Contested Collectives - Sklar

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Contested collectives: The struggle to define the we in the 1995 Qubec referendumAlissa Sklara a

Doctoral student in the Department of Communication, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Available online: 01 Apr 2009

To cite this article: Alissa Sklar (1999): Contested collectives: The struggle to define the we in the 1995 Qubec referendum, Southern Communication Journal, 64:2, 106-122 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10417949909373126

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Contested Collectives: The Struggle to Define the "We" in the 1995 Quebec ReferendumAlissa Sklarn the last three weeks of October, 1995, the citizens of Canada developed an entirely new understanding of the concept of "nation." As temperatures fell and days grew shorter, the campaign leading up to the October 30th Quebec referendum became increasingly heated. Polls reflected almost evenly split allegiances among decided votersroughly 50% for and against the eventual separation of the province. Approximately 14% of registered voters remained undecided, and the campaigns on both sides threw all their energy into convincing the population to vote YES or NO. These campaigns solidified positions for both the separatist movement (represented roughly by the provincial Parti Quebecois and the federal Bloc Quebecois, but also composed of other organizations and committees), and the resulting countermovement, referred to as federalists (represented largely by the provincial Liberal party, the federal government and other of organizations and committees in the province and across the country). In many cases, the rhetoric of these campaigns resulted in the evolution of the platform, symbols, and narratives bound up in their positions. In the end, the astoundingly narrow defeat of the referendum question by a little over 1 % of the popular vote (which despite its obfuscating language, was generally perceived as whether Quebec should separate or not) made it clear that the campaigns and election process had led to a province and a nation bitterly divided over essential questions of identity, culture and history. The political and emotional fallout of this referendum continues to feed these highly contentious issues in 1999. At the root of impassioned pleas from both movement and counter-movement was a battle for control of the meaning of key concepts. Both sides struggled to establish their definitions of such ideals as pride, unity, people and history. And at the heart of these contestations was the concerted effort to securely anchor the meaning of the collective pronoun "we" ("nous" in French). The slippery notion of "the people" has played a part in Quebec politics for at least 40 years (cf. Charland 1987). Writes Michael McGee: "Typically, 'the people'justify political philosophies; their only concrete significance is their existence, for not even their identity is agreed upon by those who appeal to them. About the only point of agreement is that, in politics, 'the people' are omnipotent; they are an idea of collective force which transcends both individuality and reason" (238). In the context of Quebec politics, the real and evocative power of "peoplehood" has become acutely appreciated. Both the separatist movement and unity counter-movement took as their principle task the fixation of this identity. This article examines the separatist and federalist campaigns in the 1995 referendum in terms of their efforts to establish legitimate identity claims on Quebec voters. In attempting to interpellate Quebecers as particular kinds of political subjects, the two movements saw marked changes in their own positions and in the definitions and meanings of key symbols. I begin with a brief discussion of work done in the area of rhetoric and national identity; the second section analyzes the key strategies and symbols of the two campaigns and the third looks at the French and English newspaper coverage of the referendum issues, events and leaders.106

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ANALYZING THE 1995 REFERENDUM Herbert Simons argues that "movements are struggles on behalf of a cause by groups whose core organizations, modes of actions, and/or guiding ideas are not fully legitimated by the larger society" (100). This is certainly true of contemporary Quebec, for which the '95 referendum was an opportunity for legitimization of the Quebecois nation. This nationalistic struggle might also be fairly characterized at the time of the 1995 referendum by what Simons calls a "top-down" movement, or a struggle "by people in positions of institutional authority on behalf of a cause whose guiding ideas, characteristic modes of action, or organizational structures have not been fully institutionalized" (100). It is, however, worth remembering that the separatists began as a grassroots movement of sorts and grew to achieve increasing amounts of support, legitimacy and institutionalization over the years. While; the "Top-Down" categorization fails to adequately account for the popular base of support that put movement leaders in positions of power, and for the political ratification required of voters across the province, it does offer a satisfying point of entry into work on the rhetoric of social movements. Quebec offers an example of a movement integral to the subject of cultural identity and the problematic concept of the "nation". The 1995 referendum is interesting theoretically for a number of reasons, not least of which is the subject of identity constitution through discourse. Stuart Hall has argued that identity is played out in the relationships between subjects and discursive practices, and it is precisely those questions of discursive access, use and manipulation that concern me here. The concept of identity I'm borrowing is a strategic and decidedly non-essentialist one. It runs directly counter to any notion of what Hall called the "stable core of the self (Hall 3), of a unified, unchanging or "true" kernel of subjectivity. Hall reminds us that identification is always conditional, contingent on the imperfect projection of commonality with another person or group. It may require material and symbolic resources to sustain it, but identification is always fantastical, or, as Michael McGee has argued, "mythical" (24). This positions identification as a constant, on-going process of signifying practice "subject to the 'play', of differance," (Hall 3). In his writings on the rhetorical trope of "the people", McGee maintains that "'the people' are more process than phenomenon" (242, emphasis his). Hall expands on this idea: "since as a process it operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of 'frontier-effects'. It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process" (Hall 3). Central to the issues of identity are what is excluded, what falls outside the parameters and margins of selected discourses, for these strategic absences prove definitive by the choice implied. The interplay of practice, text and subject is of importance to those studying the constitution of national identities. Hasian and Flores urge rhetorical critics to think beyond the inadequate traditional conceptions of nationness, so that the "crafting of a 'state' or 'nation' can therefore be considered a rhetorical performance" (92), drawing together the existing fragments of tradition, memories and histories. That this does not happen easily, instantaneously or unimpeded is a given; they see nation as as "the product of many layers of discursive units, where conflicting imaginations compete for the right of representation" (93). I would argue that the opposing discursive tendencies operative in the 1995 Quebec election were a snapshot of this forging process, in which nations are ultimately formed or dissipated. The popular trend towards separatism in Quebec has been predicated upon the identification of individuals with the larger goals of the movement. Charland's 1987 article "Constitutive Rhetoric: the Case of the Peuple Quebecois" described how movement leaders "addressed and so attempted to call into being a peuple quebecois that would legitimate the constitution of a sovereign Quebec" (134). This process involved the use of new terms ("Quebecois" instead of "Canadiens fmngais"), the re-appropria-


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tion of other terms into new political discourse (references to inhabitants of Quebec as a "peuple") and the re-telling of history to coincide with this new ideology. Charland argues that this battle hinged upon the repeated attempts to link references to a past and present "we" and "our" ("nous"and "nos") with the newly politicized term "Quebecois." "In the telling of the story of a. peuple, a. peuple comes to be" (140). The constitution of the province's citizens as political subjects has been the work of a separatist movement in Quebec for over four decades. They have been extremely successful at naturalizing their presence and claims, making the use of the above terms seem extra-rhetorical, and thus forcing participants in the federalist counter-movement to use them (Charland 137). The 1995 referendum campaign became a struggle to take this constitution to its logical telos, towards the interpellation of Quebec voters into a peuple Quebecois (138). In voting for autonomy, individuals would be actively participating in the discourse addressing them. It would represent the ultimate legitimization of this constitutive rhetorica sovereign state for a peuple called into figurative being only 30 odd years ago, and the central proposition of the YES campaign. The federalist countermovement arose in response to what it saw as the growing threat of separatism in Quebec. It attempted to stir up very muted strains of Canadian patriotism alongside rational, primarily politico-economic, arguments for the status quo constitutional arrangement.1 It is further interesting in that it arose principally around the referendum of 1995, though the separatist movement had arguably been gaining ground since the late 1960s, as documented by Charland. The counter-movement, represented by those voting NO and extending their influence beyond Quebec to all of Canada, had a two-fold task: to deconstruct and problematize the constitution of die peuple Quebecois as political subjects requiring their own sovereign state; and to re-constitute and reconfigure the provincial population as part of a strong and unified Canada. Canadian federalism is interesting not only around issues of Quebec's political autonomy, but because it has served (and arguably continues to serve) a growing national need for selfdefinition in a world where political, economic and cultural barriers continue to erode. The discourses of "Canadianness", for which Quebec is one nodal point, have stirred up intense political waves for the entire country.2 The federalist force in the 1995 referendum offers a unique opportunity to observe a pointed, intense and temporally contained battle to rhetorically constitute the national identities of Quebec residents. During the long month of October 1995 supporters of both movements strove to control the meanings of politicized terms and symbols. Their efforts spoke from billboards, from placards which papered the streets and autoroutes, from the pages of provincial and national newspapers and in the coundess rallies and marches. My principal concern here is die struggle between two movements for control of key concepts and symbols, connotations and denotations of "people," country, identity and political responsibility. The epistemic rift between the separatist movement and the unity counter-movement is most visible at this definitive moment (the October 1995 referendum) and in these contested terms. I take up where Charland left off in his 1987 essay, for the political landscape has evolved in significant ways in the intervening years, changing the ways in which the constitution of identity can be either effective or meaningful. These changes are significant both for the political evolution of Quebec and Canada, as well as for the understanding of how rhetoric has been used to conjure, define, alter, confirm or deny popular identifications. Benedict Anderson's (1983) description of the nation as a symbolic formation, imagined by its inhabitants through different systems of representation, underscores the importance of the mass media in this regard. STRATEGIES Beginning with the basic framework of Charland's "constitutive rhetoric," my critique will draw from various methods including key word, cluster analysis, and recur-



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ring metaphors.31 have been influenced by Lakoff and Johnson's writings on metaphor (1980), Weaver's concept of ultimate terms (1953) and Burke's writings on identification (1950; 1966; 1973). The deliberate attempt to naturalize the meaning of key terms constitutes a conscious weaving of what Burke called "terministic screens," in which "any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others" (45). Similarly, Blankenship has explained that choice of terms is "not merely descriptive, but 'prescriptive' as well" (237). The power of critical terms lies in their ability to influence our conceptions of reality. For this reason, the symbols, metaphors, images and verbal jousting of the campaign provide critical insight to the unprecedented outpouring of passion by millions of normally placid citizens across Canada. From a practical point of view, I have considered several elements in my analysis; these include the movement and countermovement strategies, official campaign posters, signs and slogans, the English and French newspaper coverage, and the symbolic presence developed around the persona of Lucien Bouchard. The newspapers I considered were Le Devoir, Le Journal de Montral and La Presse, (the first being a provincial paper, the second two serving mainly the Greater Montreal region) and the only English language daily in the province, The Montreal Gazette. I focused principally on the coverage in the four days surrounding the actual vote, when tensions were at their highest. As with many social movements, the Quebec separatist platform adopted a moral tone (Stewart, Smith and Denton 10). They were (and remain) convinced that separatism alone "constitutes an ethical, virtuous, principled, and righteous force with a 'moral obligation' to raise the consciousness of 'the people' and thus to reveal the moral, intellectual, and coercive bankruptcy of the opposition" (11). This moralistic bent is apparent in the terms used in the speeches and commentary of movement leaders. A brief list of these key words would include such terms as "God," "history," "destiny," "natural evolution" and "right." The religious imagery in particular strikes a chord among a group of people profoundly influenced by the Roman Catholic church. Although the YES side had widespread institutional support (the separatist leadership of the provincial legislature being only the most obvious example), the fact is that the notion of separatism itself still required legitimization in the minds of the voters. The platform of many separatists had been strategically diluted to gain political office, and inflammatory statements about autonomy had been studiously avoided. But the referendum brought this central project to the fore, and sovereignty had yet to gain popular assent from those the movement sought principally to address. The often strident tone of YES rhetoric in the 1995 campaign still found itself in the difficult position of seeking to increase acceptance for the notion of separatism without alienating those with federalist tendencies. This meant talking about separatism without speaking the word outright. One Le Devoir article referred to this obstacle as "la peur de faire peur" ("the fear of making people afraid"). The use of moral proofs to bolster their position, paired with the conscious rhetorical constitution of a unified collective remained their principle strategy. As has already been established, the separatist movement enjoyed the advantage of arguing for an affirmative position.4 For example, Lucien Bouchard's passionate appeal urged, "We have it before us. Seize it and vote Yes. Say Yes to ourselves. Say Yes to the people of Quebec." Elsewhere in the French media, supporters of sovereignty equated YES with "intelligence," the "future," "democracy," "compassion" and "tolerance." Another rhetorical strategy for the separatist movement was the consistent placement of this referendum in a historical context. References to this vote as the "culmination of a 30-year struggle for Quebec's sovereignty movement" naturalizes the struggle for independence. It serves to imbue what has long been a fringe element on the provincial political scene with a prophetic weight. The constant references to the 1980 referendum, to Parti Quebecois election victories over the years and to the Duplessis era


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places upon the voters of 1995 the responsibility for vindicating the supporters of what is painted as a long and bitterly fought popular struggle. In this way, the sovereignty of Quebec becomes a matter of destiny. Part of the evocation of the past involves the rehabilitation and re-presentation of historical figures as heroes. The crotchety, cigarette-smoking deceased leader of the Parti Quebecois, Rene Levesque, is frequently referred to by movement supporters as a benevolent ghost in whose memory political autonomy must be won. One speaker at a rally explained to the crowd, "Mr. Levesque said that night in May [at the 1980 referendum] , 'until the next time . . . . Mr. Levesque, we are at the rendezvous. The next time is now'." Articles referring to the movement's past must invariably refer to Levesque. He is attributed with putting the movement on "solid ground." The historical retrospective published by Le Devoir on voting day wraps around a picture of Levesque, hands upraised and apparently blinking back tears, speechless and overcome by emotion after the first PQ election victory in 1976. Headlined "The long march of the sovereigntists," the article details the victories and defeats of what began in the minds of "young idealists" (O'Neill A4). Outside of the blatantly political, other Quebecois cultural symbols were also coopted by the YES supporters. At a rally in the town of Longueuil, Quebec's poet hero Gilles Vigneault was reported to have warmed up the capacity crowd along with Quebec entertainers Renee Claude, Marcel Beliveau, Jeannette Bertrand and rocker Claude Dubois. On voting day, Bouchard urged voters to "think about their ancestors and their children, of the winters of Quebec poet Gilles Vigneault, of Quebec's rivers and lakes, of the mountains they had not climbed." As I have established, the YES campaign attempted to successfully paint Quebec society as deserving of autonomous political leadership. Their efforts combined to evoke "the existence of an ideological subject, the "Quebecois," so constituted that sovereignty is a natural and necessary way of life" (Charland 137). References to a Quebec "peuple" were found in virtually every text generated by the movement leadership, deployments strategically aimed at interpellating audience members into the discourse and thus requiring them to actto vote YESfor the preservation of the collective. Bouchard argued for the self-determining nature of the vote: "The people will decide. No one can speak for the people of Quebec." More blatantly, Jacques Parizeau cautioned on the day of the vote that "if Quebecers vote NO, 'we have the certitude Quebecers will not be recognized as a people. If it is a NO, we have the certitude Quebecers won't be treated as equals.'" The ultimate articulation of this constitution of a "people" was the preamble to a draft sovereignty bill released to the public just before vote. Like the White Paper of 1979, this document sets out to naturalize the concept of an autonomous political order for Quebec: We the people of Quebec declare it is our will to be in full possession of all the powers of a state: to levy all our taxes, to vote on all our laws, to sign all our treaties and to exercise the highest power of all, conceiving and controlling, by ourselves, our fundamental law. To battle against misery and poverty, to support the young and elderly, are essential features of the society we would build . . . . Our shared future is in the hands for all those for whom Quebec is a homeland (Bauch A2). The flip side to painting the population of the province as a "people" was the demonization of Canada. This was done less often, possibly out of a realization that it is far easier to argue the positive (Quebec is rightfully a country). Re-casting the position of Canada happened through a focus on historical instances of neglect and ill-will per-



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ceived to have been directed at Quebec through history. The term "debilitating regime" came to be used in reference to the federal government. A further example would be the separatist targeting of federal social legislation. Allegations that Ottawa had "abandoned" women, children, the elderly and unemployed provided a foundation for the proposed social welfare legislation in a sovereign Quebec. Another strategy of the YES campaign that may have explained their relative success was the use of language suggesting that a sovereignist victory was a certainty. This allowed Bouchard and Parizeau to use the present tense and a calm assurance in discussing their plan of action "once" they win. This was presumably intended to galvanize undecided voters and intensify the passions of sovereigntists by placing their victory almost in their hands; it was frankly terrifying to federalists. The day of the referendum, The Montreal Gazette reported: "Bouchard said he expects the rest of Canada will accept the verdict just as sovereigntists accepted defeat in 1980" (Authier A10). In the same article, Parizeau was reported to have said "nothing radical will happen the morning after the vote: Quebecers will still be Canadians but 'we will start preparing for sovereignty. It could take a year to prepare, slowly conscientiously, without a sudden shakeup'." Once the final results came through the evening of the election, a dejected Lise Beaudoin (intergovernmental minister for the separatist Bloc Quebecois) explained to the national audience on the CBC "your love is not enough." She was seeking to place the separatists' narrow loss within the context of an ongoing movement towards sovereignty, for which this lost referendum was to be a stepping stone. The federal rejection of repeated Quebecois pleas for change had cast an empty ring to the unity movement's desperate attempts to convince the province of their love. Beaudoin's post-vote comment referred to the federalist sub-theme of acceptance and love for Quebec, epitomized perhaps by an enormous pan-Canadian unity rally in Montreal on October 27th. Regrouping her forces after the defeat, she was attempting to remind Canadians that empty, toothless displays of emotion and acceptance will not sway the progress of the separatist movement. The La Presse headline following the unity rally was "Trap peu, trop tard" ("Too little, too late"). Le Devoirs director Lise Bisonnette wrote of the same rally in her editorial, titled "Apparences d'amour" ("The appearance of love"): "Love, real, free, durable and nonpartisan, was nowhere in evidence in the sentimental display in Montreal . . . . Canada has suddenly awakened and discovered a taste for 'change' now that the YES side is ahead in the polls. The country has its interests to protect" (A14). The supporters of the NO movement focused all their energies on Canadian unity. They emphasized equality, democracy, diversity, change and strength. The wellspring of support for federalism within the province came from the mostly English-speaking western half of Montreal, and from the numerous ethnic communities in the same city. They tried to turn the negativity of "Non" towards the more positive connotations of unity. Coverage emphasized the "emotional" qualities, and "straight -from-the-heart appeals." Author Pierre Berton said at a rally in Ottawa "We don't wear our hearts on our sleeves . . . but there's a time When emotion is necessary . . . . And this is one of those times." At the same time, the NO campaign stressed the need to let the mind win over the heart at the ballot box. Liberal leader Daniel Johnson summed up his campaign: "we stuck to game plan and appealed to intelligence." The NO side also integrated the notion of national legislative change to benefit Quebecbut within the larger infrastructure of a unified Canada. Jean Charest, leader of the federal Progressive Conservative party, promised to be the "guardian of change," while Johnson called a NO vote a "stepping stone from which we can effect change within Canada in an orderly fashion." In describing the overall tone of discourse on the issue of change, analyst Herbert Bauch emphasized the Canadian reputation for calm: "it has unfolded in a way most of the people like to think is eminently Canadianin


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peace and good order" (A2). Contrasting a carefully ordered change in Quebec's favor with the supposed disorder, risk and turmoil of separation was a calculated move. Federal Labour Minister Lucienne Robillard agreed that a NO vote would require the counter-movement to deliver on their promises: I think that the prime minister's speech was very clear and the NO manifesto was clear as w e l l . . . . We talk about changes to bring decisions back as close to the people as possible, we talk about recognizing Quebec's place, the prime minister of Canada said very clearly that Quebec is a distinct society. We talk, as well, that there will not be constitutional changes that will affect Quebec without Quebecers agreeing to them (Thompson A10). References to change resonated throughout the NO campaign, but specific details remained ambiguous. Chretien refused to promise constitutional change, but stressed need for major modifications: "I want to say that Canada has changed continually and will continue to change because we must be ready for the 21st century and Canadians want to make the necessary change so we can continue to be the best country in the world." In fact, the sudden openness to change in this previously rigid and entrenched camp was most marked when expressed from parts of the country least tolerant of changes in Quebec's status. "This stands on its own," said a St. John's, Newfoundland city councillor in a Gazette article. "Clearly Quebec is a distinct society. We're going to have to deal with that." ("Canadians rally" A2). However, this gilded picture of Canada was likely overshadowed by fear-mongering references to an isolated and economically weakened sovereign Quebec. Johnson warned voters to behave "responsibly" and make the "intelligent choice." The federalists made repeated threatening references to the economic consequences of separatist victory, what LeDevoirs Lise Bissonnette cynically referred to as "le trio pensions-passeportdollar" (A14). NO leaders also emphasized the historically attendant element of demagoguery in the YES side by exhorting sovereignists to "treat everyone equally, on the same footing. One vote is one vote. Once you start weighing votes instead of counting them, you're on a very slippery slope." Intrinsic to the unity counter-movement's design were the thousands of rallies and marches held by supporters widiin Quebec and around the country. These rallies, also referred to as "vigils," "prayer vigils," "candlelight vigils," "marches," "monster rallies" and "walks" served to reawaken and reaffirm a dormant (or understated) national patriotism. They offered individual supporters of unityparticularly those outside of Quebec unable to vote on what was certain to affect their own futurean opportunity to act upon their beliefs. These demonstrations of collective support ranged from cartoonist Ben Wicks' Walk For Canada (30,000 marchers in Toronto) to a "we-wantQuebec march" from Ottawa, Ontario across the Alexandra Bridge to Hull, Quebec. The ultimate expression of these unity rallies was the so-called "monster rally" in Montreal the Friday before the vote, attended by tens of thousands of Canadians who poured into the city from across the country. Despite the length of their journeys, and their intense efforts to tell Quebec they "loved them" and wanted them to "stay in Canada," Le Devoir dismissed them as "touristes dufederalisme" and made fun of their idle chit-chat and souvenir-buying. Unity movement rhetoric struggled throughout to equate a NO vote with pride in Quebec. Supporters emphasized the ability to be simultaneously a citizen of both province and country (as with their slogan "Jiers,fort, ensemble"). Argued Chretien at a rally, "It is possible to be at the same time a proud Quebecer and a proud Canadian. Our homeland will always be Quebec. Our country will always be Canada. Vive le Quebec. Vive le Canada." The NO vision was summed up in their Referendum '95 Manifesto, which included the assertion that "Canada is part of every Quebecers heritageand we don't



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want to give that up." On October 30th, Chretien kept up the affiliation of province with country in his prediction "that Canada will emerge from today's vote stronger and more united." Between the alternate visions of the YES and NO movements is the hyperpoliticized terrain of the "ethnic" or allophone population. These peoples, whose presence problematizes the existence of a true "peuple Quebecois" where they do not, have not and can not fit into the nationalist rhetoric, found themselves to be powerful symbols for the unity counter-movement. The notion of an effective racially and linguistically stratified citizenry has been anathema to the writings of celebrated Quebec nationalists like Lionel Groulx, Henri Bourassa and Pierre Vallieres. Writer Julianne Pidduck explains: Because of the deep-seated sense of Quebec's minority and endangered status, marooned in a sea of English Canadian and US culture, it seems that the political terrain of Quebec is becomingly increasingly hostile to perceived 'differences' within its borders. (Most explosive has been the question of First Nations autonomy in relation to Quebec's struggle for cultural autonomy: the scuttled Meech Lake Accord and the military standoff of the Oka Crisis in 1989 and the more recent contested Great Whale Project) (247). This resistance to accepting the demographic reality of contemporary Quebec (particularly in Montreal) highlights Bormann's argument that "'the people' may be a strictly linguistic phenomena introduced into public argument as a means of 'legitimizing' a collective fantasy" (qtd. in McGee 239). While a tolerant acceptance (but not celebration) has been forced through some aspects of the separatist movement (as with a Le Devoir feature on a Vietnamese immigrant choosing to vote YES), it has remained a significant obstacle. The unity counter-movement, by contrast, has staged their platform for a widely inclusive "we" upon a strong and diverse Canada. This was reflected in the pictures of movement supporters on both sides. YES supporters at rallies, marches, and headquarters were almost exclusively white and francophone. NO supporters, particularly in Montreal (whose multiracial communities ultimately defeated the YES agenda in the vote), appeared to have a wide variety of skin tones, styles of dress, mother tongues and accents. This discrepancy was showcased almost laughably by the English press. Their "diversity" agenda meant that visuals of proceedings required a person of color before the camera. To that end, both The Gazette's front page picture announcing a NO victory and the CBC referendum night coverage of NO headquarters prominently featured the same anonymous young man of color. Signs of Change The movement towards separatism and the counter-movement for unity used the month of October to plaster the province with signs and placards urging the population to vote. Relying on a blend of visual cues, cultural icons and clever slogans, they provided a constant reminder of the tension underlying all interactions. The 1995 campaign visuals (unlike the simple "Oui!" or "Non!" signs of the 1980 referendum) bore the slick, polished traces of advertising agencies and public relations experts. Independence and unity were "sold" to Quebec.5 The official campaign signs were colorful testaments to the underlying political strategies of the movements. The YES side began with the advantage of arguing the affirmative. The basic "Positive is Good" metaphor enabled the YES campaign to make the most of a happy, upbeat, and dynamic platform. It made it possible to advocate change (the political autonomy of Quebec) from the position of "right." Arguing for change further lent them the strength of the also powerful "Change=Progress" metaphor. Central to the separatist platform were the visual and cultural connotations of the word "Oui." That is to say, the theme of the placards was the replacement of the letter "o" with various round icons suggesting some positive aspect of change. The legend on

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the signs was "Oui: et c.a devient possible" ("YES and it becomes possible"). The association of change (the political separation of Quebec from Canada, without specifying the degree of separation) with an upbeat and optimistic energy sought to allay the consistently voiced fears of Quebec citizens. Voters' fears about the economy, political risk and the unknown were targeted (Bagnall A9). The idealism and enthusiasm of Quebec youth (the most vehement supporters of separatism) became the central thematic for the platform. The results were phenomenal. Modern, youthful Oui placards papered the provincial landscape. The MTV-style layout and colorful depictions made for a jovial and celebratory atmosphere. The various icons replacing the "o" (a daisy, the planet earth, a peace sign, a men at work symbol, the dollar coin) linked the prospect of a new independent Quebec to such various qualities as youth, a bright future, a clean earth, peace, prosperity, growth and wealth. The ambiguous "fa" ("it") that would be possible wth a YES majority was suffused with this hopeful energy. The dollar coin (popularly referred to as the "loonie" for the loon on one face) is a particularly interesting choice of icon. Reassuring Quebecers that the provincial economy would remain tied to the stability of Canada (protecting their investments and pensions) targets the greatest opposition to sovereignty among French Canadians. It does this even as the issue of currency goes unresolved in provincial-federal negotiations. The vague but strong positive reassurances of these icons are rooted in the purposeful lack of definition in the divided sovereigntist/separatist leadership the range of support for a separatist platform ran from those who advocated complete disassociation with Ottawa, to those who felt a YES vote would give the province a bargaining chip to secure more powers within a united Canada. The daisy was one of the more pervasive symbols appropriated by the separatist movement. Images of the fresh, dew-tinged flower appeared on the backdrop of the YES headquarters in Montreal on election night. These images were carefully positioned so that pictures of Bouchard and Parizeau speaking to the assembled crowds framed the leaders in an odd but compelling halo effect. Daisies appeared as the boutonniere in the leaders' lapels at rallies. "Daisies . . . were everywhere" at these gatherings, wrote Philip Authier of The Gazette (A10). The purity and associations of innocent youthfulness were co-opted by the separatists to counter the bleak and negative characterizations the counter-movement strove to pin on them. The doom-and-gloom character of the unity counter-movement suffered alongside the eye-catching colors and dynamic energy of the YES campaign. After a strong start (before the YES supporters got their signs up), the federalists found themselves suffering the negative connotations of the word NO. Much of their rhetorical strategy played upon the articulated fears of the Quebec population vis-a-vis the economy and the uncertainty and risk of such a dramatic change. Instead of a series of signs, the unity supporters relied on one central design. The legend on the sign" Le separation ? On a raison de dire Non " (Separation? We have good reason to say NO")works mainly as a visual play. The word "separation" is divided by the logo for the NO campaign, in which the letter "o" is composed of a red arc culminating in a maple leaf and a blue arc culminating in a fleur de lis.6 The argument is thus depicted visually: separation would be an intrusive physical divide of a natural vhole. Together, Quebec and Canada function as strong cooperative partners (the "o")the resulting synergy is productive in a manner impossible for separated elements. The placement of red and blue side by side (also in the background of the sign) is a visual representation of unity. On some of these signs, the boxed-in slogan "On a raison de dire Non " is underlined by the complement "et de le dire avecfierte" ("and to say it with pride"). This phrase is a counter-argument to the constitutive rhetoric of the separatists. The NO leaders are trying to counter the perceived shame of voting against a sovereign Quebec by associating pride with the concept of a strong Quebec within a unified Canada.



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The federalist counter-movement, unlike the Oui platform, also produced signs in English. Particularly in the west end of Montreal (where the majority of anglophones live), the same sign ran with bilingual wording. Although these placards were largely preaching to the convertedan overwhelming majority of the province's anglophones have ahvays voted for federalismthey were examples of the rhetorical creativity resulting from the province's language laws.7 Words which mean the same thing in both languages were frequently used both to overcome the restrictions of Bill 101 and to target speakers of both tongues.8 The word "separation" is thus divided around the French legend and its English counterpart ("The only answer is NO"). The divided, synergistic "O" anchors the key word in both languages. In some instances, this same design ran with other legends. One such slogan was aimed directly at concerns over the province's economic and political status on a world stage, should separation occur: "Pourquoirisquerd'affaiblir le Quebec?" ("Why risk weakening Quebec?"). This question punctuated a larger discourse initiated by the federalists concerning a plummeting dollar, a sovereign Quebec's exclusion from NAFTA, the substantial national debt, the billions of dollars of provincial pension funds paid into national coffers and potential loss of G7 status. The association of such terms as "risk" and "weak" served to emphasize what were both the practical problems and worst fears of most Quebecers. Although somewhat more pointed, these slogans were almost as ambiguous as that of the YES side. Both combined emotional appeals with serious practical concerns in an effort to sway voters. Perhaps in response to the YES deflections of the gloom-and-doom charges of the federalist counter-movement, the NO campaign also worked at building a passion for a unified Canada. The slogan 'Tiers, forts et ensemble" ("proud, strong and together") overlaid on the same blue and red background was designed to re-appropriate the notion of the "peuple" and the collective pronoun "nous" through the allusion to a togetherness within the nation of Canada. One of the more striking examples of the rhetorical struggle over the definition of this collective pronoun (cf. Charland 140), this is a direct attempt to actively reconfigure the Quebecois notion of identity within the confederation of Canada. To do this, federalists continued to play upon fears of an economically weak and internationally disenfranchised Quebec nation. Along these same lines werebillboards proclaiming "Canada. C'est votre pays. Redecouvrez-t-il" ("Canada. It's your

country. Rediscover it"). Leaders of both movements also ran campaign advertisements in newspapers. Le Devoir ran ads from both sides on the weekend before the election. Perhaps under the assumption that newspaper readers would take more time to wade through text, and given a little more room to expand their positions, both sides made concerted attempts to sway readers. The YES ad, occupying one-quarter of the newspaper's second page, supplemented a sharpened ballot box pencil for the letter "i". The text here stepped up the intensity of the argument: "Our future is in our h a n d s . . . . Don't let slip by what may be our last chance for real change." The emphasis on a definitive collective "us" ("nous") was coupled with the notion of group responsibility. The argument that every individual must do his/her part so that "nous" can become an autonomous, self-directed "peuple" was infused with a sense of urgency. The emotions bound up in the phrase "derniere chance" ("last chance") balance out the ambiguity of the phrase "vrai changement" ("real change"). In this instance, emotional pleas superseded (and obscured) argument based on fact. The NO advertisement occupied the entire fifth page of the same issue of Le Devoir. Far wordier than the Oui ad, the block of text ran underneath a soft picture of two oarsmen rowing together. The theme of cooperation was emphasized. The argument in the text began with the news that, for the second consecutive year, Canada has been rated first in terms of quality of life. The central premise is that this is not a coincidence, but a direct result of the cooperative work of the nation's two founding peoples towards a

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strong future. To be strong and prosperous, Canada needs Quebec. Similarly, to be strong and prosperous, Quebec needs Canada. The boldface of key phrases constitute an important sub-text: "two peoples," "same direction," "future," "stronger," "Quebec can," "must remember," "because they are unified, Quebec," and "Canada can better grow." These key words, which jump out to an eye skimming the page, reinforce recurring themes of unity, strength and growth. The words play upon and reinforce French perspectives on historical texts. The notionof two founding peoples"deuxpeuples onfonde, ily a maintenant 128 ans, un pays" ("128


years ago, two peoples founded a nation")is the preferred Quebecois reading of Canadian history, as opposed to the English version of 10 equal provinces.9 The term "se souviens" ("remember") refers to the Quebecois nationalist motto "je me souviens" ("I remember"), to the defeat of French forces by the English and to the annexation of Quebec into the British colony of Canada. In this context, the motto is appropriated and recast within federalist terms, implying Ottawa's sensitivity to Quebecois history and concerns. Occasionally visible were signs designed not by the leaders of the movements but by individual supporters. A sign designed by a supporter of the YES movement echoed the cries of French Canadian nationalists for the past 30 years: "Quebec aux Quebecois" ("Quebec to/for Quebecers"). This slogan drew upon both the constitutive rhetoric of the separatist movement (reinforcing the idea of the group as a "people") and the theme of a right to self-determination. There was an additional undercurrent to this message, and official leaders of the movement struggled to silence it: the xenophobic move to keep "others" (the variously defined non-Quebecers) out of an idealized entity (a "pure" sovereign Quebec). The strains of racism are manifested generally in suchvernacular expressions as "Quebecois pur laine" and "Quebecois de souche" ("dyed in the

wool" or "old stock" Quebeceran allusion to descendants of French colonists). Movement leaders were generally careful to avoid any expressions of racism, but their occasional reappearance served as a reminder of the dark side of nationalism. Another homemade sign, visible at the national unity rally in Montreal a few days before the referendum, was unfurled by a group of English Canadians. Their enormous banner bore the signatures of hundreds of Canadians under the motto "Mon Canada comprend le Quebec." The double meaning of this sign'My Canada includes Quebec' and 'My Canada understands Quebec'lent a new urgency to the debate. The latter meaning, particularly, refers to the new groundswell of support among English Canadians for concessions to Quebec's "distinct society" status and the national program for official bilingualism. Newspaper coverage: Before and After French and English newspaper coverage of the referendum diverged wildly, particularly in their partisanship. In a very significant way the headlines, lead paragraphs, photos and editorials were illustrative of the differing dynamics and intense partisanships of the YES and NO camps. The provincial newspaper Le Devoir spoke for and of the French intelligentsia and elite, while Le Journal de Montral and La Presse addressed the working and middle classes of Montreal and surrounding areas. The Montreal Gazette, sole English language daily in the province and newspaper to staunchly federalist anglophones and allophones, represented their fears and beliefs. The three French papers, as well as the many others in the province, were more or less allied with the separatist forces. An analysis of selections from these papers is a necessary part of the study of the rhetorical strategies used in this referendum. It should not be surprising that the French and English press painted the referendum from different perspectives. The French papers depicted the referendum as a chance to "realiser leur reue" (realize their dream), in which leaders Parizeau and Bou-


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chard "ont mis tout leur coeur et toute leur energie" for "le combat de toute une vie" (put all


their hearts and energy into the fight of their lives). While space was given to the voices of the federalist counter-movement, these papers expressed partisanship through editorials, political cartoons and the predominance of sympathetic articles about the separatist movement. A marked majority of their total coverage of the issue focuses on what the referendum and its outcome meant to the citizens of Quebecroughly four-fifths of the articles, columns and op-ed pieces in the four editions prior to and after the actual vote assumed this type of focus. By contrast, the English media focused on the general meaning of the referendum to Canada. The focus was on the divisive effects of such a debate. Along these lines, a Gazette article quoted former Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau's comment from the 1980 election: "If you take into account the broken friendships, the strained family relationships, the hurt pride, there is no one who has not suffered some wound which we must try to heal in the days and weeks to come" (Hustak A9). Other examples of the English coverage focused on the apparent exclusion of anglophone and allophone readers from some renderings of a "peuple Quebecois," such as observations that "the term 'we' [is used] to refer only to old-stock francophones" (Norris A10). Columnist Ashok Chandwani attributed his feelings of election day dread to his family's dislocation in the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, and wondered if he and other allophones might find "an acceptable niche in a new Quebec state" (A2). This reference to a historical case of politically volatile provincial separation bolstered concerns about instability. Supporting the contention that the separatist movement had found support chiefly in homogeneous French communities, The Gazette sought to provide a forum for other "ethnic" voices: Frank Alvarez, a Portuguese-Canadian broadcaster, testified to his allegiance to a multicultural Canada, "Canada must be united. That's what makes it differentthe fact it's made up of different cultures, different ethnic groups." ("Canadians rally" A2) This differing definition of who "we" included was played out in the media's treatment of Premier Parizeau's infamous concession speech comments: "we were beaten" by "money and the ethnic vote"10 and a promise of "revenge." The following day (October 31st), Le Journal de Montral pushed their story about the remarks to page 5 ("Nousavons ete battus par I'argent et par un vote ethniqueJacques Parizeau"). The same day, Le

Devoir ran front page stories about the remarks of every politician except the premier of the province. His remarks were reported in the fourth paragraph of a story with the general headline "Le Quebec divise" ("A Quebec divided"), subtitled both "Parizeau promises revenge" and "Johnson calls for reconciliation." The Montreal Gazette demonstrated outrage, running this as a major front page story on Oct. 31st, the day after the election. The acceptance of both the separatist movement and the unity countermovement depended in large part on media representation. At the most fundamental level, the use of names to describe the two movements, their supporters, leaders and activities colored both public perceptions and movement directions. There was to be no clear and simple metaphor to describe the coverage of the referendum's central issuepopularly interpreted as whether or not Quebec should separate. Indicative of the general confusion and competing tensions, there seemed to be a number of possible characterizations. The different lenses through which French and English readers perceived the same referendum were both cause and result of the battle for meaning of the concept "we." Le Devoir and Le Journal de Montral expressed concern over the lack of unity within Quebec, with very little concern or attention paid to Canada as a whole. Conversely, The Gazette referred continually to the "unity of Canada" and Quebec's intention to "break up" the country. Headlines the day after the referendum are a particularly pointed illustration: Le Devoir proclaims "Le Quebec divise" ("A Quebec divided"), while The

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Gazette announces "Canada survives." The continued use of the French pronoun "nous" ("we" or "us") in francophone media referred only to the people within the province, distinct from their counterparts outside the borders. Conversely, English media used the collective pronoun to refer variously to the ambiguously placed anglophone and allophone Quebec communities, to the citizens of Canada, and to the whole population of Quebec. These different meanings of the words "we," "us," and "our" contested the separatist constitution of a singular "peuple quebecois." Another sub-theme is suggested by the Referendum As War metaphor, in which the opposing movements are termed "camps," and the descriptive language speaks of defeat, victory, revenge, strategy and militancy. This metaphor is employed differently by the two sides. On the YES side, the war metaphor brings to the fore the fight for preservation of Quebec culture and autonomy. One editorial in Le Devoir referred to a meeting between leaders of the YES and NO sides as a "battle." This analogy generally worked to paint the federalists as tactically offensive, with political strategies which run counter to all of Quebec's best interests. This position was exemplified by Bouchard's reference to the federal government as a "debilitating regime". Some federalist sympathizers saw separatism as an invasion or incursion to the larger idea of Canadian unitya concept ironically strengthened by the presence of separatism. The war metaphor persisted after the referendum mostly within the hard-core YES contingents. It was perpetuated by Parizeau's shocking remarks in his concession speech that "Nous avons ete battus par I'argent etpar un vote ethnique" ("we were defeated by money and the ethnic vote"). The War metaphor also found general resonance in the coverage of the post-result confrontation on Sainte-Catherine Street between supporters of the YES and NO contingents (in which one policeman and one journalist were knocked down). The description in Le Journal read "Affrontement muscle Rue Sainte-Catherine" ("Muscled confrontation on Ste. Catherine Street") (Desjardins 7). The Gazette carried a story with a large picture on page 3, describing "scuffles" and a "clash" breaking out between supporters of both sides (Wilton et al. A3). Lucien BouchardBody as Text Of all the symbols of both movements, few matched the electricity generated by the persona of Lucien Bouchard. The elegant, sophisticated leader of the Bloc Quebecois party continues to this day to embody the hopes of the independantistes. The countermovement had little to compete with such charismatic leadership. In a very significant way Bouchard's physical body has served as a text for the struggles of this movement. After miraculously beating the rare and devastating flesh-eating disease that claimed his leg, the Bloc leader became a corporeal symbol of an entity repelling foreign parasites. His subsequent elevation to near "martyr" status by the francophone, largely Roman Catholic population of Quebec added a quasi-spiritual element to his quest. One Le Devoir article referred to him as "le sauveur, le messie" ("the savior, the messiah") (Cauchon All). Pollster Alain Giguere explained the outpouring of support for sovereignty: "The only thing that has changed since the first of September when the campaign started . . . is that Lucien Bouchard has reassured people who had been hesitant about voting YES. They believe he is the pope of the negotiations . . . . They believe he represents the solution." (Bagnall A9) The extent of the respect shown to him by media on both sides was evident in the coverage of his one major blundera comment about how, for a "white race," Quebecoise women don't produce very many children. Writes Gilles Lesage (translated from the French): "his gaffes and verbal excesses don't stick to his skin. He's like Teflon . . . . . Three days later [after the comment about the 'white race'] the [NO side] left him alonethe pale explanations of Mr. Bouchard were accepted as if they were the gospel truth" (A8). The word "gospel" is a further signifier of this religious rhetoric.


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What the French media came to call "I'effet Bouchard" ("the Bouchard effect") was only partly fabricated on their printed pages, their small screens and AM/FM bandwidths. There is an undeniable and ineffable grace to his proud cane-assisted gait. His poise and understated expensively tailored suits seemed magnified next to the gruff Jacques Parizeau or the eminently forgettable Johnson. Much has been made in the media of his riveting oratory style. Wrote Paul Cauchon in Le Devoir: The success of Lucien Bouchard is partly due to his style of speaking, which alternates between humor, sarcasm and a dramatic lyricism. In the same speech, Mr. Bouchard can imitate a telephone conversation between Daniel Johnson [leader of the Quebec Liberal party and head of the NO campaign] and [Prime Minister] Jean Chretien (and his performance would be extremely successful at the Festival Just For Laughs"), and then throw himself into an amazing oration about the 'federal mucking about in our affairs' from which Quebecers had 'the Constitution forced down their throats,' or a characterization of the Rene Levesque of 1982 as a man 'prostrate, abandoned by all those for whom he fought' and then 'conjure up the spectre of fear' among others, in evoking the memory of '60,000 forgotten colonial settlers, left without any instructions on a rocky, snow-covered land.' Put this way, it is easier to understand how sovereignty will finally allow us to 'see the light' (All). Now What? Most of the rhetoric in this campaign played on emotionthe intangible passions of patriotism, culture and identity. Lise Bissonnette, director of Le Devoir, wrote of this battle for the hearts of Quebecers the weekend before the vote: "Lespays n'ontpas d'emotions, Us ont des interets" ("countries don't have emotions, they have interests") (A14). In the end, after the final votes were tallied and the federalists declared the winners by the slimmest of majorities, nothing seemed to have been resolved. It was emotion that fueled the push for a secure definition of the boundaries of a reference to "we." The passion mustered by supporters addresses the concepts of identity, culture and history are a large part of the legitimization of the "collective fantasy" (McGee 239). These symbols, shrouded in perpetually woven myths, succeed partly because of their irrational nature. The 1995 Quebec referendum vote put their variously interpreted meanings to test, exposing those which did not or could not truly capture the imaginations of Quebec voters. The contest of the meanings of who "we" are was made further complex by the results: the separatists lost but felt vindicated by the majority support among "old stock" Quebecois. In Parizeau's concession speech, he said, "If you will, we'll stop talking about the francophones of Quebec [which includes French-speaking immigrants and allophones]. We'll talk about us. At 60 per cent, we voted for it." The constitution of a peuple Quebecois, it seemed, was not flexible enough to accommodate its newest members. Also clouded was the meaning of "unity"with no decisive victory, the only results seemed to be a further fractionalization of identities. If the vote was won but the battle lost for the federalists, then there was not much cause for celebration. In their failure to succeed in addressing the critical mass of people included in the "we"the old stock francophones became the "peuple Quebecois"and, as their votes show, were successfully interpellated into political subjects. The dramatic returns of the October 1995 vote convinced even the most stalwart federalists in Canada that the Quebec sovereignty movement was deadly serious about leaving Confederation. The initial aftermath was filled with the grand rhetoric of both movements promising change and stability. Lucien Bouchard promised another referendum on the subject before the year 2000. After assuming the premiership of the province (with Parizeau's sub-


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sequent hasty departure), he has found his golden reputation somewhat tarnished by the realities of leading a province economically burdened by decades of political instability. Since 1995, there has emerged a new subtle patriotism in an English Canada traditionally very conservative about displays of national pride. The unity counter-movement has blossomed into a quiet but unmistakable sense of Canadian nationness. Furthermore, die intervening years have shown some increased willingness in English Canada to make concessions to linguistic and cultural diversity, principally through the furdier decentralization of powers to the provinces. There appears to be some new willingness to acknowledge the existence of a peuple Quebecois. Buoyed by their near-win, however, separatists have seen little reason to bother listening to the proposals from the rest of Canada. They are biding their time until the next vote, secure in the knowledge that "nous autres" (we) has come to popularly refer to French Canadian residents of Quebec. Some effort continues to be spent reassuring the immigrant and anglophone Quebecers that diey too have a place in this collective, but the level of distrust remains high on both sides. Most of the important lessons of those few gut-wrenching hours in the fall of 1995, as referendum results trickled in, have been lost in the waffling and squabbling of largely ineffective government leadership on all sides. The citizens of both Canada and Quebec have grown tired of these repetitive and ineffectual debates. Years of emotional appeals have yielded no easy answers. Delineating the boundaries of "the people" will remain an on-going project for separatist and unity forces in Quebec and Canada. In a number of ways, the 1995 Quebec referendum is instructive in terms of social movements as a topic of rhetorical study. The vote highlighted the intricate interplay between two opposing forces and their ironic reliance on each other to locate and define those areas of critical significance in their own cultural structures. The referendum placed the troublesome concept of cultural identity on center stage, urging and relying on voters to learn and distinguish among die fine points of ethnic, linguistic, national, geographic and regional claims on their identity positions. It pointed to the importance of definition as a primary political activity. Controlling the meaning of who "we" are and what "we" represent has been fought in public rhetorical battles. This labeling activity is often simultaneous and contradictory, as it occurs from outside the group as well as from different positions within it. Separatists were able to exploit the weakness of English Canadian symbolic identity through the use of a superficially more unified constructed Quebecois identity. The definition of a group in opposition to another group was also clearly illustrated here; without the separatist threat, the symbolic English Canadian identity (particularly in Quebec's anglophone communities) might not have rebuilt and consolidated its own presence as a movement in its own right. Ultimately, the culturally unsatisfying vote result revealed the outmoded nature of a unified identity model; but it did so widiout providing an adequate conceptual replacement. NOTESI would like to acknowledge Jane Blankenship's guidance on this research project. I would also like to thank Hermann Stelzner for his help in the preparation of this article. The research and writing of this article were also supported by the Canadian Government's Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 1 The term "Canadian patriotism" itself seemed oxymoronic in character until the events of 1995. Aside from displays of a touristic nature, Canadians have not historically tended to distinguish themselves as openly patriotic. 2 The critical changes in national politics are but one example of this, others include the discourses of western separatism, the rise of the Reform Party, official policies of multiculturalism and bilingualism. 3 Asmy analysis necessarily involves the use of translations from the French (both mine and those of others), many of the quotations have already undergone a first level of interpretation. Translation has its own implications for rhetorical analysis, as does the use of text from two different languages. In some cases--as with translated French quotations in English press--the anglicized version becomes a text in itself, the interpretations of the journalists. Elsewhere, I have had to translate the French myself, presuming an English read-



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ing audience. Given that the analysis elsewhere in this paper is ray own, it does not seem out of place that interpretation should begin at this primary level. 4 See Lakoff and Johnson pp.14-21 on orientational metaphors. 5 Although the official campaign signs in 1980 were quite simple and straight-forward, other interested parties also put out signs which seemed clearly targetted towards the referendum issue. The Quebec Ministry of Transport ran a series of ads on sealt belt safety with the slogan "On s'attache au Quebec" (translatable as both "everyone buckles up in Quebec" and "Everyone is attached to Quebec"). The government of Qubec also ran an advertisement celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the enfranchisement of women in the province with the large print "On veut l'egalit" ("We want equality"). The Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare provided one example of the federal government's attempt to have their say; an ad about the dangers of smoking showed an individual with a cigarette in hand and the huge letters "Non, merci" ("No, thank you"). For more on government advertising in the 1980 referendum, see Rose. 6 The Canadian flag is red and white with a maple leaf displayed between two stripes; the Qubec flag is blue and white with a fleur de lis between two stripes. These colors and shapes thus have accrued symbolic meaning. 7 An illustration of language as a factor of voting behavior in this referendum is evident in the results by district. In the overwhelmingly anglophone/allophone district of Notre-Dame-de-Grace (in the west end of Montreal), 31,305 people voted NO, and 4,855 people voted YES; by contrast, the majority francophone district of Hochelaga-Maisonneuve (in the east end of Montreal) showed 18,511 votes for YES and 9,759 votes for No. (Results from The Montreal Gazette, October 31st, 1995. p.B12). 8 Bill 101, introduced in 1977, legislates the use of French in many forms of public expression, restricting the use of English and other languages on billboards, posters, storefronts, traffic signs, etc. It was declared a violation of the freedom of expression by Canada's Supreme Court in 1988. The law was then adapted into a new form (Bill 178), which allowed in some cases the use of a small English translation on interior French signs, but still forbade them outside. In 1993, the United Nations human rights committee declared these laws to be a violation of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Freedoms. The Qubec government has altered the technicalities of these laws, but retained the same degree of restriction on the use of English. The Office of the French Language oversees its application, fining shopowners and service providers for infractions where necessary. 9 Not to mention the often forgotten narrative of the pre-existence and subsequent genocide of Canada's First Nation peoples. 10 In November 1997, Parizeau helpfully explained to an audience of university students in western Canada that by "ethnics" he was specifically referring to the Italian, Greek and Jewish communities of Montreal. 11 The Just for Laughs Festival (Festival Juste Pour Rire) is a popular annual bilingual comedy festival in Montreal.

REFERENCESAnderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1983. Authier, Philip. "Think of Levesque in booth: Parizeau." The Montreal Gazette. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A1, A10. Bagnall, Janet. "Survey examines voters' motivations." The Montreal Gazette. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A9. Bauch, Hubert. "Qubec's future in voter's hands." The Montreal Gazette. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A1, A2. Bissonnette, Lise. "Apparences d'amour." Le Devoir. 28 and 29 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A14. Blankenship, Jane. "The Search for the 1972 Democratic Nomination: A Metaphorical Perspective." Rhetoric and Communication. Ed. Jane Blankenship and Hermann Stelzner. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976. Burke, Kenneth. Language As Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966. _____. The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. _____. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969 (1950). "Canadians rally for unity." The Montreal Gazette. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A1, A2. Cauchon, Paul. "Le combat de toute une vie: Parizeau et Bouchard ont mis tout leur coeur et toute leur nergie dans cette campagne." Le Devoir. 28-29 October, 1995, final ed.: All. Chandwani, Ashok. "Readings and tea at Ritz can't drown feelings of dread." The Montreal Gazette. 3 Nov., 1995, final ed.: A2. Charland, Maurice. "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Qubecois." Quarterly Journal of Speech. 73. (1987): 133-150. Desjardins, Bertrand. "Affrontement muscle rue Sainte-Catherine." Le Journal de Montreal. 31" Oct., 1995. Final edition, p. 7. Dutrisac, Robert. "Le pire ne s'est pas realise." Le Devoir. 28 and 29th Oct., 1995, final ed.:C1.

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Hall, Stuart. "Introduction: Who Needs Identity?" Questions of Cultural Identity. Eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 1-17 Hasian, Marouf Jr., & Lisa A. Flores. "Children of the Stones: the Intifada and the Mythic Creation of the Palestinian State." Southern Communication Journal 62 (1997): 89-106. Hustak, Alan. "In the counting, NO side never faltered." The Montreal Gazette. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed. A9. Lakoff, George, & Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Lesage, Gilles. "La croisade de Bouchard." Le Devoir. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A8. McGee, Michael C. "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical Alternative." The Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1975): 235-249. Norris, Alexander. "Parizeau's 'ethnic vote' remark applauded by hatemonger groups." The Montreal Gazette. 3 Nov., 1995, final ed.: A10. O'Neill, Pierre. "La longue marche des souvereainistes." Le Devoir. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.: A4. Pidduck, Julianne. "Montreal Nouveau-Queer Communities: Uneasy Alliances, Trendy Activism and Marginality in the Balance." Canadas. Ed. Jordan Zinovich. New York: Semiotext(e), 1994. pp. 246-255. Rose, Jonathan. "Government Advertising in a Crisis: The Qubec Referendum Precedent." Canadian Journal of Communication 18 (1993): 173-196. Simons, Herbert W. "On the Rhetoric of Social Movements: Historical Movements, and 'Top-Down' Movements: A Commentary." Communication Studies 42 (1991): 94-101. Stewart, Charles J., Craig Allen Smith and Robert E. Denton, Jr. Persuasion and Social Movements, 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1989. Thompson, Elizabeth. "Don't point fingers at NO side: Johnson." The Montreal Gazette. 30 Oct., 1995, final ed.:A1,A10) Weaver, Richard M. The Ethics of Rhetoric. South Bend, IN: Regnery/Gateway, 1953. Wilton, Katherine, Susan Semenak, Mary Lamey. "Yes, No Supporters Clash in Wake of Close Result." The Montreal Gazette. 31 October, 1995, final ed.: A3.

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