an environment which contains cultural contradictions and within which there are differences which are disappearing, a vision capable of shaping life itself and cultural coexistence. The cosmopolitan look is not the idealised and utopian vision presented by its critics; on the contrary, as Beck argues, it is in fact sceptical and critical.47

43 See Walter, N. (2005), Making a World of Difference? Habermas, Cosmopolitanism and the

Constitutionalization of International Law, European University Institute Working Papers, Florence: EUI, Law, 2005/17. 44

According to A. Rodrigo, hegemonic international law would be that which is characterised by opposition to imperative and customary norms of a universal nature; by the reinterpretation of certain principles of international law leading to a reduction in the limitations of these so as to enable the hegemon to achieve its objectives; by a preference for international customs, soft law and indeterminate norms over treaties as the process for creating norms; and by selectively invoking and applying juridical norms and institutions in international regimes so as to consolidate the hegemonic position of the most powerful State. Rodrigo, A. (2008), El derecho internacional hegemnico y sus lmites, in Garca, C. and A. Rodrigo, (2008), Los lmites del proyecto imperial. Estados Unidos y el orden internacional en el siglo XXII, Madrid: La catarata (pp.111-174). 45

Beck, U. (2002, first in Eglish 1999), Op. Cit. 46

Beck, U. (2008, first in German 2007), La sociedad del riesgo mundial. En busca de la paz perdida, Barcelona: Paids. 47

Beck, U. (2005, first in German 2004), La Mirada cosmopolita o la Guerra es la paz, Barcelona: Paids, p. 12

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2.3. Cosmopolitanism as a political system and its critics Although some authors will associate political projects with their approaches48,

there is a group of authors for whom the political project constitutes the raison dtre for their conception of cosmopolitanism. For the first group of these cosmopolitanism

is a project oriented towards the construction of transnational institutions which are the instruments of global governance but which do not lead to the creation of global government in any form. Works by authors such as Archibugi, Held, Klher, Kaldor, McGrew and Linklater would fall into this category. All of these thinkers agree on the need to develop political initiatives that establish frameworks and institutions that go beyond the conventional structures of the State, that is, a level of government must be established which limits State sovereignty without constituting a supranational State. This approach proposes a version of top-down cosmopolitanism, based around international organisations, which must necessarily be combined with bottom-up cosmopolitanism, thats to say, with institutional change driven by the emerging civil society. This group of authors associate themselves with the cosmopolitan democracy project, which is a political project for a new world order that is summed up by the slogan globalize democracy while, at the same time, democratizing globalization49. This project aims to increase public responsibility in basic processes and in structural changes within the contemporary world; the idiosyncrasy of this project resides in making democracy its main focus and in studying the conditions for its application to States, inter-state relations and global issues50. These authors share the idea that national democracy has been weakened by the effects of globalisation and has become incapable of responding to the demands of its citizens; it is thus necessary to develop a new form of democracy, which is cosmopolitan democracy. This line of analysis seeks to correct the limitations of cosmopolitan thought both in its ethical version (which advocates global justice without setting out how this is to be achieved) and its political or institutional version (which is highly centred on the political structures required for democratic governance but which does not specify the value or purpose of

48 See note 37.

49 Archibugi, D. (2004), Op. cit., (p. 438)

50 Archibugi, D, D. Held and M. Khler 1998), Op. cit.

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democracy)51. It is appropriate to briefly go through the seven premises52 and the four basic principles53 of the cosmopolitan democracy project. The premises are as follows: first, democracy is a process, not a set of norms and procedures; second, a conflictive State system hinders internal democracy; third, internal democracy works to the benefit of peace, though it does not necessarily lead to virtuous foreign policy; fourth, achieving democracy in every State does not represent global democracy; fifth, globalisation erodes political autonomy and thus calls into question the efficiency of State-based democracy; sixth, the geographical spread of members of different communities does not necessarily correspond with State borders; and seventh, globalisation generates social movements which are committed to issues which affect individuals and communities that are geographically and culturally distinct from their own. The principles which govern the project are the following: normative individualism (people, not States or other collectives, are the units we are morally concerned with); egalitarian individualism or inclusivity (all people have the same value and, by extension, must enjoy the same status within institutional orders); empathy, (everybody should be treated impartially and their points of view must be respected); and prioritisation of the disadvantaged (in bringing about global justice, actions must be directed first and foremost towards the most vulnerable and towards the eradication of the most serious suffering)54. In sum, the project is a base with which to promote the following: the rule of law, greater transparency and accountability of global governance, commitment to social justice, the protection and reinvention of the community on

51 McGrew, A. (2004), Cosmopolitan and Global justice, in Ritsumeikan Annual Review of

International Studies, vol. 3, pp. 1-17. 52

Archibugi, D . (2004), Op. Cit, p. 439 53

Held, D (1997, first in English 1995), La democracia y el orden global. Del Estado moderno al gobierno cosmopolita, Barcelona: Paids. Pierik and Werner reduce these four principles down to three: normative individualism, inclusivity and generality. Pierik, R. and W. Werner (eds.) (2010), Cosmopolitanism in Context Perspectives from Political International Law and Political Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Introduction available at: www.rolandpierik.nl/theory/Downloads/GJ_IL.pdf). 54This is the line of Linklaters models, which come from a post-structural position. In referring to cosmopolitanism he admits that although human reason can understand universally-applicable ethical principles, the problem is that these are not neutral, as every principle has cultural origins. The lack of consensus leads Linklater to call for a focus on minimalist ethical aspirations such as the reduction of poverty or the creation of cosmopolitan conventions on suffering. With this he resolves the problem of values and links up to the origins of the discipline of International Relations (reducing the suffering derived from the coexistence of States). Linklater (2002), Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions, in Vertovec, S. and R. Cohen (2002), Op. Cit., pp. 254-267.

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various levels, and the transformation of the global economy into a fair economic order based on norms55.

A second political perspective on cosmopolitanism views it as a project which defends the recognition of multiple identities. Sharing with the previously outlined perspective the principles of normative individualism and egalitarian individualism, this approach aims to promote a project in which individuals are capable of being simultaneously perceived and accepted as members of different communities. Therefore, the fundamental principle of this view is the legitimisation of multiple loyalties. In line with the argument laid out by Amin Maalouf, the model involves getting away from sectarian and exclusive killer identities. Maalouf maintains that identity should be perceived as all the belongings of a human being, highlighting universality and not uniformity. Every individual is the repository of two inheritances: firstly a vertical inheritance, inherited from their forbearers and their people; and secondly a horizontal inheritance, which comes from the period in which they live56. By admitting multiple personal affiliations, this political project supports the creation of institutions which are coherent with it and, as such, diverse (networks, coalitions, associations) in order to create space for different voices. This perspective could be interpreted as aiming to provide a political project which is capable of overcoming the breach between cosmopolitan and communitarian cosmovisions. According to Hollinger, what he refers to as new cosmopolitanism57 attempts to distance itself from previous versions, and what makes it genuinely cosmopolitan is its determination to maximise human consciousness and to develop instruments to understand and act on problems at a global level, thus reducing suffering without paying attention to differences of race, class, religion, gender or tribe. The need to establish solidarities below the level of that of the human race is considered as a primary need of the individual and, consequently, a sense of belonging is not viewed as an atavism that must be thrown off in order to build a cosmopolitan project58. However, this project also distances itself from pluralism. Although cosmopolitanism and pluralism share their tolerance for diversity, pluralism is generally more conservative in the sense that,

55 Held, D. (2005, first in English, 2004), Un Pacto global. Barcelona: Paids, p. 205.

56 Maalouf, A (2004, first in French, 1998), Identidades asesinas, Madrid: Alianza editorial.

57 The expression new cosmopolitanism or new cosmopolitans is used by other authors more

generically to refer to the cosmopolitan approaches of the nineties and their proponents. Harvey, D, (2009), Op. cit.

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although it admits that all cultural groups must be protected, it identifies each individual with a specific group. Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is based on the idea of multiple loyalties in constant formation and renovation59. One aspect of this political project focuses on the analysis of migratory movements and the consequences of these on the construction of political communities and the interrelations between these60.

The political perspective receives some of the same criticisms as the

philosophical strand, but it also comes under attack from the field of International Relations, with neorealist authors, in a simplifying manner, defending the central role of the State against all other actors and authorities and, by extension, arguing that there are no universal interests that replace the national interest61. In this neorealist concept there

is no space for a limitation of sovereignty in favour of the rights of persons.

Furthermore, multilateralism, which is fundamental to a cosmopolitan conception of politics, is nothing more than an instrument at the service of the State that can be abandoned if it doesnt serve State objectives62.

2.4. Cosmopolitanism as a personal perspective and its critics From a personal perspective cosmopolitanism is understood as an intellectual

and aesthetic position, an orientation, a state of mind or a way of managing the meanings which are expressed in an attitude of openness and in a desire to appreciate, and commit to, cultural diversity. This personal perspective arises from the experience of globality and is expressed in thought and behaviour63. It corresponds, to a certain extent, with the idea of global citizenship, a concept which is disputed by many detractors of cosmopolitanism as being an oxymoron: citizenship involves being attached to a political community and it is impossible to belong to a State or global community which does not exist. This perspective is also linked to the feeling of

58 Hollinger, D.A. (2002), Op. cit.

59 See Hollinger, D.A. (2006a) "Rethinking Diversity,", in California Magazine (July/August 2006), 47-

49 and (2006b), "From Identity to Solidarity," in Daedalus (Fall 2006), 23-31. 60

Cohen, M. (1992), Op. cit.; Cohen, R. (1997), Global Diasporas: An Introduction, Seatle: University of Washington Press; Appiah, K.A (2005), The Ethics of Identity, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 61

Mearsheimer, J.J., (2006), "Structural Realism," in Dunne, T., M. Kurki, and S. Smith, (eds.) (2006), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71-88. This article is an excellent summary of neorealism by one of its most representative proponents. 62

Kaldor, M. (2003), American power: from compellance to cosmopolitanism?, International Affairs, 79: I, pp. 1-22. 63

Hazner, U. (1996), Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. London: Routledge.

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identity that Heater classifies as the vaguest way to position oneself across the broad spectrum of cosmopolitanism, or what Falk refers to as aspiration of the spirit64.

In addition to being perceived as an attitude, from a personal perspective cosmopolitanism is understood as a practice or competence that is related to a personal ability, which can be learnt and fostered, to find ones own way through other cultures. The cosmopolitan will thus participate in various worlds without forming a part of any of them65. This attitude has no link whatsoever with the superficial, consumerist cosmopolitanism (identified with the globalisation of consumer preferences and habits by its critics) or with elitist cosmopolitanism defined by its detractors as the travelling style and sophisticated, cosmopolitan tastes of those elites with the income level to afford such luxuries66. Falk refers to a specific manifestation of this phenomenon in alluding to the transnational businessman whose identity is formed by a lifestyle67. However, quite to the contrary, cosmopolitanism as an individual practice links in with the image of a person committed to economic and environmental sustainability and with civil society activism.

By its very nature this perspective generates much less debate than the others, with discussion limited to comparison between the positive evaluation of cosmopolitanism which highlights its potential in terms of civil society activism and the negative view which labels it as snobbish, elitist, frivolous and superficial, with it thus being considered as socially and politically sterile.

In summary, from a cultural perspective there are two central tenets of the

cosmopolitanism-communitarianism debate: firstly, the recognition or denial of the emergence of a culture which is cosmopolitan in nature; and secondly, in the case where this culture is acknowledged, the discussion over its nature is it integrating and capable of creating spaces for all cultural manifestations that have until now been ignored or peripheral with respect to the predominant culture, or does it simplify, reproduce and expand the central elements of Western culture along with some minor

64 Heater, D. (2002), Op. cit

65 Friedman, J. (1994), Cultural Identity and Global Process, London: Sage.

66 Calhoun, C. (2002), The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually

Existing Cosmopolitanism in Vertovec, S. and R. Cohen (2002), Op. Cit., pp. 86-109. 67

Cf. in Heater D. (2002), Carter, A. (2002), The Political Theory of Global Citizenship, London: Routledge; Linklater, A. (1996), Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State, European Journal of International Relations, 2, 1, pp. 77-103.02), Op. cit.

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aspects of other cultures? From a philosophical perspective there are three main

strands which guide the debate: firstly, the acceptance or rejection of the idea of a global community which shares some values and ideas; secondly, whether or not this global community is compatible with the identity sentiments of minority groups; and thirdly, the efficiency or otherwise of the forms of conduct derived from monistic or pluralistic postures in order to deal with the current challenges faced by international society. From a political perspective, the debate revolves around three key themes: firstly, whether or not it is necessary to limit the State; secondly, the appropriateness or not of establishing different levels of governance; and thirdly, the meaning of democracy in a globalised world and the mechanisms necessary to return its significance; in short, what we are dealing with here is a reflection in new forms of legitimacy in order to face the challenges of international society. Finally, from a personal perspective, the debate turns on the possibility or not of a feeling of global citizenship and the nature of the practice which derives from it: social activism or elitist snobbery.

3. FINAL REFLECTIONS: COSMOPOLITANISM AS A BASIS FOR THE GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE OF WORLD SOCIETY The intensification of the theoretical debate on cosmopolitanism and a

widespread cosmopolitan sentiment within civil society are two tendencies that are empirically testable and which are likely to continue. Both these trends have been on an upward trajectory since the nineties and at the moment this shows no sign of changing, as the international-relations processes which brought about this situation continue. The existence of global problems, new challenges and security threats in international society call into question the functionality of the contemporary international order, which has shown itself incapable of adequately managing new problems, as its principles, norms and institutions were created at a time when such problems did not exist. The search for answers to these new challenges has thus become an unavoidable imperative and it is this context which explains the resurgence of cosmopolitan theoretical positions and the progressive articulation of politico-social cosmopolitan sentiment. The overriding need to find organising principles for the international order and satisfactory governance mechanisms is the reason why the cosmopolitanism of the nineties is not, as understood here, the utopian project it was in other eras, and why, in the theoretical ambit, it is not led by the hand of idealism. The cosmopolitanism of the

21

nineties falls within the sphere of normative theory and fits in well with critical-theory and constructivist approaches. From the perspective of the search for functionality and operability, cosmopolitan positions will be relevant if they manage to form a political project centred on the development of new governance mechanisms for the emerging world society. However, as a political project it must take on board that, even though it starts from the basis of a functional goal, it has a clear normative nature and that it brings with it an ideological position and a particular philosophical perspective.

As has been previously outlined, this project also has a social and/or personal base. Socially, cosmopolitanism identifies more closely with personal and/or group sentiment than with a precise political project. This vague sentiment relating to identity and problems shared by an increasing proportion of civil society is not necessarily expressed in joint channels of political action, though it does involve a personal commitment which conditions the behaviour of whoever shares the sentiment. It could be argued that, from the perspective of order, what we have called the cultural dimension is only relevant in that it influences other dimensions of cosmopolitanism: knowledge of reality and an intellectual opening-up to the world allow for the taking on board of a certain cosmovision and, by extension, a social and/or political commitment. Returning to the reflections of Archibugui, Held and Klhler on the political project, it is necessary to reaffirm that cosmopolitanism is not ideologically neutral, as neither is communitarianism. On the contrary, cosmopolitanism is a project which is markedly committed to changing the referent object of security and development (the individual should displace the central focus on the State, one of the main trends of world society and a factor which clearly sets it apart from the previous international society), and with a set vision of globalisation (markets should be subordinate to the interests of people). The displacement of the State does not come from a will to substitute it for another form of political power organisation but from the desire to demand more responsibilities of it. It is in this line that cosmopolitanism is committed to the transformation of State sovereignty to the benefit of citizen rights. Limits on State sovereignty are only proposed when the State acts against its citizens; in these cases, the cosmopolitan political project suggests that, even at the expense of the principle of sovereign equality, the international community should take on the responsibilities that the sovereign-but-irresponsible State has shirked.

Cosmopolitanism also defends the existence of basic interests which are common to the entire international society (peace, life, human dignity, environmental

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sustainability). It is worth reiterating here that, in the context of globalisation, these interests can only be effectively managed and protected through the collective and coordinated action of the different actors and authorities within world society. The defence of basic common interests is not incompatible with respect for, and defence of, the particularisms (values, cultures and identities) of the different groups that make up world society. It is considered here that the debate between monism and pluralism, as it has developed, does not in any way serve to improve the international order because, far from solving problems, it extrapolates postures which it presents as conflicting but which in fact are perfectly compatible. In this line, and contrary to criticisms it receives from many of its detractors, cosmopolitanism goes against homogenisation and uniformity. The basic interests that cosmopolitanism defends for all humanity are not universal per se; their universalisation forms part of the normative project of cosmopolitanism and cannot be imposed. The criticisms aimed at cosmopolitanism due to its supposed Western ethnocentrism enjoy an empirical base in that the values and rights defended have their origin in the countries which form the founding nucleus and guarantors of the contemporary international order. However, this origin does not predetermine domineering actions; in fact, the success of the cosmopolitan project depends precisely on this being avoided. What has been progressively achieved in the West as the fruit of long processes of political, economic and social transformation cannot be universally extended merely on the basis of an argument of authority (which is not recognised). In order to be defended, values have to be taken on as ones own, and even then it is not always easy. It is obvious that even in countries where these universal interests are politically and majoritarily accepted that they come up against numerous obstacles to their effective protection. But, on the other hand, communitariansim is not a panacea that will solve all the problems thrown up by cosmopolitanism. Whats more, it is equally as susceptible to political manipulation as cosmopolitanism and on many occasions it has been used to justify rolling back rights and liberties. Culture and identity, no matter which ones, are not incompatible with the basic interests which the cosmopolitan project alludes to. It must also be borne in mind that cultural habits and customs are not neutral realities either, rather they are, on occasion, reflections of

structures of dominance of some groups over others, and they can always be transformed and evolve. Nevertheless, in a globalised world individuals cannot be recognised within a single identity, as identities are multiple and overlapping. Identities,

23

as Barber demonstrates, can be constitutional and need not be linked to race or ethnicity but to a set of political ideas.

As understood here, cosmopolitanism will extend its reach as a result of the increasing awareness of the global nature of problems which are perceived as common to all members of world society. The extension of cosmopolitanism is the result of, but also reinforces, the long-term process of the evolution of internactional society towards a world society. It is thus more functional to push forward in this line than focusing on values. In the context of globalisation and a politically, socially and economically heterogeneous world common values will be the result of communal actions in the face of common problems rather than a starting point. It is beyond doubt that the spread of values is quicker and easier amongst countries with similarities in culture, political system and level of economic development; however, globalisation will accelerate the coming together of different economic, political and social situations. It is for this reason that the standpoint defended in this paper considers that it is more probable that the advance of cosmopolitanism will go hand in hand with the management of common problems than with universal political support for a cosmopolitan project. In any case, the success of the project will depend on its capacity of persuasion, and this is indivisibly linked to its legitimacy. This legitimacy, in turn, will be the result of a combination of various factors: transparency, accountability, commitment to social justice and, above all, the coherence between the project and the actions of those who defend it. Until now, for example, the greatest impediments to the credibility of the defence of universal human rights have been the double standards in policies applied by the most powerful countries in the international community.

A viable cosmopolitan political project will also involve a clear and firm commitment to multilateralism and a multi-level governance system. Multilateralism is the channel for cosmopolitan political action, it helps to avoid or counteract homogenising fads, it legitimises decisions and it opens a space in which all international actors can participate actively or passively in activities aimed at solving or managing global problems. In a globalised world society, characterised by the presence of multiple actors and public and private authorities, a multi-level governance system which is close to citizens and, at the same time, capable of responding to general interests above the particular interests of states, is of vital necessity.

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To conclude it is appropriate to point out that whilst within international relations there are apparently contradictory realities that form the basis of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, every project that transforms the international order requires that these be understood as complementary parts of a unique, complex, global reality. In addition to understanding these realities, every project which seeks to be efficient and functional must integrate them into institutions and mechanisms which facilitate global management of the problems of world society.

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