Corrections & additions to testimony of PS Barry,CK Seaman & S … · 2020. 3. 9. · s CERTIFICATE...
Transcript of Corrections & additions to testimony of PS Barry,CK Seaman & S … · 2020. 3. 9. · s CERTIFICATE...
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ATTACHMENT 1<50. Q. What do thoco cnolycso chsw? .
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A. The fracture analysis demonstrated that.the Shoreham
vessel has a high margin of protection against brittlefracture following a design basis LOCA. For example,
1 1/2 inchesickness flaw,$m agaimst
for a uarter6afd rher
deep and 9 inches long, thegbri[tle fracture - ' / siO' = q' r %^ factor of 2. ,
51. Q. What causes the high brittle fracture margin in the
Shoreham vessel?
A. The Shoreham vessel has significant advantages since
the key f actors required for unstable crack propagation-- radiation embrittlement and high pressure stresses
following thermal shock -- do not occur in a BWR. The
reasons for this are:
(1) The radiation flux level at the wall location inthe Shoreham vessel is not enough to cause appre-
ciable embrittlement of the vessel during its life-
time. 'The low radiation flux level is due to thefact that there is a water annulus between the.core and the vessel, and that there is low power
density in a BWR. Thus the toughness level re-
quired to assure ductile behavior is maintained
throughout the design life.
(2) Unstable crack propagation requires the presence of
pressure stresses following the ttiermal shock.However, in a BWR, when there is emergency
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8207120169 820707PDR ADOCK 05000322T PDR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
In the Matter ofLONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
I hereby certify that copies of CORRECTIONS ANDADDITIONS TO THE " TESTIMONY OF PETER S. BARRY, CRAIG K. SEAMANAND SAM RANGANATH ON SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTION 25 AND SHOREHAMOPPONENTS COALITION 19 (a) -- PRESERVICE AND INSERVICE
'
INSPECTION PROGRAM AND REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL INTEGRITY" wereserved upon the following by first-class mail, postage prepaid,on July 7, 1982:
Lawrence Brenner, Esq. Atomic Safety and LicensingAdministrative Judge Appeal Board PanelAtomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Board Panel CommissionU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and LicensingBoard Panel i
'Dr. Peter A. Morris U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryAdministrative Judge Commission |
Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555Board Panel
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.Commission David A. Repka, Esq.
Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission
Dr. James H. Carpenter Washington, D.C. 20555Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing David J. Gilmartin, Esq.
Board Panel Attn: Patricia A. Dempsey, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory County Attorney
Commission Suffolk County Department of LawWashington, D.C. 20555 Veterans Memorial Highway
Hauppauge, New York 11787
| Secretary of the Commission Stephen B. Latham, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Twomey, Latham & SheaCommission 33 West Second Street
,Washington, D.C. 20555 P. O. Box 398
| Riverhead, New York 11901
Herbert H. Brown, Esq. Ralph Shapiro, Esq.Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. Cammer and Shapiro, P.C.Karla J. Letsche, Esq. 9 East 40th StreetKirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, New York, New York 11901
'
Christopher & Phillips Albany, New York 12223
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8th Floor |
1900 M Street, N.W. Howard L. Blau, Esq. l
Washington, D.C. 20036 217 Newbridge RoadHicksville, New York 11801
Mr. Mark W. GoldsmithEnergy Research Group Matthew J. Kelly, Esq.400-1 Totten Pond Road State of New YorkWaltham, Massachusetts 02154 Department of Public Service
Three Empire State PlazaMHB Technical Associates Albany, New York 122231723 Hamilton AvenueSuite K Mr. Jay DunklebergerSan Jose, California 95125 New York State Energy Office
Agency Building 2Empire State PlazaAlbany, New York 12223
Respectfully submitted,
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
0bh e' Daniel O. FlanaganNJ
Hunton & Williams707 East Main StreetP.O. Box 1535Richmond, Virginia 23212
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LILCO, June 14, 1982*
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
In the Matter of ))
LONG IST,AND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL))
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF PETER S. BARRY,CRAIG K. SEAMAN AND SAM RANGANATH
ON SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTION 25 ANDSHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION 19(a) --
PRESERVICE AND INSERVICE INSPECTIONPROGRAM AND REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL INTEGRITY
PURPOSE ,
This testimony demonstrates that the preservice inspec- t
tion (PSI) and inservice inspection (ISI) programs comply with
| 10 CFR 50.55a(g). The technology and the methods used in the
f examinations are established by the ASME Code and assure the i
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l effectiveness of the inspection programs. Basic technology
will not undergo significant change so that there will be somei
correlation between the PSI and ISI results.
! Shoreham has taken numerous steps to reduce the number
of noninspectable areas so that a high percentage of the plant,
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will be inspected. However, it is not necessary for all areas
of a plant to be inspected. The same controls on the quality
of welding materials, the same welding techniques and quality
assurance programs assure that noninspected welds have the same
quality as inspected welds. For this reason, relief requests
will have no impact on the safety of Shoreham. Exemptions,
similarly, have no impact on safety, because they are permittedwhen suitable alternatives have been performed.
The significant quality control requirements of
Regulatory Guide L.150 have been met or exceeded for the pre-
service inspection of the reactor vessel. The Regulatory Guide
does not establish " travel time," nor does it deal with ALARA
Regulatory Guide 1.2 has been complied with atconcerns.Shoreham and the Shoreham pressure vessel will behave in a
non-brittle manner.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION!
.Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
| In the Matter of )! )i LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)| )i (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )' Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF PETER S. BARRY,CRAIG K. SEAMAN AND SAM PANGANATH
ON SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTION 25 ANDSHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION 19(a) --
PRESERVICE AND INSERVICE INSPECTION-| PROGRAM AND REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL INTEGRITY
1. Q. Would you please state your names?|
| A. My name is Peter S. Barry. My business address is!
! Nuclear Energy Services, Shelter Rock Road, Danbury,l
| Connecticut 06810.t
My name is Craig K. Seaman. My business address is
Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station, P. O. Box 618, Wading River, New York 11772.
My name is Sam Ranganath. My business address is
General Electric Company, 175 Curtner Avenue, San Jose,
California.
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2. Q. Would you please summarize your professional
qualifications?
A. (Barry) I am director of Technical Operations for
Inservice Inspection activities for Nuclear Energy
Services. I hold both ASNT and NES Level III
Certifications in Ultrasonics and have been involved
with all aspects of Inservice Inspection Programs for
Nuclear Power Plants. A complete resume appears on
pages 21-22.
(Seaman) I am Senior Project Engineer for engineering
mechanics, power systems and structural engineering at
the Shoreham Nuclear Power Project. I am responsible
for the development of the Shoreham Pre-Service
Inspection Program. I have worked for the Daniel
International Corporation at the Enrico Fermi II
Nuclear Project in Michigan as an Engineer. A complete
resume appears on pages 23-24.
(Ranganath) I am a Manager of the Fracture Analysis
Unit for General Electric Company. I have been active
in the field of stress analysis for the past 10 years
both as an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Santa
Clara and as an employee of General Electric Company.
A complete resume appears on pages 25-26.
3. Q. Would you please identify which portion of the testi-
mony you are sponsoring?
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A. (Barry) I am co-sponsoring with Mr. Seaman the testi-
mony on SC 25, and am sponsoring the testimony on SOC
19(a)(1) and (2)..
(Seaman) I am co-sponsoring the testimony on SC 25
with Mr. Barry, and am sponsoring the testimony on SOC
19(a)(3).
(Ranganath) I am sponsoring the testimony on SOC
19(a)(4).
4. Q. Would you please summarize your conclusions presented
in this testimony?
A. The preservice inspection (PSI) and inservice inspec-
tion (ISI) programs meet with the applicable ASME Code
and therefore comply with 10 CFR 50.55a(g). In partic-
ular, the technology and the methods by which they are;
| applied in the examinations are established by the ASME
Code and together they assure the effectiveness of the
inspection programs. Because the basic technology will
not undergo significant change, there will be some cor-
relation between the PSI and ISI results.
Shoreham has taken a number of steps to reduce the num-
ber of noninspectable areas and a high percentage of
the plant will be inspected. Moreover, it is not
| necessary for all areas of a plant to be inspected
because results from inspected areas can be extended to!
noninspectable areas. The same controls on the quality
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of welding materials, the same welding techniques and
quality assurance programs assure that noninspected
welds have the same quality as inspected welds. For
this reason, relief requests will have no impact on the
safety of Shoreham. Exemptions, similarly, have no
impact on safety, because they are permitted when
suitable alternatives have been performed.
On SOC Contention 19(a)(1), the significant quality
control requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.150 for the,
preservice inspection of the reactor vessel have been
met or exceeded. The Regulatory Guide does not estab-
lish " travel time," nor does it deal with ALARA con-
cerns. Finally, Regulatory Guide 1.2 has been complied
with at Shoreham. The Shoreham pressure vessel will r
behave in a non-brittle manner.
5. Q. Are you familiar with SC Contention 25?
A. Yes. The first part of the contention states that
"LILCO has not adequately demonstrated the effective-
ness of the technology and methods available that are
required to satisfy the inspection and tests specified
by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 32, 36, 39 and 45."
6. Q. What inspection and tests are specified by GDC 32, 36,
39 and 45?
A. Those GDC's do not establish any inspections or tests
-- they deal with the design of various systems.
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7. Q. Do the technology and methods used for the preservice
and inservice inspection programs meet applicable
standards?.
A. Yes. These inspections are established by, and conduc-
ted in accordance with the requirements of Section V of
the ASME Code, as required by 10 CFR 50.55(a)(g).
Shoreham usas four basic techniques for its inspection
program: ultrasonic testing, magnetic particle examin-
ation, liquid penetrant testing and visual examination.
This technology and the methods by which it is applied
is effective.
8. Q. What assurance do you have that the PSI examinations
are being conducted in accordance with the ASME_ Code?
A. In addition to LILCO's and NES Quality Assurance
Programs, the ASME Code requires that an independent
third party organization verify that the PSI and ISI
Programs comply with all requirements of the ASME Code.
LILCO has retained the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
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and Insurance Company to perform these functions.
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9. Q. The County next contends that the PSI technology cannot:
be correlated to that used in the ISI program. Is the'
County correct?
| A. No. The same technology is planned for use in both the
PSI and ISI programs: liquid penetrant, ultrasonic
i testing, magnetic particle testing and visual examina-
tion. These technologies are not expected to undergo
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significant changes. However, future amendments in the
ASME Code may require different tests or methods of
performing those tests.
10. Q. Even if there are different methodologies for conduct-
ing the examinations, will there be some correlation
between PSI and ISI examinations?
A. Yes, there will always be some correlation because the
technology remains essentially the same. Even where
methodologies change, correlation will remain.
11. Q. What is the purpose of having correlation between the
PSI and ISI programs?
A. Results of the PSI can be used to establish the
baseline condition of the welds. By comparing ISI
results to this baseline condition, a determination can
be made as to whether a new indication has appeared or
whether an indication has grown in size.
12. Q. Is it necessary that there be exact correlation between
PSI and ISI inspections?
A. No. Each indication disclosed during an ISI examina-
tion can be evaluated on its own without reference to
the PSI results. For every examination performed the
Code defines acceptance standards, and for this reason,
each ISI examination can be evaluated on its own with-
out reference to the PSI. Indeed, the ASME Code itself
changes, so that methodologies, will be different for
the various ISI inspections.
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13. Q. Let's move on to the next concern of the County which
is that "results from the inspected areas of the
reactor pressure boundary cannot be extended to.
non-inspectable areas." Is the County correct?
A. No. It is not necessary to inspect each area to have a
reasonable assurance that it does not have cracks.
Based on accepted statistical analyses, you can demon-
strate a very high probability that the non-inspected
areas are of the same quality as the inspected areas.
14. Q. Why does that assurance exist?
A. The results in the very high percentage of inspectable
areas can be extended to non-inopectable areas. This
assurance exists for a number of reasons: all mate-
r'.als, including welding materials, must meet the same
Code material specifications; all welding procedures
and techniques must meet the same Code requirements;
all welders are qualified in accordance with the same
Code Standards; and a common quality assurance program
must be applied to all of this work. All work is per-
formed in accordance with the appropriate Edition of
the ASME Code for construction, thereby establishingi
the " base-line" quality of these components.
Therefore, excellent correlation in terms of quality
exists.
15. Q. Has Shoreham requested exemptions from the inspection
program because the design and piping configurations
pre-date the latest Code?,
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A. No. The Code establishes exemptions because it has
been determined that.if a plant meets;certain condi-'
- tions,7 1t is unnecessary to inspect the_ exempted areas.:
16. Q. Can you give a'n exanpl'e?
A. Yes. ASME Code XI? Section'IS-121(c), for example,/
| 'provides that ifi certain piping componants, less than 1,
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| inch in diameter, are usually inspected during hydros-
tatic testing, they do not.nesd to'be: tested using
additional methods.
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17. Q. So, in other words, exemptions from inspections are
provided in the Code, regardless of the date of thet
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plant's design?
A. Yes.;
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,18. Q. The County contends that the exemptions and' waivers
,vi$1_have an impact on the safety of the plant. Will~
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A '.~ No. Gy-definition, exempt, ions, as discussed above, arepermitted by the ASME Code when' suitable alternatives
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have been met. So exemptions have no impact on safety..
By " waiver," the County probably means relief requests.~
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Theae requests will be evaluated for th~eir impact on
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not be inspected there is a reasonable assurance of
their qaality.i
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19. Jg. What has LILCO done to mitigate the, number of areas for
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which relief requests will be. sought?
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A. First, all welds on the reactor vessel have received a
pre-service inspection to verify the quality of the
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welds. Additionally, accessibility for ISI was a.
design parameter for Shoreham. For areas where the
nondestructive testing (NDE) specified by the Code can-
not be performed, alternative NDE techniques will be
utilized to the maximum extent possible. While perfor-
ming the PSI, some areas have been identified where
interferences would limit ISI examination. Wherever
possible, corrective action, such as modification of
pipe supports, attachments, or structural steel, has
been taken. Weld profiles that will enhance ISI exa-
minations were specified in construction documents.
Removable insulation was specified for areas anticipa-
ted to be included in the ISI scope.
20. Q. Were any other actions taken?
A. Yes. In recognition of anticipated ISI examination
| requirements, Shoreham installed a fixed inspection
track system in the reactor vessel cavity. The track
system is designed to carry remote ultrasonic examina-
tion scanning equipment, thereby overcoming the limited
access in the vessel area. When ASME Code changes
indicated additional areas would have to be examined
during ISI, LILCO contracted with NES to provide addi-
tional inspection track capabilities. These tracks
serve the same purpose and function as the orginal
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fixed system, but are installed and magnetically held
in place during outages when ISI is to be performed.
The magnetic tracks have already undergone a field test
program to assure their satisfactory operation. The
combined effect of the two track systems is to maximize
| areas which can be examined.
21. Q. When will the extent of the exemptions and relief
requests be identified?
A. At present, the PSI Program is still ongoing. Upon
completion, it will specify the number of non-
inspectable areas for PSI but all will have been eval-
uated for safety considerations. The exact number of
non-inspectable areas for ISI cannot be identified
until the precise ISI program is finalized. Shoreham
must meet the ASME Code that is in effect twelve months
prior to the date of the issuance of the operating
license, which has not yet been determined. The ISI
Program will be finalized once the applicable Code
Edition and Addenda are defined. It should be noted
that changes in the Code have been monitored and steps,
such as the use of magnetic tracks have been taken, in
anticipation of ISI requirements.
22. Q. Suffolk County contends that Shoreham will not meet 10:
| CFR 50.55(a)(g) because it will not comply with thet
appropriate ASME Code. Will Shoreham comply with the|
applicable Code?'
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A. Yes, it will for the reasons discussed above.
23. Q. Are you familiar with SOC Contention 19(a)(1)?
* A. Yes. SOC contends that the quality control of the
ultrasonic testing (UT) equipment does not meet the
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.150 and, thus, is
inadequate to provide reliable and reproducible UT
results.
24. Q. Are Regulatory Guide 1.150 requirements concerning UT
testing equipment applicable to the Shoreham reactor
pressure vessel preservice examination?
A. No. Regulatory Guide 1.150 is applicable to preservice
examinations performed after January 15, 1982.
Shoreham's preservice inspection of the reactor vessel
was completed in 1981. The significant quality control
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.150 are met or
exceeded for the equipment used to perform the Shoreham
reactor pressure vessel preservice and inservice exam-
inations.
25. Q. What is the first requirement?
A. Paragraph C.1.1 is the most important quality control
requirement of Regulatory Guide 1.150. It requires
that calibration checks of UT equipment for screen
height linearity and amplitude linearity be made within
one day preceding and one day following the examina-
tions.
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26. Q. Does Shoreham meet the frequency requirements for
calibration checks?
A. Yes. Shoreham exceeds the frequency requirements for
calibration checks because it performs these checks of
the UT testing equipment on a daily basis throughout
the examination period.
27. Q. What is the next quality control requirement for the UT
testing equipment of Regulatory Guide 1.150?
A. Paragraph C.1.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.150 requires that
screen height linearity of ultrasonic instruments be
determined according to the ASME Code within the time
limits specified above, that is, within a day prior to
and within a day following the examination.
28. Q. Does Shoreham perform the check of screen height lin-
earity in accordance with the manner and time limits
specified by the Regulatory Guide?
A. Yes. Shoreham performs the check of screen height lin-
earity in accordance with the ASME Code and performs
these checks on a daily basis, which is more frequent
than the Regulatory Guide requires.
29. Q. What is the third requirement concerning quality con-
trol of UT equipment?
A. Position C.l.3 requires that amplitude control linear-
ity be determined in accordance with the ASME Code,
1977 edition, within one day preceding and within one
day following the examination.
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30. Q. Does Shoreham comply?,
A. Yes. Shoreham follows the ASME Code for determining
amplitude control linearity, and, as with the other
checks, performs them on a daily basis.
31. Q. Why does Shoreham perform more frequent instrument
checks than required by Regulatory Guide 1.150?
A. Good practice indicates that frequent checking of
equipment is desirable because if an instrument fails
during the course of a preservice or inservice inspec-
tion examinaton, it is not necessary to repeat the
entire examination. Rather, it would only be necessary
to repeat that portion of the examination performed
since the last satisfactory equipment check.
32. Q. What are the next quality control requirements of
Regulatory Guide 1.150 and have they been met at
Shoreham?
A. The Regulatory Guide then requires that photographic
records be obtained for: (i) the frequency amplitude
curve, and (ii) the unloaded initial pulse against a
calibrated time base. These photographic records have
not been obtained for the Shoreham preservice examina-
tion of the reactor pressure vessel.
33. Q. What is the purpose of these photographic records?
A. Although records provide information regarding the spe-
cific characteristics of the frequency amplitude curve
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and pulse, their specific use is uncertain. Because of
the uncertainty of how this information could be uti-
lized to correlate different examination results, it is
likely that this requirement will be deleted or changed
in the future.
34. Q. Why are such photographic records of doubtful signifi-
cance?
A. They are only supplemental data which have no impact on
the reliability of the examinations and which will not
effect future ISI examinations. The more important
data is the screen height linearity and amplitude con-
trol linearity and, as discussed above, the performance
of these checks meet or exceed the Regulatory Guide
requirements.
35. Q. Are you familiar with SOC Contention 19(a)(2)?
A. Yes. SOC contends that "UT travel time does not meet
Regulatory Guide 1.150 and thus is inadequate to assure
detection of defects of significant length (larger than
the standard calibration holes) or significant depth."
36. Q. What ultrasonic testing examination travel time does
Regulatory Guide 1.150 establish?
A. Regulatory Guide 1.150 does not establish any UT travel
time..
37. Q. What is UT travel time?
A. In simple terms, it is the speed at which the UT
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transducer travels over the inspection or examination
surface.
38. Q. Is Shoreham's UT examination travel time adequate under
other applicable standards?
A. Yes. ASME Code XI, which is applicable to Shoreham,
restricts travel speed of test heads to a maximum of
six inches per second. The Code recognizes that
excessive travel times could result in missing
recordable indications and therefore established the
above travel speed. For Shoreham, examination speeds
were substantially less than this. Typically, travel
times were not in excess of 2 inches per second and in
no cases did the speeds exceed 6 inches per second.
39. Q. Do the regulations require Shoreham to follow ASME Code
XI?
A. Yes.
40. Q. Is the UT examination at Shoreham sufficient to detect
defects of significant length or depth?
A. Yes. NES has conducted tests to verify that the com-
bination of scan speed, pulse rate and data recording
level used at Shoreham will assure the detection of
recordable indications. Furthermore, following the
detection of a recordable indication, specific typing
and sizing of the indication in comparison to the cali-
bration standards is done in a static mode which is
identical to the examination calibration technique.
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41. Q. Are you familiar with SOC Contention 19(a)(3)?
A. Yes. SOC contends that ALARA has not been demonstrated
for examining personnel..
42. Q. Does Regulatory Guide 1.150 or 1.2 establish ALARA
guidelines?
A. No. Regulatory Guide 1.150 does not address ALARA,
therefore, it is outside the scope of this Contention.
43. Q. Are you familiar with SOC 19(a)(4)?
A. Yes. SOC contends that the structural integrity of the
pressure vessel at Shoreham has not been demonstrated
in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.2.
44. Q. Does Shoreham comply with Regulatory Guide 1.2?
A. Yes, as discussed in the FSAR, Appendix 3B, Sec. 1.2,
Shoreham complies with Regulatory Guide 1.2. The
structural integrity of the Shoreham vessel has been
evaluated to demonstrate that brittle fracture will not
occur in the Shoreham vessel as a result of a
| loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA).I
l 45. Q. What is the purpose of Regulatory Guide 1.2?
A. The injection of cold water by the emergency core cool-
ing system into a hot reactor vessel after a LOCA acci-
dent raises the concern that a vessel embrittled by.
| radiation could fail by brittle fracture because of theI
high stresses due to the thermal gradient. Regulatory
Guide 1.2 addresses this concern.
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46. Q. What are the specific requirements of Regulatory Guide !I
1.2? !
A. The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.2 are twofold. I
First, it specifies that the Heavy Section Steel
Technology (HSST) program be monitored and that mate-
rial property data developed under the program be col-
lected and analyzed to verify nonbrittle behavior of
the reactor vessel materials. Second, it requires dem-
onstration of an acceptable safety margin against brit-
tle fracture of the vessel due to ECCS operation any
time during the vessel life. If such a margin can not
be demonstrated, Regulatory Guide 1.2 requires a demon-'
stration that an engineering solution, such as anneal-
ing, could be applied to ensure adequate toughness.
47. Q. How is the requirement on data collection and use sat-
isfied in the case of Shoreham?
A. The fracture evaluation of the Shoreham vessel was
based on a material toughness curve that provides a
lower bound to the data developed under the HSST pro-
gram. An industry wide task group, including GE
experts and sponsored by the Pressure Vessel Research
Committee of the Welding Research Council, developed|
| the lower bound curve based on the toughness data gen-|
erated under the HSST program. The validity of this
| curve has been confirmed by new data produced under
several programs including those sponsored by the
Electric Power Research Institute.
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48. Q. Was a fracture evaluation performed to demonstrate
i brittle fracture margin following a LOCA?!
A. Yes. A generic evaluation was first performed to eval-,
uate the fracture margin in a BWR vessel following a
LOCA as indicated in FSAR, Appendix 3.B. Sec. 1.2.
Subsequent analyses using more recent data have con-
firmed this result. See, for example, " Fracture
Mechanics Evaluation of a Boiling Water Reactor Vessel
Following a Postulated Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident,"
Volume G, Transactions of the 5th International
' Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor
Technology, Berlin, Germany, August 1979. Shoreham
specific data confirm these generic conclusions.
49. Q. What factors were examined in the evaluations?
A. The most important factors, as discussed in the FSAR
Appendix 3B, Section 1.2 were:
(1) a comprehensive thermal analysis considering the
effect of blowdown and the low-pressure coolant
injection system reflooding;
(2) a stress analysis considering the effects of pres-
sure, temperature, and residual stresses;
(3) the radiation effect on material toughness;
(4) methods for calculating crack tip stress intensity;
associated with a nonuniform stress field following
the design basis accident.
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50. Q. What do these analyses show?
A. The fracture analysis demonstrated that the Shoreham
vessel has a high margin of protection against brittle
fracture following a design basis LOCA. For example,
for a quarter thickness flaw, 1 1/2 inches deep and 9
inches long, the safety margin against brittle fracture
is a factor of 2.
51. Q. What causes the high brittle fracture margin in the
Shoreham vessel?
A. The Shoreham vessel has significant advantages since
the key factors required for unstable crack propagation
-- radiation embrittlement and high pressure stresses
following thermal shock -- do not occur in a BWR. The
reasons for this are:
(1) The radiation flux level at the wall location in
j the Shoreham vessel is not enough to cause appre-
ciable embrittlement of the vessel during its
lifetime. The low rad..ation flux level is due to
the fact that there is a water annulus between the
core and the vessel, and that there is low power
density in a BWR. Thus the toughness level
required to assure ductile behavior is maintained
throughout the design life.
|(2) Unstable crack propagation requires the presence of
pressure stresses following the thermal shock.
However, in a BWR, when there is emergency
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injection of coolant following a LOCA, the vessel
pressure drops automatically as the temperature
drops since the pressure follows the saturation.
curve . The absence of significant pressure,
stresses assures that unstable crack propagation
will not occur in the Shoreham vessel.
54. Q. What are your conclusions on the structural integrity
of the Shoreham vessel?
A. In summary, the structural integrity of the Shoreham
vessel has been demonstrated in accordance with
Regulatory Guide 1.2 by:
(1) showing that crack propagation will not occur in
the vessel following a LOCA;
(2) using lower bound toughness properties based on
extensive materials data collected under several
research programs to verify nonbrittle behavior;
(3) assuring that a high margin of safety against brit-
| tle fracture exists for postulated accident condi-
tions throughout the design life.
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1
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Peter Stuyvesant Barry
Director of Technical Operations,
Inservice Inspection,
,
Nuclear Energy Services, Inc.4
1
My name is Peter Barry. My business address is Nuclear
Energy Services, Inc., Shelter Rock Road, Danbury, Connecticut.
I am employed by Nuclear Energy Services (NES) as the Director
of Technical Operations for its Inservice Inspection activi-
ties. I have been employed by NES since the company was formed
in 1974.
My college training (Yale University, University of
I Bridgeport) was in Liberal Arts. I have worked in the field of
Nondestructive Testing, specifically ultrasonic testing, since
1966. At that time, I took employment with Branson Instruments
Company in Stamford, a manufacturer of ultrasonic equipment and
became an Applications Engineer in 1967. Subsequently, in
1970, I took a position with Krautkramer Ultrasonics, again as
an Ultrasonic Applications Engineer. This position included
teaching responsibilities as well as field test activities.
In 1973 I joined Sperry Products Division of Automation
Industries, also a manufacturer of ultrasonic and other
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nondestructive testing equipment, again as an Applications
Engineer. It was at this time that I became involved with NDE
Applications related to Nuclear Power Plants. I became Manager
of Nuclear Applications in 1974.
I have been a Level III Examiner in ultrasonics since my.
employment with Krautkramer Ultrasonics. I currently hold both
ASNT and NES Level III Certifications in Ula.rasonics. I am
! also a member of the ASME Section XI Subcommittee's Working
Group on Nondestructive Examinations.
During my employment with NES, I have been involved with
all aspects of Inservice Inspection Programs for Nuclear Power
Plants. Currently I am responsible for establishing technical
policy for the Company's ISI activities.
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.
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Craig K. Seaman
Senior Assistant Project Engineer
Long Island Lighting Company
My name is Craig K. Seaman. My business address is
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, P.O. Box 618, Wading River, New
York. I am employed by the Long Island Lighting Company
(LILCO) as a Senior Assistant Project Engineer for engineering
mechanics, power systems and structural engineering on the
Shoreham Nuclear Power Project (Shoreham). I have been
employed by LILCO since 1979 and previously from 1975 to 1978.
I received the degree of Bachelor of Science in Engineering
from Cornell University in 1975 and have taken several graduate
level courses in Nuclear Engineering at Brooklyn Polytechnic
Institute. In 1978, I attended a course in the ASME Code
Section III and, in 1979, attended a course in the ASME Code
Section XI. In 1980, I attended the BWR Design Orientation
course at the General Electric Training Center.
I worked as an Engineer and Construction Supervisor in the
LILCO Construction Division at the Shoreham Nuclear Project
from 1975 through January 1978. From February 1978 through
.
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August 1979, I served as an Engineer for the Daniel
International Corporation at the Enrico Fermi II Nuclear
Project in Michigan.
In August 1979, I rejoined the Long Island Lighting Company
as an Assistant Project Engineer at Shoreham. In the Fall of
1979, I was assigned LILCO responsibility for development of
the Shoreham Pre-Service Inspection Program, and have been con-
tinuously involved in its development since that time. In
December 1981, I was promoted to Senior Assistant Project
Engineer for the Engineering Mechanics, Power Systems and
Structural Engineering Section.
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Dr. Sam Ranganath
Manager, Stress and Fracture Analysis Unit
General Electric Company.
San Jose, California
My name is Sam Ranganath. My business address is 175
Curtner Avenue, San Jose, California 95125. I am employed by
General Electric Company as Manager of the Stress Fracture
Analysis Unit. I have held this position since April 1978. My
group has the overall responsibility for performing stress
analysis, fracture mechanics and fatigue evaluations for
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) pressure vessel components. This
includes applications of ASME Code, preparation of Code cer-
tified stress reports, participation in external research con-
tracts involving material behavior and the evaluation of
stress / fracture related problems in operating plants. I have
been employed by General Electric Company since 1974.
I completed my Ph.D. in Engineering at Brown University,
Providence, Rhode Rhode Island in 1971. I was a Post Doctoral
Fellow at Brown University from December 1970 to November 1971.
In 1981, I received a Master of Business Administration degree
from the University of Santa Clara. I have been active in the
field of stress analysis, fracture Sachanics and material
behavior for the past ten years and have published several
technical papers.
I am also an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Santa
Clara and teach graduate courses in pressure vessel design and
fracture mechanics.
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I am a member of the ASME Section XI Subgroup on Evaluation
and Standards. This group is involved in developing fracture
mechanics procedures to evaluate pressure vessel components. I
am a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of
California.
List of Publications in the Field ofFracture Mechanics and Stress Analysis
1. " Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of a Boiling Water ReactorVessel Following a Loss of Coolant Accident." Proceedingsof the 5th International Conference on Structural Mechanicsin Reactor Technology, Berlin, Germany, August 1979.
2. Environmental Crack Growth Analysis Based on Elastic-Plastic Fracture Me'chanics"(coauthor with H. S. Mehta).Presented at the 1992 Pressure Vessels and PipingConference, Orlando, Florida, June 1982; ASME Paper82-PVP-23.
3. " Residual Stress Analysis of Piping with Pre-ExistingCracks Subjected to the Induction Heating StressImprovement" (coauthor with M. L. Herrera and H. S. Mehta);presented at the 1982 Pressure Vessels and PipingConference, Orlando, Florida, June 1982; ASME Paper82-PVP-60.
4. " Fatigue Behavior of Carbon Steel Components in HighTemperature Water Environments" (with J. N. Kass and J. D.Heald in Low Cycle Fatigue and Life Prediction, ASTM STP770, American Society for Testing and Materials 1982.
5. " Failure Analysis, Testing and Product Improvement of aControl Rod Drive Component from a Boiling Water Reactor"(with J. N. Kass, D. E. Delwiche and D. L. Peterson) inFailure Prevention and Reliability, Proceedings of the 1977Failure Prevention and Reliability Conference, Chicago,Illinois, American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
6. " Elastic-Plastic Stress Analysis and ASME Code Evaluationof a Bottomhead Penetration in a Reactor Pressure Vessel"presented at the 1979 Pressure Vessels and PipingConference, San Francisco, California, June 1979, ASMEPaper 79-PVP-17.
7. " Engineering Methods for the Assessment of Ductile FractureMargin in Nuclear Power Plant Piping" (with H. S. Mehta)Presented at the Second International Symposium on Elastic-Plastic Fracture, Ihiladelphia, Pennsylvania, Octcher 1981.(To appear in the new ASTM Special Technical Publication onElastic Plastic Fracture) American Society for Testing andMaterials.
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