Contemporary Polemics between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites

Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series No 2, Paper No 3, October, 2009HUDSON INSTITUTE

CENTER ON ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD

Contemporary PolemicsBetween Neo-Wahhabisand Post-KhomeinistShiites

ISAAC HASSON

The views, opinions,and/ or findings contained in thisreport are those ofthe author(s) andshould not be con-strued as an officialDepartment ofDefense pos ition,policy, or decision.

Center on Islam,

Democracy, and

the Future of the

Muslim World

HUDSON INSTITUTE1015 15th Street NW, Sixth FloorWashington, DC 20005202-974-2400 www.hudson.org

©2009 by Hudson Institute, Inc.All rights reserved.

ContemporaryPolemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-KhomeinistShiites

ISAAC HASSON

Contents

Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Post-Khomeini Shiites’ View of theWahhabis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Wahhabi View of the Shia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Neo-Wahhabi Arguments Against the Shiites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Mutual Relations Between the Shia and Judaism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Ridiculing the Shiites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix I:Sultan ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s Document Giving Palestine to the Jews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendix II:“Surat al-Walaya”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

HUDSON INSTITUTE [ 1 ]

he contemporary conflict betweenSunnis and Shiites came into promi-nence at the time of the Iranian Rev -olution, led by Ayatollah Ruhol lahKhomeini,2 in February 1979. The

revolution brought about the ouster of the Pahlavidynasty and the establishment of an Islamic repub-lic. For Khomeini and his followers, the revolutionand the clerical regime that it created were to serveas an example and model for others to follow, andin repeated declarations they expressed their desireto export their revolution to all the “downtroddenpeoples” (al-Mustad’afun) throughout the Muslimworld and beyond.3

As one consequence of the revolution, a politi-cally-charged Shiite awakening swept through theMiddle East. Not surprisingly, it was felt especiallyin those countries with disaffected or oppressedShia populations who were denied political repre-sentation (including, for instance, Iraq, Lebanon,Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UnitedArab Emirates).

As Shia throughout the Middle East expressedgrowing enthusiasm and admiration for Khomeiniand his revolution, fears mounted among regionalgovernments that their subjects might attempt to topple them in an effort to replace them with Is lam ic regimes. As a consequence, many MiddleEast ern governments implemented a range of meas-

ures aimed at arresting the spread of Iran’s influence. One such measure for these states was to revive

anti-Shiite hostility and rhetoric within Sunni pop-ulations. Anti-Shiite rhetoric had once flourishedduring certain historical periods, and especially inthe Middle Ages, yet by the latter half of the twen-tieth century it appeared to some observers to be indecline.4 Reviving anti-Shiism proved not only aninexpensive means for states to rein in Khomeinistinfluence, but it also was quite popular amongSunni Arab publics.

One important Sunni group that participated inthe revival of anti-Shiism was the ulama of Iraq.These religious scholars were under the orders ofSaddam Hussein, who had launched a bloody eight-year war against the Islamic Republic of Iran (1980-1988). The Iraqi ulama, while employing some of theWahhabi arguments, also invoked powerful historicmemories by calling the Iraqi campaign against theyoung Islamic Republic “Qadisiyyat Saddam”—areference to the famous Battle of al-Qadisiyya thattook place in 637. This battle is etched in the Arab-Muslim conscience as the decisive event leading tothe collapse of the Sassanid Empire5—the pre-Islam -ic, Persian state that once ruled over the territory ofpresent-day Iraq, Iran and parts of Greater Syria. Byexpressly linking the modern struggle againstKhomeinist Iran to the Battle of al-Qadis iyya, theIraqi religious scholars had revived the ancient

Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and

Post-Khomeinist Shiites1

T

[ 2 ] Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

ethnic-cultural argument that stemmed from Arabhostility toward the Persian Shuubiyya movement ofthe eighth and ninth centuries.6 They stressed thatKhomeinism, in fact, represented a re-awakening ofthe Shuubiyya movement, and the revival of a viru-lent Persian nationalism that was aggressively hostileto the Arabs. These accusations came naturally forthe Baath party, whose ideology was rooted inArabism.7

In many ways, anti-Shiism became a unifyingcause among some Sunnis, as hatred and fear ofthe Shia led to the merging of Sunni factions that

were notoriously hostile to each other. One espe-cially hostile reaction to Iran and the Shia came fromthe Wahhabis (or, as they prefer to be referred tothese days, “the Salafis,” a term that carries a morepositive connotation than Wahhabi). The Wahhabis,who remain the dominant interpreters of Islam onthe Arabian Peninsula, invoked earlier rulings ofleading Sunni ulama and castigated Shiism as ameaningless faith, and as a corruption of true Islam.These arguments, which became entrenched andwide ly accepted over time, accused Shiism, amongother things, of being too close to Judaism. They fur-ther claimed that Shiism had been created either bythe Jews or by the Zoroastrians (Majus in Arabic).

The two camps seem to have understood perfect-ly the need to make the best use of modern technol-ogy, reaching out to the greatest numbers of peoplewhile skirting borders, censorship, police, and secretservices. The computer offered a myriad of possibil-ities, and they did not hesitate to use it. The first todo so were probably the Wahhabi followers of theTaliban, who seized power in Afghanistan in 1996.In 1998, they inaugurated the first dialogue websitein Arabic, which they named Al-Sahat al-Arabiyya(The Arab Arenas).8 Meanwhile, the administratorsof anti-Shiite websites complained that the Shiitewebsites offer more serious material because greatayatollahs actively participate in the writing.9

The origins of the Sunni and Shia conflict are, of

course, traceable back to the quarrel that eruptedduring Islam’s earliest period over the rightful suc-cessor to Muhammad as the ruler of the Muslimpolity. That quarrel took place between, on the onehand, those who accepted the rule of the first threeso-called “rightly-guided” caliphs, and on the otherhand, those who believed that Ali Ibn Abi Talib’sclaim to rule the Muslim polity took precedenceover all others. The subsequent transformation ofAli’s early partisans into a political party, and a dis-tinctive sect within Islam, boosted these early intra-Islamic debates. This also led to the growth of aprolific literature that is of great value for the histor-ical study of Islam.

Throughout Islam’s history, the quarrelbetween Sunnis and Shias has waxed andwaned in intensity, though it has remained

a formative and central dispute within Islamic polit-ical and religious thought. However, by the secondhalf of the 20th Century, a number of developmentswere taking place, indicating that the quarrel wasfast becoming a thing of the past. These included, of course, the increasing secularization of Muslim politics, which came to be dominated by secular,rather than religiously-rooted, ideologies. At thesame time, new innovations in religious ideologywere also contributing to what appeared to be theoverall decline of the Sunni-Shia controversy. Forexample, within Sunni Islam a new, ecumenicalintellectual trend had emerged, known as “the rap-prochement between the various religious legalschools” (al-taqrib bayna al-madhahib). This rap-prochement was aimed at minimizing the differ-ences between the various Islamic legal schools,including those between Sunni and Shia.10

This ecumenical trend generally seems to havebeen initiated by distinguished Salafis who were fol-lowers of Rashid Rida (d. 1935). At the start of hiscareer, Rida was a modernist, but later on he beganprofessing more of a Wahhabist perspective. Today,Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading adherent and interpreter


of Rida’s thought, very often quotes Rida as enjoin-ing his fellow Muslims: “Let us cooperate [with thedifferent sects of Islam, including the Shiites] on allsubjects we all agree upon… and let us forgive our-selves for the disagreements that keep us apart(nata’awanu fima ittafaqna alayhi… wa-ya’dhurubaduna badan fima ikhtalafna fihi).”11

By mid-century, efforts were being made amongthe Sunni establishment to reconcile with the Shia.For example, in 1959 the al-Azhar University ofCairo, Sunni Islam’s most prestigious center oflearning, recognized the Shiite Ja’fari legal school asthe fifth legal madhhab in Islam. This recognitionoccurred following a fatwa by Mahmud Shaltut, theShaykh al-Azhar, which allows Sunni Muslims topray with Shiites.12 Moreover, after having beenbanned for centuries by Sunni authorities, someShiite books began to be taught at al-Azhar.

The Shiites, too, had undertaken to have some oftheir dogma accepted by Sunni authorities. Thus theclerical establishment of Shiite Iran established inCairo (a predominantly Sunni city, that’s conven-tionally hostile to Shiism) an institution called theDar al-Taqrib bayna al-Madhahib. This organiza-tion’s aim, like the rapprochement tendency withinSunnism, was to bring the different Muslim legalschools closer to one another. Dar al-Taqrib baynaal-Madhahib was very active between 1947 and1979, and succeeded in publishing many Shiite andpro-Shiite works in Egypt.13

Between 1949 and 1972, the Shiites also pub-lished a periodical called Risalat al-Islam,which contained articles on religious mat-

ters written by both Sunni and Shiite scholars. Thisproject originated in an ecumenical vision aiming toharmonize the two principal schools of Islam. Toachieve and preserve this harmony, the journalsought to put thorny questions of theology and pol-itics aside to be dealt with at a later time and tofocus instead on areas of commonality. For thesereasons, a majority of the journal’s articles deal with

problems of ritual—an area where the differencesbetween Sunnites and Shiites are minimal—as com-pared to problems of dogma, where Sunni and Shiathought tend to diverge sharply.

In the 1960s, in yet another effort to smooth overSunni-Shia tensions, the Shiite publishers of Biharal-Anwar, the monumental work of classical Shiismcompiled originally by Allama al-Majlisi (d. 1698),abstained from including certain chapters of theorig inal lithographic edition. These chapters wereex cluded because they contain grave insults of theProphet Muhammad’s companions (sabb al-Saha -ba) who are revered by Sunnis. Apparently, the pub-lishers believed it was more appropriate to selective-ly edit this classical Shiite work than to risk aggra-vating old quarrels and antagonisms.

With the Iranian Revolution of 1979, thisera of rapprochement seemed to cometo an abrupt close. Khomeini’s declara-

tions concerning the need to export the IranianRevolution throughout the Islamic world rekindledthe Sunni-Shiite polemics.

It is possible, in fact, to distinguish between thepre-Khomeini and the post-Khomeini Shiites on anumber of levels. Before the Khomeinist revolutionin Iran, the Shia felt themselves to be morally supe-rior to other Muslims, so certain were they of thetruth of the path chosen by their ancestors, and oftheir own path with regard to religious or politicalissues. They viewed themselves as the only group rep-resenting the true tradition of the Prophet Muham -mad, “the elite” (al-khassa) among Muslims. Theyreferred to the Sunnis, by word of mouth and in theirwritings, as “the masses” (al-‘amma).

Historically, however, the Shiites were a persecut-ed group within many Muslim societies, and theyfaced a nearly continuous wave of attacks on theirbeliefs. This, of course, included their claim that AliIbn Abi Talib was the legitimate successor to theProphet Muhammad, and that his right of rule waspassed from Ali to his offspring.14

These polemics also attacked a range of othercentral aspects of Shiite belief and practice, includ-ing the status of the graves of Ali, of his son Husseinand of the other Shiite Imams; the importance of thepilgrimage (ziyara) to these graves (which in theShiites’ view was more important than the pilgrim-age to Mecca, the hajj); the infallibility of the Imams;the appeal to them to serve as advocates with Allah(shafa’a); the absence of the twelfth Shiite Imam(ghayba), who is to reappear in the future (raj’a) asa sort of messiah (Mahdi); the obligation to cursemost of the companions of the Prophet (sabb al-Sahaba) and the enemies of the Shia,15 to reject them(bara’a), and to acknowledge the right of theProphet’s descendants (Al-Sada) to claim a fifth ofthe war’s bounty (khums).16

In response to these Sunni attacks on their faith,most Shiite apologetics tended to be defensive andreactive, rather than “missionary.” These apologet-ics were intended largely for internal consumptionwithin the Shiite community, and were designed toprevent a Shiite drain toward the Sunni in general,or toward one of the Sunni schools, hostile to the

Shiites, in particular.17 It is also true that, from timeto time, Shiite authors emerged whose writings wereaimed at Sunnis with the purpose of winning themover to Shiism. This occurred mainly at times whenthe Shiites busied themselves with missionary activ-ity (da’wa), whether with the assistance of Shiiteregimes (the Ismaili Fatimis in North Africa andEgypt, or the Safavids in Iran beginning in the six-teenth century), or with regime assistance. In anycase, the purpose of such efforts was to attract asmany as possible adherents to their camp.

But in the last three decades, the post-Khomeiniera, the Shiites have adopted a far more militant posi-tion. Today they do not limit themselves to protect-ing their faith and their leaders. Rather, they attacktheir enemies on all possible fronts: the major aspectsof the Sunnis’ faith; their commentary on the Quran;the contradictions in the traditions (Hadith) attrib-uted to Muhammad and his Com pan ions; the apos-tatizing from Islam (ridda) of most of the Prophet’sCompanions; the different explanations given to his-tory; and also the “psychological warfare” intendedto cast scorn on the enemy and even demonize it.


During the Middle Ages, Shiite polemicsagainst Sunnis centered mainly around thelegitimacy of the Sunni regime and its

op pression of the “declared” candidates of the Pro -ph et Muhammad, Ali Ibn AbiTalib and his descen-dants,18 as well as the secondary issues that devel-oped through the ages as “accessories” to this claim.However, since the appearance of the Wahhabiyyamovement in the eighteenth century, a new branchof Shiite claims developed, which only continued togrow in size and significance with the establishmentof the Islamic Republic of Iran. Clearly, most ofthese claims existed prior to the Khomeini revolu-tion but were used only on a small scale, in mostcases only for internal Shiite consumption. AfterKhomeini, the reins were taken off, and official insti-tutions in Iran, alongside non-governmental publicinstitutions, participated very actively in spreadinganti-Wahhabi material.

Throughout the history of the Shiite-Sunni con-flict, the Shia have routinely employed the time-test-ed method of borrowing materials from their oppo-nents’ opponents. By using materials originatingfrom non-Wahhabi Sunni sources—which wereaccep ted by most of the Sunni factions—they wereable to denigrate the Wahhabis and to counter theirclaims.

Throughout their existence the Wahhabis, bytheir constant verbal and physical attacks on thosethey deemed heretics, have caused many Sunnigroups to spring up against them. This meant thatthe Shiites, in fact, had available to them an abun-

dance of anti-Wahhabi material from a variety ofSunni sources from which to draw. As one memberof a Shiite internet forum points out, “All Muslimlegal schools, whether Sunni or Shiite, wrote articlesagainst the Wahhabis. Among the Sunnis, mentionmay be made of the Ash’aris, led by the Hanbalis towhom the Wahhabis themselves belong and whoclaim to follow Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (founder of theHanbali religious legal school). Followers of thisschool deny that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s[false] claims tie in with the opinions of Ahmad IbnHanbal or of the sages of other legal schools—theHanafis, Shafiis and Malikis; The Sufi orders such asAl-Rifa’iyya and the Naqshabandiyya; the Zaydis(Shiites) and even the Ibadis (Kharijis) in Uman.”19

In attacking the Wahhabis, the Shiites have uti-lized a number of other prominent anti-Wahhabibooks or articles composed by Sunni authors. Theseinclude, for example, a famous booklet entitled“The Godly Lightning in Response to the Wahha -biyya” (Al-Sawa’iq al-Ilahiyya fi-al-Radd ala al-Wah habiyya). The author of this book was noneother than Sulayman Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, thebrother of the Wahhabi movement’s founder, andone of the first Sunni scholars to categorically con-demn the Wahhabiyya teaching. This book hasenjoyed great circulation among the enemies of theWahhabis, particularly the Shia.20 Among otherthings, Sulayman attacks Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s cre-dentials as a religious scholar and as a mujaddid(reformer), and disputes the Wahhabi argumentthat Muslims who adhere to flawed, folk customs


The Post-Khomeini Shiites’ View of theWahhabis

are to be considered apostates. (In taking issue withthis Wahhabi contention, Sulayman appeals to thehigher authority of the classical jurist Ahmad IbnHanbal, who, while rejecting certain folk customs,does not consider those who follow them to beheretics.)

Another representative Sunni text utilized byShiites against the Wahhabis is an article entitled“The Wahhabiyya Civil War” (Fitnat al-Wahha -biyya),21 which was written by the nineteenth-cen-tury Shafi’i Mufti of Mecca, Ahmad Ibn ZayniDahlan, who also wrote a comprehensive biogra-phy of the Prophet (Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya). (Thisarticle appeared as a chapter in the mufti’s book,History of the Islamic Conquests (Al-Futuhat al-Islamiyya).) Despite the mufti’s declared oppositionto the Shiites,22 contemporary Shiites have frequent-ly circulated this article in various publications andhave even translated it into Persian in order toembarrass the Wahhabis. In the article, Mufti Dah -lan examines the history of the Wahhabi movementfrom its beginning, with descriptions of the destruc-tion and horror wreaked by the Wahhabis upon thelocal inhabitants of Medina, Al-Taif, and otherplaces. He further attacks the Wahhabis’ indiscrim-inate use of takfir (the designation of the otherMuslims as heretics), stating that whoever considersa majority of other Muslims as heretics is himselfguilty of heresy.23 Mufti Dahlan additionally citesthe story of the Meccan and Medinan scholars whotried to discuss the principles of Wahhabiyya withWahhabi emissaries, during which it dawned on thescholars that the very same emissaries were “funnyclowns as though they were frightened asses whofled from a lion” (wajaduhum duhka wa-sukhara“ka-humur mustanfira farrat min qaswara;” see theQuran, Sura 74 Al-Muddathir:51).

Similarly, the Shiite Center for Studies of Faithpublicized Al-Sayyid Abd Allah Muhammad Ali’s“A List of Compositions by Sages of the MuslimCommunity who Respond to the Nonsense of theWahhabiyya” (Mujam ma Allafahu ulama al-Umma

al-Islamyya li-al-Radd ala Khurafat al-Da’wa al-Wahhabiyya). This contains 213 Sunni andShiite compositions against the Wahhabiyya teach-ing and movement.24 Some of these pieces wereagain published by the Organization for IslamicInformation in Tehran (Munazzamat al-Ilam al-Islami fi Tahran). The fact that this is an officialorganization of the government of the IslamicRepublic of Iran indicates the importance that theIranian regime attaches to the struggle against theWahhabiyya.

The main Shiite criticisms of the Wahhabisand their movement are that they are prim-itive, violent, intolerant, and motivated by

blind hatred of the Shia, the Sufis, and anyone elsewho does not accept their way. Moreover, theShiites claim that a Wahhabi victory within Islamwould take the Muslims back to the backwardnessand darkness of the past. In this way, the Shiitesclaim that the Wahhabis are in effect serving theinterests of West ern countries.

Shiites commonly describe the Wahhabis as “theKhawarij of this [contemporary] age” (Khawarijhadha al-‘asr).25 The Khawarij refers to a group ofearly Muslims who were originally allied with thefollowers of Ali Ibn Abi Talib when the latter ruledas the fourth caliph after Muhammad and led a mil-itary campaign in Siffin in the year 657 againstMuawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan, who would later establishthe Umayyad Caliphate. When Ali received Mua -wiya’s proposal to arbitrate the dispute, a groupmade up of Bedouin combatants broke away fromAli’s camp, demanding that the fighting continueuntil Allah decides the issue between the two ene-mies. Ali was subsequently forced to fight theseKhawarij (which means in Arabic those who “with-draw” from the community), but he did not manageto overcome them. They continued to operate in var-ious locations in the Muslim world, trying to imposetheir principles on those around them. Their faithwas characterized by puritanism and fanaticism,


strictness in matters of belief and the observance ofcustoms. Their view was that any non-KharijiMuslim was a heretic, and they included the holy war(jihad) as one of the main pillars of Islam (rukn).They also allowed the killing of Muslims and theirwives and children whom they considered heretics.26

The term Khariji has a negative connotation formost Muslims, both Shiite and Sunni, because theimage of the Khawarij continues to be that of divi-sive groups outside the consensus made up of anar-chists or zealots who are impatient and intolerant.On more than one occasion the Shiite authors go be -yond at taching the Khawarij label to the Wahha bis,and in fact draw a parallel between the two groups.Salih al-Wardani, an Egyptian Sunni fundamentalistwho joined the Shia,27 devoted several pages to adetailed description of this parallel. He wrote:

My attention was attracted by the streams ofzealots [in Egypt], who, just as they adopted theWahhabi assumptions also adopted the Wah -habi character, which is characterized by rude-ness, zealotry, and the bloodletting of enemies -… I was surprised to find out that the stands ofthese [Wahhabi] groups and their characteris-tics are identical with those of the Khawarij,concerning whom we have in our possessiontexts [by the Prophet Muhammad]28 that cen-sure them and caution the Muslim communityabout them. The self-image of the Khawarij andtheir theories accented their crooked characterand bad behavior, just like … [the Wahhabi]streams. The Khawarij were also markedly rudeand stern and this term suits these streams [ofIslamists and Wahhabis]. The Khawarij swordswere always drawn against the Muslims allow-ing their blood to be spilled and their propertyravaged, and the same goes for the fundamen-talist Wahhabis. The Wahhabi stream fromwhich these other [Sunni fundamentalist]streams draw satisfaction was founded by rudeand ossified people who willed this rudeness

and ossification upon their followers, who laterbecame the modern-day copy of the Khawarij.They later split from the camp of the Imam Ali [Ibn] Abi Talib. The Wahhabi stream thatemerged holds that all Muslims, who defy theWahhabiyya, are polytheists (Mushrikun) andthat they may be killed. This is the trend whichthis stream willed to the Islamic streams.29

But in some respects, Shiite polemicists claimthat the Wahhabis are even more radicalthan the Khawarij. They argue, for instance,

that the Wahhabis view all Islamic states and alltheir leaders as heretics, and thus, as heretics whomust be executed according to Shari’a law. In theiropinion, there is no administration that applies thereligious law anywhere in the world apart from theTaliban.30 As far as the Wahhabis are concerned, all Muslims are heretics because they have declareda ceasefire (hudna) on their [so-called Muslim]treach erous rulers and the heretics, and did notwage a holy war against them.31 The conclusiontherefore is: “the Wahhabis are worse than theKhawarij (al-Wahhabiyya sharrun mina al-Khawa -rij) since the Khawarij dealt with things that theMuslims unanimously declared to be very sinful(Kaba’ir) and they determined that whoever com-mits one such sinful act is a heretic, while the Wah -habis concentrate their attacks not only on Muslimswho commit acts that are not considered as sins(dhunub) but that are desired (mustahabbat), actsthat the Companions of the Prophet, their disciplesand the following generations did without any dis-agreement.”32

For these reasons, Shiites claim that the Wahhabidoctrine is “corrupt and anti-Islamist, and is similarto a wayward faction” (“a’lana da’watahu al-la-Islamiyya al-fasida ka-hizb shadhdh”).33

Moreover, according to Shiite polemics, Wah -habis are “rude and uncivil Bedouins” (A’rab ajlaf).Beyond this mocking of the Bedouin, this accusa-tion implies many more negative aspects. In the


Quran, the term A’rab is mostly used as an adjectiveto describe the heretic Bedouins (Sura 9: 97) whosefaith is only outward and not internal (Munafiqun,Sura 9: 101), or who refused to assist the Prophet ata time of need (Sura 9: 120; Sura 11: 48). Whenthese accusations are made by Iranians, they un -doubtedly reflect the anti-Arab claims raised by thePersian Shu’ubis during the second and third cen-turies after the Hijra.

Following are further Shia observations aboutthe Wahabists: The story of the Wahhabi movementis in fact exceptionally violent. Their movement’shistory is riddled with acts of violence against all,even against Muslims who did not accept their way.In fact their movement spread only as a result ofmilitary power and acts of cruelty committed any-where they met with resistance. Today they makeextensive use of cash to spread their faith. “TheNajd [Wahhabi] Sultan (Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, thefounder of the third Saudi state,) rests on two cleararguments… the cutting sword and the dirham anddinar, the sword and pointed spear and the resound-ing gold”(“sultan najd lahu hujjattani qatiatani…al-husam al-battar wa-al-dirham wa-al-dinar, al-sayf wa-al-sinan wa-al-ahmar al-rannan”).34

The Wahhabi ideology is full of internal contradictions. The Wahhabis claim thatthey base their faith and habits on two

types of sources: First, on rules that are categorical-ly laid down in the Quran and the Prophet’s Sunna.In such cases the Wah habis are not prepared toaccept any other interpretation (ijtihad) of theProphet’s Companions (al-Sahaba), their disciples(al-Tabiun), or of the greatest imams. Second,where there is no specific mention in the Quran andSunna, they make do with the provision laid downby Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. Andindeed, according to the Shiite source, the Wahhabisfailed, became entangled, and their way was full ofcontradictions: their thought is frozen, they act con-trary to the stands of Ibn Hanbal (who never

declared any Muslim to be a heretic, apart fromthose who refuse to pray) and contrary to Ibn Tay -miyya’s specific provision that “Those who cause asplit in the Muslim community and determine thattheir opponents in matters of thought (ara wa-ijti-hadat) are heretics, and the person who allows towage war against them, are themselves traitors toIslamic unity.”35 Given the above, the Shiite author(he does not identify himself) concludes that theWahhabis, according to the rules laid down by theirspiritual father Ibn Taymiyya, are “the people be -hind factionalism and differences of opinion [insidethe Islamic community]” (hum min ahl al-tafarruqwa-al-ikhtilaf).36

The Wahhabis live in a “bubble,” or to be moreprecise: “in the darkness of the cave and they are ossi-fied,” and are thus unwilling and unable to change.This is the description given by the Al-KawtharInstitute in the Iranian city of Qom (Mu’assasat al-Kawthar li-al-Ma’arif al-Islamiyya) in the introduc-tion to the book The New and Correct Way for aDialogue with the Wahhabis (Al-Minhaj al-Jadid wa-al-Sahih fi-al-Hiwar maa al-Wahhabiyyina) by Dr.Isam al-‘Imad, a former Wahhabi from Yemen whoconverted to Shiism (taharrara min kahf al-Wah -habiyya bi-kull ma yahmiluhu al-kahf min maanial-zhulma wa-l-hajariyya).37

The Wahhabis are now in fact radicals (ghulat) intheir uncompromising stance in all matters thathave to do with the attributes of Allah (al-sifat al-ilahiyya) and their accusation of anyone who up -holds views other than their own as a heretic. (Theuse of the term ghulat is somewhat exceptionalgiven that it was previously used in medieval pol -emical literature to designate extreme Shiite groupswho, for example, deified Ali.)38

The Wahhabis, and the Salafis in particular,allow themselves to lie when they argue with oppo-nents, and to falsify early sources to tie in with theirstand (tahrif al-turath… wa-istihlal al-kadhib ala al-khusum). Muhammad al-Kuthayri claims that IbnTaymiyya was not the inventor of this method.


Rather he mimicked the Hanbalis who came beforehim and willed it to the Wahhabis, who turned itinto a rule that they follow.39 By the same token,they knowingly falsified Muslim history to align itwith their stands.40

The Shiites claim that in his youth Mu ham -mad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder ofthe Wah ha biyya, was very fond of reading

the stories about the false prophets. These prophetsappeared during the early period of Islam —prophets such as Maslama Ibn Habib or Ibn Thu -mama, known in Muslim sources as Musaylima al-Kadhdhab (“Maslama the poor liar”), whoappeared among the tribe of Hanifa in the Najdarea; Sajah Bint al-Harith, the “prophet” of thetribe of Tamim; Al-Aswad al-Anasi in Yemen; andothers.41 Indeed, the Shiite author Saib Abd al-Hamid stresses this fact, yet does not mention itssource;42 his intention is clear and transparent: IbnAbd Al-Wahhab is a cheat who is no different fromthe false prophets.

The placards carried by Hezbollah supporters inLebanon following the al-Taif agreement of 1989that put a stop to the civil war in Lebanon, read:“The Wahhabis are the filthy work of Satan” (al-wahhabiyyun rijs min amal al-shaytan).43 In this casethe word “Wahhabis” replaced the words “wine,gam bling, the altars and the arrows [used to distrib-ute the meat of animals slaughtered on the altar as a custom practiced by Arab idol worshipers]” (seeQuran, Sura 5: 90).

Shiite publications refer to the Wahhabis assuperficial and of limited intelligence. According tothem, the Wahhabis are unable to delve deeply intothe finer details, especially regarding their adver-saries. They want to understand everything at thesimplest level (al-fahm al-sathi li-afkar al-mukhal-ifin).44 One of the mustabsirun who went over tothe Shia while studying for a doctorate at the al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Meccawrote a book; at the end of it he described how to

debate with the Wahhabis: “The Wahhabis are notthe enemies of this wonderful school of thought[Shiism], and as soon as they familiarize themselveswell with it they will not hesitate to adopt it. But we must descend to the intellectual level of theWahhabi when we present to them the exclusive,noble and deep characteristics of the Twelver Shiaschool of thought so that we may elevate them tothe intellectual level of the Twelver Shia.”45

According to the Shia, the Wahhabis have alwaysserved “Western imperialism in the Islamic coun-tries… what did these countries do in order to withstand the Crusader and Zionist influence? Theyalways opened their gates to the West so that itcould take control of the Muslim countries andtheir sovereignty and honor.”46

Abd al-Aziz, the founder of the (current) thirdSaudi [Wahhabi] state, is described as having warm-ly supported the “handover of Palestine to theJews.” Shiite sources show a photograph of a docu-ment written by Abd al-Aziz in which he declared toPercy Cook, Britain’s emissary to Saudi Arabia, thathis country (Saudi Arabia) “has no objection to pre-senting Palestine to the Jews or to others, as Britainsees fit.” Sultan Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, even beforedeclaring himself king of Saudi Arabia, declaredthat he would never “until Judgment Day” disobeyBritain.47 The full text reads:

In the name of Allah, the Merciful and theCom passionate,

I, Sultan Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman of theHouse of Faisal of the House of Saud, acknowl-edge and admit a thousand times to Sir PercyCook, representative of Great Britain, that Ihave no objection to giving Palestine to the Jewsor to others, as Britain sees fit. I will never dis-obey Britain until Judgment Day.48

Sa’ib ‘Abd al-Hamid, a former Hanafi (fromIraq) who became Shiite, attacks the Wahhabis



and des cribes them as “the malignant bacteriathat prepared the ground for the West to plantIsrael, the foundling, in the heart of the Islamicnation. And they are the malignant bacteriaworking still today to strengthen the West’shold on the heart of the Muslim world… Thereare the cursed hands that the West motivates inorder to suppress the Islamic awakening and tosupport the two-faced regimes (al-anzima al-munafiqa), there are agents of the West whooppress the awakening with blood and fire.”49

The “two-faced regimes” means the Muslimregimes who work “against Islam and realinterests of Muslims.”

“The Wahhabis believe themselves to be the onlyones who totally serve Allah. The other Muslimsworship gods other than Allah (Mushrikun) andtheir lives, descendants and properties are notimmune, their land must be fought against (DarHarb)... In point of fact they, the Wahhabis,brought a despicable innovation to the world(bida kubra).”50

In conclusion, the post-Khomeinist Shiites have beentrying for the past thirty years to wage a savage war

against the Wahhabis, their primary enemy for morethan two hundred years. The Wahhabis have deni-grated them, desecrated their holy sites, and foughta terrible campaign against them—a quite success-ful effort in various Islamic countries and among theMuslim diaspora in various locations throughoutthe world.

To this end the Shiites have acted methodi-cally, as they still do, with the aid of Islamichistory. They compare the Wahhabis with

the false prophets who appeared early on in Islamichistory such as Musay lima, or groups such as theKhawarij, whose doctrine and way of life theIslamic consensus rejected. The Shiites make use ofclassical Sunni writings to denigrate all Wahhabifactions, presenting them as false and lacking inintellect, as misled and misleading heretics, servantsof the West, whose only purpose is to prevent a trueIslamic awakening. This Shiite campaign long agoviolated the accepted limits of inter-religious or,more correctly, inter-sectarian controversies. As wehave seen, the Shiites demonize the Wah habis, com-paring them to malignant bacteria that must beexorcised from the Islamic body.


The sheer volume of anti-Shiite texts pro-duced by Wahhabi authors in the past fewdecades is staggering. A great number of

these works are written in accordance with themodel typical of medieval polemical texts. Theauthors of these works cite Shiite arguments, andrefute them one by one by one, comparing themeither to other Shiite texts (to demonstrate theShiism’s fallacies), or to verses from the Quran andthe traditional sayings (Hadith) attributed to theProphet. There is a growing body online of anti-Shiite literature written by Wahhabi and Neo-Wah -habi authors that follows this centuries-old method,and the authors of these texts often strive to presenttheir works as reflective of the highest standards ofscholarly rigor.51

Another body of anti-Shiite literature is, by schol-arly standards, quite mediocre, despite the fact thatits authors claim to be religious scholars. The gener-al purpose of this literature is to reach a popularaudience, and to reassure an uneasy public that itpossesses the truth, at the exclusion of others. Veryoften, these texts are published anonymously, ortheir authors use deceptive pseudonyms. This is thecase of one work entitled Li-Llah thumma li i-Tarikh(For Allah and for History), which was attributed toan imaginary Shiite scholar from Najaf who identi-fied himself Hussein al-Musawi. The manager of thepublishing house that originally published this arti-cle was condemned by the Court of Appeals inBeirut to two years of prison and to a fine of 50 million Lebanese pounds. The reason for such aheavy sentence was that, according to the Court, thework’s supposed author—who was said to be a

“repentant Shiite” and a convert to Sun nism, andwho later was supposedly assassinated by his formerShiite coreligionists—in fact never existed.52

Another work bears the title Fada’ih al-Hawzaal-Ilmiyya fi-al-Najaf, Siyaha fi Alam al-Tashayyu,al-Hawza al-Ilmiyya, or Asrar wa-Khafaya (TheScandals of the Religious College [which educatesthe Shiite ulama] in Najaf, A Voyage in the Worldof the Shia, the Ulama College, or Secrets andHidden Facts). This work is said to have been writ-ten by an author whose name is Muhibb al-DinAbbas al-Kazimi. Shiite apologists dispute the factthat this author ever belonged to their faith; morelikely, he is a disguised Wahhabi.53

Sometimes these anti-Shiite works are so blatant-ly over-the-top and clearly false that, presumably,even the most naive reader understands their truenature. Such texts can nevertheless be quite spicy,and have a certain popular attraction emanatingfrom their bawdy and direct allusions to the mut’a(temporary marriage) and the sodomy of women,considered permissible by the Shiites though inad-visable (makruha). A perfect example is given by aman calling himself the “Ayatollah al-Uzma wa-Hujjatullah al-Baligha Abu Ishaq Ya’qub Ezra al-Amili” of Qom. It appears that this man was in factfrom Dearborn, Michigan, where over the course oftwo evenings he answered questions put to him byShiite students. All the questions concerned themut’a.54 The real authors did not refrain from quot-ing at length obscene details bordering on pornog-raphy. Obviously, when reading the name Ya’qubEzra, it is easy to guess the real objective of these falsifications: to show that Shiites and Jews are

The Wahhabi View of the Shia

one and the same and that the Shiites, just like theirbrethren Jews, didn’t spare any effort in dis sem -inating hedonism, licentiousness and debauchery.

Other examples come from a text that may befound on the anti-Shiite website www.fnoor.comunder two different titles: Brutukulat Ayat Qummhawla al-Haramayn al-Muqaddasayn (The Proto -cols of the Ayat of Qumm Concerning the Two HolyCities) whose author is Dr. Abd Allah al-Ghifari,55

and Al-Khutta al-Sirriyya li-Ayat al-Shia fi Iran(The Secret Plan of the Shia Ayat in Iran) with anintroduction by Doctor Abd Al-Rahim Al-Balushi.56

This document is sometimes referred to as the “Pro -tocol,” a name that readers might immediately asso-ciate with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Aswith the latter text, this document claims the Shiitesare using the same methods as the Jews in a plot todominate the world. In some ways, however, theSecret Plan ascribes to the Shiites far lesser ambi-tions than the Protocols does the Jews: Whereas thelatter claims that the Jews intend to control thewhole world, The Secret Plan claims that the Shiitesaim only to take control of the Muslim oil-produc-ing countries in the next 50 years.

The document further describes the methods thatShiites will use to attain this objective. It asserts thatthe Shiites may appear to be harmless and moderateand even willing to engage in dialogue, but warnsthat they will tirelessly seek to sow discord betweenthose in power and the religious leaders. The textfurther claims that the Shiites will also seek toundermine the economic stability of the MiddleEast and upset the social order of the countries theyhave set their sights on, while encouraging theinhabitants of these countries to become morallylax and to indulge in debauchery and pornography.

Finally, the texts claim that the Iranian regime isencouraging ordinary Iranians to immigrate tocountries throughout the Middle East, infiltratingsubversive agents and buying real estate and com-mercial establishments for the use of Shiites whowill arrive in those countries in the future. The doc-

ument describes in detail every clause and insists onthe following point: fifty years are but a very short,and therefore insignificant, period in the history ofpeoples and religions. One should not forget thatpresent-day Shiites assert that they are “the descen-dants of millions of martyrs who were assassinatedby the sons of Satan disguised as Sunni Muslims”(nahnu warathatu malayin al-shuhadai lladhinaqutilu bi-yad al-shayatin al-mutaslimuna [sic] l-Sunna).57

Neo-Wahhabi Arguments

Against the Shiites

The richest and most scathing anti-Shiitesource: the popular discussion forums onthe Internet (muntadayat) that are main-

tained by Neo-Wahhabi activists. Among these,Shabakat al-Difa an al-Sunna (The Network for theDefense of the Sunna) deserves special mention.These forums give unqualified and ignorant peoplethe occasion to participate in such polemics. Theymay express their opinions and disseminate ideasthat have been widely held by the Sunni population,perhaps for centuries. Mockery is always present,since many of these arguments aim at ridiculing theShiites. The Internet has thus succeeded in introduc-ing into this controversy arguments stemming fromthe local collective folklore of the Muslim world,thereby intensifying the negative and ridiculing por-trayal of the Shiites. These forums report in detailreal or fictitious accusations, complete or partialquotations, serious or vain discussions: anythinggoes, and everything is permissible.

Certain formulas used by the Neo-Wahhabis todefine the Shiites are utterly offensive, using Shiitesas the butt of jokes, and describing them as odiouscreatures. Among other things, they claim that the


Shia are “a Christian seed planted by Judaism onZor oastrian land” (“al-Shia hiya bidhra nasraniyyagharasatha al-yahudiyya fi ard majusiyya.”)58 Thisdescription constitutes the preamble to an articletitled “The Resemblance between Shiites, Jews andChristians” (“Mushabahat al-Shia li-al-Yahud wa li-al-Nas ara.”) The author explains that Shiism’s foun -der was in fact a Jew named Abd Allah Ibn Saba’ al-Yahudi59 who used the authority of Ali in an effort tofalsify the Quran, just as St. Paul, the author claims,used the authority of Jesus to alter Christianity.60

The Shiite followers of Ibn Saba’ al-Yahudi, theauthor claims, are actually Persian Magi or Zoroas -trians who hate Islam because it has destroyed theirstate. In an effort to provide a scholarly basis for hisarguments, the author quotes freely from the Minhajal-Sunna, the classical work of the 13th Centuryscholar Ibn Taymiyya, on the role that Ibn Saba’ al-Yahudi supposedly played in the early developmentof Shiism.

In their effort to link Shiism with Christianity, theNeo-Wahhabis charge that the Shiite institution ofthe husainiyya—an establishment where variousShiite religious and social activities take place, in -cluding mourning celebrations of the murder of theImam Hussayn in Karbala in 680—is no differentthan the Christian church. Both the husainiyya andthe church, the Neo-Wahhabis point out, are deco-rated with images and paintings, and both use choirson various occasions, which demonstrates fromwhere the Husainiyyat took their inspiration.61

More over, the Neo-Wahhabis argue that the ShiiteSayyids (those whose genealogy is supposedly tracedback to the Prophet Muhammad) perform in thehusainiyyat certain rites and tasks similar to mem-bers of the church clergy.62

Regarding the relations of the Shia with Zoroa -strianism, certain writers, as well as the authorswriting for the Internet, do not always make the dis-tinction between the terms Zandaqa (heretics)63 andMajusiyya Zaradushtiyya (Zoro as trians.) Manyarticles and even booklets have been published to

prove that such relations do indeed exist.64 Thesame circles also insist on the connection betweenthe Shia, or the rawafid (literally “those who re -fuse,” or who refuse to accept the first three right-eous caliphs as legitimate) and the Zandaqa. Theseaccusations are commonly used in the variousIslam ic controversies against those who, on the faceof it, appear to belong to the faithful but in realityare infidels.65 The Neo-Wahhabis often claim thateven today the Zanadiqa use the Shiites to dissem-inate their ideas and implement their designs.66

Equating the Shia with Zandaqa probably origi-nates with the Hadith, which is recognized as auth -entic by Sunni scholars, and which states: “Who -ever assails the Companions of the Prophet is azindiq” (idha ra’ayta al-rajul yatanaqqasu ahadmin ashab al-rasul fa-‘lam annahu zindiq).67

The texts seeking to establish links betweenShiism and Zoroastrianism are very superficiallyargued, and they recycle many of the same attacksput forth in the Middle Ages. Among other things,they argue that that Imam Hussayn married aPersian princess, and that this marriage explainswhy the Shiites (who are alleged to be Persian) worship the descendants of Husain only, and notthose of his elder brother Hasan (Intisab al-rafida li-al-majus al-furs).68 Some Neo-Wahhabi activistsquote experts on the Shia to give their accusations asemblance of legitimacy.

The Shiites celebrate the Nowruz (the NewYear for the Persians, in Arabic Nayruz).And even today the Shiites still celebrate the

murder of the Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khattab in theyear 644 by a mawla, or client, of Al-Mughira IbnShuba, of Persian descent, known under the name ofAbu Lu’lu’a.69 Some Shi ites confer upon him the titleof Baba Shuja’ al-Din.70 All this goes to prove, in theNeo-Wahhabi mind, the existence of a Zoroastrian“conspiracy” aimed at avenging the destruction ofthe Sassanid Empire.

All these polemics are meant to lead the reader to


one obvious conclusion: the Shiites are either rene-gades (kuffar) or heretical innovators (ashabBid’a,mubtadi’un). The Neo-Wahhabis like to repeat that“whoever claims that the Vulgate, the present ver-sion of the Quran, has been altered (muharraf), orthat the Companions of the Prophet, who arepraised in the Quran (al-Sahaba al-ladhina zak -kahum al-Qur’an), are renegades—whoever claimsthat is himself a renegade.”

The Neo-Wahhabis base their arguments on tra-ditions attributed to the Prophet or on opinionsexpressed by many Hanbali and Wahhabi scholarsand exegetes. They often quote Ibn Taymiyya, butalso other authors from the Middle Ages and frommodern times who belong to all the legal schools(without mentioning the sources), such as Malik b.Anas, Ahmad b. Hanbal, Al-Bukhari, Ibn Qutayba,Ibn Hazm, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, al-Qadi Iyad,Ali al-Qari, Ibn Kathir, Al-Sam’ani, Bahjat al-Bitar,Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Mustafa al-Siba’i, Muhibbal-Din al-Khatib, Rashid Rida, etc.71

Having raised the problem of the Shiites’ status,the question many Sunni authors ask is whether allShiites should be considered as kuffar, or should not one rather accept the position of the moderateSunni authors who consider that only the Shiiteulama are kuffar, while an ordinary Shiite(awammuhum) is simply a heretical innovator(mubtadi’)?72

The question of the Imamate has also beenaddressed in these polemics. According to the Wah -habis, the Shiites have committed perjury becausethey have endowed Ali and the other Imams withsupernatural, almost divine faculties, as guides inthe path of rectitude. Literally, “They are polythe-ists and total apostates who deserve to be executed”(hadha shirk akbar wa-ridda an al-Islam yastah -iqquna al-qatl alayha).73

The Shiites are the target of other grave accusa-tions, every possible sin on earth being dumped onthem. The Neo-Wahhabis do not fail to point outthat certain proverbs related to treachery, avarice,

and lying refer to the Shiites (madrib al-mathal fi-al-ghadr wa-al-bukhl wa-al-kadhib). They base theirarguments on stories told by the traditional adver-saries of the Shia. According to Ibn Taymiyya, theShiites are the biggest liars on earth. The Neo-Wah -habis often quote the following sentence, whichthey attribute to Ibn Taymiyya, without botheringto indicate an exact source: subhana man khalaqaal-kadhib wa-a’ta tis’ata a’sharihi li-al-Rawafid(“blessed be He who created lying and who gave theRafida nine tenths of it”).74

To illustrate this accusation, they recount ananecdote attributed to Muhammad IbnIdris, the warraq (librarian) of al-Humaydi

(d. 834), following the traditionalists of Medina:“We have fabricated seventy traditions to test theIraqi traditionalists. We sent them to Kufa [a tradi-tionally Shiite center] and to Basra [a traditionallySunni center]. The traditionalists of Basra sent themback to us, refusing them point-blank because allwere faked; the Kufites sent them back after fabri-cating an isnad (transmission chain) for each tradi-tion.”75

The Shiites are said to have become masters inthe art of treachery (ghadr). Their ancestors bet -rayed the following great figures: First, Al-HasanIbn Ali in Sabat al-Mada’in just before the battleagainst the Syrian army of Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyanin 661; second, Al-Husain Ibn Ali, who was invitedby them to Kufa to rebel against the Caliph YazidIbn Muawiya (reigned 680 – 83); the Shiites sided,however, with the Umayyad force, resulting in hismartyrdom at Karbala in 680; and third, Zayd IbnAli Ibn al-Husain, who was abandoned by histroops and then crucified by the Umayyad governorYusuf b.Umar in 740.76 Using the pseudonym Kha lid Ahl al-Sunna, the inspector of the “IslamicDia log” on the website Al-Difa’ ‘an al-Sunna (TheDefense of the Sunna) adds: “such were the ances-tors of the Shiites, how spiteful they are and howspiteful their descendants are!” (Ha’ula’i kanu al-


Shia al-aslaf fa-bi’sa al-salaf salafuhum, wa-bi’sa al-khalaf khalafuhum).

To make matters worse, the Shiites are accused of working hand in hand with the Freemasons inarms and narcotics deals.77 In their internal fights,the Shiites themselves accuse their opponents ofbeing members of Freemason lodges. Thus, ShaykhMuham mad Hussein Fad lallah, one of the mostnotorious Lebanese Shiite leaders, is described by hisideological enemies as a “well-implanted agent ofthe British Intelligence Service and a veteran of theFreemasons’ lodges” (amma Fadlullah fa-‘amilmu’attaq li-al-mukha barat al-Baritaniyya wa-‘unsurasil fi-al-Masun iyya).78 In the eyes of the Islamic fun-damentalists, this accusation is very serious indeedsince, for more than half a century, the Freemasonshave been considered in those circles as the agentsof “world Judaism” and as bitter enemies of Islam.79

The Mutual RelationsBetween the Shia

and Judaism

The relations between certain Shiite traditionsand Judaism have not yet been thoroughlystudied: Israel Friedlander,80 Georges Vaj -

da,81 and Shlomo Pines82 have touched the topicwithout analyzing it in depth. More re cently, MeirBar-Asher has published two important articles onthe place occupied by Jews and Judaism in the reli-gious literature of the early Shia.83 This presentationexamines this question from another angle—that ofthe anti-Shiite polemics.

We know that since the dawn of Islam, one of themost humiliating insults has been to call a Muslima Jew.84 The Shiites are accused by the Neo-Wah- ha bis of having been influenced by the Jews or ofbehaving like Jews. The question of the authenti-

city of these accusations will not be examined: theyhave been uttered by scholars who went no furtherthan simply mentioning the insulting attributes ofJews.

This insult of the Shiites is legitimized by refer-ence to the exegetical literature where it is said thatbeing a Jew means belonging to the category of themaghdub alayhim, who are the objects of Allah’swrath (Quran 1: 7), and to that of the al-mufsidunafi-al-ard, those who do their utmost to sow scandalon earth (5:64; 17:4). Moreover, according to theNeo-Wahhabis, this accusation is plainly justifiedsince they regard Shiism as a heretical teaching sectfirst established by a former Jew, Ibn Saba.’

These trivial and threadbare arguments havebeen used for ages. However, I would like to drawattention to an original contribution from moderntimes that has been enthusiastically endorsed by theNeo-Wahhabis: the Hebraic title Hakham (Rabbi,especially among Oriental Jews) is now being usedto designate the great leaders of the Shia. It seemsthat the term has been accepted by certain Salafi,anti-Shiite activists. One can thus find on the for -ums of the Internet the following word combina-tions: “kibar Hakhamat al-Shia” or “Hakhama tu -hum al-ma’suma” (“the great Rabbis of the Shi -ites,” or “their infallible Rabbis.”)

Finally, regarding Jews and Shiites, we mustrecall one aspect of the Imami eschatology decriedby Neo-Wahhabi circles, namely the Shiites’ beliefthat the Twelfth Imam will appear before the end oftimes to wreak vengeance on those who mistreatedAli, his offspring, and their disciples. The Neo-Wahhabis call him kalb yahudi ibn yahudi (Jewishdog, or son of a Jew) because “he will judge human-ity according to the law of David and his offspring”(Yahkumu bi-shari’at Dawud wa Al Dawud). Theyask with an affected ingenuousness: “why won’t hejudge according to the law of Muhammad andMuhammad’s family?”; (shari’at Muhammad waAl Muhammad?). They answer: “Because the JewAbd Allah b. Saba’ is the founder of your damned



religion!” (Abd Alah b. Saba’ al-yahudi l-ladhiawjada dinakum al-la’in). We can find an addition-al example of this scurrilous style in the articletitled, “Evidence That the Mahdi Awaited by theRafida Is the One-Eyed Jewish Antichrist” (ithbatanna mahdi l-rafida l-muntazar huwa nafsuhu 'l-aÝwarm al-dajjal al-yahudi).

In order to support these attacks likening theShiites to the Jews, the author selectively citesfrom a number of the most eminent Shiite

sources. These include, for instance, Al-Kulini, whois described as “the Bukhari of the Rafida,” andwho allegedly claimed: “When Qa’im al Muham -mad (the Twelfth Imam) appears, he will rule/judgeaccording to David and Solomon’s law. We willhave to refrain from asking him any kind of evi-dence” (idha qama qa’im al Muhammad alayhi l-salam hakama bi-hukmi Dawud wa-Sulayman wala yusala bayyinatan).85 The author also cites vari-ous versions of this Hadith, including a detailed ver-sion specifying that the Twelfth Imam will rule“according to the code of Allah and of David’s fam-ily, and according to Muhammad’s law (bi-hukni l-Lahi wa-hukm al Dawud wa hukn Muhammad).”In addition, he will be escorted by the Holy Spirit(la-talq n bihi ruh al qudus). Al-Nu‘mani: “Whenthe Imam calls to [prayer], he will call Allah by hisname in Hebrew” (idha adhdhana l-imamu da’aLaha bi smihi l ibrani).8 This seems to refer to whatis known as al-Ism al-A’zam, known by the prophetsonly. Al-Saykh al-Mufid: “When he appears in theregion of Kufa, the Qa’im will be accompanied bytwenty-seven men from the people of Moses, sevenfrom the people of the Cave, Joshua b. Nun…Allwill be his auxiliaries.”87

On the basis of these three Hadiths, neo-Wah -habis draw a number of conclusions. First of all, theMahdi of the Rafida will base his judgments on “thelaw of the Dawud family and on a new Koran thatis not similar to the one we have.” It seems that thelaw of the Dawud family must be the Talmud. The

Mahdi will use Hebrew as a vernacular language.The Jews will be his support, which means he is theawaited king (Redeemer) of the Jews. In other words,the Mahdi of the Shiites is none other than theAntichrist announced by the Prophet Muhammad.

The Iqaz bulletin published in London by RabitatAhl al-Sunna fi Iran (the Sunni League in Iran) con-tained in its issue of April 12, 2002 an article titled“The Similarities between the Rafidas and the Jews”(mushabahat al-Rafida li-l Yahuud). The authorrecounts a Hadith attributed to Amir b. Shar ahil al-Sha’bi (d. 722), the famous Kufan Epi gone. There theShiites are described as Yahud hadhihi l-umma88

(“the Jews of the Islamic community”) because “theyhate Islam the same way Jews hate Christianity”(yubghiduna l-Islama kama yubghidu l-Yahudu l-Nasraniyyata). Al-Sha’bi adds: “If [the Shiites] wereturned into pack animals, they would surely havebeen donkeys” (fa-law kanu mina l-dawabbi la-kanuhamiran). This reference contains an allusion to theKoran (Chapter 62, verse 5) in which Jews are com-pared to donkeys carrying books.

In his argumentation, a neo-Wahhabi Inter net -forum author cites Ibn Taymiyya, saying that theShiites help the renegades acting against Islam.Therefore they are considered by Muslims, “Don -keys as the Jews (hatta ja‘alahumu l-nasu lahum ka-l-hamir).”89 Others prefer to quote a more detailedtext, attributed to Ibn Taymiyya,90 in which he com-pares the Shiites to the Jews. In order to do this, hedraws a number of parallels.

Ibn Taymiyya claims that Jews believe onlyDavid’s descendents can rule, while the Shiites be -lieve that the imams can only be Ali’s descendents.The Jews “ban jihad until the coming of theirMessiah” (this ban, imposed by the rabbis of theTalmud, forbids rebellion to free themselves fromsubmission to the Gentiles), while the Shiites insiston not taking part in the jihad before the coming ofthe Twelfth Imam. The Jews falsified the Torah;91

the Shiites distorted the Koran.92 The Jews hate thearchangel Gabriel, claiming he is their enemy;93 the


Shiites believe that Gabriel, who was sent by Allahto Ali, made a mistake and gave the prophecy toMuhammad.94 The Jews allow themselves to do asthey like with the property and the blood of theGentiles; the Shiites allow themselves to take holdof Muslims’ properties and to spill their blood. TheJews are described in the Koran as al-mufsidun fi l-ard (workers of corruption in the earth); Shiites alsoare mufsidun. The Jews are condemned to wanderand to be scattered amongst other peoples; Shiitesare condemned to similar punishments.

In completing this comparison, Ibn Taymiyyaadds that “Jews and Christians are better than Shi -ites, because the Jews believe that the best generationis that of the Moses’ Companions and the Christiansconsider the Apostles to be the best Christians.However the Shiites claim that Muham mad’sCompanions are the worst kind of Muslims.”95

Ridiculing the Shiites

It seems that the Salafis were not convinced ofthe efficacy of these arguments in restraining theShiite tide. Therefore they resorted to other tac-

tics that seem to be more effective in certain Sunnicircles.

The Salafis replaced honorifics and even epithetsof sanctity with epithets of debasement and scorn:thus the attribute al-ashraf (the noble one, the loftyone), usually used to describe the holy city al-Najaf,is sometimes re placed by al-anjas (the impure)96 orby al-akhsaf (buried in the earth, a literal antonymof al-ashraf);97 Karbala’ becomes Sharrbala’, whichcan be broken down into sharr and bala (the worstof [all] torments);98 Ni’mat Allah (the grace of Allah)al-Jazairi99 is designated as Niqmat Allah (Allah’spunishment); the customary addition to the names ofthe great ulema, qaddasa llah sirrahu (may Allahbless his secret) becomes, in the case of Khomeini,

fadaha llah sirrahu (may God reveal his secret). Inone discussion, the name ayat Allah al-uzma al-Sistani is distorted: the first “i” is replaced by the let-ter “k” to become al-Sextani. This distortion appearsimmediately following the citing of a few of Sistani’slegal opinions, one of which allows the husband tosodomize his wife, if such is his wish. The neo-Wah -habi author does not say a word on Sistani’s person-al opinion, which is completely opposed to suchacts.100 The Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah(Allah’s party) is called in a few publications Hizbual-Shaytan (Satan’s party) or Hizbu al-Lat (the partyof pre-Islamic goddess al-Lat, one of “Allah’s daugh-ters”).101

One of the participants on a chat, writing underthe pseudonym Abu l-Dahdah, states:

Hakamtu bayna l-millatayni falam ajid min farqin bi l-kufri wa l-ijrami

Kilahuma bayna l-shu’ubi jara’imu nabatat ka-sillin aw ka-‘I-judhami

Wa-ara dimaa l-kufri khayra wasilatin li-taharati l-dunya mina l-athami.102

After comparing the two religions [of the Jewsand the Shiites], I found no difference regardingtheir apostasy and criminality. Each of thesetwo communities has committed numerouscrimes among [other] peoples and emerges liketuberculosis or leprosy. In order to purify theworld from the impurity caused by thesecrimes, there is no better solution than to spillthe blood of apostasy.

The “errant and deceptive” Shiites at times replacethe Devil, especially in the very common Islamicexpression al-shaytan al-rajim (Satan worth ston-ing). On one neo-Wahhabi forum, one of the mostprestigious modern Shiite leaders, Ayatullah al-Sistani, is called Ayatu l-shaytan al-Sistani.103


Another forum opens with the following formula:Bismi Lahi l-Rahmani l-Rahim wa-bihi nasta’in,ala l-dallin min a l-Shia l-mudillin, wa-na’udhubihi minhum ila yawmi l-din “In the name of Godthe compassionate and merciful! We ask for His helpto face the errant Shiites who continuously deceiveothers, and we seek a shelter in Him [because of thefear they arouse in us] until Judg ment Day.104 Re -garding this matter, we must not forget that Quranicexe getes attest unanimously to the fact that the worddallin in the first Sura refers to the Christians. Inanother instance, one of the neo-Wahhabi authorsquotes a verse by the famous poet al-Qahtani inwhich Shiites are designated as hizbat [sic] al-shay-tan (Satan’s party).”105

Once we reach the end of this long (though notexhaustive) series of accusations, we cannot butask: in the eyes of neo-Wahhabis and even Wahha -bis in general, are Shiites Muslims or have theytransgressed the limits of what is deemed within thefold of Islam?

The terminology used by neo-Wahhabis is alltoo clear: the shia or the rafd constitute a sep-arate “religion,” not a sect of Islam. The Shi -

ites who “convert” to the sunna are described as muh-tadun (guided by Allah on the path of truth, i.e. oftrue Islam). It should be noted that this is how Jewsand Christians who join the fold of Islam are usuallytermed. On the other hand, those who “convert”from sunna to shia are dall (errant, on the way toperdition). Ali al-Tijani, the alim (scholar) of Tunisianorigin who converted to Shiism, gives the followingtitle to his book, in which he describes abandoningthe Sunna and adopting the Shia: Thumma htadaytu.

“Afterwards, I was guided [by Allah] to the truepath.” The neo-Wahhabi response, authored by Kha -lid al-Asqalani, was: Bal dalilta, “Oh no! you are [infact on the way] of perdition!”106

The answer to the question “Are Shiites Muslimsin the eyes of the neo-Wahhabis?” if we confine our-selves to these texts, ignoring the replies of theShiites and the writings of many moderate Sunnis,seems very simple. However, one must not forgetthat Wahhabis and neo-Wahhabis are still a minor-ity in Islam whose views represent only their ownperspective. What makes them important is theiractivism and the huge funds placed at their dispos-al, as well as their skill at spreading their ideasthrough traditional as well as ultra-modern means.Those who dare to oppose their positions and doc-trine are afraid of being called kuffar (infidels), murtaddun (renegades), bid’iyyun (heretical inno-vators), quburiyyun (tomb worshippers), mulhidun(apostates), etc. The resources they enjoy allowthem to flood the Arab and Muslim world, as wellas the Muslim minorities in the West, with theirtracts, books, disks, video cassettes and CDs.

There is no doubt that this all-out offensive hasbeen successful in convincing a number of unso-phisticated minds regarding bid’a (heretic innova-tion), jihad (holy war against the infidels) and ani-mosity toward the West and its values. However itseems to be less successful in its anti-Shiite endeav-or. The Islamic Republic of Iran has succeeded notonly in curbing the neo-Wahhabi propaganda; it hasalso made its way in the Arab world. It has done sothrough its far more intelligent responses, and to thepolicy adopted by Iran and Shiite organizations re -garding current problems.


appendix i

Sultan ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s Document: Giving Palestine to the Jews

appendix i i

“Surat al-Walaya”

The Chapter establishes that the wiliayat of Ali Ibn Abi Talib requires the duty of unquestioned loyalty and obedience to him.

Some anti-Shiite circles claim that this is a part of the “secret Shiite version” of the Quran.



1.A note about our sources: almost all of the material used in the preparation of this paper can be found on the Internet.This medium grants a number of advantages to those partaking in the debate, but it also has its disadvantages. There isno way to establish the true identity of the author; moreover, in certain cases the article is merely intended to provokepublic opinion for or against an idea, a faith or a certain group; it is possible to forge material and accredit it to peoplewho have no connection with it, especially if the person belongs to the opposing side; the denials, if any, of those connect-ed with the issue will not necessarily appear in the same site and this prevents the reader from knowing of the existenceof the denial; and there is partial or misquotation of the opponent’s words on the assumption that the regular reader isunable or will not go to the source to find out the true quotation. For our purposes, it is unimportant whether the texts that appear in the Internet are true or not, or whether they trulyreflect what was said or authorized by the Shiite or Wahhabi leaderships. Their importance is in their being said and dis-seminated by Shiites and Wahhabis. Note: A version of the section dealing with the Shia in the eyes of the Neo-Wahhabites has been published in French inArabica 53, no. 3 (2006), 299-330, under the title “Les Shiites vus par les Néo-Wahhabites.” The author wishes to thankKoninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, for permission to republish this section.

2. In this article I have used, where possible, the common spelling of names and terms rather than a precise transliteration.3. See David Menashri, Iran in Revolution (in Hebrew), 2nd ed. (Tel Aviv: Kav Adom Library-Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1989),

pp. 216-21.4.Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: The Azhar and Shi’ism between Rapprochement and Restraint

(Leiden: Brill, 2004). I owe this last reference to my friend Professor Etan Kohlberg.5. Concerning this battle see Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1981), pp. 201-9.6. The Shu‘ubiyya was a socio-cultural protest movement that operated in the above-mentioned period, led mainly by Persian

Muslims who demanded full equality with the Arab Muslims and claimed that the Arabs had no right to preferentialstanding over non-Arabs. See The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), vol. 11, 513 (s.v. “Shu’ubiyya,” by S. Enderwitz).Regarding the revival of the term Shu‘ubiyya during modern times, see A. Hanna and G. H. Gardner, “Al-Shu‘ubiyyaUpdated: A Study of the 20th Century Revival of an 8th Century Concept,” Middle East Journal 20 (1966): 335-52.

7. See, for example, the book written by the Baath Party member Mundhir al-Mawsili, Qira’at fi Harb al-khalij: ‘Arab wa-

furs (Readings Regarding the Gulf War: Arabs and Persians), (Cairo: Dar al-‘Uruba, 1988); see also Dr. Bashshar ‘AwwadMa ruf, Al-Islam wa-Mafhum al-Qiyada al-‘Arabiyya li-al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Islam and the Concept of Arabic

Leading of the Muslim Community), with an introduction by Sa’id Hawwa [the radical Syrian Islamic leader], (Baghdad,1989).

8. See al-Àmili, al-Intisar: ahammu munazarat al-Shi’a fi-al-internet, ed. Markaz al-abhath al-Aqa‘idiyya, series of the kutub

al-munazarat, no. 7, 37 in www.aqaed.files/shi‘alib/index.htm, where the Shiite author reviews the first stages of the Sunni-Shiite polemics on the Internet.

9. Al-Malak al-Ta’ir, www.fnoor.com/fn0315.htm, 27.02.01.10. Concerning this subject, see the excellent survey of Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism. 11. Al-Qaradawi in his CD al-Fiqh wa-usuluhu; this attitude was severely criticized by Salafis, see for example Ayaltaqi al-

naqidani? Hiwar ma’a fadilat al-shayh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, www.khayma.com/fnoor/fn0990.htm; recently, al-Qaradawichanged his attitude and attacked the Shiites for their efforts to convince the Sunnites in Egypt and other Arab countriesto adopt Shiism; Muhammad al-Ghazali, Humum da’iya (al-Dawha 1985), 278.

notes

12. See Wilfrid Buchta, “Teheran Ecumenical Society (Majma’ al-taqrib): A Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horseof Iran?” in Brunner and Ende, The Twelver Shia in Modern Times, 336. A photocopy of this Fatwa can be found on theanti-Shiite website www.fnoor.com.

13. The fnoor.com website published two lists of Shiite or pro-Shiite books that were published in Egypt either by Dar al-taqrib or by other publishers. The first list is sloppy, since it never indicates the author or the year of publication. In thesecond list, the name of the author appears together with his religious or political views, but the list also contains anti-Shiite books. Buchta (“Teheran Ecumenical Society,” 334-35) mentions that all through Khomeini’s era, the Iranian offi-cial Islamic propaganda took no interest whatsoever in this institution and its ecumenical role.

14. ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib was the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law and was the fourth “righteous” Caliph afterMuhammad. The Shia movement sprang from his and his offspring’s supporters (Shi’at ‘Ali means Ali’s faction), whoclaimed that he and his descendants are the sole legal inheritors of the Prophet. In the Shiite view, the legitimacy of Ali’sand his descendants’ rule is ordained by Allah; thus, the three first caliphs (preceding Ali) changed the will of Allah by pre-venting Ali’s rule.

15. The attitude of the Shiites concerning the majority of the Prophet’s companions has been thoroughly studied by E.Kohlberg in his typed thesis, “The Attitude of the Imami-Shi‘is to the Companions of the Prophet” (Oxford University,1971); also see his “Some Imami Shi’i Views on the Sahaba,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 5 (1984): 143-75.

16. According to the Quran (see Sura 8:41), a fifth of the booty belongs to Allah, to the Apostle, to the nearest ones [to him],to the orphans and to the voyager. The Shiite imams are considered by the Shiites to be the sole heirs of the Prophet, andthus have the right to collect certain taxes imposed by Allah, the khums being one of them. In this case, the khums meansthe fifth of the wealth of the Shiite.

17. See Abd al-Aziz al-Tabataba’i, Mawqif al-shi’a min hajamat al-khusum wa-khulasa ‘an kitab ‘abiqat al-anwar (The Shia’s

Stand vis-à-vis the Attacks of the Enemies and a Choice Part of the Book ‘The Scents of the Lights’), especially p. 4, inwww.aqaed.com/shalib/books/04/mawqef/index.html.

18. The Shiite relate a number of Hadiths (traditions) attributed to the Prophet in which he “determined” categorically thatAli and his descendants are his inheritors and that this is by the will of Allah. One example is the tradition known as theHadith of Ghadir Khumm (delivered near a stream known as Khumm), which states that Ali’s status in comparison withthat of Muhammad is the same as that of Aaron compared to Moses, only that Ali cannot be a prophet (unlike Aaronwho is considered a prophet in Islam) since Muhammad is the last of the prophets; another example is the Hadith thatholds that Muhammad, on his death bed, dictated a will mentioning the twelve Shiite Imams by their full names, statingthat Ali and his descendants will serve in turn in his place (caliphs) over his people (the Muslims), see BihÁr al-anwar, vol.36, p. 260.

19. ‘Abd Allah Muhammad ‘Ali, Mu’jam ma allafahu ‘ulama’ al-umma al-islamiyya li-al-radd ‘ala khurafat al-da’wa al-wah-

habiyya (A List of Compositions by Sages of the Muslim Community Who Respond to the Nonsense of the Wahhabiyya),www.aqaed.com/book-books3-wahabie3-index.html.

20. It appears in full in the publications of The Center for Studies of Faith (Markaz al-Abhath al-Aqa’idiyya), which has beenrun for more than eleven years under the guidance of Ayatollah al-Sistani,www.aqaed.com/book/bookw3/sawaeq/sawaeq.html.

21. www.aqaed.com/book/books3/fetne/index.htmk. The book is titled History of the Islamic Conquests (Al-Futuhat al-

Islamiyya).22. See, for example, his Risala fi kayfiyyat al-muhawara ma’a al-Shi’a wa-al-radd alayha (A Treatise Regarding the Method

by Which to Debate with the Shia and Respond to It), Cairo, 1905.23. Ibid., 7: “The religious sages of Mecca and Medina studied the faith [of the Wahhabis] and found that they contained

many statements regarding declarations of others as heretics... And wrote a report against them with the Shar’i Qadi ofMecca determining that they [the Wahhabis] are heretics because of their beliefs in those faiths [declaring others as heretics](wa-nazaru ila ‘aqa’idihim fa-wajaduha mushtamila ‘ala kathir min al-mukaffirÁt… wa-katabu ‘alayhim hujja ‘inda qadi

al-shar’ bi-makka tatadammanu al-hukm bi-kufrihim bi-tilka al-‘aqa’id).”24. See above n. 19; for another partial list of anti-Wahhabi, particularly Sunni, compositions, see in Sa’ib ‘Abd al-Hamid’s

article www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/05/w-s-h/index, Paragraph 11.25. See al-Àmili, Kitab al-Intisar, p. 1 and all of chapter 2, www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/06/enternt/html.


26. For additional details about this group see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (New edition), vol. 4, pp. 1074-77 (s.v.“Kharidjites,” by G. Levi Della Vida).

27. He served in the past as the editor of an Egyptian Islamist publication al-Balagh, and afterwards as a correspondent forthe al-Risala weekly. He abandoned this work when he found out that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime funded the maga-zine. Following a lengthy stay in Egypt he adopted the Shia some ten years ago and became an active Shiite. He wrote anumber of books, among them al-Shi’a fi misr (The Shia in Egypt), Firaq ahl al-Sunna (The Sunni Sects), and most impor-tant of all al-Khud’a: rihlati min al-Sunna ila al-Shi’a (The Imposture: My Journey from the Sunna to the Shia) publicizedon the site www.shiaweb.org/shia/khedaa/index.html, as well as in Iran by the ‘Ashura Institution.

28. The Khawarij appeared for the first time some twenty years after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, but in the frameworkof the struggle against them, traditions attributed to the Prophet were invented in which he foresaw the appearance of theKhawarij and cautioned the Muslim people about them, calling them “deviants from Islam (Mariqun) who are doomedto hell.”

29. Al-Khud’a, www.shiaweb.org/shia/khedaa/index.html, 16; Sa’ib Abd al-Hamid, Al-Wahhabiyya fi Suratiha al-haqiqiyya,

www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/05/w-s-h/index, quoted in its entirety in a Sunni site, without mentioning the author’s name or the source; see the Shiite-Sunni free discussion forum (Muntada al-Hiwar al-Shii al-Sunni al-Hurr), www.alrak-iza...ForumMessage.

30. Al-‘Amili, Kitab al-Intisar, 100.31. Ibid.32. Sa’ib ‘Abd al-Hamid, see above note 25 (Asl al-Wahhabiyya). 33. ‘Abd Allah Muhammad ‘Ali, Mu’jam, 2.34. Muhhammad al-Kuthayri, Al-Salafiyya bayna ahl al-sunna wa-l-imamiyya (The Salafi Movement between Sunnis and

Shiites), www.aqaed.com, in the series Al-Radd ‘ala Ibn Taymiyya wa-l-Wahhabiyya, essay no. 16, pp. 465-6.35. Sa’ib Abd al-Hamid (see above n. 24), Masadir al-fikr al-Wahhabi (The Sources of Wahhabi Thought). 36. Ibid.37. www.aqaed.com, in the series Al-Radd ‘ala Ibn Taymiyya wa-l-Wahhabiyya, essay number 28, in the Introduction.38. See Goldziher, Lectures on Islam (the Hebrew translation), Jerusalem: 1951, 150-1.39. Al-Salafiyya bayna ahl al-sunna wa-l-imamiyya, 482.40. Ibid, 473.41. This phenomenon is known in Muslim historiography as al-Ridda (apostasy from Islam). For the most part this was an

attempt to break away from the reign of Muhammad and his inheritors: see H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the

Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (in Hebrew, translated by Emmanuel Kopel -evich), Jerusalem: 1998,. 48-51; Ella Landau-Tasseron, Aspects of the Ridda War (in Hebrew), PhD thesis, (HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem: 1981), Introduction, 2-6.

42. Sa’ib Abd al-Hamid (see above n.34), Al-Wahhabiyya wa-mu’assisuha (The Wahhabiyya and its Founder). 43. Abd al-Mun’im Shafiq, Haqiqat al-Muqawama: Qira’a fi awrÁq al-Haraka al-siyasiyya al-Shi’iyya fi Lubnan,

www.fnoor.com/books.htm.44. Al-Kuthayri, Al-Salafiyya baynaAahl al-Sunna wa-l-Imamiyya, 480.45. ‘Isam al-‘Imad, Al-Minhag al-jadid wa-al-sahihi fi-al-hiiwar ma’a al-Wahhabiyyina),

www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/03/manhaj-jadid, 179.46. Sa’ibAbd al-Hamid (see above n. 29), Al-Wahhabiyya fi khidmat man? (In Whose Service Does the Wahhabiyya Operate?).47. See www.aqaed.com, Shubuhat al-Salafiyya (Suspicions [Reagarding] the Salafiyya) by Jawad Hussayn Al-Daylami, in the

series Al-Radd ala ibn Taymiyya wa-l-Wahhabiyya, essay no. 33.48. The Shiite author does not disclose the source this document’s photocopy. Unfortunately, its authenticity is difficult to ver-

ify, and it is highly likely that it may be forged. 49. See above note 46. 50. Ibid., section 6: al-Wahhabiyya wa-l-Muslimun (The Wahhabis and rhe Muslims).51. One Sunni website containing a great deal of anti-Shiite material is www.fnoor.com. The treatises published on this web-

site, which is run by Faysal Nur, are as a general rule well documented and draw their material from classical Shiite texts(with the exception of the discussions of the muntada al-Hiwar al-Shi’i al-Sunni al-Hurr “The Forum of Free Dialogue


between Shiites and Sunnites”). Faysal Nur is probably also the author of a series entitled Silsilat al-Haqa’iq al-Gha’iba

(The Chain/Series of Hidden Truths), which consists of the following anti-Shite works: 1) Naqd ‘Aqidat al-‘Isma (Criticism

of the Dogma of [the Imams’] Infallibility); 2) Al-Khums wa-Sahm al-Imam (The Fifth and the Share of the Imam); 3) Al-

Imama wa-al-Nass (The Imamate and the Textual Determination [of the heir who should rule after the death of theProphet]); 4) Al-Taqiyya, al-Wajh al-Akhar (Taqiyya: the Hidden Side); 5) Ayat al-Tathir wa-Hadith al-Thaqalayn (The

Verse Declaring that [the Descendants of the Prophet] Are Pure and the Tradition Attributed to the Prophet Concerning

the Thaqalayn); 6) Riwayat al-Tasadduq bi-al-Khatam (The Traditions Telling that [‘Ali] Gave [his] Ring as Charity); 7)Mawqif al-Shia mina al-Sahaba (The Attitude of the Shiites towards the Companions of the Prophet). All these treatiseshave been published on the Internet (www.khayma.com/fnoor/index2.htm). Additionally, the series called Shubuhat wa-

Rudud (Suspicions and Retorts), which appears without signature on the same website (…fnoor/shubuhat.htm), consistsof more than a hundred articles copiously annotated, aiming first of all at defending the Sahaba (the Companions of theProphet) and the “righteous” caliphs. The series bearing the title Tanbih al-Ha’ir ila Mawadi’ al-Malak al-Ta’ir (The Cal -

ing to Arms of the Perplexed Concerning the Subjects of the Flying Angel). This series is also copiously annotated and hasno qualms about telling racy stories (…fnoor/almalak1.htm). This latter series has disappeared from its original website,without any explanation given. Some articles belonging to the series continue to appear on other websites, such as munta-

da al-Hiwar al-Shi’i al-Sunni al-Hurr in fnoor.com.52. alrakiza.com/forumNo1=1&Message No=594, 23.05.2002. This book attacks the Shiites, asserting that the Shia is noth-

ing but a Jewish Bid’a (religious innovation). It blames the Shiites for practicing certain rites termed qabahat mushina

(abominable and shameful actions). Some Sunnites reacted to this sentence by saying that this judicial decision is not sur-prising since “a third of the court was Shiite, and the remaining two thirds were Christians.”

53. www.albrhn.com, 19.06.2002).54. (alrakiza.../forum messagepage.asp?userNo489, 05.05.2002.55. www.ayma.com/fnoor/fn0300.htm, 06.01.2002).56. (www.fnoor/book13, 28.01.2002).57. www.fnoor/book13, 28.01.02).58. islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/shia-jews-christians.htm. 59. Concerning the historicity of this figure and the declaration attributed to him, according to which ‘Ali b. Abi Talib is God,

see al-Shahrastani, al-Milal wa-l-nihal, ed. Abd al-Aziz al-Wakil, Cairo: 1968, vol. 1, p. 174 ; The Encyclopaedia of Islam

(new edition), vol. p. 51 (s.v. “Abd Allah b. Saba’,” by M.C.S. Hodgson). Nowadays, these discussions continue to be afocus of interest; see for example Salah al-Din al-Munajjid, al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 13.05.85, and the reply of Qasimal-Zuhayri, published in the same journal on May 13, 1985.

60. See also www.khayma.com/fnoor/fn0441.htm.61. One should not forget, in this respect, that the Wahhabiyya rejects categorically all pictorial representations of persons or

living creatures, as well as music and songs.62. www.alrakiza. ./ForumMessagePage.asp?UserNo=489..., 04.04.02. 63. Concerning the different meanings of this term and its use through the ages, see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edi-

tion), (s.v. “Zindik,” by F. C. de Blois). 64. See, for example, ‘Abd Allah al-Gharib, Wa-ja’a dawr al-Majus (At Last, the Turn of the Zoroastrians Has Come), or the

article “al-Shi’a... al-Furs... al-Majus... hal hunaka alaqa?” (“The Shiites...The Persians...The Zoroastrians. Is There aConnection?”), at www.fnoor/fn0226. The adjective al-Majus is often added to the noun al-Rafida; seewww.khayma.com/fnoor/fn0336, 20.06.02.

65. The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition), vol. 5, pp. 1110-17 (s.v. “Madjus,” by M. Morony).66. khayma.com/fnoor/fn0441, 08.05.02.67. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, al-Isaba fi tamyiz al-Sahaba, ed. ‘Adil Ahmad ‘Abd Al-Mawjud et.al., vol. 1 (Beirut: 1995): 22,

quoting Abu Zur’a al-Razi.68. islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/shia_R-persians.69. Muhammad Mal Allah, Yawm al-ghufran, ihtifal al-rafida bi-maqtal ‘Umar b. al-Khattab (The Day of Atonement, the

Celebration of the Murder of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab by the Rafida),www.khayma.com.fnoor/fn0936.htm, 11.11.01.


70. islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/shia_R_persians.htm, 06.10.02;www.pureislam.org/montada/showthread.php?s=86d7a3944c22cbc, 28.03.04.

71. arabic.islamicweb.com/shia/dialog.htm, 25.12.2001; for a partial but well-annotated survey containing the opinions ofcertain Muslim scholars, see. E. Kohlberg, “Some Imami Shi’i views on the Sahaba,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam

5 (1984): 143-75 (particularly 143-44, 171-75).72. khayma.com/fnoor/fn0189, 26.05.1999; see also the article “Hal nukaffiru ‘Umum al-Shi’a?” (“Do We Consider All

Shiites to Be Renegades?”), www.fnoor/fno0148, where the author quotes Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayna l-

firaq, 37.73. khayma.com/fnoor/fn0417, 16.06.99.74. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?s, 08.07.03.75. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?s, 08.07.03, quoting al-Hafiz al-Haliki, al-Irshad, vol. I, p.

421; al-Humaydi was well known for his hostility towards the ‘Ulamas of Iraq, see al-Hafiz al-Humaydi, al-Musnad, ed.Habib al-Rahman al-A’zami, Beirut: 1382/1962, p. 7 of the publisher’s introduction.

76. www.d-sunnah.net/forum: Rawafid al-kufa madrib al-mathal fi al-ghadr, 28.03.03.77. Iqaz (bulletin published in London by a group called Rabitat ahl al-Sunna fi Iran, or the “Association of the Sunnite

Iranians”), 03.05.2002 Al-Masuniyya fi khidmat dawlat al-tashayyu’ wa-wilayat al-faqih (Freemasonry at the Service of

the Shia State and of the Government of the Doctors of Religious Law).78. fnoor/fn0051, 29.01.2002. This accusation is quoted on an anti-Shiite website, but one needs only to read what is writ-

ten against Fadl Allah on the websites close to Ayatollah al-Uzma al-Sistani, the great Shiite religious leader of Iraq, to getan idea of the internal struggles within the Shia.

79. See for example, the additions by one of the translators in Arabic of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, AjajNuwayhid,(no place of publication specified), 1967, vol. 1, p. 22, explaining that the “Jews consist of Kabbalists, Talmudists,Freemasons, and Zionists who are all made of the same stuff.” See also the pamphlets of the Turkish general Jawad Rif’atAtilhan that have been widely translated and distributed among Islamist circles; the article: “Hum al-Ýaduww fa-

Hdharuhum – al-masuniyya,” in Filastin al-muslima (Manchester: February 1986), 21-23.80. “The Heterodoxies of the Shiites according to Ibn Hazm,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 28 (1907): 1-80, and

29 (1908): 1-183; idem, “Jewish Arabic Studies,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 2 (1912): 481-561, and 3 (1912): 235-300.

81. “De quelques emprunts d’origine juive dans le Hadith Shi’ite,” in Studies in Judaism and Islam, ed. S. Morag et al.(Jerusalem: 1981), 45-53.

82. “Shiite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980): 165-251.83. “The Place of Judaism and Jews in the Religious Literature of the Ancient Shia” (in Hebrew), Pe’amim: Studies in Oriental

Jewry (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1993): 16-36; “Banu Isra’il ka-anmat awwaliyya li-al-Shi’a” (“The Children of Israelas Prototypes of the Shiites”), al-Karmil: Studies in Arabic Language and Literature 18-19 (Haifa: University of Haifa,1997-8): 49-61.

84. The Umayyads and their auxiliaries called the Ansar. Jews, see for example the letter of Mu’awiya b. Abi Sufyan to thechief Ansari Qays b. Sa’d b. ‘Ubada in al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf, ed. M. Schloessinger and M.J. Kister (Jerusalem :1971), vol. 4a, p. 26.

85. Al-rakiza, Forum 1 message 48, 04.05.02.86. Islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/mahdi_jew.htm. 87. Abu Ja‘far Muhammad b. Ya‘qub al-Kulini, al-Usul min al-Kafi, ed. ‘Ali Akbar al-Ghifari, Beirut, 1401H/1981,I, 397-98.88. The neo-Wahhabi author cites Kitab al-Ghayba by al-Nu‘mani without providing further details. I could not find this tra-

dition in the edition I had (1317 H lithographic edition).89. Al-Irshad, 402.90. Quoted by E. Kohlberg, op. cit. 143-44.91. www.khayma.com/rafidah/tbn/tbninttrz, 13.03.02. 92. www.kotob.hypermart.net/joso4htm, quoting ‘Abd Allah al-Ghunayman, MukhtaÒar Minhaj al-sunna li-Ibn Taymiyya,

I, 12.93. A reference to the Koranic accusation reproaching the Jews with modifying or falsifying their holy scriptures, see for


example Koran, 4 : 46 and 75 ; 5 : 13 and 41. Regarding the word Tora (Pentateuch), it is almost always used in Muslimand Arab sources to refer to the Old Testament as well as to any other Jewish scripture.

94. In fact, the Shiites accuse the Sunnis of distorting the Koran; see R. Brunner, Die Schia und die Koranfälschung, Würz -berg, 2001. The Sunnis’ claims are based on certain Shiite traditions that regard the Fatima mushaf as the complete ver-sion of the Koran. It is much more extensive than the ‘Utman b. ‘Affan mushaf, which makes up the Muslims’ tradition-al Koran.

95. A reference to a tradition recounted in various biographies of the Prophet (siyar nabawiyya) in which the Jew ‘Abd AllÁhb. Sallam asks the Prophet which angel tells him the prophecies. When Muhammad answers it is Gabriel, Ibn Sallamreplies: “He is the enemy of the Jews (dhaka, ya‘ni Jibril, ‘aduww al-Yahud);” see Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, ‘Uyun al-athar fi

funun al-maghazi wa- l-shma’il wa-l-siyar, Beirut, 1974 (2), I, 207; Ahmad b. Zayni Dahlan, al-Sira l-nabawiyya, Beirut,1973, I, 342.

96. This is the opinion of a few Shi‘ite sects from the Middle Ages belonging to the extremist trend (ghulat) who believedthat the archangel Gabriel was mistaken when passing on the prophecy to Muhammad instead of ‘Ali. The best knownsect to adopt this idea is called al-Ghurabiyya, see EI 2, “Ghur biyya,” (I. Goldziher).

97. Quoted by E. Kohlberg, “Some Imami Shi’i views on the Sahaba,” 143-44.98. www.al-rakiza.../Forum 1Message 48, 05.04.02.99.D-sunnah, 64.4.16.250/cgi-bin, in a forum named al-ikthar min dhikr al-jins fi ‘l-kutub wa-‘l-rasa’il al-fiqhiyya lada

kahanat al-Najaf al-akhsaf wa-Qumm al-qumama (The abundance of the mentioning of sex in the priests’ books andJurisprudence epistles of “buried al-Najaf” and “Qumm’s sweepings”). As for Qum, the holy city of the Shiites, it isdescribed as al-qumama (sweepings). The Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem was described in the same way in most Muslimhistorical and polemical sources, until the beginning of the twentieth century, replacing its Arabic name al-Qiyama, theResurrection [of Christ].

100. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread, under the title madha taquluna ya ahla ‘l-Sunna? (What do you have to say,Sunnites?); this is the contribution of a forum member writing under the pseudonym al-Mu’tazz bi-dinihi.

101. Ni‘mat Allah b. ‘Abd Allah al-Jaza’iri (d. 1700-01), a Shi‘ite author, one of those who aided (sa‘ada) al-Majlisi in hishuge work Bihar al-anwar; see Muhsin al-Amin, A’yan al-Shi’a, ed. Hasan al-Amin, Beirut, 1986, vol. 10, 226-27.

102. “Yajuzu ‘ala karahatin idha radiyat, wa- ‘l-ahwatu wujuban tarkuhu” (lawful if she agrees but not recommended – it ispreferable to avoid), www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php_?s. The forum is named nisa’ukum harthun la-kum

(Koran 2 : 223, Your wives are a tillage for you, 20.07.03).103. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread under the title madha taquluna ya ahla ‘l-Sunna? (What do you have to say,

Sunnites?) (al-Mu’tazz bi-dinihi and Asrar‘s contributions); see also R. Paz, “Hizballah or Hizb al-Shaytan: recent Salafi-Jihadi attacks against the Shi’ite group,” PRISM Occasional papers I/2 (2004), www.e-PRISM.org.

104. Al-rakiza…, Forum Messagepage.asp?userNo=489 & Forum No=1&message No= 34,02.04.02.105. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=22593, 08.11.03.106. Al-rakiza, Forum 1 Message 48,05.01.02.107. www.khayma.com/rafidha/tnb/tnbintro.htm,13.01. 02.108. Regarding al-Tijani and his book, see www.aqaed.net, al-mustabsirun (“those who wanted to see the truth” are the

Sunnis who became Shiites). As for al-‘Asqalan’s book, see the fnoor site. A partial response to the al-Tijani book waspublished in English on www.ansar.org/english and titled “Exposing al-Tijani’s lies in his book Then I was guided.” It isattributed to Abu Sulayman.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Isaac Hasson is professor emeritus at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of ArabicLanguage and Literature. The principal focus of his scholarship has been on Jerusalem in Islam,the transition from Jahiliyya to Islam, and contemporary Sunni-Shia relations. His publicationsinclude: Fada’il al-Bayt al-Muqaddas of Abu Bakr al-Wasiti (1979); Le voyage de Sa’id ibnMuhammad al-Suwaysi au Yaman 1890-1895 (2008) (in collaboration with A. Arazi); “MuslimLiterature in Praise of Jerusalem: Fada’il Bayt al-Maqdis,” The Jerusalem Cahedra, 1 (1981); “TheMuslim View of Jerusalem—The Qur’an and Hadith” in J. Prawer and H. Ben-Shammai (eds.),The History of Jerusalem, The Early Muslim Period 638-1099, (1996); “Judham entre la Jahiliyyaet l’Islam,” Studia Islamica (1995); “La conversion de Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan,” JSAI (1998;“Les Shiites vus par les Neo-Wahhabites,” Arabica (2006).

ABOUT THIS SERIES

This second series of research monographs on the Muslim world is the product of a research proj-ect undertaken jointly by Hudson Institute and the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Herzilya,Israel for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The views, opinions,and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed asan official Department of Defense position, policy, or decision.

ABOUT THE CENTER

Hudson Institute’s Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World conducts awide-ranging program of research and analysis addressed to the political, religious, social, and otherdynamics within majority Muslim countries and Muslim populations around the world. A principalfocus of the Center’s work is the ideological dynamic within Islam, and the connected issue of howthis political and religious debate impacts both Islamist radicalism as well as the Muslim search formoderate and democratic alternatives. By focusing on ideology, the Center aims to contribute to thedevelopment of American policy options and to effective strategies to prosecute and to win theworldwide struggle against radical Islam.

To learn more, visit www.futureofmuslimworld.com

ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE

Hudson Institute is a non-partisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research andanalysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. We challenge conventional thinkingand help manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary and collaborative stud-ies in defense, international relations, economics, culture, science, technology, and law. Through pub-lications, conferences and policy recommendations, we seek to guide global leaders in governmentand business.

To learn more, visit www.hudson.org

Contemporary Polemics between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites

Documents

Transcript of Contemporary Polemics between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites