Cooperating in the Commons

8/3/2019 Cooperating in the Commons

1/17

1

Michel CAMES

MA in Development Studies

Rural Development

University of Leeds

Essay - Semester 2

1995/96

Cooperating in the commons: an urgency for the poor

In this essay, I shall aim to discuss the truism that resources held in

common are prone to overexploitation. It has been claimed that the only

escape from the dilemma of common pool resources - referred to as the

tragedy of the commons by the seminal article of Hardin (1968) - could be

found either in privatization of the resources or in converting them into state

property. However this conventional wisdom has been challenged since.

Hardins model fails to take into account the self-regulating capabilities ofusers assuming that users are unable to limit access or institute rules to

regulate use. It confuses the open access with common property in which

the individual interest is constrained by existing institutional arrangements.

So if the adoption of the model relying overly sanguine on the option of

privatization of common property resources is generally not more efficient

and clearly less equitable, and the variant option of government control hasbeen unable to replace traditional communal controls with an effective

alternative system, why, I refer to Milton M. R. Freeman (1989:92), is more

effort not directed to re-establishing traditionally-based local-level

management systems which much empirical evidence now suggests to be

often more effective?


2/17

2

After attempting to answer this question, I will proceed to shed light on the

causes for a gradual decline of common-property systems by using

contemporary evidence from drought-prone areas of India. Next I will

highlight why it is important to sustain such systems especially in regard ofthe rural poor. Pointing towards possible solutions to reinstate appropriate

management systems allowing more ecological and social sustainable

development will conclude this essay emphasizing that sustainable resource

management is not intrinsically associated with any particular property-

rights regime and a combination of conventional and traditional or neo-

traditional regimes may in many cases be more advantageous.

The Debate around the Maintenance of the Commons

Since time immemorial, the structure and functioning of resource-regulating

institutions has been based on customs, taboos and kinship. These informal

regulations have been based on the principle of equity to its members

generally at the expense of exclusion of others. Common property resources

(CPRs) have been open for its users through an essentially closed mode of

access to these resources.

According to Runge, these arrangements closely resemble those that

dominated the early stages of European economic development. With the

forced enclosure movements of the 15th and 16th centuries, the common

property typical of Western Europe declined. However, as he continues,

recent research on the common field systems replaced by 18th-century

enclosures continues to break down the conventional wisdom that enclosure

was a prerequisite to the adoption of advanced agricultural methods. It

would conclude that the major economic consequence of the enclosure was

to redistribute the existing agricultural income and not to create additional

income by increasing efficiency (Runge, 1986:623,632). Ciriacy-Wantrup

and Bishop assert that overgrazing was not a cause for the historical

reduction of the commons in Great Britain. One important factor was the


3/17

3

increased profitability for the feudal lord of grazing sheep for commercial

wool production. They argue that, as forest lands on the European continent

became increasingly profitable as sources of timber for sale vis--vis their

traditional role as sources of subsistence, the feudal lords changed fromadministrators to profit-seeking entrepreneurs. As they concisely point out,

this has been the true tragedy of the commons: the peasant was

transformed from a co-equal owner on the commons with secure tenure to a

landless worker on the feudal estate (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop,

1975:719-20).

It has been a tragic truism to equate the dismantling of the commons withprogress and efficiency. It is Boulding who claims that:

It is one of the great ironies of the French revolution that the egalite,

which really meant equal distribution of estates among children and

the abolition of primogeniture along with other hallmarks of

aristocracy, is a sure recipe for equality of misery (...) (Boulding,

1977:285).

The solution to the tragedy of the commons would, according to Boulding,

not lie in the adoption of equity principles as propagated by the French

revolution, but in the acknowledgement of Malthus remedy of the great

miserific vision:

The answer is the segregation of misery through a class structure. (...)

If we privatize the commons, we will create an upper class who owns

and administers it. It will be administered well. There will be no

overgrazing. (...) If the class structure can be preserved, if the fences

hold through a combination of the threat system, the police and the

military, and the opiates of religion, nationalism, and ideology, the

system is pretty stable. Up to now one can almost say that this has


4/17

4

been the only successful answer to the tragedy of the commons

(Boulding, 1977:285-86).

This line of thought has also been justified by Hardin (1968) and Baden(1977). Hardin, who popularized the concept of the tragedy of the

commons claims that if the commons can be justifiable at all, then only

under conditions of low-population density (Hardin, 1968:1248) assuming

that otherwise it is impossible to upkeep or institute CPR management

systems. Baden, who argues that discussions involving the management of

common pool resources often resemble religious arguments conducted by

nontheologians, sees government action as a requirement in themanagement of common pool resources in the absence of collective

management (Baden, 1977:138-39, emphasis added). However he

obviously does not take this restriction seriously into account as no reference

to action with collective management is given which could be an obstacle to

the free-rider phenomenon. This ideology of resigning CPRs to private or

state control as a panacea for the tragedy of the commons reflects,

according to Grima and Berkes, the assumption of market-oriented societies

of Western industrial nations that all valuable resources are individually

owned, fully mobile and exchangeable in small increments in well-

functioning markets (Grima and Berkes, 1989:37, quoting Bromley, 1985).

Grima and Berkes argue that in many Western societies, the individual self-

interest is seen as supreme. This could however not be extrapolated to many

other societies where the individual is not the dominant locus of choice and

the community is the relevant decision-making unit (Grima and Berkes,

1989:37).

Berkes assumes that where societies are fluid, with large numbers of

individuals only in casual contact, all having access to the commons, the

tragedy is relatively likely.


5/17


6/17

6

together with Western culture tending to emphasize competition as opposed

to cooperation, would have nurtured Western ecologists to be overly

indulgent with the concepts of competition, predation and parasitism, as

opposed to positive ecological interactions such as cooperation,commensalism and mutualism (Berkes, 1989a:72,85).

But besides this cultural bias against common-property regimes, other

obstacles remain.

According to Gibbs and Bromley, common-property regimes imply an

acceptance of participatory approaches to resource management and more

decentralized administration. This however would involve a major shift in therole of resource-management agencies and bureaucracies unaccustomed to

sharing power (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989:31).

Also the inherence of empirically derived indirect measures of stock

circumstances adopted by many tradition-based local common-property

systems to ascertain catch limits in fishing and hunting as being inferior and

non-scientific compared to science-based rational management techniques

constitutes an impediment to the introduction of more effective management

institutions. As Freeman points out, an intuitive management approach

based on feedback of information and learning does not require knowing

various stock parameters nor undertaking complex modelling exercises, but

determines new harvest levels by modification of an earlier empirically

derived value.

However, as he proceeds, until public awareness of the efficacy of traditional

systems of management becomes widespread, public policy will continue to

favour a conservative approach towards resource management, ensuring

continuation of orthodox science-based approaches (Freeman, 1989:104-

06).


7/17

7

The lack of commitment to establish or reinstate traditional or neo-

traditional local-level management systems however can be sought only to

some extent in the zeal of resource managers to privatize or nationalize

CPRs having in mind the tragedy of the commons. Other causes, among thestrong resistance of authoritarian regimes and urban elites to relinquish

political power to local institutions (Ruttan, 1984:399) and the urge of

modernization by any possible means making societies throw overboard

management practices in use since centuries contributes to the

transformation of sustainably managed resource systems into open-access

spheres attractive to free-riders.

The answer to inefficient management of resources however does not lie in

removing common-property systems - this only will throw out the baby with

the bathwater - but in attempting to seek for solutions which can overcome

constraints of these systems if they do not have to be re-created anew

altogether.

Causes of the decline of CPRs: indian evidence

Common-property resources are often in decline for the regime managing

them is dwindling or disappearing altogether. Jodha argues that increased

marketability and value of products lead to enhanced profitability which

becomes the guiding force behind the choice of enterprises and usage

patterns of CPRs rather than the concern for their upkeep. He further points

out that technological innovation often makes it physically easier to

overexploit natural resources (Jodha, 1985:259-60).

According to Goodland et al, increased participation in market economies

which encourages the overexploitation for export of natural resources

previously harvested for local subsistence is one major cause of common-

property system breakdown (Goodland et al, 1989:151).


8/17

8

Structural adjustment policies are just one case in point. The demand for

foreign exchange creates competition for resources among governments,

concessionaires, and rural communities as well as a pressure to redefine

property rights (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989:30).

Referring to dry regions of India, Jodha argues that the main form of decline

is the privatization of CPRs:

Under various welfare programmes [mainly land reforms in the early

1950s] CPR lands had been distributed to people for private use. CPR

lands had also been illegally appropriated often with subsequentlegalization. The stated intention of privatization of CPRs was to give

land to the poor who were landless or who had very little land. (...)

The consequent decline in the area of CPRs, and the resultant

overcrowding and degradation of CPRs have led to a considerable

reduction in the overall quantity of CPR benefits for the poor (Jodha,

1986:1178).

Ensuing breakdown of traditional value systems also contribute to the

dismantling of the commons. According to Gadgil and Iyer, small multi-caste

village communities in which the different caste groups were linked to each

other in a web of reciprocity favoured sustainable use of CPRs under

communal management. However, as they argue, they are increasingly

coming into conflict because of the destruction of traditional occupations and

the erosion of their resource base (Gadgil and Iyer, 1989:240,252).

Also the tradition of providing free inputs by common-property users and a

common revenue fund for the maintenance of CPRs has been gradually

eroded. According to Jodha, peoples contribution and common property

resource revenue generated through auctioning of trees, etc. have

disappeared and government grants or relief has proven to be a poor

substitute for these traditional sources of upkeep (Jodha, 1985:251).


9/17

9

Another cause is population growth. Sustainable use of CPRs requires the

number of parties sharing access to the resource to be not too large.

However, as Jodha argues, increasing population density creates relativeresource scarcity which in turn is thought to induce privatization of resources

for reasons of efficiency and internalization of gains from resource use

(Jodha, 1985:256).

Increased differentiation of the rural community can as well cause the

management quality of CPRs to decline (Jodha, 1995:3282). Given the

complimentarity between PPRs and CPRs in the rural economy and assumingthe concentration of PPRs in a few households of a village, as is often the

case, the non-poor can reap more benefits from CPRs than the poor and

consequently only the PPR owners may participate in preserving the CPRs

primarily to reinforce their existing structure of income generation (Chopra

et al, 1989:A-192).

Investigations in a number of Karnatakan villages reveal that, according to

Pasha,

though CPRs play a crucial role in the household economy of the rural

poor, it is the non-poor who get more benefits from CPRs in absolute

terms. (...) though in relative terms the poor obtained a greater

proportion of their income from them (Pasha, 1992:2502).

Given a high ratio of income differentiation between non-poor and poor, the

non-poors share is generally considerably higher than the poors despite the

higher share in the relative income of the latter.

However, rising disparities in PPR ownership of CPR users are not only a

cause for a decline in the ability to manage CPRs sustainably, they are also

an effect of the decline.


10/17

10

Consequences of the decline of CPRs

or: Why maintaining CPRs is a necessity for the rural poor

Although only limited empirical evidence exists in the Indian case, mostauthors agree that privatization has helped well-endowed land owners more

than the poor (Jodha, 1985:260). The comparison of landholding size before

and after the privatization indicates, as Jodha argues, that those who had

relatively more land also got more land.

The complete process of privatization of CPRs as it affected the rural

poor involved three stages: (i) they were deprived of their right tocollectively use the CPRs, (ii) they were given individual title to small

parts of privatized CPRs, and (iii) the circumstances disentitled them of

the newly received lands. (...)

Mere distribution of land, particularly of sub-marginal land, without the

provision of necessary complementary resources was not sufficient to

develop and cultivate the land (...). Rather than sticking to a small

piece of land that could not be developed and used for want of other

resources, these households preferred to sell or mortgage the land

(...) (Jodha, 1986:1179).

On further investigation the response of the poor is quite rational. As animal

husbandry plays a very important role in the economy of small and marginal

farmers (Pasha, 1991:A-27), small pieces of marginal land are not efficient

in their agricultural and livelihood system because, as Gadgil and Iyer argue,

when the resource involved is not being produced but foraged, it entails the

use of relatively large tracts of land (Gadgil and Iyer, 1989:241).

Jodha points out that livestock, because they are mobile, are less subject to

the adverse impact of localized droughts than crops are. This advantage is


11/17

11

lost however, if a farmers livestock must depend solely on his own forage

and water resources (Jodha, 1985:248).

It is this hedge against environmental uncertainty inherent in CPRmanagement, still amplified by the right to be included in a group that

provides a hedge against individual failure (Runge, 1986:632) that is

reduced or lost by the decline of the CPRs.

Through the interaction of privatization, sub-marginal CPR lands which have

only been used as pasture land so far, have been converted into croplands.

According to Jodha, in the case of the arid zone of Rajasthan, unlike thesituation in Europe following privatization of CPRs, it has invariably meant

putting the land under plow. The consequences of this practice which strains

the limited use-capability of the land are soil erosion and decline in overall

crop yields (Jodha, 1985:260).

On the other hand, due to the decline in size and the depletion of CPRs there

has been a substantial increase in the number of sheep and goats. According

to Jodha, the small ruminants could not only be sustained by degraded

CPRs, but they also fit better in the changed migration patterns:

In the context of the reduced CPRs, the migration of cattle has become

more difficult than of small ruminants. Thus the sheep and goats often

accused for destroying vegetation in the CPRs, seem to have become

more important following the degradation of CPRs rather than vice

versa (Jodha, 1990:A73-74).

However, large ruminants such as draft animals have more and more

difficulties to survive on the degraded CPRs. According to Pasha, the

population of bullocks has decreased due to the high overhead cost of

maintaining them on purchased fodder as the CPR lands have declined, or,

where they survive on degraded CPR lands, these animals are subject to


12/17

12

many diseases, miscarriages, prolonged unproductive period, low growth

and low productivity (Pasha, 1991:A-28).

Jodha argues that the maintenance of such animals without the CPR facilitymeans diversion of a substantial proportion of marginal farm households

crop lands from food and cash crops to fodder crops. The alternative option,

i.e. reducing animal numbers to levels sustainable by own fodder/feed

resources, implies the loss of own farm inputs, e.g. draft power and farm-

yard manure (Jodha, 1990:A-66).

It can be concluded that in dryland areas, as privatization raises the cost oflivestock raising and erodes the regions comparative advantage (Jodha,

1985:262), it is the poor being most dependent on animal husbandry who

lose out the most.

Reinstating appropriate management systems

Recognizing that reinstating or developing CPRs is required as a strategy to

help the rural poor can lead us searching for possible approaches. As Jodha

argues, one strategy could be to develop CPRs and improve their use

through technological and institutional interventions.

However, it may be pointed out that growth in the CPR productivity

alone may prove counter-productive. At present the process of self-

selection of CPR users, tend to induce mainly the poor to depend on

these resources. CPR activities are low pay-off options. The poor

chooses them as the opportunity cost of their labour is lower than the

returns from CPR activities. An increase in CPR productivity will induce

greater demand on CPRs (Jodha, 1986:1179).

Rehabilitation of CPRs is, according to Jodha, less of an investment-cum-

technological problem and more of a resource management problem.


13/17

13

In most areas, even natural regeneration itself can make CPRs more

productive, provided the regeneration is permitted, through controlled

and regulated use of resources. However, this cannot happen unlessthe CPRs are reconverted from open access resources to common

property resources. In operational terms this would mean the re-

establishment and enforcement of usage regulations and user-

obligations towards CPRs (Jodha, 1990:A-77).

Re-establishment and subsequent control mechanisms represent a far

greater challenge for implementation than technological and institutionalinterventions from outsiders. While the latter necessitates merely a one-off

activity to re-establish ecological equilibrium - mostly a both costly and futile

intervention - the former implies the establishment of local institutional

arrangements of CPR user groups which can regulate sustainable use of

CPRs on a permanent basis. In the context of the current situation, this can

sound utopian. As Pasha points out, in discussions with the poor households

in villages in Karnataka, even these households largely prefer the available

CPRs to be distributed among them as PPRs. Among other reasons for this

reaction he assumes the lack through unequal distribution of CPR-based

PPRs in the past and the lack of a proper policy by the government about the

CPRs (Pasha, 1992:2503).

This reaction however could suggest that basically the poor prefer a

common-property regime provided that the principle of equity is respected

and past injustices regarding the distribution of CPR based PPRs will be

nullified - what will be unlikely to happen.

On the other hand, as already noted above, when PPR ownership is

widespread, preservation of CPRs by increasing their productivity promotes

the interests of the majority in participatory institutions (Chopra et al,

1989:A-194). To provide however an increasing population with CPR-based


14/17

14

PPR land is arithmetically nonsense: all the remaining CPR land would have

to be distributed that each poor household could own a non-viable small size

of marginal land.

If however means can be found for establishing participatory institutions, the

basic pre-condition for sustainable management of common lands would be

met. A local CPR management regime could, according to Damodaran,

institute following rules:

All users have access to CPRs in their capacity as members of the

community and no individual user enjoys any preferential access to theselands by virtue of any social and economic advantages vis--vis other fellow

users. In some cases, he proceeds, restrictions are imposed on the number

of livestock grazed by a grazier which is either prohibited or discouraged by

a grazing fee by the community. The basic concept implicit in these

measures is sustainable and equitable exploitation of the common land

resources without doing away with open access to the lands bearing the

resources (Damodaran, 1991:2214).

Supporting collective action through the participation of local people in such

management regimes however requires more than populist interventions. A

collaboration of the stereotypical top-down and bottom-up approaches

(Paul, 1989:104) has to be taken into account. Paul pleads for a synergy

between governments and grassroots organizations - which have historically

been antagonists - in the fight against poverty. This potential of

collaboration would offer opportunities to the poor to participate and express

their voice effectively particularly to enhance their self confidence and self

reliance. As he argues, governments and grassroots organizations have

different strengths which are complementary. In the context of poverty

alleviation, there is a clear case for a division of labour that exploits their

comparative advantage (Paul, 1989:100,105-06).


15/17

15

It is this common effort to empower the poor which could be more

successful in the attempt to sustain CPR regimes and consequently maintain

the ecological sustainability of CPRs.

As Berkes argues, even that it may not be possible in many cases to turn

back the clock, the knowledge base that would enable sustainable resource

use nevertheless remains with local users. Hence, it makes management

sense to leave as much control and responsibility as possible at the

communal level while coordinating activities of users at the government level

(Berkes, 1989b:238-239).

As Runge puts it, it is the search for appropriate institutional responses

which must respect both the traditions and the constraints of local needs in

specific choice environments. There are no universal prescriptions for

efficient and equitable resource management (Runge, 1986:633). Berkes

proposes that combinations of property-rights regimes may in many cases

work better than any single regime. The success of local-level management,

for example, often depends on its legitimization by central government,

involving the sharing of power between governments and local communities

(Berkes et al, 1989:93).

Rather than invoking the general superiority of one type of property

institution, e.g. Hardins deterministic model (Berkes et al, 1989:93), a

continuum of property rights, from pure rights of exclusion to pure rights of

inclusion, depending on the nature of resource management problems paired

with the need for more empirical research (Runge, 1986:633) may show us

the way to explain resource use in complex socio-ecologic systems with

more well-balanced models.


16/17

16

Bibliography

Baden, John (1977), A Primer for the Management of Common PoolResources in Hardin, G. and Baden, J. (eds.), Managing the Commons, NewYork, Freeman

Berkes, Fikret (1989a), Cooperation from the Perspective of Human Ecologyin Berkes, Fikret, Common Property Resources - Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development, London, Belhaven Press

Berkes, Fikret (1989b), Multiple-Resource Cases and IntegratedDevelopment in Berkes, Fikret, Common Property Resources - Ecology andCommunity-Based Sustainable Development, London, Belhaven Press

Berkes, F., Feeny D., McCay B. J. and Acheson J. M. (1989), The benefits of

the commons in Nature, 340, pp. 91-93, 13 July

Boulding, Kenneth E. (1977), Commons and Community: The Idea of aPublic in Hardin, G. and Baden, J. (eds.), Managing the Commons, NewYork, Freeman

Bromley, D. W. (1985), Common property issues in internationaldevelopment in Developments, 5 (1), pp. 12-15

Chopra, Kanchan, Kadekodi, Gopal K. and Murty M. N. (1989), Peoples

Participation and Common Property Resources in Economical and PoliticalWeekly, pp. A-189-A-195,December 23-30

Ciriacy-Wantrup S. V. and Bishop, Richard C. (1975), Common Property asa Concept in Natural Resources Policy in Natural Resources Journal, 15, pp.713-727, October

Damodaran, A. (1991), Tragedy of the Commons and Comedy of CommonProperty Resources in Economical and Political Weekly, pp. 2213- 2215,September 21

Freeman, Milton M. R. (1989), Graphs and Gaffs: A Cautionary Tale in theCommon-Property Resources Debate in Berkes, Fikret, Common PropertyResources - Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development,London, Belhaven Press

Gadgil, Madhav and Iyer, Prema (1989), On the Diversification of Common-Property Resource Use by Indian Society in Berkes, Fikret, CommonProperty Resources - Ecology and Community-Based SustainableDevelopment, London, Belhaven Press

Gibbs, Christopher J. N. and Bromley, Daniel W. (1989), InstitutionalArrangements for Management of Rural Resources: Common-Property


17/17

17

Regimes in Berkes, Fikret, Common Property Resources - Ecology andCommunity-Based Sustainable Development, London, Belhaven Press

Goodland, Robert, Ledec, George and Webb Maryla (1989), MeetingEnvironmental Concerns Caused by Common-Property Mismanagement in

Economic Development Projects in Berkes, Fikret, Common PropertyResources - Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development,London, Belhaven Press

Grima A. P. Lino and Berkes, Fikret (1989), Natural Resources: Access,Rights-to-Use and Management in Berkes, Fikret, Common PropertyResources - Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development,London, Belhaven Press

Hardin, Garrett (1968), The tragedy of the Commons in Science, 162, pp.

1243-1248, 13 December

Jodha, N. S. (1985), Population Growth and the Decline of CommonProperty Resources in Rajasthan, India in Population and DevelopmentReview, 11 (2), pp. 247-264, June

Jodha, N. S. (1986), Common Property Resources and Rural Poor in DryRegions of India in Economical and Political Weekly, pp. 1169-1181, July 5

Jodha, N. S. (1990), Rural Common Property Resources - Contributions and

Crisis in Economical and Political Weekly, pp. A-65-A78, June 30Jodha, N. S. (1995), Common Property Resources and the EnvironmentalContext - Role of Biophysical versus Social Stresses in Economical andPolitical Weekly, pp. 3278-3283, December 23

Pasha, Syed Ajmal (1991), Sustainability and Viability of Small and MarginalFarmers - Animal Husbandry and Common Property Resources inEconomical and Political Weekly, pp. A-27-A30, March 30

Pasha, Syed Ajmal (1992), CPRs and Rural Poor - A Micro Level Analysis inEconomical and Political Weekly, pp. 2499-2503, November 14

Paul, Samuel (1989), Poverty Alleviation and Participation - The Case forGovernment-Grassroots Agency Collaboration in Economical and PoliticalWeekly, pp. 100-06, January 14

Runge, Carlisle Ford (1986), Common Property and Collective Action inEconomic Development in World Development, 14 (5), pp. 623-635

Ruttan, Vernon W. (1984), Integrated Rural Development Programmes: AHistorical Perspective in World Development, 12 (4), pp. 393-401

Wade, Robert (1988), Village Republics, Cambridge, University Press

Cooperating in the Commons

Documents

Transcript of Cooperating in the Commons