Contracts and Effort
description
Transcript of Contracts and Effort
![Page 1: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Contracts and Effort
Cumming and Johan (2013 Chapter 15)
1
![Page 2: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Motivation
• Corporate finance literature dominated by “incentive effects”
• Vast theoretical literature• Scant empirical literature
• Significant need for empirical assessment
• The fundamental basis of all work in venture capital and private equity
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
2
![Page 3: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Chapter Objectives
• Do contracts affect effort, and if so, how?
• Focus on venture capital contracts, syndication, legal environment
• Assess total effort
• Distinguish between advice and monitoring
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
3
![Page 4: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Particular Features in this Chapter
• Measure actual hours of work contributed by VCs to each investee
• Distinguish between VC advice and monitoring
• Assess the role of specific contractual details, & syndication across VC funds, etc.
• Provide very specific empirical details Contract structures, portfolio size, entrepreneurial firm, VC, exit
outcomes, etc.
• Relate results to vast theoretical literature
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
4
![Page 5: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Theoretical Focus in VC Literature
1. Cash flow rights
2. Control rights
3. Legal Systems
4. Control variables
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
5
![Page 6: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
1. Cash Flow Rights
• Casamatta (2003 JF), Schmidt (2003 JF), Farmer and Winter (1986 JF) Bilateral moral hazard in VC finance Role for convertible preferred shares
• Hypothesis 15.1a: Venture capital fund managers provide more effort and advice to entrepreneurial firms financed with convertible securities (instead of common equity or debt). Moreover, the effort exerted by the venture capital fund manager and advice provided is directly correlated with the venture capital fund’s ownership percentage.
• Concern with endogeneity• Frequent use of non-convertibles outside the US
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
6
![Page 7: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
1. Cash Flow Rights (Continued)
• Cornelli and Yosha (2003 RES) Convertible securities mitigate signal manipulation in staged
financing
• Hypothesis 15.1b: There are fewer venture capital fund manager-entrepreneur conflicts within entrepreneurial firms financed with convertible securities.
• Concern with endogeneity• Competing behavioral finance ideas
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
7
![Page 8: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
2. Control Rights
• Chan et al. (1990 IER); Kirilenko (2001 JF) Control is related to project risk
• Hypothesis 15.2a: Venture capital fund managers provide more effort and advice for entrepreneurial firms for which the venture capital fund has been allocated greater control rights.
• Hypothesis 15.2b: Venture capital fund manager-entrepreneur conflicts are more likely among investee firms for which the venture capital fund has been allocated greater control rights.
• Concern with endogeneity• Heterogeneous allocation of control across firms
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
8
![Page 9: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
3. Legal Systems
• Hypothesis 15.3: Countries with better legal systems mitigate the scope for venture capital fund manager–entrepreneur conflict as better legal systems facilitate more certainty in the enforcement of contracts, as well as the interpretation of incomplete contracts.
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
9
![Page 10: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
4. Control Variables
• Type of VC (captive / non-captive)• Portfolio size / VC Manager• Capital Managed / VC Manager• Staging• Entrepreneur stage of development• Entrepreneurial firm industry• Entrepreneur experience• Exit outcomes
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
10
![Page 11: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Control Variables (Continued)
• Syndication– Lerner (1994 FM), Brander et al. (2002 JEMS),
Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007 JFI)Effort complementarities
• Expect VCs work more when syndicated investors work more
• Endogeneity concerns
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
11
![Page 12: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Hand Collected Sample
• 121 investment rounds
• 74 entrepreneurial firms
• 14 VC funds
• 7 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands)
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
12
![Page 13: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
OLS, Ordered Logit and IV Estimates
• Dependent Variables Hours/Month, Advice Rank, # Disagreements
• Explanatory Variables VC characteristics, ENT characteristics, Exits, Contract Terms,
Risk Measures, legality, etc.
• Instruments Year of investment and exit dummies, MSCI returns over
investment period Correlations (Tables 3 and 4) work “fairly” well, but not
100% perfect
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
13
![Page 14: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Tables 15.5 – 15.7
• Table 15.5: Dep Var: Hours / Month
• Table 15.6: Dep Var: Advice Rank
• Table 15.7: Dep Var: # Disagreements
• 5 Models per Panel to show robustness– Regressions with and without instruments– Regressions with different sets of explanatory variables
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
14
![Page 15: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing15
Table 15.4: Dep Variable Hours Per MonthModel (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS Model (4) OLS Model (5) 2SLS
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 10.75 2.00* 1.43 0.17 10.20 1.02 14.87 0.46 -3.55 -0.10
Contractual Terms and Legal Conditions
Convertible Security (H1) 2.25 0.51 1.88 0.50 -3.23 -0.92 -2.22 -0.66 -10.33 -1.87**
Ownership % (H1) 4.55 0.30 20.83 1.50 25.69 2.30** 30.67 2.67*** 38.76 1.64*
Veto Rights (H2) 13.44 4.98*** 7.96 2.10** 11.36 3.26*** 12.15 3.22*** -0.87 -0.07
Board Rights (H2) -0.004 -0.48 -0.001 -0.15 0.003 0.65 0.002 0.44 -0.03 -0.91
Special Control Rights (H2) -1.49 -0.23
Country Legality (H3) -0.39 -0.50
Project and Environment Related Risk
Project Risk Ranking -4.67 -0.56 -9.77 -1.12 -4.07 -0.46 2.51 0.29 -6.01 -0.37
Entrepreneur Experience Ranking 0.21 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.26
Late or Buyout Stage -8.35 -2.13** -10.50 -3.22*** -9.15 -2.47** -7.44 -1.89* -5.87 -0.66
Medical / Biotechnology -4.70 -0.92 -5.33 -0.93 2.77 0.31
Computer / Electronics -4.92 -1.54 -3.95 -1.13 -4.31 -0.78
Communications / Internet -11.58 -2.82*** -11.16 -2.48** -9.70 -1.58
Foreign Investment 0.46 0.10 -2.85 -0.63 -0.79 -0.20 1.87 0.39 2.75 0.44
Investment Characteristics and Performance
Hours from Syndicated Partners 0.49 5.60*** 0.40 5.51*** 0.38 5.07*** 0.67 2.07**
Investment Rounds 3.81 2.59** 4.00 2.55** 1.64 0.19
(Log of) Book Value 0.51 0.72 -0.21 -0.28 -0.96 -1.13 0.94 -0.06
Investment Months -0.30 -3.35*** -0.30 -3.61*** 17.09 1.74**
IPO Exit 10.76 2.44** 16.26 3.26*** 0.25 0.03
Acquisition Exit 7.74 2.09**
Venture capital fund manager Fund Characteristics
Limited Partnership Venture capital fund manager 1.74 0.42 0.96 0.29 -2.92 0.74 3.00 0.62
Venture capital fund manager Portfolio Size / # of Venture capital fund manager Managers
-1.98 -2.53** -1.19 -1.55 -2.39 -2.67*** -1.69 -1.88* -3.01 -1.40
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.31 0.47 0.48 0.24
F-statistic 1.96* 3.99*** 4.57*** 4.16*** 2.18***
![Page 16: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing16
Table 15.5. Dep Variable Advice RankingModel (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS Model (4) OLS Model (5) 2SLS
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 0.44 0.85 2.31 2.96** 1.64 1.64 3.31 1.19 -2.24 -0.72
Contractual Terms and Legal Conditions
Convertible Security (H1) 0.97 2.87*** 0.83 2.59** 0.48 1.27 0.62 1.93* -0.11 -0.19
Ownership % (H1) -0.52 -0.53 -0.11 -0.12 -0.19 -0.24 -0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.04
Veto Rights (H2) 2.63 6.90*** 2.57 5.63*** 2.63 5.63*** 2.45 5.17*** 3.80 3.67***
Board Rights (H2) 0.001 1.69* 0.001 1.51 0.001 1.20 -0.007 -2.61**
Special Control Rights (H2) 0.24 0.31
Country Legality (H3) -0.07 -0.64
Project and Environment Related Risk
Project Risk Ranking 1.36 1.51 2.15 2.59*** 2.46 2.83*** 2.30 2.60** 3.10 2.33**
Entrepreneur Experience Ranking 0.14 1.98** 0.14 1.85** 0.27 2.07**
Late or Buyout Stage -1.34 -4.46*** -0.98 -2.92*** -0.86 -1.88** -0.80 -1.80** -0.48 -0.59
Medical / Biotechnology -0.47 -0.63 -0.46 -0.68 0.32 0.33
Computer / Electronics 0.30 0.75 0.26 0.64 0.93 1.73*
Communications / Internet -1.03 -1.50 -1.06 -1.68* -0.68 -1.10
Foreign Investment -0.29 -0.84 -0.26 -0.74 -0.28 -0.82 -0.19 -0.63 0.45 0.78
Investment Characteristics and Performance
Hours from Syndicated Partners -0.003 -0.29 -0.008 -0.78 -0.008 -0.77 -0.01 -0.46
Investment Rounds 0.25 1.10 0.34 1.36 0.99 1.21
(Log of) Book Value -0.25 -2.98*** -0.30 -4.13*** -0.30 -3.65*** -0.29 -1.95*
Investment Months -0.008 -0.84 -0.006 -0.71 0.10 0.11
IPO Exit 0.12 0.33 -0.05 -0.13 0.002 2.11**
Acquisition Exit -0.24 -0.61
Venture capital fund manager Fund Characteristics
Limited Partnership Venture capital fund manager -0.18 -0.43 -0.01 -0.04 -0.16 -0.45 0.57 1.08
Venture capital fund manager Portfolio Size / # of Venture capital fund manager Managers
-0.07 -0.78 -0.14 -1.59 -0.22 -2.21** -0.26 -2.78*** -0.37 -1.76*
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.44
F-statistic 6.69*** 5.50*** 4.02*** 4.01*** 4.01***
![Page 17: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing17
Table 15.6. Dep. Variable Scope of DisagreementModel (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) Ordered Logit Model (4) Ordered Logit Model (5) IV Ordered Logit
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 0.53 0.61 7.75 2.72*** 3.67 1.50 9.97 2.07** 7.79 2.13**
Contractual Terms and Legal Conditions
Convertible Security (H1) -0.04 -0.13 0.31 1.01 0.03 0.40 0.36 0.48 0.20 0.15
Ownership % (H1) 1.21 1.22 1.55 1.67* 3.14 1.14 3.03 1.76* -0.34 -0.06
Veto Rights (H2) 0.27 0.86 -0.42 -0.95 -0.12 -0.11 -0.93 -1.17 -2.57 -0.81
Board Rights (H2) 0.83 0.15 3.27 1.15 0.002 0.48
Special Control Rights (H2) -2.92 -1.75* 1.64 0.26
Country Legality (H3) -0.29 -3.10*** -0.40 -2.17**
Project and Environment Related Risk
Project Risk Ranking (H2) -0.23 -0.28 0.41 0.49 0.73 0.20 0.34 0.14 -0.89 -0.40
Entrepreneur Experience Ranking (H2) -0.16 -1.83* -0.39 -1.81* -0.32 -1.84* -0.39 -2.35**
Late or Buyout Stage (H2) -0.88 -2.83*** -0.34 -1.09 -2.76 -2.46** -1.30 -1.08 -2.15 -2.02**
Medical / Biotechnology (H2) 1.15 1.43 1.93 1.45 1.10 0.93 -0.08 -0.05
Computer / Electronics (H2) -0.33 -0.90 0.44 0.53 -0.06 -0.09 -0.47 -0.41
Communications / Internet (H2) -0.78 -1.80* -1.05 -0.93 -1.29 -1.38 -1.19 -0.81
Foreign Investment 0.21 0.60 0.48 1.19 0.81 0.75 0.78 0.86 -0.58 -0.25
Investment Characteristics and Performance
Hours from Syndicated Partners 0.03 3.72*** 0.03 4.00*** 0.09 2.24** 0.06 2.40** 0.02 0.44
Investment Rounds 0.16 1.14 -0.42 -0.84 0.06 0.13 -2.57 -2.38**
(Log of) Book Value 0.03 0.34 0.03 0.33 0.19 0.90 0.14 0.61 0.12 0.50
Investment Months -0.01 -1.87* -0.04 -1.35 -0.02 -1.02 1.96 1.38
IPO Exit -0.14 -0.28 0.16 0.19 0.81 0.90 0.43 0.52
Acquisition Exit -0.02 -0.04 0.53 0.73
Venture capital fund manager Fund Characteristics
Limited Partnership Venture capital fund manager -0.98 -2.24** -0.53 -0.62 -1.23 -1.43 -0.61 -0.82
Venture capital fund manager Portfolio Size / # of Venture capital fund manager Managers
-0.23 -3.22*** -0.18 -2.20** -0.79 -1.91* -0.74 -1.55 -0.42 -1.05
Mu (1) 0.95 3.03*** 0.84 2.74*** 0.66 2.96***
Mu (2) 1.30 2.41** 1.20 3.10*** 0.95 3.42***
Mu (3) 2.59 2.52** 2.60 3.09*** 2.01 3.37***
Mu (4) 3.69 2.78*** 3.77 2.74*** 2.98 2.35**
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74
Adjusted R2 (Pseudo R2 for Models (3) – (5)) 0.16 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.31
F-statistic (Chi-square for Models (3) – (5)) 2.44** 2.81*** Chi-squared: 67.30*** Chi-squared: 60.94*** Chi-squared: 38.28***
![Page 18: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing18
Explanatory VariablesImpact on
Total hours effort Advice Disagreement
Use of Convertible Securities 0 + 0
VC Ownership % + 0 + / 0
Veto Rights + / 0 + 0
Board Rights 0 0 0
Syndication + 0 + / 0
Early Stage + + +
Project Risk 0 + 0
Entrepreneur Experience 0 + -
VC Portfolio Size / # Managers - - -
Success Potential + / 0 0 0
Length of Investment Period + 0 +
Legality 0 0 -
‘+’ refers to robust positive effect, ‘-’ refers to robust negative effect, 0 refers to no significant impact, and ‘+ / 0’ refers to positive but non-robust estimates.
![Page 19: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Summary
• Rare direct look at investor activities• Important aspect of most theory papers • Prior empirical papers tend to look at effect of effort,
not actual effort
• Novel empirical approach in distinguishing between advice and monitoring
• Advice: congruent with entrepreneurial interests• Monitoring: dissonant with entrepreneur interests
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
19
![Page 20: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Key Findings (1)
• Cash-flow and control rights enhance advice but not monitoring.
• Supports Casamatta (2003 JF), Repullo and Suarez (2003 RES), Schmidt (2003 JF), De Bettignies (2008 MS)
• Does not support Cornelli and Yosha (2003 RES), although not a direct test of that model
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
20
![Page 21: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Key Findings (2)
• Complementarities in VC Syndicate effort• Supports Lerner (1994 FM), Brander et al
(2002 JEMS)
• Complementarities in VC-Entrepreneur effort
• Supports Casamatta (2003 JF), Cestone (2013 RF), Repullo and Suarez (2004 RF)
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
21
![Page 22: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Key Findings (3)
• Strong and robust negative relation between VC portfolio size/manager and involvement
• Funds with larger portfolios per manager tend to provide less effort in both advising and monitoring.
• Consistent with– Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2004 JCF, JBF)– Keuschnigg (2004 OEP)– Cumming (2006 J Bus)
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
22
![Page 23: Contracts and Effort](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062723/56814017550346895dab651b/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
© Cumming & Johan (2013) Venture Capital Investing
Key Findings (4)
• Better legal systems mitigate VC-Entrepreneur conflicts
• Consistent with evidence in other parts of book on the importance of legality in the development of VC markets
MotivationTheoryData
RegressionsConclusion/Summary
23