Consti II Cases - Eminent Domain

7/22/2019 Consti II Cases - Eminent Domain

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES - EMINENT DOMAIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TENORIO vs MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY ......................................... 2MODAY vs COURT OF APPEALS ................................................................... 4FILSTREAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS ......................................................... 7REPUBLIC vs. PRIMO MENDOZA ...............................................................12VISAYAS REFINING COMPANY vs CAMUS AND PAREDES .............14CITY OF MANILA vs CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA ...............18HEIRS OF SUGUITAN vs CITY OF MANDALUYONG ...........................27MUN. OF PARANAQUE vs VM REALTY ...................................................32BELUSO vs MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY ...................................................36REPUBLIC vs. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., ..........................................39AMIGABLE vs. CUENCA .................................................................................47NAPOCOR vs COURT OF APPEALS ............................................................49MUN. OF LA CARLOTA vs. NAWASA ........................................................54REPUBLIC vs PLDT ..........................................................................................55

TELEBAP vs COMELEC ..................................................................................59NAPOCOR vs IBRAHIM ..................................................................................72SUMULONG vs GUERRERO ..........................................................................75MANOSCA vs COURT OF APPEALS ...........................................................78MCIAA vs LOZADA ...........................................................................................81EPZA vs DULAY .................................................................................................85DE KNECHT vs COURT OF APPEALS ........................................................89MIAA vs RODRIGUEZ ......................................................................................95REPUBLIC vs LIM .............................................................................................98LANDBANK vs HEIRS OF RADAZA ......................................................... 103HON. EUSEBIO vs LUIS, ET. AL ................................................................ 106

APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs LANDBANK ..................................... 109LANDBANK vs RIVERA ............................................................................... 118DPWH SECRETARY vs SPS TECSON ..................................................... 122EPZA vs ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ .................................................. 126MUN. OF BIAN vs. Hon. JOSE MAR GARCIA ..................................... 129AGAN JR. et al vs PIATCO ........................................................................... 134PEOPLE vs FAJARDO ................................................................................... 173AGAN vs PIATCO 2004 ................................................................................ 175FERNANDO vs ST SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE................................... 183


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TENORIO vs MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 6690. March 29, 1912.]SILVESTRA TENORIO Y VILLAMIL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY,defendant-appellant.Jose Robles Lahesa and O'Brien & DeWitt, for appellantA. B. Ritchey, for appellee.SYLLABUS

1.RAILROAD CORPORATIONS; EMINENT DOMAIN; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. A statuteauthorizing a railroad company to exercise the power of eminent domain being in derogation ofgeneral right, and conferring upon it exceptional privileges with regard to the property of othersof which it may have need, should be construed strictly in favor of land owners whose property isaffected by its terms; and before any right to ta ke possession of land under such a statute can belawfully exercised its provisions must be "fully and fairly" complied with.2.ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR DAMAGES. The seizure and occupation of property by such a railroadcompany without first serving process on the owners or occupants in the manner and formprescribed by the statute authorizing condemnation proceedings, is so gross a violation of one ofthe most essential conditions precedent prescribed by the statute, that no claim by the companythat it is acting or desires to act under the authority of its charter in taking possession of thisproperty, can be heard by way of defense to an action for damages for the unlawful trespass.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ERROR. Judgment for damages against the defendant railroad companysustained, notwithstanding the fact that there was error in excluding certain evidence offered by

the defendant, it appearing from a review of the whole record tha t the result would not havebeen otherwise had this evidence been admitted.4.ID.; ID.; ID.; MARKET VALUE OF LAND. While evidence touching the assessed valuation of landis by no means conclusive as to its actual market value, and is in general of but little value,nevertheless evidence of this nature is competent and admissible for what it is worth, where thequestion of damages for the unlawful taking of such land is at issue.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL POSSESSION. A railroad company having unlawfully taken possessionof a part of a tract of land, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless tothe owner, the latter is entitled to abandon the entire tract and recover damages for its full value.D E C I S I O NCARSON, J p:This is an action to recover damages for the alleged unlawful detention and oc cupation bydefendant of a small parcel of land, the property of the plaintiff, situated near the railroad stationin Dagupan in the Province of Pangasinan.Plaintiff alleges that the land in question, some 1,219 square meters in extent, is worth P7,314.40;that before it was entered upon by defendant, two small houses erected thereon brought her a

rental at the rate of P280 per annum of which she has been deprived by defendant since themonth of March, 1907; that the defendant company compelled her to move three buildings fromthe land taken by it, whereby she had suffered damages in the sum of P400 and that as a result ofthe unlawful occupation of this tract of land by the defendant company she had suffered furtherdamages to the extent of P250 from the accumulation of water on an adjoining parcel of land ofwhich she is the owner.Defendant company answering, admits that it has taken and is now occ upying a small part of theland in question, 314 meters in extent; but alleges that it is now and always has been ready andwilling to pay the plaintiff a fair price for the land thus taken and all damages to the remainder ofher land resulting therefrom.In explanation of the fact that it took possession of and continues to occupy this part of the land inquestion with out the express consent of the plaintiff and without having made payment therefor,defendant company alleges that the land taken is a part of certain lands described in

condemnation proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan,whereby, by virtue of the authority lawfully conferred upon defendant company, it sought to havethe land in question, and other lands in that province, condemned for use as a roadbed; and whilethe facts are not fully developed in the record, it does appear that condemnation proceedingswere regularly instituted for the purposes indicated, and there are indications in the record thatthe land in question was included in the lands sought to be condemned therein, but that in thoseproceedings it was described as the property of one Silvino Tenorio, although the name of the trueowner, the plaintiff in this action, is, as she alleges, Silvestra Tenorio.

The defendant company both by demurrer and answer, undertook in the court below to question

plaintiff s right to maintain this action (which is an ordinary action for damages for trespass onplaintiff's land) on the ground that under the statutor y provisions for the condemnation of landsby virtue of which defendant company had already instituted proceedings looking to thecondemnation of the land in question, it was the duty of the plaintiff to seek redress in thoseproceedings. But while we agree with counsel for defendant company that, had the defendantcompany before entering upon and taking possession of the land in question, proceeded inaccordance with the provisions of law touching condemnation proceedings, by virtue of which itclaims to have been acting, in that event the plaintiff would not be entitled to bring a separateaction; we are of opinion that in the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with theprovisions of law touching such proceedings the plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute anyappropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of anunauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property."The mode in which land may be condemned and the steps to be taken for that purpose areprescribed either by the statute or charter conferring the right o f eminent domain or by a generallaw. The remedy so provided is exclusive, and as a general rule the steps prescribed by the s tatutemust be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of generalright and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of thelandowner, and must be at least substantially or as sometimes said, 'fully and fairly' compliedwith. Indeed the general rule in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, is that theymust be strictly complied with. . . . Thus the statutes must be complied with as to filing andcontents of petition or application, . . . notice to the landowner and other persons interested inthe property, . . . and all other con ditions precedent prescribed by the statute." (Cyclopedia of Lawand Procedure, vol. 15, pp. 815-817, and cases cited. See also American and English Encyclopediaof Law, vol. 10, p. 1054, and cases cited.)The mode in which the defendant company was authorized to exercise the power of eminentdomain is to be found in various Acts of the Commission of which the following are pertinentcitations:"The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of anymunicipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having by law the right to condemn

private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed."(Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission, sec. 241.)"The complaint in condemnation proceedings shall state with certainty the right of condemnation,and describe the property sought to be condemned, showing the interest of each defendantseparately." (Act No. 190, sec. 242.)"In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the power of eminentdomain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three, inclusive, of ActNumbered One hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in civil actionsand special proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' the procedure in this Act provided may beadopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land for the c onstruction,extension, or operation of its railroad line." (Act No. 1258, sec. 1.)"Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized by its charter, or by general law, to exercise thepower of eminent domain in the city of Manila or in any province, and has not obtained byagreement with the owners thereof the lands necessary for its purposes as authorized by law, it

may in its complaint, . . . in the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is situated,


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Join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any of the lands sought tobe condemned, or any interest therein, within the city or province, respectively, showing, so far aspracticable, the interest of each defendant and stating with certainty th e right of condemnation,and describing the property sought to be condemned. Process requiring the defendants to appearin answer to the complaint shall be served upon all occupants of the land sought to becondemned, and upon the owners and all persons claiming interest therein, so far as known. If thetitle to any lands sought to be condemned appears to be in the Insular Government, although thelands are occupied by private individuals, or if it is uncertain whether the t itle is in the Insular

Government or in private individuals, or if the title is otherwise so obscure or doubtful that the

company can not with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment may bemade by the company in its complaint to that effect. Process shall be served upon residents andnonresidents in the same manner as provided therefor in Act Numbered One hundred and ninety,. . .." (Act No. 1258, sec. 3.)". . . The provisions . . . as to persons not notified of the condemnation proceedings, shall be suchas are defined in sections 248 to 253, inclusive, of Act No. 190." (Act No. 1258, sec. 5, last five lines)

"Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy theestate, right, or title of any person claiming land or any part thereof, or any interest therein, whowas not made a party defendant to t he condemnation proceeding and did not have actual orconstructive notice of the proceeding in such manner as the law requires." (Act No. 190, sec. 253.)The record wholly fails to disclose that process requiring the plaintiff to appear and answer thecomplaint filed in the condemnation proceedings was served upon her, or upon any of theoccupants of the land; and this, notwithstanding the fact, as found by the trial court and

practically conceded by counsel for defendant, that she was the known owner of the land inquestion.The statute authorizing the defendant company to exercise the power of eminent domain, beingin derogation of general right and conferring upon it exceptional privileges with regard to theproperty of others of which it may have need, should be construed strictly in favor of landownerswhose property is affected by its terms. Hence before any right to take possession of land underthis statute could have been lawfully exercised by the company, the provisions of the statute musthave been "fully and fairly" complied with. Manifestly, the seizure and occupation of propertywithout first serving process on the owners or occupants is so gross a violation of one of the mostessential conditions precedent prescribed by the statute, that no c laim by the company that it isacting or desires to act under the authority of its charter in taking possession of this property canbe heard by way of defense to an ac tion for damages for the unlawful trespass. The right to takesuch land, over the objection of the owner, and to have a fair valuation placed thereon in specialproceedings prescribed by law for that purpose is made to depend upon the compliance by the

company with certain conditions precedent, and of course no rights can or do arise unless suchconditions are fully and fairly complied with. Not only did the defendant company fail to prove inthe lower court that it had served process on the owner and the occupants of the land, but it didnot even claim to have done so when its couns el undertook to introduce in evidence the record inthe pending condemnation proceedings. And, indeed, no such claim has at any time been madeon its behalf.Plaintiff's evidence as to the value of the land appropriated is not wholly satisfactory but in theabsence of any evidence whatever, worthy of the name, to put in doubt the testimony of herwitnesses, we do not think that we would be justified in reversing the findings of fact by the trialjudge who arrived at his conclusions after seeing and hearing these witnesses testify.Counsel for defendant company assigns among other errors the action of the trial judge inexcluding certain testimony and insists that the exclusion of these witnesses justifies and requiresthe reversal of the judgment of the court below and the return of the record for a new trial. Butwhile we agree with counsel that the trial judge erred in excluding certain evidence offered by the

defendant, we are satisfied upon a review of the whole record that the result would not have

been otherwise had this evidence been admitted, and we do not think that a reversal should begranted for error of this character.We think that the evidence of defendant, including the map, whereby counsel undertook to showthe exact amount of the land of the plaintiff occupied by the roadbed of the railroad; as also theevidence offered touching the assessed valuation of the land of the plaintiff should have beenadmitted for what it was worth. But we do not think that had this evidence been admitted, andgranting that it would have been to the effect claimed for it by counsel for the defendant, that theresult would have been different.

The conclusion of the trial judge from the evidence before him was that the entire tract

mentioned in his judgment had been rendered substantially worthless to the plaintiff by theunauthorized occupation of a part of it by the defendant company, and we do not think that theevidence on which he based this conclusion would be affected by p roof that only a part of thetract was actually occupied and retained in possession. The theory on which the trial judgecorrectly proceeded was that defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part ofthe tract of land in question, and- by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless tothe plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value.So also proof of the assessed valuation of the land in question, while proper and competentevidence in a case of this character, is at best of but very little value in a judicial inquiry as to itsactual market value. We do not believe that the weight to be given the practically undisputedtestimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff as to the actual market value of the land in questionwould have been materially affected by proof that this land was assessed at a valuation greatlyless than that placed upon it by the trial judge.The judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instanceagainst the appellant.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.


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MODAY vs COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997.]PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DELSUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.Roldan L. Torralba, for petitioners.Estanislao G. Ebarle, Jr. for public respondent Municipality of Bunawan.

SYLLABUSPOLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER OF THE SANGGUNIANGPANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERSPROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLEGROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE THERESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan'sdisapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render saidresolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants theSangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole groundthat it is beyond the power of th e Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertainingto a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court'spronouncements in Velazco vs.Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicableto the case at bar. "The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipalresolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is 'beyond the

powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground isrecognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration ofa municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution,ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, ororder is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes theselimits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been theconsistent course of executive authority." Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without theauthority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearlyhas the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its S angguniang Bayan the capacity topromulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, itfollows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority topetition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.D E C I S I O NROMERO, J p:The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private property

by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and resolution, promulgated on July15, 1992 and October 22, 1992 respectively, 1 and a declaration that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passedResolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriationof a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by PercivalModay for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Go vernment Sports Facilities." 2In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo andtransmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval On September 11, 1989, theSangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that"expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for theestablishment of the government center." 3

The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for EminentDomain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional TrialCourt at Prosperidad, Agusandel Sur. 4 The complaint was later amended to include the registered owners, Percival Moday'sparents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants.On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon thePossession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipaltreasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules ofCourt and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed

to take possession of the property.

Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court grantedrespondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that theSangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It addedthat the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutionspassed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 , old Local GovernmentCode and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 5The dispositive portion ofthe lower court's Order dated July 2, 1 991 reads:"WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per Official ReceiptNo. 5379647 on December 12, 198 9 which this Court now determines as the provisional value ofthe land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the Property filed by petitionerthrough counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of this Court is ordered to forthwith place theplaintiff in possession of the property involved.Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for the purpose ofascertaining the just compensation or fair market value of the property sought to be taken, with

notice to all the parties concerned.SO ORDERED." 6Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on Oct ober 31, 1991.Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on thepart of the trial court but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court on July 15, 1 992.7 The Court of Appeals held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from ResolutionNo. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declareResolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. cdasiaRespondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on October 22,1992. 8Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: theAssociation of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures,and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the reversal of the

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of theMunicipality of Bunawan is null and void.On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restrainingpublic respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order and respondentmunicipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from further constructingany building on the land subject of this petition. 9Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt,the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C.Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and t o demolish the "blocktiendas" which werebuilt in violation of the restraining order. 10Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8, 1995election. 11 The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve"Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" andMemorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan. 12


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Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the c ondemnationproceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the expropriation waspolitically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the SangguniangPanlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the purpose. Petitioners alsopray that the former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay damages for insisting on theenforcement of a void municipal reso lution.The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving theresolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are 'those available

lots."' Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declarethe municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.13The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is afundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is government's right toappropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use orpurpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent domain may bevalidly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. 16 For the takingof private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and theremust be just compensation. 17The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not d isputed as itis expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in force atthe time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:

"Section 9.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant

to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnationproceedings for public use or purpose."What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right sincethe Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:"Sec. 153.Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies ofapproved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, thesangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincialattorney, or if there be none, to the .provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly andinform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he maydiscover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.(2)If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or executiveorder is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declaresuch ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions u pon

the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an actionshall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. Theaction of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.xxx xxx xxx." (Emphasis supplied.)The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm actionwhich does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P.Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalidon the sole ground that it is beyond t he power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining,theCourt's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant early jurisprudence,are applicable to the case at bar."The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance,or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is 'beyond th e powers conferredupon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the

law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal

resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance,or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order isoutside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, itusurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the c onsistentcourse of executive authority." 20Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove MunicipalResolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the rightof eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,

pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce; it follows that Resolution No.43-89 is valid and binding and could be used. as lawful authority to petition for the condemnationof petitioners' property.As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ireof then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor inprevious elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriationto retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to themunicipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns avacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. 2 1The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensationmust be made and due process of law must be observed. 22 The Supreme Court, takingcognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the publicuse character or the purpose of the taking,23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminentdomain must be genuine and of a public character. 24 Government may not capriciously choosewhat private property should be taken.After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for

petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively provethat the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purposeof the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that thepleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "otheravailable properties available for the same purpose." 25 The accusations of political reprisal arelikewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners'demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution ofthe Court of Appeals in the case of " Percival Moday, et al. v.Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CAG.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court onDecember 8, 1993 is LIFTED.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.Footnotes

1."Percival Moday v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." CA G.R. SP No. 26712, penned by JusticeArtemon D. Luna, with Justices Jose A.R. Melo (now a member of thisCourt) and Segundino G.Chua, concurring, Rollo, p. 21, 36.2.The lot is part of 5.6610 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3132 in the nameof Zotico Moday, married to Leonora Moday. The assessed value of the entire lot in 1989 wasP3,580.00 while the assessed value of one hectare is about P632.39.3.Excerpts From the Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusandel Sur Held at the Session Hall, Training Center, Prosperidad, on September 11, 1989 . Rollo, p. 85.4."Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur v. Percival Moday, et al.," Special Civil Case No. 719,Judge Evangeline S. Yuipco, presiding.5."Sec. 19.Certain Acts of the Sangguniang Bayan Requiring Approval of the SangguniangPanlalawigan. The following acts of the sangguniang bayan shall be subject to the approval ofthe sangguniang panlalawigan:(1)Permanent closure of a public road, street, alley, park or square; and

(2)Donation of municipal funds or property."


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6.Rollo, p. 75.7."Percival Moday, et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al.," CA G.R. SP No. 26712, Rollo, pp. 21-25.8.Rollo, p. 36.9.Rollo, p. 104.10.Rollo, pp. 242-245.11.Rollo, pp. 248-249.12.Rollo, p. 286.

13.Rollo, p. 24.14.V. SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 592 (10th ed., 1954) citingKohl v. US, 91 U.S. 371. A. PIMENTEL, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: THE KEY TONATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 106 (1993). Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550.15.BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (4th ed.) cited in I. CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (1991 ed.);J. BERNAS, THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, A REVIEWER-PRIMER 92 (2nd ed., 1992) citingCharles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 641 (US 1837).16.BERNAS, op. cit. at 93; CRUZ, op. cit. at 59-60; Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, G.R. No.103125, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA 173.17.Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution states th at "(p)rivate property shall not be takenfor public use without just compensation."18.Approved on February 10, 1983, the Code was published in 79 O.G. No. 7. The LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992, Evardone v.Comelec, G.R. No. 94010, December 2, 1991, 20 4 SCRA 464.19.G.R. No. L-30456, July 30, 1982, 1 15 SCRA 540, 544-545. The law then in force, Section 2233 ofthe Revised Administrative Code, also provided that "(i)f the board should in any case find that any

resolution, ordinance, or order, as aforesaid, is beyond the powers conferred upon the council ormayor making the same, it shall declare such resolution, ordinance, or order invalid, entering itsaction upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of suchaction shall be to annul the resolution, ordinance, or order in question, subject to action by theSecretary of the Interior as hereinafter provided."20.At pages 544-545, citing Gabriel v. Provincial Board of Pampanga, 50 Phil. 686, 692- 693; Cariov. Jamoralne, 56 Phil. 188, Manantan v. Municipality of Luna, 82 Phil. 844, which cite the OpinionsAttorney-General Wilfley (1905), II Op. Atty.-Gen., 5 57, 642, Opinion Attorney-General Villareal,November 22, 1922; Opinion Attorney-General Jaranilla, August 9, 1926; Provincial CircularExecutive Bureau, September 16, 1918.21.Rollo, p. 88.22.V. SINCO, op. cit. citing Visayan Refining Company v. Camus, supra. and In re Fowler, 53 N.Y. 60.23.Municipality of Meycauayan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72126, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 690; J.M.Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206

SCRA 520; Republic v. IAC, 185 SCRA 572.24.City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 citing Morrison v. Indianapolis, 166Ind. 511; Stearns v. Barre, 73 Vt. 281; Wheeling v. Toledo, 72 Ohio St. 368.25.Rollo, p. 23.


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FILSTREAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 125218. January 23, 1998.]FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S.TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.[G.R. No. 128077. January 23, 1998.]FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDOMALIT, ANTONIO CAGUIAT, ALICIA CABRERA, ARMANDO LACHICA, JACINTO CAGUIAT, GLORIA

ANTONIO, ELIZALDE NAVARRA, DOLORES FUENTES, S USANA ROY, ANTONIO IBAEZ, BENIGNOBASILIO, LUCERIA DEMATULAC, FLORENCIA GOMEZ, LAZARO GOMEZ, JOSE GOMEZ, VENANCIOMANALOTO, CRISTINO UMALI, DEMETRIA GATUS, PRISCILLA MALONG, DOMINGO AGUILA,RAMON SAN AGUSTIN, JULIAN FERRER, JR., FRANCISCO GALANG, FLORENTINO MALIWAT,SEVERINA VILLAR, TRINIDAD NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, FORTUNATO AGUSTIN CABRERA, GAUDENCIOINTAL, DANILO DAVID, ENRIQUE DAVID, VICENTE DE GUZMAN, POLICARPIO LUMBA, BELENPALMA, ELEN SOMVILLO, LEONARDO MANICAD, OPRENG MICLAT, BENITA MATA, GREGORIOLOPEZ, MARCELINA SAPNO, JESUS MERCADO and CALIXTO GOMEZ, respondents.Siruelo, Muyco & Associates Law Office for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 125218 & 128077.Lucky M. Damasen for private respondent in G.R. No. 128077.SYNOPSISPetitioner, Filstream International, Inc., obtained a favorable judgment in an ejectment case itfiled before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Said judgment became final and executory.However, during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, the City of Manila passed anordinance authorizing Mayor Lim to expropriate the subject properties of petitioner then occupiedby private respondents. Pursuant to the complaint for eminent domain filed by the City of Manila,the trial court issued a Writ of Possession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals likewise finds for thecondemnation of the property and further issuing a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction againstthe order issued by the trial court for the imposition of its ruling in the ejectment case which hasbecame final and executory.Petitioner Filstream went to the Supreme Court objecting to the issuance of the TRO and thepreliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the writ of demolition issued in the ejectmentsuit.There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitionerFilstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of thedispute. However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right toexercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. More specifically, the City of Manilahas the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housingprogram as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

In fact, the City of Manila's right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of afinal and executory judgment over the property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Courtin the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis.Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given anunbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions tothese problems. The basic rules shall have to be followed. The exercise by local government unitsof the power of eminent domain is not without limitations.Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition havebeen exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these arethe only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when theirproperty is expropriated for public use.Petitioner Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City ofManila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of oth er lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA

7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to dueprocess which must accordingly be rectified. EDaHATSYLLABUS1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CITY OFMANILA HAS THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. The City of Manila hasan undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right toexpropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991Local Government Code. More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private

property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in theRevised Charter of the City of Manila (R A. No. 409). In fact, the City of Manila's right to exercisethese prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over theproperty to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of Philippine ColumbianAssociation vs. Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21, 1993.2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN IS SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS. Localgovernment units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminentdomain in pursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, whichare as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution);private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9,1987 Constitution)." Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domainis not without limitations. Even Section 19 of the 19 91 Local Government Code is very explicit thatit must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. The governing law thatdeals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is Sections9 and 10, Republic Act 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Very clear from the

abovequoted provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiringprivate lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same.Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition havebeen exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these arethe only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when theirproperty is expropriated for public use.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. We havecarefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would indicate thatrespondent City of Manila complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioner Filstream'sproperties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans anyshowing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of R.A. 7279 have provedfutile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which mustaccordingly be rectified. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in

exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of theState to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence overthe interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that theindividual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing inmind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due processextended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance overcompliance with the due process requirements is in order.D E C I S I O NFRANCISCO, J p:In resolving the instant petitions, the Court is tasked to strike a balance between the contendinginterests when the state exercises its power of eminent domain. On one side, we have the ownersof the property to be expropriated who must be duly compensated for the loss of their property,while on the other is the State which must take the property for public use. prLLPetitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject of this

dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, T ondo II, Manila,


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with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters and covered by T.C.T. Nos. 203937, 203936, 169198,169199, 169200 and 169202 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofManila (Branch 15) docketed as Civil Case No. 140817-CV against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land (herein private respondents in G. R. No. 128077) on the grounds oftermination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by theMTC on September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay backrentals to petitioner. 1

Not satisfied, private respondents appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,Branch 4 (Civil Case No. 93-68130) which in turn affirmed the decision of t he MTC in its decisiondated February 22, 1994. Still not content, private respondents proceeded to the Court of Appealsvia a petition for review (CA-G. R. SP No. 33714). The result however remained the same as the CAaffirmed the decision of the RTC in its decision dated August 25, 1994. 2 Thereafter, no furtheraction was taken by the private respondents, as a result of which the decision in the ejectmentsuit became final and executory.However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondentsfiled on May 25, 1993, a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitionerFilstream which was docketed in Civil Case No. 93-66059 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 43. Itwas at this stage that respondent City of Manila came into the picture when the city governmentapproved Ordinance No. 7813 3 on November 5, 199 3, authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiatethe acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels ofland registered under T.C.T. Nos. 169193, 169198, 169190, 169200, 169202 and 169192 of theRegistry of Deeds of Manila which formed part of the properties of pet itioner then occupied byprivate respondents. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 4 declaring

the expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma.Guerrero streets in Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierrez,petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. The said properties were to be sold and distributed toqualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City ofManila.

On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No.94-70560) before the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, 5 seeking to expropriate the aforecited parcels ofland owned by petitioner Filstream which are situated at Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. 6Pursuant to the complaint filed by respondent City of Manila, the trial court issued a Writ ofPossession 7 in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputedpremises to the City of Manila.At this juncture, petitioner Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domainas well as a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion to dismiss was premised on the

following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does not sa tisfy the requirements ofpublic use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ of execution issued by theRTC of Manila, Branch 4 in the ejectment suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee againstnon-impairment of obligations and contracts; price offered was too low hence violative of the justcompensation provision of the constitution and the said amount is without the certification of theCity Treasurer for availability of funds. 8 With respect to the motion to quash the writ ofpossession, petitioner raised the following objections: failure to comply with Section 2 of Rule 67of the Rules of Court, Ordinance No. 7813 is a void enactment for it was approved without a publichearing and violative of the c onstitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations andcontracts; the price is too low and unconscionable violating the just compensation provision of theconstitution, and the said writ is tainted with infirmity considering the absence of a certificationfrom the City of Manila that there is an immediately available fund for the subject expropriation. 9Respondent City of Manila filed its opposition 10 to petitioner Filstream's two motions and towhich petitioner accordingly filed a reply. 11 On September 30, 1994, the RTC of Manila, Branch

42, issued an order denying petitioner Filstream's motion to dismiss and the motion to quash theWrit of Possession and declared as follows:"IN FINE, the defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to quash writ of possession are bothwithout merit and are hereby DENIED and the subject parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos.203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200 and 169202 (of the Register of Deeds of Manila) locatedat Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters are herebydeclared CONDEMNED in favor of the City of Manila for distribution and resale to all poor andlandless qualified residents/tenants in the said area under the city's ' land-for-the landless'

program upon payment of just compensation which is yet to be determined by this Court." 12Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 13 as well as a supplemental motion forreconsideration 14 seeking the reversal of the above-quoted order but the same were denied. 15Still, petitioner filed a subsequent motion to be allowed to file a second motion forreconsideration but it was also denied.Aggrieved, petitioner filed on March 31, 1996, a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals(CA-G.R. SP No. 36904) seeking to set aside the September 30, 1994 order of the RTC of Manila,Branch 42. However, on March 18, 19 96, respondent CA issued a resolution dismissing thepetition in this wise:"It appearing that the above-entitled petition is insufficient in form and substance it does notcomply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals whichrequires that the 'petition shall be . . . accompanied by . . . other pertinent documents and papers,'aside from the fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are blurred andunreadable this Court resolved to summarily DISMISS the same (petition). 16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached clearer copies of the pertinentdocuments and papers pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court

of Appeals. But on May 20, 1996 respondent CA issued a resolution denying the motion aspetitioner failed to submit clearer and readable copies of the pleadings. 17 This promptedpetitioner to proceed to this Court giving rise to the instant petition for review on certiorari underRule 45 and docketed herein as G.R. No. 125218, assailing the dismissal of its petition by the CA inits resolution dated March 18, 1996 as well as that of its motion for reconsideration in theresolution dated May 20, 1996.Meanwhile, owing to the finality of the decision in the ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817- CV),the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, upon motion of petitioner Filstream, issued a Writ of Execution aswell as a Notice to Vacate the disputed premises. 18 Private respondents filed a Motion toRecall/Quash the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate 19 alleging the existence of asupervening event in that the properties subject of the dispute have already been orderedcondemned in an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of thequalified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be stayed. Petitioner opposed the motion,reiterating that the decision in the ejectment case is already final and executory and disputed

private respondents' right to interpose the expropriation proceedings as a defense because thelatter were not parties to the same.For its part, the City of Manila filed on March 13, 1996, a motion for intervention with prayer tostay/quash the writ of execution on the ground that it is the present possessor of the propertysubject of execution.In its order dated March 14, 1996, the MTC of Manila, Branch 14, denied private respondents'motion as it found the allegations therein bereft of merit and upheld the issuance of the Writ ofExecution and Notice to Vacate in petitioner's favor. 20 Subsequently, the trial court also deniedthe motion filed by the City of Manila.On April 22, 1996, the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structureerected on the disputed premises. To avert the demolition, private respondents filed before theRTC of Manila, Branch 14, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of atemporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (docketed as Civil Case No. 96-78098). OnApril 29, 1996, the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the writ


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issued in Civil Case No. 140817-CV by the MTC of Manila, Branch 14. 21 Subsequently the RTCissued a writ of preliminary injunction on May 14, 1996. 22On May 15, 1996, the City of Manila filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer forthe issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which was raffled toBranch 23 of the RTC of Manila (docketed as Civil Case No. 96-78382), seeking the reversal of theorders issued by the MTC of Manila, Branch 14, which denied its motion to intervene and quashthe writ of execution in Civil Case No. 140817-CV.Thereafter, upon motion filed by the City of Manila, an order was issued by the RTC of Manila,

Branch 10, ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-78382 with Civil Case No. 96-78098pending before Branch 14 of the RTC of Manila. 23 On May 21, 1996, the RTC of Manila, Branch14, issued an injunction in Civil Case No. 96-78098 enjoining the implementation of the writ ofexecution until further orders from the court. 24 Petitioner Filstream filed a Motion to Dissolvethe Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to be allowed to post a counter-bond but the trial courtdenied the same. Filstream then filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of denial butpending resolution of this motion, it filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of the pr esiding judgeof the RTC of Manila, Branch 14. T he motion for inhibition was granted 25 and as a result, theconsolidated cases (Civil Case No. 96-78382 and 96-78098) were re-raffled to the RTC of Manila,Branch 33. cdasiaDuring the proceedings before the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, petitioner Filstream moved for thedismissal of the consolidated cases (Civil Case No. 96-78382 and No. 96-78098) for violation ofSupreme Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping) because the same parties, causes of actionand subject matter involved therein have already been disposed of in the decision in theejectment case (Civil Case No. 140817) which has already become final and executory prior to thefiling of these consolidated cases.

On December 9, 1996, an order was issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 3 3, ordering the dismissalof Civil Case Nos. 96-78382 and 96-78098 for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94. 26Immediately thereafter, petitioner Filstream filed an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writof Demolition and Ejectment and a supplemental motion to the same dated January 10 and 13,1997, respectively, 27 before the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, which promulgated the decision inthe ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817-CV). On January 23, 1997, the court granted the motionand issued the corresponding writ of demolition.As a consequence of the dismissal of the consolidated cases, herein private respondents filed aPetition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restrainingorder and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43101)28 assailing the above-mentioned order of dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, as havingbeen issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.In a resolution dated January 28, 1997, the Court of Appeals granted herein private respondentsprayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and directed the MTC of Manila, Branch

15, to desist from implementing the order of demolition dated January 23, 199 7, unless otherwisedirected. 29

At the conclusion of the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the Court ofAppeals, in its resolution dated February 18, 1997, found merit in private respondents' allegationsin support of their application of the issuance of t he writ and granted the same, to wit:"Finding that the enforcement or implementation of the writ of execution and notice to vacateissued in Civil Case No. 140817-CV, the ejectment case before respondent Judge Jiro, during thependency of the instant petition, would probably be in violation of petitioners' right, and wouldtend to render the judgment in the instant case ineffectual, and probably work injustice to thepetitioners, the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED."WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P150,000.00, let a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued enjoining respondents, their employees, agents, representatives and anyoneacting in their behalf from enforcing or executing the writ of execution and notice to vacate issued

in Civil Case No. 140817-CV of the court of respondent Judge Jiro, or otherwise disturbing thestatus quo, until further orders of this Court." 30In turn, petitioner Filstream is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65(G.R. No. 128077), seeking to nullify the Resolutions of the Court ofAppeals dated January 28,1997 and February 18, 1997 which granted herein private respondents' prayer for a TRO and Writof Preliminary Injunction, the same being null and void for having been issued in grave abuse ofdiscretion.Upon motion filed by petitioner Filstream, in order to avoid any conflicting decisions on the legal

issues raised in the petitions, the Court ordered that the later petition, G.R. No. 128077 beconsolidated with G.R. No. 128077 in the resolution of March 5, 1997. 31The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely a procedural and technical matter. Petitioner takesexception to the resolutions of respondent CA dated March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 whichordered the dismissal of its Petition for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 ofthe Revised Internal Rules of the Court ofAppeals by failing to attach to its petition other pertinentdocuments and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and unreadable.Petitioner argues that respondent appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to formrather than substance.We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this casewould defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of thesubstantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is theexercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated andhave in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal oftheir appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds istantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically

validate the expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. It must beemphasized that where substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application ofprocedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.In these instances, respondent CA can exercise its discretion to suspend it s internal rules and allowthe parties to present and litigate their causes of action so that the Court can make an actual andcomplete disposition of the issues presented in the case. Rather than simply dismissing thepetition summarily for non-compliance with respondent court's internal rules, respondent CAshould have instead entertained petitioner Filstream's petition for review on certiorari, andordered petitioner to submit the corresponding pleadings which it deems relevant and replacethose which are unreadable. This leniency could not have caused any prejudice to the rights of theother parties.With regard to the other petition, G.R. No. 128077, petitioner Filstream objects to the issuance byrespondent CA of the restraining order and the preliminary injunction enjoining the execution ofthe writ of demolition issued in the ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817-CV) as an incident to

private respondents' pending petition assailing the dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, ofthe consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by private respondents and the City of Manila on theground of forum shopping.The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction is buta mere incident to the actual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rightsof the parties in this case over the d isputed premises. In order to determine whether privaterespondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted by respondent CA, we deemed it properto extract the source of discord.Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties and theexistence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents ordering the latter'sejectment from the premises (Civil Case No. 1 40817-CV).Private respondents' claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which hasrendered the enforcement of petitioner's rights moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings (CivilCase No. 94-70560) undertaken by the City of Manila over the d isputed premises for the benefit of


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herein private respondents. For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power ofeminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner's properties for public use.There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitionerFilstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of thisdispute. The judgment in the ejectment suit became final and executory after private respondentsfailed to interpose any appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 25,1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33714. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of thisdecision as it had already become final and executory.

However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise itspower of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property forpublic use is expressly granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code, to wit:"SEC. 19.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and actingpursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for pub lic use, or purpose, orwelfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That thepower of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has beenpreviously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the localgovernment unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of theexpropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the propertyto be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated propertyshall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the takingof the property." (Emphasis supplied)More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit

of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of theCity of Manila (R.A. No. 409) as follows:"General powers. The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and maytake, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for thegeneral interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contr act and be contractedwith, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise allthe powers hereinafter conferred." (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied).xxx xxx xxx"Sec. 100.The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide thesame into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents, giving first priority to the bona fidetenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees.For the purpose of this section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations ofgeneral funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the landsthrough expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval of the President . .

.". (Emphasis supplied).In fact, the City of Manila's right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of afinal and executory judgment aver the property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Courtin the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21, 1993. 32Relying on the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the Courtdeclared that:"The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire privatelands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants oroccupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. llcdThat only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish itspublic use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all whoneed them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vasttracts of land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v.Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 103125,

May 17, 1993; J. M. T uason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is

therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half ahectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexibleconcept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. NationalHousing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 1 25 SCRA 220 [1983]).Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including inparticular, urban land reform and housing." 33

We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view ofthe acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless,despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridledauthority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to theseproblems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no person shall bedeprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deniedthe equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not betaken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)". Thus, theexercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limitations.Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must comply with theprovisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws, to wit:"SEC. 19.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and actingpursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, orwelfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: . . . (Emphasis supplied).The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform

and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 199 2) and Sections9 and 10 of which specifically provide as follows:"Sec. 9.Priorities in the acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in thefollowing order:(a)Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;(b)Alienable lands of the public domain;(c)Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;(d)Those within the declared Areas f or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and SlumImprovement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;(e)Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet beenacquired; and(f)Privately-owned lands.Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the

priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government u nits shall givebudgetary priority to on-site development of government lands."Sec. 10.Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shallinclude, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, landbanking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, andexpropriation:Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modesof acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to,parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act:Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated tothe State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid d own in Rule 91 of the Rules ofCourt.For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall beacquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily throughnegotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the landshall be given the right o f first refusal." (Emphasis supplied).


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Very clear from the abovequoted provisions are the limitations with respect to the order ofpriority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means toacquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing.In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes ofacquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatorybecause these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to dueprocess when their property is expropriated for public use.Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above disquisitions, we now pose the crucial

question: Did the City of Manila comply with the above mentioned conditions when itexpropriated petitioner Filstream's properties? We have carefully scrutinized the records of thiscase and found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of Manila complied with Sec. 9and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioner Filstream's properties were expropriated and orderedcondemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of otherlands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation ofpetitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified.Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power ofeminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate privateproperty as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of privateproperty owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected bythe exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of thissuperior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of theproperty to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due processrequirements is in order.WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the resolutions of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36904 dated March 18, 199 6 and May 20, 1996 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 128077, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43101dated January 28, 1997 and February 18, 1997 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C .J ., Romero, Melo and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.Footnotes1.Annex C, G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, pp. 72-79.2.G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, pp. 204-211.3.Annex E, G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, p. 86.4.Annex F, G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, p. 88.5.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 44.6.Covered by T.C.T. Nos. 203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200 and 199202 of the Registry ofDeeds of Manila.7.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 62.

8.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, pp. 50-51.9.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, pp. 68-70.10.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, pp. 71, 76.11.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, pp. 79.12.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 85.13.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 86.14.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 90.15.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 95.16.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 41.17.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 43.18.G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, pp. 106, 107.19.G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, p. 108.20.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 119.21.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 137.

22.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 138.

23.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 157.24.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 159.25.G.R. No. 128077, Rollo, p. 181.26.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 194.27.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, pp. 190-191.28.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 42.29.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 32.30.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, pp. 40-41.

31.G.R. No. 125218, Rollo, p. 427.32.228 SCRA 668.33.228 SCRA 668, 673.


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REPUBLIC vs. PRIMO MENDOZA

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 185091. August 9, 2010.]2:45 P.M.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OFLIPA CITY (FOR PANINSINGIN PRIMARY SCHOOL), petitioner, vs. PRIMO ME NDOZA and MARIALUCERO, respondents.DECISION

ABAD, J p:This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the Government for its failure toacquire ownership of a privately owned property that it had long used as a school site and to payjust compensation for it.The Facts and the CasePaninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of thePhilippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 squaremeters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (theMendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410. 1On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdividedinto four lots, as follows:Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga;Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas;Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; andLot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa. 2As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued newtitles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in thename of the Mendozas but no new t itle was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa forLot 4. 3 Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property. IaESCHThe Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa,the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by theconsolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the nameof the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. Theseimprovements had also been tax-declared. 4The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to usethe property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupythe property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered in theirname under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled.

On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. 5When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with theMunicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawfuldetainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. 6On July 13, 1999 the MT CC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of theRepublic's immunity from suit. 7 The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of LipaCity which ruled that the Republic's consent was not necessary since the action before the MTCCwas not against it. 8In light of the RTC's decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment inthe case before it. 9 The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the casehad passed to the RTC upon appeal. 10 Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, 11which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. 12 Consequently, the Mendozas onceagain appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property.It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners.PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the t ransfer of ownership ofthe land in its favor. 13 PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed t he RTC decision to theCourt of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred bylaches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that theMendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as

school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since1957 for taxation purposes. 14In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. 15 Upholding the Torrenssystem, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas' registered title and the imprescriptiblenature of their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA held that, this being thecase, the Republic'spossession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a toleratedone that could not ripen into ownership. DIEcHaThe CA also rejected the Republic's claim of ownership since it presented no documentaryevidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government. Moreover, evenassuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the government'sfavor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have itsright as owner annotated on the Mendozas' title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republicmay be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing itsaction.With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken r ecourse to this Court viapetition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue PresentedThe issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled toevict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school.The Court's RulingA decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republicand all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or itsnotice. 16 Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. 17 No one may acquire itfrom the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. 18 T hus, to a registeredowner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of th e registered property isequally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas' title over the property has not beendisputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that nonew title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying

since 1957. 19That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its namecannot defeat the Mendozas' title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof ofownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. 20 Otherwise, they have little evidentiaryweight as proof of ownership. 21The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property t hat it had held asgovernment school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozasintended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowedthe city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 tohave the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 squaremeters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that theMendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to th e government, whether to the CityGovernment of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do so and the Republicitself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to


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possession pending the Mendozas' formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of justcompensation. aHICDcThe Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by thegovernment for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriationproceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. L uis, 22 the failurefor a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a propertythat the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. TheMendozas' remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court affirmed the RTC's power to awardjust compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTCcan determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an o rdinary civilaction for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when justcompensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit ofexpropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before thecommencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of takingthat is controlling. 24Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken forpublic use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas' right to just compensation for it, th e CAshould have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to theirfiling a proper action for recovery of such compensation.WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decisionand the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS thedismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza's action for eviction before the Municipal TrialCourt in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to t heir filing an action for

payment of just compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate,against the City of Lipa.SO ORDERED.Carpio, Villarama, Jr., * Perez ** and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Footnotes1.Rollo, p. 46.2.Id. at 48.3.Id. at 46-48.4.Id. at 49-50; Tax Declaration (TD) 00491 issued in 1989, cancelled by TD 01914 (for the lot) andTD 0915 (for the buildings), and further cancelled by TD 00748 issued in 1995.5.Id. at 53.6.Id. at 52-56.7.Id. at 57-59.8.Id. at 60-67.

9.CA rollo, pp. 74-77.10.Id. at 49-51.11.Rollo, pp. 68-70.12.Id. at 71-74.13.CA rollo, pp. 58-63. Penned by Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion.14.Id. at 2-21.15.Rollo, pp. 24-36. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in byAssociate Justices Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.16.Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes,Presidential Decree No. 1529, [P.D. No. 1529], 31, 2.17.Section 47 of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.18.Id. at 47.19.Rollo, p. 11.20.Republic of the Philippines v. Catarroja, G.R. No. 171774, February 12, 2010. In this case, the

tax declaration could stand as evidence of ownership because the certificate of t itle was never

recon

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