Cooperation in the International Space Station Program: Some Lessons for the Future Ian Pryke
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Transcript of Cooperation in the International Space Station Program: Some Lessons for the Future Ian Pryke
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 1
Cooperation in the
International Space Station Program:
Some Lessons for the Future
Ian PrykeSenior Fellow
Center for Aerospace Policy Research
School of Public Policy
George Mason University
Symposium
on
“Space Exploration and International Cooperation”
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 2
Acknowledgement
This presentation is based on a paper entitled “Structuring Future International Cooperation: Learning from the ISS”, authored by:
- Lynn Cline [NASA] - Peggy Finarelli [ISU]
- Graham Gibbs [CSA] - Ian Pryke [then ESA]
and originally presented at the International Space University’s June 2002 Symposium “Beyond the International Space Station: The Future of Human
Spaceflight”.
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 3
International Space Station [ISS]
The ISS is often referred to as:
“The largest, most complex, international
scientific and technological co-operation
ever undertaken.”
As such, it can offer numerous lessons that can be applied in the structuring of future large scale international co-operative space
endeavors.
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 4
Lesson #1: “It is possible to craft a large complex international space cooperation
that is multiple decades in duration.”
• 1984 (January) • 1988 (September)• 1992• 1993 (March)• 1993 (December)• 1998 (January)• 1998 (December)• 2000 (December)• 2003 (January)
• 2005 (March/April)• 2010 (?)• 2010 (?) - ???
President Reagan’s State of the Union Address
Original IGA / MoUs signed [Freedom]
Originally planned on-orbit date
Space Station Redesign initiated
Russia invited to join the Partnership
Renegotiated IGA / MoUs signed [ISS]
First Station element launched
Permanent occupancy of Station initiated
Loss of Challenger – Station Assembly hiatus– Access limited to Russian vehicles– Crew size limited to two
Current schedule for Shuttle return to flight
Planned completion of Station assembly
Utilization of Station
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 5
Lesson #2: “Long-term Partnerships must be structured so that they can evolve over
time if required.” The Original Partnership:
• The Invitation• NASA to develop a permanently manned Space
Station and do it within a decade.• NASA to “invite other countries to participate so
that we can strengthen peace, build prosperity and expand freedom for all who share our goals”
• “The Friends and Allies”:• Canada• Europe [Through the European Space Agency]• Japan
• “The Evil Empire”: USSR
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 6
Lesson #2: “Long-term Partnerships must be structured so that they can evolve over
time if required.”
The Enlarged Partnership;
• Originally:• US to build “a fully functional space station”.• Partners contributions to ”enhance capability” but not be on the
critical path.• Canadian waiver granted by US.
• Bringing in the Russians as a full Partner:• Required extensive re-negotiation of agreements• Opened critical path to all non-US Partners.
• Bringing in the Italians [in parallel to their ESA involvement] and the Brazilians. Mechanism was foreseen - Participants .
• “Genuine Partnership”: Each partner dependent on the performance of other partners.
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 7
Lesson #3: “Partners will have different motivations for getting involved in a
program and these motivations can evolve.”
• United States:• Originally “Cold War Politics”• Post Cold War - Russian Engagement• US budgetary threats encouraged Russian involvement• Resulted in re-evaluation of “Partnership”
• Canada:• Originally “Foreseen Economic Return”• ‘94 - Budget deficit led to reappraisal of involvement
• Japan:• Interest in developing HSF capabilities• High political priority of conducting space program with
international cooperation• “Missed the boat” on Shuttle
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 8
Lesson #3: “Partners will have different motivations for getting involved in a
program and these motivations can evolve.”
• Europe:• European desire for a degree of autonomy in HSF• Amortize SPACELAB investment• HERMES / MTFF cancellation• ISS involvement currently sole European MSF programme
• Russia:• Post cold war space co-operation with US grew to include:
– Station Phase 1: Shuttle-MIR– Station Phase 2: ISS permanent human habitation capability– Station Phase 3: Assembly complete of all partner elements
• Russian “pride” in HSF capabilities• Keep HSF program alive / engineers employed
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 9
Lesson #4: “Accept that which cannot be changed.”
Long term, expensive space cooperation programs have certain inherent characteristics that can create problems:
• Decisions to undertake taken at highest levels of government• Program duration transcends political terms• Each partner seeks political and economic leverage on their investment
and will have national priorities must be accommodated • Partnership must satisfy individual interests of each partner• Compromise necessary - up to a point where national interests are in
danger of being jeopardized
Station has had to contend with:• Cost and schedule problems• Geopolitical changes
many of which were unanticipated but unavoidable.
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 10
Lesson #4: “Accept that which cannot be changed.”
• One Partners problems will impact other partners• Annual appropriations versus multi-year appropriations• Cost overruns and management changes in the U.S. portion of
the Station program have had cost and management implications for other Partners
• Russians involvement:• Invitation was politically correct when made• Expectation - Cost savings / Schedule Improvement• Actuality - Cost increases / Schedule Delays• Actuality - Without Russian Involvement the Station would
probably not have survived the Clinton Administration and would be in serious trouble with the stand-down of the Shuttle
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 11
Lesson #5: “A little bit of constructive ambiguity never hurts.”
Partnerships must find ways to accommodate policy
differences among partners. A Space Station Example:
• Partners differed in their interpretation of what activities met the commitments they had undertaken in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, re. the use space for “peaceful purposes”, as:• U.S.: D.o.D. insisted on being able to utilize the Station.• Canada Europe & Japan: Wanted agreements to refer to “a Space
Station of exclusively peaceful purposes”• Russia: In ISS re-negotiation Russia adopted same position as U.S.
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 12
Lesson #5: “A little bit of constructive ambiguity never hurts.”
• Solution adopted in both negotiations: Each Partner defines “peaceful purposes” in relation to the utilization of the elements which it supplies.
• Solution was memorialized in an exchange of side letters rather than in the agreements themselves.
Difficult topics sometimes need to be finessed using
less than precise language.
June 21, 2004 Washington DC 13
Conclusion
The Overarching Lesson:
“Those involved in structuring and implementing large scale partnerships must approach matters with an open mind. They must realize that they will not be able to identify every contingency in advance and hence must structure their cooperation with built in flexibility.”