THE CONSTITUTION

1. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

CIVIL LIBERTIES V EXEC SEC FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.

Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the

Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.

Ratio:

In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

FRANCISCO v HR

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever

mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to

assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

B. AMMENDMENT and REVISION

ARTICLE XVII

Amendments or Revisions

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

1. DISTINCTION

LAMBINO V COMELEC

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with

the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their

initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution

under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of

Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and

Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had

the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at

least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered

voters, with each legislative district represented by at

least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.

The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC

election registrars had verified the signatures of the

6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the

1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article

VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of

Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding

Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These

proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-

Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary

form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an

Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating

modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory

Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v.

COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to

implement the initiative clause on proposals to

amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition

complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution on amendments to the Constitution

through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in

Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate

or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to

implement the initiative clause on proposals to

amend the Constitution; and

HELD:

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct

Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the

governing constitutional provision that allows a

people’s initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise

be directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the

total number of registered voters of which every

legislative district must be represented by at least

three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x

x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the

“draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”

should be “ready and shown” to the people “before”

they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated

that “before they sign there is already a draft shown

to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the

people should sign on the proposal itself because the

proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it

around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by

the people through initiative upon a petition” is that

the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the

people. This means two essential elements must be

present.First, the people must author and thus sign

the entire proposal. No agent or representative can

sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a

petition, the proposal must be embodied in a

petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full

text of the proposed amendments is first shown to

the people who express their assent by signing such

complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment

is “directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition

that contains the full text of the proposed

amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents

observed the constitutional requirements in

gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the

burden of proving that they complied with the

constitutional requirements in gathering the

signatures – that the petition contained, or

incorporated by attachment, the full text of the

proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present

petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the

people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino

Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature

sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006

when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October

2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not

Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to

comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,

Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and

scope of a people’s initiative to amend the

Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s

ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,

inadequate or wanting in essential terms and

conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend

the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of

Santiago will not change the outcome of the present

petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit

Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does

not comply with the requirements of the Constitution

to implement the initiative clause on amendments to

the Constitution.

2. STAGES:

PROPOSAL STAGE

Occena vs. Comelec

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three BatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The three Resolutions were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3

on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections. The three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981 which the date of plebiscite has been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a fundamental law.

(2) Whether or not the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power to propose amendments.

(3) Whether or not the three-fourth votes is necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission.

(4) Whether or not the three BatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid.

Held: Yes, the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power and privilege to propose amendments. On January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this power is indubitable as the applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit.The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim BatasangPambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstentionThe three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus making them valid.

IMBONG VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such convention?

2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

SANTIAGO V COMELEC

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin,

founding member of the Movement for People's

Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to

Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of

Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section

2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the

petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and

directed Delfin to have the petition published. After

the hearing the arguments between petitioners and

opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and

the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or

oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On

December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor

Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin

filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule

65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by

people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed

by Congress, to which no such law has yet been

passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law

on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in

the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment

of the Constitution by people’s initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the

Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct

of initiative on amendments to the constitution is

valid, considering the absence in the law of specific

provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and

local official, as proposed in the draft petition would

constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the

constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has

jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take

cognizance of the petition when there is a pending

case before the COMELEC.

HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to the

Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the

Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.

The people are not accorded the power to "directly

propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in

part, the Constitution" through the system of

initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,

ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause

"proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No.

6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the

Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for

National Initiative and Referendum and for Local

Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for

initiative on the Constitution. This means that the

main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on

national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were

intended to fully provide for the implementation of

the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it

could have provided for a subtitle therefor,

considering that in the order of things, the primacy of

interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the

people to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution is far more important than the initiative

on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735

specially detailed the process in implementing

initiative and referendum on national and local laws,

it intentionally did not do so on the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared

void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss

the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996

is made permanent. WHEREFORE, petition is

GRANTED.

RATIFICATION STAGE

GONZALEZ V COMELEC

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition,

with preliminary injunction. On March 16, 1967, the

Senate and the House of Representatives passed the

following resolutions, (1) increasing the number of

seats in the lower house from 120 to 180, (2) calling

for a constitutional convention, and (3) allowing

members of the Congress to run as delegates to the

constitutional convention without forfeiting their

seats. Congress passed a bill, which, approved by the

President on 17 June 1967, became Republic Act No.

4913, providing that the amendments to the

Constitution proposed in the aforementioned

Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by

the people, at the general elections on 14 November

1967.

Issue: Whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting

as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution

pursuant to Section 1 Article XV.

Decision: The power to amend the Constitution or to

propose amendments is not included in the general

grant of legislative power to Congress. Pursuant to

Section 1 Article XV, “The Congress in joint session

assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the

Members of the Senate and of the House of

Representatives voting separately, may propose

amendments to this Constitution or call a contention

for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as

part of this Constitution when approved by a majority

of the votes cast at an election at which the

amendments are submitted to the people for their

ratification.” The said resolutions are null and void

because the Congress may not avail of both amending

and calling a convention at the same time and the

election must be a special election not a general

election for amendment to the Constitution shall be

submitted for ratification.

3. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Mabanag vs. Vito

[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]

En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate

opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed

separate opinion

Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had

been proclaimed by a majority vote of the

Commission on Elections as having been elected

senators and representatives in the elections held on

23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by

the Senate shortly after the opening of the first

session of Congress following the elections, on

account of alleged irregularities in their election. The

eight representatives since their election had not

been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take

part in the election of the Speaker, for the same

reason, although they had not been formally

suspended. A resolution for their suspension had

been introduced in the House of Representatives, but

that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by

the House when the petition for prohibition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight

representatives did not take part in the passage of

the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution

of both houses proposing an amendment to the

Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an

ordinance thereto," nor was their membership

reckoned within the computation of the necessary

three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an

amendment to the Constitution. If these members of

Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in

favor of the proposed amendment would have been

short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either

branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition

sought to prevent the enforcement of said

congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to

the Constitution. The members of the Commission on

Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the

Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of

Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17

representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic

Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth

Party.

Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the

irregularities in the approval of the resolution

proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need

citation of authorities that political questions are not

within the province of the judiciary, except to the

extent that power to deal with such questions has

been conferred upon the courts by express

constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is

predicated on the principle of the separation of

powers, a principle also too well known to require

elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies

in determining what matters fall within the meaning

of political question. The term is not susceptible of

exact definition, and precedents and authorities are

not always in full harmony as to the scope of the

restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle

with the actions of the political departments of the

government. If a political question conclusively binds

the judges out of respect to the political

departments, a duly certified law or resolution also

binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of

that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a

political question, a proposal which leads to

ratification has to be a political question. The two

steps complement each other in a scheme intended

to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the

amendatory process as provided in section I of Article

XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only)

two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is

no logic in attaching political character to one and

withholding that character from the other. Proposal

to amend the Constitution is a highly political

function performed by the Congress in its sovereign

legislative capacity and committed to its charge by

the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is

even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief

Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous

attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard

public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry

into the validity of a proposal then into that of

ratification.

SANIDAD v COMELEC

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E.

Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a

national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the

Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among

other things, the issues of martial law, the interim

assembly, its replacement, the powers of such

replacement, the period of its existence, the length of

the period for the exercise by the President of his

present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September

1976, the President issued another related decree,

Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous

Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions

of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner

of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"

(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national

referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite

relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter

alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the

same date of 22 September 1976, the President

issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions

to he submitted to the people in the referendum-

plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in

its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued

opposition to the convening of the interim National

Assembly evinces their desire to have such body

abolished and replaced thru a constitutional

amendment, providing for a new interim legislative

body, which will be submitted directly to the people

in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The

Commission on Elections was vested with the

exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976

National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September

1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father

and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with

Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the

Commission on Elections from holding and

conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16;

to declare without force and effect Presidential

Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose

amendments to the Constitution, as well as

Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the

Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,

and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on

16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935

and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the

incumbent President to exercise the constituent

power to propose amendments to the new

Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-

Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal

basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for

Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as

L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a

delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,

asserting that the power to propose amendments to,

or revision of the Constitution during the transition

period is expressly conferred on the interim National

Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the

Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition

with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October

1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and

Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain

the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative

to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October

16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a

referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution

on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to,

or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by

the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths

of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.

(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-

thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional

convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members,

submit the question of calling such a convention to

the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof

provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority

of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held

not later than three months a after the approval of

such amendment or revision." In the present period

of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted

in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that

amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory

Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly,

upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,

by a majority vote of all its Members, propose

amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments

shall take effect when ratified in accordance with

Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two

periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the

nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of

transition. In times of normalcy, the amending

process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1)

regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-

fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional

Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the

Members of the National Assembly. However the

calling of a Constitutional Convention may be

submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon

by a majority vote of all the members of the National

Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be

proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of

the interim National Assembly upon special call by

the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v.

COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent

President is vested with that prerogative of discretion

as to when he shall initially convene the interim

National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention

intended to leave to the President the determination

of the time when he shall initially convene the interim

National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing

conditions of peace and order in the country. When

the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted

on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the

fact that under the same, the incumbent President

was given the discretion as to when he could convene

the interim National Assembly. The President's

decision to defer the convening of the interim

National Assembly soon found support from the

people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15,

1973, at which the ratification of the 1973

Constitution was submitted, the people voted against

the convening of the interim National Assembly. In

the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens

Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign

will to withhold the convening of the interim National

Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February

1975, the proposed question of whether the interim

National Assembly shall be initially convened was

eliminated, because some of the members of

Congress and delegates of the Constitutional

Convention, who were deemed automatically

members of the interim National Assembly, were

against its inclusion since in that referendum of

January, 1973 the people had already resolved

against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm

of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment

to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual

function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when

engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is

exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the

fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that

power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973

Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in

Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the

interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the

business of the legislating body to legislate for the

nation by virtue of constitutional conferment,

amending of the Constitution is not legislative in

character. In political science a distinction is made

between constitutional content of an organic

character and that of a legislative character. The

distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such

being the case, approval of the President of any

proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative

of the President to approve or disapprove applies

only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The

President has nothing to do with proposition or

adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

C. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS1. VOTING OF THE SC (SEE ARTICLE 8, SEC 4)

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW: 1. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

Dumlao v COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva

Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for

said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections

of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of

section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory

and contrary to theequal protection and due process

guarantees of the Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal

official who has received payment of the retirement

benefits to which he is entitled under the law and

who shall have been 65 years of age at the

commencement of the term of office to which he

seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for

the same elective local office from which he has

retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed

insidiously against him, and that the classification

provided therein is based on

"purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore,

class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the

prohibition for candidcay of a person who was

convicted of a crime given that there was judgment

for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing

of charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political

parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by

Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is

contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the

Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide

candidate for any public office shall be free from any

form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form

this, hey also attacked the term of office and the

election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec

6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:

1. Did petitioners have standing

2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the

Constitution?

Held:

1. No

2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition

partially granted.

Petition granted

Ratio:

1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a

taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three

requisites are present:

a. actual case and controversy

b. proper party

c. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute.

No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification.

It was only a hypothetical question.

b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the

enforcement? No one has yet been adversely

affected by the operation of the statutes.

c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows

that the necessity for resolving the issue of

constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity

would require that his suit be dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due

to the public interest involved and

the imminent elections.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal

protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal

protection of the laws is subject to rational

classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real

differentiations, one class can be treated and

regulated differently from another class. For purposes

of public service, employees 65 years of age, have

been validly classified differently from younger

employees. Employees attaining that age are subject

to compulsory retirement, while those of younger

ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at

65 may or may not be a reasonable

classification. Young blood can be encouraged to

come in to politics.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official

who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify

him from running for the same office, as provided for

in the challenged provision. The need for new blood

assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is

present, and what is emphatically significant is that

the retired employee has already declared himself

tired an unavailable for the same government work,

but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would

like to assume again.

It is for the very reason that inequality will neither

result from the application of the challenged

provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal

protection, neither does it permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal

protection clause does not forbid all legal

classification. What is proscribes is a classification

which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat

constitutional guarantee is not violated by a

reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of

the law and applies to all those belonging to the same

class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of

younger blood in local governments. The

classification in question being pursuant to that

purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at

times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is

marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit

is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy

the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An

accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not

synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso

contravenes the constitutional presumption of

innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running

from public office on the ground alone that charges

have been filed against him before a civil or military

tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In

ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no

distinction is made between a person convicted of

acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have

been filed for such acts, as both of them would be

ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the

ground that charges have been filed against him is

virtually placed in the same category as a person

already convicted of a crime with the penalty

of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty

of suspension of the right to hold office during the

term of the sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but

prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be

rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that

because the proximity of the elections, time

constraints will prevent one charged with acts of

disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome

the prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt

should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial

determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION v LIM

Facts:

Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating the

Conversion of Military Reservations into other

Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and

Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing

Funds Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise

known as the "Bases Conversion and Development

Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law

set out the policy of the government to accelerate

the sound and balanced conversion into alternative

productive uses of the former military bases under

the 1947 Philippines-United States of America

Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and

Subic military reservations as well as their extensions

including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the

City of Baguio.

RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and

Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with

powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of

carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the

base areas in accordance with the declared

government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the

Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic

SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be

delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the

President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic

SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free

importations, exemption of businesses therein from

local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a

liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227

expressly gave authority to the President to create

through executive proclamation, subject to the

concurrence of the local government units directly

affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the

areas covered respectively by the Clark military

reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando,

La Union, and Camp John Hay.

On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement

with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld

Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private

corporations registered under the laws of the British

Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint

venture for the development of Poro Point in La

Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist

destinations and recreation centers.

4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA,

TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture

Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put

up a joint venture company known as the Baguio

International Development and Management

Corporation which would lease areas within Camp

John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning

such places into principal tourist and recreation spots,

as originally envisioned by the parties under their

Memorandum of Agreement. The Baguio City

government meanwhile passed a number of

resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA

as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay.

By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially

asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or

totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach

or coverage of any plan or program for its

development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19

January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an

abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over

the home lots being occupied by residents of 9

barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still

by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994,

the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-

point concept for the development of Camp John

Hay.

The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other

things, a kind of development that affords protection

to the environment, the making of a family-oriented

type of tourist destination, priority in employment

opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to

the base area, guaranteed participation of the city

government in the management and operation of the

camp, exclusion of the previously named nine

barangays from the area for development, and

liability for local taxes of businesses to be established

within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD

agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other

proposals of the sanggunian."They stressed the need

to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition

precedent to its full development in accordance with

the mandate of RA 7227.

On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution

requesting the Mayor to order the determination of

realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from

real properties of Camp John Hay. The resolution was

intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in

determining its position on whether Camp John Hay

be declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view

that such declaration would exempt the camp's

property and the economic activity therein from local

or national taxation.

More than a month later, however, the sanggunian

passed Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and

supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance

by then President Ramos of a presidential

proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of

the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions

of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was

submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for

consideration by the President.

On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued

Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and

designating a portion of the area covered by the

former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special

Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227."

The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al.

filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and

declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary

restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary

injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the main,

the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420

as well as the legality of the Memorandum of

Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between

the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420,

respondents contend that by extending to the John

Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed

by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A.

No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing

the legislative intent of said law to turn the US

military bases into hubs of business activity or

investment. They underscore the point that the

government’s policy of bases conversion can not be

achieved without extending the same tax exemptions

granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.

Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in derogation of

the local autonomy of Baguio City or that it is

violative of the constitutional guarantee of equal

protection, respondents assail petitioners’ lack of

standing to bring the present suit even as taxpayers

and in the absence of any actual case or controversy

to warrant this Court’s exercise of its power of judicial

review over the proclamation.

Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in

filing the case questioning the validity of Presidential

Proclamation 420.

Held: It is settled that when questions of

constitutional significance are raised, the court can

exercise its power of judicial review only if the

following requisites are present: (1) the existence of

an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and

substantial interest of the party raising the

constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial

review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4)

the constitutional question is the lis mota of the

case."

RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the

affected local government units to the creation of

SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The

grant by the law on local government units of the

right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is

equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it

is in effect a recognition of the real interests that

communities nearby or surrounding a particular base

area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of

petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing

the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and

substantial such that they have sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the government act

being challenged."

Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue

affected by the proclamation and not merely an

interest in the question involved or an incidental

interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of

Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social

existence of the people of Baguio City.

Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia

G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at

the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio

City and whose duties included deciding for and on

behalf of their constituents the question of whether

to concur with the declaration of a portion of the

area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly

then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who

voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255

(Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now

challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to

bring the present petition.

That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and

interests is thus beyond doubt. The mootness of the

issues concerning the questioned agreements

between public and private respondents is of no

moment.

OSMENA v COMELEC

FACTS: Emilio Osmena, a candidate for President and

Pablo Garcia, a candidate to reelection as governor in

Cebu Province. They are candidates for public office

in the 1998 elections, seek to invalidate provision of

RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987), which

prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of

charge print space or air time for campaign or other

political purposes, except to the COMELEC. They

contend that the ban has not only failed to level the

playing field, but actually worked to the grave

disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving

them of a medium which they can afford to pay while

their affluent rivals can always resort to other means

of reaching voters as per the events in ruling in NPC

vs. COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention has an actual

case or controversy.

HELD: The petition is dismissed. There is no case or

controversy to decide only an academic discussion to

hold. General rule cases rendered moot and academic

the petition will be dismissed, however it can prosper

if it is capable of repetition, thus it is the court’s

discretion also to dismiss even if there is capable

repetition of the events.

What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a

case but simply the holding of an academic exercise.

And since a majority of the present Court is

unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is founded in

error, it will suffice for present purposes simply to

reaffirm the ruling in that case. Stare decisis et non

quieta movere. This is what makes the present case

different from the overruling decision invoked by

petitioners.

Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the

decision in NPC v. COMELEC in order to clarify our

own understanding of its reach and set forth a theory

of freedom of speech.

CRUZ v DENR, opinion of J. MENDOZA

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed

a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and

taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain

provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known

as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)

and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The

petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and

its IRR on the ground that these amount to an

unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over

lands of the public domain as well as minerals and

other natural resources therein, in violation of the

regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of

the Constitution.

ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the

Constitution?

HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene

the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing

in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over

the natural resources within their ancestral domain.

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral

domains remains with the State and the rights

granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural

resources in their ancestral domains merely gives

them, as owners and occupants of the land on which

the resources are found, the right to the small scale

utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a

priority in their large scale development and

exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and

ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the

public domain. They are private lands and belong to

the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of

private land title that existed irrespective of any royal

grant from the State. However, the right of ownership

and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral

domains is a limited form of ownership and does not

include the right to alienate the same.

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:

This suit was instituted to determine the

constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No.

8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples

Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury

as a result of the application of the statute to them.

They assert a right to seek an adjudication of

constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers,

upon the plea that the questions raised are of

transcendental importance.

The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1

extends only to cases and controversies for the

determination of such proceedings as are established

by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or

the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.[1]

In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a

property right of petitioners against the government

and other respondents or to demand compensation

for injuries suffered by them as a result of the

enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they

believe to be the doubtful character of the law in

question. Any judgment that we render in this case

will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the

future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court

the question of the constitutionality of such

legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it

amounts to no more than an expression of opinion

upon the validity of the provisions of the law in

question.[2]

I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court

under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to determine in

the abstract whether or not there has been a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and

executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our

jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No

one reading Art. VIII, 5 can fail to note that, in

enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this

Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase all

cases. . . .

The statement that the judicial power includes the

duty to determine whether there has been a grave

abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, 1 not

really to give the judiciary a roving commission to

right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts

from invoking the political question doctrine in order

to evade the decision of certain cases even where

violations of civil liberties are alleged.

The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in

Lansang v. Garcia,[3] in which this Court, adopting the

submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the

following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:

[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned

proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the

Court not that the Presidents decision is correct and

that public safety was endangered by the rebellion

and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in

suspending the writ, the President did not act

arbitrarily.

That is why Art. VII, 18 now confers on any citizen

standing to question the proclamation of martial law

or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice

Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on

the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was

the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v.

Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.

Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to

matters which do not involve actual cases or

controversies without upsetting the balance of power

among the three branches of the government and

erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the

Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with

power not only to invalidate statutes but even to

rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be

permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction

and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of

the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party

can question the validity of a statute only if, as

applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is

sought to be declared void on its face.

The only instance where a facial challenge to a

statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of

freedom of expression. In such instance, the

overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the

validity of a statute even though as applied to him it

is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to

others not before the Court whose activities are

constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute

on its face rather than as applied is permitted in the

interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of

expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that

a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will

decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid

portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the

statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not

possible.

For the Court to exercise its power of review when

there is no case or controversy is not only to act

without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in

adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its

decision will be based on speculation rather than

experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe

the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate

questions of constitutionality with questions of

wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain

of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot

be too often repeated, cannot take place in a

vacuum.

Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the

constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be a

galling cop out[4] or an advocacy of timidity, let alone

isolationism.[5] To decline the exercise of jurisdiction

in this case is no more a cop out or a sign of timidity

than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.

Madison[6] to hold that petitioner had the right to

the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace

of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end

that after all mandamus did not lie, because 13 of the

Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original

jurisdiction on the United States Supreme Court to

issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as

the courts jurisdiction is mainly appellate.

Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the

institution of the power of judicial review, and so that

there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we

in this country have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII,

1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result

either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in

upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating

functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the

decisions[7] of this Court.

To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction

where there is no genuine controversy is not to show

timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal

department of government whose acts, unless shown

to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are

presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional

adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the

Angara case when he said that this power of judicial

review is limited to actual cases and controversies to

be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the

parties, and limited further to the constitutional

question raised or the very lis mota, presented.[8] For

the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last

resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,

earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.[9]

Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the

constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of

constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must

be accorded to it.

Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the

statement in Severino v. Governor General,[10]

reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,[11] that when the

question is one of public right and the object of

mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public

duty, the people are regarded as the real party in

interest, and the relator at whose instigation the

proceedings are instituted need not show that he has

any legal or special interest in the result, it being

sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested

in the execution of the laws. On the basis of this

statement, he argues that petitioners have standing

to bring these proceedings.[12]

In Severino v. Governor General,[13] the question

was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor

General to call a special election on the ground that it

was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he did not

have such a duty. On the other hand, although

mandamus was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was

clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit,

because the public has a right to know and the failure

of respondents to publish all decrees and other

presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed

petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and

issuances. But, in this case, what public right is there

for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not

apply to them except in general and in common with

other citizens.

For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the

petition in this case.

EXC: MOOT AND ACADEMIC

ENRILE v SET

Facts:Said case is a Petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion Resolution 97-22 denying

petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties; and Resolution No. 98-02 denying his motion for reconsideration in SET Case No. 001-95, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. vs. Gregorio B. Honasan, et al.

Prior to petition, on January 20, 1995 Senator Pimentel filed and election protest to the SET against Senator Enrile and other senatorial candidates who wone the May 1995 senatorial elections. On June 30, 1995 Enrile filed a counter-protest where SET required the parties to submit lists of pilot precincts (no more that 25% of the total precincts involved in protest). SET conducted a revision of ballots. On August 21, 1997 SET held a press conference announcing the partial results in Pimentel’s protest, where Enrile’s result dropped from 11th to 15th. September 24, 1997 petitioner filed a motion to set aside the results and re-tabulate in presence of all parties assailing said results were erroneous; however SET denied petitioner’s motion since there was no sufficient basis. Thus this case.

Issues:- Public respondent committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that no sufficient basis exists to annul the manifestly erroneous tabulation of the results of revision and appreciation of ballots.

- Public respondent committed patent and gross error in rectifying the results of the physical count, as reflected in the revision reports by using other election documents.

- Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it released partial and tentative results which caused grave prejudice to herein petitioner.

- The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to be heard in the appreciation proceedings.

Ruling- As per the main issues of grave abuse of

discretion and the erroneous partial results claimed by petitioner does not hold since it was proven the accuracy of the tribunals results, proven from various sources.

- The petition is also moved to be moot and academic since the tenure of the contested senatorial election expired on June 30, 1998. Also since there is no more actual case and controversy between said parties and no useful purpose can be served.

PETITION IS DISMISSED

EXC TO EXC:

1. QUESTION OF CAPABLE REPITION YET

EVADING REVIEW

ALUNAN v MIRASOL

Facts:

•LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to

be composed of a chairman, 7members, a secretary

and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK

elections wereto be held 30 days after the next local

elections. The Local Government Code wasenacted

January 1, 1992.

• The first elections under the code were held May of

1992. August 1992, COMELEC provided guidelines for

the holding of the general elections for the SK on

Sept. 30,1992, which also placed the SK elections

under the direct control and supervision of DILG, with

the technical assistance of COMELEC. After

postponements, they were held December 4, 1992.

•Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted.

152,363 people aged 15-21registered, 15,749 of them

filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council

passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.

•September 18, 1992 – The DILG, through Alunan,

issued a letter-resolution exempting Manila from

holding SK elections because the elections previously

held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first

SK elections under the new LGC. DILGacted on a letter

by Santiago, acting President of the KB (Kabataang

Barangay) City Federation of Manila and a member of

the City Council of Manila, which stated that elections

for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26,

1990. In this resolution, DILG stated that the LGC

intended to exempt those barangay chapters which

conducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to

January 1, 1992 from the forth coming SK elections.

The terms of those elected would be extended to

coincide with the terms of those elected in the SK

elections

•Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000

members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a

petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that

the DILG had no power to amend the resolutions of

the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs, and

that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.

•RTC – issued an injunction and ordered petitioners

to desist from implementing the order of the DILG

Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified

pre-election activities in order to implement the

general elections. The case was re raffled to a

different branch of the same court, and the new

judge held that DILG had no power to exempt Manila

from holding SK elections, because that power rests

solely in COMELEC, and that COMELEC already

determined that Manila has not previously held

elections for KB by calling for a general election, and

that the exemption of Manila violated the equal

protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays

that previously held elections, only in Manila, 897

barangay, were there no elections.

Issue: Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG

with the power of direct control and supervisionover

the SK elections with the technical assistance of

COMELEC

Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK

elections

Held:

•Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case

is not moot; it is capable of repetition, yet evading

review.

•DILG had the authority to determine whether

Manila would be required to hold SK elections.

COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not

unconstitutional. Election forSK officers are not

subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same

waythat contests involving elections of SK officials do

not fall within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.

SALONGA v HERMOSO, separate opinion J,

TEEHANKEE

FACTS: During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga

filed a case for mandamus against Rolando Hermoso

of the Travel Processing Center to compel the latter

to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel in favor of

Salonga.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be

prohibited during martial law.

HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic

because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did

not deny Salonga’s request for a certificate of

eligibility to travel.

The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to

Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under

martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion

of human rights. The Travel Processing Center should

exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that

certain citizens desirous of exercising their

constitutional right to travel could be subjected to

inconvenience or annoyance – this is to avoid such

similar cases to face the Court which needlessly

expire the Court’s effort and time

J, TEEHANKEE, SEPARATE OPINION,

In Salonga vs. Medalla * after the therein public

respondents in charge of the Travel Processing Center

had issued in 1978 to herein petitioner the

corresponding travel permit or certificate, I remarked

"that the issuance of the travel certificate necessarily

is a recognition of petitioner's right to travel under

the present circumstances."

The circumstances have not changed in any manner.

Petitioner is the holder of a Philippine passport issued

on March 3, 1980 and valid up to March 1982 and has

urgent medical appointments and official

engagements as the only Filipino member of the

Board of Trustees of the United Board for Higher

Christian Education in Asia based in New York. His last

trip abroad was from February 21, 1980 — March 15,

1980 without any complaint from any government

agency. There seems no valid basis for the delay in

the issuance of petitioner's travel permit (which he

had long applied for on April 1, 1980) and for his

representative to have had to follow up in vain daily

from the scheduled release date of April 11, 1980

until he was constrained to file the present petition

on April 18th as his scheduled trip on April 23rd was

in jeopardy (while all other applications had already

been long acted upon favorably).

As the Chief Justice stresses in the Court's resolution

"it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing

Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the

impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising

their constitutional right to travel could be subjected

to inconvenience or annoyance." Under the

antecedents, with petitioner having previously

established his right to travel as sanctioned by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs which duly issued him his

passport, petitioner has cause to complain that he

should not be placed by respondents on their "watch

list without benefit of previous notice and hearing so

as to be afforded the opportunity to rebut whatever

adverse information might have been compiled or

given in secret against him.

Finally, it is not amiss to call the attention of the

public officials concerned to the provisions of Article

27 of the Civil Code that "Any person suffering

material or moral loss because a public servant or

employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to

perform his official duty may file an action for

damages and other relief against the latter, without

prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action

that may be taken."

2. SC EXERCISES SYMBOLIC FUNCTION

SALONGA v PANO

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally

protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the

due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case

has been established to warrant the filing of an

information for subversion against him. Petitioner

asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the

respondents from using the iron arm of the law to

harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the

democratic opposition in the Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which

occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of

August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns

Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,

implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those

responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General

sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary

Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.

(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating

that “the preliminary investigation of the above-

entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on

December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given

ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and

the supporting evidence within which to file his

counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the

time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and

despite assurance to the contrary, he has not

received any copies of the charges against him nor

any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an

amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas,

dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with

39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as

amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15

October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion

to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of

the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against

him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano

(Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,

Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4

January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering

the filing of an information for violation of the

Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40

people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said

judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are

the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is

the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case

has been established by the prosecution to justify the

filing of an information against him. He states that to

sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of

evidence against him would be to admit that no rule

of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues:

1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual

case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower

court still deserves a decision from the Supreme

Court

Held:

1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case,

a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been

arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for

concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on

January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz

granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio

Apostol to drop the subversion case against the

petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of

Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and

decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito

Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed

under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the

prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw

the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences

and signatures and to place it once again in the

Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to

warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned,

this decision has been rendered moot and academic

by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due

to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on

several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in

similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and

controlling constitutional principles, precepts,

doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of

educating bench and bar on the extent of protection

given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled

that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should

not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in

language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of

fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the

unequivocal command of the Constitution that

excessive bail shall not be required.”

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not

the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be

created through an executive order was mooted by

Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter

pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under

martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the

constitutional mandate on the preservation and

development of Filipino culture for national Identity.

(Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the

Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59

SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and

academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of

its symbolic function from promulgating one of the

most voluminous decisions ever printed in the

Reports.

LEGITIMIZING FUNCTIONS OF THE SC

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate

implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Josue

Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to

enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries

from implementing the said constitution filing a

prohibition case to restrain respondents from

implementing any of the provisions of the proposed

constitution not found in the present constitution on

January 20, 1973. Javellana averred that the said

constitution is void because the same was initiated by

the president. He argued that the President is w/o

power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino

people of the proposed constitution. Further, the

election held to ratify such constitution is not a free

election there being intimidation and fraud. Javellana

maintained that the respondents are acting without

or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed

constitution and that the president is without power

to proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar

actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas,

among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of

Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any

order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in

objective.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president acted without or

in excess of jurisdiction.

HELD: The SC ruled that no, the president did not act

without or in excess of jurisdiction and that they

cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC

justices expressed the view that they were concluded

by the ascertainment made by the president of the

Philippines, in the exercise of his political

prerogatives. Further, there being no competent

evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during

the election, it is to be assumed that the people had

acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The

question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a

political question which was left to the people in their

sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the

same had shown such acquiescence. Furthermore,

whether a constitutional amendment has been

properly adopted according to an existing

constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute

duty of the judiciary to determine whether the

Constitution has been amended in the manner

required by the constitution. The Constitution

proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly

ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the

1935 Constitution which provides only one way for

ratification (election or plebiscite held in accordance

with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the

environmental and social conditions in the Philippines

(i.e. martial law) the Court cannot honestly say that

the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution.

The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the

effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic

issue posed by the cases which considerations other

than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new

constitution is in force as there are not enough votes

to say otherwise.

PROPER PARTY (LOCUS STANDI):

1. TAXPAYERS SUIT- REQUISITES

MACALINTAL V. SET

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and

prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member

of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that

certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from

constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual

and material legal interest in the subject matter of

this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly

and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed

the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No.

9189 violates the residency requirement in Section 1

of Article V of the Constitution.

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law

violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution that the winning

candidates for President and the Vice-President shall

be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee created in

Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power

to review, revise, amend, and approve the

Implementing Rules and Regulations that the

Commission on Elections, promulgate without

violating the independence of the COMELEC under

Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:

(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those

who are disqualified voting under this Act. It

disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident

who is recognized as such in the host country.

However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she

executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for

the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she

shall resume actual physical permanent residence in

the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval

of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that

he/she has not applied for citizenship in another

country. Failure to return shall be cause for the

removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent

resident from the National Registry of Absentee

Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote

in absentia. Petitioner claims that this is violative of

the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of

the Constitution which requires the voter must be a

resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a

resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at

least 6 months immediately preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not

hold water at present, and that the Court may have

to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the

controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption

of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The

qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is

deemed to have retained his domicile in the

Philippines and presumed not to have lost his

domicile by his physical absence from this country.

Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the

promise to resume actual physical permanent

residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years

after approval of registration but it also requires the

Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a

temporary visitor or even on business trip, must

declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in

another country. Thus, he/she must return to the

Philippines otherwise consequences will be met

according to RA No. 9189. Although there is a

possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has

exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a

position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal

or modify it if such law is found to be impractical.

However, it can be said that the Congress itself was

conscious of this probability and provided for

deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to

return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage.

Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated

because he was qualified to vote on the date of the

elections. Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a

law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is

prevented from making it mean what the Court

pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of

the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory

construction and intent of the framers, which is to

grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents

abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right

of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that

Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally

defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC

to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it.

The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of

the winning candidates for President and Vice

President for the entire nation must remain in the

hands of Congress as its duty and power under

Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC

has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates

only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve,

review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules &

Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond

the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress

trampled upon the constitutional mandate of

independence of the COMELEC. Under such a

situation, the Court is left with no option but to

withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a

provision of law unconstitutional

OPOSA V FACTORAN

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan

Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation

and generations yet unborn, and represented by their

parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of

DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered

ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives

and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements

(TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,

processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and

granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and

equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they

have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced

and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection

by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.

Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant

in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the

remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation

and/or impairment of the natural resources property

he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors

and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political

question which properly pertains to the legislative or

executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action

in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation

or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they

represent their generation as well as generations to

come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for

themselves, for others of their generation, and for

the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their

personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations

is based on the concept of intergenerational

responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers

the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which

indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious

disposition, utilization, management, renewal and

conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,

waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other

natural resources to the end that their exploration,

development, and utilization be equitably accessible

to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility

to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for

the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful

ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion

of their right to a sound environment constitutes at

the same time, the performance of their obligation to

ensure the protection of that right for the

generations to come.

AGAN V PIATCO

FACTS:

On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA

for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).

DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.

AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.

During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.

RULING: Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay “reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain.

Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Police power is the “most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.

OPLE V TORRES

Facts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the

part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking

of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice

Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of

rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men."

Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate

Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a

National Computerized Identification Reference

System" on two important constitutional grounds,

viz

(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to

legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our

citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the

petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the

petitioner need stronger barriers against

furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four

newspapers of general circulation on January 22,

1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997,

petitioner filed the instant petition against

respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben

Torresand the heads of the government agencies,

who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating

Committee, arecharged with the implementation of

A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary

restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue:WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the

validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: YES

Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation,

respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the

standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability

of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver

that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that

the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be

promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our

sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished

member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is

possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit

raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a

usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service

InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn

the legality of the misalignment of public funds and

the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is

not affected by the fact that the implementing rules

of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper

seand as infirmed on itsface. His action is not

premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot

cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents

themselves have started the implementation of A.O.

No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as

January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System

(SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for

themanufacture of the National Identification (ID)

card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has

publicly announcedthat representatives from the

GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for

the national identificationsystem.All signals from the

respondents show their unswerving will to implement

A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of

the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In

this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the

rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its

result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional

principle and a fundamental right.

TADTAD V SECRETARY OF ENERGY

FACTS:

The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No.

8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream

Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The

deregulation process has two phases: (a) the

transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full

deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No.

372). Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power to the President and

the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a

determinate or determinable standard to guide the

Executive Branch in determining when to implement

the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry,

and the law does not provide any specific standard to

determine when the prices of crude oil in the world

market are considered to be declining nor when the

exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is

considered stable.

Issue:w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No.

372 is unconstitutional.

sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional

prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b)

w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it

considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor

in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in

Feb. 1997.

HELD/RULING:

(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test

and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180

provided that the full deregulation will start at the

end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of

any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question

of the final date of full deregulation. Sec. 15 lays

down the standard to guide the judgment of the

President—he is to time it as far as practicable when

the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world

market are declining and when the exchange rate of

the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to

practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a

downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly

established.

(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the

OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the

Executive before ordering full deregulation. The

Executive department failed to follow faithfully the

standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered

the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.

The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by

subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No.

8180 for it has no powers to make laws

CHAVEZ V PEA AND AMARI

In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered

into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with

the Construction and Development Corportion of the

Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by

President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with

developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands

were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085

as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation

Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an

agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP

would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No.

3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the

transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the

Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the

three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM

ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture

agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine

corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along

with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered

the JVA which would later transfer said lands to

AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen.

Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such

lands were part of public domain (famously known as

the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer

praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary

injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed

lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the

JVA. Following these events, under President

Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an

Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract

is null and void.

Issue:

w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be

reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended)

JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of

the 1987 Constitution

w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the

issue of whether the amended joint venture

agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the

government.

Held:

On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the

constitution:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising

the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of

title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the

public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private

corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership

of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only

sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the

ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and

existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila

Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public

domain until classified as alienable or disposable

lands open to disposition and declared no longer

needed for public service. The government can make

such classification and declaration only after PEA has

reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can

these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public

domain, which are the only natural resources the

government can alienate. In their present state, the

592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable

and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI,

a private corporation, ownership of 77.34

hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is

void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the

1987 Constitution which prohibits private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable

land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to

AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still

submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void

for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural

resources other than agricultural lands of the public

domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,

the government can classify the reclaimed lands as

alienable or disposable, and further declare them no

longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of

such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain

to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII

of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable

land of the public domain.

BIRAOGO V TRUTH COMMISSION, DISSENT OF J.

NACHURA AND J. CARPIO MORALES

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing

Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July

30, 2010.PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the

Office of the President with the primary task to

investigate reports of graft and corruption committed

by third-level public officers and employees, their co-

principals, accomplices and accessories during the

previous administration, and to submit its finding and

recommendations to the President, Congress and the

Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an

investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body

as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or

render awards in disputes between contending

parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess

evidence of graft and corruption and make

recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but

it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less

order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it

cannot determine from such facts if probable cause

exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our

courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it

unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from

performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it

arrogates the power of the Congress to create a

public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of

the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize

E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the

President to structurally reorganize the Office of the

President to achieve economy, simplicity and

efficiency does not include the power to create an

entirely new public office which was hitherto

inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and

statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with

quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,

those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under

the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the

Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as

it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution

officials and personnel of the previous administration

as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it

excludes those of the other administrations, past and

present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal

standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of

Congress because the President’s executive power

and power of control necessarily include the inherent

power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws

are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the

Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987,

PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and

settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to

create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to

appropriate funds because there is no appropriation

but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated

by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or

supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the

DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-

judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,

supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal

protection clause because it was validly created for

laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the

petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of

separation of powers by usurping the powers of

Congress to create and to appropriate funds for

public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the

Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection

clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations,

to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or

controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have the

standing to question the validity of the subject act or

issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal

and substantial interest in the case such that he has

sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality

must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the

issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of

the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the

power of the Congress as a body to which they

belong as members. To the extent the powers of

Congress are impaired, so is the power of each

member thereof, since his office confers a right to

participate in the exercise of the powers of that

institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to

it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested

by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.

Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any

official action which, to their mind, infringes on their

prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he

has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable

to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is

“a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question.” In private suits, standing is governed by

the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that

“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the

name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in

interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit or the party

entitled to the avails of the suit.” Difficulty of

determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here,

the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing

an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a

representative of the general public. He has to show

that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has

to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of

the public order and the securing of relief as a

“citizen” or “taxpayer. The person who impugns the

validity of a statute must have “a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has

sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The

Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion

that the petition covers matters of transcendental

importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by

the Court. There are constitutional issues in the

petition which deserve the attention of this Court in

view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as

precedents The Executive is given much leeway in

ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The

powers of the President are not limited to those

specific powers under the Constitution. One of the

recognized powers of the President granted pursuant

to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power

to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the

obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws

have been faithfully executed. The purpose of

allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to

allow an inquiry into matters which the President is

entitled to know so that he can be properly advised

and guided in the performance of his duties relative

to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the

land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an

allotment or allocations of existing funds already

appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of

the Executive of the power of Congress to

appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the

amount to be earmarked for the operation of the

commission because, whatever funds the Congress

has provided for the Office of the President will be

the very source of the funds for the commission. The

amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be

subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so

there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ

or erode their respective powers. If at all, the

investigative function of the commission will

complement those of the two offices. The function of

determining probable cause for the filing of the

appropriate complaints before the courts remains to

be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to

investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can

advise and guide the President in the performance of

his duties relative to the execution and enforcement

of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of

its apparent transgression of the equal protection

clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights)

of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires

that all persons or things similarly situated should be

treated alike, both as to rights conferred and

responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and

institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a

similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection

clause is to secure every person within a state’s

jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary

discrimination, whether occasioned by the express

terms of a statue or by its improper execution

through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined

according to a valid classification. Equal protection

clause permits classification. Such classification,

however, to be valid must pass the test of

reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The

classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is

germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not

limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies

equally to all members of the same class. The

classification will be regarded as invalid if all the

members of the class are not similarly treated, both

as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as

violative of the equal protection clause. The clear

mandate of truth commission is to investigate and

find out the truth concerning the reported cases of

graft and corruption during the previous

administration only. The intent to single out the

previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,

that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class

of its own. Not to include past administrations

similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the

equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such

discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to

label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness

and selective retribution. Superficial differences do

not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not

exclude the other past administrations. The PTC

must, at least, have the authority to investigate all

past administrations. The Constitution is the

fundamental and paramount law of the nation to

which all other laws must conform and in accordance

with which all private rights determined and all public

authority administered. Laws that do not conform to

the Constitution should be stricken down for being

unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are

GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the

equal protection clause of the Constitution.

2. NO LOCUS STANDI

GUANZON V DE VILLA, DISSENT OF J, CRUZ AND J

SARMIENTO

Facts:

The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive"

or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their

place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They

alleged that there is no specific target house to be

search and that there is no search warrant or warrant

of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their

civilian clothes and without nameplates or

identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse

from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows

of their houses. The residents were at the point of

high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were

ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to

examine their tattoo marks. The residents

complained that their homes were ransacked, tossing

their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some

of their money and valuables had disappeared after

the operation. The residents also reported incidents

of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those

who were detained also suffered mental and physical

torture to extract confessions and tactical

information. The respondents said that such

accusations were all lies. Respondents contend that

the Constitution grants to government the power to

seek and cripple subversive movements for the

maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target

zoning were intended to flush out subversives and

criminal elements coddled by the communities were

the said drives were conducted. They said that they

have intelligently and carefully planned months

ahead for the actual operation and that local and

foreign media joined the operation to witness and

record such event.

Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed

consisted of violation of human rights.

Held: It is not the police action per se which should be

prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the

methods which "offend even hardened

sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties,

it appears to have been no impediment to securing

search warrants or warrants of arrest before any

houses were searched or individuals roused from

sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the

objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial

zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of

the squatters and low income families are fully

protected. However, the remedy should not be

brought by a taxpayer suit where not one victim

complaints and not one violator is properly charged.

In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is

no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can

order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no

permanent relief can be given. In the meantime

where there is showing that some abuses were

committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged

violations which are shocking to the senses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to

the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and

Pasay City where the petitioners may present

evidence supporting their allegations and where

specific erring parties may be pinpointed and

prosecuted.

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

UMALI V GUINGONA

Facts: Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional

Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. However,

a confidential memorandum against him was sent to

President Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential

Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption for

investigation. Umali complied with the pleadings and

hearings set by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not

raise clarficatory questions during the hearing. PCAGC

foud prima facie evidence to support the charges and

President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He

appealed to the Office of the President but was

denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not

accorded due process and deprived of security of

tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA

reversed the decision and was elevated to SC. One of

Umali raised the issue of the constitutionality of

PCAGC as a government agency.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of Umali was

raised at the earliest opportunity?

Decision: In lieu of the supervening events AO 152

was lifted. Regarding the constitutionality of PCAGC,

it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for

reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too

late to raise the said issue for the first time at such a

late stage of the proceedings.

ZANDUETA V DE LA COSTA

NATURE

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the

Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable

Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment

declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the

office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting

him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is

entitled to continue occupying the office in question

by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to

said respondent

FACTS: Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth

Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco

Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first

instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the

City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth

Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by

virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the

President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2,

1936, and confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments of the National Assembly-On

November 7, 1936, the date on which

Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the

Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the

petitioner received from the President of the

Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as

judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial

District, with authority to preside over the Courts of

First Instance of Manila and Palawan-The National

Assembly adjourned without its Commission on

Appointments having acted on said ad interim

appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the

same office was issued in favor of said petitioner,

pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his

appointment and qualification as judge of first

instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner,

acting as executive judge, performed several

executive acts-On May 19, 1938, the Commission on

Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved

the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said

petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the

Philippines appointed the herein respondent,

Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of

the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside

over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of

Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,

and his appointment was approved by the

Commission on Appointments

ISSUE: WON the petitioner may question the validity

of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to

repossess the office occupied by him prior to the

appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the

assailed statute

HELD: When a judge of first instance, presiding over

a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial

district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment,

accepts another appointment to preside over the

same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in

addition to another court of the same category, both

of which belong to a new judicial district formed by

the addition of another Court of First Instance to the

old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of

his new office and receives the corresponding salary,

he abandons his old office and cannot claim to

repossess it or question the constitutionality of the

law by virtue of which his new appointment has been

issued.

The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is

that when a public official voluntarily accepts an

appointment to an office newly created or

reorganized by law, —which new office is

incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him

— , qualifies for the discharge of the functions

thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into

the performance of his duties by executing acts

inherent in said newly created or reorganized office

and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be

considered to have abandoned the office he was

occupying by virtue of his former appointment

(46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question

the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he

was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166,

par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said

rule only when his non-acceptance of the new

appointment may affect public interest or when he is

compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies.

In the case under consideration, the petitioner was

free to accept or not the ad interim appointment

issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his

favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act

No. 145. If the petitioner believed that

Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he

should have refused to accept the appointment

offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it

with reservation, had he believed that his duty of

obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and

afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the

final determination of the question whether a law is

unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware

of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations,

by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code),

accepted the office and entered into the performance

of the duties inherent therein, after taking the

necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge

that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he

was appointed, he would later be stopped from

questioning the validity of said appointment by

alleging that the law, by virtue of which his

appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The

petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the

same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.

NECESSITY OF DECIDEING THE CONSTITUTIONAL

QUESTION

TARROSA V SINGSON

Facts: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of

the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos. Jesus

Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for

prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson

for not having been confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments (CA). Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of

Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the

Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to the

confirmation of the CA. In his comment, Singson

claimed that the Congress exceeded its legislative

powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of the

appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral.

He contended that an appointment to the said

position is not among the appointments which have

to be confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the

Constitution.

Issues:

Whether or not Tarrosa has the locus standi to

challenge the appointment.

Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to

COA’s confirmation.

Held:

1. Tarrosa has no legal standing to question the

appointment. The petition is in the nature of a quo

warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of

respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is

unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of

Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil

action can only be commenced by the Solicitor

General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a

public office or position unlawfully held or exercised

by another." In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA

637 (1992), the court held that the petitioner therein,

who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of

the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring

the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent

from said office as a mere usurper. Likewise in

Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it

was held that the question of title to an office, which

must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may

not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment

of salary to the person holding such office, brought by

someone who does not claim to be the one entitled

to occupy the said office.

2. Appointment to the position of the Governor of the

BSP is not one of those that need confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by

law expand the confirmation powers of the

Commission on Appointments and require

confirmation of appointment of other government

officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence

of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

(Tarrosa vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994)

DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUIONALITY

EFFECTS:

1. ORTHODOX VIEW v MODERN VIEW

NORTON V SHELBY

Facts: A case was filed before the Tennessee Court,

questioning the action upon twenty-nine bonds of

$1,000 each, alleged to be the bonds of Shelby

County, Tennessee, issued on the first of March,

1869, and payable on the first of January, 1873, with

interest from January 1, 1869 at 6percent per annum;

and three coupons of $60 each. Plaintiffs contend

that the commissioners who issued to them the said

bonds were lawful officers, thereby authorized to

bind the county to the legal obligations of the bonds.

However, the defendants contend that such

commissioners were not lawful officers, thereby

absolving them from the legal obligations of the

bonds, and that there was no office in Tennessee as

that of a county commissioner, and thereby

rendering the issued bonds as void. Also they

challenged the statutes that commissioned the

commissioners, particularly the act of March 9, 1867

which provides for the creation of the board of

commissioners in issuing the bonds, as

unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the act of March 9, 1867 is

unconstitutional, therefore rendering the

commissioned officers as illegally appointed.

Held: The Tennessee high court rendered the act of

March 9, 1867 unconstitutional. The creation of the

board of commissioners also confers the powers of

the justices of the peace of the county court, and

such a provision is unconstitutional and void, since

these powers shall be exercised only by the justices.

It is difficult to meet it by any argument beyond this

statement: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it

confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no

protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal

contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never

been passed.

The Supreme Court affirmed this decision. However,

it said that even if the commissioners were not

appointed de jure, they were working de facto, thus

still providing lawful authority. It is contended that if

the act creating the board was void, and the

commissioners were not officers de jure, they were

nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the

board as a de facto court are binding upon the

county. This contention is met by the fact that there

can be no officer, either de jure or de facto, if there

be no office to fill.

MANILA MOTORS CO V FLORES

In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the

Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to recover

from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as

chattel mortgage installments which fell due in

September 1941. Defendant pleaded prescription:

1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On

appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently,

sustaining plaintiff's contention that the moratorium

laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive

period, and that deducting the time during which said

laws were in operation — three years and eight

months1 — the ten year term had not yet elapsed

when complainant sued for collection in May 1954.

Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case

to the municipal judge for trial on the merits.

Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the

moratorium laws did not have the effect of

suspending the period of limitations, because they

were unconstitutional, as declared by this court in

Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites

jurisprudence holding that when a statute is adjudged

unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never

been passed, and no rights can be built upon it. Some

members expressed doubts as to whether the order

of the lower court was appealable in nature; but we

agreed not to discuss the point, inasmuch as the

question submitted by appellant could speedily be

disposed of. InMontilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we

held that the moratorium laws suspended the period

of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-

Esteban decision. It should be stated however, in

fairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision came

down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer

to his main contention, the following portion is

quoted from a resolution of this Court Rutter vs.

Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that

at the of the decision the Moratorium law could no

longer be validly applied because of the prevailing

circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule

is that an unconstitutional statute —"confers no right,

create no office, affords no protection and justifies no

acts performed under it." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)

there are several instances wherein courts, out of

equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in

Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and

Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its effects "since

the actual existence of a statute prior to such

declaration is an operative fact, and may have

consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot

County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic

approach is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs.

Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUIONALITY:

IN RE CUNANAN

FACTS:Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is

known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of

the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar

Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no

grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate

who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be

deemed to have already passed that subject and the

grade/grades shall be included in the computation of

the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether or not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due

to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title

of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only

the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.

Section2 establishes a permanent system for an

indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing

partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact

that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary. As to

Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared

unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was

declared in force and effect. The portion that was

stricken down was based under the following

reasons: The law itself admits that the candidates for

admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952

had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this

was very close to the end of World War II; The law is,

in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the

court on the petitions of the said candidates; The law

is an encroachment on the Court’s primary

prerogative to determine who may be admitted to

practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative

power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of

Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this

power are only minimum norms, not designed to

substitute the judgment of the court on who can

practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts

to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the

Court could not muster enough votes to declare it

void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take

effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing

Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the

bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall

within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or

modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

MACALINTAL V COMELEC

FACTS:Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and

prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member

of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that

certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from

constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual

and material legal interest in the subject matter of

this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly

and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed

the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No.

9189 violates the residency requirement in Section 1

of Article V of the Constitution.

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law

violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution that the winning

candidates for President and the Vice-President shall

be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee created in

Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power

to review, revise, amend, and approve the

Implementing Rules and Regulations that the

Commission on Elections, promulgate without

violating the independence of the COMELEC under

Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:

(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those

who are disqualified voting under this Act. It

disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident

who is recognized as such in the host country.

However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she

executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for

the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she

shall resume actual physical permanent residence in

the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval

of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that

he/she has not applied for citizenship in another

country. Failure to return shall be cause for the

removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent

resident from the National Registry of Absentee

Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote

in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency

requirement in Section 1 Article V of the Constitution

which requires the voter must be a resident in the

Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the

place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months

immediately preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not

hold water at present, and that the Court may have

to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the

controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption

of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The

qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is

deemed to have retained his domicile in the

Philippines and presumed not to have lost his

domicile by his physical absence from this country.

Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the

promise to resume actual physical permanent

residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years

after approval of registration but it also requires the

Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a

temporary visitor or even on business trip, must

declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in

another country. Thus, he/she must return to the

Philippines otherwise consequences will be met

according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not

return after he has exercised his right to vote, the

Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the

law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be

impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress

itself was conscious of this probability and provided

for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to

return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage.

Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated

because he was qualified to vote on the date of the

elections.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets

down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is

prevented from making it mean what the Court

pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of

the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory

construction and intent of the framers, which is to

grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents

abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right

of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that

Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally

defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC

to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it.

The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of

the winning candidates for President and Vice

President for the entire nation must remain in the

hands of Congress as its duty and power under

Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC

has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates

only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve,

review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules &

Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond

the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress

trampled upon the constitutional mandate of

independence of the COMELEC. Under such a

situation, the Court is left with no option but to

withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a

provision of law unconstitutional

EXCEPTION

LINDASAN V COMELEC

FACT: Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang,

Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An

Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the

Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan

however discovered that certain barrios located in

Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur

pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the

Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]

Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to

establish precincts for voter registration in the said

territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to

have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional.

He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its

title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in

its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?

RULING: RA 4790 declared as NULL and VOID.

Constitutional requirement aforestated that ³no bill

which may be enacted into law shall embrace more

than one subject which shall be expressed in the title

of the bill´. Constitutional provision contains DUAL

LIMITATIONS upon legislative power:

1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under

one statute, of heterogenous subjects.

2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language

sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and

those concerned of the import of the single subject

thereof. It violates the constitutional requirement

that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. It

did not inform the Congress the full impact of the

Law. Moreover, It did not inform thecitizens of

Buldon and Parang in Cotabato that part of their

territory is being taken away from their towns and

municipalities and that such will be added to the

Province of Lanao del Sur. The subject was the

creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it

makes the title misleading and deceptive. Even upon

removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the

municipality of Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional

because the valid part is not independent of the

invalid portion. Thus, it is indivisible, and it is

accordingly null and void in its totality

DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE CONSTITUIONALITY

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASS,N IC V BSP

FACTS:

First the facts.

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.

The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.[1]

Respondent BSP, in its comment,[10] contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."[12]?

RULING:

- THE ENACTMENT OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

The concept of relative constitutionality.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.[24] A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

II. THE FUNDEMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

A. SIMILARITIES, DISTINCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

B. POLICE POWER 1. DEFINITION, SCOPE CHARACTERISTICS

INCHONG V HERNANDEZ

Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic Survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.

Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. Furthermore, the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population

affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

ORTIGAS AND CO. V CA

Facts: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which

results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments. Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED

PRC V DE GUZMAN

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio- Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”

Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen career

2. WHO MAY EXERCISE

MMDA V GARIN

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the reply from the Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary injunction assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rules in his favor directing MMDA to return Garin’s driver’s license and for MMDA to desist from confiscating driver’s license

without first giving the driver to opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic constitutional.

RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislative to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, P.O., NGO’s and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services.”

3. TEST OF VALID EXERCISE (LIMITATIONS)

LAWFUL SUBJECTS

TAXI CAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA V BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry. Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

------

Facts: Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old. Pursuant to the BOT circular, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing the implementation of said circular and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years is arbitrarily and oppressive because the road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected and therefore their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of the registration.

Issue: WON a circular phasing out taxicabs more than 6 years old is unreasonable and arbitrary.

Held: No, A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly. The span of 6 years supplies that reaonable standard. By the time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public. Taxicabs in Manila, compared to those in other places are subject to heavier traffic pressure and constant use

TIO V VRB

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:

“SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.”

“Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.” “Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila

Commission.” The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor’s specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. (2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state’s police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering “the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor’s permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.”

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs

DEPED V SAN DIEGO

Facts: The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1

When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis:

MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge TeresitaDizon- Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. DECS appealed the decision, hence this case.

Issue: Is MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 a valid exercise of police power by the state?

Held:The decision of the lower court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED and the petition is GRANTED. In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the court ruled that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country” and is recognized as a valid exercises of governmental power. The country is entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the

challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits,

SANGALANG V IAC

FACTS: The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD: No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO: Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise

other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed

----------

Facts: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation. The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, particularly, “. . . The Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary . . .” disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity.

Issue: Whether or not the counsel’s act constitutes malpractice in violation of the Code’s (CPR) provision on the use of scandalous offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

Held: In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general. Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem . In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession."

The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

DEL ROSARIO V BENGZON

Facts: Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No. 62. The law specifically provides that “All government health agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name.

The petitioner’s main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.

In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctor’s prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their prices.

Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by the government.

Held: Petition Dismissed. The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost”. The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law. The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their corresponding process. The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless. The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional. The purpose of the Generics Act is to “promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand name counterparts”. The effect of the drug does not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it contains.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEY V COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is toauthorize unjust taking of private property.

According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and televisionbroadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and televisionbroadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with theperformance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

OPLE V TORRES

Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,

viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.

On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: Yes, As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished

member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper seand as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.

LAWFUL MEANS

YNOT V IAC

Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner

appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V COMELEC

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication

and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?

HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.

C. Eminent Domain(also read Rule 67 (Re Expropriation) of the Rules of Court

RULE 67

Expropriation

Section 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or

doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (1a)

Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.

If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court.

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. (2a)

Section 3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.

A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award. (n)

Section 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the

payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.

After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)

Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.

Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. (5a)

Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (6a)

Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. — The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not

be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)

Section 8. Action upon commissioners' report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. (8a)

Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)

Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. — Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)

Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. — The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the

restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)

Section 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)

Section 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. — The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or purpose. (13a)

Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. — The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent. (14a)

1. Definition and Scope

- Power of Expropriation- The highest and the most exact idea of

property remaining in the government that may acquired from some public purpose through a method in the nature of a compulsory sale of the State.

Article 3, Sec. 9: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

- Should be strictly interpreted against the expropriator and liberally construed in favour of the property owner

Distinguished from destruction from necessity

- May be validly undertaken even by private individuals

- Not allowed in eminent domain- Cannot require the conversion of the

property taken to public use - No need for payment of just compensation

American Print Works vs Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590

In this case the defendant pleaded in justification a statute of the State of New York, passed 9th

April, 1813, which provides that when a building in a city shall be on fire, it shall be lawful for the Mayor, Aldermen, &c., to direct or order the same, or any other building which they may deem hazardous and likely to take fire, or to convey the fire to other buildings, to be pulled down or destroyed. Such statute does not deprive any citizen of his natural right to destroy buildings, to prevent the spread of a fire, in a case of necessity, and exercise that right at the peril of being held responsible for an error of judgment as to the existence of the necessity, but vested the power of judging of the existence of the necessity in the discretion of certain officers designated by it, and makes their judgment conclusive as to the existence of that necessity. In so doing, the Legislature do not act in violation of the 5th Art. of amendments of Constitution of U. S., which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation ; even if the party is deprived of the right of trial by Jury, the statute is not therefore necessarily unconstitutional. Baldw. 220, Saxton 687, 3 Page 75. The destruction of the building necessarily involved the destruction of the goods. The article which constitutes the Mayor, Aldermen, &c., judges of the necessity of destroying the building, must of consequence make them judges also of the time at which the act of destruction becomes necessary.*

Note: Right to eminent domain – public right, it arises from the laws of society and is vested in the state, or benefit of the state, or those under it;

Right to necessity – under the laws of society or society itself, right of self-defense or self-preservation

2. Who May Exercise

Congress; President of the Philippines; various local legislative bodies; certain public corporation (Land Authority, National Housing Authority); quasi-public corporation (Philippine National Railways, PLDT Co., Meralco)

3. Elements

Necessity of the Exercise – decided by a delegate only of the national legislature; judiciary – whether the expropriation

contemplated by the delegate is necessary or wise

Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961

The Power of Eminent Domain

To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.

The petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General; and the respondent is La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College.

Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the property in question at P270,000.00 and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.

In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.

The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain.

Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for

public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.

It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)

“expropriation of Chinese cemetery”

Facts: The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the Chinese community as cemetery for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue for public use. The respondents contend that the land already acquires a quasi-public character and many dead bodies are already buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of taking the land for public purpose since such is under Torrens title and the expropriation will disturb the resting place of the dead. The plaintiff contends that under the Charter of City of Manila, they may condemn private lands for public purpose, such being an exclusive function of the legislature and the only function of the court is to assess the value of the land expropriated.

Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of expropriation.

Held: The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the inquiry of the existence of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public purpose. The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) that the right

or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. There are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be public. The taking of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but the court is bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled that the cemetery is a public property and it found no great necessity to allow the expropriation of the land by the City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Private Property – includes real and personal, tangible, and intangible properties

Eg. Churches, franchises and other religious properties and cemeteries

EXCEPTIONS: money and chose in action – a personal right not reduced into possession but recoverable by a suit at law, a right to receive, demand or recover a debt, demand or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of duty; conjectural both as to its validity and value.

Republic vs PLDT 26 SCRA 620

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through

expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

PLDT vs NTC, 190 SCRA 717

Facts: In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCI’s shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? – not specified in the case); that such transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT’s petition should prosper.

HELD: No. PLDT cannot attack ETCI’s franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto. Further, for any violation of the franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first place.

The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than 40% of the corporation’s stocks, it should be approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of the shares. A

corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of continuity or perpetual succession.

Taking – may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended.

Requisites of Taking:1. The expropriator must enter a private

property2. The entry must be for more than a

momentary period.3. The entry must be under warrant or

color of legal authority.4. The property must be devoted to

public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected.

5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Republic vs Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)

FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

Examples:US vs Lynah, 188 US 445

Facts: All private property is held subject to the necessities of government and, the right of eminent domain underlies all such rights of property.

When the United States government appropriates property which it does not claim as its own, it does so under an implied contract that it will pay the value of the property it so appropriates.

When it is alleged in an action that the government of the United States in the exercise of its powers of eminent domain and regulation of commerce, through officers and agents duly empowered thereto by acts of Congress, places dams, training walls and other obstructions in the Savannah River in such manner as to hinder its natural flow and to raise the water so as to overflow the land of plaintiff along the banks to such an extent as to cause a total destruction of its value, and the government does not deny the ownership, admits that the work was done by authority of Congress, and simply denies that the work has produced the alleged injury and destruction, the circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction to inquire whether the acts done by the officers of the United States under the direction of Congress have resulted in such an overflow and injury of the land as to render it absolutely valueless, and, if thereby the property was, in contemplation of law, taken and appropriated by the government, to render judgment against it for the value of the property so taken and appropriated.

Where the government of the United States, by the construction of a dam or other public works, so floods lands belonging to an individual as to totally destroy its value, there is a taking of private property within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.

The proceeding must be regarded as an actual appropriation of the land, including the possession and the fee, and when the amount awarded as compensation is paid, the title, the fee and whatever rights may attach thereto pass to the government, which becomes henceforth the full owner.

Notwithstanding that the work causing the injury was done in improving the navigability of a navigable river and by the Constitution Congress is given full control over such improvements, the injuries cannot be regarded as purely consequential, and the government cannot appropriate property without being liable to the obligation created by the Fifth Amendment of paying just compensation.

On February 4, 1897, defendants in error commenced their action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina to recover of the United States the sum of $10,000 as compensation for certain real estate (being a part of a plantation

known as Verzenobre) taken and appropriated by the defendant.

The petition alleged in the first paragraph the citizenship and residence of the petitioners; in the second that they had a claim against the United States under an implied contract for compensation for the value of property taken by the United States for public use; third, that they were the owners as tenants in common of the plantation, and in the fourth and seventh paragraphs:

"Fourth. That for several years continuously, and now continuously, the said government of the United States of America, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain under the Constitution of the United States and by authority of the acts of Congress, duly empowering its officers and agents thereto, in that case made and provided, did erect, build, and maintain, and continuously since have been erecting, building and maintaining, and are now building, erecting, and maintaining in and across the said Savannah River, in the bed of the said Savannah River, certain dams, training walls, and other obstructions, obstructing and hindering the natural flow of the said Savannah River through, in, and along the natural bed thereof and raising the said Savannah River feet at the point of and above the said obstructions and dams in the bed of the said Savannah River, and causing the said waters of the Savannah River aforesaid to be kept back and to flow back and to be raised and elevated above the natural height of the Savannah River along its natural bed at the points of the said dams, training walls, and obstructions, and at points above the said dams, training walls, and obstructions in said river."

"Seventh. And your petitioners further show that the said acts of the government of the United States as aforesaid have been done and are being done lawfully by the officers and agents of the United States under the authority of the United States in the exercise of its powers of eminent domain and regulation of commerce under the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress for the public purpose of the improvement of the harbor of Savannah and deepening the waters of the Savannah River at the port of Savannah, a port of entry of the United States and seaport of the United States of America situated within the State of Georgia, on the Savannah River, and with the purpose of deepening and enlarging the navigable channel and highway for commerce of the said Savannah River for the public use, purpose, and benefit of interstate and foreign and international trade and commerce, and for other public purposes, uses, and benefits."

The remaining paragraphs set forth the effect of the placing by the government of

the dams, restraining walls, and other obstructions in the river, together with the value of the property appropriated by the overflow. The answer of the government averred.

"First. That this defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in the first and third paragraphs of the said petition and complaint."

"Second. That this defendant denies all of the allegations contained in the second fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth paragraphs of the said petition and complaint except so much of the fourth paragraph as alleges that the said United States heretofore erected certain dams in the Savannah River pursuant to power vested in it by law, and except so much of the seventh paragraph as alleges that the said dams heretofore erected by the United States were lawfully erected by its officers and agents."

For a further defense, the statute of limitations was pleaded. The case came on for trial before the court without a jury, which made findings of fact, and from them deduced conclusions of law and entered a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $10,000. The findings were to the effect that the plaintiffs were the owners of the plantation, deriving title by proper mesne conveyances from "a grant by the lord's proprietors of South Carolina," made in 1736. Other findings pertinent to the questions which must be considered in deciding this case were as follows:

"IV. A certain parcel of these plantations, measuring about 420 acres, had been reclaimed by drainage, and had been in actual continued use for seventy years and upwards as a rice plantation, used solely for this purpose. This rice plantation was dependent for its irrigation upon the waters of the Savannah River and its ditches, drains, and canals, through and by which the waters of the river were flowed in and upon the lands, and were then drained therefrom, were adapted to the natural level of the said Savannah River, and dependent for their proper drainage and cultivation upon the maintenance of the natural flow of the said river in, through, and over its natural channel along its natural bed to the waters of the ocean."

"V. This portion of the plantation fronting on the river and dedicated to the culture of rice, extended almost up to, if not quite to, low water mark, and a large part of it was between mean high water and low water mark, protected from the river by an embankment. Through this embankment trunks or waterways were constructed, with flood gates therein. The outer opening of the trunk was about a foot or a little less above the mean low water mark of the river, in which the tide ebbs and flows.

When it is desired to flow the lands, the flood gates are opened and the water comes in. When it is desired to draw off this water and to effect the drainage of the lands, the flood gates are opened at low water and the water escapes. It is essential that the outlets of the trunks or waterways should always be above the mean low water mark."

"VII. For several years last past and at the present time, the government of the United States, under its proper officers, authorized thereto by the act of Congress, have been engaged in the improvement of the navigation of the Savannah River, a navigable water of the United States, this improvement being carried on by virtue of the provisions of Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, giving to the Congress the power to regulate commerce."

"VIII. In thus improving navigation of this navigable water the United States has built and maintained, and is now building and maintaining, in and across the Savannah River, in the bed thereof, certain dams, training walls, and other obstructions, obstructing the natural flow of said river in and along its natural bed, and so raising the level of the said river above said obstructions, and causing its waters to be kept back and to flow back and to be elevated above its natural height in its natural bed."

"IX. This rice plantation Verzenobre is above these obstructions. The direct effect thereof is to raise the level of the Savannah River at this plantation, and to keep the point of mean low water above its natural point, so that the outlet of the trunks and waterways above spoken of in the bank of said plantation, instead of being above this point of low water mark, is now below this point. Another direct result was that, by seepage and percolation the water rose in the plantation until the water level in the land gradually rose to the height of the increased water level in the river, and the super induced addition of water in the plantation was about eighteen inches thereby. By reason of this, it gradually became difficult, and has now become impossible, to let off the water on this plantation or to drain the same, so that these acres dedicated to the culture of rice have become boggy, unfit for cultivation, and impossible to be cultivated in rice."

"X. By the raising of the level of the Savannah River by these dams and obstructions, the water thereof has been backed up against the embankment on the river and has been caused to flow back upon and in this plantation above the obstruction, and has actually invaded said plantation, directly raising the water in said plantation about eighteen inches, which it is impossible to remove from said plantation. This flooding is the permanent condition now, and the rice plantation is thereby

practically destroyed for the purpose of rice culture or any other known agriculture, and is an irreclaimable bog, and has no value."

"XI. By reason of this super induced addition of water actually invading the said rice plantation, and its destruction thereby for all purposes of agriculture, plaintiffs have been compelled to abandon the cultivation of said rice plantation and have been forced to pursue their calling of planting rice on other plantations below the dams. The direct result to plaintiffs is an actual and practical ouster of possession from this rice plantation, cultivated by themselves and family for many years."

"XII. Beyond the backing up of the water on and in the plantation by reason of the dams and obstruction, and the invasion of these lands by this super induced addition of water at and in the plantation as above described, rendered necessary by the execution of the government's plans, the United States is not in actual possession of these lands."

"XIII. Up to this time, no other use has been discovered for these lands than for rice culture, and the direct results above stated have totally destroyed the market value of the lands. They now have no value."

"XIV. The value of these rice lands before the obstructions aforesaid were put into the river was about thirty dollars per acre; between twenty-five and thirty dollars per acre. The value of the rice plantation, 420 acres, thus destroyed, is ten thousand dollars."

ISSUE: in this case is was there a taking of this land in the sense of the Constitution?

HELD: "The facts found show that, by reason of the obstruction in the Savannah River the water has been directly backed up against the embankment on the river and the banks on and in this plantation, the superinduced addition of water actually invading it and destroying its drainage and leaving it useless for all practical purposes. The government does not in a sense take this land for the purposes of putting its obstructions on it. But it forces back the water of the river on the land as a result necessary to its purpose, without which its purpose could not be accomplished. For the purpose of the government, that water in the river must be raised. The banks of this plantation materially assist this operation, for by their resistance the water is kept in the channel. The backing up of the water against the banks to create this resistance raises the water in the plantation and destroys the drainage of the plantation. This is a taking. 'It would,' says Mr. Justice Miller,"

"be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if, in construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been

adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the government, and which had received the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as placing the just principles of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control them, it shall be held that, if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public, it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent; can, in effect, subject to total destruction without making any compensation, because in the narrowest sense of that word it has not been taken for the public use."

"Pumpelly v. Green Bay

Page 188 U. S. 452

Co., 13 Wall. 177, 80 U. S. 178. In that case, the backing up of water on land was held to be a taking."

"VI. The plantation of plaintiffs being actually invaded by superinduced addition of water directly caused by the government dams and obstructions backing up the water of the Savannah River, and raising the water level at and in the rice plantation, and making it unfit for rice cultivation or for any other known agriculture, and plaintiffs having been compelled thereby to abandon the plantation, and this actual and practical ouster of possession being continued and permanent by reason of the permanent condition of the flooding of the plantation, and the plantation being thereby now an irreclaimable bog of no value,makes the action of the government a taking of lands for public purposes within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for which compensation is due to the plaintiffs. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 182; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 668."

"VII. The government has not gone into actual occupancy of this land, but by reason of these dams and obstructions made necessary by this public work and fulfilling its purpose the water in the Savannah River has been raised at the plaintiffs' plantation and has been backed up on it and remains on it so that the drainage has been destroyed and ditches filled up and superadded water permanently kept on the land and forced up into it, making it wholly unfit for cultivation, and the plaintiffs have thereby been practically and actually ousted of their possession. This is taking of the land for public purposes, for which compensation must be provided. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 181."

The case involving the application of the Constitution of the United States was brought by writ of error directly to this Court.

US vs Causby, 328 SCRA 256

United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946]

Douglas (J)

Facts: Causby owns 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from Causby's barn and 2,275 feet from their house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease executed in May 1942, for a term commencing 1 June 1942 and ending 30 June 1942, with a provision for renewals until 30 June 1967, or 6 months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the earlier. Various aircraft of the United States, i.e. bombers, transports and fighters, use this airport. Since the United States began operations in May 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over Causby's land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, the Causbys had to give up their chicken business. As many as 6 to 10 of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. The Causbys are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane accidents on their property, there have been several accidents near the airport and close to their place. These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found that the property had depreciated in value. It held that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. The United States contends that when flights are made within the navigable airspace (Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air navigation.

Issue: Whether there was taking of the Causby’s property, even in the light that the United States allegedly has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over the country.

Held: The United States conceded that if the flights over Causby's property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the 5th Amendment. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken. Market value fairly determined is the

normal measure of the recovery. And that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it. Herein, there was a taking. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be a case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. (233 U.S. 546). In that case property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains. Herein, the line of flight is over the land, and the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the runways themselves. However, since the record in the case is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature for the Court to consider whether the amount of the award made by the Court of Claims was proper, and thus the Court remanded the cause to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with the Court's opinion.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, et al. 464 SCRA 481 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function and the recommendation of the commissioners is given weight and consideration if the same is reasonable and just.

FACTS:

National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land located in Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.

The RTC issued an order granting NPC„s motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter. However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395 which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes, subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines. The RTC

rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the same was denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of judgment was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation

HELD:

In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.

Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term ―expropriation.

From the Commissioner„s report it cannot be gainsaid that NPC„s complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.„s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupant„s life and limb. The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, the Court finds the commissioners„ recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.

Taking under Police Power – aimed at improving the general welfare, and whatever damages are sustained by the property owners are regarded as merely incidental to a proper execution of such power; loss - damnm obsque injuria; recompensation - altruistic feeling special injury - if he suffers more than his aliquot part of the damages, he will be entitled to payment of the corresponding compensation.

Richards vs. Washington Terminal, 33 US 546

if the petitioner sustained more than the damage incurred bu the other houses in the vicinity, he is entitled to just compensation

invalid taking under the police power

City of Quezon vs. Ericta 122 SCRA 359

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:

Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power. Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The

questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

> Public Use – any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or accommodation.

-Res communes – subject to direct enjoyment by any and all members of the public indiscriminately

-Telephone or light companies – such services are demandable as a matter of right by any one prepared to pay for them

-Any member of the general public, as such, can demand the right to use the converted property for his direct and personal convenience.

-if the lot is transferred already, it ceases to be public property and come under the exclusive ownership of the transferees; the promotion of social objectives is more paramount.

-slum clearance - valid object of expropriation under the modern expanded interpretation of public use.

Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Just Compensation - full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the privateowner by the expropriator; intended to indemnify the owner fully for the loss he hassustained as a result of the expropriation.–if it is prejudicial to rge public, it will not satisfy the requirementof just compensation.

Eslaban vs. De Onono, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001]

Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur

Facts: Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio's husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Rightof-Way agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035, §18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31 October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time the property was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation is filed.

Held: Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owner's duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a "public

highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."

Who is the “owner” who shall receive the payment?

Knecht vs. CA, 297 SCRA 754

KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS [290 SCRA 223; G.R. NO. 108015, 20 MAY 1998]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts’ property. The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay

real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished.

The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given just compensation.

Issue: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government.

Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law — one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition

of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility.

Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

Determination of JC: Judicial Function

NHA vs Reyes, 123 SCRA 245

Facts: National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland owned by the petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the expropriation is for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots with payment of just compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme Court order, so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of Quezon City. They also said that NHA did not relocate squatters from Manila on the expropriated lands which violate the reason for public purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment.

In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus, several issues are already raised in the expropriation court.

The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a contract with a developer for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries. The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of the petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just compensation is based on the value at the time the property was taken.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.

Held: The decision appealed is modified.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over the private properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.

The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties “for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project”.

The “public use” is synonymous with “public interest”, “public benefit”, “public welfare”, and “public convenience”. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.

Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies and other private concerns.

The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

Records show that there is an outstanding balance of P1,218,574.35 that ought to be paid to petitioners.[16] It is not disputed that respondent NHA took actual possession of the expropriated properties in 1977.[17] Perforce, while petitioners are not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, they are entitled to be paid the balance of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the property in 1977 until the due amount shall have been fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as follows:

1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay petitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have been fully paid;

2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and

3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National Housing Authority the owners duplicate certificates of title of the expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

EPZA v Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

“appointment of commissioners to determine just compensation in expropriation”

Facts: A land reserve was provided for the Export Processing Zone which some portion of the land is privately owned by the respondents. Petitioner offered to purchase the land but both parties did not come to an agreement in terms of the assessed value of the property. Petitioner files an expropriation case which the court decided in favor of them and issued a writ of possession for the immediate possession of land subject to just compensation. Respondents however are not amenable to the amount and thus the court appointed commissioners to determine the appropriate property value. Petitioner now questions the appointment of commissioners to determine the value of property while invoking PD No. 1533 that indicates the determination of just compensation is based on the declared value indicated by the land owner and the assessor whichever is lower and there is no need to appoint commissioners for the purpose of assessing the property value.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in appointing commissioners to the case at bar

Held: The court ruled that PD No. 1533 only serves as a guiding principle providing some considerations in the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. It does not substitute the discretion vested upon the court to exercise in determining the fair and just compensation in expropriating property. The appointment of commissioners is one way the court may determine the fair and just compensation in dispute for judicial evaluation.

Form of JC

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [GR

78741, 14 July 1989]; Also Acuna vs. Arroyo [GR 79310], Pabico vs. Juico [GR 79744], and

Manaay vs. Juico [GR 79777]

En Banc, Cruz (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 17 July 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of Presidential Decree (PD) 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on 22 July 1987 by PD 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public

hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on 10 June 11988. This law, while considerably changing RA 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code, 8 August 1963) and PD 27 (21 October 1972), nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[GR 79777] Nicolas Manaay and his wife owned a 9-hectare riceland worked by 4 tenants, while Augustin Hermano Jr. owned a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. The tenants therein were declared full owners of these lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. Manaay and Hermano questioned the constitutionality of PD 27, and EOs 228 and 229, before the Supreme Court, in GR 79777, on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In the amended petition dated 22 November 1988, it was contended that PD 27, EOs 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by RA 6657, but that the latter statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on 1 June 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare land, who complained that the department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was insisting on the implementation of PD 27 and EO 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals.

[GR 79310] Arsenio Al. Acuña, Newton Jison, Victorino Ferraris, Dennis Jereza, Herminigildo Gustilo, and Paulino D. Tolentino are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental; while the Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. They filed a petition (GR 79310) seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation 131 and EO 229, claiming that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President; that although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period; and that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proclamation 131 and EO 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the EO 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest,

maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC. A motion for intervention was filed on 27 August 1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On 10 September 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court. On 11 April 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of EO 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because (1) only public lands should be included in the CARP; (2) EO 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title; (3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on 2 July 1987; and (4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives. [GR 79744] Inocentes Pabico in his petition (GR 79744) alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to Salvador Talento, Jaime Abogado, Conrado Avanceña, and Roberto Taay, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. On 3 September 1986, Pabico protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the Talento, et. al. Pabico claims that on 24 December 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On 17 February 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when EO 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to Talento, et. al. Pabico argues that (1) EOs 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines; 92) the said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation; and (3) Pabico is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

[GR 78742] The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., Juanito D. Gomez, Gerardo B. Alarcio, Felife A. Guico, Jr., Bernardo M. Almonte, Canuto Ramir B. Cabrito, Isidro T. Guico, Felisa I. Llamido, Fausto J. Salva, Reynaldo G. Estrada, Felisa C. Bautista, Esmenia J. Cabe, Teodoro B. Madriaga, Aurea J. Prestosa, Emerenciana J. Isla, Felicisima C. Apresto, Consuelo M. Morales, Benjamin R. Segismundo, Cirila A. Jose, and Napoleon S. Ferrer invoke in their petition (GR 78742) the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has so far not issued the implementing rules required under PD 316, implementing PD 27. They therefore

ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue the said rules.

Issue: Whether just compensation should exclusively be made in money and not other things of value.

Held: This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What is dealt with herein is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The Court assumes that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. The court may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, the Court find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. However, this cannot be avoided.

Landbank vs CA, 249 SCRA 149

In 1980, ECO Management Corporation (ECO) obtained loans amounting to about P26 million from Land Bank. ECO defaulted in its payment but in 1981, ECO submitted a Payment Plan with the hope of restructuring its loan. The plan was rejected and Land

Bank sued ECO. It impleaded Emmanuel C. Oñate, the majority stockholder of ECO who is serving as the Chairman and treasurer of ECO.

The trial court ruled in favor of Land Bank but Oñate was absolved from liabilities. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Land Bank appealed as it wanted Oñate to be personally liable on the following grounds (among others): a) ECO stands for Emmanuel C. Oñate, b) Oñate is the majority stockholder, c) ECO was formed ostensibly to allow Oñate to acquire loans from Land Bank which he used for his personal advantage, d) Oñate holds two positions in the corporation, and e) ECO never held any board meeting which just shows only Oñate was in control of the corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Oñate should be held personally.

HELD: No. Land Bank was not able to produce sufficient evidence to prove its claim. A corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those persons composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related. The corporate fiction is only disregarded when the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate entity. None of the foregoing was proved by Land Bank.

The mere fact that Oñate owned the majority of the shares of ECO is not a ground to conclude that Oñate and ECO is one and the same. Mere ownership by a single stockholder of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not by itself sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.

Anent the issue of the corporate name, the fact that Oñate’s initials coincide with the corporate name ECO is not sufficient to disregard the corporate fiction. Even if ECO does stand for “Emmanuel C. Oñate”, it does not mean that the said corporation is merely a dummy of Oñate. A corporation may assume any name provided it is lawful. There is nothing illegal in a corporation acquiring the name or as in this case, the initials of one of its shareholders.

Time of assessing JCEslaban vs. De Onorio, supra

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

R E S O L U T I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the

PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option

the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other

agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the

landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Entitlement of owner to interestUrtula vs Republic, 22 SCRA 477

Facts: The Court of First Instance had rendered judgment on 16 November 1957 in its Civil Case No. 3837, for the expropriation of the Hacienda Quitang,

owned by Dalmacio Urtula by the Republic of the Philippines, for the sum of P213,094.00, "and upon making the payment the plaintiff shall take full possession of the land." The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole issue of whether the amount fixed by the trial court was a just compensation for the property. While the appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, the Republic of the Philippines deposited on 29 July 1958, with the Philippine National Bank the sum of P117,690.00 as provisional value of the land, in accordance with an order of the trial court dated 3 January 1958, and this deposit was withdrawn by Dalmacio Urtula in August of 1958.

Thereafter, on 10 September 1958, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's petition to be placed in possession of the property; and under a writ of possession issued by the provincial sheriff of the province, the Land Tenure Administration took actual physical possession of the land on 11 October 1958.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals found that the issue between the parties was purely one of law and thereby elevated the appeal to the Supreme Court. This Court rendered judgment thereon on 29 November 1960 in case No. L-16028, affirming the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance, without modification.

The Supreme Court had affirmed, as aforesaid, the decision of the trial court fixing the amount of just compensation for P213,094.00; thus, at the time the decision became final, the balance still due was P95,404.00. Of this balance, the Republic paid Dalmacio Urtula the sum of P5,404.00 on 17 April 1961; but on the same day, Urtula deposited same amount with the Land Tenure Administration in payment of taxes and penalties for prior years up to 1958 on the expropriated land and for the surveyor's fee for segregating one hectare donated by condemnee Urtula for a school site. On liquidation at a later date, an excess in the amount of P423.38 was found, and the Republic refunded this excess to Urtula on 25 September 1961. On 3 May 1961, the Republic paid the remaining balance of P90,000.00.

The taxes due and unpaid, including penalties, on the land for the years 1959, 1960 and 70% of 1961 were computed at a total of P3,534.23 as of 28 February 1962. The interest of 6% on P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958, the date when the condemnor Republic took possession of the land to May 1961, when the final balance was paid to Urtula was also computed at a total of P14,633.52.

On 26 January 1961, the plaintiff demanded payment of said interest (P14,633.52) but

the defendant Republic refused, on the ground that no payment of interest had been ordered in the decision in Civil Case No. 3837, the expropriation proceedings, or in the affirmatory decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-16028.

The parties further stipulated as a fact that the plaintiff had agreed to pay his counsel 10% of the amount recoverable from the defendant, as attorney's fees.

Upon the foregoing stipulated facts, the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff Urtula and ordered the defendant Republic to pay P14,633.52 as interest on the balance of P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958 to 3 May 1961 and to pay the costs, but denied the plaintiff's claim on the land taxes 1 and attorney's fees.

Both parties were not satisfied with the decision; hence, both appealed to this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant to pay interest upon a sum determined by final judgment as compensation for the property expropriated in a previous case of eminent domain between the same parties.

Held: As the issue of interest could have been raised in the former case but was not raised, res judicata blocks the recovery of interest in the present case. (Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494; Phil. Engineering Corp., et al. vs. Ceniza, etc., et al., L-17834, 29 Sept. 1962). It is settled that a former judgment constitutes a bar, as between the parties, not only as to matters expressly adjudged, but all matters that could have been adjudged at the time (Rule 39, sec. 49; Corda vs. Maglinti, L-17476, Nov. 30, 1961; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 48 Off. Gaz. 3330). It follows that interest upon the unrecoverable interest, which plaintiff also seeks, cannot, likewise, be granted.

It is not amiss to note that Section 3 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 4, Rule 69 of the old Rules), in fact, directs the defendant in an expropriation case to "present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses . . ." and if not so presented "are waived." (Emphasis Supplied.) 2 As it is, the judgment allowing the collection of interest, now under appeal in effect amends the final judgment in the expropriation case, a procedure abhorrent to orderly judicial proceedings.

The Republic took possession on 11 October 1958. From this date, therefore, the owner, while retaining the naked title, was deprived of the benefits from the land and it is just and fair that realty taxes for the years 1959 and onward should be borne by the entity exercising the right of eminent domain. (City of Manila vs. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215).

Costs in cases of eminent domain, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, are charged against the plaintiff. (Sec. 12, Rule 67, Rules of Court; Sec. 13, Rule 67 of the old Rules.) But the present case is not one of eminent domain but an ordinary civil action where the Republic of the Philippines is a party. Section 1 of Rule 142 provides that no costs shall be allowed against it, unless otherwise provided by law. No provision of law providing the contrary has been cited; hence, costs should be charged against Urtula.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is reversed and the case dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs Dalmacio Urtula, et al.

Right of landowner in case of non-payment of Just CompensationREPUBLIC vs. CAG.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002

FACTS:Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project.

Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for the property.

It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof.

Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated land to the Bulacan State University.

Despite the court’s order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.

The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the expropriated property.

The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979

Decision to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Permit Deposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question

HELD:

1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or

benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.

2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -

“The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment,

long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be deemed just and equitable under the premises'."

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.

Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the

judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.

The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.

All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.

REPUBLIC vs. LIMGR no. 161656, June 29, 2005FACTS:In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948. In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for thetwo lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republicand AFP officers in possession of the property. On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value". On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P 4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name. On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint forquieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim,

declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “ just"...µPetitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent·spredecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early asMay 14, 1940.

Held: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use.[7] Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondents predecessors-in-interest were given a run around by the Republics officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of respondents predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market value of the two lots in question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation.[10] From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,[26] however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)[27] years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.[28] To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[29] we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within

a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just.