Constitutional Review Sandoval

8/11/2019 Constitutional Review Sandoval

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

Police Power

1. Define Police Power and clarify its scope.

Held: 1. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has beendefined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, andestablish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, eitherwith penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be forthe good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same . Thepower is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measuresfor public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the ational!egislature. It cannot be e"ercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing

legislative power. The ational !egislature, however, may delegate this power to thePresident and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipalcorporations or local government units. #nce delegated, the agents can e"ercise onlysuch legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,328 !"A 83#, 8$3-8$$, March 2%, 2&&&, 'stDiv. )uno*+

$. The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as toencompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfortand convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature andthe power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if e"ercised for a regulatory andnot revenue%raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.

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'T(he issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city isessentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local governmentunits to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the e"ercise of the policepower of the )tate within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the !ocal*overnment Code. (Aceeo ptical !ompany, Inc. v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 320 !"A3'$, March 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc )urisima*+

2. Does Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (esting !pon the "ecretary of Labor thediscretion to deter#ine what ind!stries are indispensable to the national interest and

thereafter$ ass!#e %!risdiction oer disp!tes in said ind!stries) iolate the wor&ers'constit!tional right to stri&e

Held: )aid article does not interfere with the workers+ right to strike but merelyregulates it, when in the e"ercise of such right, national interests will be affected. Therights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control andlimitation to ensure that they are not e"ercised arbitrarily. The interests of both theemployers and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is givenundue preference.

The !abor Code vests upon the )ecretary of !abor the discretion to determinewhat industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of

the )ecretary of !abor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it willassume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of

jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion ofthe common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to thenational economy. The )ecretary of !abor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, hiscertification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers+ right tostrike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. ()hiltrea orers 4nion)54* v. !on/esor, 2#0 !"A 303, March '2, '00%+

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indispensable attribute of sovereignty3 a power grounded in the primary duty ofgovernment to serve the common need and advance the general welfare . Thus, theright of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without thenecessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions ofcivili-ed countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not byimplication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise

be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that 0'p(rivate property shall not betaken for public use without just compensation. (Art. $ "ec. /). urthermore, the dueprocess and e/ual protection clauses (1/0 Constit!tion$ Art. $ "ec. 1) act asadditional safeguards against the arbitrary e"ercise of this governmental power.

)ince the e"ercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual+s right toprivate property, a constitutionally%protected right necessary for the preservation andenhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life andliberty$ the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasi-ed. In City ofanila . Chinese Co##!nity of anila we said (+ Phil. 3+/ 1/1/)4

The e"ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the )tate,

or by its authori-ed agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and therule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. o species ofproperty is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by theConstitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold ofinhabitants. hen the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater publicpurposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without his consent, the plainmeaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt'ful( interpretation. (4ensley. o!ntainla&e ,ater Co.$ 13 Cal.$ 36 and cases cited 3 A#. Dec.$ 56)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is oneof the most delicate e"ercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealousscrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which

all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citi-ens, constrains the strictobservance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribedas modes of thee"ercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse " " ".

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmlysettled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units,other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislativepower is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only bee"ercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. (6eirs o/ Alertouguitan v. !ity o/ Manaluyong, 328 !"A '3%, '$$-'$#, March '$, 2&&&, 3 rDiv.7onaga-"eyes*+

$. 2minent domain is a fundamental )tate power that is inseparable fromsovereignty. It is government+s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale tothe )tate, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by thenational legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to localgovernments, other public entities and public utilities. or the taking of private propertyby the government to be valid, the taking must be for public purpose and there must be

just compensation. (Moay v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 2#8 !"A 98#, :eruary 2&, '00%+

5. "tate so#e li#itations on the e*ercise of the power of -#inent Do#ain.

Held: The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must bepublic, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The

)upreme Court, taking cogni-ance of such issues as the ade/uacy of compensation,necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, hasruled that the necessity of e"ercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a publiccharacter. *overnment may not capriciously choose what private property should betaken. (Moay v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 2#8 !"A 98#, :eruary 2&, '00%+

6. Disc!ss the e*panded notion of p!blic !se in e#inent do#ain proceedings.

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Held: The City of 5anila, acting through its legislative branch, has the e"presspower to ac/uire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots forsale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low%salariedemployees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the e"propriation of the property does

not diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land andshelter for all who need them.

Corollary to the e"panded notion of public use, e"propriation is not anymoreconfined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that theland sought to be e"propriated in this case is less than half a hectare only.

Through the years, the public use re/uirement in eminent domain has evolvedinto a fle"ible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes thebroader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban landreform and housing. (:ilstream International Incorporate v. !A, 28$ !"A %'#,;an.23, '008 :rancisco*+

. 7he constit!tionality of "ec. /2 of 4.P. 4lg. 001 (re8!iring radio and teleision stationowners and operators to gie to the Co#elec radio and teleision ti#e free ofcharge) was challenged on the gro!nd$ a#ong others$ that it iolated the d!e

process cla!se and the e#inent do#ain proision of the Constit!tion by ta&ingairti#e fro# radio and teleision broadcasting stations witho!t pay#ent of %!stco#pensation. Petitioners clai# that the pri#ary so!rce of reen!e of radio andteleision stations is the sale of airti#e to adertisers and that to re8!ire thesestations to proide free airti#e is to a!thori9e a ta&ing which is not :a de #ini#iste#porary li#itation or restraint !pon the !se of priate property.; ,ill yo! s!stainthe challenge

Held: 6ll broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed bythe government. 6irwave fre/uencies have to be allocated as there are more individualswho want to broadcast than there are fre/uencies to assign. 6 franchise is thus aprivilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance withthe constitutional provision that 0any such franchise or right granted " " " shall be subjectto amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good sore/uires. (Art.


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licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even re/uire thelicensees to render public service by giving free airtime.

The claim that petitioner would be losing P9$,:;


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the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of thedate of the filing of the complaint= " " ".

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with thedetermination by the court of =the just compensation for the property sought to betaken.= This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three >:?

commissioners " " ".

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that e"propriation is said tohave been completed. 5oreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that titleover the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for e"propriationhas been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being e"propriatedremains with the registered owner. Conse/uently, the latter can e"ercise all rightspertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the powerof the )tate ultimately to ac/uire it through e"propriation. ("epulic v. alemInvestment !orporation, et. al., 7.". >o. '3%9#0, ;une 23, 2&&&, 2nDiv. Menoa*+

1. Does the two (2) stages in e*propriation apply only to %!dicial$ and not to legislatie$

e*propriation

Held: The @e la Aamas are mistaken in arguing that the two stages ofe"propriation " " " only apply to judicial, and not to legislative, e"propriation. 6lthoughCongress has the power to determine what land to take, it can not do so arbitrarily.Budicial determination of the propriety of the e"ercise of the power, for instance, in viewof allegations of partiality and prejudice by those adversely affected$ and the justcompensation for the subject property is provided in our constitutional system.

e see no point in distinguishing between judicial and legislative e"propriation asfar as the two stages mentioned above are concerned. oth involve these stages and inboth the process is not completed until payment of just compensation is made. The

Court of 6ppeals was correct in saying that .P. lg. :D< did not effectively e"propriatethe land of the @e la Aamas. 6s a matter of fact, it merely commenced the e"propriationof the subject property.

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The @e la Aamas make much of the fact that ownership of the land wastransferred to the government because the e/uitable and the beneficial title was alreadyac/uired by it in 1E;:, leaving them with only the naked title. Fowever, as this Courtheld in Association of "#all Landowners in the Phil.$ nc. . "ecretary of Agrarian=efor# (15 "C=A 3+3$ 30/ 1/0/)F

The recogni-ed rule, indeed, is that title to the property e"propriated shallpass from the owner to the e"propriator only upon full payment of the justcompensation. Burisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both hereand in other democratic jurisdictions. & " "

("epulic v. alem Investment !orporation, et. al., 7.". >o. '3%9#0, ;une 23, 2&&&,2nDiv. Menoa*+

11. s prior !ns!ccessf!l negotiation a condition precedent for the e*ercise of e#inentdo#ain

Held: Citing ron and "teel A!thority . Co!rt of Appeals (2+/ "C=A 530$Gctober 25$ 1//5)$ petitioner insists that before eminent domain may be e"ercised by

the state, there must be a showing of prior unsuccessful negotiation with the owner ofthe property to be e"propriated.

This contention is not correct. 6s pointed out by the )olicitor *eneral the currenteffective law on delegated authority to e"ercise the power of eminent domain is found in)ection 1$, ook III of the Aevised 6dministrative Code, which provides4

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Held: e reiterate that private respondent is e"empt from the payment ofproperty ta", but not income ta" on the rentals from its property. The bare allegationalone that it is a non%stock, non%profit educational institution is insufficient to justify itse"emption from the payment of income ta".

'!(aws allowing ta" e"emption are construed strictissi#i %!ris. Fence, for the

5C6 to be granted the e"emption it claims under the abovecited provision, it mustprove with substantial evidence that >1? it falls under the classification nonstoc&$ non

profit ed!cational instit!tionJand >$? the income it seeks to be e"empted from ta"ation is!sed act!ally$ directly$ and e*cl!siely for ed!cational p!rposes. Fowever, the Courtnotes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that itmet the said re/uisites. (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. !A, 208 !"A 83,ct. '$, '008 )anganian*+

15. s the ICA an ed!cational instit!tion within the p!riew of Article D?, 6rticle HI of theConstitution, specifically provides4 0o law granting any ta" e"emption shall be passedwithout the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The PC**has absolutely no power to grant ta" e"emptions, even under the cover of its authority tocompromise ill%gotten wealth cases.

2ven granting that Congress enacts a law e"empting the 5arcoses from payingta"es on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the e/ual protectionclause under the ill of Aights. 6ny special grant of ta" e"emption in favor only of the5arcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that0ta"ation shall be uniform and e/uitable.@ (!have v. )!77, 200 !"A %$$, Dec. 0,'008 )anganian*+

1. Disc!ss the p!rpose of ta* treaties

Held: The AP%8) Ta" Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties whichthe Philippines has entered into for the avoidance of double ta"ation. The purpose ofthese international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of thecontracting parties in order to help the ta"payer avoid simultaneous ta"ation in twodifferent jurisdictions. 5ore precisely, the ta" conventions are drafted with a view

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towards the elimination of international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation" " ". (!ommissionero/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%, '&'-'&2, ;une 29,'000, 3rDiv. 7onaga-"eyes*+

10. ,hat is @international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation@

Held: It is defined as the imposition of comparable ta"es in two or more stateson the same ta"payer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.(!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%,'&2, ;une 29, '000+

1/. ,hat is the rationale for doing away with international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation,hat are the #ethods resorted to by ta* treaties to eli#inate do!ble ta*ation

Held: The apparent rationale for doing away with double ta"ation is toencourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technologyand persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamiceconomies. oreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable

international investment climate and the protection against double ta"ation is crucial increating such a climate.

@ouble ta"ation usually takes place when a person is resident of a contractingstate and derives income from, or owns capital in, the other contracting state and bothstates impose ta" on that income or capital. In order to eliminate double ta"ation, a ta"treaty resorts to several methods. irst, it sets out the respective rights to ta" of thestate of source or situs and of the state of residence with regard to certain classes ofincome or capital. In some cases, an e"clusive right to ta" is conferred on one of thecontracting states3 however, for other items of income or capital, both states are giventhe right to ta", although the amount of ta" that may be imposed by the state of source islimited.

The second method for the elimination of double ta"ation applies whenever thestate of source is given a full or limited right to ta" together with the state of residence.In this case, the treaties make it incumbent upon the state of residence to allow relief inorder to avoid double ta"ation. There are two methods of relief % the e"emption methodand the credit method. In the e"emption method, the income or capital which is ta"ablein the state of source or situs is e"empted in the state of residence, although in someinstances it may be taken into account in determining the rate of ta" applicable to theta"payerJs remaining income or capital. #n the other hand, in the credit method,although the income or capital which is ta"ed in the state of source is still ta"able in thestate of residence, the ta" paid in the former is credited against the ta" levied in thelatter. The basic difference between the two methods is that in the e"emption method,

the focus is on the income or capital itself, whereas the credit method focuses upon theta". (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A8%, '&2-'&3, ;une 29, '000+

2. ,hat is the rationale for red!cing the ta* rate in negotiating ta* treaties

Held: In negotiating ta" treaties, the underlying rationale for reducing the ta"rate is that the Philippines will give up a part of the ta" in the e"pectation that the ta"given up for this particular investment is not ta"ed by the other country. (!ommissionero/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%, '&3, ;une 29,'000+

#. THE #ILL OF RI$HTS

The %e Proce&& Cl!%&e

21. Disc!ss the D!e Process Cla!se. Disting!ish s!bstantie d!e process fro#proced!ral d!e process.

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Held: )ection 1 of the ill of Aights lays down what is known as the =dueprocess clause= of the Constitution.

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without properobservance of due process. hen one speaks of due process of law, however, a

distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. Inessence, procedural due process =refers to the method or manner by which the law isenforced,= while substantive due process =re/uires that the law itself, not merely theprocedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.= (!oronav. 4nite 6aror )ilots Association o/ the )hils., 283 !"A 3', Dec. '2, '00%"omero*+

22. =espondents ?nited Karbor Pilots Association of the Philippines arg!e that d!eprocess was not obsered in the adoption of PPAAG o. +/2 which proides thatF:(a)ll e*isting reg!lar appoint#ents which hae been preio!sly iss!ed by the4!rea! of C!sto#s or the PPA shall re#ain alid !p to 31 Dece#ber 1//2 only$; and:(a)ll appoint#ents to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall$ henceforth$

be only for a ter# of one (1) year fro# date of effectiity s!b%ect to renewal orcancellation by the Philippine Ports A!thority after cond!ct of a rigid eal!ation of

perfor#ance$; allegedly beca!se no hearing was cond!cted whereby :releantgoern#ent agencies; and the harbor pilots the#seles co!ld entilate their iews.7hey also contended that the sole and e*cl!sie right to the e*ercise of harbor

pilotage by pilots has beco#e ested and can only be :withdrawn or shortened; byobsering the constit!tional #andate of d!e process of law.

Held: They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment.ortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it hasstressed in the recent case of L!#i8!ed . Kon. -*eea (B.=. o. 11565$ oe#ber10$ 1//)$where it declared that 0>a?s long as a party was given the opportunity to

defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due processof law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 5oreover,this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity toseek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

In the case at bar, respondents /uestioned PP6%6# o.


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efore harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literallyhave to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but fiee"aminations, each followed by actual training and practice. & " "

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them toengage in pilotage until they retire at the age of K< years. This is a vested right. 8nder

the terms of PP6%6# o.


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Held: Considering that in the case at bar, the e"tradition proceeding is only at itsevaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent isnebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greaterweight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner )ecretary ofBustice. & " "

n tilting the balance in faor of the interests of the "tate$ the Co!rt stresses thatit is not r!ling that the priate respondent has no right to d!e process at all thro!gho!tthe length and breadth of the e*tradition proceedings. Procedural due process re/uiresa determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due.)tated otherwise, a prior deter#ination sho!ld be #ade as to whether proced!ral

protections are at all d!e and when they are d!e$ which in t!rn depends on the e*tent towhich an indiid!al will be @conde#ned to s!ffer grieo!s loss.@ e have e"plainedwhy an e"traditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of thee"tradition process. 6s aforesaid, P.@. o. 1o. '30$#9,ct. '%, 2&&&, 1n Banc )uno*+

The E'%!l Protection Cl!%&e

25. -*plain and disc!ss the e8!al protection of the law cla!se.

Held: 1. The e/ual protection of the law is embraced in the concept of dueprocess, as every unfair discrimination offends the re/uirements of justice and fair play.

It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in 6rticle III, )ec. 1, of theConstitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritismor hostility from the government. 6rbitrariness in general may be challenged on thebasis of the due process clause. ut if the particular act assailed partakes of anunwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the e/ualprotection clause.

6ccording to a long line of decisions, e/ual protection simply re/uires that allpersons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferredand responsibilities imposed. )imilar subjects, in other words, should not be treateddifferently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The e/ual protection clause does not re/uire the universal application of the lawson all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result inune/ual protection, as where, for e"ample, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.hat the clause re/uires is e/uality among e/uals as determined according to a validclassification. y classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar toeach other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars .

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()hilippine ;uges Association v. )rao, 22% !"A %&3, %''-%'2, >ov. '', '003, 1nBanc !ru*+

$. The e/ual protection clause e"ists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It isintended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on ine/uality. Aecogni-ingthe e"istence of real difference among men, the e/ual protection clause does not

demand absolute e/uality. It merely re/uires that all persons shall be treated alike,under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilitiesenforced. Thus, the e/ual protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications " "". If the classification is based on real and substantial differences3 is germane to thepurpose of the law3 applies to all members of the same class3 and applies to current aswell as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating theConstitutionJs e/ual protection guarantee. 6 distinction based on real and reasonableconsiderations related to a proper legislative purpose " " " is neither unreasonable,capricious nor unfounded. (6imagan v. )eople, 23% !"A 938, ct. %, '00$, 1n Bancapunan*+

26. Congress enacted =.A. o. 010/ which proides$ in "ection ++ thereof$ that @o

-lection Gfficer shall hold office in a partic!lar city or #!nicipality for #ore than fo!r(+) years. Any election officer who$ either at the ti#e of the approal of this Act ors!bse8!ent thereto$ has sered for at least fo!r (+) years in a partic!lar city or#!nicipality shall a!to#atically be reassigned by the Co##ission to a new stationo!tside the original congressional district.@ Petitioners$ who are City and !nicipal-lection Gfficers$ theori9e that "ection ++ of =A 010/ is iolatie of the @e8!al

protection cla!se@ of the 1/0 Constit!tion beca!se it singles o!t the City and!nicipal -lection Gfficers of the CG-L-C as prohibited fro# holding office in thesa#e city or #!nicipality for #ore than fo!r (+) years. 7hey #aintain that there is nos!bstantial distinction between the# and other CG-L-C officials$ and therefore$there is no alid classification to %!stify the ob%ectie of the proision of law !nderattac&. =esole.

Held: The Court is not persuaded by petitionersJ arguments. The =e/ualprotection clause= of the 1E;K Constitution permits a valid classification under thefollowing conditions4

1? The classification must rest on substantial distinction3$? The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law3:? The classification must not be limited to e"isting conditions only3 andD? The classification must apply e/ually to all members of the same class.

6fter a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under)ection DD of A6 ;1;E satisfies the aforestated re/uirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to =ensure the impartiality of electionofficials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place ofassignment= does not violate the e/ual protection clause of the Constitution.

In L!t9 . Araneta (/0 Phil. 1+0$ 153 1/55)$it was held that =the legislature is notre/uired by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of Jall or noneJ=. This is so forunderinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true thatall other officers of C#52!2C referred to by petitioners are e"posed to the same evilssought to be addressed by the statute. Fowever, in this case, it can be discerned thatthe legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served bybreaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every

link thereof. Herily, under )ection :>n? of A6 ;1;E, election officers are the highestofficials or authori-ed representatives of the C#52!2C in a city or municipality. It issafe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large%scale anomalies in theregistration of voters can hardly be carried out. (Agripino A. De 7uman, ;r., et al. v.!M1


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the p!blic of 8!alifications and progra# of goern#ent of candidates and politicalparties d!ring the ca#paign period Disc!ss.

Held: There are important differences in the characteristics of the two mediawhich justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. ecause of thephysical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity,

allocate broadcast fre/uencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similarjustification for government allocation and regulation of the print media.

In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposedon the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that the government spends publicfunds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do inthe case of print media. To re/uire radio and television broadcast industry to providefree airtime for the Comelec Time is a fair e"change for what the industry gets.

rom another point of view, the )C has also held that because of the uni/ue andpervasive influence of the broadcast media, 0'n(ecessarily " " " the freedom of televisionand radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to

newspaper and print media. (51K? years old. 6pparently, the death penalty law makes no distinction. Itapplies to all persons and to all classes of persons G rich or poor, educated oruneducated, religious or non%religious. o particular person or classes of persons are

identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be e"clusively imposed. Thelaw punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below sevenyears of age. Thus, the perpetration of rape against a 9%year old girl does not absolve ore"empt an accused from the imposition of the death penalty by the fact that he is poor,uneducated, jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction. To hold otherwise will noteliminate but promote ine/ualities.

In Cecilleille =ealty and "erice Corporation . CA$ 20 "C=A 01/ 1//)$ the)C clarified that compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society butonly when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. ()eople v.;immy Miano y 5amora, 7.". >o. '20''2, ;uly 23, '000, 1n Banc )er !uriam*+

2/. 7he nternational "chool Alliance of -d!cators ("A-) 8!estioned the pointofhireclassification e#ployed by nternational "chool$ nc. to %!stify distinction in salaryrates between foreignhires and localhires$ i.e.$ salary rates of foreignhires arehigher by 25 than their local co!nterparts$ as discri#inatory and$ therefore$ iolatesthe e8!al protection cla!se. 7he nternational "chool contended that this isnecessary in order to entice foreignhires to leae their do#icile and wor& here.=esole.

Held: That public policy abhors ine/uality and discrimination is beyondcontention. #ur Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. & " "

International law, which springs from general principles of law$ likewise

proscribes discrimination " " ". The 8niversal @eclaration of Fuman Aights, theInternational Covenant on 2conomic, )ocial and Cultural Aights, the InternationalConvention on the 2limination of 6ll orms of Aacial @iscrimination, the Conventionagainst @iscrimination in 2ducation, the Convention >o. 111? Concerning @iscriminationin Aespect of 2mployment and #ccupation % all embody the general principle againstdiscrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through itsConstitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

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'I(t would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the )tate,in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure e/ual employmentopportunities, closes its eyes to une/ual and discriminatory terms and conditions ofemployment " " ".

@iscrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the !abor

Code. 6rticle 1:9, for e"ample, prohibits and penali-es the payment of lessercompensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of e/ualvalue. 6rticle $D; declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate inregards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labororgani-ation. & " "

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionali-e in this jurisdiction the longhonored legal truism of =2/ual pay for e/ual work.= Persons who work with substantiallye/ual /ualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should bepaid similar salaries. This rule applies to the )chool >International )chool, Inc.?, its=international character= notwithstanding.

The )chool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local%hiresperform work e/ual to that of foreign%hires. The Court finds this argument a littlecavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, thepresumption is that these employees perform e/ual work. This presumption is borne bylogic and human e"perience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it isnot for that employee to e"plain why he receives less or why the others receive more.That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against thatemployee3 it is for the employer to e"plain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidencehere that foreign%hires perform $9M more efficiently or effectively than the local%hires.oth groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar

working conditions.

The )chool cannot invoke the need to entice foreign%hires to leave their domicileto rationali-e the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of e/ual workfor e/ual pay.

& " "

hile we recogni-e the need of the )chool to attract foreign%hires, salariesshould not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local%hires. The local%hiresperform the same services as foreign%hires and they ought to be paid the same salariesas the latter. or the same reason, the =dislocation factor= and the foreign%hiresJ limited

tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. Thedislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign%hires are ade/uately compensatedby certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local%hires, such as housing,transportation, shipping costs, ta"es and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the )tate to =protect the rights of workers and promotetheir welfare=, =to afford labor full protection.= The )tate, therefore, has the right andduty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merelycontractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collectivebargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. )hould suchcontracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate tostrike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point%of%hire classification employed by respondent)chool to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign%hires and local%hires to be aninvalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services renderedby foreign%hires and local%hires. The practice of the )chool of according higher salariesto foreign%hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathyof this Court. (International chool Alliance o/ 1ucators (IA1+ v. 6on.


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3. Acc!sedappellant =o#eo B. Ealos%os filed a #otion before the Co!rt as&ing that hebe allowed to f!lly discharge the d!ties of a Congress#an$ incl!ding attendance atlegislatie sessions and co##ittee #eetings despite his haing been conicted inthe first instance of a nonbailable offense. Does being an electie official res!lt in as!bstantial distinction that allows different treat#ent s being a Congress#an a

s!bstantial differentiation which re#oes the acc!sedappellant as a prisoner fro#the sa#e class as all persons alidly confined !nder law

Held: In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a /uestion ofconstitutional e/ual protection.

& " "

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers hasnever been an e"cuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the0mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused%appellant asserts that the duty tolegislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused%appellant is only

one of $9< members of the Fouse of Aepresentatives, not to mention the $D members ofthe )enate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well inthe physical absence of one or a few of its members. @epending on the e"igency of*overnment that has to be addressed, the President or the )upreme Court can also bedeemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends onthe need for its e"ercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compellingunder the law of nature. 6 doctor with uni/ue skills has the duty to save the lives ofthose with a particular affliction. 6n elective governor has to serve provincialconstituents. 6 police officer must maintain peace and order. ever had the call of aparticular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who arevalidly restrained by law.

6 strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidiousdiscriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals .

The Court cannot validate badges of ine/uality. The necessities imposed bypublic welfare may justify e"ercise of government authority to regulate even if therebycertain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

e, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not areasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of theoffice are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interruptedin their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. !awful arrest and confinementare germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same

class.

& " "

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes anindividual+s status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job ofpreserving the security in a potentially e"plosive setting, as well as of attempting toprovide rehabilitation that prepare inmates for re%entry into the social mainstream.ecessarily, both these demands re/uire the curtailment and elimination of certainrights.

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused%appellant+s

claim that re%election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, includingthe police power of the )tate. ()eople v. ;alosos, 32$ !"A #80, :e. 3, 2&&&, 1nBanc nares-antiago*+

The Ri(ht !(!in&t Unre!&on!)le Se!rche& !nd Sei*%re&

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31. Disc!ss the constit!tional re8!ire#ent that a %!dge$ in iss!ing a warrant of arrest$#!st deter#ine probable ca!se :personally.; Disting!ish deter#ination of probableca!se by the prosec!tor and deter#ination of probable ca!se by the %!dge.

Held: It must be stressed that the 1E;K Constitution re/uires the judge todetermine probable cause 0personally, a re/uirement which does not appear in the

corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intentof the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than thatimposed under previous Constitutions.

In "olien . a&asiar$ this Court pronounced4

0hat the Constitution underscores is the e"clusive and personalresponsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the e"istence of probablecause. In satisfying himself of the e"istence of probable cause for the issuanceof a warrant of arrest, the judge is not re/uired to personally e"amine thecomplainant and his witnesses. ollowing established doctrine and procedure,he shall4 >1? personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents

submitted by the fiscal regarding the e"istence of probable cause and, on thebasis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest3 or >$? if in the basis thereof he finds noprobable cause, he may disregard the fiscal+s report and re/uire the submissionof supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as tothe e"istence of probable cause.

Ko . People (bid.) summari-es e"isting jurisprudence on the matter as follows4

0!est we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasi-e three vital mattersonce more4 >irst$ as held in nting$ the determination of probable cause by theprosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge.hether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the

offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should beissued against the accused, i.e.$ whether there is a necessity for placing himunder immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, evenif both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence,there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

"econd$ since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solelyon the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance ofa warrant of arrest. #bviously and understandably, the contents of theprosecutor+s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to chargethe accused for an offense and hold him for trial. Fowever, the judge must

decide independently. Fence, he must have supporting evidence, other than theprosecutor+s barereport, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on thee"istence >or none"istence? of probable cause to issue an arrest order. Thisresponsibility of determining personally and independently the e"istence ornone"istence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basiclaw of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the

judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only theinformation and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much ofthe records and the evidence on hand as to enable the Fis Fonor to make hispersonal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly$ it is not re/uired that the co#plete or entire records of the case

during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and e"amined by the judge.e do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to e"amine thecomplete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering thearrest of an accused. hat is re/uired, rather, is that the judge must haves!fficient supporting documents >such as the complaint, affidavits, counter%affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, ifany? upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, uponwhich to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the e"istence of probable

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cause. The point is4 he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor+srecommendation, as Aespondent Court did in this case. 6lthough the prosecutorenjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official dutiesand functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, theConstitution, we repeat, commands the judge topersonallydetermine probablecause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that

a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or thereport of the investigating officer. (Citations o#itted)

In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the /uestioned warrantas there was 0no reason for >him? to doubt the validity of the certification made by the

6ssistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probablecause was found to e"ist as against those charged in the information filed. Thestatement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on thecertification made by the fiscal that probable cause e"ists as against those charged inthe information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of theprosecutor+s findings and recommendations. Fe adopted the judgment of the prosecutorregarding the e"istence of probable cause as his own. (Aula v. 7uiani, 32# !"A ',

:e. '8, 2&&&, 3rDiv. 7onaga-"eyes*+

32. n an application for search warrant$ the application was acco#panied by a s&etch ofthe co#po!nd at 516 "an Eose de la ontana "t.$ abolo$ Ceb! City$ indicating the2storey residential ho!se of priate respondent with a large :


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that specified in the warrant G is e"actly what they had in view when they applied for thewarrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. hat is material indetermining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not whatapplicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to thecourt issuing the warrant. ()eople v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 20' !"A $&&, ;une 2#, '008>arvasa*+

3+. ,hat is :search incidental to a lawf!l arrest; Disc!ss.

Held: hile a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected todiscover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of thecrime and which search may e"tend to the area within his immediate control where hemight gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest mustprecede the search. The process cannot be reversed.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrestdetermines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is/uestioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely

used as a prete"t for conducting a search. In this instance, the law re/uires thatthere be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made G the process cannotbe reversed. (alacat . Co!rt of Appeals$ 203 "C=A 15/$ 15 1//)

()eople v. !hua 6o an, 3&8 !"A $32, ;une '%, '000, 1n Banc Davie, ;r., !.;.*+

35. ,hat is the :plain iew; doctrine ,hat are its re8!isites Disc!ss.

Held: 1. #bjects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in theposition to have that view are subject to sei-ure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. The 0plain view doctrine applies when the followingre/uisites concur4 >a? the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior

justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area3

>b? the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent3 >c? it is immediatelyapparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,contraband or otherwise subject to sei-ure. The law enforcement officer must lawfullymake an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly viewthe area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece ofevidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and itsdiscovery inadvertent.

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly e"posed tosight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. here theobject sei-ed was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view andtherefore cannot be sei-ed without a warrant. Fowever, if the package proclaims its

contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents areobvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei-ed. In otherwords, if the package is such that an e"perienced observer could infer from itsappearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may beevidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to sei-ure. ()eople v. Doria, 3&'!"A ##8, ;an. 22, '000, 1n Banc )uno, ;.*+

$. or the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present4

a? a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the policeare legally present in the pursuit of their official duties3

b? the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right tobe where they are3 and

c? the evidence must be immediately apparent3 andd? plain view justified mere sei-ure of evidence without further search.

In the instant case, recall that P#$ alut testified that they first located themarijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Fence, there was novalid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant+s premises. ote further

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that the police team was dispatched to appellant+s &ainginprecisely to search for anduproot the prohibited flora. The sei-ure of evidence in 0plain view applies only wherethe police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertentlycomes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plantswas not inadvertent. e also note the testimony of )P#$ Tipay that upon arriving at thearea, they first had to 0look around the area before they could spot the illegal plants.

Patently, the sei-ed marijuana plants were not 0immediately apparent and 0furthersearch was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in /uestion were not in 0plain view or0open to eye and hand. The 0plain view doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

or can we sustain the trial court+s conclusion that just because the marijuanaplants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection affordedby the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the )tate. The right againstunreasonable searches and sei-ures is the immunity of one+s person, which includes hisresidence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to 0the right ofpersonal security of the individual. & " ", what is sought to be protected against the)tate+s unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not onlymean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a

person to be immune against unreasonable searches and sei-ures, he must be in hishome or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The ill of Aights belongs asmuch to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.()eople v. Ae Vale, 7.". >o. '2020#, ept. 29, 2&&&, 1n Banc Cuisuming*+

:. Considering its factual milieu, this case falls s/uarely under the plain iewdoctrine. & " ".

hen )pencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of P#$ *aviola, heinstinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buy%bust teamwere justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant forthey were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. #nce inside the house, the police

officers cornered )pencer and recovered the buy%bust money from him. They alsocaught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in fullview on top of a table. & " ".

Fence, appellant+s subse/uent arrest was likewise lawful, coming as it is withinthe purview of )ection 9>a? of Aule 11: of the 1E;9 Aules on Criminal Procedure " " ".

)ection 9>a? is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.Fere two elements must concur4 >1? the person to be arrested must e"ecute an overt actindicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit acrime3 and >$? such overt act is done in the presence or within the iew of the arrestingofficer. Thus, when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were

not only authori-ed but also duty%bound to arrest him even without a warrant. ()eoplev. 1lamparo, 320 !"A $&$, $'$-$'9, March 3', 2&&&, 2nDiv. Cuisuming*+

36. ,hat is a :stopandfris&; search

Held: 1. In the landmark case of 7erry . Ghio (2 L -d 2d 00/J 00 " Ct 1060$3/2 ?" 1$ /$ E!ne 1$ 1/60)$ a stop%and%frisk was defined as the vernaculardesignation of the right of a police officer to stop a citi-en on the street, interrogate him,and pat him for weapon>s?4

0" " " >?here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leadshim reasonably to conclude in light of his e"perience that criminal activity may be

afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presentlydangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifiedhimself as a policeman and make reasonable in/uiries, and where nothing in theinitial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own orothers+ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area toconduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in anattempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. )uch a searchis a reasonable search under the ourth 6mendment, and any weapon sei-ed

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may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they weretaken. (Kerrera$ A Kandboo& on Arrest$ "earch and "ei9!re and C!stodialnestigation$ 1//5 ed.$ p. 105J and 7erry . Ghio$ s!pra$ p. /11)

In allowing such a search, the 8nited )tates )upreme Court held that the interestof effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person,

in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminalbehavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.

In admitting in evidence two guns sei-ed during the stop%and%frisk, the 8))upreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediateinterest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whomhe was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could une"pectedly and fatally beused against him.

It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable,obtain advance judicial approval of searches and sei-ures through the warrantprocedure, e"cused only by e"igent circumstances. (Manalili v. !A, 28& !"A $&&,

ct. 0, '00% )anganian*+

$. e now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a 0stop%and%frisk as a 0limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons, as laid down in 7erry$thus4

e merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusualconduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his e"perience thatcriminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing maybe armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating thisbehavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable in/uiries,and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his

reasonable fear for his own or others+ safety, he is entitled for the protection ofhimself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outerclothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be usedto assault him. )uch a search is a reasonable search under the ourth

6mendment (7erry$ at /11. n fact$ the Co!rt noted that the Msole %!stification' fora stopandfris& was the Mprotection of the police officer and others nearby'J whilethe scope of the search cond!cted in the case was li#ited to patting down theo!ter clothing of petitioner and his co#panions$ the police officer did not placehis hands in their poc&ets nor !nder the o!ter s!rface of their gar#ents !ntil hehad felt weapons$ and then he #erely reached for and re#oed the g!ns. 7hisdid not constit!te a general e*ploratory search$ d.)

#ther notable points of 7erryare that while probable cause is not re/uired toconduct a 0stop%and%frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will notvalidate a 0stop%and%frisk. 6 genuine reason must e"ist, in light of the police officer+se"perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detainedhas weapons concealed about him. inally, a 0stop%and%frisk serves a two%fold interest4>1? the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies therecognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in anappropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminalbehavior even without probable cause3 and >$? the more pressing interest of safety andself%preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that theperson with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could une"pectedlyand fatally be used against the police officer. (Malacat v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 283 !"A

'90, Dec. '2, '00% Davie*+

3. Are searches at chec&points alid Disc!ss.

Held: 6ccused%appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in /uestionwas conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the 5akatiPolice should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conductedin an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

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e take judicial notice of the e"istence of the C#52!2C resolution imposing agun ban during the election period issued pursuant to )ection 9$>c? in relation to )ection$L>/? of the #mnibus 2lection Code >atas Pambansa lg. ;;1?. The national and localelections in 1EE9 were held on ; 5ay, the second 5onday of the month. The incident,which happened on 9 6pril 1EE9, was well within the election period.

This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which arewarranted by the e"igencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive tomotorists are allowed. or, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certaine"tent, on motorists+ right to 0free passage without interruption, but it cannot be deniedthat, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle+soccupants are re/uired to answer a brief /uestion or two. or as long as the vehicle isneither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of thevehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violativeof an individual+s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, whenconducted in a fi"ed area, are even less intrusive.

The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced bythe C#52!2C. The C#52!2C would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputi-edagents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purposefor which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said periodwould know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their maliciousdesigns.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutionalrights of the accused against illegal search and sei-ure. P#: )uba admitted that theywere merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows areheavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. 6t best theywould merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the

car+s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothingdiscriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.

e see no need for checkpoints to be announced " " ". ot only would it beimpractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. 2ven so, badgesof legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fi"ed location and theregulari-ed manner in which they are operated. ()eople v. 4sana, 323 !"A %9$,;an. 28, 2&&&, 'stDiv. Davie, !;*+

30. Do the ordinary rights against !nreasonable searches and sei9!res apply tosearches cond!cted at the airport p!rs!ant to ro!tine airport sec!rity proced!res

Held: Persons may lose the protection of the search and sei-ure clause bye"posure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack ofsubjective e"pectation of privacy, which e"pectation society is prepared to recogni-e asreasonable. )uch recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. ith increasedconcern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at thenation+s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass throughmetal detectors3 their carry%on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinelysubjected to "%ray scans. )hould these procedures suggest the presence of suspiciousobjects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There islittle /uestion that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, thegravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy e"pectations associatedwith airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address

systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, ifany prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to sei-ure.These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutionalprotections against warrantless searches and sei-ures do not apply to routine airportprocedures.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtainedthrough a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused%

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appellant herein. Corollarily, her subse/uent arrest, although likewise without warrant,was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of 0shabu in herperson in flagrante delicto.()eople v.


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forfeiture proceedings has e*cl!sie %!risdiction to hear and determine all/uestions touching on the sei-ure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The AegionalTrial Courts are precluded from assuming cogni-ance over such matters eventhrough petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

It is likewise well%settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs

Code and that of Aepublic 6ct o. 11$9, as amended, otherwise known as 06n6ct Creating the Court of Ta" 6ppeals, specify the proper fora and procedure forthe ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning theseproceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to theCommissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the e"clusiveappellate jurisdiction of the Court of Ta" 6ppeals and from there to the Court of

6ppeals.

The rule that Aegional Trial Courts have no review powers over suchproceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance onthe government+s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds uponCustoms, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of

import and e"port duties due the )tate, which enables the government to carryout the functions it has been instituted to perform.

2ven if the sei-ure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, " " " we havesaid that such act does not deprive the ureau of Customs of jurisdictionthereon.

Aespondents cite the statement of the Court of 6ppeals that regular courts stillretain jurisdiction 0where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is seriousdoubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs jurisdiction throughsei-ureNforfeiture proceedings. They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the/uestion of whether probable cause e"ists for the sei-ure of the subject sacks of rice is

not for the Aegional Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have toprove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were importedfrom abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may e"ercise the powerto effect customs+ searches, sei-ures, or arrests provided by law and continue with theadministrative hearings. 6s the Court held in Ponce -nrile . Hin!ya (3 "C=A 301$30030/ 1/1$ reiterated in Eao . Co!rt of Appeals$ s!pra and ison . atiidad$ 213"C=A 3+ 1//2)4

The governmental agency concerned, the ureau of Customs, is vested withe"clusive authority. 2ven if it be assumed that in the e"ercise of such e"clusivecompetence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can besaid is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred

may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly acourt of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of theabove decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before theCollector of Customs is not final. 6n appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customsand thereafter to the Court of Ta" 6ppeals. It may even reach this Court throughthe appropriate petition for review. 7he proper entilation of the legal iss!esraised is th!s indicated. Certainly a co!rt of first instance is not therein incl!ded.t is deoid of %!risdiction.

(Bureau o/ !ustoms v. gario, 320 !"A 280, 20#-208, March 3&, 2&&&, 2nDiv.Menoa*+

The Pri+!c, of Comm%nic!tion& !nd Corre&-ondence

+2. Priate respondent =afael ". Grtane9 filed with the =egional 7rial Co!rt of N!e9onCity a co#plaint for ann!l#ent of #arriage with da#ages against petitioner 7eresita"alcedoGrtane9$ on gro!nds of lac& of #arriage license andOor psychologicalincapacity of the petitioner. A#ong the e*hibits offered by priate respondent werethree (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conersations between petitioner and!nidentified persons. 7he trial co!rt iss!ed the assailed order ad#itting all of the

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eidence offered by priate respondent$ incl!ding tape recordings of telephoneconersations of petitioner with !nidentified persons. 7hese tape recordings were#ade and obtained when priate respondent allowed his friends fro# the #ilitary towire tap his ho#e telephone. Did the trial co!rt act properly when it ad#itted ineidence said tape recordings

Held: Aepublic 6ct o. D$L? years for violation of said 6ct. (alceo-rtane v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 239!"A ''', Aug. $, '00$ )ailla*+

The Ri(ht to Pri+!c,

+3. s there a constit!tional right to priacy

Held: The essence of privacy is the 0right to be let alone. In the 1EL9 case ofBriswold . Connectic!t (301 ?.". +/$ 1+ l. ed. 2D 51 1/65)$ the 8nited )tates)upreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the righthas a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found

within the penumbras of the irst, Third, ourth, ifth and inth 6mendments. In the1EL; case of orfe . !t!c (22 "C=A +2+$ +++++5)$ we adopted the Briswold rulingthat there is a constit!tional right to priacy.

The )C clarified that the right of privacy is recogni-ed and enshrined in severalprovisions of our Constitution. It is e"pressly recogni-ed in )ection :>1? of the ill ofAights. #ther facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the illof Aights, i.e.$)ecs. 1, $, L, ;, and 1K. (ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89, ;uly 23,'008 )uno*+

++. dentify the 9ones of priacy recogni9ed and protected in o!r laws.

Held: The Ciil Codeprovides that 0'e(very person shall respect the dignity,personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons and punishesas actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy ofanother. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable fordamages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recogni-esthe privacy of letters and other private communications. The =eised Penal Codemakes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrialsecrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special lawslikethe 6nti%iretapping !aw >A.6. D$


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6.#. o. :$? the need toreduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations bypersons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling

enough to warrant the issuance of 6.#. o. :


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scr!tiny. t will not do for the a!thorities to ino&e the pres!#ption of reg!larity in theperfor#ance of official d!ties. or is it eno!gh for the a!thorities to proe that their actis not irrational for a basic right can be di#inished$ if not defeated$ een when thegoern#ent does not act irrationally. 7hey #!st satisfactorily show the presence ofco#pelling state interest and that the law$ r!le$ or reg!lation is narrowly drawn to

precl!de ab!ses. This approach is demanded by the 1E;K Constitution whose entire

matri" is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case ofdoubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger therights protected by the Constitution.

7he right to priacy is one of the #ost threatened rights of #an liing in a #asssociety. The threats emanate from various sources G governments, journalists,employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the e"ecutivebranch of government which by issuing 6.#. o. :o. '2%#89, ;uly 23, '008 )uno*+

+6. "ho!ld in ca#era inspection of ban& acco!nts be allowed f in the affir#atie$!nder what circ!#stances sho!ld it be allowed

Held: The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for herfailure to produce the documents re/uested by the #mbudsman. 6nd whether the orderof the #mbudsman to have an in ca#era inspection of the /uestioned account isallowed as an e"ception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits >A.6. o. 1D


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$? In an e"amination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank toconduct its regular audit provided that the e"amination is for audit purposesonly and the results thereof shall be for the e"clusive use of the bank,

:? 8pon written permission of the depositor,D? In cases of impeachment,9? 8pon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of

public officials, orL? In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the

litigation.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competentauthority. hat is e"isting is an investigation by the #ffice of the #mbudsman. In short,what the #ffice of the #mbudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence toformally charge 6mado !agdameo, et. al.$with the )andiganbayan. Clearly, there wasno pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account forinspection.

ones of privacy are recogni-ed and protected in our laws. The Civil Code

provides that 0'e(very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace ofmind of his neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several actsfor meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer oremployee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights andliberties of another person, and recogni-es the privacy of letters and other privatecommunications. The Aevised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets byan officer, revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasionof privacy is an offense in special laws like the anti%iretapping !aw $ the "ecrecy of4an& Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code. (


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+0. Does the cond!ct of e*it poll by A4" C4 present a clear and present danger ofdestroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process as it has the tendencyto sow conf!sion considering the rando#ness of selecting interiewees$ whichf!rther #a&es the e*it poll highly !nreliable$ to %!stify the pro#!lgation of a Co#elecresol!tion prohibiting the sa#e

Held: )uch arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. >irst$bythe very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, sothat the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the generalsentiment or view of the community or group polled. "econd$ the survey result is notmeant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of theopinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. >inally$not at stake are thecredibility and the integrity of the elections, which are e"ercises that are separate andindependent from the e"it polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of e"it pollscannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If atall, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

The C#52!2C+s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of e"it pollsG disorder and confusion in the voting centers G does not justify a total ban on them.8ndoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Aesolution is too broad, since its application iswithout /ualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing,however, that e"it polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers.either has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of e"it poll reportersnear an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.

5oreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of e"it poll data andtheir use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derivedfrom them, based on the voters+ answers to the survey /uestions will forever remainunknown and une"plored. 8nless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social

scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact ofcurrent events and of election%day and other factors on voters+ choices.

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. Itdoes not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type ofinformation obtained through e"it polling. #n the other hand, there are other valid andreasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimi-ingdisorder and confusion that may be brought about by e"it surveys.

ith foregoing premises, it is concluded that the interest of the state in reducingdisruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteedrights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections,

e"it polls G properly conducted and publici-ed G can be vital tools for the holding ofhonest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections3 and for the elimination of election%fi"ing,fraud and other electoral ills. (AB-!B> Broacasting !orporation v. !M1air -lection Act) which proidesF :"!reys affectingnational candidates shall not be p!blished fifteen (15) days before an election ands!reys affecting local candidates shall not be p!blished seen () days before anelection.; 7he "ocial ,eather "tations$ nc. (",")$ a priate nonstoc&$ nonprofitsocial research instit!tion cond!cting s!reys in ario!s fieldsJ and a#ahalanP!blishing Corporation$ p!blisher of the anila "tandard$ a newspaper of generalcirc!lation$ which feat!res newsworthy ite#s of infor#ation incl!ding election

s!reys$ challenged the constit!tionality of aforesaid proision as it constit!tes aprior restraint on the e*ercise of freedo# of speech witho!t any clear and presentdanger to %!stify s!ch restraint. "ho!ld the challenge be s!stained

Held: or reason hereunder given, we hold that )ection 9.D of A.6. o. E


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To be sure, )ection 9.D lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, e"pression,and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affectingcandidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen >19? days immediately preceding anational election and seven >K? days before a local election. ecause of the preferredstatus of the constitutional rights of speech, e"pression, and the press, such a measureis vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, 0any system of prior restraints

of e"pression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionalvalidity " " ". The *overnment Othus carries a heavy burden of showing justification forthe enforcement of such restraint.+ There is thus a reversal of the normal presumptionof validity that inheres in every legislation.

or may it be argued that because of 6rt. I&%C, )ec. D of the Constitution, whichgives the Comelec supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utili-ation of franchisefor the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to ameasure like )ec. 9.D. or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on mediapolitical advertisements, the grant of power to the Comelec under 6rt. I&%C, )ec. D islimited to ensuring 0e/ual opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply as well asuniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for 0public

information campaigns and forums among candidates.

& " "

or can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that there areother countries " " " which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of electionsurveys. 6t best this survey is inconclusive. It is noteworthy that in the 8nited )tates norestriction on the publication of election survey results e"ists. It cannot be argued thatthis is because the 8nited )tates is a mature democracy. either are there lawsimposing an embargo on survey results, even for a limited period, in other countries. & "".

hat test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of)ection 9.D7 The 8nited )tates )upreme Court " " " held in ?nited "tates . G' 4rienF

'6( government regulation is sufficiently justified >1? if it is within the constitutionalpower of the government3 >$? if it furthers an important or substantialgovernmental interest3 >:? if the governmental interest is unrelated to thesuppression of free e"pression3 and >D? if the incidental restriction on allegedirst 6mendment freedoms >of speech, e"pression and press? is no greater thanis essential to the furtherance of that interest (3/1 ?.". 36$ 2 L. -d. 2d 6/2$60 1/60 brac&eted n!#bers added).

This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content%based from

content%neutral regulations and is said to have 0become canonical in the review of suchlaws. It is noteworthy that the G' 4rientest has been applied by this Court in at leasttwo cases (Adiong . Co#elec$ 2 "C=A 12 1//2J Gs#ena . Co#elec$ s!pra.).

8nder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmentalinterest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is 0not unrelated to thesuppression of free e"pression. 5oreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to thesuppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restrictionon freedom of e"pression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmentalpurpose in /uestion.

#ur in/uiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to

)ec. 9.D.

>irst. )ec. 9.D fails to meet criterion >:? of the G' 4rien test because the causalconnection of e"pression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest 0notunrelated to the suppression of free e"pression. y prohibiting the publication ofelection survey results because of the possibility that such publication might underminethe integrity of the election, )ec. 9.D actually suppresses a whole class of e"pression,while allowing the e"pression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by

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newspaper columnists, radio and TH commentators, armchair theorists, and otheropinion makers. In effect, )ec. 9.D shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if notviewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutionalguarantee of freedom of e"pression means that 0the government has no power to restricte"pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its contents. Theinhibition of speech should be upheld only if the e"pression falls within one of the few

unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplins&y . ew Ka#pshire (315 ?.". 560$ 5152$ 06 L. -d. 131$ 135 1/+2)$ thus4

There are certain well%defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, theprevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise anyConstitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, thelibelous, and the insulting or Ofighting+ words G those which by their very utteranceinflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. ')(uchutterances are no essential part of any e"position of ideas, and are of such slightsocial value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them isclearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

or is there justification for the prior restraint which )ec. 9.D lays on protectedspeech. In ear . innesota (203 ?.". 6/$ 1516$ 5 l. -d. 135$ 136 1/31)$ itwas held4

'T(he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. ut thelimitation has been recogni-ed only in e"ceptional cases " " ". o one would/uestion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruitingservice or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number andlocation of troops. #n similar grounds, the primary re/uirements of decency maybe enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community lifemay be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow byforce of orderly government " " ".

Thus, " " " the prohibition imposed by )ec. 9.D cannot be justified on the groundthat it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for alimited time, but the curtailment of the right of e"pression is direct, absolute, andsubstantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not madeless so because it is only for a period of fifteen >19? days immediately before a nationalelection and seven >K? days immediately before a local election.

This sufficiently distinguishes )ec. 9.D from A.6. o. LLDL, )ec. 11>b?, which thisCourt found to be valid in ational Press Cl!b . Co#elec (s!pra.)$ and Gs#ena .Co#elec (s!pra.). or the ban imposed by A.6. o. LLDL, )ec. 11>b? is not onlyauthori-ed by a specific constitutional provision (Art.


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This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in )ec. 9.D.Pursuant to this power of the Comelec, it can confiscate bogus survey results calculatedto mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. o right of replycan be invoked by others. o principle of e/uality is involved. It is a free market towhich each candidate brings his ideas. 6s for the purpose of the law to prevent

bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the *overnment can deal with this natural%enough tendency of some voters. )ome voters want to be identified with the 0winners.)ome are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited bysuppressing the publication of survey results which are a form of e"pression7 It hasbeen held that 0'mere( legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of publicconvenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but beinsufficient to justify such as diminishes the e"ercise of rights so vital to the maintenanceof democratic institutions.

To summari-e then, we hold that )ec. 9.D. is invalid because >1? it imposes aprior restraint on the freedom of e"pression, >$? it is a direct and total suppression of acategory of e"pression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and >:?

the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other thanthe suppression of freedom of e"pression. (ocial eather tations, Inc., v.!M1


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& " " a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or byadopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in hisdoings, his affairs and his character, has become a Opublic personage.+ Fe is, inother words, a celebrity. #bviously, to be included in this category are those whohave achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as inthe case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other

entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers,famous inventors and e"plorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infantprodigy, and no less a personage than the *reat 2

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