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Cosmopolitan Europeans or Partisans of Fortress Europe?
Supra-national identity patterns in the EU
Andrea Schlenker
Institute of Political Science University of Lucerne
Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Conference,
University of Reykjavik, 26th
August 2011
Draft
Abstract
The European Union is founded on the principles of freedom, democracy and human rights. Yet while internally the principle of free movement reigns, Europe is fortifying its outer boundaries. This paper analyses the question whether we find comparable dynamics in the construction of European identity. More concretely, based on which commonalities and which boundaries do Europeans construct their emerging collective identity? Is European identity one step towards a universalist and inclusive cosmopolitan identity? Or are Europeans partisans of fortress Europe with exclusionary forms of boundary construction? The question of boundaries has an external as well as an internal dimension: externally it concerns the question who would be admitted as new member states. Internally it refers to others within, to cultural diversity which is mainly created by immigrants’ inflow. In order to analyse these dimensions I will build upon socio-psychological insights into mechanisms of in- and out-group building as well as upon the debate on different constructions of national identity. Empirically Eurobarometer data on the 27 member states from the last decade will be analysed. The extent of European and cosmopolitan identification is set in relation by analysing in more details how European identity is filled. This regards first different references made in respect to the content or central markers of European identity. Secondly, concerning the boundaries, I especially differentiate between attitudes towards potential new member states as well as those towards European and non-European immigrants of different ethnic and religious origin. A structural equation model finally rounds up the analysed relationships between the identity patterns in a comprehensive manner. The results show that emotional European and cosmopolitan identification have increased in the past decade and that both kinds of supra-national identity go hand in hand. Yet, the kind of European identity construction makes a difference. As expected, there is an especially strong and positive relationship between a civic construction of European identity and cosmopolitanism, and a negative one between ethnic elements of EU identity and cosmopolitanism. Surprisingly, a cultural European identity is less, but still positively related to cosmopolitanism. However, the widespread cosmopolitanism in Europe still has to work out its relationship to the existing external and internal boundaries drawn by European citizens.
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Introduction
Europe today is bound to be a space of freedom, peace and security. In light of the history of
devastating wars between European nation-states, the initial purpose of European integration
was to overcome national egoisms and ethnocentrism. According to the Treaties, the European
Union is founded “on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Article 6 TEU). These are quite universal values
with a very inclusive character. Indeed, the number of member states today is more than four
times higher than when the European Community was founded by six countries. Thus, on first
sight one might conclude that the European Union (EU) is not only on paper, but also in reality
an inclusive entity based on postnational, universal values. This assumption concerns first of
all legal matters as to the definition who is a member and who is not. The criteria for accession
of potential new member states laid down in the treaty of Amsterdam indeed include the above
mentioned universal values, but also obligations specific for the EU, such as the ‘acquis
communautaire’. This oscillation between universal and particular values is also inherent in the
treatment of migration. While internally the principle of free movement reigns, Europe is
fortifying its outer boundaries. This shows that already in these policy domains the EU is not
necessarily as universalistic as its founding values might suggest.
Yet, the EU is not only a legal entity, but also a community of people. The extent of
inclusiveness of the EU is therefore not only legally defined but also dependent on the
orientations and convictions of the individuals who make up this entity. The question whether a
political community of Europeans, a European ‘demos’, exists that backs up the institutional
structure has gained in salience since the elite driven character of the EU has increasingly come
under attack. Various analyses found that the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and
Scheingold 1970) of the first decades slowly withers away (e.g. Kaina 2009: 15-30). Talking
about a European ‘demos’ refers to the assumption that the EU, in order to be persistent, has to
be based on a community that is held together not only by short-term economic interests, but
by long-term support, finally by a European identity. The quest for a European identity
advanced to the centre stage of political as well as scientific debates and research on this topic
exploded in recent years (Bruter 2005; Cederman 2001; Cerutti and Rudolph 2001; Citrin and
Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frogner 1995, 2008; Fuchs et al. 2009; Herrmann et al. 2004; Kaina
2009; Kantner 2006; Kohli 2000). Mainly two camps formed: those who deny the possibility of
such a postnational European identity and those who belief in its possibility and in first
evidence of its existence.
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Those who are more optimistic about the prospect of a European identity can back up
their position by a long research tradition which assumes that regional integration along with
globalisation processes produces a postnational, cosmopolitan identity among a wide public.
Not only for Europe, but also for other continents, it was anticipated that the more countries
penetrate into one another, the more boundaries of nation-states would wither away and the
more national loyalty would be superseded by sub-, cross-, trans- and supra-national identities
(Galtung 1967). In the same vein, the globalisation literature conjectures that economic
globalisation accompanied by increasing interconnectedness of political communities, global
migration and communication, leads to a higher degree of mass cultural homogenisation
particularly among younger generations, and some degree of value convergenve toward
universal principles (Dower 2003; Falk 1994; Held and McGrew 2002; Vertovec and Cohen
2002). These tendencies are expected to erode the capacity of nation-states to sustain a singular
political identity, eventually leading to the rise of ‘global citizenship’.
On the other side, established national identifications may pose real barriers to the mass
development of supranational attitudes including, as a response to supra-national integration
and globalisation, a revival of nationalism or a more localised mobilisation effort rather than
the rise of a global identity (Keohane and Nye 2000; Scharpf 1999). The sceptics of European
identity mainly point to the diffuse and fuzzy boundaries of the EU, its immense cultural
diversity and the lack of institutional transparency as well as the lack of democratic and
symbolic references for identification offered by the EU; all these aspects would undermine the
possibility to construct a common European identity (Duchesne and Frognier 1995;
Kielmannsegg 1996; Kohli 2000; Offe 1998; Lepsius 1999; Walkenhorst 1999).1 The clearly
demarcated nation-state offers many more commonalities and historical memories and is
therefore the dominant ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) attracting loyalty.
However, conceiving of national and European identities in opposition to each other
underestimates the multiple nature of social identities. It is meanwhile well established that an
identity shift toward higher levels of the continent or the world need not presume a substantial
decrease of identification on lower levels (Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 2008;
Diez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Herrmann et al. 2004; Marcussen et al. 1999; Marks and
Hooghe 2003; Risse 2001; Schlenker-Fischer 2011). Supranational identities oftentimes
coexist comfortably with local and national identities. The simultaneous multiplicity of
1 The introduction of a European Citizenship is an attempt to bolster identification and participation with this particular supranational entity (Jacobs and Maier 1998; Preuss 1998). Its power to redefine collective identities is however limited given that this status still depends on the nationality of a member country and that nation states control the access to political membership and ultimately implement rights (Bauböck 1994; Olsen 2011).
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collective identities on different levels gives a brighter future to the development of more
widespread European identification.
Yet even if European identity is possible and eventually increasing, there is no
automatic link between different kinds of supranational identity. Re-inventing political
community on the continental level as within the EU certainly means to overcome national
boundaries to a certain extent. Thus identification on this level could be closely tied up with
cosmopolitan identities. However, this is not necessarily the case. Even if national boundaries
are eventually less important within a developing community of European citizens2,
exclusionary tendencies can always be shifted up to the continental level. Such an expectation
is nurtured by psychological research which repeatedly underlined that the definition of
boundaries is fundamental in the construction of collective identities and in any community
building process (Barth 1969; Schlenker-Fischer 2009). Universal values and the community
of human beings are expected to be too flou and fuzzy in order to serve as anchors for
collective identification (Calhoun 2002, 2003; Cerutti and Rudolph 2001; Spinner-Halev
2008). In addition, collective identities such as European identity can be very differently
constructed, with more or less exclusionary consequences (Greenfeld 1999; Brubaker 1999).
The most widespread differentiation on the national level is between ethnic, cultural and civic
ways to construct collective identity (e.g. Kymlicka 1999; Shulman 2002). Such different
constructions are conceptually also possible on the European level. We cannot automatically
assume that a civic European identity prevails among citizens because of the officially
universalistic founding values of the EU. Given the ambivalent inclusiveness of European
policies, this assumption is even less convincing and apart from some experimental evidence
on the question what kind of European identity is predominant (Bruter 2004), this is still an
open empirical question.
Therefore the research question of this paper is: which supra-national identity patterns
do we find in the European Union and what is their relationship? This involves in a first step an
analysis of the extent of emotional identification with Europe and the world as a whole as well
as their relationship. In order to assess this relationship in more details it is in a second step
instructive to analyse how Europeans construct European identity, what the main content of
this collective identity is. Finally, complementing this content oriented analysis of European
identity construction, I will ask in a third step: where are the boundaries drawn? Who is ‘the
other’ for European citizens? To frame it provocatively: Is the Polish plumber more ‘part of the
crew’ than the African refugee due to his European passport? The analysis of content as well as
2 For the sake of simplicity, I use Europeans and European citizens for citizens of the European Union, thus employing a restricted understanding of Europeans.
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boundaries will allow understanding in more details which kind of European identity prevails
and what its relationship to cosmopolitan identity is. After a short overview over social-
psychological insights into collective identity construction, I derive concrete hypotheses based
on the discussion on cosmopolitanism in Europe as well as on tensions in European identity
construction ‘from above’. These hypotheses will be empirically tested by analysing public
opinion surveys, namely Eurobarometer data from the last decade. Although these surveys are
not as complete as I would like, they offer the only representative data available covering the
relevant indicators and all EU countries. Wherever appropriate I complement this data with
findings from the European Value Studies.
Theoretical framework
Foundations of collective identity construction
Though all kinds of collective identities are contested3, there are some fundamentals which
these phenomena share. In the first place, any identity should not be conceived as static, but as
dynamic; no form of identity is ever complete or totally stable. Secondly, identity is not a loose
patchwork but a more or less integrated symbolic structure with time dimensions (past, present,
future), providing certain continuity and consistency to individuals. The central question is
which are the dominant references and how do they change over time and with the changing
institutional environment. This refers mainly to the social aspects of identity which originate
from different forms of association. Every personal identity is a continuous (re)combination of
different identifications of changing, but relatively persistent patterns of references to potential
groups of belonging (Duchesne and Frognier 2008: 144). Building on social identity theory
(Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Abrams and Hogg 1999), collective identities are thus
defined as individual knowledge about the belonging to a social group, which is endowed with
affective and evaluative meaning. This literature underlines that two central operations are
necessary for any collective identity construction, namely (1) an internal definition of the in-
group, thus certain commonalities to refer to, and (2) an external boundary drawing by
constructing outsiders or out-groups.4 For defining the in-group real or imagined similarities or
commonalities are activated and (over-)emphasized, and for demarcation towards the outside
accordingly real or imagined differences. With reference to these elements, the individual as
3 Brubaker and Cooper (2000) offer an instructive critique of the many meanings and uses of the term. 4 This stems from the assumption that collective identities are fundamentally relational. Philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Simone de Beauvois and Jacques Derrida did the theoretical groundwork for this assumption. In terms of method, the breakthrough came within social anthropology. Frederik Barth and his colleagues (1969) underlined that the maintenance of ethnic groups could be studied from the borders, especially in terms of which differences the groups themselves saw as constituting them. Ever since their pioneer work, the process of ‘other-building’ has been considered to be a basic characteristic of any kind of collective identity.
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social actor can redefine him/herself; yet this identification usually takes place within
categorizations imposed by various more or less powerful actors.
Different entities may differ in the mix of the traits that form the basis of their unity and
identity. National identity seems to be particularly important since it is at the same time
constitutive for as well as constructed by the state, one of the most important forms of
association. Due to the widespread usage and familiarity of national identity its various ways to
be constructed, its different contents and boundaries, might serve as blueprint for other forms
of association. Research on nationalism was for a long time based on the distinction between
civic, political, or territorial national identity on the one hand and ethnic or cultural nations on
the other hand. This distinction dates back to the beginning of the last century (Meinecke 1907/
1970; see also Kohn 1944) and is still employed and discussed (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Ignatieff
1993). Yet many scholars have already criticised this dichotomy as being too simple
(Greenfield 1999; Brubaker 1999). Nielsen (1999) and Kymlicka (1999), for example, note that
it is a mistake to equate ethnic with cultural nationalism, because they differ according to their
openness to outsiders. Nieguth (1999) similarly calls for unpacking the dichotomy, since
ancestry, race, culture, and territory are analytically distinct bases for national membership.
The main problem with the civic/ ethnic dichotomy is that it collapses too much in the ethnic
category. Therefore many scholars meanwhile differentiate three idealtypes, namely an ethnic,
cultural and civic one (e.g. Kymlicka 1999; Nielson 1999; Shulman 2002).5
The focus of this paper concerns the extent and relationship of broader forms of
association than the nation-state that trigger supra-national forms of identification
encompassing the continental as well as the global level. In the following I will first give a
brief overview on the foundations of global or cosmopolitan identification and the relevant
empirical literature in order to state some hypotheses on its relationship to European identity.
This aim makes it necessary to differentiate in a second step between different ways to
conceive of European identity for which the insights into different ways to construct national
identity will become relevant again.
Cosmopolitanism and postnational identity in Europe
Cosmopolitanism as a philosophy urges us all to be ‘citizens of the world’, creating a world-
wide moral community of humanity committed to universal values (e.g. Nussbaum 1997; for
an overview see Carter 2005). Waldron defines cosmopolitans as individuals whose cultural
5 This is in line with Greenfield’s (1999) collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic and individualistic-civic types of nationalism. These models can also be paralleled by different codes of collective identity construction, namely primordial, traditional and universalistic ones (see Giesen 1999; Schlenker-Fischer 2011).
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identities are not defined by any bounded subset of the cultural resources available in the world
(1992: 782). This idea is usually contrasted with communitarian theories, in particular
ideologies of patriotism and nationalism. Deriving from the Greek cosmos (the universe) and
polis (city) cosmopolitanism is usually traced back to Diogenes who called himself a ‘citizen
of the world’. The Stoics developed his idea further and stressed that we should conceive of
our identity in concentric circles: the first is the self, the next the immediate family, then the
extended family, the local group, all co-citizens, countrymen, and lastly humanity. The task of
world citizens then becomes to “draw the circles somehow towards the centre, making all
human beings more like our fellow city dwellers, and so forth” (Nussbaum 1994: 9).6 Since
philosophical cosmopolitans are moral universalists, they believe that all humans, and not
merely compatriots or fellow-citizens, come under the same moral standards. The boundaries
between nations, states, cultures or societies in which one happens to be born or situated are
morally irrelevant (e.g. Appiah 2006; Nussbaum 1997).7
One of the primary goals of founding the European Union was indeed to overcome
national egoisms. Along with modernisation, the related functional differentiation and the
predominantly economic aims of integration in the beginning, especially functionalists
expected spill-over effects to further integration processes. This also meant that ethnic, regional
and national particularities would step back, in fact that all collective identities and social
categorisations would make place for more individual differentiations and a growing
convergence of the member states in all societal spheres accompanied by the strengthening of a
European sense of community (e.g. Deutsch 1954; Haas 1964). In fact, some argue today that
the spread of a legal order above the nation state paves the way to supplant rights based on
membership in a particular national community with rights based on supranational membership
or on universal personhood (Soysal 1994). This is close to cosmopolitan citizenship and
implies less an overcoming of national citizenship than its embedding and complementing
through more universal levels of citizenship (e.g. Benhabib 2004, 2006; Archibugi et al.
1998).8 In consequence some scholars are convinced that European identity must grow out of a
sense of cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006; Beck and Grande 2007; Delanty 2006).
6 Immanuel Kant has prominently adopted the Stoic ideas. In his 1795 essay on “perpetual peace” he stages a ‘ius cosmopoliticum’ as a guiding principle to protect people from war. He morally grounds this right on the principle of universal hospitality, the duty to aid foreigners who are starving or otherwise suffering. 7 Empirically a concrete step towards cosmopolitanism occurred after the Second World War. As a reaction to the Holocaust and other massacres, the concept of crimes against humanity became a generally accepted category in international law and led, though decades later, to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The idea is to protect human dignity as a universal value in international law (Beck 2006: 45; Benhabib 2008). 8 This can also be thought in line with a developmental psychology according to which patriotism is a step on the way to cosmopolitanism: as human individuals mature they develop ever wider loyalties and allegiances, starting with attachment to their caregivers and ending with allegiance to humanity at large.
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Yet, critics doubt that citizenship beyond a narrow liberal perspective on human rights
is viable on a global or on a supranational level. Even more, cosmopolitanism would embody
“all the worst aspects of classical liberalism – atomism, abstraction, alienation from one’s
roots, vacuity of commitment, indeterminacy of character, and ambivalence towards the good”
(Waldron 1992: 764f). Cosmopolitanism would therefore endanger the positive aspects of
national citizenship, namely foremost loyalty and solidarity (Carter 2005: 167-176). It might
furthermore exaggerate the availability of universal citizenship not marked by ethnicity or
other asymmetrically available solidarities (Calhoun 2007: 287). Universality is usually
conceived of as being insufficient for identity building since every identity would need a
genuine particularity and a boundary towards others. Thus critics refer to the very possibility,
but also to the desirability of a truly supranational and universal identity (e.g. Cerutti and
Rudolph 2001). Anti-cosmopolitan stances in the moral sphere are especially taken by those
communitarians (e.g. MacIntyre 1992) who believe either that our obligations to compatriots
and more local people crowd out any obligations to benefit human beings as such or that there
are no obligations except where there are close, communal relationships. But also liberals
argue that the elimination of particular and motivating attachments to fellow-citizens will
render democracy impossible (e.g. Spinner-Halev 2008). Nussbaum is aware of the fact that
cosmopolitanism does not offer any easy refuge; “it offers only reason and the love for
humanity, which may seem at times less colourful than other sources of belonging” (1994: 11).
With Beck we can therefore summarize: “To belong or not to belong, that is the cosmopolitan
question” (2003: 45).
Indeed several empirical studies stressed that worldwide there is relatively little
identification beyond the nation state. Norris (2000: 161) for example found, based on World
Value Survey data, that only 15 percent of the public see themselves as belonging primarily to
their continent or the world as a whole. While Norris interprets the differences between
generations optimistically and expects an increase of identification with supranational
communities in the future, Jung (2008) contradicts this interpretation and discovers instead a
life cycle effect. Such findings strengthen those scholars who argue that postnationalism and
cosmopolitanism lack empirical support. This critical stance is repeatedly also taken towards
the possibility and first evidence of a European identity. The main argument holds that such a
postnational identity could never supersede the strong and long established national identities
(Kielmansegg 1996; Offe 1998; Scharpf 1999; Lepsius 1999; Zürn 2000).
However, this result has to be taken carefully since identities on different levels do not
always stand in an exclusive relationship to each other, which is assumed if only the ‘primary
identity’ is taken into consideration. Because of their potentially varying embeddedness,
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Herrmann, Brewer and Risse (2004) question a presumed hierarchy between identities. In
contrast to the low numbers above, analysing the extent of simultaneous identification with the
national and European level, we also have to consider different observations: nearly three
quarters of Europeans (73 percent in 2009) feel attached to their nation and to the EU at the
same time (Schlenker-Fischer 2010; see also Fuchs et al. 2009: 101).9 National and European
identification in contrast to being antagonistic rather seem cumulative or nested (see also Diez
Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2003). This widespread simultaneous identification has not
yet been empirically set in relation to further levels such as the world as a whole. It is an open
empirical question to what extent European integration has led to the emergence of supra-
national identities anchored in Europe itself or constructed with reference to the world. Given
Europe’s interconnectedness worldwide and the far reaching advances made in European
integration, I assume that the more optimistic camp is right and that we can expect that
(H1a) There is considerably more supra-national identification in Europe today than in
the past, including European as well as cosmopolitan identity.
Furthermore, the evidence on nested identities on various territorial levels might be explained
by an individually variable disposition to identify with collectives or the underlying general
tendency to identify with a remote and abstract – or imagined – group (Duchesne and Frognier
2008). The feeling of belonging to the world would in this perspective be a logical last step in
the enlargement of an increasingly inclusive ‘we’ one feels belonging to. This leads to the
hypothesis that
(H1b) There is a positive relationship between European and cosmopolitan identity.
Duchesne and Frognier (2008), however, do not only point out to the variable disposition to
identify with a group but to a dual nature of identification processes. In the process of concrete
community building identification with a specific group is facilitated by the delimitation of the
group as the second mechanism in collective identity construction. I therefore venture to dig
deeper into the different ways to construct European identity in order to disentangle the various
supra-national identity patterns and their compatible or, under certain circumstances, rather
competitive relationship. For this endeavour I will differentiate various commonalities and
boundaries of European identity as the necessary two ingredients of collective identity
construction as specified above.
9 While there are considerable country differences in this respect, more than a majority display such a multiple identity in 20 out of 25 member states, in seven countries even more than three quarters (Schlenker-Fischer 2011.; see also Fuchs et al. 2009: 102).
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Different ways to construct European identity
Different commonalities
A positive relationship between European and cosmopolitan identity might not be
straightforward. Even if it is not convincing to conceive of different collective identities always
in opposition to each other, we know from the national level that this is nevertheless many
times the case. Repeatedly collective identifications are (re-)vived in ways which make them
incompatible with others. Re-ethnifications not only appeared in Eastern Europe after the
breakdown of the Soviet Union, but we also see them in Western Europe with several
movements for autonomy and secession along ethno-regional boundaries, such as in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, Flanders and Wallonia, the Basque country and Catalonia. While
mainly directed against the central state, these movements partly also develop as
counterreactions to impositions caused by modernisation, globalisation and supra-
nationalisation in the form of the European Union.10
The emphasis on commonalities and boundaries of a specific community is not limited
to subnational or national entities, but also possible on the European level. Conceptualisations
of European identity indeed oscillate between the concepts of ‘society’ and ‘community’, in
line with the tension between a modernist vision of an individualised world and a
communitarian insistence on collective identities and particularities. On the one hand, there is a
strong emphasis on universal, democracy related characteristics as they are associated with
terms such as ‘postnationality’, ‘open society’ or ‘open republic’ (Dewandre and Lenoble
1994; Habermas 2001; Oberndörfer 1991; Flora 2000; Strath 2000; White 2000). In terms of
the different models of national identity construction mentioned above, official European
policy is strongly guided by a civic approach. The EU is, after all, a self-proclaimed civic
community which respects and promotes its cultural diversity. Politicians and researchers alike
most of the time proclaim ‘unity in diversity’ as the core reference for a European identity (e.g.
Reif 1993; Kielmannsegg 1996; Lepsius 1999). In order to enhance unity the European Union
employs symbols that represent the cultural diversity of its member states. This is exemplified
in the flag which includes a star for each original member state, and the anthem which
mentions Europe’s cultural diversity. That the fundamental values basic to the whole project of
European integration are essentially universalistic was strengthened when after long
discussions no reference to God was included in the draft for an EU constitution.
10 They sometimes also go hand-in-hand with Europeanisation and its promotion of subsidiarity and direct regional subsidies (e.g. Hettlage 1997). Westle (2003: 116) therefore alerts that the overarching aim in Europe to overcome small scale particularities could also lead to the opposite in the long run, to a fragmentation of Europe.
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On the other hand, the European Union has also clearly communitarian traits, such as
particular conditions for membership (see Westle 2003). Whether a candidate can apply for
membership in the EU is less tied to a subjective will or commitment to a political regime
form, but in the first place depends on unchangeable conditions such as European geopolitical
location. Furthermore membership is collective (accession of states) and in many instances
happens without a direct vote of the people concerned. In addition, membership is conceived
irredeemable; there are no provisions for exit by or exclusion of single countries.11
Usually communitarian conceptions of collective identity are closely tied to cultural or
even ethnic references. Whether it is possible to find a cultural trait that is shared by all
Europeans and not shared by any non-Europeans is however widely in doubt (e.g. Neumann
2006: 9). Yet, even if this is in theory difficult to argue, we cannot preclude from the outset
that Europeans base their European identity on presumed cultural commonalities. Gerhards
(2007) even offers scientific evidence for the conviction that some cultural differences between
EU members and other countries seem bigger than differences within the EU. Also Ruiz
Jiménez and her colleagues (2004) find that European identity in most countries includes
cultural elements such as references to language, culture and history in a similar way to
national identities (also Bruter 2004). Because of their particular and exclusive character, such
cultural elements of European identity are presumably not compatible with cosmopolitanism.
Lastly even common ancestry of all Europeans in opposition to non-European peoples is a
possibility to construct a common ground, not unusual in rather right-wing political camps.
Even though such a conceptually difficult and normatively highly contestable ethnic element of
European identity might be marginal, it might nevertheless trigger consequences for
cosmopolitanism, presumably the strongest negative ones. Thus, summing up I hypothesize:
(H2a) A civic construction of European identity is strongly and positively related to
cosmopolitanism.
(H2b) A cultural construction of European identity is negatively related to
cosmopolitanism.
(H2c) An ethnic construction of European identity is most strongly negatively related to
cosmopolitanism.
Different boundaries
The official abstraction of cultural particularities makes the Union in principle open to new
members; internally we are meanwhile used to open borders within the EU. In general, a
consequently universalistic framing would imply the attrition of any boundary drawing.
However, while borders were indeed eliminated between EU member-states, the opening up of
11 Westle (2003) points out that these communitarian components are in tension with the growing ‘Vergesellschaftung’ of European societies as well as with the rational universalistic legitimation of the EU.
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this internal space of free movement was accompanied by a fortification of its external
boundaries. Since the EU deepened with Maastricht, advancing the monetary and further
political unification, as well as since it grew considerably to the East including now twelve
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU is also strengthening its outer
borders by more restrictive immigration policies towards third country nationals (Hassner
1994; Lavenex 2001). The old picture of ‘fortress Europe’ does not concern the formerly
communist East any more, but the migratory movements from developing countries and areas
of catastrophes as well as foreign culture areas. In consequence, while Europe is for many
worldwide a haven of human rights, peace and liberty, the reality for migrants from non
European countries looks often different. Recurrent pictures of desperate boat people from
Africa illustrate this fact sadly. In the sense of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” (1993),
these phenomena are interpreted as the counter-pictures of European identity which would
serve to wall-off Europe and its new boundaries (Niethammer 2000). This entails that
strengthening European identity would merely transform the excluding and aggressive
components of nationalism, which were meant to be overcome by the very European
integration process, and revive Eurocentrist orientations.
As mentioned, it is widely assumed that collective identities have their constitutive
‘others’. Who these others are is a question of construction and perception. The size of cultural
differences, for example, depends not on some inherent trait, but on how different they are
perceived to be. It is an especially interesting question whether also supranational identities
have to shore up against someone or something in order to perpetuate themselves (see
Abizadeh 2005). The cultural boundaries of Europe are decidedly fuzzy – as any culture is
patchy, amorphous and unstable. There are family resemblances between EU countries and
their neighbours all around and big changes over time. Since any argument where the boundary
of Europe is, is very hard to sustain, we might settle on an empirical fact: if enough people
adopt these differences as constitutive of Europe, then that becomes a social fact, and thereby
self-fulfilling (see also Westle 2003). This is about forging a ‘we’, this is identity politics at
work – with high stakes.
Thus, the empirical question is: how relevant is boundary drawing in Europe? Are ‘us-
them’ relations in the EU merely enlarged to include all Europeans while non-Europeans are
excluded and thus cosmopolitanism rejected? This concerns two kinds of boundary drawing:
on the one hand, external boundaries, who would be accepted as a new member entering the
EU; and on the other hand, internal boundaries, where the anchorage point for delimination is
not a territorial state entity but cultural, non-European otherness, mainly of immigrants. Fuchs
and his colleagues (1995) offered an instructive analysis in this respect. Their results indeed
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show that the migratory movements in Europe brought about a re-drawing of the boundaries
between ‘us’ and ‘them’; these boundaries today seem to be less drawn between individual
countries than between natives and immigrant foreigners within countries. However, it appears
to matter to citizens making this distinction whether immigrants come from outside Europe or
from other European countries. In addition, this kind of Eurocentrist attitudes mainly derive
from the shared culture of the West, since Northern European and North Americans are
evaluated considerably higher than other non European migrants (ibid. 175f). What does the
picture look like almost 20 years later? Especially with the heightened salience of the question
whether Turkey will become a member of the EU as well as the (at least mediated) increase of
tensions between majority populations and immigrant, especially Muslim minorities in several
member states, I expect the following:
(H3a) There is a relatively strong external boundary drawing towards countries which
are perceived as being culturally non Western.
(H3b) Internally, European citizens clearly differentiate between European and non-
European immigrants.
(H3c) Among minority groups, European citizens are least willing to accept Muslims.
These hypotheses contradict any assumption on a close relationship between European
identification and cosmopolitanism which explicitly embraces cultural diversity and open
borders. If the empirical results are in this line, we have evidence of a widespread ‘fortress
Europe’ mentality. If European identity is however constructed in universal terms, such
distinctions are minor or even not made at all, i.e. new members would be welcomed with open
arms and immigrants would be accepted to a large extent and without major differentiations.
Empirical results: Supra-national identity construction in Europe
European and cosmopolitan identification
Repeating Beck’s “To belong or not to belong is the cosmopolitan question” (2003: 45) – to
which territorial level do Europeans actually feel belonging to? As other studies confirmed
before, also in 2009 identification with the nation is predominant (95 per cent), closely
followed by identification with the region (93 per cent). Yet, simultaneously three quarters of
Europeans also feel belonging to Europe and a considerable 65 per cent say that they feel at
least somewhat to be a citizen of the world. While comparing the intensity of these identity
patterns (see Figure 1) we discover by far stronger identification with the nation and the region,
than with the larger communities of Europe or humanity. However, in light of several accounts
of a widespread lack of supra-national consciousness it is quite remarkable that a clear majority
of Europeans not only identify with Europe, but also feel as citizens of the world.
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Figure 1: Identity patterns over different territorial levels (EU27, 2009)
29,332,4
81,8
72,1
35,4
43,1
13,3
21,022,2
16,3
2,9 4,3
11,17,1
1,5 1,4
,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
World citizen European Nationality Region
To a great extent Somew hat Not really Not at all
Question: (QE4) “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are…” Source: Eb 73.1 (N=26830)
Supranationalists are even more confirmed when we regard the development of European and
cosmopolitan identification over time. In spite of considerable ups and downs in the European
integration processes – one might only think of the crisis following the rejection of the
Constitutional Treaty in several countries – the extent of emotional European identification has
not decreased in the last decade, rather to the contrary. While in 1999 a majority of 58 per cent
of Europeans felt attached to Europe, this majority increased to three quarters in 2009 (see
Figure 2).12 At the same time, the proportion of those who do not feel European decreased
from 37 to 23 per cent. This slight increase in European identification did not take place at the
expense of national identification. Instead, it is an increase in dual identification with Europe
and the nation. This trend was coupled with a decrease in exclusive national identity from 31
percent in 1999 to 20 percent in 2009, when meanwhile 27 member states were included in the
surveys (see also Schlenker-Fischer 2010).13
12 Unfortunately the wording of the question changed in 2009. Instead of asking about feelings of attachment to Europe, now the extent one is feeling European is asked. Yet, since both questions focus on emotional identification in a similar way, the numbers are, in my opinion, comparable. 13 For a development of identification with the nation and Europe since 1992 see Kaina (2009: 59-62), who uses a more cognitive self-description indicator (‘In the near future, do you see yourself as…’).
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Figure 2: European identification over time (EU-wide)
20,5 20,4 21,2
32,4
38,2
45,4 44 43,1
27,624,6
27,1
16,3
9,97,4 6,4 7,1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1999 2004 2007 2009
very fairly not really not at all
Questions: 1999: EB 51 (EU15, N=16179) Q13, 2004: Eb 62.0 (EU25, N=24 791) Q47, 2007: Eb 67.1 (EU27, N=26746) Qa14_4: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to d) Europe?” (1. Very attached, 2. Fairly attached, 3. Not very attached, 4. Not at all attached). 2009: Eb 73.1 (EU27, N= 26 830) QE4_1: “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are… 1. European” (1. To a great extent, 2. Somewhat, 3. Not really, 4. Not at all)
What about the development of cosmopolitan identity? Contradicting the small numbers found
by Norris (2000) in the mid-1990s, the development of cosmopolitan feeling in Europe over
time is impressive: over the past five years there has been an increase in consciousness for the
world from 41 per cent in 2005, 56 per cent in 2007 to finally 64 per cent in 2009. Today only
a third of Europeans do not sense any belonging to humankind (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Feeling as a World Citizen over time (EU25)
10,4
19,9
28,530,6
36,5 36,0
55,9
40,3
33,8
,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
2005 2007 2009
To a great extent Somew hat Not really/ not at all
Question: (QE4) “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are a world citizen” Sources: 2009: Eb 73.1 (N=24795); 2007: Eb 67.1 (N=24709); 2005: Eb 64.2 (N=24924)
These results strengthen our first hypothesis, there is indeed more supra-national identification
in Europe today than in the past, including European as well as cosmopolitan identity (H1a).
However, disaggregating the European average reveals big differences in the amount of world
citizens in each country, ranging from more than 80 per cent in Romania, Malta, Spain and
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Cyprus to less than 50 per cent in East Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The results
contradict any modernist expectation that the level of socio-economic development of a
country is necessarily connected to cosmopolitan attitudes. They also stand in opposition to
widespread assumptions that Central and Eastern European countries have populations whose
collective identities are stronger ethno-cultural than those of West European citizens (see also
Shulman 2002).14 These country differences are impressive and it is an interesting question
what might cause them. While this would be a promising question for another paper, my focus
here is on general European trends.
In the literature, more than country specific influences, individual characteristics such
as education, occupation and age are usually detected as primarily influencing cosmopolitan
orientations. These factors are indeed significantly correlated to a cosmopolitan orientation
(feeling to belong to the world; EU27 in 2009); education exerts the strongest positive
influence (r =0,12), occupation also a positive one (r =0,11) and age a negative one (r = -0,11).
The younger, the better educated and the higher the occupation, the more Europeans tend to
feel belonging to the world. However, cosmopolitan identity is much stronger related to
European identity than to these demographics.15 It makes a big difference for cosmopolitan
attitudes if one identifies with Europe or not. On the aggregate European level again, these two
forms of supranational identification are strongly and positively correlated (r =0,46)
confirming hypothesis (H1b). A majority of Europeans, namely 57,5 per cent, feel
simultaneously attached to Europe and the world, while 15 per cent do not identify with either
of these two entities. Almost one fifth feels European but not citizen of the world, while only
8,5 per cent feel citizen of the world but not European (Table 1).
Table 1: European and cosmopolitan identity (EU 27, 2009)
Feeling as a world citizen
Yes No
Yes 57,5 % 19,0 % Feeling
European No 8,5 % 15,0 %
Pearson’s R = 0,46 (p<0,01)
Question: (QE4) “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are European/ a world citizen” Source: Eb 73.1 (N= 26 830)
14 The three countries in the survey which are not members of the EU – Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey – also show a high percentage of world citizens, namely 74 per cent and more. 15 This is in line with findings on European identity and its various elements which are hardly influenced by traditional social and demographic variables (Bruter 2004: 208).
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This strong positive correlation is slightly weaker in non-EU countries (r =0,34), but still
present.16 Thus even beyond the borders of the EU, both kinds of supranational identification
often go hand in hand.17 This speaks for a widespread disposition to identify with a remote
collective which seems to be for many enlarged to even include humanity. Does this strong
relationship hold for all kinds of European identity construction? An analysis of the content as
well as boundaries of European identity is revealing.
Content of European identity
In analogy to civic, cultural and ethnic ways to construct national identity we can differentiate
between civic elements used for European identity construction such as democratic values and
rights, cultural ones including common history and language and ethnic elements based on
ancestry and religious heritage (for more details see Shulman 2002: 559; Bruter 2004: 192f).
Several indicators of the Eurobarometer are at our disposal in order to determine what people
mean by European identity. When asked about the most important elements that go to make up
a European identity, democratic values are indeed by far most often mentioned (Figure 5).
Democracy is followed by two other non-cultural traits, namely geography and social
protection. Yet with more than 20 per cent mentioning common history and common culture
and still almost 8 per cent relating European identity to religious heritage we can see that
cultural and even ethnic elements are not absent in the construction of European identity
confirming previous findings (Bruter 2004, 2005; Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004).18
16 In Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia – the three non-EU countries included in the survey – 43,6 per cent feel simultaneously European and as a world citizen, while 16,8 per cent reject both identities. Only 6,2 per cent feel European but not citizen of the world, and an impressive 33,3 per cent are world citizens not feeling European. 17 Also impressive are the percentages of those in the EU27 who feel belonging to Europe: three quarters also feel as citizens of the world, only one quarter reject this broader identity. 36 per cent of those without European attachment feel as a citizen of the world, against 64 per cent not attached to either entity. 18 In addition, here again, we find considerable differences between countries, with almost 80 per cent of the respondents referring to democratic values in Sweden in contrast to only a fourth of the population in Portugal, Poland and Latvia. Yet, as already mentioned, country differences have to be analysed in another paper.
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Figure 5: European identity elements (EU27, 2009, percentages)
42,1
26,8 27,2
22,921,7
11,1
7,7
,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
45,0
Dem
ocra
tic
valu
es
Geogra
phy
Socia
l Pro
tectio
n
Com
mon h
isto
ry
Com
mon C
ultu
re
Entr
epre
neurs
hip
Relig
ious
herita
ge
Question: (QE1) “In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important elements that go to make up a European identity?” Source: Eb 71.3 (N=26830)
However, the predominantly civic framing of European identity does not so neatly hold when
assessed in a different way. Directly compared to national identity construction, the
characteristics associated with being European do not differ a lot from those used to describe
nationality. Citizens’ rights, the prototype of a civic identity construction, is with 29 per cent
exactly as important on the European as on the national level. Feeling (European or nationality)
and place of birth, which are again typical for civic constructions of collective identities, are
slightly less mentioned for European identity than for national identity. More difference is
found with respect to cultural elements such as language and traditions; both seem to be less
important on the European level, but still 22 and 31 per cent respectively mention these
commonalities as anchors for European identity. Even parentage and being Christian, the most
exclusive and ethnic way to construct a community, are not much less important on the
European than on the national level (Table 2). This evidence has to make us cautious to
conclude too fast that European identity construction is, due to its inherent enormous cultural
diversity, automatically more inclusive and civic than national identity construction. In contrast
it seems that, on average, European identity is in average as inclusively or exclusively
constructed as national identities; it also shows a mix of civic, cultural and ethnic elements.
Table 2: Characteristics of European and national identity (EU27, 2009)
Feeling Place of Birth
Cultural traditions
Citizens' rights
Brought up Language
Paren-tage
Be Christian
Partici-pation
European identity 44,0 37,2 31,0 29,0 26,9 22,1 12,1 8,4
5,3
National identity 46,3 41 36,7 29,5 25,8 31,7 14,2 11,7
4,7
Questions (QE2) “People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). In your view, among the following, what do you think are the most important characteristics to be (NATIONALITY)?” (QE3) “And in terms of being European, among the following, what do you think are the most important characteristics?” Source: Eb 71.3 (N=26830)
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In addition it is an important finding that there is no unanimity with respect to the question
what makes up a European identity (see also Westle 2003). This makes the question whether
there is more consensus on the boundaries of it, drawn either to the external world or to internal
‘others’, even more relevant.
Boundaries of European identity
External boundary drawing
As elaborated above, cosmopolitans do not draw boundaries around particular groups but
instead think in inclusive terms. Such an outlook applied to the European collective would
mean in respect to the external world to accept new members as well as to internally accept
newcomers, such as immigrants, and to embrace cultural diversity. ‘Partisans of fortress
Europe’ would not easily accept the accession of new member states nor cultural diversity and
the arrival of individual newcomers, especially of those without a European background.
Concerning the acceptance of potential new member states, the majority of Europeans
make a clear difference between countries in West Europe, such as Switzerland, Norway and
Iceland, and those on the Balkans and in Eastern Europe including Turkey (Figure 7).
Impressively, only almost half of the population in the EU25 in 2005 was in favour of the
meanwhile effectuated accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Whether this has changed since
their accession in 2007, leading to a stronger integration into the Union also by the population,
unfortunately has not been surveyed yet. However, the results of Gerhards (2007) showing
long established cultural differences between old and new member states and Turkey do not
render optimistic in this respect.
Figure 7: External boundary drawing: acceptance of potential new members (EU25, 2005, percentages)
80,9 80,6
72,4
54,5 53,748,4 46,8 44,7 44,6 43,2
35,431,2
9,3 8,9
14,2
30,6 31,4
36,8 38,2 37,7 38,5 39,5
47,9
54,4
9,9 10,413,4 14,9 14,9 14,8 15
17,6 16,8 17,2 16,714,4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Sw
itze
rland
Norw
ay
Ice
lan
d
Cro
atia
Bulg
ari
a
Rom
an
ia
Ukr
ain
e
Makedo
nia
Bosnia
-
Herz
ego
win
a
Serb
ia-
Monte
neg
ro
Alb
ania
Turk
ey
Favour Against Don't know
Question: “For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union (in the future)?” Source: Eb 64.2
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Given the unanimity of accepting the accession of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, we might
conclude that there are common justifications for defining the external borders of the EU.
However, even if these countries would be accepted by a big majority, this inclusion is not
necessarily coupled by common exclusion criteria. Except for Turkey and Albania, the
population of the ten new member states are clearly more in favour of the accession of the
potential candidates from the Balkans and Eastern Europe than the six founding member states
(Kaina 2009: 137f). In addition, the concrete reasons why some are included and others
excluded vary considerably (ibid. 139-142).
EU citizens are thus far from accepting every possible accession candidate.
Cosmopolitanism combined with open borders towards all humankind would look different. A
majority of Europeans agree to specific further enlargements, they do not regard the external
boundaries of the EU today as fixed. However, this acceptance is very limited; no majority is
in favour of including any other country than the Western European countries not members of
the EU so far. Boundaries are drawn to the external world, even if not in a uniform way. Still,
those who would accept Turkey are a minority, but with 31 per cent not an irrelevant one; and
the more inclusively oriented minority is even bigger for all other countries. Thus, we can see a
certain divide among European citizens in respect to this external boundary drawing, with a big
minority thinking very inclusively and a majority being more hesitant towards further
enlarging the EU to the East and South. The results for this majority thus support our
hypothesis that there is a relatively strong external boundary drawing towards countries which
are perceived as being culturally non Western (H3a).
As elaborated above, inclusiveness does not only concern the exterior, but especially in
our times of large international migration, a delimitated entity can be internally more or less
inclusive. I therefore look in a last step at the extent to which different groups of immigrants
and cultural diversity in general are accepted by European citizens.
Internal boundary drawing
Again, when asked whether they embrace cultural diversity, Europeans are divided. In 2009
half of them embrace cultural diversity and say that different ethnic groups enrich the cultural
life of their country. In contrast, a third disagrees with this statement, 12 per cent say this
depends on specific conditions and four per cent are not decided. These proportions are
impressively constant over the past ten years, they were exactly the same in 1999. However,
these European averages again conceal considerable country differences. While a large
majority in Sweden, namely 80 per cent, tend to embrace cultural diversity, the same large
majority tend to reject it in Malta. Malta is extreme in this respect, but also in Greece, Cyprus
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and Austria only less than a third perceive the existence of different ethnicities in their country
positively. These differences show that there is no consensus as to whether cultural diversity in
general should be embraced or not. It is therefore difficult to generalize on this aspect of
cosmopolitanism, i.e. acceptance of cultural diversity, and talk about any dominant perspective
among EU citizens as a whole. Eventually some further differentiations offer valuable clues.
This general question might hide a more differentiated pattern of accepting cultural
diversity, namely one which distinguishes between different kinds of minorities. In most
European countries, ethnic minorities mainly arise by different kinds of immigration. If there is
something like fortress Europe in the minds of Europeans, we should be able to discover a
differentiation between different circles. First of all, people would make a difference between
migrants from EU countries and those coming from outside of the EU. Furthermore it is
interesting whether this would mark a clear-cut differentiation or whether there are several
boundaries drawn in the sense of concentric circles. This would imply to differentiate again, for
example, between migrants from Eastern Europe and others. Or whether it is less about where
people come from geographically than more about their different religion. Whether these
assumptions stand empirical scrutiny shows the following figure.
Figure 8: Acceptance of different groups of immigrants (EU15, 2000, percentages)
17,6
20,5
27,825,5
39,7
58,459,7
55,257,3
46,5
16,7
12,610,5 10,1
77,3 7,1 6,4 7,1 6,8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Muslim migrants Eastern Europeans Refugees Asylum seekers EU migrants
be accepted, without restrictions be accepted, but with restrictions not be accepted don't know
Questions: „If people from Muslim countries wish to work here in the European Union, do you think that they should ... “ “And what about people coming from Eastern Europe who wish to work in the West?”, “And what about people fleeing from countries where there is a serious international conflict?”, “And what about citizens of other countries of the European Union, who wish to settle in (OUR COUNTRY)” Source: Eb53 (2000, Q54-58), N= 16078
As for the fifteen old member states in 200019, we can say that indeed European migrants are
clearly more accepted without restrictions (almost 40 per cent) than all other kinds of migrants.
The group least accepted without restrictions (under 18 per cent) are Muslim migrants without
19 Unfortunately, this differentiated evaluation of immigrants from different countries has not been assessed in the new member states.
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any specifications why they migrate. Taking together conditional and unconditional
acceptance, Muslims again are the least liked ones with 76 per cent accepting them compared
to 80 per cent for Eastern Europeans, 82,8 for Asylum seekers, 83 for refugees and, again the
highest acceptance, 86 per cent for EU migrants. Still, it is relatively surprising that the
difference in the overall acceptance of EU migrants and other migrants is with max. 10 per cent
not huge. This difference could merely be interpreted as a hint towards the existence of fortress
Europe; we can not (yet) discover clear-cut internal boundaries including migrants from EU
countries and excluding all other migrants. European citizens thus differentiate between
European and non-European immigrants (H3b), however the difference is not very big.
The results furthermore show that for a considerable part of Europeans religious
background indeed seems to be important. The relative highest rejection of Muslim migrants
confirms analyses of Islamophobia in Europe to a certain extent and one might expect that the
figure would be a lot higher if this question was raised after the terrorist attacks of September
2001. Unfortunately, the same question has not been asked in more recent surveys. However,
we can use instead a widespread indicator of prejudice, namely the acceptance or rather
rejection as neighbours of members of specific groups or with specific stigmata raised by the
European Value Survey (Figure 9). In 2000, Muslims were mentioned by 17,3 per cent of the
population in the then 25 member and accession states. This percentage has indeed raised by 6
per cent points to 23 per cent in the EU27 in 2008. This rejection rate is higher than the
rejection of immigrants and guest workers in general (17,7 per cent) and of those with a
different race (13,7 per cent). Yet, in comparison to other stigmatised groups, for example drug
addicts or people with a criminal record, this rejection rate is much lower. It is also by far
overtaken by the rejection of Gypsies which are mentioned by almost 40 per cent of the
respondents. This minority spread over many member states continues to be one of the most
vulnerable and discriminated groups in Europe.
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Figure 9: Rejection as neighbors (EU27, 2008, percentages)
67,5
57,550,8
39,5 36,433
28,8 28,7 27,623,1
17,713,7 12,8 11,3
5,6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Dru
g a
ddic
ts
Heavy d
rinkers
People
with
crim
inal re
cord
Gypsie
s
Em
otionally
unsta
ble
Rig
ht extr
em
ists
Hom
osexuals
People
with A
IDS
Left e
xtr
em
ists
Muslim
s
Imm
igra
nts
/guest
work
ers
People
of
diffe
rent ra
ce
Jew
s
Larg
e fam
ilies
Christians
Not liked as neighbors
Question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?” Source: European Value Study, 4th wave, 2008.
These results are strengthened and even more pronounced referring to the same question in the
Eurobarometer (Figure 10). Only 33 per cent of the respondents in the EU27 in 2008 feel
comfortable with a Roma as a neighbour. The acceptance of homosexuals is also surprisingly
low with only about half of the population, lower than the acceptance of people of different
ethnic origin (61 per cent). People with a different religion or belief are even more widely
accepted as neighbours (67 per cent). In light of these results, we have to reject our hypothesis
that among minority groups, European citizens are least willing to accept Muslims (H3c).
Figure 10: Acceptance as neighbors (EU27, 2008, percentages)
25,8
12,85,9 3,9 2,0
32,7
19,022,2
16,211,3
33,0
55,560,9
67,4
76,0
6,510,7 10,0 11,7 10,2
,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
Roma Homosexuals Diff ethnic
origin
Diff
religion/belief
Disabled
person
Uncomfortable Fairly comfortable Comfortable Indifferent
Question: “For each of the following situations, please tell me how you would personally feel about it. (from very uncomfortable to totally comfortable) Having a … as a neighbour.” Source: Eb 69.1 (N=26746)
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Analysing the influence of different identity patterns on the acceptance of migrants we find that
those who identify exclusively with Europe are twice as willing as those with exclusive
national identification to accept all kinds of migrants without restrictions. Those with dual
identification with both territorial levels lie in between. Exclusive national identity is also
constantly more related to rejecting migrants of all kinds. Thus, the more Europeans identify
with Europe, the more they embrace cultural diversity – and vice versa.20 Yet, among all
identity patterns, we find considerably more acceptance of EU migrants than of others.
In addition to the repeated pattern of more acceptance of EU migrants, more than a
third (36 per cent) of the citizens in the old member states in 2000 think that there are too many
non EU immigrants in their country. This conviction is a further hint of the existence of
Eurocentrist orientations among a considerably large minority in Europe. Still, a majority (57
per cent) does not think so. However, more recent numbers taken from the European Value
Study in 2008 and concerning immigrants in general are more pronounced. 46 per cent of the
respondents in the 27 member states say that there are too many immigrants in their country,
only 31,3 disagree with this statement and 22,7 per cent are undecided. This shows a further
increase in the salience of the issue of immigration and a strong tendency in European societies
to shore up against outsiders.
When we consider more down to earth questions that concern the daily life in our
multicultural European societies, cultural boundaries are less clearly drawn. An overwhelming
majority (80 per cent) does not feel disturbed by the opinions, customs or way of life of people
different from themselves, neither of those of another nationality, nor of another race nor
religion. Only around 15 per cent say they do indeed feel disturbed by such people, but
interestingly, the results are very similar for each group, with even slightly less rejection (of 2
per cent) of people of another religion. In contrast to the results above, this contradicts the
widespread assumption of Islamophobia in Europe. Overall, this last indicator draws a picture
of Europeans which are in daily life more tolerant towards cultural differences than their
general attitude towards immigration and cultural diversity would make us expect.
Overall, however, most indicators of boundary drawing point to the fact that a majority
of Europeans delimitate the European in-group to the exterior as well as to the interior. This is
in line with the assumptions of social identity theory on the necessity of boundaries for
collective identity construction (see also Duchesne and Frognier 2008). These findings show a
mixed picture of boundaries drawn around and within Europe which is not so neatly
compatible with cosmopolitanism.
20 Asked whether different ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of their society, 55 per cent of those who feel belonging to Europe agree (31 per cent disagree) against only 39 per cent of those who have no European sense of belonging (44 per cent of which disagree).
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Relationships between the supra-national identity patterns
So far, I have not yet treated my second hypothesis, split into three statements concerning the
relationship between different kinds of European identity construction and cosmopolitanism.
For this endeavour, we have to analyse these constructs with the help of a synthesizing
empirical method. The reflections on the relationship between European and cosmopolitan
identification as well as on different content and boundaries can be captured in a structural
equation model (Figure 12). Such a model allows analysing various relationships as well as
measuring various latent constructs, in our case various forms of collective identity, by several
indicators simultaneously. The aim is to evaluate whether different types of European identity
constructions differently influence cosmopolitanism and thus whether the strong influence of
emotional identification with Europe on cosmopolitan identity found above is mediated by
these various forms of European identity construction.
Cosmopolitanism, civic as well as cultural European identity constructions are each
measured with two indicators derived from the discussion above. Cosmopolitanism
encompasses the feeling as a world citizen as well as the acceptance of cultural diversity
(“minorities enrich the life of our country”). Civic European identity is measured by reference
to democratic values and citizens’ rights as the most important elements of European identity.
Cultural European identity again is based on the mentioning of common cultural traditions and
common history as the basis of European identity. Confirmatory factor analysis scores of more
than .3 allow considering these latent variables to be sufficiently measured by the selected
indicators (see Brown 2006). An ethnic construction of European identity is based on the
reference to ancestry (European parentage) as basis of European identity; a similar second
indicator was unfortunately not available.
The evaluation of this model relies on the accepted standards of Hu and Bentler (1999):
A CFI above 0.90, an RMSEA below 0.06 and an SRMR below 0.08 indicate acceptable model
fit. The global fit measures of our model indicate that we can indeed draw conclusions from
this model to reality. The analyses are based on covariance matrices and robust maximum
likelihood estimates using AMOS. Already with this restricted selection of influencing factors
we can explain 39 per cent of the variance in cosmopolitanism. However, the large residuals
also draw to our attention that many other factors influence these complex identity patterns.
This model demonstrates that the different ways to construct European identity indeed
influence cosmopolitanism differently. A civic European identity has a strong and positive
influence on cosmopolitanism (r = .55), confirming hypothesis (2a). The second hypothesis
expected that a cultural construction of European identity is negatively correlated with
cosmopolitanism (H2b). To our surprise, this is not the case and we have to reject this
hypothesis. Also here we find a positive though clearly less strong relationship with
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cosmopolitanism (r = .27). This finding is puzzling and calls for more detailed analysis what
kind of cultural traditions people have in mind when they think of such commonalities on the
European level. We can assume that these traditions refer among others to a common political
culture. This might explain the positive relationship to cosmopolitanism. Finally, in accordance
with our expectation, an ethnic European identity is negatively related to cosmopolitanism
(H2c). However, this negative relationship is not very strongly (r = -.08), leaving considerable
room for a very exclusive construction of European identity and simultaneous attachment to
the idea of a world citizen. In these cases the exclusionary tendencies of ethnic nationalism is
simply enlarged to the European level and at the same time embedded in a broader community
of humankind; or this puzzling combination is simply due to hypocrisy.
Figure 12: Relationship between European identity constructions and cosmopolitanism
(EU27, 2009)
All regression coefficients are significant on the 0,01 level.
Model Fit Measures CFI = ,901; SRMR = ,0239; RMSEA = ,040; PClose = 1,00; CMIN/DF = 46,758 Source: Eb 73.1 (2009, N = 28 960)
Including the classically assumed influencing factors education and age (for a better readability
of the figure not shown in the model here) they have surprisingly little effects. Education has a
small positive influence on a civic frame of EU identity as well as on cosmopolitanism and age
has a slightly negative effect on these constructs. Thus the different ways to construct
European identity are stronger related to cosmopolitanism than these classical socio-
demographic controls. However, we have to be cautious about interpreting the direction of the
causal path. Indeed, cosmopolitanism is influencing the different elements of European identity
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construction in exactly the same way and in almost the same strength. Thus we have equivalent
models which are confirmed by the data. In order to find out the final causality between these
correlations and the most valid model, we would need panel data or experiments. With the data
at hand we can thus not decide what comes first, a cosmopolitan or a civic European identity. It
might well be that finally both constructs are influenced by deeper value orientations such as
universalism which is one of ten basic human value types postulated by Schwartz (1994).
Conversely, an ethnic construction of European identity might be based on Eurocentrist
convictions in parallel to nationalist orientations which again are known to be related to deeper
ethnic prejudices (e.g. Wagner et al. 2010), motivating some to reject cosmopolitanism
stronger than others who use the same frame of European identity. Yet overall, and for our
research question most importantly, we can retain that there are remarkable relationships
between the different ways to construct European identity and cosmopolitanism which go in
the expected directions except for the unexpectedly positive relationship between cultural
European identity and cosmopolitanism.
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper allows drawing several conclusions and, at the same time, leaves us
with important open questions. First of all, an impressively large majority of Europeans today
manifest supra-national identities. Almost two thirds feel simultaneously European and citizens
of the world without actually loosing their attachment to national or regional entities. Thus,
multiple identities on different territorial levels including the global level are widespread in
Europe today. Furthermore, European and cosmopolitan identification measured on the
emotional level go hand in hand, they are strongly and positively correlated. Thus to leave the
national frame of reference and to enlarge collective identity construction in order to include
other Europeans indeed seems to be one step in the direction of including all humankind into
one’s consciousness. Emotionally, a majority of Europeans are cosmopolitans and from first
sight no partisans of fortress Europe.
The picture becomes more complicated when one digs deeper into the question on what
commonalities and boundaries these emotional identification patterns rest, i.e. how the
emerging European identity is concretely constructed. Civic elements such as peace and
democracy are indeed very important references made when Europeans think of their common
identity. However, common culture and history are also important. Thus European identity
seems to be constructed – as we know it from national identities – by referring to a mix of
civic, cultural and – though to a clearly less degree – even ethnic elements. Still, civic elements
dominate on the European level. However, without going back as far as to the very exclusive
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form of democracy in ancient Athens we know that also civic elements such as democratic
values can be applied to a clearly demarcated entity with restrictive membership rules. And
indeed, the majority of Europeans are far from propagating open borders, neither for every
potential new member state nor for all kinds of newcomers to their society. Western European
countries would be accepted into the EU, neighbours further to the East overwhelmingly not.
This is thus no sign of a cosmopolitan construction of the European community but a particular
and demarcated conception of it which is rooted in Western Europe.
With respect to boundaries which are drawn within European societies and which
concern different immigrant groups, the results showed that EU migrants are indeed more
accepted than others. Thus the Polish plumber seems to be more ‘part of the crew’ than the
African refugee due to his European passport. However, the difference is not very big and
certainly does not mark a clear inclusion of all Europeans and exclusion of non-Europeans.
Large majorities accept at least with restrictions also Eastern Europeans, Muslims or refugees,
exhibiting a considerable degree of conditional openness to all kinds of immigrants. However,
the impression that there are too many immigrants rose in the past decade considerably. Still,
so far, although half of the Europeans do not embrace cultural diversity warm-heartedly, they
would not go as far as to really (and openly) favour a fortress Europe with impassable borders
around and within European societies. People with different ethnic or religious origin, also
Muslims, are by large majorities accepted with the important exception of Roma. The open
rejection of this widespread minority group calls for more scientific and political attention.
Apart from this exception, Eurocentrist constructions of European identity are (so far) in a
minority. This reminds us that there is a lot of space for wise political decisions and
constructive solutions for the sensitive challenges and problems created by immigration and
xenophobia in European societies.
Again, Europeans are not receiving everybody with open arms, but especially those
who identify with this culturally diverse Europe are open to others and proofed to be rather
cosmopolitans. This is especially the case for those who construct European identity in a civic
way, or in whose European identity civic elements predominate. But even a cultural
construction of European identity does not necessarily stand in the way of developing
cosmopolitanism – in contrast to ethnic elements in European identity construction which
usually do not go hand in hand with cosmopolitan identity. However, repeatedly it became
evident that it is difficult to talk about European averages. Country differences in the extent of
cosmopolitan identity, democratic values for European identity construction as well as
acceptance of cultural diversity are immense and call for further explanation. Thus in spite of
the need to transcend national boundaries in research on postnational identity, it seems to be
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necessary to analyse influencing factors on the national level and to find out national
particularities which might be especially prone to lead to cosmopolitanism.
For our analysis in this paper we can conclude that a kind of demarcated
cosmopolitanism prevails among Europeans and especially among those who also emotionally
identify with this postnational entity. The results concerning still existing boundaries around
and within European societies might make us interpret this finding as bigotry. A more generous
interpretation might take into account the way we are used to think of democracy. The
widespread demarcation tendencies might exist not in spite of the big relevance of democratic
values among the European public, but precisely because of it. Theoretically as well as
empirically, we are thus far used to think of democratic rule within a demarcated political
community; the demos is conceived of as a demarcated entity constituting the sovereign of
political rule. It might therefore be only logic for Europeans who value democracy that it
should be implemented in a demarcated political community on the European level as well.
This need for demarcation might also be strengthened by the widespread conviction that
collective identities need external boundaries, even though in theory this does not necessarily
have to be the case (see Abizadeh 2005). The results show that boundaries (still) exist in
Europe, to the outside as well as with reference to internal others. Thus, widespread
cosmopolitan orientations do not necessarily bring about the erosion of demarcation,
rootedness and community building on lower levels.
This nuanced picture of cosmopolitanism in Europe and simultaneous boundary
drawing allows cautious conclusions in respect to supra-national forms of governance in this
region. On the one hand, on the basis of the widespread feeling to belong to the world as a
whole we can expect a considerable concern about issues that transcend national and even
continental borders such as environmental protection. On the other hand, the majority of
political issues should be treated within familiar political communities, may they be national
ones or increasingly European one. Such an approach would be in line with the subsidiarity
rule which is applied in European affairs and which is proposed to be enlarged by scholars on
cosmopolitan democracy (Held 2003; Archibugi and Held 1998; for their explicit application
to democracy in the EU see Eriksen 2006; Eriksen and Fossum 2007; Olsen 2011). The
postnational identity patterns empirically detected in this paper are compatible with an
innovative enlargement of such institutional arrangements.
Thus overall, it seems too idealistic to expect Europeans to be citizens of the world
without still referring to a demarcated community. The evidence in this paper points to the
necessity to demarcate political communities. However, we still have ample work to do to
conceive of visions and concrete implementations of citizenship and political community
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beyond the nation-state in imaginative ways, thus to offer institutional, democratic and
symbolic references for Europeans and individuals worldwide who identify as world citizens
and would still like to preserve a bounded political community integrated in and able to act on
different levels of political rule. With respect to Europe and the prevailing collective identity
we can pursue several avenues since Europe’s identity is tied to Europe’s relations not only to
the external world and its internal social others; the relationship to its own past is also highly
important. For some people, the European heritage has to do with the triumph of secularism
over faith, so Enlightenment thinking and intellectual life are the cornerstone and ideal. For
others, Europe’s historic lessons come mainly from the painful experiences and barbaric
excesses against humanity before and during the Second World War (Habermas 2001). This
kind of boundary construction involves former generations, regimes and political ideologies
against which an in-group might be defined as being different from the former. This would
lend the necessary demarcation to universalistic values without creating a living out-group
except those who still adhere to similar values like those of former generations. There is no
necessary zero-sum relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism. The future of
supra-national identities is more related to the question to which extent cosmopolitanism is
conceptualized as a positive form of belonging rather than as the absence of particularism.
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