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1QUARTERLY ANALYTICAL REVIEW 3 (71)/2018

C O N T E N T S

CONTENTS

Issued Quarterly Since 2003

Editor-in-Chief IRINA CHERNYKHChief Research Fellow of KazISS

EditorANASTASSIYA RESHETNYAK Senior Research Fellow of KazISS

Responsible for publication:Almas ArzikulovLayout:Ernar Imangaliev

Translation by LLC «Delta Consulting Group»

Address:Kazakhstan Institutefor Strategic Studies under the Presidentof the Republic of Kazakhstan 4, Beybitshilik St.Astana, 010000, Republic of Kazakhstan

Phone: (7172) 75 20 20 Fax: (7172) 75 20 21E-mail: [email protected]

This Journal was registeredwith the Ministry of Culture and Informationof the Republic of Kazakhstanon January 24, 2003.Registration certificate No. 3529-zh.

ISSN 2414-570X

None of the articles shall be reproduced without reference to the Journal.The opinion of the editorial board may differ from that of the authors of articles.

Printed by Limited liability “Society of the Disabled “ZAMAN”VP-6, 22/2, Manas str., Astana sityCopies 350.

3/2018

KAZAKHSTAN IN A GLOBAL WORLD: DEVELOPMENT, COOPERATION, IDENTIFICATION

Mukesh Kumar MishraKazakhstan’s Quest for Strengthening Democracy: Understanding Strategy "Kazakhstan-2050" ......................................7

Muratbek Imanalyev Eurasian Identity as a Method of Uniting the Peoples of Central Asia ...............................................................18

Aigul Zabirova The New Capital Building as an Urbanization Policy of the Emerging State .......................................................................23

Tetsuji Tanaka Expected Future Image of the Republic of Kazakhstan ...................27

Irina Chernykh Potential and Prospects Economic Cooperation between Central Asian Countries and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan ........30

Parvana Rustamova Azerbaijan - Kazakhstan: Caspian Cooperation and Prospects ....................................................................................36

Aidar Khoroshash Teachers as Leaders in Modernizing Kazakhstan .............................47

2 QUARTERLY ANALYTICAL REVIEW 3 (71)/2018

ЖАҺАНДЫҚ ӘЛЕМДЕГІ ҚАЗАҚСТАН: ДАМУ, ЫНТЫМАҚТАСТЫҚ, БІРЕГЕЙЛІК

Мукеш Кумар МишраДемократияны нығайту жолындағы Қазақстанның міндеттері: «Қазақстан -2050» стратегиясын түйсіну ...................7

Муратбек Иманалиев Еуразиялық бірегейлік Орталық Азия халықтарын «біріктіру» тәсілі ретінде .........................................18

Айгүл ЗабироваЖаңа елорда құрылысы – қалыптасу кезеңіндегі мемлекеттің урбандану саясаты ретінде .......................................23

Тетсужи ТанакаҚазақстан Республикасының болашақ бейнесі ............................27

Ирина ЧерныхОрталық Азия елдері және Пәкістан Ислам Республикасы арасындағы экономикалық ынтымақтастықтың әлеуеті мен болашағы ..................................................................................30

Пәрванә Рустамова Әзербайжан-Қазақстан: Каспий аймағының ынтымақтастығы және болашағы ..................................................36

Айдар Хорошаш Қазақстанның жаңғыруы жағдайындағы көшбасшы ретіндегі мұғалім бейнесі ...........................................47

М А З М Ұ Н Ы

МАЗМҰНЫ

Бас редакторИРИНА ЧЕРНЫХҚСЗИ-дың бас ғылыми қызметкері

РедакторАНАСТАСИЯ РЕШЕТНЯК ҚСЗИ-дың аға ғылыми қызметкері

Басуға жауапты:Алмас АрзықұловБеттеу:Ернар ИманғалиевАударма: ЖШС «Астана білім ордасы»

Мекен-жайы:Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстан стратегиялық зерттеулер институты010000, Қазақстан Республикасы, Астана,Бейбітшілік көш, 4

Телефон: (7172) 75 20 20Факс: (7172) 75 20 21E-mail: [email protected]

Журнал Қазақстан Республикасының мәдениет және ақпарат министрілігінде 2003 жылдың 24 қаңтарында тіркелген

Тіркеу туралы №. 3529-ж. куәлігі берілді

ISSN 2414-570X

Мақалаларды көшіріп басқан жағдайда журналға сілтеме жасалынуы тиіс.

Мақала авторларының пікірі редакция көзқарасымен сәйкес келмеуі мүмкін

"Общество инвалидов "ЗАМАН" ЖШС Астана қ., Манас к., 22/2, ВП-6 баспасынан басылып шығарылды

350 дана.

3/2018


СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

С О Д Е Р Ж А Н И Е

Главный редакторИРИНА ЧЕРНЫХ Главный научный сотрудник КИСИ

РедакторАНАСТАСИЯ РЕШЕТНЯК Старший научный сотрудник КИСИ

Ответственный за публикацию:Алмас АрзикуловВерстка:Ернар Имангалиев

Перевод: ТОО «Астана білім ордасы»

Адрес:Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте Республики Казахстан 010000, Республика Казахстан, Астанаул. Бейбитшилик 4

Телефон: (7172) 75 20 20Факс: (7172) 75 20 21E-mail: [email protected]

Журнал зарегистрирован в Министерстве культуры и информации Республики Казахстан 24 января 2003 года

Регистрационное свидетельство № 3529-ж.

ISSN 2414-570X

Статьи не могут быть воспроизведены без ссылки на Журнал.

Мнение редакторской коллегии может отличаться от мнения авторов статей

Отпечатано ТОО "Общество инвалидов "ЗАМАН" г.Астана, МАНАСА, 22/2, ВП-6

350 экз.

3/2018

КАЗАХСТАН В ГЛОБАЛЬНОМ МИРЕ: РАЗВИТИЕ, СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО, ИДЕНТИФИКАЦИЯ

Мукеш Кумар Мишра Задачи Казахстана по укреплению демократии: понимание Стратегии «Казахстан-2050» ........................................7

Муратбек Иманалиев Евразийская идентичность как способ «сборки» центральноазиатских народов .......................................................18

Айгуль Забирова Строительство новой столицы как политика урбанизации государства на этапе становления ..........................23

Тетсужи ТанакаБудущий облик Республики Казахстан .........................................27

Ирина ЧерныхПотенциал и перспективы экономического сотрудничества между странами Центральной Азии и Исламской Республикой Пакистан .............................................30

Парвана Рустамова Азербайджан-Казахстан: прикаспийское сотрудничество и перспективы ......................................................36

Айдар Хорошаш Учителя как лидеры в условиях модернизации Казахстана ..............................................................47


T H E E D I T O R I A L B O A R D

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Maulen Ashimbayev The Chairman of the Editorial Board, First Deputy Chairman of the "Nur Otan" Party, Candidate of Political Sciences

Irina Chernykh Editor-in-Chief, the Chief Research Fellow of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Historical Sciences

Anastassyia Reshetnyak Editor, Senior Research Fellow at the Department of International Studies the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Master of International Relations

Sanat Kushkumbayev Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of RK, Doctor of Political Sciences

Murat Laumulin Chief Research Fellow of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies underthe President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Political Sciences

Konstantin Syroyezhkin Chief Research Fellow of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Political Sciences

Timur Dadabayev Professor of International Relations, Director of Combined MA/Ph.D. Program for Japanese and Eurasian Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tsukuba, Ph.D. (Japan)

Marlène Laruelle Director of the Central Asia Program (CAP) of the Institute for European,Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the Elliot School of InternationalAffairs at the George Washington University, Ph.D. (USA)

Thomas Ruttig Director of Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), Ph.D. (Germany)

Ding Xiaoxing Head of the Central Asia Department at the China Institute of ContemporaryInternational Relations (China)

3/2018


Мәулен Әшімбаев Редакциялық кеңестің төрағасы, "Нұр Отан" партиясы Төрағасының Бірінші орынбасары, саяси ғылымдарының кандидаты

Ирина Черных Бас редактор, ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының бас ғылыми қызметкері, тарих ғылым-дарының докторы

Анастасия Решетняк Редактор, ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының Халықаралық зерттеулер бөлімінің аға ғылыми қызметкері, әлеуметтік ғылымдары магистрі

Санат Көшкімбаев ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты директорының орынбасары, саяси ғылымдарының докторы

Мұрат Лаумулин ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулеринститутының бас ғылыми қызметкері, саяси ғылымдарының докторы

Константин Сыроежкин ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының бас ғылыми қызметкері, саяси ғылымдарының докторы

Тимур Дадабаев Халықаралық қатынастар кафедрасының доценті, Цукуба УниверситетіӘлеуметтік және гуманитарлық ғылымдар факультетінің жапон және еуразиялық зерттеулерге арналған біріктірілген MA/Ph.D. бағдарламасының директоры, Ph.D. (Жапония)

Марлен Ларуэль Джордж Вашингтон университеті Эллиот Халықаралық қатынастар мектебі Орталық Азияны зерттеу бағдарламасының жетекшісі, Ph.D. (АҚШ)

Томас Руттиг Ауғанстан бойынша сарапшылар желісінің директоры, Ph.D. (Германия)

Дин Сяосин Қытайлық заманауи халықаралық қатынастар институтының Орталық Азияны зерттеу бөлімінің директоры (Қытай)

Р Е Д А К Ц И Я Л Ы Қ К Е Ң Е С

РЕДАКЦИЯЛЫҚ КЕҢЕС

3/2018


Маулен Ашимбаев Председатель Редакционного совета, Первый заместитель Председателя партии "Нур Отан", кандидат политических наук

Ирина Черных Шеф-редактор, главный научный сотрудник Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, доктор исторических наук

Анастасия Решетняк Редактор, старший научный сотрудник Отдела международных исследований Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, магистр социальных наук

Санат Кушкумбаев Заместитель директора Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, доктор политических наук

Мурат Лаумулин Главный научный сотрудник Казахстанского института стратегическихисследований при Президенте РК, доктор политических наук

Константин Сыроежкин Главный научный сотрудник Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, доктор политических наук

Тимур Дадабаев Доцент кафедры международных отношений, директор Объединенной программы магистратуры и Ph.D. докторантуры по японским и евразийским исследованиям факультета социальных и гуманитарных наук Университета Цукуба, доктор Ph.D. (Япония)

Марлен Ларуэль Руководитель программы по изучению Центральной Азии Школы Международных отношений Эллиота университета Джорджа Вашингтона, доктор Ph.D. (США)

Томас Руттиг Директор Сети аналитиков по Афганистану, доктор Ph.D. (Германия)

Дин Сяосин Директор отдела по изучению Центральной Азии Китайской академии современных международных отношений (Китай)

РЕДАКЦИОННЫЙ СОВЕТ

Р Е Д А К Ц И О Н Н Ы Й С О В Е Т

3/2018



KAZAKHSTAN’S QUEST FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY "KAZAKHSTAN-2050"

Dr. Mukesh Kumar Mishra

UGC-Area Studies Programme, Centre for Inner Asian StudiesSchool of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Abstract. This article explores the new strategy of strengthening democracy in Kazakhstan as declared in its “Strategy 2050” document. It also seeks to analyze the new democratization model Kazakhstan wants to adopt, besides highlighting the democratic reforms strategies not only in political but also in the socio-economic fields. In conclusion, it can be said that Strategy Kazakhstan 2050 Programme appears to give Kazakhstan further boost for its nation-building in a country that experienced one party-rule for a long time.

Keywords: democracy, modernization, statehood, reforms, 100 Concrete Steps, Kazakhstan

ДЕМОКРАТИЯНЫ НЫҒАЙТУ ЖОЛЫНДАҒЫ ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ МІНДЕТТЕРІ: «ҚАЗАҚСТАН -2050» СТРАТЕГИЯСЫН» ТҮЙСІНУ

Мукеш Кумар Мишра

Аңдатпа. Мақалада «Қазақстан-2050 Стратегиясы» құжатында көтерілген Қазақстандағы демократияны нығайтудың жаңа стратегиясы қарастырылады.

Сонымен қатар автор Қазақстанда қабылдануы тиіс демократияның жаңа үлгісін талдап, демократиялық реформалардың саяси салада ғана емес, сонымен қатар әлеуметтік-экономикалық саладағы көрініс беруін де саралайды. Қорытындылай келе,

МРНТИ11.15.31



«Қазақстан-2050» стратегиясы" бағдарламасы ұзақ уақыт бойы бірпартиялық басқаруда болған Қазақстанға ұлт құрылысында одан әрі жаңа серпін береді деп күтіледі.

Түйін сөздер: демократия, жаңғырту, мемлекеттілік, реформалар, 100 нақты қадам,Қазақстан

ЗАДАЧИ КАЗАХСТАНА ПО УКРЕПЛЕНИЮ ДЕМОКРАТИИ: ПОНИМАНИЕ "СТРАТЕГИИ "КАЗАХСТАН-2050"

Мукеш Кумар Мишра

Аннотация. В данной статье рассматривается новая стратегия укрепления демократии в Казахстане, о которой говорится в документе «Стратегия 2050». Автор также дает анализ новой модели демократизации, которую Казахстан хочет принять, помимо освещения стратегий демократических реформ не только в политической, но и в социально-экономической областях. В заключение можно сказать, что программа «Стратегия Казахстан-2050», как представляется, дает Казахстану дальнейший импульс для его национального строительства в стране, которая долгое время находилась под однопартийным правлением.

Ключевые слова: демократия, модернизация, государственность, реформы, 100 конкретных шагов, Казахстан

Background

Kazakhstan has no historic memory of a state, nation, or a democratic society before 1991 when it became independent after the disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union. It was successful in boosting the construction of national institutions and growth of economy during the late 1990s. The experience of a young democracy has helped it to play a role on the global stage as well such as the Chairmanship in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Due to such developments in Kazakhstan’s politics during the process of democratic reforms, the country got a new identity in the post-Soviet era. In the 21st century, the political development in Kazakhstan indicates two positive factors: “The first has been the introduction of Ombudsman under the President of Kazakhstan in autumn of 2002 and the second is a Permanently Acting Deliberation

(PAD) created in December 2002 in Almaty.”[1] It is to be noted that PAD is a body, started by the Kazakhstan government to look after the democratisation process and development of civil society under which “all political parties, movements, public organisations and trade unions were invited to have dialogue with the government.” Another important aspect of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan is the area of legal reforms where western countries have supported to a great deal by rendering their assistance in not only forming but also funding the Non-Governmental Organisations. All the NGOs are working for the educational development programmes in the country in order to promote awareness about the need of political, legal, social and economic reforms. The objective is “to make people aware of the process of transition from totalitarianism of the past to democracy”. [2]

The Kazakh government after the independence was structured in accordance with the constitution of 1993 with a powerful three



pillar of executive, parliament and judiciary. In general, the post-independence governance of the country remained under the domination of Nursultan Nazarbayev. The constitution formalised the increased powers given to President Nazarbayev after the termination of parliament in the beginning of 1995. Basically, “it continued the previous constitutional definition of Kazakhstan as a unitary state with a Presidential form of government”. As enshrined in the constitution of 1995, the parliament comprised two houses: (a) the Senate and (b) the Majilis. The constitution also continued with the terms of appointing all judges by the President in the country. However, for the new judiciary system the constitution of 1995 noticeably subordinated all the courts to the Supreme Court.

In 2007, the Parliament of Kazakhstan underwent its most radical transformation over a decade when seatswere added to both senate and Majilis, with the latter body elected exclusively through a system of proportional representation, with nine members elected from within the 400 member Assembly of Peoples. But the concentration of power in the hands of an experienced statesman and administrator like N.Nazarbayev during the critical years of transition has proved fruitful for Kazakhstan which has withstood the difficulties in its economic and socio-political transition. As a result of the amendments done in 2007, “the key powers are transferred from the President to the Parliament. The new changes are thus aimed at increasing Parliament’s authority in forming the Government, thus reducing the powers of the President.” [3]

The Presidential election of 2005 was a landmark in the history of Kazakhstan which has had effects on the future of country and the Central Asian region. In the Presidential election of 4 December 2005, N.Nazarbayev was re-elected after gaining over 90 per cent of votes. It appears that N.Nazarbayev used the experience of Presidential elections held previously in other Central Asian countries. It is noteworthy that Nazarbaev was supposed to

rule Kazakhstan for 7 years till the new election could take place in 2012. Nevertheless “in January 2011, the lower house of Parliament adopted an appeal to Nursultan Nazarbayev on holding a referendum to extend his presidential term until December 2020.” As such a Daft Law "On amendments to the Constitution of Kazakhstan" was approved at a joint session of the Kazakh Parliament. But on January 6, 2011, President Nazarbayev rejected the measure to keep him in power until 2020. “Nazarbayev’’s decision to reject the proposed referendum probably stems mainly from his wish to be seen to be observing democratic norms, while at the same time reaffirming his widespread public support.”

With regard to the democratisation of social, economic and political fields “Strategy Kazakhstan 2030” was developed in 1997 for the period which Kazakhstan considered as the formation of its sovereignty. It now believes that the basic parameters of this strategy have already been accomplished, and therefore it has recently declared its “Strategy Kazakhstan 2050”.It is considered to be a new political course for the fast growing Kazakhstan in the changing world setting. The new paradigm of challenges has come to the light and so the year 2050 is a real timeline adopted by the world community. The United Nations has developed the Global Forecast on “Future of civilizations” until 2050. Food and Agriculture Organization issued a forecast report until 2050. Now more and more countries are developing and adopting long term strategies. Strategy Kazakhstan 2050 is aimed at integrating with the country’s previous strategy so that its achievements and development model become the basis of the new political course.

Recent Developments

On 16th December 2016, Kazakhstan celebrated 25th anniversary of its independence. Since gaining independence Kazakhstan has come a long way in carrying out democratic reforms. The way Kazakhstan’s democratic



development took place has been long and uninterrupted, and hence in the initial stage of formation as a state the country needed a strong presidential power. However, the strong presidential power has been conditioned by the initial years of the transition period as well. But at the end Kazakhstan remained stick to democratization of its political system including the devolution of Presidential powers. The strategic document that came out in the press on January 31, 2017, focuses on what “President Nursultan Nazarbayev considers to be the country’s new, third stage of modernisation.” [4] The first and foremost, “was the creation of an entirely new state based on the principles of a market economy; the second was the implementation of the Strategy 2030 and the creation of our country’s capital, Astana,” Nursultan Nazarbayev declared while addressing the country on January 25, 2017. He said that “Kazakhstan has been developing at an accelerated pace to become one of the 50 most-developed countries, though drastic changes in the technological sphere require a transition to a new model of economic growth. That is why he spoke about the third stage of modernisation.”

One of the key priorities of what Nursultan Nazarbayev calls “the third modernization is the accelerated technological renovation” in Kazakhstan’s economy. It involves the formation of new innovative sectors based on “digital technologies”. For this purpose, he stressed that “it is necessary to minimise state involvement in the economy, reduce all possible costs for businesses and develop public-private partnerships.” He pointed out that agriculture, transport, logistics, real estate market, education, healthcare and social protection of the population remained among issues of paramount importance in the future development model. The country’s macroeconomic policy also requires modernisation. He instructed the government to develop a strategic plan of development until 2025 on the third modernisation of the country, i.e., “Kazakhstan’s national technological

initiative.” This is important to make certain that economic growth in the country could take place positively in the future as well as achieving the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy’s main objective of connecting with the uppermost 30 developed countries in the world. During his address to the country N.Nazarbayev called for the necessity to redistribute the roles and functions among the authority branches. The core idea is that the President hands over a range of his powers to the Parliament and Government. [5] Therefore, the main focus of this article is to deal with the impact of the devolution of Presidential powers on reforms in Kazakhstan.

Steps towards Devolution

It was on 16 May 2007 that the government of Nazarbayev had undertaken a number of amendments to the Constitution which increased the power of the Parliament. This gave way to transforming the republic from presidential to a parliamentary form of government. The Parliament’s role “was increased by raising the number of deputies, introducing new procedures of forming the Government on the principles of parliamentary majority, creating proportional election system of deputies to the lower chamber of Majilis, calling off the party affiliation of the Senate deputies and introducing many other political innovations.” [6] As per the new system of forming the Government, it was stipulated that “Prime Minister has to be appointed by the President after consultations with political parties and by the appropriation of a majority of the Parliament’s deputies.” The execution of such norms was aimed, first of all, to raise the function and responsibilities of political parties in the Government formation. And secondly, the mainstream with a majority in parliament will be accountable to the Government formation and its subsequent actions. Moreover, “the President also offered to develop practical mechanisms for partial support of the activities of political



parties from the republican budget”, besides recommending a cut short of the presidential term from the existing seven to five years.[7] The President also proposed that “regional governors to be elected with the appropriation of corresponding maslikhats (regional elective entity)”. [8]

In the field of judicial reform, “not only legal confirmation of an arrest but also the abolition of the death penalty was announced. It may be pointed out that the Constitution provides for death penalty to those who commit terrorist acts or violent crimes. President N. Nazarbayev underscored the need for the above stated amendments to the Constitution of Kazakhstan for ushering in a new stage in the democratization of the nation.” [9] Economic rebuilding launched soon after attaining independence was very complex. The Soviet era’s planned economy system was abolished, finance and banking system were restructured and the the Tenge (KZT) as the new currency was launched. In addition, not only the small and medium size businesses but also housing sector was privatized. Overseas investment started coming to develop the affluent natural resources sector. Although there was economic suffering initially after the independence, by the closing decade of 1990 economic reforms raised a sign of hope. The GDP in the first half of 2001 was found to be up to the tune of 13 percent over the year 2000 and inflation rate came down to 7 percent. At about the same time, in 2000, Strategy 2030 was introduced which focused on further economic reforms and set the objectives for a thirty-year period. In his speech delivered in September 2001, President N.Nazarbayev drew attention towards country’s aim of doubling the GDP by 2010 and increasing the investment regime.

Impact of Devolution on Reforms

Kazakhstan set out on some of the most determined reforms in its history of independence as Nursultan Nazarbayev decided to implement five institutional reforms. [10]

On May 20, 2015, he announced that a “Plan of the Nation” would be developed to drastically transform the country through these reforms. As such the approaches, outlined in the “100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional Reforms” document, were published to give the country a clear sense of direction.

On May 22, 2015, in his speech delivered to the Astana Economic Forum’s plenary session, N.Nazarbayev said that “We have now published the 100 Steps for the world to see,” and added that “Now the world will be able to track our progress or lack thereof on all of them.” The preamble of the document sketched out the following: “One hundred concrete steps are a response to global and local challenges and, at the same time, it is a plan for the nation to join the top 30 most-developed countries in the new historical conditions. One hundred concrete steps will give Kazakhstan a margin of safety that will help the country through a difficult period, implement the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy and strengthen Kazakh statehood. The plan lays out radical changes in society and the state, the main goal of which is treatment of systemic diseases, not just smoothing their exterior symptoms.” The 100 concrete steps were put in a cluster under five institutional reforms, i.e., “formation of a professional state apparatus; the rule of law; industrialisation and economic growth; identity and unity; and formation of accountable government.” [10]

Formation of a Professional State Apparatus

This institutional reform suggests the creation of a modern, professional and independent public service that guarantees excellent execution of economic programmes and distribution of public services. Under this reform some of the initiatives are concentrated on new methods to appoint talented professionals for public office that will also include a few professionals from the private sector. It even permits foreign



citizens to be recruited on posts within the government, which was prevalent in the post-Soviet states like Georgia and Ukraine. Two more methods stipulate that there will be an enlargement of a new code on civil service and a re-examination of public servants in order to crackdown on those who are incompetent. These steps also anticipate the initiation of a renovated system of salary and wages for bureaucrats that will be decided on the basis of performance and region. This is relevant for those working in the oil-producing regions of Atyrau and Mangystau, as well as in Almaty and Astana where living standard is remarkably more expansive than in Shymkent or Petropavlovsk.

The Rule of Law

This reform takes into consideration “the transition from the five-level justice system (first, appeal, cassation, supervising and re-supervising) to a three-level (first, appeal and cassation) system.” [10] The goal is to reinforce foreign and domestic investors’ faith in Kazakhstan’s court system. The processes include hardening qualification norms for the appointment of judges by introducing a new criterion for an entrant to serve a minimum of five years in the court system and a one-year testing period for newly-recruited judges, besides advancing the civic image of police in order to increase the level of Kazakh national’s faith and reduce corruption. On the whole, this reform aims at ensuring property rights by expanding environments for business movement and defending contractual commitments. One of the measures under this reform necessitates enlargement of court proceedings “that must be decided by a jury, while introducing into laws a category of criminal cases where consideration by jury will be mandatory.” Another “step” insists on creating “a municipal or local police force, which will work in close cooperation with local executive authorities and local communities”. This has been planned keeping in mind that a

system of local police force was introduced in 1992 but was soon dismantled in favour of a more centralized model.

Industrialisation and Economic Growth

Within this reform, the idea is to make investors fascinated towards the Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector that is slower than the industrial and services sectors of economy. Besides, one of the steps clearly specifies the integration of tax and customs structure. The idea is to open doors for a trader to transport merchandises into Kazakhstan before being sold. This reform also provides for not only making declarations of incomes by the civil servants but also declaring their expenditures with effect from January 2017. The next stage could be extended to all citizens sooner or later. One of the measures lays down to strengthen the institution of a “business ombudsman,” a kind of prosecutor on behalf of businesspersons. Execution of those tasks is aimed at boosting economic growth and diversifying industry. Some measures focus on establishing a “multi-modal Eurasian transcontinental transport corridor” that would ease faster deliverance of goods between Asia and Europe passing through Kazakhstan.

Two more measures envision the formation of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) with a status ominously different so much so that it may need fresh amendments in Kazakhstan’s Constitution. Those may be justified by a need to introduce a separate judicial system in the AIFC based largely on the English law and the use of English as “an official language” of the centre, along with Kazakh and Russian. The model of the centre, like the one used in Dubai, would covert Astana into a major “financial hub for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and West Asia.” The centre would focus particularly on “servicing capital markets and Islamic finances” with a goal to becoming one of the 20 leading financial centres of the world. Nursultan Nazarbayev announced at the



Astana Economic Forum that AIFC will utilize the amenities built for EXPO 2017 after the exhibition is over.

Identity and Unity

The main aspect of this reform is to shape a ‘Nation of Common Future’ by “nurturing a viable middle class as the backbone of a successful nation, which can be achieved by sustaining the genuine rule of law and modern and valid political, economic and civil institutions in the society.” [10] For this purpose, the philosophy of Mangilik El (The Eternal Nation) can serve as a basis of universal civic ethics. Procedures to advance domestic tourism and establish encyclopedia-type information resources and records as well as regulating management of Kazakhstan’s natural and human resources are central in the portrayal of the “steps” under the agenda of this reform.

Formation of Accountable Government

Under this reform the heads of public bodies will report annually to the general public on the achievements of their agencies. This will include a concept of “open government” (expansion of a new law on unrestricted “access to public information with an exclusion for classified materials), budget and consolidated financial statements, the results of an external financial audit, evaluation of the effectiveness of public policy, public assessment of the results of the quality of public services, online statistical reports from the state agencies and reports on the execution of the national and local budgets.” [10] Moreover, “development of an e-government concept, that has seen a highly successful implementation in Kazakhstan, is included in the proposal as reflected in the last of the 100 steps, on establishing a State Corporation of Government for Citizens that is to become a single provider of public services.” [10]

Furthermore, with the aim of putting into practice all the aforementioned reforms, the

National Modernisation Commission under the direct supervision of President has been established. The Prime Minister has been chosen as the head of the commission. It comprises five working groups in which members are drawn from local and overseas experts. Significantly. “the commission will have its own International Advisory Council, with the inclusion of international experts responsible not only for providing recommendations but also performing an independent systematised monitoring of results in implementation of the reforms.” [11]

Impact on Political Development

Recently, a major development took place on March 10, 2017 when President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a number of amendments to the country’s constitution that will strengthen the role of Parliament and take powers away from the presidency, though the government will remain a presidential system. This has been a clear indication of the positive impact of devolution on the political development of Kazakhstan. In all 26 amendments have been made to 19 articles of Kazakhstan’s constitution, most of them redistributing the powers of the President, the Parliament and the government. Such reforms are expected to help propel the development of Kazakhstan’s democracy and strengthen the people’s power over government. Even Nursultan Nazarbaev expressed his support for the changes by describing in the following words: [11] Firstly, “the new law significantly strengthens the Parliament’s role in state affairs, including in the formation of the government.” Secondly, “the government becomes more independent, receiving power to directly manage the economy. Thirdly, “the constitutional foundation of law enforcement and judicial systems will be modernized”, because “the law lays the foundations for the activities of the Prosecutor General’s Office, providing the highest supervision over the observance of the rule of law and representation of state interests



in court. Fourthly, “constitutional control will be strengthened”, while Fifthly, “guarantees of immutability of our [Kazakhstan’s] independence, unitary status, territorial integrity and form of government are to be fixed at the constitutional level.”

The importance of these amendments is that they support the 100 Concrete Steps Plan, the guiding document of Kazakhstan’s ongoing five institutional reforms programme that have been discussed above. According to the Kazakh President, the updated constitution will help Kazakhstan meet the challenges of the evolving global economy. He reminded the government of the goal of becoming one of the 30 most developed countries in the world by 2050 and asked all citizens to work toward that goal. He has been quoted as saying, “I am confident that together we will be able to ensure the successful development of the state and the prosperity of our people in the 21st century. The main goal of the reforms is to preserve our unity, friendship and mutual understanding, as well as equality in terms of ethnic, linguistic and confessional identity. Thanks to our cohesion, we have achieved many victories. Following these amendments, we will achieve new ones”.

In fact, the Constitutional reforms bill was first introduced to Parliament on March 3, 2017. The bill entitled “On introducing amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (first reading)” proposed to amend “23 articles of the Basic Law, redistributing 35 presidential powers.” [12] However, “the new reforms, stipulated that it will keep the presidential form of government while strengthening the roles of the legislative and executive branches.” During a speech delivered in parliament, Nursultan Nazarbayev explained the main characteristics of political reforms included in the draft Constitutional amendments. He focused on the process of preparing the draft amendments, highlighting the openness and transparency of the discussion process: “Upon my order, the draft was presented for nationwide discussion,

which was held intensively for a month. Every single citizen had the opportunity to express his/her opinion. We all witnessed not only a large-scale discussion, but also a high-quality one.” The nationwide discussion of the amendments to the Constitution took place from January 26 to February 24, 2017.

In addition to the members of the Parliament, “the draft amendments were discussed by representatives of the Constitutional Council, Prosecutor General’s Office, Supreme Court, Notarial Chamber, Academy of law enforcement agencies, Trade unions’ federation, Lawyers’ union, Forensic Centre of the Ministry of Justice and the Research institute of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Kazakhstan.” Several NGOs also participated in the deliberations. Moreover, “the legislation, as well as suggestions by the Mazhilis (lower house a Parliament) and Senate deputies, was considered by the joint commission of the Parliament chambers.” [12]

President Nursultan Nazarbayev also offered the outcome of the working group’s activities, stressing on “the ambiguous understanding of the amendments to Article 26 of the Constitution by some Kazakh citizens.” In all, the working group acknowledged 6,000 suggestions concerning with almost two thirds of the articles mentioned in the Constitution. Since the the goal of the constitutional reform is to strengthen the Kazakhstani society, the President put forth a proposal to put down Article 26 in its earlier version. It is to be noted that “the proposed amendments in Article 26 would have changed the wording on the protection of property rights from ‘citizens of Kazakhstan’ to ‘everyone’, which caused wide discussions about the appropriateness of such step.” The President stressed on “separate stages of Kazakhstan’s political modernisation, highlighting the peculiarity of current reforms.” He noted “the high professionalism of all branches of government, emphasising their ability to take responsibility and make decisions independently,” adding in his words that: “I am sure the expansion of powers of the Parliament and the government



will contribute to a more effective achievement of the objectives of the third modernisation of the economy.”

The head of the working group Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, who serves as the president’s chief of staff, reported about developed proposals for a distribution of powers between branches of the government along three general lines [13]: Firstly, he said about the proposed redistribution of the statutory powers of the head of state, which do not require amending the Constitution. In general, proposals of state bodies that relate to the powers that govern the social and economic fields were mentioned, including: economic governance issues, finances, state property and the powers associated with the solution of certain issues of administrative-territorial structure. Secondly, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office presented proposals to improve the judicial and law enforcement systems, which also do not require amending the Constitution. The proposals concern strengthening judicial control, further reducing the participation of prosecutors in civil and administrative proceedings. There were 13 such proposals. And. third, the working group considered approximately 40 proposals, which implied amending the Constitution.

Meanwhile, Nazarbayev also stressed that the county’s political reform and technological modernisation should begin simultaneously as they will mutually reinforce and complement each other. Under the proposed reforms, the Prime Minister will be assigned the task of submitting nominees for the government to the head of state after consulting the Mazhilis. But an exception is made for the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, who will be appointed by only the President. Interestingly, an important innovation is the norm, according to which the government will resign before the newly elected Mazhilis, not the newly elected President. At the same time, President would retain the right to impose moratoria on bills and to relieve the akims (mayors) of different levels of their duties. The bill was passed in its first reading on the

same day. A joint commission of members of the Mazhilis and the Senate was set up to prepare the bill for the second reading which took place on March 6, and finally it was signed by the President on March 10.

Conclusion

Since Kazakhstan felt the necessity to redistribute the roles and functions among the authority branches in accordance with Strategy Kazakhstan 2050, Nazarbayev’s initiative of the devolution of Presidential powers is noteworthy. His core idea of devolution is that the President hands over a range of his powers to the Parliament and Government. He himself emphasized the need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the public administration system. Keeping in mind that the government is formed by the winning party or faction, the role of Parliament has been revised in relation to the government on many issues. This has been in line with the approaches, outlined in the “100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional Reforms” document. The implementation of five institutional reforms may sooner or later prove to be a boon for Kazakhstan’s society, politics and economy. One of the institutional reforms includes giving the government additional executive powers in the economic field, though in the political field the President will still be responsible for main issues in defence, foreign policy, governance, protection of the Constitution and effective work between different branches of government. Hence, currently the impact of the devolution of Presidential powers on reforms in Kazakhstan is clearly visible which appears to be a necessity for Kazakhstan’s quest for strengthening democracy.

Acknowledgement

This article is an outcome of a Research Project undertaken by the author, which was funded by the UGC-Area Studies Programme, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.



1. See for details, Mukesh Kumar Mishra, “Democratisation Process in Kazakhstan: Gauging the Indicators”, India Quarterly, 65 (3), 2009, p. 315.

2. Thomas.Carother, “Democracy without Illusions”, Foreign Aff airs, January–February, 1997, p. 17.

3. Mishra, “Democratisation Process in Kazakhstan”, p.320Aigerim Seisembayeva in Nation on 31 January 2017. The Astana Times Bringing Kazakhstan to the World.

4. KAZINFORM, 27 January, Astana. https://www.inform.kz/en/archive/?date=27.01.2018Marat Yermukanov, CACI Analyst, 30 May 2007.

5. Mukesh Kumar Mishra, ‘Political Development and Constitutional Reforms in Contemporary Kazakhstan’, Central Asia’s Affairs, Quarterly Analytical Review, 3 (55)/2014.

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EURASIAN IDENTITY AS A METHOD OF UNITING THEPEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA

Muratbek Imanaliyev

The Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2010-2012)

Annotation. Today, the Eurasian continent is also a region of continental and regional economic and other projects, to which Central Asian states also pay attention, and which, remaining in the geopolitical periphery mode for objective and subjective reasons, are still more passive participants of the Eurasian design.

These projects, among which, first of all, the Eurasian Economic Union should be noted, are of obvious interest to Central Asian countries, however, with all the unfolded and hidden benefits and merits, as it seems to me, there is some shortage of meaningfulness, more precisely, semantic structures, including in the field of cultural and humanitarian activities of people and states, however, under certain efforts with the consequent possible construction of some kind of Eurasian identity model.

Keywords: Central Asia, identity, regionalization, partnership

ЕУРАЗИЯЛЫҚ БІРЕГЕЙЛІК – ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ ХАЛЫҚТАРЫН «БІРІКТІРУ» ТӘСІЛІ РЕТІНДЕ

Муратбек Иманалиев

Аңдатпа. Бүгінде Еуразиялық континент – Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің де назарын аударатын құрлықтық және өңірлік экономикалық және өзге де жобалардың өңірі, және олар бүгінгі күні геосаяси периферия режиміндегі объективті және субъективті себептерге байланысты Еуразиялық жобалаудың енжар қатысушылары болып табылады.

Бұл жобалар қатарында, ең алдымен, Eуразиялық экономикалық одақты атап өткен жөн, Орталық Азия елдері үшін айқын қызығушылық танытады, сонымен қатар барлық ашық және жасырын артықшылықтары мен ұтымдылығына қарамастан, мағыналық конструкциялардың, соның ішінде адамдар мен мемлекеттердің мәдени-гуманитарлық қызметі саласында да, еуразиялық бірегейлікті қалыптастырурдың кезінде де бірқатар мазмұндылық тапшылық орын алуы мүмкін.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия, бірегейлік, аймақт андыру, серіктестік

МРНТИ11.25.43



ЕВРАЗИЙСКАЯ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ КАК СПОСОБ «СБОРКИ»ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОАЗИАТСКИХ НАРОДОВ

Муратбек Иманалиев

Аннотация. Сегодня евразийский континент – это еще и регион континентальных и региональных экономических и иных проектов, к которым приковано внимание также и центральноазиатских государств, и которые, сегодня оставаясь пока в силу объективных и субъективных причин в режиме геополитической периферии, являются все-таки больше пассивными участниками евразийского проектирования.

Эти проекты, в числе коих, прежде всего, следует отметить Евразийский экономический союз, представляют очевидный интерес для центральноазиатских стран, вместе с тем при всех развернутых и скрытых преимуществах и достоинствах страдают, как мне представляется, некоторым дефицитом содержательности, точнее, смысловых конструкций, в том числе и в сфере культурно-гуманитарной деятельности людей и государств, правда, при определенных усилиях с последующим возможным выстраиванием некоей модели евразийской идентичности.

Ключевые слова: Центральная Азия, идентичность, регионализация, партнерство

As a continent, Eurasia (also known as the “Big Island”) is a more civilized part of the world than other areas of the planet. The European, Indian and Far Eastern tips of Eurasia are regions of the Atlantic, Indo-Eurasian and Pacific areas, where there is intellectual tension and a fairly high standard of living, between which other major world civilizations are squeezed which are, in turn, fundamentally different from those described above and between each other.

Eurasia today is a continent, the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific tips of which penetrate into the region. However, the goals and the concerns of these areas are completely opposed to one another.

Observable elements of the ongoing “Big Game” are also noticeable, which has expanded in geographical and political terms after the collapse of the USSR.

Today, the Eurasian continent is also a region of continental and regional economic and other projects, to which the Central Asian states pay attention; and which today by remaining on the geopolitical periphery for objective and subjective reasons are still more passive participants in terms of Eurasian planning.

These projects, among which, first of all, the Eurasian Economic Union should be noted, provide an obvious interest to Central Asian countries. However, with all the detailed and hidden advantages and merits, it seems to me there is a certain lack of content, or more precisely semantic structures, including in the field of the cultural and humanitarian activities of these people and states. However particular actions may be followed by the possible construction of some kind of model of Eurasian identity.

First, it is worth noting that true meanings, new value capacities and new guidelines can be identified as attractive ideas oriented towards the future or, we may say, as something very important that cannot yet be spelled out but which everyone has in mind and where there is a comprehensive, if silent, consensus. Relying on the centuries-old constructions of identity is unlikely to be able to move some common cause forward.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, beyond the consensus, only direct or indirect enforcement, which is strategically and methodologically, in general, quite counterproductive, remains possible.



The main thrust of ideas should also probably be directed to the possibility of people living together and developing outside of the normative and everyday decoration of the hierarchical pyramid of “older and younger” and not only in a procedural sense. Of course, this can also be understood and perceived as a kind of precondition, without regard of which even a weak substantive dialogue is not possible, not to mention some kind of joint creative activity.

The process associated with the formulation and design of the main idea highlights, in my opinion, several fundamental issues related, above all, and it is the most important in any project activity form, with human capital or material. In the present text we will indicate only two: who and by what parameters should be referred to Eurasians, and who nevertheless considers himself to be Eurasian. And if he identifies himself or he is identified with the quality of being Eurasian, then what is the defining identification parameter or criterion - geography, history, economics, lingua franca or something else, or all of these in combination?

It is quite possible that the designers of modern Eurasianism did not set the task of constructing a shared identity model that is understandable to all participants on the base of some value orientations, but it seems that building a modern, even limited space of cooperation in the form of an international organization based on the idea of only military-political or only economic convergence with each other with an appropriate procedures set and unclear rules is not enough, and such constructions, as I see it, are short-lived, especially considering the attractiveness and benefits of the proposed options from the outside.

At the stage of a long-term global crisis, international structures created by “ad hoc” will probably also be in demand for the implementation of some specific joint projects and programs.

In the context of the systemic global crisis that is decaying into a local and functional

one, it seems that a consensus towards the formation of a multi-layered partnership space is required. With regard to the Eurasian projects, we can talk, for example, if we keep in mind the Eurasian Economic Union, the most important for all former "Soviet", and which have been forgotten or missed in the heat of the struggle for a brighter "market" future - a joint search for a way out or liberation from the "post-communist" state and subsequent creative activities for the benefit of all.

In the former USSR, it is probable that only two countries with some constancy and more or less clear sense declare Eurasianism as an important idea for them, while putting into it differently mismatched, fragments of different meanings. There are, however, other states that occasionally somehow almost coincidentally recall their Eurasianism. Still others are detached from Eurasianism either by the fragile wall of their identification programs and projects, or by the imaginary inaccessibility for them of the proposed Eurasianism’s meaning. Or Eurasianism is understood by them as a kind of euphemism for expansion or restoration.

Of course, abstraction of the modern Eurasianism problem cannot be carried out outside the context of the contemporary global situation development, which today is characterized by such a deep crisis of the concepts of socio-economic development, religions, humanitarian value containers, international law, as well as other principles and drivers of international communication, etc.

The system and mechanisms of the international organizations and structures functioning that emerged and developed in the 20th century have undergone obvious corrosion. It seems to me that with the collapse of the bipolar world, one of the main motivational foundations and drivers of the creation and existence of international organizations has collapsed - I mean their construction according to a fairly simple confrontational scheme “for something” and “against someone”. The pros and cons reflected the competition of



ideologies, socio-economic platforms and military capabilities. But the continuing rather serious inertial influence, and sometimes the renewal of these schemes, should probably be recognized.

It is clear that competition between states, groups of states has not disappeared, but the fundamentals and mechanisms of long-term alliance and even compromise partnership, including, and, perhaps primarily, in global and regional international organizations, are radically changing; and meanwhile some representatives of the “third world” seemed to have suddenly suggested that religious differences and dogmas should be regarded on the basis of international competition, not ideological or socio-economic concepts; international criminal structures emerged, claiming to be very serious actors of international life with their own ideas and potential for concrete actions, etc.

Under these conditions, the creation and restructuring of international organizations, the search for semantic structures and activity tools that are adequate to the new time, remains a very difficult problem, and maybe even unsolvable: new radically different approaches to the formation of international organizations will be required.

The interest of the state today remains the enduring foundation of the foreign policy of all countries, including their participation and activities in international organizations. Often, the interest and foreign policy proclaimed by the same state come into conflict, but the priority and dictate of interest is obvious, especially in times of crisis. The egoism and cynicism of the state (if it wants to be strong) is the indestructible truth of all time.

If we develop “Eurasianism” as a platform of identity or (self) identification model, the latter will need, first of all, a harmonious combination of the interests of all and real equality, but not equalization.

At the time N.Trubetskoy proposed to construct a so-called “Eurasian nationalism” (“... a national substrate of a state called

the USSR can only be the totality of the peoples inhabiting this state, considered as a special multi-people nation and having such nationalism as such. We call this nation Eurasian, its territory - Eurasia, its nationalism – Eurasianism”.

There are also other proposals and recommendations on the issue of constructing Eurasian identity. I believe that there should not be haste and unnecessary trouble - we should quietly think together.

Due to the reference to culture, it should be emphasized that the intangible sphere of human activity, or in a broader context, the totality of their non-economic achievements and orientations (also included in the national value system) plays, ironically, a significant role in economic development. In particular, let me remind my readership once again about the experience of Korea and Zambia, which in 1960 began economic reforms from about the same starting position. However, ten years later, the economic development of the Asians was four times higher than that of the Africans. Why? The answer is simple: the presence of an aggregate of value orientations and capacities to which a nation or another identified group of people not only focuses, but this aggregate seems to be moving the nation forward.

The search for national roots is not just an attempt to “dig up” the national Idea from the depth of the centuries and at the same time restore the history of the people, or rather, write out its documented version - this is the desire to understand the historical mission of people generations who have identified and identified with some ethnonym born from time to time based on a motto, idea or symbol of spatial, and sometimes totem designation. A certain sacralization of the historical mission of an ethnos or a group of ethnoses is one of the fundamental bases for the construction of a self-identifying model, which, in turn, can become an engine for development. The sacralization process can obviously be artificially excited and successful, as we can see from the history of some nations. But, if this excitement is



not accompanied by the creation of concrete material, spiritual and moral platforms, then all efforts, in general, are in vain.

Versions of God’s origin, moreover, with the divine name of a person can be found in the materials of ethnogony, genealogical traditions, and even in sacred books. Thus, God's chosen people confirms the messianic role of this people among others. No need to delve into history; I will give just one example: US President R. Reagan states: “If we deprive Americans of faith in our great future, it will be impossible to explain why we are so convinced that America is a promised land, and our people are chosen by God to work over creating a better world.”

The belief in God’s chosen people should find not only “imminent” confirmation within the national self-identification model, sometimes arising on a powerful wave of self-interpretation “methods and sole possession of space information”, but “imminent”can be a very difficult concept, especially if the latter is not recognized by others ethnosubjects and confessional communities. There is only a faith in the special peoples’ mission based on the “dialogue with God”, again if this dialogue took place. As V. Soloviev said: “The idea of a nation is not what it thinks about itself in time, but what God thinks about it in eternity”.

Every nation has two versions of its own historical past: documented and mythologized. In the first case we can point to, for example, the history of European and other sedentary agricultural peoples, and note that is grounded on the historical writings of Thucydides and Geradot.

However, their system and methods are legitimate, from my point of view, only to explain the history of sedentary peoples, with a more or less fixed territory inhabited with a certain class-political, pyramidal control system, etc. - that is, state formations with watchtowers and protected gates. With respect to nomadic peoples, the methodology of Thucydides and Geradot is applicable only in certain fragments, because the history of horse and nomadic states and communities, in general, is a history of more

symbols, signs, and a network of organized communities, rather than material evidence of people's livelihoods, including a bibliographic culture, which, of course and unconditionally, constitutes the great heritage of mankind, its experience, work and intellectual curiosity.

The purpose of the Eurasian horse-based nomadic community, which existed until the middle of the 19th century, consisted, among other aspects of the historical mission, to transfer knowledge, skill and other value containers from one civilization center to another; but the “carriers” did not use this knowledge, because they did not need it (another so-called paradox). A very fundamental explanation of the “difficulties of translation” is required here: the paradox is the straitjacket that the world puts on the “anti-world”.

Why are we talking about this today? The inertia of nomadism, just like the Soviet civilizational identity and some religious preferences, plays a fairly large role in shaping the outlook of people in a certain area of Eurasia. The context for the development of all the models of different types of identity mentioned can lead to unpredictable consequences, including the state’s collapse. From my point of view, so far from the known possible identity models, only the Eurasian one can in some way cement the common ideas of some Central Asian peoples about themselves, without constructing a platform of uniformity and monotony.

Today, for the former “nomads”, it’s time to dream about the future, not the past.

AcknowledgementThis article is a speech of Dr. Muratbek

Imanaliyev, the Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2010-2012) on the International Conference “National Strategies of Modernization: Achievements and Prospects”, dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (15 July 2018, Astana).



THE NEW CAPITAL BUILDING AS AN URBANIZATION POLICY OF THE EMERGING STATE

Aigul Zabirova

Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Professor,United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE

Abstract. In this article, the transfer of the capital of Kazakhstan to Astana is interpreted as a successful urbanization policy of the young state. It shows the importance of Astana in the formation of national identity, in solving the geographic and demographic imbalances inherited in the Soviet period. Kazakhstan was in need of new centers of modernization. Astana is defined as one of the key successful narratives of the young state.

Keywords: Astana, capital, urbanization policy

ЖАҢА ЕЛОРДА ҚҰРЫЛЫСЫ – ҚАЛЫПТАСУ КЕЗЕҢІНДЕГІ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІҢУРБАНДАНУ САЯСАТЫ РЕТІНДЕ

Айгүл Забирова

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Қазақстанның бас қаласының Астанаға көшуі жас мемлекеттің сәтті урбандалу саясаты ретінде интерпретацияланады. Ұлттық бірегейліктің қалыптасуында, Кеңес уақытынан қалған географиялық және демографиялық дисбаланстарды шешудегі Астананың мәні көрсетіледі. Қазақстанға жаңғыртудың жаңа орталықытары қажет болды. Астана жас мемлекеттің басты табысты нарративтерінің бірі ретінде анықталады.

Түйін сөздер: Астана, бас қала, урбанизациялау саясаты

СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВО НОВОЙ СТОЛИЦЫ КАК ПОЛИТИКА УРБАНИЗАЦИИ ГОСУДАРСТВА НА ЭТАПЕ СТАВЛЕНИЯ

Айгуль Забирова

Аннотация. В данной статье перенос казахстанской столицы в Астану интерпретируется как успешная урбанизационная политика молодого государства. Показано значение

МРНТИ11.15.25



Астаны в формировании национальной идентичности, в решении географического и демографического дисбалансов, унаследованных в советский период. Казахстан нуждался в новых центрах модернизации. Астана определяется как один из ключевых успешных нарративов молодого государства.

Ключевые слова: Астана, столица, политика урбанизации

Currently new capitals building are reappeared in the developing countries to duplicate large global cities by patterns of glamorous architecture and shining skyscrapers. On the base of Astana experience as one of the new capital cities this paper examines the success of the new capital building as an urbanization policy of the emerging state and considers some challenges and lessons for last two decades.

20 years ago the Kazakhstani capital had moved from the Soviet Alma-Ata to provincial small town Akmola. The capital shift was considered by society as a personal voluntary decision of the President N. Nazarbayev, forcing will of the ruling power. At the very beginning of independence the new national state should manage several issues. The most crucial challenge was the nation building and development of the new state. For stabilizing and strengthening the new state the new capital was required, which would become the strongest object of identity for the whole emerging nation.

It has been agreed that all soviet republics invented and developed different strategies in solving issues related with the nation building process. After the break of the USSR special decisions had been undertaken in formation of new national identity in former republics, nationalistic strategies had been chosen by many of them, the most drastic policy of ‘nationalizing state’ is the notoriously famous nationalistic policy of all three Baltic states for pushing out of Russians from the region. Ethnic composition and ethno - demographic disproportion in distribution of population was one of the strongest challenges for Kazakhstan. According to the last Soviet census Kazakhs

and Russians had equal proportions in 1989; Kazaks were 40.1% and Russians – 37.4% [1].

However ethnic composition was complicated with geographic distribution of these two large ethnic groups. Geographic distribution of population had ethnic feature in the soviet time: the southern and the western parts of republic were mainly concentration of Kazakh population. Whereas northern and central parts traditionally were considered as “Russian”. In these regions Kazakhs were quantitatively much less than other ethnic groups. New nation faced a question: how to balance the national state without violent exile of Russian-speaking population? How to bring Kazakhs to the North? How could the northern part of country become attractive for Kazakh population from the South? How to stimulate southern Kazakhs to move, to migrate to very Russian and Russian-speaking north? Furthermore Russian and Russian-speaking in the early 90-s for various reasons actively left the country, including northern and central regions of the country, therefore there could be a gradual emptiness threat of these lands.

Historically population’s density in Kazakh Steppe always was low. Harsh winter’s conditions and very short summer demanded strong resources for residing, so Kazakhs here practiced only nomadic survival strategies, not comparable with living conditions on the southern agricultural region of Kazakhstan. Therefore the state should do something with former Russian-speaking northern and central regions of the country, it was necessary from somewhere to bring people in exchange.

The decision was found in the movement of capital from the south to the north, which in reality stimulated huge float of population



to Astana and surrounding territories, towns and villages. This fact is confirmed by official statistics of 2000s [2]. The key cores in this southern migration float were Kazakhs. In 2004 in my Doctor dissertation I emphasized two qualitatively diverse groups of Kazakhs migrating to the north from the south: rural-urban and city-to-city migrations. I argued that such differences in social background of migrating population as an education, qualification, and economic capital, involvement in network relations and skills in Kazakh and Russian languages strongly influenced on the adaptation processes on the new place and finally on positive or negative results of migration. Moreover I explored how emergence and development new national state influenced on rural-urban and city-to-city migrations of Kazakh population, how the idea of kazakhisation triggered this continuing move, and how formation, legitimacy and reproduction of new national identity in Kazakhstan were (along with traditional, socio-economic factors) “attractive” factors of rural-urban and city-to city migration [3].

Secondly, new centers of modernization needed. It is essential to notice, that Kazakhs did not have historical attachment to a certain city. For example Baku or Tbilisi, being the same russified cities as Almaty, despite their ethnic composition, remained as an Azeri city as well as Tbilisi as a Georgian city. I argue that soviet Almaty was not Kazakh type of city, during Soviet time Kazakhs never defined Almaty as a cradle of the Kazakh nation. The point is that after the declaring the movement of the capital in 1990th population of Almaty didn’t protests against loss of the capital status.

Definitely there were serious Kazakh intelligence, national press, national writers and poets, national historians and linguists in the Soviet Almaty as defenders of the Kazakh language and the whole Kazakh culture. Apparently this intelligence gave way to Russian-speaking culture and science, as a result of which the whole Kazakhs ethnos became the most russified and sovetisized

ethnos in the USSR. I argue that in soviet period Almaty didn’t become the Kazakh city, it was a Soviet city, and correspondingly the Soviet identity (especially through language and culture) dominated over the Kazakh identity. If at the moment of the USSR’ collapse Baku, Tbilisi or Tashkent (together with Bukhara and Samarkand) already had necessary urban platform for nation building, in Kazakhstan in 1990 this urban platform should be created. Therefore N. Nazarbayev initiated or supported northern expedition. By the way the last is not known, the question who suggested the idea of creation the new capital is still open. Elite of an emerging state had been challenged with question: how to make a Kazakh capital without conflicts and simultaneously implement kazakhization in the North?

Apparently, the Kazakh elite made a decision to construct new national core for the new national state and to locate this core in new Kazakh capital. I argue that such new national core for new Kazakh nation became government class, officials (chinovnichestvo).

Kazakh elite faced with the necessity to create new centers of modernization and initiated formation of new enclave of modernization. In this context it is important to notice that Kazakhstan chose strategy very typical for the postcolonial country: so called ‘enclave’ modernization, strategy of creation of new enclave of Kazakhstan on the North in addition to already existing enclave on the South, which was created by Soviet Empire.

Apparently modernization was understood by Kazakh elite as an urban modernization in parallel with kazakhization of North and then the whole society. However it’s a different story whether national officials become core of the new national state? It is a different story whether strategy of urban Kazakh state was successful? At least today it is clear that problem on indigenization or kazakhisation of the North was solved successfully by elite, according to the second national census Kazakhs in Astana makes the demographic majority.



Nowadays in official speeches, in academic publications, in mass media Astana identifies as a new chapter of Kazakh history, of independent Kazakhstan; and as a symbol of political distance from soviet past and soviet Almaty, so Astana became the new postcolonial narrative.

The post-coloniality of new narrative is that Astana became the “shift” not only in geographical sense but also in “distancing” from the Soviet past prevailing with its soviet grand narratives. New state demanded emergence of new ideas, one of the symbols of which became Astana. New city became an implementation of the new urbanization strategy, culture and economy of emerging state.

Firstly, the ethno-demographic composition of the northern part of country has been changed and now we witness typical for many postcolonial countries speed urbanization with a signs of Asian and Muslim types

of urbanization. Substantially state didn’t consider what to do and how to adjust the floating rural population to the urban place?

Secondly, revival of many cultural traditions, change of language policy and everyday practices, emergence of new political, cultural and business elite among the native population are signs of Astana’ post-coloniality.

Thirdly new capital city project is a very expensive project for the whole emerging state. However Astana is not capable to provide adequate and affordable housing for its inhabitants, especially for newcomers; many rural migrants are living under poverty at destination. Employment possibilities are the main factors that would help rural migrants to escape from social exclusion and urban poverty. Therefore in the process of new capital building Kazakhstani government should focus more on the meeting contemporary urban challenges as rapid urbanization, informality, social segregation, poverty and unemployment.

1. Краткие итоги переписи населения. – Астана,2009. Astana, 2010.2. Астана. Энциклопедия // Народонаселение. – Алматы, Атамұра, 2008.3. Забирова А.Т. Формирование, легитимация и воспроизводство

идентичности в пост-советском Казахстане. // Социологические исследования. 2003. №12. С.118-126.

REFERENCES:



EXPECTED FUTURE IMAGE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

Tetsuji Tanaka

Executive Director, Central Asia and Caucasian Research Institute (Tokyo),Visiting Professor, Graduate School, Kokushikan University, Former SeniorAdviser to the President, UN University (Tokyo)

Abstract. In this article has a comprehensive sense about Kazakhstan`s contemporary development in terms of political, economic and social development. Ideas depicted in the article show Kazakhstan`s outstanding achievements and at the same time prioritizes necessary aims for enhancing the further developments of the country. Following actual spheres of research within country`s development are considered: economic front, country`s leadership in the promotion of regional economic, political cooperation system, role of the SCO within Kazakhstan`s regional policy, the role of the "world religious leaders"in promotion of peace, Kazakhstan`s promotion to the denuclearization of the CA region, perspectives of democracy development, increasing of welfare and some mentions on "Strategy for Kazakhstan 2050".

Key words: Kazakhstan, Japan, cooperation, region

ҚАЗАҚСТАН РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫНЫҢ БОЛАШАҚ БЕЙНЕСІ

Тетсужи Танака

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Қазақстанның қазіргі заманғы дамуының саяси, экономикалық және әлеуметтік өлшемінің жалпы талдауы беріледі. Мақалада көрсетілген идеялар көрнекті жетістіктерді көрсетеді және болашақта елдің дамуын жақсарту үшін қажетті мақсаттарды талдайды. Ел дамуындағы келесі өзекті зерттеулер қаралды: экономикалық бағыт, өңірлік экономикалық, саяси ынтымақтастық жүйесін ілгерілетудегі елдің көшбасшылығы, қазақстандық өңірлік саясат шеңберіндегі ШЫҰ рөлі, бейбітшілікті ілгерілетудегі «әлемдік діни көшбасшылардың» рөлі, Қазақстанның ОА аймағын ядролық қарусыздануға қосқан үлесі, демократияның даму перспективалары, әл-ауқатты арттыру және «Қазақстан-2050» стратегиясы туралы бірқатар жазбалар.

Түйін сөздер: Қазақстан, Жапония, ынтымақтастық, аймақ

МРНТИ11.25.42



БУДУЩИЙ ОБЛИК РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН

Тетсужи Танака

Аннотация. В статье дается общий анализ современного развития Казахстана в политическом, экономическом и социальном измерениях. Идеи, отображенные в статье, показывают выдающиеся достижения и в тоже время приоритизируют необходимые цели для улучшения развития страны в будущем. Рассмотрены следующие актуальные исследования в развитии страны: экономическое направление, лидерство страны в продвижении региональной экономической, политической системы сотрудничества, роль ШОС в рамках казахстанской региональной политики, роли «мировых религиозных лидеров» в продвижении мира, вклад Казахстана в продвижений ядерного разоружения региона ЦА, перспективы развития демократии, увеличение благосостояния и некоторые заметки о Стратегии «Казахстан-2050».

Ключевые слова: Казахстан, Япония, сотрудничество, регион

For more than 25 years, I have been watching the development and changes of the Kazakhstan society, sometimes as an advisor to a minister of the Kazakhstan government, sometimes as an honorary professor of several universities in Kazakhstan, or as an advisor to the Japan-Kazakhstan Joint Economic Committee, as well as through participation in several international conferences held in Kazakhstan. Currently I serve the ruling Nur Otan Party as a member of its committee of overseas advisors. To come right to the point, the country has realized an outstanding high economic growth in the former Soviet Union zone, supported by its rich endowment of natural resources. Based on the growth and under the excellent leadership of its first President Nazarbayev, it has increased its Asian democracy and national welfare, thus making its big presence felt in the world.

Now let me focus on two points that are distinctive about the relationship between Kazakhstan and Japan. The first is the fact that the basic city planning of Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan, was made by a world-class Japanese architect Mr. Kisho Kurokawa. Now Astana has grown to a city of skyscrapers, often referred to as “New York in East Eurasia”. This can be said as a part of a successful cultural exchange between Japan and Kazakhstan. The second is on the economic relationship. Looking from the

Japanese perspective, development of natural resources and their imports and the increased market participation of car makers in Kazakhstan have been the prominent characteristics in their relationship, but further efforts are required, in addition to the already started cooperation in the area of fostering of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which is an area of Japanese specialty, and encouragement of value added agriculture, to promote cooperation in such areas as environmental countermeasures, support for higher education, and provision of medical technology and equipment.

On the Kazakhstan side, the followings are expected for the sake of its nation building and development of its society.

(1) First on the economic front, it is necessary for the country to further diversify its economic structure. The country has already achieved a substantial progress on the reform of its economic structure that heavily depends on the development and exports of energy resources. However, the country is not in a position to fully cope with the fluctuations in international energy prices.

(2) Secondly, the country is hoped to exercise a leadership in the promotion of formation of regional economic and political cooperation system. The change of presidents in the neighboring Uzbekistan and its inclination to good-neighbor policy will give a good condition



to Kazakhstan for promoting its effort on that. It is indispensable to the realization of economic and political stability in Central Eurasia that through this cooperation long-confusing issues of intraregional distribution of water resources can be solved.

(3) In this regard, it is also important for Kazakhstan to strengthen its economic cooperation in the Central Asian region while on the level of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) balancing the economic relations with China and Russia. Kazakhstan should promote, not one-sidedly, an appropriate and well-balanced cooperation both with China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative and Russia’s “Eurasian Economic Union.”

(4) Already Kazakhstan has hosted several meetings of “world religious leaders” and it is in a position to seek for a pilot or model nation in the long run that has a system that enables peaceful coexistence of “multiple races, multiple tribes and multiple religions.”

(5) In light of the damages caused in the former Soviet days in the nuclear testing site (Semipalatinsk), Kazakhstan has contributed to the campaign for the extinction of nuclear weapons in Central Asia by promoting the “Treaty on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia” (also called Treaty of Semei, 2006). The country is expected to continue to play a leading role for a worldwide anti-nuclear campaign including in the place in the UN. The visit of President Nazarbayev in November 2016 to Hiroshima which suffered a big damage by the first use of nuclear weapon in the war has been highly evaluated internationally. Of course the Japanese people support the continuation of the global anti-nuclear campaign by Kazakhstan.

(6) “Democracy in the East Eurasian way” has many aspects in it. In an economic system and policy aspect, it means a market economy that allows a certain degree of intervention by an incorrupt and efficient government. In electing president, the country has a democratic system based on a multi-political party system, but for the moment it may have to take into account the traditional election system and spirit for electing leaders of kurultai, a general

assembly of representatives of nomadic tribes, that has been formed with a long historical background. In the future, however, it will be desired that the country adopt a presidential election system that forbids a third term under a two-party system.

(7) Further, it will be desired for Kazakhstan to improve its national welfare system including pension, health care and expenditures for education. In the medium and long run, the country should make it a goal to build a welfare society of Scandinavian style. In preparing for the case the population still continues to increase in that phase, it will have to establish an economic structure that can be easily understood and that secures a room for a certain degree of economic growth and fiscal expansion.

(8) “Strategy for Kazakhstan 2050” makes it a goal for the country to become one of the 30 advanced economies in the world by 2050. Given the large national land ranking the 9th in the world and rich endowment of natural resources, there will be a good chance the country ranks even within the highest 20 countries in terms of “competitiveness and presence of the nation” if the following conditions are ensured. These conditions include (i) continuation of a stable and strong presidential system that is based on a democratic election, (ii) diversification of industrial structure that does not depend only on resources development and their exports, (iii) promotion of human values such as coexistence of “multiple races, multiple tribes and multiple religions” and anti-nuclear campaign, (iv) highly transparent policy management and economic structure. Efforts to achieve these conditions will surely increase the trust on the country from the international society.

AcknowledgementThis article is a speech of Dr.Tetsuji Tanaka,

Executive Director of the Central Asia and Caucasian Research Institute (Tokyo) on the IV Congress of Sociologists of Kazakhstan “Modernization Strategy of Kazakhstan in Sociological Dimensions: New Values, New Coordinate System and New Time” (27-28 September 2018, Astana)



POTENCIAL AND PROSPECTS ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN CENTRA ASIAN COUNTRIES AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Irina Chernykh

Doctor in History, ProfessorChief Research Fellow, KazakhstanInstitute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Abstract. Trade and economic relations between the countries of Central Asia and the Is-lamic Republic of Pakistan have significant potential and prospects. However, at the present stage, the intensity of our relations is not very high and there is considerable potential for their further development. The main factors limiting the cooperation between Central Asian countries and Pakistan include the underdeveloped transport infrastructure in the region, the orientation of the Central Asian countries towards the export of raw materials mostly, specificities of the Central Asia geographical location, namely, the lack of direct access to international maritime routs and, therefore, the relatively high share of transport costs in the price of the goods. At the same time, a number of positive factors are recorded - the absence of serious political disagreements between Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia, a number of multilateral international platforms, including Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia as members (SCO, CICA, OEC, OIC, etc.), common perceptions of threats to international security and others that provide opportunities for capacity building in mu-tual collaboration.

Key words: Central Asian countries, Pakistan, economic cooperation, transport corridors, infrastructure.

МРНТИ11.25.40



ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯЛЫҚ ЕЛДЕРІ ЖӘНЕ ПӘКІСТАН ИСЛАМ РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫ АРАСЫНДАҒЫ ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ

ЫНТЫМАҚТАСТЫҚТЫҢ ӘЛЕУЕТІ МЕН БОЛАШАҒЫ

Ирина Черных

Аңдатпа. Орталық Азия мен Пәкістан Ислам Республикасы арасындағы сауда-экономикалық қатынастар айтарлықтай әлеует пен перспективаға ие. Алайда, қазіргі кезеңде біздің қарым-қатынастарымыздың қарқындылығы аса жоғары емес және одан әрі даму үшін елеулі әлеует бар. Орталық Азия елдері мен Пәкістан арасындағы ынтымақтастықты тереңдетуге кедергі келтіретін негізгі факторлар аймақтағы дамымаған көлік инфрақұрылымы, Орталық Азия елдерінің шикізат экспорты бағытына бағдарлануы, географиялық ерекшеліктер, атап айтқанда теңізге тікелей қол жетімсіздік және, осыған орай жүк тасымалы құнының салыстырмалы түрде жоғары болуы. Сонымен қатар, Пәкістан мен Орталық Азия елдері арасында елеулі қолайлы шарттар да бар, ол саяси қайшылықтардың болмауы, Пәкістан мен Орталық Азия елдері үшін (ШЫҰ, АӨСШК, ЭЫДҰ, ИКҰ және т.б.) бірқатар халықаралық көпжақты платформалардың ортақ болуы, халықаралық қауіпсіздік қауіп-қатерлеріне қатысты жалпы ұстанымдар және т.б. бұл әлеуетті күшейту мүмкіндіктерін анықтайды.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия елдері, Пәкістан, экономикалық ынтымақтастық, көлік дәліздері, инфрақұрылым

ПОТЕНЦИАЛ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА МЕЖДУ СТРАНАМИ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ И ИСЛАМСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ

ПАКИСТАН

Ирина Черных

Аннотация. Торгово-экономические отношения между странами Центральной Азии и Исламской Республикой Пакистан имеют значительный потенциал и перспективы. Однако, на современном этапе интенсивность наших отношений не очень высокая и имеется значительный потенциал для дальнейшего развития. В качестве основных факторов, препятствующих углублению сотрудничества между Центральноазиатскими странами и Пакистаном, выделяются такие как слаборазвитая транспортная инфраструктура в регионе, ориентация стран Центральной Азии на экспорт сырья, особенности географического расположения, а именно, отсутствие прямого выхода к морским акваториям и, в связи с этим, относительно высокая стоимость грузоперевозок. При этом фиксируется ряд позитивных факторов – отсутствие серьезных политических разногласий между Пакистаном и странами Центральной Азии, наличие ряда многосторонних международных платформ, включающих Пакистан и страны Центральной Азии (ШОС, СВМДА, ОЭС, ОИС и др.), общее восприятие угроз международной безопасности и другие, что определяет возможности для наращивания потенциала сотрудничества.

Ключевые слова: страны Центральной Азии, Пакистан, экономическое сотруд- ничество, транспортные коридоры, инфраструктура



Relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have a great importance for Central Asian countries. It is not just about the interna-tional weight of this country and its strategic location at the crossroads of several regions. Pakistan and Central Asian countries connect cultural ties that go deep into history. Today we can rightly say that bilateral relations be-tween Central Asian states and Pakistan are traditionally friendly. They are not aggravated by complex/negative historical experience, as well as ideological and religious differences. This creates prerequisites for further develop-ment of political ties and strengthening our relationship at all levels and spheres. And today we can say that not only Pakistan is a country of opportunities for the Central Asia, but Central Asia is a region of opportunities for Pakistan.

The article analyzes the factors contribut-ing to the development of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Pakistan, as well as the factors limiting or impeding this develop-ment.

As well-known that the Central Asia is composed of five states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uz-bekistan which emerged on the political map in 1991 after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that Central Asia is not a certain monolith. These are five countries that differ significantly in their models of econom-ic development and in their export and import capacities.

Speaking about the factors contributing to the deepening of trade and economic relations between the countries of Central Asia and Pak-istan, it can be marked the following:

1. There are no serious political disagree-ments and contradictions among Pakistan and Central Asian countries. Moreover, it’s noted that cooperation is increasing by the due to the entry of Pakistan into the Shanghai Co-operation Organization in June 2017. Paki-stan and the countries of the region regularly exchange visits at the highest level. For in-

stance, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, twice visited Pakistan - in 1992 and 2003, the leaders of Pakistan made recip-rocal visits in Kazakhstan during 1990th and 2000th years;

2. The development of cooperation is facili-tated by a number of multilateral international platforms, which simultaneously include both the Central Asian countries and Pakistan. In addition to the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-nization (SCO), already mentioned, it is the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Eco-nomic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Central Asia Regional Economic Coopera-tion Program and others;

3. Central Asian countries and Pakistan have a similar understanding of key contem-porary challenges and risks to international se-curity. First of all, it is about attitudes towards struggle against terrorism, smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal migration and etc.;

4. The Central Asia has a great importance in terms of natural resources (raw materials) which the region possesses. It’s enough to say that Central Asia is on the second place in the world in terms of fuel and energy resources. At the same time, there are impressive reserves of uranium, gold, copper, hard coal, iron ore, etc. The hydropower potential is high. The region is one of the most promising in terms of hu-man capital development. More than 70 mil-lion people live here, while all adult popula-tion is literate and well educated.

One of the key bases expanding the coop-eration between the Central Asia and Pakistan is the intensification and deepening of rela-tionship among the countries of the region it-self. Undoubtedly, the change of Uzbekistan policy towards region, which began in 2017, have given impetus to political climate im-provement in Central Asia and to the solution



of some controversial issues, accumulated for the past two decades. In February 2017 Uz-bekistan adopted and started to implement "The Action Strategy on Five Priority direc-tions on Development of the Republic of Uz-bekistan for the period of 2017-2021".1 One of the key directions of this strategy is to set up a zone of "security, stability and good-neighborliness" in Central Asia. Recently, in March 15, 2018, a Consultative meeting of the Leaders of Central Asian countries was car-ried out in Astana.2 It was the first meeting in the "regional" format over the past 13 years. Outcomes of the meeting allow us to hope that in the mid-term perspective, our five countries will be able to speak as a regional integrity in trade and economic interaction with neighbor-ing countries.

* * *

Despite all factors, pointed out above, obvi-ously, the level of interaction and cooperation between the Central Asian countries and Paki-stan cannot be considered as absolutely sat-isfactory because we have potential for their further development. This applies primarily to trade and economic relations. But there are some factors that limits or impedes coopera-tion. I would like to pointed out some most important:

First of all, it lacks a sufficiently developed regional transport infrastructure in Central Asia:

- there is no unified railway system, effec-tively integrated into the outside regional rail-way networks;

- in a number of Central Asian countries, the quality of railways and motorways (high-ways) remains unsatisfied (low) with a high degree of depreciation;

- logistic hubs and some other institutional mechanisms are not working efficiently.

Until recently, the development of interstate

infrastructure was limited by some tensions or even conflicts between the countries. So, the transportations between Uzbekistan and Kyr-gyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was seri-ously restricted. At present, these issues are in the process of negotiation and taking a proper decision, which encouraging a sort of opti-mism and setting up a space for cooperation with extra-regional actors, such Pakistan is.

National infrastructure development proj-ects have been adopted. For example, the gov-ernment of Kyrgyzstan approved “The Main Directions of Rail Transport Development for 2014–2020”.3 Kazakhstan approved the devel-opment strategy of National Company “Temir Zholy " for 2015-2025.4

The Central Asian countries are interested in and are building (mainly with the help of international donors’ institutions) internation-al railway transport corridors. So, in 2011, the intergovernmental agreement was signed with purpose of to create a transport corridor "Uzbekistan - Turkmenistan - Iran - Oman - Qatar", which allow to connect the countries of Central Asia and the Persian Gulf countries. In 2014, the construction of the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway was completed. Currently, the projects of transport infrastruc-ture under the Chinese "Belt and Road" Ini-tiative are being actively discussed. However, these initiatives and projects are not directed towards South Asia. One of the key infrastruc-tural problems in this direction is the situation in Afghanistan - instability in this country seriously limits the possibility of developing transit corridors from the Central Asian coun-tries to South direction, including towards Pakistan.

Second, the Central Asian countries econ-omies are oriented mainly on the export of raw materials. The basis of Kazakhstan's export, for example, is mineral resources, which account for 65.7% of total exports. It’s mostly oil and gas. The export of high-tech products is one of the key current tasks



for Central Asia and for Kazakhstan as well. We have potential for this development. For example, Uzbekistan is ready to export prod-ucts of the own car industry and advanced processing agriculture products. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, partly Uzbekistan have advantag-es in the field of hydropower industry. Ka-zakhstan has a great potential to export some technologies in spheres of smart and renew-able energy, agriculture, building construc-tion and etc.

Third, the Central Asia is facing of some complexities in trade development dealing with or depending on geographical location of the region. It’ s a lack of direct access to in-ternational maritime routs and high share of transport costs in the price of the goods.

All these factors negatively affect to the competitiveness of our economies and trade cooperation with other countries, including Pakistan.

* * *

In the same time, it is obviously, that these factors are not only restrictors or obstacles, but also directions for capacity building of further cooperation in Central Asia. I am talking about the challenges that can became new opportuni-ties for us.

Thus, it can be argued that the relations between the Central Asian countries and Pakistan are mostly political, but we have a good potential for further development the trade and economic segment. In the case of Kazakhstan, the Intergovernmental Kazakh-stan-Pakistan Joint Commission on Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technical, and Cultural acts as an instrument for the tran-sition of cooperation to the economic sector. Priority areas of cooperation are the spheres of the mining industry, non-ferrous metallur-

gy, machine building, energy, light industry, transport and communications. The Pakistani delegations very active to participate in dif-ferent international events which conduct in Kazakhstan such as the Central Asian Trade Forum (5th, 28-29 October 2015, Almaty), Central Asian International Exhibition titled “WorldFoodKazakhstan" (18th, 4-6 Novem-ber 2015, Almaty). I would especially like to note the participation of Pakistan in Inter-national Specialised Exhibition EXPO-2017 in Astana. Pakistani Pavilion was one of the most visited and interesting.

At the same time, the main task for the moment is to transit of interstate relations to the "technical level", the interaction level be-tween business communities and societies of our countries. What is important directions for Kazakhstan in developing cooperation with Pakistan? It has to be mostly highlighted next priorities:

To increase export of Kazakhstani high

quality end products such as diesel locomo-tives, aircrafts and helicopters, (if possibly - to involve Pakistani business in investing the producing of these goods);

- To use the Baikonur cosmodrome in vari-ous aspects on jointly basis;

- To develop jointly and exchange technolo-gies in the field of digitalization of the econ-omy (Official Program “The Digital Kazakh-stan”);

- To attract Pakistani investments and com-panies for implementing the Nurly Zhol New Economic Program of Kazakhstan;

- To conduct research projects and intro-ducing innovative technologies in the agri-cultural sector, energy sector ("green" energy technologies);

- To cooperate in the sphere of Islamic fi-nance (banking) within the framework of the International Financial Center "Astana".

Finally, Islamabad may have in an inter-est in promoting its products in the markets of



the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), can strengthen its cooperation with Kazakhstan in this direction.

In conclusion, considering the quality of human capital in Central Asian countries, it is promising to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of knowledge-based sustain-

able national economies. Thus, President of Kazakhstan expressed readiness for coopera-tion with the OIC member countries within the framework of the Nazarbayev University and the Park of Innovative Technologies at the plenary session of the First Summit of the Or-ganization of Islamic Cooperation in Science and Technology (September 10, 2017).

1. Президент Республики Узбекистан. Указ от 7 февраля 2017 года «О Стратегии действий по дальнейшему развитию Республики Узбекистан»// Официальный сайт Президента Республики Узбекистан. – 2017. – 7 февраля // http://president.uz/ru/lists/view/231

2. Участие в Рабочей (консультативной) встрече глав государств Центральной Азии// Официальный сайт Президента Республики Казахстан. – 2018. - 15 марта// http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/uchastie-v-rabochei-konsultativnoi-vstreche-glav-gosudarstv-centralnoi-azii

3. Постановление Правительства Кыргызской Республики от 30 сентября 2014 года № 558 «Об утверждении Основных направлений развития железнодорожного транспорта Кыргызской Республики на 2014-2020 годы»// https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31613734#pos=1;-286

4. Стратегия развития акционерного общества «Национальная компания «Қазақстан темір жолы» до 2025 года// https://www.railways.kz/upload/docs/strategiya_razvitiya_ktzh_do_2025_goda_kratkiy_obzor.pdf

REFERENCES:



AZERBAIJAN - KAZAKHSTAN: CASPIAN COOPERATION AND PROSPECTS

Parvana Rustamova

Research scientist in the A.A. Bakikhanov Institute of History of the NAS of Azerbaijan Baki (Azerbaijan) Post-graduate student in the I. Frank Lviv National University

Abstract. This article analyses co-operation between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region in foreign policy, economic, security and cultural affairs, and in the transport and energy supply sector. It explores the history of the development of diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the two countries’ strategies for foreign policy and the role of transport and energy supply projects in establishing a strategic partnership. It outlines the current issues concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea and draws special attention to inter-cultural ties within Türksoy.

The scientific objective of this article is to examine the objectivity in the analysis of bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region and the prospects for co-operation. The comparative and deductive approaches made it possible to describe energy supply projects in the Caspian region and the importance and role of the projects in enhancing the bilateral relations and identify the interests of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region.

The strategic importance of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway line in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and of a close co-operation with Azerbaijan in the Caspian region is rising. There is a tendency for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to have convergent views on co-operation in multiple areas.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Caspian region, the status of the Caspian sea, oil and gas, transport policy, Baku – Tbilisi – Kars, Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan, strategic partnership, TURKSOY.

ӘЗЕРБАЙЖАН-ҚАЗАҚСТАН: КАСПИЙ АЙМАҒЫНЫҢ ЫНТЫМАҚТАСТЫҒЫ ЖӘНЕ БОЛАШАҒЫ

Пәрванә Рустәмова

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Каспий аймағындағы Әзербайжан мен Қазақстан арасындағы сыртқы саясат, экономика, көлік және энергетика, қауіпсіздік және мәдениет сияқты бағыттардағы

МРНТИ11.25.91



ынтымақтастық талқыланады. Әзербайжан мен Қазақстан арасындағы дипломатиялық қатынастардың қалыптасу тарихы, екі елдің сыртқы саясатының стратегиясы, сондай-ақ стратегиялық әріптестікті қалыптастырудағы көлік және энергетикалық жобалардың рөлі зерттеліп, Каспий теңізінің мәртебесі мәселесінің қазіргі кезеңі де аталып өтілді.

Әзербайжан мен Қазақстан арасындағы мәдени байланыстарға ерекше көңіл бөлінеді. Мақаланың ғылыми мақсаты Каспий аймағындағы Әзербайжан мен Қазақстан арасындағы екі жақты қарым-қатынастарды талдаудың объективтілігі, сондай-ақ ынтымақтастық перспективалары. Салыстырмалы және шегерілетін әдісті ескере отырып, Каспий аймағындағы көліктік-энергетикалық жобаларды, олардың маңыздылығы мен екіжақты қарым-қатынастардағы рөлін, сондай-ақ Каспий аймағындағы Әзербайжан мен Қазақстанның негізгі мүдделерін анықтау мүмкін болды.

Қазақстанның сыртқы саясатындағы Баку-Тбилиси-Карс стратегиялық маңызы, сондай-ақ Каспий аймағындағы Әзербайжанмен тығыз ынтымақтастық оңтайлы нәтижеге ие. Әзербайжан мен Қазақстан арасындағы ынтымақтастықтың көптеген салаларында жақындасу, сондай-ақ Каспий аймағында өзара сенім қалыптастыру тенденциясы байқалады.

Түйін сөздер: Әзербайжан, Қазақстан, Каспий аймағы, Каспий теңізі мәртебесі, мұнай және газ, көлік саясаты, Баку-Тбилиси-Карс, Баку-Тбилиси-Джейхан, стратегиялық әріптестік, ТҮРКСОЙ.

АЗЕРБАЙДЖАН – КАЗАХСТАН: ПРИКАСПИЙСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

Парвана Рустамова

Аннотация. В статье анализируется сотрудничество Азербайджана и Казахстана в Каспийском регионе в таких направлениях как: внешняя политика, экономика, транспортно-энергетическая сфера, безопасность и культура. Исследуется история становления дипломатических отношений между Азербайджаном и Казахстаном, стратегия внешней политики обеих государств, а также роль транспортно-энергетических проектов в формировании стратегического партнерства, упоминается современный этап проблемы статуса Каспийского моря. Особое внимание обращается на межкультурные связи Азербайджана и Казахстана в рамках ТЮРКСОЙ.

Научной целью статьи является объективность анализа двухсторонних отношений Азербайджана и Казахстана в Каспийском регионе, а также перспективы сотрудничества. С учетом сравнительного и дедуктивного метода удалось характеризировать транспортно-энергетические проекты Каспийского региона, их значения и роль в двухсторонних отношениях, выявить основные интересы Азербайджана и Казахстана в Каспийском регионе.

Стратегическое значение Баку – Тбилиси – Карс во внешней политике Казахстана, а также тесное сотрудничество с Азербайджаном в Каспийском регионе имеют положительный характер. Соблюдается тенденция сближения позиций Азербайджана и Казахстана по многим сферам сотрудничества, а также формирования взаимного доверия в Каспийском регионе.

Ключевые слова: Азербайджан, Казахстан, Каспийский регион, статус Каспийского моря, нефть и газ, транспортная политика, Баку – Тбилиси – Карс, Баку – Тбилиси – Джейхан, стратегическое партнерство, ТЮРКСОЙ.



Introduction

Bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have always been friendly. These countries are connected by a common culture, a common religion and common traditions. The existing transport and energy projects in the Caspian region unite the interests and geopolitical goals of both countries. Strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region takes place in the context of a number of important issues. Caspian cooperation between countries is a worthwhile topic for academic research, and deserves special attention.

The main direction of Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s foreign policy

in the Caspian region

Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kazakhstan were established on August 30, 1992. The Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Republic of Azerbaijan was established on January 9, 1993. The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Kazakhstan was established on March 1, 2004. The first official visit of the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to Azerbaijan was on September 16, 1996 [1].

During the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhstani political leadership tried to consolidate its independence, and a political area was formed, both at regional and international levels [2].

After gaining independence, the foreign policy milestones of both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan had common features. For example, Azerbaijan pursued a foreign policy aimed at strengthening stability in the region. Using economic force as an instrument of foreign policy, the state expanded its circle of partners. The economic strength of the state is a weapon from the "hard-power" arsenal of foreign policy, based on the use of resources.

The presence of political interest in the economic cooperation of states remains a fact. For example, the foreign economic cooperation of the states of the Caspian region and the implementation of oil and gas projects reduce the dependence of the states of the region on the Russian Federation. Such steps ensure effective regional integration within a certain format. In this context, the Caspian region is the main center of strategic cooperation between the Caspian countries.

Azerbaijan's foreign policy in the Caspian region is aimed at expanding mutually beneficial cooperation and integration of the states of the region. Azerbaijan has turned the Caspian region into an open zone of international cooperation.

After coming to power in 1993, President Aliyev of the Republic of Azerbaijan witnessed one of the most important problems - the contradiction and unstable nature of the state's foreign political correlations at the regional level and uncertain prospects in the world foreign policy arena. He prepared a draft foreign-policy concept that fully corresponded to the state interests of modern Azerbaijan, taking into account the issues of establishing international and regional security on the basis of democratic values [3].

The first official visit of Azerbaijani President, Heydar Aliyev, to Kazakhstan was in June 1997. As a result, agreements on cooperation and free trade were signed.

An official visit by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Kazakhstan was made in March 2004. During the visit, issues of bilateral economic cooperation were discussed, especially in the Caspian region. The heads of states expressed their intention to supply oil and gas from the Caspian Sea shelf to the world market and underlined the important role of Kazakhstan in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project [4].

In its foreign policy, Kazakhstan adheres to the multi-vector strategy proclaimed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, on December 1, 1991 [5]. The main element of the implementation of the Foreign



Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the strengthening of the multilateral nature of Kazakhstan's diplomacy [6].

Therefore its geopolitical location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe; its economic and military political interests; and its existing resources and industrial potential determine the place of Kazakhstan in the system of international relations as a regional state with a multi-vector foreign policy. To ensure its long-term interests, Kazakhstan is interested in maintaining a broad field for political maneuvers. Special features of Kazakhstan's diplomacy are its decisiveness in upholding national-state interests, multi-vector and balance.

The Republic of Kazakhstan is interested in partnership with the Republic of Azerbaijan, especially in resolving strategic issues: determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea; transportation of oil to world markets; maintenance of transport and logistics interconnections; and development of bilateral economic, political and cultural relations.

Azerbaijan was the first among the states of the region to form a new economic model of development in the Caspian region, despite the fact that the Caspian Sea is a closed sea and the issues of international cooperation were contradictory. Today even non-regional actors are interested in the projects initiated by Azerbaijan.

One of the most important issues of bilateral cooperation between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is the implementation of the TRACECA project. Kazakhstan became a party to the main multilateral agreement on the development of the international transport corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia, signed on September 7 - 8, 1998 [7].

TRACECA is an international transport corridor that links the countries of Europe and Asia. One of the specific features of the Europe-Asia route is that the delivery of goods from the sender to the recipient is carried out by rail and by ships that run on the Black and Caspian Seas. [8]. About thirty states are

participants in the TRACECA project, whose headquarters are located in Baku.

For Kazakhstan, the Caspian factor is an opportunity to strengthen its position in the development of the navy, oil and gas production on the shelf of the Caspian Sea and their transportation along alternative routes. Energy policy and the possibility of transit of energy resources strengthen the strategic importance and role of Kazakhstan in the region.

Through the Republic of Kazakhstan, transport routes for oil and natural gas are going to Europe and Asia. Today Kazakhstan remains a stable supplier of energy to the world market.

Thus, in 2008, the National Company KazMunayGas and the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan signed the Agreement on the Basic Principles for the Establishment of the Trans-Caspian Transport System. This system was designed to transport Kazakhstan oil from the Tengiz and Kashagan oil fields to the world markets via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline [9]. The first batch of oil extracted from the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan passed through the BTC pipeline in October 2008. However, the increase in tariffs by BTC shareholders in 2011 led to the termination of this agreement.

Oil production in Kazakhstan is growing rapidly, and has already exceeded, by some estimates, 55 million tons per year: most experts believe that the export potential of the state is four times larger than the deposits of Azerbaijan oil. At the opening ceremony of the BTC, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev specified that the "Ceyhan" direction will become only one of the routes for oil export from Kazakhstan, but in any case not the main one [10].

An important factor for both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is the Transcaspian International Transport Route (TCTR). The trans-Caspian international transport route (TCTR) runs through China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and further through Turkey and Ukraine - to Europe. It was decided to hold



the third meeting of Baku-Aktau-Samsun twin-cities council of cooperation of Turkic-speaking countries in Kazakhstan. Last October, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia signed an agreement on the establishment of the International Association of TCTR, with the office in Astana. Its activities are aimed at attracting transit and foreign trade cargo, as well as developing integrated logistics products along the TCTR route.

The Republic of Azerbaijan has enough oil reserves to fully fill the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, so the implementation of this project will be successful without Kazakh oil.

It is obvious that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan adhere to the principle of diversification in the issues of oil delivery to the world market.

The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, shows significant activity in the region [11]. The state seeks to implement transport and energy projects that satisfy its interests and simplify the integration processes in the region. Being a Caspian state, Kazakhstan maintains partnership relations, both with the states of Central Asia, and with the South Caucasus. The idea of regional integration of the states of Central Asia was realized on April 30, 1994 by signing the Agreement on the Common Economic Space.

Today Kazakhstan has significant chances to strengthen its positions in the region. Kazakhstan has a sufficient foreign policy resource for carrying out an independent play, taking into account geopolitical realities, especially in the Central Asian region [12]. In turn, the states of the South Caucasus occupy an important place in the system of economic, political, transit and transport interests of Kazakhstan [13]. The main element of the implementation of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the strengthening of the multilateral nature of Kazakhstan's diplomacy.

Kazakhstan's interests in Central Asia and the Caspian region are interrelated. This is justified by the implementation of the existing key transport and energy projects. Kazakhstan

is forming its foreign policy course in the Caspian region, taking into account the priority importance of achieving the set goals, in particular, this concerns the economic sphere.

The regional policy of Azerbaijan influences the formation of national interests. Analyzing the national interests of Azerbaijan in the context of regional policy, the strategic importance of the Caspian region will not remain without attention.

The development of national security is possible due to the correct understanding, formation and maintenance of national interests. Azerbaijan - is the state of the South Caucasus and the Caspian region, which directly affects the nature of the national interests of this state in the region.

In 2010, Kazakhstan began its course of economic modernization - "Kazakhstan - 2020". Today, Kazakhstan's economy not only successfully overcomes crisis conditions, but also moves purposefully on the path of innovation-industrial development [14].

Foreign policy milestones of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan


Looking ahead, Kazakhstan will enhance its foreign policy in the east, especially in relation to China. Cooperation with the Russian Federation is lower down the priority list. This is confirmed by Kazakhstan academics and analysts, by characterizing the situation in the region as confrontational for the Russian Federation. So, in his book "Apart: Russia and the countries of Central Asia" A.K. Bisenbaev notes: "Russia's integration efforts in the CIS space are ritualistic. In practice, the state, the ideology of which has the character of confrontation with the whole world, is engaged in pushing away its allies and searching for new enemies. All world and regional events are evaluated from the standpoint of stand-off and confrontation" [15].

The book "Caspian chess board: geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic



analysis" of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan states: "The development of energy and transport potential makes Azerbaijan an important player in the Eurasian region. In this context, due to the favorable geographic location, Azerbaijan becomes an active participant in transport projects between the Middle East and the European Union" [16].

Despite the fact that China is a strategic partner of Kazakhstan in the implementation of energy and transport projects, the role of Azerbaijan in the implementation of the Great Silk Road project is not without interest. Thus, the project of President Nursultan Nazarbayev "The New Silk Road" provides for the transit of goods between Europe and Asia through the South Caucasus corridor and Kazakhstan. China, being an extra-regional power, is interested in seeking a shorter transit route to Europe. That is why the South Caucasus and the Caspian region as a whole are of strategic importance not only in the bilateral relations of the Caspian states, but also with extra-regional actors.

No wonder that Patrick Verhoeven, chairman of the International Association of Ports and Harbors, said: "Baku can play an important role in the implementation of the concept "One zone - one way" [17]. The capital of Azerbaijan has historically been an integral part of the Silk Road and today there are all opportunities for building effective and favorable conditions for cooperation in the Caspian region, both with Kazakhstan and the states of the Far East. In turn, the Turkic vector and cooperation with the Turkic-speaking states, first of all with the Republic of Azerbaijan, play an important role in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. Bilateral relations of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in the Caspian region are realized taking into account economic and geopolitical interests.

According to Kazakhstan expert Aidos Taibekuly, there is a transit dependence of Kazakhstan. Transit routes, which Kazakhstan uses to enter world markets and the ocean, run through the territories of other states [18].

For example, a cargo transportation route from Turkey to Kazakhstan passes through Azerbaijan, in particular, cargo is transported to the port of Aktau via the ferry lines operating in the Caspian Sea. In addition, diversification of transit and export routes of Kazakhstan gas is an important strategic task of the Kazakhstan government.

Another direction of the foreign policy of Kazakhstan in the Caspian region is cooperation with Azerbaijan within the framework of Turkey - Georgia - Azerbaijan - Kazakhstan format. So, in August 2012 at the Bishkek summit of the Council on Cooperation of the Turkic-speaking countries a decision was made to create a transport corridor between these states [19]. The strategy "Kazakhstan - 2050" states: "It is difficult to imagine the sustainable development of the state's transit potential without the exit of Kazakhstan into the World Ocean" [20]. Kazakhstan strives for broad cooperation, including the whole region of the Caspian Sea. Orientation to the West is possible due to the implementation of transport and energy projects, initiated by the Republic of Azerbaijan. One of these projects is the "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars" transport corridor.

In April 2017, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, paid an official visit to Azerbaijan. Analyst of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies S. Kushkumbayev emphasized the importance of this visit: "Azerbaijan is our strategic partner in Transcaucasus - economic, transport, communication, moreover, we are part of the Turkic Union, this is an important factor" [21]. As a result of the visit, bilateral trade and economic agreements were signed. "We look forward to the introduction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will significantly shorten the time spent on transportation from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia through our territories," said President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. [22] The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will become an "Iron Silk Road", which will unite Asia with Europe. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will be able to



supply goods in different directions, as well as to act as transit countries for a large cargo flow [23].

On October 30, 2017, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was invited to Baku for the opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars project. This important event was the beginning of the implementation of the international transport project, which became the shortest corridor between Asia and Europe. The initiative of the Republic of Azerbaijan allowed all parties to benefit on equal terms. For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars project ensured economic cooperation, tourism development, integration, trade and security in the Caspian region and outside the region. Undoubtedly, in the long term Kazakhstan will also be able to become a participant of this project. The export of Kazakhstan grain to Europe will be possible through the territory of Azerbaijan, in case of connection of the large "Silk Road" to the new project. Given this geopolitical situation, the government of Kazakhstan can potentially take the initiative to participate in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars project. This will strengthen existing relations between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in the Caspian region. Kazakhstan has established itself as a reliable partner in matters of international cooperation and is an important partner of Azerbaijan in the Caspian region [24].

The status of the Caspian Sea at the present stage

Another important issue is the status of the Caspian Sea. Between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan there are no contradictions on the status of the Caspian Sea.

The official position of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the status of the Caspian Sea provides for the application of certain provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 concerning the modes and breadth of various parts of the sea. Kazakhstan stands for establishment of the territorial sea,

fishing zone and common water space in the Caspian. On November 29, 2001 the Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kazakhstan was signed, and on February 27, 2003 the Additional Protocol was signed [25]. Also in 2003, an agreement was signed between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on the point of junction of the lines of delineation of adjacent sections of the bottom of the Caspian Sea. These agreements have legal force and were signed with the aim of realizing the sovereign rights to subsurface use. From a legal point of view, these states agreed on delimitation of the Northern part of the Caspian Sea [26].

The presence of natural resources on the Caspian Sea bottom pushed Kazakhstan to more actively defend the position of the sectoral division of the Caspian Sea.

The legal positions of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the status of the Caspian Sea coincide. In his work, an Azerbaijani international lawyer conducts a comparison of the positions of both states: "Azerbaijan views the Caspian Sea as an international or border lake", the bottom and waters of which should be divided according to the sectoral principle of coastal states into zones subject to their full control. Kazakhstan, which once drafted the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 1994, tended to a less radical position - the Caspian Sea is a closed sea and must be governed by the principles and norms of international maritime law, including the establishment of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, continental for each coastal state [27].

Since the contradictions regarding the status of the Caspian Sea continue to weaken, a solution to this problem becomes possible. The Caspian states are gradually implementing plans to develop a draft Convention to determine the status of the Caspian Sea. The governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are supporters of the project and are making efforts to accelerate this process. "The current



stage of negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian Sea can be considered the beginning of the final stage", Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Khalaf Khalafov said at a press conference on the results of the 39th meeting of the Special Working Group held in Baku at the level of foreign ministers of the Caspian states in connection with the preparation of the Convention on the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea [28].

The adoption of a joint Convention will ensure close and broad cooperation in the field of security. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan share common interests in creating safe communications in the region: counterterrorism efforts, fight against organized crime, prevention of smuggling and other important issues that require joint efforts to resolve. Obviously, the preservation of security in the Caspian region is the prerogative of the Caspian states, therefore, negotiations on security are often conducted at the multilateral level during the Caspian summit.

Cooperation in the field of security

It is known that the third Caspian summit was held in Baku on November 18, 2010. As a result of the summit, an agreement on cooperation in the field of security was signed [29]. This document has become an important legal base, which all the Caspian states have signed. As a result of the 5th summit of the Caspian states, which was held in Aktau on August 12, 2018, the Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea was adopted. Negotiations over this convention have been conducted for many years. Achieving a compromise between the countries was a historic event.

According to the convention, the main area of the water surface of the Caspian Sea remains in the common use of the parties, and the bottom and subsoil are divided by neighboring states into zones by agreement between them on the basis of international law.

The summit in Aktau was a very important

event. First, the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea was resolved. Second, the laying of pipelines along the bottom of the Caspian Sea became possible without obstacles. In the future, the transit potential of the Caspian countries will increase. Kazakhstan, like Azerbaijan, actively invests in the development of port connections.

The signing of the Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea also affects the development of cooperation between the Caspian countries in the security sphere.

In 2010, Kazakhstan was elected chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was an important event for the government of Kazakhstan. For the first time among post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan took this place and earned the trust of many European states. Kazakhstan positions itself as a key intermediary between East and West, respecting the basic principles of the OSCE [30]. Also, Kazakhstan was elected on June 28, 2016 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2017-2018.

Cooperation in the field of ensuring energy security was among the key priorities of Kazakhstan in the activities of the UN Security Council [31]. The adoption of Kazakhstan in the framework of such an important structure confirms the dynamically growing authority of the state in the region and draws attention to the official position of the state in the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the official speeches of the President of Kazakhstan is formulated as the need for a peaceful settlement. The Government of Kazakhstan supports the principle of peaceful settlement of conflicts and calls for compliance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are members of the Turkic Council, an international organization that was established in 2009 in Nakhchivan (Azerbaijan). Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are the founding states of the organization. The summits were



held in such cities as Bishkek, Gabala, Bodrum and Astana. The main goals of the Turkic Cooperation Council are to strengthen peace in the region and the world, to jointly solve foreign policy issues, to maintain ties and create conditions for attracting investments, and to fight extremism, terrorism, and transnational crime. [32]

Cooperation in the field of security: "Soft power" and foreign policy


The effectiveness of "cultural diplomacy" between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is confirmed by the activities of the International Turkic Academy (ITA), whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, established in 2012 by the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev during the 9th summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states in Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan).

The main mission of the ITA is to develop the scientific and educational activities of associations of Turkic nations, as well as create conditions for supporting and creating conditions for initiatives of politicians of Turkic-speaking states [33].

In April 2017, in honor of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kazakhstan in the cities of Baku and Sheki, the days of Kazakhstan culture organized by the TURKSOY organization were held. This year, Ilham Aliyev presented the Order of Heydar Aliyev to President Nursultan Nazarbayev, which had a symbolic character. This event underscored the high level of bilateral relations between fraternal peoples.

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have a common language, religion and traditions. Geographic proximity and historical past play an important role in strengthening bilateral relations. Transport and energy projects bring together the interests and positions of Azerbaijan and

Kazakhstan in the Caspian region. In the context of a new geopolitical reality, the efforts of the Turkic-speaking states on various forms of interaction are continuously increasing. The Republic of Azerbaijan supports the unity of the Turkic world.

Conclusion

Thus, bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have a dynamic character. Cooperation in the Caspian region creates mutual trust and partnership, as the strategic importance of the region brings together the interests of both states. Existing transport and energy projects play an important role in strengthening economic relations between states and opening up new prospects. The Republic of Azerbaijan is the leading state in the region and the initiator of international projects aimed at making the Caspian Sea a center of trade between the West and the East. The international policy of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region is conditioned by the implementation of a number of important issues:

Economic issues: the transit dependence of Kazakhstan creates the need for rapprochement with the states of the region. Thus, the export of the Kazakhstani goods to Europe through the territory of Azerbaijan will be promising and profitable. This also concerns the diversification of energy resources, covers the supply of oil and gas. Taking into account economic opportunities and international confidence to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan takes active part and shows interest in the initiated projects of official Baku. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars project envisages the creation of a railway corridor, which will facilitate the attraction of cargoes from China to Europe through the territory of Kazakhstan.

Political and legal issues: common position of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan concerning the status of the Caspian Sea is confirmed by the absence of contradictions. Agreed contract is a



guarantee of the existing position and readiness of the parties to adopt the Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea at the level of five Caspian states.

The position of Kazakhstan in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict deserves the confidence of the Azerbaijani government.

Cultural issues: The presence of the Turkic factor in the relations between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan plays a special role. Joint participation in international organizations that unite Turkic-speaking states is not only a form of strengthening cultural relations and cultural heritage, but also a kind of political unity.

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REFERENCES:



TEACHERS AS LEADERS IN MODERNIZING KAZAKHSTAN

Aidar Khoroshash

PhD (Astana, Kazakhstan)

Abstract. Despite the vast amount of research about educational leadership found in international literature, Kazakhstan has not yet developed an extensive discussion about leadership in education, including teacher leadership. This study explores teacher leadership at secondary schools in Kazakhstan, looking specifically at how important it is for Kazakhstani education to promote its teachers as leaders, and what facilitates or challenges teacher leadership in this country. Because Kazakhstani education is inevitably connected to its Soviet Union heritage, the typical costs of the "traditional" system are still present in society and thus have an impact on promoting teacher leadership in this currently independent country.

Key words: education, schools, ideology, teachers, leadership

ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ ЖАҢҒЫРУЫ ЖАҒДАЙЫНДАҒЫ КӨШБАСШЫ РЕТІНДЕГІ МҰҒАЛІМ БЕЙНЕСІ

Айдар Хорошаш

Аңдатпа. Білім берудегі көшбасшылық тақырыбын ашатын көлемді халықаралық зерт-теулерге қарамастан, Қазақстан көшбасшылықты, оның ішінде мұғалім көшбасшылығы туралы пікірталасты дамыту жолында. Бұл зерттеу Қазақстан Республикасының орта мектептеріндегі мұғалім көшбасшылығына қатысты. Қазақстандық білім беру жүйесінің мұғалімдердің көшбасшы ретінде дамуына жағдай жасауы қаншалықты маңызды; еліміздегі мұғалімдердің көшбасшы болуына не түрткі болып отыр деген сияқты маңызды сұрақтар қамтылған. Қазақстандық білім беру жүйесі кеңес одағынан бері мұра болып қалған «дәстүрлі» мектеп жүйесін ұстану секілді әдеттегі ұстанымдар әлі де бол-са қоғамда кездеседі, сондай-ақ тәуелсіз мемлекетіміздегі мұғалімдер көшбасшылығын ілгерілету үдерісіне әсерін тигізеді.

Түйін сөздер: білім беру, мектеп, идеология, мұғалім, көшбасшылық.

МРНТИ04.41



УЧИТЕЛЯ КАК ЛИДЕРЫ В УСЛОВИЯХ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИИ КАЗАХСТАНА

Айдар Хорошаш

Аннотация. Несмотря на обширный объем международных исследований, раскрывающих тему лидерства в образовании, Казахстан в этом плане находится на пути развития дискуссии о лидерстве, в том числе лидерстве учителей. Данное исследование обращается к лидерству учителей в средних школах Республики Казахстан, задаваясь вопросом, насколько важно, чтобы казахстанское образование способствовало продвижению своих учителей в качестве лидеров; что продвигает, а что бросает вызов лидерству учителей в стране. Поскольку казахстанское образование неизбежно связано с наследием Советского Союза, типичные издержки «традиционной» школы все еще присутствуют в обществе и оказывают влияние на продвижение лидерства учителей независимого государства.

Ключевые слова: образование, школы, идеология, учителя, лидерство

Introduction

Modernization of public opinion has been announced as key for Kazakhstani people. Now that the Republic of Kazakhstan is rapidly developing its public and private sectors, the country has also set a clear goal, i.e. “to reach the top 30 most developed nations of the world” [1]. This ambitious target includes a number of directions that are to help Kazakhstan achieve prosperity and recognition in the world arena. These directions are marketability, pragmatism, national identity cultivation, knowledge cult, evolutionary (vs. revolutionary) enhancement, as well as open-mindedness.

In order to modernize public opinion, a country needs to invest in not just material resources but primarily human capital consisting of knowledge, skills, services and certainly labor market. As those become desired in practically any sphere of a human activity, education can be regarded as a platform that ensures all mentioned resources are in place. It is teachers who are entrusted to educate young people and thus raise all necessary knowledge and skills in them.

Methodology

This paper is based on the review of literature that originates from different sources. Those include official decrees of the government, as well as research described by national and international authors. It should be noted too that this article is only a part of a bigger research of mine where I use a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods such as surveying and interviewing.

With the upcoming editions of this journal, more results and reflections are planned for publishing.

Context

Now that more than two decades have passed since the USSR collapsed, the role of teachers in Kazakhstan is starting to change as well. I observe that the current demands of secondary education necessitate that teachers take a more active part in preparing children for real life conditions outside of their classrooms by managing instruction properly and exercising leadership continuously. However, the lack of appropriate literature about teacher leadership in Kazakhstan precludes, to an



extent, my fuller investigation of the issue. I must therefore presume that the story of Kazakhstan – a country that made the transition from one system to another – needs continuation in terms of developing a higher level of discussion about internal teacher leadership. Bringing teachers’ voices to the forefront is needed to turn the general perception of teachers from being inactive to active writers of this country’s history.

Despite the scarce literature and lack of attention to educational leadership in Kazakhstan, this topic is inevitably becoming more and more central in the discussions of international researchers. Shigeo Katsu, President of Nazarbayev University, reflects on the educational reform in Kazakhstan:

The evolution of Kazakhstan’s education sector since independence reminds the reader of two characteristics that stand out when deliberating the direction of future reforms: the centrality, in the thinking of the nation’s leadership, of education to any development strategies; and the country’s openness to study, adopt and adapt international good practices, often in a fearless manner. [2, p. xviii]

As Kazakhstan has been evolving through the period of Soviet Communism to this new millennium, the tasks set for secondary education in this country have been changing as well. In this process of change, `a new generation of leaders in power` [3], i.e. those who view the term `leadership` more broadly but yet more profoundly have been in high demand. Following Huisman and Currie’s idea, the scope of teacher leaders’ roles goes beyond any conventional list of teacher duties. In contrast to a highly centralized management approach that the Ministry employs in relation to schools in Kazakhstan, teachers, in my view, need to be better heard by policymakers, and make the most of their leadership potential. Ultimately, re-orienting the teachers’ role in the current Kazakhstani education system could also invite many other possible stakeholders to bring

their own voices and opinions to the table of reform in this country.

In hindsight, it is clear that the Soviet legacy as well as the critical period of establishing itself as an independent country has meant that Kazakhstan has not hurried to invest in developing teacher leadership. The topic remains unvocalized and hence unclear to many teachers in the same way as it is for many principals, parents, students and even policymakers. Apart from NIS, the majority of schools in the country do not engage broadly in dealing with questions about leadership as raised by teachers or other educational agents. It is unclear whether they do it consciously, deliberately or maybe routinely.

Some researchers such as McLaughlin et al. [4] concluded in their investigations that the reform happening in Kazakhstan does not allow teachers to develop as leaders, let alone invite those teachers to participate. One can say that schools are doing many things assigned by the Ministry. However, one can ask: do any of the Ministry’s assignments involve teachers in discussing, recommending or critiquing the state’s messages? If yes, how deeply and on how many levels? McLaughlin et al. dwell on the lack of teacher participation in reforms by considering a number of factors that have been hindering the development of active involvement of teachers in the process of change in Kazakhstan:

Teacher performance in the Kazakhstan education system is very public with teachers being expected to compete in Olympiads to demonstrate their abilities. Teachers are also graded at different levels and have to demonstrate their competence through various tests as well as maintaining a portfolio to show that they are worthy of promotion to a higher level. Given this view of teacher learning and professionalism, the dominant perception of the teacher as expert and the high stakes of nature of the reform process, it was surprising to see that teachers who were not involved in the programme were initially reluctant to take risks as they feared failure [4, p. 251]



The “failure” that McLaughlin et al. mention here might be partly found in the teachers’ histories that hark back to the Soviet management style which dominated and prevailed in the development of teacher leadership for a long time. The policy of positioning teachers as passive deliverers of knowledge resulted in insufficient chances to uncover the sleeping potential of Kazakhstani teachers and invoke their capacity to lead.

Meanwhile, teachers in Kazakhstan, like any other agents involved in education, ought to have a right to question what teacher leadership is and how it should work for them. More substantially, teachers need to become primary enactors of multiple changes that take place throughout Kazakhstan’s education system. Understanding their role in reforms could empower the teachers to lead their schools and re-energize their own enthusiasm for contributing to the improvement of secondary education in this country.

Results of the literature review

As the updated content of the present curriculum of Kazakhstan necessitates taking more effective approaches and requires more action from teachers, the paradox of hierarchical distribution of duties to teachers is also a problem. In order to better understand what underpins the situation, it is necessary to fully understand where the teachers’ place in the system is; how the `teacher-state` relationship works in practice; and what the country does in order to evoke effective and whole-hearted teacher leadership.

Centralized Governing and Teacher Leadership

The former Soviet education system forced public schools to favor performativity. Our current system also focuses on that same performativity, and therefore, schools are tied mostly to teaching knowledge rather than teaching and learning leadership. One of the

main documents stipulating education in the country is the Law on Education (Law on Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan. № 319-III ЗРК. (2013). Astana. Retrieved from http://online.zakon.kz), which outlines the content and management of education; state regulations; financial provisions; and other important points. Moreover, the Law contains the definition of the term `teacher status`. However, neither the definition nor the Law in general includes a clear dimension that might be conceptualized as teacher leadership.

Consequently, the State Educational Mandatory Standard of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2012). State Educational Mandatory Standard of the Republic of Kazakhstan. № 1080. Astana. Retrieved from http://www.edu.gov.kz/), developed on the basis of the Law on Education, sets the norms to regulate teaching and learning in schools and focuses more on the requirements for educational organizations rather than the role of teachers in building capacity and leadership. Besides this, the Standard promotes production of knowledge and portrays teachers as professionals who will demonstrate excellence in fortifying the knowledge base of their students. Of course, there is nothing wrong if the schools produce students with a good, solid base of knowledge. However, this could be achieved without accentuating performativity and thus sacrificing teacher leadership.

The International Bureau of Education (International Bureau of Education. (2004). Challenges of curriculum development in the XXI century: perspectives from Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. Geneva: IBE. Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001472/147206mb.pdf) explains in their report on secondary education in post-Soviet countries that the teachers’ perception of change often differs from the perceptions of government officials and policymakers when approaching the topic of teacher leadership. This is true in Kazakhstan, largely because



teachers “receive only brief and superficial training and guidance” [p. 5]. The report suggests that professional handbooks and supplementary materials should be developed in order to help and support the teachers transferring from the `traditional Soviet education` [5] to a new professional educator identity. In addition, the IBE investigators specify:

Leaving teachers out of the design and development of curricular change is likely to result in little, if any, real change. Teacher involvement in curriculum development can be a motivating factor for the teachers themselves … raising their morale and giving them a sense of „ownership” of the curriculum [5, p. 5]

The level of involvement that teachers have in the developmental processes that shape secondary education in Kazakhstan is low, and there is little research evidence showing cases that have engaged teachers in the reform process. In this respect, the situation in newly independent Kazakhstan is not very much different from the old Soviet system. Kerr [6], for example, reflects on this question in the following manner:

Soviet educational management was highly centralized. There was no tradition of teacher-generated curriculum development. The curriculum was developed in the center and disseminated through the bureaucratic structure. In the Soviet Union, curriculum was an area of total control by the central educational authority” [6, p. 32]

While the development of professional and subject knowledge is somewhat important to and even demanded by all teachers, the dominance of the top-down governing system is generally known to distance state

policymakers from schools. I agree that a teacher’s role is certainly to teach, and teach well. However, the educator’s role needs many more facets. It seems to me that demanding the best results and doing little to achieve them is simply issuing a dictum rather than creating an opportunity for any school. The approach that we observe in most cases in Kazakhstan raises a wall of misperception and misunderstanding between the Ministry and the teachers, to the point where the latter rarely volunteer to go beyond their actual teaching purview due to the pressure of producing the `best` results for the Ministry.

Devotion to `Traditional` Soviet Values

Kazakhstan strives for developing a new paradigm for its education. However, I find that the immaturity of the independent Kazakhstani state is experiencing many flashbacks to the traditional Soviet system of education while it develops.

By `traditional`, scholars in Kazakhstan often mean Soviet [5]. Even though the twenty-five-year period since Kazakhstan transitioned from the USSR to an independent republic has already produced several new generations of teachers, a large proportion of the teacher population in the country is represented by 50-60 year-olds; that is, those who were born in the Soviet era and who accumulated years of experience working at Soviet schools. My point here is that this category of teachers is unique from the perspective of educational researchers. Firstly, schools in Kazakhstan generally value those èxperienced` [5, 7] teachers by recognizing their expertise and professional wisdom. Secondly, it is important for schools to blend their teacher contingents by having not only `young` but also èxperienced` teachers. Thirdly, I have witnessed the general perception that the èxperienced` teachers accept the requirements that come from the Ministry more easily and are therefore entrusted to fulfil those centralized requirements more frequently.



In comparison to the experienced teachers, I can say that younger teachers are often lost when they have to deal with ministerial orders to schools, especially in terms of the ways the requirements are delivered to them. This may be so partly because due to their youth, these young teachers cannot understand that despite Kazakhstan becoming independent from the Soviet Union, the culture in the schools has not changed as radically as the status of the country. More specifically, I can share that when a newly graduated person comes to work at an institution, they often hope to see that the old Soviet school will have gone. The young people expect to see a change, a spirit of innovation that will be ready to recognize, accept and support the hidden capacities of all teachers. What they meet in reality, however, differs from their expectations, as most of the public schools are still struggling towards a shift to a new paradigm.

Interestingly, the majority of my `experienced` colleagues with whom I worked in public schools seem to be reluctant to change any aspect of their Soviet-style mindset. To analyze a similar case, Fimyar & Kurakbayev [8] depict the concept of `Soviet` in the memories of Kazakhstani teachers by addressing a certain degree of the teachers’ nostalgia about the Soviet era and discovering that `the Soviet` still sits deeply in the minds of many Kazakhstani teachers. In other words, a substantial percentage of teachers in Kazakhstan reminisce about the Soviet Union and apparently regret the loss of the Soviet pedagogy. To this effect, Fimyar and Kurakbayev propose to regard the teachers’ devotion to `traditional Soviet` as a historical and evidential background on the way to creating a new paradigm of bringing leadership to the country.

Meanwhile, international experts from the OECD and the World Bank (OECD (2007). Higher education in Kazakhstan: Reviews of national policies for education. Berlin: OECD Publishing). Higher education in Kazakhstan: Reviews of national

policies for education. Berlin: OECD Publishing) point out that the culture of Kazakhstan’s education favors conservatism and achievement in only specific specializations but prevents innovation, creativity and leadership. Challenges regarding the lack of authentic leadership in schools have also been addressed in the country’s profile by UNICEF (Education in Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Kazakhstan.pdf), that accuses a “crumbling Soviet school infrastructure, a shortage of trained teachers, as well as the outdated teaching materials and the national curriculum which largely date from the Soviet period” (p. 4).

Yakavets [9], in her study of educational reform in Kazakhstan, illustrates that modifying the curriculum in this country while it experienced its first decade of independence has been a major issue because of the longevity of the Soviet educational system and lack of expertise in forming and formulating a new orientation to leadership:

Firstly, there was a challenge of pedagogy which involved a shift of emphasis from the content of teaching to the complexities of student learning. Secondly, there was the challenge of introducing new subject-matter which often had no precedent in the region … And thirdly, and by far the most complex, the challenges in the teaching of Social Studies, Languages and History [9, p.12]

While building a discourse about ̀ traditional education’ in the USSR, Klarin [5] implies ways, methods and techniques that focus closely on reproductive learning rather than reinforcing teacher and student capacity for leadership. Klarin considers lack of leadership in teaching and learning as a traditional aspect of the status quo, which valued only knowledge, models and actions. Krasnukhina [10] adds to this with the fact that within traditional education, teachers rely strongly



on memorizing knowledge, and keeping and reproducing this tradition as a replica of their past practices.

Nevertheless, I do not intend to investigate whose fault it is that the schools in Kazakhstan still rely closely on the old system of educating students. I do recognize that our èxperienced` teachers were born and raised during the Soviet era; and that everything they learned and taught about has been tightly connected to the traditional Soviet ideology. Since our schools have not changed much either, the Soviet tradition continues its life in there as well. I also observe that the `new` curriculum, which is delivered by the Ministry, often alienates the schools, because the way the Ministry treats the schools, and teachers in particular, seems old-fashioned itself to me. I must conclude, therefore, that this vicious cycle of a deeply rooted tradition looks quite powerful, but the situation is not hopeless at all. In saying this, I imply that researching reform in Kazakhstan’s education system requires a certain degree of attention in order to study the perceptions of both `young` and èxperienced` teachers, and obtain a clearer picture of the situation.

Discussion of literature review

Current objectives of the Ministry, such as a switchover to 12-year learning or the promotion of trilingual education, are certainly important for the country. At the same time, looking at the current situation on a larger scale, I notice that very little is spoken when it comes to the empowerment of teachers in Kazakhstan. The country keeps on pushing teachers to be the executors in their classrooms – who produce the best performance indicators based on the results of the Unified National Testing rather than those who have a say on whether the UNT [as an example] works in practice.

This sea of the top-down relations is not endless to my mind. Even though the teachers’ credentials for leadership remain unclear in most cases of the reformations, there appear to be a few recent indications of teacher

leadership arising in Kazakhstan’s society. For instance, the Ministry established the National Center for Professional Development Òrleu` (Òrleu` National Center for Professional Development. Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Retrieved from the official site at www.orleu-edu.kz) in 2012 to fulfil the State Program of Education Development for 2011-2020 (Ministry of Education and Science, 2010). According to its strategy, Òrleu` is to become an alternative to the National Teachers’ Re-Training Institute, publicly known as ÌPK`, that provides in-service teacher training in every regional center of the country. In contrast to IPK, who are frequently criticized for their poor quality of teacher preparation and organization of in-service programs, Òrleu` offers teachers a leadership module asserting itself as “the leader in developing teacher training for Kazakhstan’s education as it enhances the quality of teachers and improves their professional skills” (Orleu Strategy of Development for 2012-2020. Astana: Orleu, p. 5). Among the key activities of Òrleu`, which include focusing on public education to innovation, continuity, diversification, transparency, autonomy and academic freedom, there is an allusion to teacher leadership, worded as “an aspiration for leadership in improving the skills of teachers; introduction of a single vertical management system; as well as creation of new management principles.” (Orleu Strategy of Development for 2012-2020. Astana: Orleu, p. 5).

Moreover, the Òrleu` Center identifies some of the current issues and challenges in the secondary education system of the country, and thus reveals certain breaches in the system such as (a) fragmentation of the national training system; (b) lack of corporate governance; (c) shortage of and non-compliance with the current training system and content to meet modern challenges and trends in education; (d) an insufficiency of existing teacher training programs; (e) the



underfunding of continuing education; and (f) the poor resourcing of training institutes. Following these identified breaches, Òrleu` has targeted modernizing the system and thus looks primarily at creating of a new teacher training scenario for the country that promotes professionalism and leadership among teachers. At the same time, I think that all the issues identified by Òrleu` do not address the teacher leadership situation extensively. My logic is that the increase of the number of training institutions and the re-orienting of others could be directly linked to the current needs of teachers. For example, the “lack of corporate governance”, according to Òrleu`, refers mainly to the system, whereas the system is formed not just by training institutions or the Ministry but mostly by those who work and teach at schools.

Meanwhile, Òrleu` is not the only agency that intends to improve leadership of Kazakhstani teachers. The Center of Excellence, which operates under the auspices of the aforementioned Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools (NIS), shares a similar vision in terms of reforming the current system of secondary education and advancing leadership among teachers and principals in Kazakhstan. The NIS program for leadership development (Center of Excellence. Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools. Retrieved from the official site at www.cpm.kz) has the aim to ensure success in and through collaborative teacher practices and professional growth of the teachers. The NIS CoE sees the success of their leadership training program in teaching and learning at each level of pedagogy. This relates to teachers, students, teacher assistants, schools and the system as a whole (New approaches in education. Professional development program for secondary school teachers of Kazakhstan. Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Pavlodar State Pedagogical Institute; Regional center for teacher professional development. Retrieved from http://www.docme.ru/doc/86653/soderzhanie-kursov-cpm-kembridzh on

August 18, 2014). Given this, a teacher-leader needs to be continuously involved in self-reflection and self-guidance. They must constantly ask themselves: (a) what is successful in my classroom and what makes that success? (b) who are my students? (c) is anyone excluded from the learning process? (d) how does my teaching help their learning? and finally (e) how do I know I am not managing or leading the situation?

In order to achieve a high degree of professionalism, NIS coaches prospective educators to identify values, specify aims and tasks, detect issues and challenges, and coordinate and plan activities, including the evaluation of new teaching techniques, assessment, and life-long reflection (www.cpm.kz). Besides this, the Center helps teachers to develop leadership in and through research as well as to communicate efficiently in professional and social environments. Teachers attending NIS CoE courses are expected to interact efficiently in teams and engage fully in teamwork where they work on improving professional cultures in their schools by trying new leadership roles. As a result, the trainees are expected to change and enhance their leaderful practices of bringing innovations to their pedagogies as well as the system of secondary education in general.

NIS teachers also disseminate the expertise they have gained among the mainstream schools of the country. Their dissemination plan (Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools Conferences. Retrieved from the official site at conference.nis.edu.kz) aims to (1) promote the dialogue between teachers, administrators and international experts as an opportunity to introduce `best` practices in schools; (2) build leadership capacity; (3) develop additional strategies for improving schools’ understanding of leadership as a concept; and at the same time (4) increase the level of responsibility of all stakeholders engaged in the formation of educational change in Kazakhstan.



Conclusion

Despite the general situation in the country underestimating the great role of teachers in leading their schools to success, signs of change seem to be emerging in the system. This indication of reform has some good news too. The first is that the government and the Ministry do not just theorize but try to realize some change in the system. The second one is that teachers can now access not only the traditional IPK but also the modern training

centers of `Orleu` and NIS to learn about leadership.

Summing up, this paper appeals to the idea that modernization of public opinion in Kazakhstan is hugely important – to be precise, as important as teachers in the schools. Sharing more voice and entrusting a larger extent of power to educators in this part of the world will not simply approach Kazakhstan toward the best international practice but mainly help the country respond adequately to the local as well as global needs of its population.

1. Nazarbayev, N. A. (2017). Course towards the future: modernization of Kazakhstan’s identity. Astana. Retrieved from http://www.akorda.kz/en/events/akorda_news/press_conferences/course-towards-the-future-modernization-of-kazakhstans-identity on February 15, 2018

2. Katsu, S. (2014). The introductory foreword. In D. Bridges (Ed.), Education reform and internationalization (pp. 239-260). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3. Huisman, J., & Currie, J. (2004). Accountability in higher education: Bridge over troubled water?. Higher Education, 48(4), 529-551.

4. McLaughlin, C., McLellan, R., Fordham, M., Chandler-Grevatt, A., & Daubney, A. (2014). The role of the teacher in education reform in Kazakhstan: teacher enquiry as a vehicle for change. In D. Bridges (Ed.), Education Reform and Internationalisation (pp. 239-260). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Klarin, M. V. (1996). Personal orientation in continuous education. Pedagogy, 4, 14-21.

6. Kerr, A. V. (2003). Narodnoe obrazovanie. Novossibirsk: Novossibirsk State University Press.

7. Silova, I. (2005). Traveling policies: hijacked in Central Asia. European Educational Research Journal, 4(1), 50-59.

8. Fimyar, O., & Kurakbayev, K. (2016). ‘Soviet’ in teachers’ memories and professional beliefs in Kazakhstan: points for reflection for reformers, international consultants and practitioners. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 29(1), 86-103.

9. Yakavets, N. (2014). Educational reform in Kazakhstan: The first decade of independence. In D. Bridges (Ed.), Education reform and internationalisation (pp. 10-16). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10. Krasnukhina, O. K. (2003). Traditional education and knowledge production. Pedagogicheskiy nomer, 2, 11-23.

REFERENCES:



THE KAZISS REMAINS THE ONLY KAZAKHSTANI THINK TANK WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN THE GLOBAL RANKING

OF "TOP THINK TANKS WORLDWIDE"

On January 31st, 2018 the annual ranking of the world's research and analytical centers "Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" of the University of Pennsylvania was presented which is considered the most reputable global ranking of "think tanks". The rankings are made within the framework of the program "Think Tanks and Civil Society" under the leadership of Professor James McGann. The American University analyzed the activity of 7815 "think tanks" for 2017 where 28 represented Kazakhstan. (see the following link https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=think_tanks)

Chart 1. Number of think tanks by country



THE POSITION OF KAZISS (#KAZISS) IN GLOBAL RANKING OF THINK TANKS

According to the results of 2017 in global ranking “Top think tanks worldwide” (excluding the US research centers)" the KAZISS was ranked as the 140th (in 2016 for the first time entering top the KAZISS was ranked as the 147th. To generate this ranking the activity of 6,846 "think tanks" was analyzed). Once again, the KAZISS became the only Kazakhstani "think tank" that entered the main ranking list confirming its special status.

In addition, there are 55 different nominations in the ranking which in turn are grouped into 4 main groups. In some nominations of the ranking the KAZISS has improved and maintained its positions. Thus, in the nomination "Top think tanks in the field of defense and national security" the KAZISS gained 4 places ranking 91st (in 2016 it was rated 95th) and becoming the only "think tank" representing Kazakhstan and the countries of Central Asia.

Chart 2: Global top-ranking of think tanks (excluding the US)



Chart 3. Top think tanks in the field of defense and national security

The KAZISS retained its position in the nomination "Top think tanks in Central Asia" and was rated second after the Center for Economic and Social Development (Azerbaijan). Based on the results of 2017 other Kazakhstani analytical structures are also included in this category. Among these are the following: the Institute of Economic Research (IEI) of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan (8th place), the Center for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) of the Ministry of Defense and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan (18th place), the Public Policy Research Centre (28 th place), the National Analytical Center under the Nazarbayev University (40th place), the Institute of Oriental Studies named after R.B. Suleimenov of the SC of the MES of the Republic of Kazakhstan (47th place), the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research (49th place), the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) (51st place), the Center for Political Analysis and Strategic Studies of "Nur Otan" Party (54th place) and others.

In two nominations "Top think tanks in the field of energy and resource policy" and "Top government affiliated think tanks" the KAZISS has maintained its previous position (28th place and 57th place respectively).

The ranking is compiled on the basis of the survey results of the evaluated centers as well as more than 4 thousand journalists, politicians and experts in the field of economic and political studies. At the final stage a group of reputable experts participates in the ranking compilation based on the opinions of which the final ranking takes place. More than 30 of different criteria are used to put the ranking together including structuring the "think tanks" on the basis of geographical location, functional and organizational focus, quality and reputation of scientific and analytical work, "recognizability" of the center, the number of briefings and official meetings as well as a number of nominations for special achievements. The presentation of the global ranking "Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" was preceded by the annual global forum Why Think Tanks Matter 2018 which simultaneously hosted various events in 150 cities around the world including in Astana.

The Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KAZISS) marks the 25th anniversary in 2018. The decree on its establishment was signed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev on June 16th, 1993.



THE KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES UNDER THE PRESIDENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan (KAZISS) was established on June 16, 1993, by the Decree of the President of Kazakhstan. In April 2014, the President of Kazakhstan issued the Executive Order to relocate the KazISS to Astana. In 2018, the Institute celebrated its 25th anniversary.

Since its foundation, the mission of the KazISS has been the provision of forecast and analytical support of strategic perspectives of the domestic and foreign policies of Kazakhstan.

The KazISS is a professional think tank. According to the “2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index”, the KazISS was ranked 140th. The Institute is the only Kazakhstani think tank listed among the 100 by the University of Pennsylvania (https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=think_tanks).

The KazISS employs a highly professional pool of experts; at present it includes two Corresponding Members of the National Academy of Science, one Corresponding Member of the Military Academy of Kazakhstan, nine Doctors of Science, five Candidates of Science, three PhDs and twelve Masters specializing in political science, sociology, public administration, history, and economics. The Institute has a representative office in Almaty and it is currently launching a number of branches in other regions of Kazakhstan. During the twenty-five years experience, the KazISS have published more than 300 books on international relations, global and regional security. The Institute issues three journals: the Kogam zhane Dayir (in Kazakh), the Kazakhstan-Spectrum (in Russian) and the Central Asia’s Affairs in English. The KazISS has a trilingual website (in Kazakh, Russian, and English) and manages the corporate accounts on Facebook and Twitter.

The KazISS holds a great number of international conferences, seminars and round- table discussions on the annual basis. Since 2003, the KazISS has held fifteen Annual Conferences on Security and Stability in Central Asia. On June 15, 2018 passed International Conference «National modernization strategies: Achievements and Prospects», dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The KazISS forums are attended by reputable experts from Kazakhstan and Central Asia as well as from Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, China, France, Georgia, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, the USA and others.

For the long period the KazISS has been considered as the distinguished place for the research, professional and thesis internships of bachelor, master and Phd students from various universities.

Currently the Institute has created the necessary conditions for professional and scientific growth of employees. In 2017 and 2018 the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan allocated targeted grants to KazISS for master's and PhD programmes. Today KazISS provides for the teaching of 6 master`s and 10 Ph.D. students at the L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University and Al-Farabi Kazakh National University.

For any further information, contact us:4, Beybitshilik St.Astana, 010000 Republic of Kazakhstan Tel: +7 (717) 75-20-20E-mail: [email protected] www.kisi.kz, www.kaziss.kz



ҚАЗАҚСТАН РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫНЫҢ ПРЕЗИДЕНТІ ЖАНЫНДАҒЫ ҚАЗАҚСТАН СТРАТЕГИЯЛЫҚ ЗЕРТТЕУЛЕР ИНСТИТУТЫ

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстан стратегиялық зерттеулер институты (ҚСЗИ) Қазақстан Республикасы Президентінің 1993 жылғы 16 маусымдағы Жарлығымен құрылған. 2014 жылдың сәуір айында Қазақстан Республикасы Президентінің Жарлығымен Институт Астана қаласына көшірілді. 2018 жылы Институт өзінің 25 жылдық мерейтойын атап өтті.

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстан стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының құрылған күнінен бастап оның негізгі мақсаты – Қазақстан Республикасының ішкі және сыртқы саясатының стратегиялық аспектілерін аналитикалық қамтамасыз ету.

ҚСЗИ кәсіби ғылыми-талдау орталығы болып табылады. 2017 жылдың қорытындысы бойынша Пенсильвания университетінің «Global Go To Think Tank Index Report» дүниежүзілік зерттеу және талдау орталықтарының негізгі рейтингі бойынша ҚСЗИ 140 орынды иемденіп, аталынған рейтингке кірген жалғыз қазақстандық «ақыл орталығы» (https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=think_tanks).

Қазіргі таңда институтта саясаттану, әлеуметтану, мемлекеттік басқару, тарих және экономика секілді салалардың танымал мамандары – ҚР ҰҒА екі корреспондент-мүшесі, тоғыз ғылым докторы, бес ғылым кандидаты, үш Ph.D. және он екі ғылым магистрлері қызмет атқарады. ҚСЗИ-дың Алматы қаласында Өкілдігі бар және аймақтарда жаңадан өкілдіктер ашты.

ҚСЗИ өзінің 25 жылдық қызметі барысында институт халықаралық қатынастар, жаһандық және аймақтық қауіпсіздік мәселелері бойынша 300-ден астам кітап басып шығарды. Институтта үш журнал басылып шығарылады: «Қоғам және Дәуір» тоқсандық ғылыми-сараптамалық журналы (қазақ тілінде), «Казахстан-Спектр» тоқсандық ғылыми журналы (орыс тілінде) және «Central Asia’s Affairs» тоқсандық сараптамалық журналы (ағылшын тілінде). Үш тілде жүргізіліп отыратын сайты және Facebook, Twitter әлеуметтік желілерінде өз парақшасы бар.

ҚСЗИ жыл сайын халықаралық ғылыми конференциялар, дөңгелек үстелдер, семинарлар, сарап- шылар кездесулерін өткізіп тұрады. 2003 жылдан бері Институт Орталық Азия аймағының қауіпсізді- гі мен тұрақтылығы мәселелеріне арналған 15 конференция өткізді. 2018 жылдың 15 маусымында Қазақстан Республикасы Президенті жанындағы ҚСЗИ-нің 25 жылдығына арналған «Жаңғыртудың ұлттық стратегиялары: жетістіктері мен келешегі» атты мерейтойлық конференция өтті.

ҚСЗИ-дың ғылыми басқосуларына Қазақстан өңірлерінің және Орталық Азия елдерінің сарапшылары, сонымен қатар, АҚШ, Ауғанстан, Әзербайжан, Германия, Грузия, Жапония, Иран, Корея, Қытай, Моңғолия, Пәкістан, Ресей, Түркия, Үндістан, Ұлыбритания, Франция, Швеция және басқа да мемлекеттердің ғалымдары белсене қатысады.

ҚСЗИ көп жылдардан бері Қазақстанның жетекші жоғарғы оқу орындарының студенттері, магистранттары мен докторанттары ғылыми-зерттеу, кәсіби және дипломалды тәжірибелер мен тағылымдамалардан өтетін алаң болып келеді.

Институтта қызметкерлердің кәсіби және ғылыми өсулері үшін барлық қажетті жағдайлар жасалған. 2017-2018 жылдары Қазақстан Республикасының Білім және ғылым министрілігі ҚСЗИ үшін докторантура мен магистратураға мақсаттық гранттар бөлді. Қазіргі таңда ҚСЗИ Л.Н. Гумилёв атындағы Еуразия ұлтық университеті мен әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті базасында 6 магистрант және 10 Ph.D. докторант дайындап жатыр.

ҚСЗИ туралы толық ақпаратты төмендегі мекен-жайдан алуға болады:Қазақстан Республикасы, 010000, Астана,Бейбітшілік көшесі, 4Тел.: +7 (7172) 75-20-20Факс: +7 (7172) 75-20-21E-mail: [email protected], www.kaziss.kz

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