Consti Cases July- 2nd Assignment

7/30/2019 Consti Cases July- 2nd Assignment

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Lansang v CA 326 SCRA 25925 FEBRUARY 2000QUISIMBING, J.

FACTS: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) wereallegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 by the NationalParks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civicbodyengaged in the development of national perks including RizalPark. No

document or instrument appears on record to show thegrantor of the verbal license to private respondents to occupy aportion of thegovernment park. They were given office and library space as wellas kiosks for selling food and drinks along TM Kalaw. 40% of the profitsderived from the kiosks were to remit to NPDC again without anythingshown on the record. With the change of the Government after theEDSA Revolution, anew chairman of the NPDC, Amado J. Lansang(herein petitioner),sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-calledverbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the lattervacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the park.Notice was given March 5, 1988 and respondents were given until

March 8tovacate. The notice was signed by Jose Iglesias, GABI president,allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias,who was totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing thenotice. GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RegionalTrial Court against petitioner. The trial court issued a TRO and expiredon March 28, 1988. The following day GABI was finally evicted byNPDC.RTCs ruling: The case was dismissed ruling that the complaint wasagainst the state which could not be sued without its consent.Court of Appeals ruling: Reversed the decision. The mere allegationthat the government official is being sued in his official capacity is not

enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or inexcess of his authority.ISSUES:1. W/N respondent court erred in not holding that privaterespondents complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, andhis co-defendants in civil case no. 88-43887, is in effect a suit againstthe state which cannot be sued without its consent.2. W/N respondentcourt erred in not holding that petitioners act of terminatingrespondent GABIs concession is valid and done in the lawfulperformance of official duty.HELD:The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his

official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights ofothers. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, fromliability arising from acts committed in bad faith. There is no question

in the capacity of the petitioner as NPDC chairman and his authority toterminate the agreement. The question now is whether or not thepetitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of the privaterespondents. However, no evidence of such abuse of authority is onrecord.Rizal part is beyond the commerce of man, thus could not besubject to lease of contract. Private respondents cannot and doesntclaim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park. However,the petitioners cannot be awarded with moral and exemplary damagesas well as attorneys fees. There is no evidence on record to support

Iglesias claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABIsejectment from Rizal Park. ] WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside.

Callado v. IRRI, G.R. No. 106483, May 27 1995

Facts:Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the IRRI. While drivinganIRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino InternationalAirport and backto the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.Af te r having charged and be ing issued a Notice of Termination by the

IRRI, petitioner filed a complaint before theLabor Arbiter for illegal

dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay withmoral andexemplary damages and attorneys fees. Private respondent informtheLabor Arbiter that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtueof Art ic le 3 of PD No. 1620 and tha t i t invo kes suchdip lomat i c immuni ty and privileges as an international organization.Issue:WON international immunity of the IRRI may be invoked in the caseatbenchHeld:The peti tion is di smissed. It is clear that in cases invo lv ingdismissedemployees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifyingthat such waiver isdiscretionary on its part. The grant of immunity to

IRRI is clear and unequivocaland an express waiver by itsDirector -Gene ral is the only way by w hich it mayrelinquish orabandon this immunity

Department of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 503

CRUZ,J .:The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East witha degree of Bachelor ofScience in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT threetimes and flunked it asmany times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected

his application on thebasis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court ofValenzuela, Metro


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Manila, to compel his admission to the test.After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4,1989, declaring thechallenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge TeresitaDizon-Capulong held that thepetitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medicaleducation through an arbitraryexercise of the police power.RULING:

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Sufficeit to repeat thatthe power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the publicgenerally, as distinguishedfrom those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,and (b) the meansemployed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objectsought to beaccomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.5In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires theconcurrence of alawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambitof the police power.It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure thatthe medicalprofession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients mayunwarily entrust theirlives and health.The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant tothe purpose ofthe law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule isintended to insulate themedical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the

intrusion of those notqualified to be doctors.While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does nothave a constitutionalright to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the publicinterest isinvolved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one'sambition. The State hasthe responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it thatthey are notdissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must beapplied in a

manner that will best promote the common good while also giving theindividual a senseof satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace tohis patients.The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right toquality education as aguarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to itbecause of hispreparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMATfivetimes.7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is

certainly misplaced,like a hopeless love.No depreciation is intended or madDECISIONWHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondentcourt dated January13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It isso ordered.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201

Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition againstrespondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stampscommemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutionalprovision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used inthe benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is aresult of the principle of the separation of church and state, for thepurpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church,or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondentcontends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052,providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production

and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to thegovernment.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom andnot mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition ofprofound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence inhuman affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power thatbinds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as itinstills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence isdeeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052

advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of theConstitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by anyfeeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They


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were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Thepostage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originallyplanned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location ofManila,with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. Thefocus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the cityofManila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertisethePhilippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely tookadvantage of an event considered of international importance.Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the

Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentallyresulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization,abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of countrieshas revolutionized international business and economic relationsamongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards tradeliberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization,deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, areushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as

mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promotingand protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, importquotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currencycontrols. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specificindustries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario arereplacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterallyprotect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods andservices.

The Petition in BriefArguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to placenationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as

Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limitsand/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and theSupreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTOAgreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to"develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectivelycontrolled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domesticmaterials and locally produced goods."Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippineparticipation in worldwide trade liberalization and economicglobalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a globaleconomy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the

main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for thenullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the

Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippinesof the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTOAgreement, for brevity).

The IssuesIn their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarizedthe issues as follows:C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World

Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, andSecs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreementand Economic NationalismThis is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of theConstitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered invarious parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but alsoin the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understandingon Commitments in Financial Services.

Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, whichare worded as follows:Article IIDECLARATION OF PRINCIPLESAND STATE POLICIESxxx xxx xxxSec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independentnational economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.xxx xxx xxxArticle XIINATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONYxxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encouragethe formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is whollyowned by Filipinos.In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the nationaleconomy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualifiedFilipinos.xxx xxx xxxSec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measuresthat help make them competitive.

It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and

"parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals andproducts of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos andlocal products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the


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Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase"effectively controlled by Filipinos."

We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.Declaration of PrinciplesNot Self-ExecutingBy its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration ofprinciples and state policies."These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executingprinciples ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used

by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power ofjudicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As heldin the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 theprinciples and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sectionsof Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of whichcan give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embodyjudicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines forlegislation."

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read withOther ConstitutionalMandates to AttainBalanced Development of EconomyAll told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of

Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, itrecognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the worldon the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipinoenterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices thatare unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursuean isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goodsand services in the development of the Philippine economy. While theConstitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit themeither. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality andreciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

Constitution Does NotRule Out Foreign CompetitionFurthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant andindependent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out theentry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplatesneither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the internationalcommunity."

Sovereignty Limited byInternational Law and TreatiesHowever, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absoluteand all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject torestrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,

expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-typeisolation of the country from the rest of the world.

In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as partof the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By thedoctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally acceptedprinciples of international law, which are considered to beautomatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the oldest and mostfundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda

international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treatyengagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legallybinding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contractedvalid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations suchmodifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of theobligations undertaken." 45By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict theabsoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations maysurrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greaterbenefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all,states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutuallycovenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit

the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties havebeen used to record agreements between States concerning suchwidely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, thesale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation ofconduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation ofcommercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rulesgoverning conduct in peace and the establishment of internationalorganizations.

EpilogueIn praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO

Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionallyimposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on thepart of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via SenateResolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on graveabuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of theRules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no otherplain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principlesrequire the State to develop an independent national economyeffectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipinolabor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it

is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial andlegislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes ofaction. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional


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principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a"trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms andarrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity"and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in bothdomestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance ofsaid treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in theexercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoptionof the generally accepted principles of international law as part of thelaw of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of

cooperation and amity with all nations.That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily andoverwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement therebymaking it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of itssovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrarinessor despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in suchexercise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary, 175 SCRA 342

Equal ProtectionThese are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of theAgrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rightsincludes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reformprogram. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reformprogram founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, inthe case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruitsthereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already beenenacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantiallysuperseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated

on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsoryacquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers andto specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987,Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of thebeneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvaluedlands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting acomprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229,providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is theenactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changingthe earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory

effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, theexecutive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights asprotected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violatedbecause the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problemson the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation isimposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored

judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measurewould not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmersare deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by theConstitution.

In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of theequal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show thatthey belong to a different class and should be differently treated. TheComment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributingpublic agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of privateagricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibitionwould be premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protectionclause.HELD:The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the smallfarmers that they have been denied equal protection because of theabsence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 ofRA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of suchlimits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made toshare the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by thesugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular classwith particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has beensubmitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have

been violated.Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or thingssimilar to each other in certain particulars and different from eachother in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to thefollowing requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.


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The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by themeasures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarlysituated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and theliabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong toa different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument

that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must bemade to share the burden of implementing land reform must berejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classesof owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. Thereis no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress isallowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Itsdecision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justiceexcept only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Billof Rights.

Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) forPresident. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others asnuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaignand/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by aregistered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Courtclaiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to

opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only tothose who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or arenominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred indisqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all thepresidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional andlegal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable ofwaging a national campaign since he has numerous nationalorganizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wagean international campaign since he has practiced law in othercountries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution ismerely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neitherbestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of anenforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of theprovision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation ofthe sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of theConstitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." Theprovisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a differenttreatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policiesenumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judiciallyenforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline forlegislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does notgive rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact

positive measures that would accommodate as many people aspossible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leavesmuch to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positiverights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absenceof legislation since its effective means and reach are not properlydefined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumedunder this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrasessuch as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" aresusceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherentimpreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers toinflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation fromwhich innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may besubjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on theprivilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of theOmnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as thelimitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is notsacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations aremeant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate ofcandidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person isexempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates andthe disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fideintention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling


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interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account thepractical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greaterthe number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logisticalconfusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time andresources in preparation for the election. The organization of anelection with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To addinto the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to runa viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is

not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as toconstitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged byirrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, mostprobably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It wouldbe a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not isboth legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is notbefore this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception offurther evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for thereception of further evidence, to determine the question on whetherpetitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as

contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was aninternational lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likesof Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1)natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able toread and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of theelection; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten yearsimmediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidateand was disqualified.

Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)

Roe V. Wade was a Supreme Court decision upholding a woman's rightto choose, and maintain control over her body. It is one of the mostcontroversial decisions in Supreme Court history.

Whether you are on the Pro-Choice or Right to Life side of the issue,you should be informed about the law and how it effects women andtheir unborn children.

A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging theconstitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe

procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for thepurpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford),who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, waspermitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wifenot being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing allegedinjury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy,unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. Athree-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held thatRoe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue

and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory,though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared theabortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing thoseplaintiffs' Ninth andFourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruledthe Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to thisCourt on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from theDistrict Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.

Held:

1. While 28 U.S.C. 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Courtfrom the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not

foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court on appeal fromspecific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to bothinjunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 123.

2. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 123-129.

(a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe'spregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, whichis "capable of repetition, yet evading review," is an exception to theusual federal rule that an actual controversy [p114] must exist atreview stages, and not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 124-125.

(b) The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in grantingdeclaratory, relief to Hallford, who alleged no federally protected rightnot assertable as a defense against the good faith state prosecutionspending against him. Samuels v. Mackell,401 U.S. 66. Pp. 125-127.

(c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one ormore of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actualcase or controversy. Pp. 127-129.

3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that exceptfrom criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf

without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interestsinvolved violate the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy,


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including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interestsin protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality ofhuman life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling"point at various stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 147-164.

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medicaljudgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp. 163, 164.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the firsttrimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of themother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in waysthat are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 163, 164.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting itsinterest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate,and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriatemedical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of themother. Pp. 163-164; 164-165.

4. The State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physiciancurrently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by aperson who is not a physician as so defined. P. 165.

5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue, since theTexas authorities will doubtless fully recognize the Court'sruling [p115] that the Texas criminal abortion statutes areunconstitutional. P. 166.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,C.J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ.,joined. BURGER, C.J.,post, p. 207, DOUGLAS, J.,post, p. 209, and

STEWART, J.,post, p. 167, filed concurring opinions. WHITE, J., filed adissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined,post, p. 221.REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion,post, p. 171. [p116]

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