Contagion Systemic Risk in Networks · 21 Systemic Rules – Debt with the system Following...
Transcript of Contagion Systemic Risk in Networks · 21 Systemic Rules – Debt with the system Following...
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Contagion Systemic Risk in Networks
Rodrigo Cifuentes
Head of Financial Research Unit Central Bank of Chile
September 2013
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This paper
• Proposes a measure to contain systemic risk arising from direct interbank exposures.
• Considers three channels of transmission: credit risk, funding risk and runs.
• A policy proposal to contain systemic risk is derived naturally from standard limits for individual risk management.
• Compares results with proposal of limiting interbank exposures among large institutions.
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Agenda
1. Definitions and simulation parameters
2. Interbank market: Risks, limits and policy proposal
3. Simulated Interbank Markets: Methodology
4. Results
5. A real-world case
6. Conclusions
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1. Definitions and simulation parameters
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Risks
• Upon the failure of a bank, we propose to channels it can affect others:
• Credit Risk: A bank cannot pay its obligations. Impact on holders of liabilities of that bank.
• Funding Risk: A bank that fails does not continue providing funds to others. Recipient banks may face losses.
• In addition, the two may combine in a single institution :
• Run: As a consequence of losses suffered by a bank due to credit risk, funding risk may materialise in the form of a run.
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Network: Exposures
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Credit risk
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Contagion
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Funding risk
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Funding risk
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?
?
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Runs
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Parameters
Panel A
Parameter Instrument Contagion Contagion with run
Loss given default Derivatives in foreign currency 20 20
Derivatives in pesos and UF 1.5 1.5
Other intruments 30 30
Funding replace ratio All instruments 50 0
Fire-Sales ratios Cash 90 90
Financial instruments 70 70
Commercial loans 60 60
Mortgages 60 60
Consumption loans 20 20
Panel B
Parameters Value Description
Default IAC <8%
Runs IAC <11%
Runs* Loss in capital>5%
Notes: In runs scenario, if a bank defaults it will not be able to find other funding resources. Therefore, it’s funding replacement ratio turn to zero. For the
case of fictitious exposure matrix, we create five instruments which try to replicate what we seen in the case of Chile.
If IAC falls under the 8% the bank is declared in default.
If IAC falls under the 11% the bank will suffer a run.
If the the bank lost more than 5% and independent of the other
conditions, tha bank will suffer a run.
Table parameters.
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2. Interbank Credit: Risks, Limits and Policy Proposal
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
Bank A Bank B
A E
$
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
Bank A Bank B
AE
r
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
Bank A Bank B
AE
r r
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
Bank A Bank B
AE
r
r
r
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
(problem in A)
Bank A Bank B
AE
Credit risk
r
r
r
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
(problem in B) (problem in A)
Bank A Bank B
AE
Funding risk Credit risk
r
r
r
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Limits to risks in the interbank market
(problem in B) (problem in A)
(problem in A)
Bank A Bank B
E
Funding risk
Run
Credit risk
A
r
r
r
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Systemic Rules – Debt with the system
Following Cifuentes (2003), the systemic rules limit the credit or borrowing of an institution from a system perspective.
The Credit Risk Imposure (𝐶𝑅𝐼) is the relation between the borrowing of a bank and the equity of the rest of the system:
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑗∀𝑗
𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖< 𝜃
Where:
- 𝑑𝑖𝑗 represents the debt of bank 𝑖 to the bank 𝑗,
- 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖 represents the equity of the rest of the system (total equity of the system minus the equity of the bank 𝑖),
- 𝜃 indicates the regulatory limit to this measure.
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Limit risk exposure of the system by limiting Credit Risk Imposure
E
E
E
E
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-Funding
-Run
-Other
Additional shocks
E
E
E
E
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Systemic Rules – Provision of liquidity to the system
Similarly, Liquidity Risk Imposure (𝐿𝑅𝐼) is the relation between the aggregate provision of liquidity of a bank and the assets of the rest of the system.
𝐿𝑅𝐼𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑗∀𝑗
𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖< 𝜗
Where:
- 𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖 is defined as the total assets of the system minus the assets of bank 𝑖.
- 𝜗 is the regulatory limit.
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Aditional dynamics
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Systemic Rules – Bilateral position (BIS)
The systemic rules of the bilateral type ( 𝐵𝑅 ) limit the exposure of a systemic bank to another systemic bank in relation to its own equity.
𝐵𝑅𝑗 =𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐸𝑗 𝐵𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥
Where:
₋ 𝐸𝑗 the equity of bank 𝑗, and
₋ 𝐵𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the threshold.
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3. Simulated interbank markets: Methodology
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Three cases
Table: Parameters
CRI LRI
1 Two peaks [15%-20%] [2.5%-3.0%] 90% 60% 40% 90% 60% 40%
2 Big borrower [15%-20%] Below 1.5% 90% 60% 40% 90% 60% 40%
3 Big lender Below 10% [2.5%-3.0%] 90% 60% 40% 90% 60% 40%
Notes:
- CRI and LRI are the targeted values for Credit Risk Imposure and Liquidity Risk Imposure, respectively.
- Panel B shows the probability of a link between big banks (block 1), small banks (block 3) and medium
banks (block 2), which include all other possible combinations.
- Panel C shows our parametrization of the size of the credit relationship in relation to its regulatory maximum.
It depends on the bank's size (large, medium and small).
Panel A Panel B Panel CCase Description
𝑆
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Model simulated to create different exposure matrix
In each iteration, the process used to create fictitious banking systems (matrix 𝐼𝑀) is the following:
Balance sheet: We obtain a draw for the distribution of total assets from a Chi-square distribution. Both equity and current assets are defined as a percentage of total assets.
Regulatory matrix: We define 𝑅1 (𝑛𝑥𝑛 matrix) as the maximum credit between each pair of banks:
𝑟1𝑖𝑗 = min ( , 𝑥𝐴𝑖; , 𝑥𝐸𝑗)
and 𝑅2 (𝑛𝑥1 vector) that defines the maximum aggregated borrowing for every bank:
𝑟2𝑖 = , 𝑥𝐴𝑖
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Model simulated to create different exposure matrix
Link matrix: We define 𝑃𝐵 (binary matrix 𝑛𝑥𝑛) of random links among banks (Erdos-Renyi), where big banks have a higher probability. For case 2 (3), we consider the lower (upper) triangular matrix of 𝑃𝐵 to be zero.
Matrix proposed: We define the element 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 of matrix 𝐼𝑀 as:
𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝑟1𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 1
where 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is a weight that takes values between 0 and 1 depending on the size of the bank.
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Three cases
Table: Parameters
CRI LRI
1 Two peaks [15%-20%] [2.5%-3.0%] 90% 60% 40% 90% 60% 40%
2 Big borrower [15%-20%] Below 1.5% 90% 60% 40% 90% 60% 40%
3 Big lender Below 10% [2.5%-3.0%] 90% 60% 40% 90% 60% 40%
Notes:
- CRI and LRI are the targeted values for Credit Risk Imposure and Liquidity Risk Imposure, respectively.
- Panel B shows the probability of a link between big banks (block 1), small banks (block 3) and medium
banks (block 2), which include all other possible combinations.
- Panel C shows our parametrization of the size of the credit relationship in relation to its regulatory maximum.
It depends on the bank's size (large, medium and small).
Panel A Panel B Panel CCase Description
𝑆
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Model simulated to create different exposure matrix
Condition 1: If 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 𝑟2𝑖 ∀𝑖 , ∀𝑗 we proceed to the
next condition. If not, we drop 𝐼𝑀 and the process starts again.
Condition 2: Depending on the simulated case, the Credit Risk Imposure and the Liquidity Risk Imposure must be consistent with the desired target. If not, we drop 𝐼𝑀 and the process starts again.
Condition 3: Similarly, if the implied size of the interbank market is consistent with the desired size, we keep 𝐼𝑀 . If not, we drop 𝐼𝑀 and the process starts again.
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Parametrization
Table: Other parameters relevant for simulations
Parameters Value Description
N° banks 24 Number of banks in Chile.
Banks Balance sheet
Equity 10% Percentage of total assets of the bank.
Current assets 95% Idem.
Risk-weighted assets 80% Idem.
Liquid assets 60% Idem.
Limits to interbank Assets and Liabilities
Limit to Credit Risk Exposure 30% Percentage of own equity.
Maximum funding from a given bank 5% Percentage of own current assets.
Maximum interbank funding 40% Percentage of own current assets.
Interbank Market
Size of the interbank market [7%, 10%] Percentage of total assets of the system.
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Interbank markets - Case 1
Figure: Twin peaks - Big borrowers, Big lenders
(percentage of ERS and ARS, respectively)
Source: author’s simulations.
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Interbank markets – Case 2
Figure: Big borrower (percentage of ERS and ARS, respectively)
Source: author’s simulations.
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Interbank markets – Case 3
Figure: Big lender (percentage of ERS and ARS, respectively)
Source: author’s simulations.
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4. Results
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Definition of Systemic Risk
We consider that a bank causes systemic damage if its failure causes losses in other banks above 5% of total equity of the system.
We call “Systemic losses” those caused by all banks in a given simulated interbank market.
We report average SL and p95.
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Effectiveness of Policies
We measure the effectiveness of a policy as the reduction in the losses described.
Relative to initial loss: 𝐸1 = 1 ∗ (𝑆 𝐵𝑃−𝑆 𝐴𝑃
𝑆 𝐵𝑃)
Relative to equity of the system:
𝐸2 = 1 ∗ (𝑆 𝑡𝐵𝑃−𝑆 𝑡
𝐴𝑃
𝐸)
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Case 2: Average effectiveness of Limit to CRI policy
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of initial systemic loss
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Case 2: Reduction in interbank market of Limit to CRI policy
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of initial systemic loss
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2 1 3
SIFI’s
Bilateral Systemic Rule
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2 1 3
SIFI’s
Bilateral Systemic Rule
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2 1 3
SIFI’s
Bilateral Systemic Rule
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Case 2: Equity recovered is significant
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of total equity
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Case 3: Average effectiveness of Limit to LRI policy
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of initial systemic loss
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Case 3: On average, policy has to be more restrictive to attain results
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of initial systemic loss
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Case 3: Under the parameterizations studied, damage is lower than Case 2
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of total equity
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Case 1: Both limits to CRI and to LRI are relevant policies
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of initial systemic loss
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Case 1
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of total equity
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(a) Reduction of losses in equity
In order to determine the optimal combination of policies we need to do a grid search
(b) Equity recovered
Figure: Grid search systemic rules.
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(a) Alternative 1
Optimal policy, for a given reduction in IB market, focuses more on limiting CRI, while LRI only at end
(b) Alternative 2
Figure: Grid search systemic rules.
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Case 1- Optimal policy combination
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of initial systemic loss
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Case 1
Figure: Equity recovered as a fraction of total equity
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6. Conclusions
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Conclusions
In order to limit systemic risk, it seems more effective to limit the overall participation of large banks in the interbank market, rather than focusing on the relations between large institutions.
For the range of parameters described here, limit to CRI seems more effective than limits to LRI when both are relevant.
A simulation framework can provide a rich environment for policy analysis.
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Contagion Systemic Risk in Networks
Rodrigo Cifuentes
Head of Financial Research Unit Central Bank of Chile
September 2013