STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

© Nomura

Connecting Markets East & West

February 2017

A product of Sales and Trading and not investment research

Latin America Corporates – searching for value

Emerging Market Credit Trading

Source: Bloomberg; EPFR

Latam Corps | EM technicals

Technicals for EM corporates were supportive for most of 2016 with positive

funds flows for most of the year that turned sharply negative following the US

presidential election in early November. 2017 has gotten to a positive start

with positive fund flows through January.

Another supportive technical for EM corporates is the sizeable cash-flows

going back to investors from principal and interest payments which we

estimate to total approximately $66bn during 2017. The bulk of P&I payments

will come from Asian corporates at about $39bn while LatAm corporates

should pay about $16bn and CEMEA $10bn.

Solid inflows supported a solid issuance calendar that say $280bn in gross

issuance priced during 2016. Asia represented over 50% of total issuance and

Latin America priced about $53bn in new bonds.

For 2017, we expect a similar level of gross issuance for LatAm ($50bn to

$60bn). YTD 2017 LatAm corporates have issued $10.6bn in bonds with

Petrobras accounting for about 40% and Argentine corporates with about 20%

of the total.

EPFR fund flows for EM

Weekly flows (USD

millions) Cumulative

Last

week Previous

week 4-wk avg

3-MO Z-score 2015 2016

Total EM flows 1,660 (374) 747 (3.38) (24,803) 29,92

6

Local Currency funds 625 (699) 106 (3.09) (11,710)

13,574

Hard Currency funds 1,025 289 603 (3.43) (8,891)

20,553

Blended Funds 10 36 38 (3.02) (4,202) 2,480

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028+

EM corporate P&I

LatAm Asia CEMEA

-8,000

-6,000

-4,000

-2,000

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

Mar-15 Sep-15 Mar-16 Sep-16

EM debt weekly fund of flows

1

Source: Bloomberg

Latam Corps | recent performance

The recovery in commodity prices during 2016 was supportive EM corporates with the yield for the Barclays EM Agg index tightening nearly 100bp

during the year with EM IG yields tighter by about 40bp while EM HY tightened by about 220bp in yield.

In terms of regions, during 2016 LatAm tightened by nearly 200bp in yield while Asia tightened by about 45bp. Within LatAm, Brazil outperformed,

tightening about 360bp in yield while Mexico tightened only 30bp.

EM corporates in general and LatAm corporates specifically have continued to perform YTD 2017 with EM Agg tighter by about 20bp with LatAm

tighter by nearly 40bp, Asia about 14bps tighter and Brazil continuing to outperform and about 75bps tighter.

Relative to US corporates, EM IG trades at about a +40bp spread to US IG while EM HY trades about +190bps to US BBs.

Despite the rally in LatAm during 2016 and YTD 2017, LatAm continues to offer compelling value relative to Asia at +270bp pickup in yield.

In terms of credit fundamentals, we think 2017 will be mixed amid tepid economic growth, uncertainties around US policy that could drive US rates

higher and EMFX weaker and lead to deteriorating balance sheets.

In this context, we prefer credits with improving fundamentals stories and sufficient credit spreads to cushion any rate and FX volatility (Argentine

corporates, Quasi sovereign O&G) as well as those that are exposed to US growth (Cemex). We remain cautious IG credits trading at historical

tights as well as credits that generate local currency cash flows (Andean utilities, IG telecoms).

2

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

bp Yield

EM IG vs US IG EM IG US CORP

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

bp Yield

EM HY vs US BB EM USD HY US BB

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10.00

Yield

LATAM - Asia USD LATAM Asia AGG

Latam Corps | oil and gas quasi-sovereigns

PEMEX: We see more value in the long-end, but think overall valuations are fair. We believe that if oil prices hold, there could be room for another

~25bp of tightening relative to the sovereign, as we expect lower levels of issuance (compared to 2016), improved (although still negative) cash flow

generation and additional farmouts. The tightening, however, could be limited by Pemex’s weak credit metrics, declining production, supply risk and

uncertainties regarding Mexico’s outlook. Our economists believe that a combination of headwinds to growth (coming from trade policies in the U.S.) and

fiscal risks could result in a one-notch downgrade of Mexico, which would have consequences for Pemex ratings.

PETBRA: We still like the PETBRA curve given improving fundamentals and higher absolute yields compared to most quasis and other opportunities in

the Latam corporate space. We believe PETBRA will continue to deliver on asset sales, market-oriented fuel price adjustments and gradual

deleveraging. In our view, the biggest risk for valuations is potential political volatility in Brazil. While the current spread-to-sovereign seems tight

compared to the last couple years, it is in line with the pick-up offered by the other quasis. Our favorite bonds in the curve are the ‘26s, as they offer the

highest spread in the belly, highest spread to sovereign and have lower supply risk compared to the ’27s. We also like the ‘40s and ‘41s, given a

combination of high spreads and lower dollar price. We think the ‘22s are the most expensive bonds on the curve and would prefer to switch to the ‘23s

for a 30bp pick-up in spread and 10pts lower dollar price for 1yr additional duration.

YPFDAR: Although YPF bonds offer the lowest pick-up to the sovereign, we believe this is justified, as the company has the lowest leverage (~2x NL)

compared to other quasis and operates in a strategic sector which should benefit from favorable government policies. We prefer the ’25s given a spread

pick-up of 55bp vs the ‘24s. 3

Source: Bloomberg, Nomura, company reports.

'21

'21 N '22

'23

'24

'26 '27

'40 '41

'43

'44

2115

5.5 21

6.375 21

'22 3.5 23

4.625 23

'24 '25 4.5 26

6.875 26

'35 '38

'41

'44 '45

'46

'47 '49

'23 '25

'26

'43

'45 '21

'24

'25

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0

Z-Spread

Duration Petrobras Pemex Ecopetrol YPF

'21

'21 N

'22

'23

'24

'26

'27 '40

'41

'43

'44

5.5 21 6.375 21

'22

3.5 23

4.625 23

'24

'25 4.5 26

6.875 26

'35

'38 '41

'44

'45 '47 '49

'23

'25

'26

'43

'45

'21

'24 '25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0

Spread to Sov

Duration Petrobras Pemex Ecopetrol YPF

Latam Corps | Oil Drillers ODEBRE ’21s & ‘22s

4

Source: Bloomberg, Nomura, company reports.

Average Dayrate

Dis

co

un

t R

ate

280 300 320 340 360 380

7.5%

0.29

0.33

0.38

0.42

0.46

0.50

10.0%

0.27

0.30

0.34

0.38

0.42

0.46

12.5%

0.24

0.28

0.31

0.35

0.38

0.42

15.0%

0.22

0.26

0.29

0.32

0.36

0.39

17.5%

0.20

0.24

0.27

0.30

0.33

0.36

20.0%

0.19

0.22

0.25

0.28

0.31

0.34

22.5%

0.17

0.20

0.23

0.26

0.29

0.31

Average Dayrate

Dis

co

un

t R

ate

300 320 340 360 380 400

7.5% 0.45

0.50

0.55

0.60

0.65

0.70

10.0% 0.41

0.46

0.51

0.55

0.60

0.65

12.5% 0.38

0.42

0.47

0.51

0.56

0.60

15.0%

0.35

0.39

0.43

0.47

0.52

0.56

17.5%

0.32

0.36

0.40

0.44

0.48

0.52

20.0%

0.30

0.33

0.37

0.41

0.45

0.48

22.5%

0.28

0.31

0.35

0.38

0.42

0.45

ODEBRE ‘21s

Bonds are backed by cash flows of two 6th gen drillships (Norbe VIII/IX)

contracted until 2021, with est. dayrates of ~$390k and ~$415k.

We estimate current prices of $47-48 imply: (i) a discount rate of 15%; (ii)

dayrates are cut by 10-15% to $355k and contracts are not extended; (iii)

93% avg uptime; (iv) the rigs distribute ~$20m in dividends to the holdco; (v)

the transaction fully covers all opex and capex; (vi) rigs are worth ~$150m

each in 2021; (vii) LoCs of $100m used at maturity to pay bonds.

There could be upside for the bonds if negotiations with Petrobras are

NPV neutral (on a per rig basis) and/or provide certainty that contracts will

remain in place, allowing investors to use lower discount rates. Additionally,

bonds could benefit if higher oil prices translate into expectations of higher

valuations for the rigs (which cost ~$700m each to build).

In an optimistic scenario in which negotiations are NPV neutral for each rig

and the assets are worth $175-200m each at maturity, bonds could be worth

close to 70c if we use a 10% discount rate.

ODEBRE ‘21s Recovery – Sensitivity Analysis

ODEBRE ’22s Recovery – Sensitivity Analysis ODEBRE ‘22s

Bonds backed by two 6th gen drillships (ODN I/II) contracted until 2022,

with est. dayrates of ~$364k, and one 5th gen semi-sub (Norbe VI)

contracted until 2019 with est. dayrate of $340k. Tay IV was terminated.

Current prices ($35-36) imply: (i) 15% disc. rate; (ii) dayrates kept at

current levels and contracts not extended; (iii) Norbe VI isn’t renewed; (iv)

93% avg uptime; (v) rigs send ~$20m in to holdco; (vi) the transaction fully

covers all opex and capex on rigs; (vii) 6th gen rigs worth ~$150m each at

maturity and Norbe VI $50m; (viii) LoCs of ~$160m used at maturity.

There could be upside to current levels if negotiations with Petrobras are

NPV neutral and/or provide certainty that contracts will remain in place,

resulting in lower discount rates. Bonds could also benefit if higher oil prices

translate into expectations of a renewal of Norbe VI’s contract in 2020 and/or

higher valuations for the rigs.

In an optimistic scenario in which negotiations are NPV neutral, Norbe VI

is renewed in 2019 and the assets are worth an average of $175m each at

maturity, bonds could be worth close to 50c if we use a 10% discount rate.

Latam Corps | Odebrecht Construction (ODBR)

We acknowledge the leniency agreement was a very positive

development, but remain cautious on the credit.

Since the announcement of the execution of agreement on December

21 (which imposed a R$3.8bn fine on the company), political authorities

from several different countries have announced that they plan on taking

measures against the company.

We believe the main questions for 2017-2018 are whether OEC will

be able to preserve liquidity and win new contracts.

We estimate that ~40% of ODBR’s 3Q16 backlog ($21bn) could be

at risk of cancelation/non-performance, as the company had $4.6bn

in contracts in Venezuela, $2.6bn in Peru, $350m in the Navalena

project (Colombia) and $733m in projects with no variation vs 2Q16.

For ODBR to have a cash position of $1bn+ at YE17, we estimate that

the company would need to have a working backlog of $13bn at YE16,

win $2.5bn in new projects (guidance is$4bn in 2H17), monetize at least

$300m in overdue A/R, and give no additional intercompany loans.

For ODBR to maintain a runrate EBITDA of ~$450-500m and neutral

FCF before WC, we believe the company would need to maintain a

backlog of $18-20bn with a 3yr average life and 8% margins.

We believe the above scenarios seem challenging considering the

company’s current situation, and therefore do not recommend the

bonds to investors.

5

Source: Nomura, company reports.

3Q16 Adj Avg

Life

Adjustments

to backlog

Adj. Backlog

At 3Q16

Backlog 21,311 13,003

Brazil 4,950 3.74 4,950

Abroad 16,361 3.52 -8,308 8,052

Venezuela 4,596 -4,596

Peru 2,627 -2,627

Colombia - Navalena 352 -352

Contracts with no /\ qoq 733 -733

2017 Forecast Negative Base Positive

Working Backlog at YE16 11,503 13,003 15,000

Avg life 3.0 3.0 3.0

Addl backlog 2H17 500 1,500 4,000

Avg life 3.0 3.0 3.0

Revenues 3,918 4,584 5,667

From current backlog 3,834 4,334 5,000

From new backlog 2H17 83 250 667

COGS (~80%) (3,134) (3,667) (4,533)

G&A (~12%) (470) (550) (680)

Implied EBITDA 313 367 453

EBITDA margin 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%

Interest on bonds and bank debt (205) (205) (205)

Insurance fees (25) (25) (25)

Fines – Brazil, US, Switzerland (60) (60) (60)

Other fines (100) (75) (50)

Capex (59) (69) (85)

Taxes (47) (55) (68)

WC (313) (163) 150

Advances Used (588) (688) (850)

Advances received (15%) 75 225 600

Overdue A/R received 200 300 400

Intercompany loans (given)/received (100) - 350

FCF (908) (447) 610

ST debt rolled / (paid) (210) (100) -

Cash at YE16 (est.) 1,300 1,350 1,400

Cash at YE17 182 803 2,010

Debt 3,317 3,317 3,417

Fine 1,152 1,152 1,152

Net Debt including fine 4,286 3,666 2,558

GL incl fine 14.26 12.19 10.08

NL incl fine 13.68 10.00 5.64

Source: Bloomberg

2017 has been a busy month for Argentina with the sovereign issuing $7bn in bonds and Argentine corporates issuing a further $2.1bn. The bulk

of the corporate activity was concentrated in the utility space, including Pampa, AES Argentina and Genneia.

We expect Argentine utilities will benefit from improvement in the regulatory and tariff framework during 1H17, ahead of the midterm elections in

October. The government recently announced increases in electricity tariffs that will raise end-user costs by up to 150%. Despite this steep

increase, Argentina power tariffs remain amongst the lowest in the region. The tariffs are due to take effect March 2017 (absent legal challenges)

and will benefit the large distribution companies serving Greater Buenos Aires, potentially setting them up to come back to the capital markets

later in the year.

On the generation front, the recent new issues have included large players such as AES Argentina and Pampa and smaller generators (Albanesi,

Genneia) characterized by high leverage (circa 3.5x - 4x) for the next two years as they expand capacity.

Our preferred credit in the Argentine utility space is Pampa given its diversified business mix (oil, gas and power generation), its relatively low

leverage (1.75x proforma) and the potential for credit upside across its businesses.

o We like the Pampa 27s which trade to a 2025 call at 510bp in zspread, provide +70bp pickup to Pampa 23s, +80bp pickup to the sovereign and

better liquidity than the smaller generators.

Argentine utilities should benefit from higher tariffs

Latam Corps | high yield utilities

6

AES 24

AlBA 23

GNIA 22

Pampa 23

Pampa 27

CBVS 21

ARG19

ARG 21

ARG 22

ARG 26

ARG 27

ARG 28

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0

Z-Spread

Duration

AES 24

AlBA 23

GNIA 22

Pampa 23 Pampa 27

CBVS 21

CLBN 24

CLBN 20

GUACl 25

KALLPA 26

CALLAO 23

ELEBRA 21

ELEBRA 19

FERMAC 38

ECLCI 25 TRANSM 23

ECLCI 21

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0

Z-Spread

Duration

Source: Bloomberg, Nomura

• The Digicel Limited (“Opco”) curve remains attractive relative to other TMT HY opportunities at a +200bps pickup to longer dated bonds (LBTYA,

MIICCF). We prefer the DLLTD 6% 2021 given its shorter duration, comparable dollar price and a slight 10bp give up relative to the DLLTD 2023s.

• Opco bonds have been rallying late November 2016 and are now some 300bp tighter. Compared to the Digicel Group (“Holdco”), Opco bonds have

outperformed with Opco 2021s now about -450bp inside the Holdco 2020s and 2022s versus about 400bp at the end of November 2016. The bonds

should continue to benefit from a supportive technical backdrop absent any negative operating surprises.

• The Opco’s performance is underpinned by:

o Declining capex should translate into sustained free cash flow generation necessary to refinance debt.

o Fair / manageable liquidity. The next major debt maturity for Opco is the amortization of 25% of the DIFL bank facility March 2018. We think that

the banks will likely refinance given leverage through the secured tranche is only 1x.

o The Opco has other sources of potential liquidity, including sale and lease back of towers.

• The main risk to our view include:

o Seasonally higher capex during fiscal 2H could lead to deteriorating credit metrics in the short term.

o Significant deterioration in Opco FX basket. To date, the Jamaican and T&T currencies have been relatively stable, down only about 2%.

A disorderly restructuring at Digicel Group.

Digicel Limited remains attractive despite rally

Latam Corps | high yield TMT

7

DLTD 20

DG 20

DLTD 21

DG 22

DLTD 23

MIIC 20

MIIC 21 COMCL 24

COLUIF 21 COLTEL 22

COLTEL P

VTR 24

CBVS 21

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

OAS-Spread

Duration

Debt Structure as of Sep 30, 2016Amount

Security Description Outstanding Leverage Net leverage Comm. L/B

Cash $152

Opco-level debt

Senior Secured debt

DIFL Facility $856

Total senior secured debt $856 1.0x 0.8x Debt maturity profile

FY'2017 0.5% $17

Senior unsecured debt FY'2018 8.4% $290

DLLTD 7 02/15/20 $250 B FY'2019 18.2% $628

DLLTD 6 04/15/21 $1,300 B FY'2020 8.7% $300

DLLTD 6 3/4 03/01/23 $925 B FY'2021 0.0% $0

Total senior unsecured debt $2,475 3.8x 3.7x FY'2022 37.6% $1,300

FY'2023 26.7% $925

Total opco-level debt $3,331 3.8x 3.7x $3,461

Net Debt $3,179

LTM EBITDA $871

LTM Interest Expens $202 4.3x

Source: Bloomberg

Trade Theme: Iron ore price volatility is not the same for everyone

Latam Corps | metals & mining

Iron ore recovery has been driven by continued Chinese demand and marginal supply reductions from the 3 majors, but price outlook appears

skewed to the downside after 76% YoY increase from $46/t to the current $81/t.

Iron ore inventories at Chinese ports are back to record highs, China’s manufacturing PMI data has declined for each of the past 3 months and threat

of oversupply could be exasperated if higher cost Chinese iron ore production comes back on line given rise in prices.

Long VALEBZ 39s at 107bp wide (Z-spread) to SCCO 42s – spread differential should continue to converge with expectations for similar NL at

FYE17 (low 2.0x) as VALEBZ remains committed to deleveraging. We see FV closer to 25-50bp apart considering that VALEBZ and SCCO traded

within a narrow (+/- 25bp) band before the 2015 commodity crisis.

Short CSNABZ and SAMMIN – given liquidity constraints both credits are dependent on spot prices to amend respective financial situations.

o CSNABZ - lower spot market makes asset sales more difficult and could cause debtholders to be less willing to negotiate $9.3bn of obligations.

o SAMMIN – bonds appear to be “priced to perfection” despite numerous regulatory, environmental and operational questions that still remain. Even

with parent support, manageable liability settlement and operational re-start, lower spot prices could alter bondholder recovery assumptions. 8

5.625 '19

4.625 '20

5.875 '21

4.375 '22

6.25 '22

7.2 '32

8.25 '34 6.875 '36 6.875 '39

5.625 '42

5.375 '20

3.5 '22 3.875 '25

7.5 '35 6.75 '40 5.25 '42

5.875 '45

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0

Z-Spread

Duration VALEBZ SCCO

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

CSNABZ 6.5 20 SAMMIN 4.125 22

Iron Ore $/t

Source: Bloomberg

Trade Theme: Can the grind continue?

Latam Corps | proteins

We remain positive on the outlook for the Brazilian protein space given expectations for increased cattle availability by mid-2017, continued expansion

of the export market and potential for bonds to benefit from scarcity value as JBS pursues its re-organization to become a US listed company.

Long JBS SA bonds versus JBS USA bonds - JBSSBZ 7.25% 24s offer 115-125bp pick-up (Z-spread) to similar maturity JBS USA bonds.

o JBS aims to complete its plan to consolidate and IPO all businesses, except Brazilian beef, under the newly proposed US listed entity, JBSFI.

o IPO should generate proceeds for deleveraging, improve transparency and provide cheaper funding as entity moves from EM to US HY.

o We expect JBS SA and USA bonds to converge back to 25-50bp (Z-spread) apart as the plan materializes in coming months, after initially tightening

to a 50bp differential when initiative was first announced in December.

Long BEEFBZ 26s and MRFGBZ 23s - For investors not inclined to take on the “Batista risk” that accompanies the re-domiciling, Minerva and Marfrig

also stand to benefit from the improving industry backdrop and ample liquidity while providing relatively attractive yields of 6.5 – 6.75%.

o If JBS is successful in migrating towards US HY, US$2.5bn of existing JBS SA debt may shift to US HY indices, leaving traditional EM investors with

limited options in the Brazilian beef space. Conversely, if the process is unsuccessful, JBS investors may look to swap into the higher yielding

comps within the space.

9

JBS SA '20

JBS SA '23 JBS SA '24

JBS USA '20

JBS USA '21

JBS USA '24 JBS USA '25

MRF '19

MRF '20

MRF '23

BEEFBZ '26

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0

ytw %

Years to Maturity

JBS SA JBS USA

MRFGBZ BEEFBZ

Nomura Latin America Platform

10

JP Alvarado

Managing Director

Head of Latin America Credit

Trading, Americas

Brazil, Venezuela and

Ecuador

Elias Abud

Executive Director

Chile, Colombia, Mexico,

Panama, Peru and Uruguay

Leandro Infantino

Executive Director

Argentina, Costa Rica,

Dominican Republic, El

Salvador, Guatemala,

Jamaica and Trinidad and

Tobago

David Matty

Executive Director

High Yield and Distressed

Corporates

Bruno Cipriani

Executive Director

Investment Grade Corporates

with focus in Mexican and

South American Financials

Jennifer Wohland

Vice President

High Yield and Investment

Grade Corporate Mix

Siobhan Morden

Managing Director

Head of Latin America Fixed

Income Strategy

Argentina, Uruguay and

Venezuela

Julian Rios

Executive Director

TMT, Utilities and Financials

Edward Santevecchi

Vice President

Metals & Mining, Food &

Beverage, Consumers and

Pulp & Paper

Marcela Nagib

Vice President

Oil & Gas, Industrials and

Infrastructure

Mario Robles

Executive Director

Head of Latin America Local

Markets Strategy

Brazil, Chile, Colombia and

Mexico

Benito Berber

Executive Director

Head of Latin America

Economics

Brazil and Mexico

Mario Castro

Vice President

Latin America Research

Chile, Colombia and Peru

João Pedro Ribeiro dos

Santos

Associate

FX Research

Brazil

Credit Trading: Sovereign and Corporate Strategy/Corporate Coverage Research

* THIS IS A PRODUCT OF THE SALES AND TRADING DESK AND NOT RESEARCH MATERIAL *

For Institutional Investors Only

DISCLAIMER: This material has been prepared by a sales and trading desk of Nomura Securities International, Inc. (“NSI”), and if applicable, with the contribution of one or more of its affiliates. It is made

available to you on a confidential basis by NSI for your sole use only. This is not a research report and commentary contained herein should not be considered research.

The information contained herein is based on sources that we believe to be reliable, but we do not represent that it is accurate or complete. It is not to be considered an offer to sell or solicitation of an offer

to buy the securities or other products discussed herein. All material herein is provided for informational purposes only, and is intended solely for your use and may not be quoted, circulated or otherwise

referred to without our express consent.

Any market commentary contained herein was prepared by sales and trading desk personnel. All projections, valuations and statistical analyses are provided to assist the recipient in the evaluation of the

matters described herein. They may be based on subjective assessments and assumptions and may use one among many methodologies that produce different results and, to the extent that they are based

on historical information, they should not be relied upon as an accurate prediction of future performance. All prices, yields and opinions expressed are indicative only and are subject to change without

notice. The trading desk generally make a market or generally deals as principal in the financial instruments mentioned herein or in related securities, options or other derivative instruments. The trading desk

may have accumulated a long or short position in the financial instruments or related derivatives products that are the subject of this material. Nomura also may have acted as an underwriter of such

securities or other products, and may currently be providing investment banking services to the issuers of such securities or products.

Opinions expressed are current opinions as of the date appearing on this material only and the information, including the opinions contained herein, are subject to change without notice, and may differ from,

or be inconsistent with the views of Nomura research analysts who publish research reports. The desk analysts from the sales and trading desks within NSI responsible for preparing this material have

received compensation based on various factors including NSI’s total revenues, a portion of which is generated by its sales and trading desks.

No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied, or duplicated in any form, by any means, or (ii) redistributed without our prior express consent. Further information on any of the securities mentioned

herein may be obtained upon request. If this publication has been distributed by electronic transmission, such as e-mail, then such transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free as

information could be intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or incomplete, or contain viruses. The sender does not accept liability for any errors or omissions in the contents of this material or any

other damage that which may arise as a result of electronic transmission. If verification is required, please request a hard-copy version of this material.

Disclaimers