Concorde - Crowood.pdf
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2004
by
Crowood PressLlu
ry, Marlborough
SN82HR
Kev Darling 2004
rightsreserved. No parr of thispublicationmay
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
electronicor
mechanical
including
orany
information storage
retrievalsystem, without permission inwriting
the
publishers.
Publication
Data
cataloguerecordfor thisbook is available from
British Library.
1861266545
previouspage: Air France Concorde
ot BravoapproachesParis to land. Since its
ent the aircrafthas gone toGermany to join
Tu-144 at Sinsheim.
Colleaion
Goudy
text),
headings).
and designed
hy
N Publishing
Woodlands, Hungerford, Berkshire.
and bound in
Great
Britain byCPI Group,
knowledgements
Concorde is oneo f
those
aircraft
that
sparked myinterest in
aviation the others
being
a black
Hawker
Sea
Hawk
and
a red
and
whiteGlosterjavelin.
A t ri p
to
the
mock-up
at
Filton would further increase my interestin
Concorde
especially as
the
first produc
tion
examples werebeing
constructed
in
the
same building; my
one
regret
is that
I mis
laid
the
leaflets I received
at
the
time.
This
desire
to
knowmore
about
the
aircraft was
reinforced
by
seeing
the
prototype, its followers
and
i ts chase planes flying
over
the
Cotswolds
either
departingor
arriving
at
Fairford.
Concorde
and
Iwould miss
each other
overthe next
few years before
our becomingreaquainted at
Royal
InternationalAir
Tat
toos,
where
I wouldbe al lowed aboard
the
flagship
of
British Airways.
As
the
story
of Concorde
involved
the
efforts
of
many, so did
the
effort required
to
put
this book
together and
therefore I must
thank
my co-conspirators for
their
inputs.
The
first as
ever is Peter
Russell
Smith
whoas always al lowed me
to
rampage
through
his
photograph collection
for those
interesting
shots. My good friend
Dennis
jenkins
provided
the
usual
encouragement
plus
help
in securing images from the
NASA
col
lection.
john
Battersby,
Curator
of
the
Bristol Aircraft
Collection
assisted
with many
photographs, while
Capt Peter
Duffey provided
much
useful information.
The
staff at
the
Fleet
A irA rm
Museum
and the
Public RecordOffice,Kew were, asever,
their
smil
ing,helpful selves,
as
alsowere
their counterparts
at BAESystems
and the
Heritage Cen-
tres.
The
PR
departments
at
Air
France
and
Brit ish Airways were more
than
helpful,
although
I
never
did
get
my
complimentary
ticket Others who rose
to the occas ion
included Lee Howard, Phil l ipe
juret
Bernard Charles, Nick
Challoner
plus justin
Cederholm
in
New
York
and jose
M Palacios from Portugal , who
came
up with
the
impounded photographsand the
Pepsi photographs, respectively. Alsohigh
on
the
men-
tion
list are
Adrian
Falconer for
the in depth
Concorde
walk-around
taken
at
the
Con-
corde
Facility, Filton,
and
last
bu t never
least,
Henry Matthews
for those snippets
of
information concerning
test pilots.
To all , my sincerest
thanks and
it goes
without
saying
that
any goofs are
mine and
mine
alone.
ev arling
South Wales, 2003
ontents
Acknowledgements
4
1
THE
SUPERSONIC CIVILIAN
7
2
DESIGN
AND
DEVELOPMENT
3
SKIN AND BONES
47
4
FLYING THE FASTEST AIRLINER
73
5 TRIALS
AND
TRIBULATIONS 95
6
THE AMERICAN
SST
115
7
SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU-144
127
8
DEATH AND DISASTER
145
9
SST INTO
THE
FUTURE
65
Appendix I
Concorde Data
183
Appendix
Concorde Incidents
184
Append
ix
III
Concorde and Tu-144 Fleet Details
187
Bibliography
190
Index
9
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CHAPTERONE
The upersonic ivilian
TheMe 163 w s one of
two
designs by Messerschmittthatfeaturedswept wings
theother beingthe e 262 jet.Thisearlier rocket powered aircrafthad wings of
moderatesweep; even so it gave aremarkableperformance albeit with atendency
to crash. BBA Colecton
will no
longergraceour skies
with
anyregularity isthat of Concorde. Here theill fated
F WTSC
s awayfrom thecamera.Whether anyaerobaticswere everperformed using a Concordehas never been
led. However exceptfor upsetting thepassengers there is
no
reason why suchgyrationscould nothave
attempted. BBA Colecton
Prehistory
The
1960swere described bypoliticians at
the time s giving
bi rth t o
the
white
heat
of
technology .
O u t o f
thisperiod
cam et he
nuclearpower
station
the
six-lanemotor
way
a nd t he
m ost successful supersoni c
transport
aircraft
t o d at e t he BAC/
Aerospatiale
Concorde. Of the
three
the
nuclear
power
station
has becom e a poli t
ical
embarrassment and
a
potential
disas
ter
the
s ix -l an e m ot or wa y h as b ec o me a
carm agnet and
perpetually clogged while
Concorde
is still awaiting
the
verdict
of
historyto confirm
whether
it was
an
expen
sive white elephant
o r o n e o f t h e
most sig
nificant advances
in
aviation technology
since 1945.
The
stories
of
t he developm ent
o f t h e
supersonic
t r an s po r t a n d C o nc o r de
are
completely
intertwinedand
would
encom
pass
both
Britain
and
France with signifi
cant
contributions
from
the
USA
a n d t h e
USSR.
It has
to
be
conceded
that war
ha
t h e h a bi t
of
pushing
the
bounds
of tech
nology
both
further
and
faster
not
only
those
then
in
development but
those
that
existed only at
the
theoretical level. In
the
closing years of
t heSecond
World
Wart he
piston-engined
fighter was
at
the zenith of
aircraft
development
not only asa
combat
machine
but
i n p ur e a e ro n au t ic a l t er ms
and
included
the
R oll s-R oyce Merli n
powered
North American
P-51 Mustang
the Griffon-powered Spitfires
the
radial
engined
w 190/Ta 152 series of
German
fighters
a n d t h e H a w ke r
Tempest.
However waiting in t he win gs w er e
emergent technologies
that
were beingdri
ven
by
t he i ndust rial m i ght and t echnical
muscle
of
B ri ta in a nd A me ri ca f or
the
Allies while opposing them were
the
inno
vative organizations in Nazi
Germany
sup
port i ng t he A xis forces. The
Third
Reich
had begun
to
providesupportto
the
Heinkel
aircraftcompanyand intotal
contravention
of the
terms
oft he
Treaty
of
Versailles.
Not
onlywereaircraftbeingdeveloped
that
were
capable
of
being converted for
combat
pur
poses but more importantly in 1937
the
same
company
had begun w ork
on the jet
engine.
A f te r m u ch d e ve l op m en t
work
and not a few set backs a w orkabl e engine
an axial flow powerplant made its maiden
flight
in
the
speciallydesigned
Heinkel
He
1 78 in 1 93 9.
The
success
of this
flight
would lead
t o t h e
further
development of
the
axial flow jet
engine
albeitby Junkers
s
the
main
contractor
instead of
Heinkel.
With
t his new
powerplant
looking promis
ing airframe
construction
wa s p la ce d i n
the
hands of
Messerschm it t w ho w oul d
create
the
M e 2 62 p o we re d b y J u nk er s
Jumo
engines
a nd t he
M e 16 3 K om et
powered by
rocket
motors.
A l t hough t he
l at ter pow erpl ant is
not
r el ev an t t o t he
developm ent of
jet-powered aircraft
both
featured
o n e i m po r ta n t i n no v at i on :
the
swept
wing.
The
use
of swept
w ings had
become
an i m port ant requirem ent
for
the
furtherance
ofh
igh-speed ight
since their
use
on an
ai rcraft del ayed the
onset
of
compressibility
which
in
turn
delayed
7
the onset of generat ed drag
and p
unpredictability
i nfl i ght . A
furt her
vat ion developed
by
Messerschm
the
nose-wheel undercarriage
whi
been
found necessary
to
replace
the
nal
tail-wheel
arrangement
now
wanting
at
both
take-off and
la
E ve n H ei nk el h ad e xp er ie nc ed
probl em s w i th i ts H e
l78
trials airc
this
case the
company
e x ten d ed th
wheel assembly
to
compensate.
Across
t h e C h an n e l
such i nnov
were viewed
by
the
establishmentwi
picion if
not
downrighthostilityand
In
the
field
of
powerplant
develo
Frank
Whittle
later
and
deservedly
Frank was pursuing
thedevelopmen
j et engine
s well s his career of b
j unior R A F
officer
at
Cranwell. Bein
to
t ak e a s ab ba ti ca l a nd
the
creat
PowerJets Ltd allowed
Whittle
topu
ward work
o n t he
centrifugal jet eng
contrast
to
the
m ore compl icated
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THE
SUPERSONIC CIVILI N
T HE SUPERSO NIC CIVILI N
erWhittle, builtto Specification E 28/39 was constructedpurely to prove
Whittlecentrifugal jet engine was viable.Fewreal aerodynamicrefinements
orated. Rea
WingsPhotographs
deleted. Further power was t o h av e
obtained
by
fitting a specially ducted f
increase airflow through
the jet
sy
After Ministry approval , a
contrac
issued which authorized
the
release
of
to build a single prototype. All this v
effor t came to naught in February
when the entire project was cancelled
reasons frequently quoted
for
this dec
include the poten ti al ser ious r isk t o
The
first
jet-powered aircraft to enter
RAF
servicewas theMeteor.This is
DG202lG
apreproductionversionbuilt byGlosterAircraft.
The
engines thatpoweredthis series
ofaircraftwere centrifugal intype, ablindalleysincetheaxial flow engine
was
seen
as
a betterprospect. BBA
Colecton
supersonic speed range,
but
none satisfied
the
need for pos it ive cont ro l behav iour
across
the
proposed speed envelope.
This
notwithstanding, Miles began construc
tion
of
a woodenmock-up
with
shortspan,
st raight wings. Engine
development
was
by
the
Whittle company, utilizing
the
W2/700
engine with
an
afterburner which
was later developed i n to t he Rolls-Royce
Den-vent,
although the
afterburner was
Contrasting with theforegoingphotographis the GlosterWhittle justafter reassembly
atCranwell. Soon afterwards,the aircraftmade itsfirst flight.and
was
painted and
acquiredsecondaryfins
on
thetailplanesto improvelongitudinalstability. BBA Colecton
The Military
Imperative
G iv en t he h um an d es ir e t o s tr iv e f or
improvement, the technical deficiencies
would eventually be overcome.
The
Royal
Aircraft Establ ishment
at
Farnborough
hecame
home
t o a ser ies
of
wind tunnels
that were more than capable of providing
the airflowneededto testscalemodels and
full-size sections, while the major engine
manufacturers, mainly Rolls-Royce and
Armstrong
Whitworth
made strenuous
efforts to improve
the
reliability
of
the
jet
engine, thereby increasing i ts mean t ime
between fai lures rate to an economically
sustainable level.To give these effortssub
stance, experimental specification E.24/43
was issued by
the
Ministry
of
Supply.
This
called for
an
aircraft capable
of
achieving
I OOOmph although
no
inclination to
wards
either
civil
or
military status was
implied.
The
manufacturereventuallycho
sen to develop this futurist ic ai rcraft was
Mil es Aircraf t, a surpr is ing choice , per
haps, given
that their
previous experience
was geared to
the
building of lightaircraft
more orientated towards l ight sport , tour
i ng and t ra in ing. In l at er years i t was pos
tulated that there was greatscepticism that
such
an
a ircraf t cou ld be bui lt , l et a l one
flownsafely, therefore to grant thecontract
t o a company wit h
no
experience in this
kind of design would lead to failure, where
as w it h ano th er , b ig ge r c ompany
the
chances
of
immediatesuccesswere greater.
To the
consternation of
many, Miles Air
craft presented the M.52 d es ig n t o the
Ministry
of
Supply in 1942 for considera
t io n. L ooki ng much lik e a bul le t w it h
wings, the aircraft featured a flush-fi tted
cockpit that was not only jettisonable,
but
was fully pressurized while still
attached
to
the ai tframe. Thisideawould gain further
prominence
when
General
Dynamics
designed
the
F-l11 f ight er bomber wit h a
similar module.
Within
the presentation
given to
the
Ministry were ideas for sever
al wing planforms, since this was the pri
mary area that was giving the greatest
headache.
All
were
either
capable of per
forming adequately in the subsonic
or
the
the
type
of
powerplant needed, and the
centrifugal engine was
n ot t he
answer.
Although
thistype
ofengine
wasfairlysim
p le and robus t, i t was recognized that fur
ther development
would be fairly limited;
thus
the
temperamental axial flow engine
was seen as
the
best
bet
for
the
future.
1944.
In
contrast
to
the German
aircraft,
the Meteor
st il l revealed i ts earlier piston
antecedents
and
camecomplete with
fair
ly
straight
wings
that
carried
w it h t hem
the problems of
extra
drag and associated
speed limitations. Although both fighters
would enter service
with
their own a ir
force,
n o h ea d to h ea d combat
ever
ensued, much to
the chagrin of
those who
rel ish such thi ngs. What subsequently
emerged, however, was that the axial flow
jet
engine
ha d a
short
service l ife, being
l im ite d t o s om e 7 flying h ou rs be fo re
requiring
an
overhaul,whereas the farsim
pler centri fugal powerplant pushing
the
Meteor
c ou ld s tay in
the
airframe far
longerbefore needing removal.
W ith the final defeat of Germany, the
All ies descended upon i ts manufacturers
a nd t es t e st ab li shment s t o r emove
the
spoils
of
war: teams from
theUSA
Britain,
Franceand the
USSR
departed
with
infor
mation
on the axial flow jet
engineand
the
principles of sweptwings, plus the associat
e d s ki ll of wing-fuselage blending.
In
Britain under
the
aeg is of, among
other
bodies, the Brabazon
Committee
the the
ory
of
transonicand supersonic flight were
not
onlyunderstood
but
were beingactive
ly pursued.
The
majorproblem facing
both
the designers and the aircraft manufactur
ers was thatofthe hardware to test the the
ori es and the powerplants to propel the
designs. Before any
attempt
was made t o
developany high-speedtransport, the deci
sionhad already
been
reached
concerning
operators. To further prove the
concept
the
Gloster
Aircraft
Company
was con
t racted to
construct
an airframe to specifi
cation E .28/ 39 t o hou se a
development
engine.
What
eme rg ed t o make its f ir st
flight
a t R AF
Cranwel l was a l ow-wing
monoplane
aircraft
with
a tricycle under
carriage, unl ike i ts German
counterpart
with
its tail-wheel undercarriage and mid
fuselage-mounted wings. After a series of
ground taxi runs, this flying test bed made
itsmaiden
fl
ight
on 5
May 1941.
The
suc
cess
ofthe
E.28/39during its testflight led
to the
G l ost er Meteor
f ight er whi ch
entered servicewith 616
Squadron
inJuly
jet
f ighteravailableatthe war s end was the
Me
262 Notonly did
it
combine
swept
anda carefullyblendedstructure, it alsoused axial flow turbojets.althoughthe MTBF mean time
n failure)
was
limitedto approximatelyseven hours. Rea
WingsPhotographs
the progress of
the
centrifugal
was speeded up by its simplicity.
Power Jet s and
Whittle
would
ce some interestingproblems,
be tt e rknown ones wasa
bench
thethrot t le
failed to
control
output; eventually the engine
down
by
the simple expedient of
the
fuel supply, which prevented
to
the
machine,which was
ing on the
attached
gauges. In the
of time, as with all such projects,
on and careful redesign
meant
that
engine could be test run with
much
trepidation on the part ofthe
8
9
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Miles M.52
the cancelation
of
the M.52. the govern
a new
programme
that involved no
to testpiots and a limited purpose.
TheRoya
Establshmentwasresponsiblefor the devel
nt of a suitable rocket
motor. and in charge
of
desgn
was
Barnes Wallis on detachment
Vickers
Armstrongs. The
drones
were
J{oth scale
of the
M.52 and designated
the Vickers A.l.
flight control system was a two-axis automatc
. while
external control and data transmission
va
radio
telemetering equipment; the
first
test
h tookplace on
30 May
1947.
A Mosquito light
r took
off
fromSt Eva
airfield
in
Cornwal with
A.l
drone
complete with i ts B ft
12.4m)
wings
in
its
bely. It
was intended
t o launcht he
ne f rom a h e ig h t o f 3 0 .0 0 0ft 9 .1 0 0ml b efo re
westwards
overthe Atlantic. This
wasnot to
as the Mosquito
entered
astorm
cloud
at20.000ft
the pilot lostcontrol durng
t heensung
tur
ce. It would take a 14,000ft 14.300m) drop
for
pilot
to
recover
control. by wh ich tme thedrone
torn
off
and
had disappeared into
the
Brs
Channe. A further test flight was undertaken
on
off Lands End
usng drone A.2.
Ths was
by two otherflights on 9
June
and 9 Octo
drone A.3. This latter run was suc
and
a speed of
Mach
1.5
wasobtained;how
instea d o fd iving in to th e sea asplanned. t he
ne ignored
radio
commands
and w as l as t
on
radar
heading
into the Atlantic. Durng
perod
the NOTAMS INotices to Air Mariners)
indicatethat
an area some 4
mies 122.5km)
the
Bishop
Rock lghthouse off the S ci y
Isles
off limits. A l p i o ts w er e w a rn ed o f
the
possi
thatpi otless drones would be operatng with
radius
of
11.5
mies 11B.5km
from
the lghthouse
that
there was
a
danger
of drones fa ln g from
12.200ml and diving into
the
sea.
The
final
terof thisstory
cameto an
end when
eventhese
et trialswere suspended, t he reasonbeing t he
co st for little apparent return. although once
1
was
achieved thelead
in
thisfield
was
hand
over
to
the
Amerca ns. Al d esign d ata we re se n t
Aircraft
i n t h e U S A
for
further
development,
result ofwhich wasthat
in
1947the sound barri
broken by t he Be XS-l.
whichwas
simiar in
t o t he Miles
M.52.
As
well
as airframe
data
transferred to Amerca,
t he Ros-Royce
Der
engine
would
later
appear
as t heGenera Eec
Type 1 powerplant.
flying
the machine and
the
possibili
Miles Aircraft with its
production
t ie s f ir ml y r o ot ed
at
the light
on end
of
the
m arket w ould be
to
sust ain a reasonabl e rate of pro
should
the
M.52 provesuccessful.
y
although
the
pilot
safety aspect
a bl y h ad a b ea r in g
on
the
cancella
is
more likely
that
the
limited pro
capability available allied
t o an
ri shed B rit ain w ere cl oser
t o t he
THE SUPERSONIC
IVILI N
point.
Al though the
ful l size M. 52 w oul d
be
terminated, the
general specification
was worked
on
by Vickers Aircraft who
w ou ld b ui ld a s er ie s of rocket-powered
scale models for
development
in
the
fields
of
supersonic flight
and
air-launched mis
siles.
The
launch
vehiclefor
the
trial mod
els w oul dbe a m odi fied
de
Havilland Mos
qui t o b ombe r a nd t he
r oc ke ts w ou ld b e
successfully flown
at
speeds up
to Mach
1.4
unguided.
By the
time
Vickers
had
begun
their
unguided
rocket
test programme
thoughts
on
aerofoi l desi gn had progressed beyond
the
earlier idea
of
short stubby wings
and
were
concentrating
o n t h e
swept wing in
all
of
itsvarietiesfrom
gentle
t osevere. A s
the
information
recovered from
Germany
had
been
s h ar e d t o s o me d eg r ee
between
the m ajor ai rfram e m anufact urers al l
w oul d begi n t o i nvest igate
the
integrating
of
such advancesi n
current
and
future pro
jects.
Oneof the
first
to
d o s o w as d e H a v
illand
who
took a modified Vampire fuse
lage pod
and
used i t
t ocrea te t he
D H 1 08
Swallow a tailless swept-wing
machine.
The
first protot ype w oul d
undertake
its
maiden
flight
on
15 May 1948 with Geof
frey
de Havi lland
a t t he
controls before
being transferred to
RAE
Farnborough for
in-depth
i nvest igat ive t est flying. A sec
ond
D H 108 al so based
o n t he
Vampire
w ou ld b e r ol le d out some
months
later.
Unlike
its predecessor this version of
the
Swallow was
intended
to
breach
the
sound
barrierfrom
the
outset.
To
ensure
that
this
version
stood
a great er
chance
of
success
the
airframe
had
undergone considerable
modification
and
refinement.
The
wing
leading-edge sweep
had
b ee n s et at 45
degrees
and t h e
fl ight
controls
h a d b e en
changed
from
the
earlier mechanically
assisted type
to
being fully powered.
The
w ings al so featured l eadi ng-edge sl ot s
to
assist with stability while changesapplied
t o t he
fuselage included
the
fitting of a
more
pointed
nosesection.
After
aseries
of
proving flights
the
S wa ll ow w ou ld b e
pushed
to
its limits successfully
setting
a
world speed record
of
6]
6mph 992km/h
on
23
August
1946 with
John
Derry
a t t h e
controls.
This jubilation
w ould soon t urn
to
tragedy
on
27
September
when the air
frame being piloted byGeoffrey
de
Havil
land the son of
t he company
founder
w oul d break up w hil e i t w as bei ng used
to
investigate
the
behaviour of
aircraft in
the
Mach
0.9
to
1 r eg io n. E ve n
though
the
secondSwallowhad
been
lost in tragic cir
cumstances a third
machine
was built
and
70
this would successfully breach
t heMach
1
barrier
on
9
September
1948
although
i t wo uld r eq uir e a d iv e f rom 4 0 00 0f t
12,200m to achieve
this. Piloted by
John
Derry later
to
l ose his l ife in
the
DH ] 10
crash at Farnborough the
entire
exercise
consumed
10,OOOft
3,OOOm
of
altitude
before success was achieved.
Once
the
DH
108 seri es
had
m an ag ed t o b re ac h
the
Mach
1 barrier
thei r contribut ion
to
the
development
of high-speed flight would be
complete
s in ce t he y we re
inherently
unstable.
T hu s t he
t wo survi vors w oul d
eventually
be scrapped as
no
further use
could befound for
them.
Al though the de Havi l l and
Swallow
had
paved
the
w ay for supersoni c fl ight
t h e b at on
w ou ld b e p as se d
on to
two
machines
being
developed
for m i li t ary
purposes. One w as bei ng designed for the
bomber
role while
the other
was
intend
ed
to operate
asa fighter;
both
would
have
a
significant
bearing
on t h e
development
of Concorde. The bomber
would emerge
as the A vr o T yp e 6 98 V ul ca n
and
the
fighter would
become known
as the Eng
lish Electric Lightning
both
would enter
servi ce w i th
the
RAF and
the
annals
of
British
aviation
history. From
the
Avro
Vulcan
development
programme
the
designers
of the
futurewould
gain the
nec
essary
informat ion on
the
behav iour of
t h e d el t a
wing
at
various
heigh ts and
speeds.
Some data
would
come
from
the
several versi ons
of
the
Vulcan
a nd t he
wing planforms
they
employed;
but
most
was
generated
by a
unique
series
of
devel
opment and
trials
machines that
weredes
i gn at ed T yp e 7 07 .
The
first of these
machines
w oul dbe l ost i na fatal crash
due
to
a
malfunction
o f t h e airbrake circuit.
Although
this
accident
was at first seenas
a
setback,
i t di dgi ve
the
Avrodesign team
a
chance to
review
the
kind
of
airframe
r e qu ir e d f or t hi s r e se ar c h
and
thus
the
subsequent
Type707s were
moreorientat
ed towardshigh-speed flight
even though
there
weredifferencesin
performanceand
behaviour. Whi le t he Avro
machines
were
intended to support the Vulcan
pro
gramme,
m ost w oul d befl own by
the RAE
for research purposes.
Both Avro and the
RAE
would quickly
come t o
the
conclu
sion
that
the pure
delta
wingwas
unstable
in flight
and
therefore two
separate
routes
w ere pursued
to
remedy
this
deficiency.
The
first required
t hat the
bomber s wing
be
cranked and drooped
forward
of
the
front spar while
the
flight
controls
would
require
that their
power
operating
unitsbe
The DH
108
Swallow
was
based
on
the Vampire
fighterbomberfuselageand was intendedto prove
that sweptwings wereviable.Thisaircraft is
TG283/G,
the
first
proof of concept vehicle. Thenext
airframe wasfurther modified andexceededthe
speed ofsound. BBA
Colecton
BELOW: The
Lightning s contribution to the Concorde
projectincluded proving thatsupersonicspeeds
could
be
reached
by
usingreheated or augmented
engines. BBA Colecton
THE SUPERSONIC IVILI N
slaved
to
pitch
and
yawdampers.
The
fit
ting
of both of
these
enhancements
would
immediately improve
the
bomber s stabili
ty,
even t hough
i t w ou ld a lw ay s r e ta in a
tendency to
t ra ve rs e a m il d a r c i n a l ev el
pl aneof
flight.
O n t he o th er
hand,
the
Lightning,
al though having
separate wings
and
tail
planes describeda deltashape inplanform.
This however was
not the
Lightning s main
77
claim to f am e a s f ar as
Concorde
i
cerned,
since the fighter
cont r ibu
the
development
of
theengine
powe
essary to drive an ai lframe
at
speeds
Mach
2.
The
rstbeneficiaries
of
thesetech
ical advances would be
the
military b
civilian market also sawsome benefit
all them.The planning
of
civilian tran
had begun
in
1943 two years before
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THE
SUPERSONIC
CIVILIAN
THE SUPERSONIC CIVILIAN
of
M or ie n M or ga n l at er
Sir
Mor
the
deputy uirector
o f t he
RAE.
W
months
of
its formation thissteeringg
deli vereu i ts first report, w hich concl
that
a supersoni cai rl i ner w i th fi ft een
sengers
anu
crew aboaru for comm e
flights between London
anuNew
York
entirely feasible.
Farnborough
anu the RAE
wind tu
woulu be where
much ofthe
originald
w ork w oulu be
concentrateu.
Formal
posals
into
research anu
development
formally
s et o ut a t
a m ee ti ng h el d
a
Ministry
of
Supply
on
I
October
1956
sent
at
thisgathering
at
Shell-Mex
Hou
London
and
chaired
by
Sir Cyril Mus
of t he
Ministry were representatives
o
major manufacturers,
the
Ministry
of
T
port
anu
Civil Aviation plus uelegates
the
t wo m aj or airl ines, B ri ti sh E uro
Airways BEA)
anu
the
British Ove
Airways
Company (BOAC).
The
res
thismeeting was
the
creation
ofthe
S
s on ic T ra ns po rt A ir cr af t
Comm
(STAC),
w hich w oulu also be chai r
Morgan.Joininghim
as
part
ofSTAC
be personnel uraw n from A vro, A rms
~ = r ~ = ~
---_::-......._------_.
<--F;:-----------.
-
...
- . -
--------------
Q.Q
o -0
-
-
.. - - - -
-
- -- - - - - - - --- -
-
- - -- - - - -
-
-
-
- --_ -
--------
----_.-
- ----------------- ---------
theywerealso investigating
the
application
of
auvancedflightaerodynamic
and
engine
developments
to
match.Someof
the
result
ingaircraft were rightly described
as
weird
and
wonderful,
but
t he y d id g iv e s om e
insightsinto
the
behaviour
of
aircraft
at
dif
fering heights, speeds
and
angles
of
attack.
In Britain
the
firstapproach towardsa high
speeu, uelt a, j et-powered ai rl i ner resul ted
in
the
A vro T ype 720
Atlantic,
developed
from
the
V ulcan, w hil e a further
advance
baseu around
the
s up er so n ic T yp e 7 30
wasalso
onthe
drawing board. In its initial
guise
the
latter was originally a supersonic
bomber
constructed
of
stainless steel
and
powered
by eight
engines, while
the
former
married
the
Vulcan s delta wings
to
a m or e
conventional
fusel age, al bei t sti ll m i nus a
tailplane.
Although nei ther
design would
progress farbeyond
the
confines
ofthe
wind
tunnel , their
very existence would
prompt
RAE
Farnborough t o begi n
to
devel op a
supersonictransport
(SST).
To
controland
steer
the
research in
the
correct direction
anu
to reduce
the
potential financial waste,
the
Morgan
Committee
w as form ed
on
25 February 1954,
under the chairmanship
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
--0..-
. -¥::.-
1111 It 1 t , •.
- \.
=:: :: :L
= - - - - - . - - .• -
~ : ~ _
its own,
the nn
l A ir w ou ld h a ve t o
rely
on
ai rcraft purchased from overseas.
M an y w ou ld c om e f ro m d e H av il la n d i n
Britain
and
w ere powered
by
its
Nene
engine.Havingenteredthe jet
age,
French
manufacturers then
began
to
work
on
sev
eral designs
a t t he behes t of government ,
a
maj or f in an ci al i nv es to r a t t he
time.
Numerouspathsof
development
werepur
s ue d, s om e l ed
to
a d ea d
end
while
the
remainder would
culminate
in
the
Dassault
series
of
delta-winged fighters
and
bombers.
While
Dassaultwere leading
the
develop
m en t o f
m i li t ary ai rfram es t owards
the
supersonicera,
the
company
mostinvolved
with developing
ai rcraft for
the civil ian
airline market
was
Sud Aviat ion. Under
pinning the
efforts
of both
these organiza
tions was
theengine
manufacturers
SNEC
MA.
From
the
efforts
of
Sud A viat ion
emerged
theCaravel
Ie
airliner,
which
bore
a m arked resem blance
to t he Come t
in
many
respects,
even down t o
the
similar
flight
deckand
pilots panels.
While
Britain
and
France were actively
developing military
and
civilian jet-pow
ered aircraft for
their
air forces
and
airline
Althoughnota majorplayerinthe British SST programme English Electric
stil l putforward some proposals as thisdiagram shows. BBAColecton
The
French Join In
LEFT TheAvro
Type
707C was originally developedto
support theVulcan programme; however itsdelta
wing gave pointerstowards the developmentofthe
Concordewing. BBA Colecton
ABOVE The contributionsof theVulcan includedthe
use ofelevonsforroll
and
pitchcontrol and of
mixingboxes and feel unitsto assist in controlling
the aircraft. BBAColecton
Although
British aircraftmanufacturers had
gained a certain advantage from
the
secrets
removed fromGermany,
the
Frenchhad
not
b ee n p ri vy t o s o m an y
of
them. However,
engi neers i n France gained m ore physi cal
embodiments
of
t hem to
w ork from; t hus
access
t o j e t
engines was
obtained
from air
fields around
the
country,
as
were examples
of
swept-wing aircraft.
These
benefits were
passed on to
the
French aircraft manufac
turers forfurther
development
work. Before
the
Frenchindustry coulddeliverdesigns
of
w oul d be
subject to
a seri es
of
accidents
that
would
eventually
l ea d t o i ts
ground
ing
and eventua l
withdrawal.
Although
the Comet
M k. 4 wa s a f ar
better
aircraft,
the
loss
ofdevelopment
l ead t o
the
Boeing
and
D ougl as ai rcraft
companies meant
that
sales were limited.
The
next
genera
tion
of
airlinerto
be
built
was exemplified
by
the
Vickers
VC
10.
Although
a speedy
and elegant
aircraft,
the VC
10 would
not
achieve great
sales i n
comparison to
its
American
rivals
and
w ou ld i n r ea li ty b e
the
final
airliner
created
i n B rit ain unti l
the appearanceof Concorde.
in
the
immediate post-war period
aircraft
that
could beused
sh routes to generate income were
ed m il it ary t ransports such as
the
the
D ougl as D C-3 and D C
hiatusgave
the
aircraft industrytime
creatinga new
generation
airliners. However, some
oftheir
efforts, such
as the
Brabazon, would
beyond
the
initial prototype.
The
wered aircraftto emerge from
the
Committee s
deliberations would
de Havil land
Comet. The
first pro
version
of
this
landmark
aircraft
7
7
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THE SUPERSONIC CIVILIAN
THE SUPERSONIC CIVILIAN
were
the
extra requirements brought
o
supersonicflight,which, itwasnoted, w
increase theamounto f testflying neede
clear the design for commercial usage. I
also proposed thatthe testrequirements
schedulesshouldbedevelopedalongsid
aircraftdeSign stage in order to cater for
possible failures in the early stages
of
flight-test period. Itwasalso noted
that
an approach would reduce
the
numbe
test flyinghours required.
The STAC was
one
of the f ir st to
that such a n a ir li ne r n ee de d t o h av
support
equipment
designed and te
together with the airframe. Also requ
development were air-traffic control
vices, ground handling, navigation,
take-off
and landing
aids. Away from
scientific
and technical
fields
the com
tee
began
to
speculate
about
the
pote
sales of such
an
SST. In 1959
the com
tee
suggested,
that
by 1970,
potential
cou ld be be tween 150and 500 airfra
What d id con fu se i t to some extent
the mathematicsconcerning the opera
costs o f a n SST even under cruising
ditions, although these were
not
unu
during the introductory period of a
airliner.
The only
answer STAC c
provide was thatthe careful
integratio
all
the
efforts by the workinggroupsw
result in lower costs eventually, which
turn, would lead to a par i ty
of
opera
costs with
competing
subsonicaircraf
an attempt to p rov ide some so rt of in
opera ting and f ir st purcha se cos t s
committee turned to
that
stalwart form
of
the
British aircraft industry:
the po
sterling perpound weight value, whichg
a return of
one-third greater
for
an
SS
comparison with i ts sub son ic
equiva
The
committee
was
convinced
tha
British industry was advanced enoug
design and build an economically v
SST for sale around the world and th
reasonable stabcould be made with reg
to the costs of operating such an aircra
wasrecognized
by
the
STAC
tha t thed
opment,
design
and
manufacture
of
a Br
SST
would have
to
be
of the
highest o
sinceitsgreatestrival,
theUSA,
hadgre
resources in all areas
of
manufacture
marketingand wouldbe quick toseizeu
any perceived deficiencies.
With t he decision made to use con
tional alloys for constructing the ailfr
the committee turned itsattention tod
mining the aerodynamics required
f
supersonic transport. Ideas on the
dra
board
at
several manufacturers were stu
the
extra coolingneeded for enginesoper
ating at high speeds. With
the
technology
available at the time it wasdeduced
that
the
chosen engine would experience its opti
mum efficiency a t Mach 2 to 2.5, although
it was recognized tha t k ine t ic heat ing and
low-speed hand l ing migh t compromise
this . Allied to th is was the more pressing
concern
of
the
noise
o n t he
ground that
would be generated by a powerplant engi
n ee red for thi s k ind
of
performance; thus
investigations would be needed into howto
reduce this without compromising petfor
mance, otherwise the whole projectwould
be put in jeopardy. Considerationwasgiven
to the use of special engines, specific throt
t le-handling techniques a nd t he use of
engine-silencing devices.
First consideration
wasgiven
t o t h e
use
of
a turbofan bypass
engine which
would
operate
effic iently up to
Mach
1.2
and
with
which
the
ground
noise
component
wo ul d be r ed uc ed . B ut for operations
above this speed t he e ng in e a n d t h e noz
zles would require modification, otherwise
the noise problem would recur. Fortunate
ly
a solution appeared to be a t hand in the
form
of
a m ix in g duct which provided
noise
a t te n ua ti o n a nd t he e je ct ed
air
which
wou ld a ls o s up pl y a sma ll
extra
thrust. The design of these mixing duets
was viewed as critical, otherwise
there
could be weight
or
drag penalties . To com
ba t th is i t was recognized that great skill
would be needed in the design and in te
g ra ti on o f b ot h t he e ng in es a nd the air
frame. It wasalso recognized that thecom
plete propulsivesystem needed to befitted
in such a way that
the engines
perfor
mance
was not compromised.
Having
dealt
with
the
type
o f e ng in e a nd
noise
suppres sion requi red for
t he eme rg en t
SST, attention was tu rned to
the
types of
intake needed to feed
the
powerplants. Up
to a speed ofMach 1 2 fixed intakes were
deemed acceptable; however, beyond that
point i t was realized that variable geome
t ry in tak es wou ld be requi r ed s ince they
offered
d ist inc t advantages over the con
trol of
the incoming
air mass
when com
pared with fixed intakes.
Beyond the basic technical requirements
each relevant working group also provided
the committee with information concern
ing the airworthiness and operational
aspects of SST operations. By t hi s t im e i t
was recognized tha t the increased complex
ity
of
modern airliners required extensive
flight testing
to ensure
the
long-term air
worthiness of the aircraft.
Added
t o t hi s
The
STAC
Report
would effectively abrogate any industrial
leadgainedfrom
the
researchthus far
None
of
th is report was based on the fanciful, as
the reasons given for a recommendation to
proceed noted. Thus the efficiency o f t h e
turbojet engine and i ts b ehav iou r in h igh
speed flight were alreadyascertained, as was
the ability of the aircraft manufacturers to
huild
the
airframe from
conventional
mate
rialsso longas
the
maximumexpectedspeed
did
not
straytoofarabove Mach 2 A further
point concerned
the
design
of
the ailframe
itself, where much work had already been
completed,taking asits basis the idealsuper
sonic delta and modifying it for low-speed
operation. This conclusion had been the
result of a two-pronged approach: the first
based upon the puredeltashape and the sec
ond
looking
a t t he
creation
of
a wing
that
featured a shock-free aerofoil, to which was
added subsonic leading and trailing edges,
all
of
which formed
an
aerodynamic com
promise aimed
at
producing a wingcapable
of petforming adequately throughout the
r eq ui red s peed r ange. A s b ot h wings
appeared to offer the solution to different
parts
of
the speed range, it was decided that
the final product would bea judiciousblend
of
both.
The STAC report also highlighted other
development areas that were either under
active considerationor givingrise for con
cern. These included the dispersion
of
heat
created
by
kinetic energy, a l though no
revisions
t o t he m et ho d
of
construction
wou ld b e n ee de d. B ey on d
t he h ea ti ng
problemand how it would affect the struc
ture, another
of
the working groups had
also raised concerns
about
possible prob
lems with control-surface flutter, structur
al oscillations, vibration effects on the
structure and the behaviour of the air
frame under the effects
of
aero-elasticity.
These points, the committee concluded,
would require
extensive
research
in to the
required
strengthand
stiffnessof
candidate
materials, plus the
performance
of sub
structures
andcomplete
assemblies
under
a
full range
of
heat ing and loading effects
throughout
the
intended speed envelope.
Unlike the airframe
that
carries it, the
powerplants were identified as needing lit
t le in the way ofextra research. However,
the working groups and the
STAC
conced
ed that
the
British industry lacked
the
required
in-depth
knowledge to
cater
for
these efforts the Ministry of Supply would
issue contracts to individual organizations
for research.To push the research effortfor
ward was a technical
subcommittee
backed
up by seven specialist working groups;
the
subcommittee
met
for
the
first time
o n 3 0
November
1956where
the
RAE briefed
the
technical staff from
the
participating com
panies on th e problems to be concentrated
upon. The working groups would concen
tra te upon project and assessment studies,
operations, cruising aerodynamics, low
speed aerodynamic s, s truc tu re s, power
plants
and engine
installation.
Once
the
workhad started, further inter
ested bodieswere invitedto send represen
tatives to join the subcommittee and thus
people from theAir Registration Board, the
Aircraft Research Association a nd t he
National Physical Laboratory plus some
from the College of Aeronautics at Cran
fie ld would soon add their expertise. After
two years
of
meetings, trials and intensive
investigations
and the
writing of some 400
research papers,a final report was ready for
delivery to
the Control ler
Aircraft, Air
hiefMarshal Sir Claude Pelly, at
the
Min
istry
of
Supply on 9 March 1959. Toget th is
far the main committee had met seven
times, the technical subcommittee at least
twelve times and the working groups innu
merable times, while the RAE staged meet
ings
at
Farnborough at vita l points during
the
process.
This document
confirmed
the
fe<lsibility
ofthe
SST
concept and
provided
strongpointerstowards itsdesign and devel
opment. The report would emphasize
one
recommendationmost strongly: the require
ment for two separate aircraft designs. The
first would concentrate upon a long-range
design which would need to travel further
and faster and theo therspecification would
centre around an airframecateringfor medi
um ranges.
The
shorter-range aircraft was
intended to h av e a r an ge
of
1,300 miles
2,100km and a top speed
of
Mach 1 3 and
the
longer-range machine was estimated to
havea range
of
3,000 miles 4,800km and
a topspeed
of
Mach 2
This
was seen as
the
maximumfeasiblespeed possible using con
ventional construction methods and mate
rials. This proviso meant t ha t t he use of
exotic materia ls in airframe construction
was not required to combat the highertem
peratures generated above
Mach 2;
i t a lso
meant t ha t
manufacturing and develop
ment
costscouldbe keptwithin reasonable
levels. TheSTAC reportalsostated that, if
the design work were
not
progressed from
this point, then the British aircraft industry
18 3IN5
i
i
scientists from t he RAE t ha t a n aircraft
could bebuilt that was capableof travelling
between
800 and 1 ,2 00mph
1,300
and
I,900km/h ; however, thiswas
the
easy part
as itwasquickly realized
that
researchneed
ed t o b e concentrated more
on
some areas
inwhich Brita inwasweakest. Tospeed this
up, the partic ipating companies agreed to
co-operate with RAE as neither group had
the resources to proceed alone.These com
binedresourceswould bring togetherall the
workshops, wind tunnels,
computing
sys
tems as well as
the technical
facilities, pro
ject
offices
and
drawingoffices. To fund all
.100
so I TNOMINAL
.000 sa FT ACTUAL
SPECTR TlO
25 ACTUAL
MAi CSA
22. sa n
AUW 3SO OODLBS
107FT,INS
ENTRY
DOOR
22FtIINS
HP 9 design.plannedas a large transatlantictransport.had eight
acentral block. BBA
Colecton
1121 T81N9
Bristol,de Havilland, Handley
Bros and VickersAircraft.Join
airframe manufacturers were dele
from the powerplant constructors:
Siddeley, Bristol Aero Engines,
lland Engine division and Rolls
Fur th er i nd us tr y p ar ti ci pa ti on
beadded
at
a late r
date when
Fairey
g li sh Ele ct ri c were a lso inv ited to
to
the
programme in
November
The first consultative meeting of
wouldbe held on 5 November 1956
Giles Court, London. This initial
confirmed the findings of the
74
75
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THE
SUPERSONIC
CIVILIAN
THE SUPERSONIC
CIVILIAN
t ha t t he h ea t
generated by kinetic en
would be kept under control but still a
for the use
of
conventional alloys and s
in itsconstruction. The committee also
ommended that investigations be unde
en in developing the design to reach M
3, although a combined programme in
cert
with
the
military was seen as
the
course in order to reduce
developmen
production
costs. The third
and
fina l
posed SST design was a smaller versio
the first proposal, although thi s h ad a
senger capacity
of
100 passengers and a
gle-stage range
of
1,300 miles (Z,IOO
This last aircraft wasseen as ideal for ro
acrossEurope and domestic routesacros
USA. The report from the STAC, ba
by
the Ministry of Transport and Civ
Aviation, was alsoexceptionally optim
regarding sales since
at
least
ZOO
were
jected as being sold by 1970.
Another
in which
there
was greatoptimism was
of
development costs , those indicate
STAC
being that no more
than
£95 mi
would beneeded for the building of six
totypes and the required type certifica
The three designs proposedwere gen
innature, itwould beup to individual
m
ufacturcrs
to develop their
own propo
Those
companies
tha tpu t
forwarddefi
proposals included Avro, English Ele
and Handley Page, who based their des
around
the
delta-wing shape; but i t w
crea t ing an a irl ine r
that was
virtually
a
pure f ly ing wing, thi s b eing based
on
an
earlierproposal put forward by Avro for the
Type 698 Vulcanbomber. Ina similarman
ner to Roy Chadwick
at
Avro,
the
Morgan
Committee would eventually discard this
ideaas impractical since the flight control
technology
did
no t then
exist to
make
this
ideaworkable. Alsomil
itating
against
such
a design were
the potential
structural diffi
culties
broughtto the
fore by tryingto inte
grate a sufficiently large passenger com
partment
and flight deck in to
the
layout,
whi le p roblems with h igh d rag, skin f ri c
t io n a nd all the pena l tie s o f excess heat
would haveneeded to besolved.
Eventuallyall thesedesignconfigurations
and
investigations would be compressed
i nt o o ne
concise report
t ha t t he S TA
wou ld p resen t to
the
Ministry in March
1956.
Contained
within it were details and
diagrams
that
covered
three
different
con
figurations
that
were deemed worthy
of
fur
ther investigation and development. The
one proposal that wasstrongly recommend
ed was a super sonic t r an spor t d es igned to
convey 150 passengers over a single-stage
length
of3,000
miles (4,800km), this made
the
aircraft capable
of
flying
the Atlantic
non-stop. The proposed cruising speed was
Mach 1.8 , which was entire ly feasible and
would givea crossingtime
of
approximately
3hr. Travelling at thesespeeds would ensure
to judge their possible use; however,all were
rejected as being ineffic ient. Even though
applying brute-force engine power would
have had the desired effect the operating
cos ts wou ld have been unacceptable .
Analysis of all the available data would
eventually reveal that a slenderdelta-wing
planform
1V0uid
be
the
ideal
shape
for an
SST flying
at
a high sustained speed
and
sweptwingswereviewedas
the
bestforsub
sonic handling. To blend
the
best
of
both
some unusual designs were proposed. From
the
drawing boards
of
Armstrong
Whit
worth came an airframebasedaround anM
shaped wing and Handley Page developed
an airliner that was based around a slew
winglayout, a totally impracticable
concept
that
remained
on the
drawing board.
With
the
unusual
andthe
impracticable
outofthe
way
the
design teamsreturned to
the
delta
wing layout, although their first task would
be to
overcome the handling
problems
inherent in it . The primary concern
that
needed tobe tackled was the tendency for a
del t a wing to t rans fe r i ts centre of lift aft
wardsas the speed increased; to compensate
for thi s i t was p roposed tha t any a irc raf t
designed
for
this
role
must include
fuel
transfer tanks that
would
enab le thecen
t re o f
gravity
a nd h enc e t he c en t re o f
lift
t o b e altered
to compensate.
On e avenue
that wa s f ol lowe d f or a
while before it was abandoned was
tha to f
lO in
3 000
son
111FT
4,n
nOSOFT
310
SQ
FT
AlRCRAFTOATA
WINOSP '
WINOAREA
LENGTH
HEIGHT.NOMINAL
TAllPLA '
ARE A
,NIRUDDERAREA
-
.
.
~
GROUNDLINEWITH FUSELAGE DATUM I iOR1Z0NTAL
1FT
116FT
UINS
UINS
20lNS
5FT10lNS
•
FT
IINS
CABIN DATA
FUSELAGELENGTH
PRESSURISEDLENGTH
TRIPLESEATWlFTH
DOUBLE
SEATWIDTH
MINIMUM
GANGWAY
MINIMUMHEADROOM
NORMALHEADROOM
T O L T S ~
rr
GALLEY
PITCH
Armstrong
Whitworth
produced its
SST
design thecompany
were
tryingto
inethe benefitsfrom bothfore andaft sweptwings Notethe arearuling
to thefuselage hencethe cokebottle effect BBA
Coecton
Whenthe Bristol
Type198
appeare
ideasthatwould underpin Concord
hadstartedto emerge
One
ofthese
the
wing
shape although Concorde
a lowwing mounting not
as
shown
here BBA Coecton
:<d 4 1l4
L
g
u
:_:::.e;:::
. .•. . . :.
; ; u
e € - 3 ~ 1
0 : -- -. -- -- -. . ....
B f . ~ ~ ~ ~ . I
c:
~ .
CABIN SECTION A-A
CABIN ENTRANCE
- - - - - -. . : ~ : : : ~ t
150
SF A
r
- -
- -
A.SSF2NGF2b -
- . - '1
CA EJ N
_ ,
- - -_ . . J r - - - . . t -
I
UF L
__
./
.
II
JI
LANDING CONFIGURATION
BELOW:
ThisHandleyPage slew-wing design
was
known
as
theSycamore In this layoutthepassengerstravelled
inthe wingwhile thepod housedthe crew Theidea
was
abandoned BBA Coecton
BRISTOLTYPE198
GENERALARRANGEMENT
16
17
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THE
SUPERSONIC
CIVILI N
THE
SUPERSONIC CIVILI N
the
air. Known as kinetic heating,
t
frame experiences
t he h ea t
genera
skin Friction, this beingproJlortional
square
ofthe
aircraft'svelocity. The sh
an aircraft governs the dispersal o f t h
generated; however, some
of
this is e
allyoffset by radiation coolingand in
conduction. But a fter a p er iod in
flig
dispersion pattern for the heat range
d own t o a n a ve ra ge
o f 9 0 °C
overa
t h ou g h t h e
tip
o f t he
nose is sub je
maximum
of 12r.
To
combat the
v
heat
rangesgenerated by speed and al
the
surfaceskin
o f t h e
aircraft expen
contracts;
the
passengers in their air-
tioned cabin would noticenone
of
thi
the conditioning remains constant.
heat differentia ls cause thermal s
within the structure that need com
tionin the design process to reduce the
es of potential fatigue failure.
Because
an
SST design would be
ed in
t he q ua nt i ty o f
fue l i t could
owing to its weight
and
size, it was
do
the
designers
to
ensure that
the
ai
exhibited
the
greatest aerodynami
ciency possible, powered by a n e
w it h t h e best cruise effiCiency whe
lowesr possible specific fuel consum
was m at ch ed t o t h e best possible
output. Another factor
that
guide
design was
t h e r eq ui re me nt t o k ee
basic
weight
as low as possible,
oth
the
total
w eightof the
aircraFtwould
beyonda
prohibitive
level, especiall
per
c e n t o f t h e
fuel
is consumed
in
th
sonic part
o f t h e
flight.
T o c r ea te an SST
that
compliedw
theserequirementswas a complex bu
especially as above Mach 1 the airc
sub jec t to a phenomenon known a
drag. This is t h e h i dd e n p en al t y t h a
trols the size of an aircraft's fuselage.
subsonic regime,
expansion
in
the
section
o f t h e
fuselage brings little in
in wave d rag; but above
the
limit
soundbarrier
the
opposite applies
an
a
slender
fuselage
is
the only option
able for high-speed flight. In contra
design
of
a supersonic wing is fraugh
contrasting complications. In theo
best wingfor sUJlersonic flight is one a
der aspossible, yetthis brings itsown
ties in t h a t t h er e is an increase in in
drag caused by
t h e g e ne r at i on o f
l
counteract
this requires
t h a t t h e
wing
should be modified to achieve
the
g
lift:drag ratio as possible.
Having
tw
the
wingfor
the
bestperformance at
sonic s pe ed s i t w ou ld r eq ui re f
known sonic
boom,
the
most
conspicuous
aspect
of
compressibility.
At
subsonic
speeds
the
air
c a n a c t
as a non-compress
ible fluid, but
at
supersonic speeds
changes
occur in
the
shape
o f t h e
wave in front
of
t he o bj ec t travelling at speed.
Under
Mach 1 the wavesbegin t o b u nc h t o ge t h
er, but
at
the point
of
transition to Mach 1
the w avefront becomes a completely flat
shock
wall. As
the
speed increases
above
Mach
1
t h e c o ne
begins
to
form
and
will
r e ma i n i n
place
unti
I
t h e o b je c t
reduces
speed.
G etting
an aircraftup
to
supersonic
speed requires
t h a t t h e
lift:drag ratio beas
efficient as possible; therefore
t ha t o f
a
subsonicairliner has a ra tio
of
16:1 which
reduces sharply as Mach I is approached.
However, an SST with itsslender, pointed
fuselage a nd d el ta wings has a l if t:drag
ratio
of
8:1, which gradually decreases
above Mach
2 before
evening out.
W h e n t h e
scientists
and
engineers
turned
their
attention
to the type o f engi ne
required to give sustained
supersonic
per
formance i t w as
apparenr rhat
o n ly t wo
typeswould be available to poweran SST:
the
turbojet,which literally turns fuel
into
propulsive energy and becomes more effi
cient
as speed increases, or
the
emergent
turbofan, which is firmly anchored in the
subsonic regime and becomes less efficient
as
Mach I approaches.
As
the
proposed SST was
intended to
fly
at between
50,000
and
60,000ft,
there
were
other
f ac to rs t o t ak e
into
consideration
besides those
that
normally affect subsonic
aircraft.
Changes
in temperature, pressure
and wind direction and the gas dynamics
of
the
air, which behaves like a compressible
fluid at this height and speed, all affect
an
SST's performance. Against thesevariables
the technical teams found t h a t t h er e was
one bonus: t h e b e ha vi o ur o f t h e preferred
turbojet engine,
which becomes more effi
cient
as
altitude
increases. Behaviour inside
the
cabin was also taken
into consideration
since there were
other
variables
to
be taken
intoaccount,
such aschangesin
cabin
pres
surization
at
different altitudes and temper
atures, and, surprisingly enough, variations
in external temperature that could affect
the behaviour
of
the air-conditioning sys
tem. Fortunately , wind varia tions
at
such
height and speed normally fail to affect an
SST,
although therehave been some
prob
lems with high
altitudejet
streams kicking
the autopilotout of
lock.
A s w i th all such aircraft
rhat
travel
at
supersonicspeeds, an
SST is
subjectto
the
temperature built UJl by its Jlassage through
By
t h e t i m e t h e t e n d er
for proposals was
ready for sending
to
manufacturers
the
French aviation industry had been reduced
t o j us t three major p laye rs , the se being
Nord Avi(ltion, S ud A viation and Avions
Marcel Dassault. All would begin theirown
design approaches in 1958-59,although by
1960 there would be only one design being
pursued assiduously. This wou ld bea com
bined effort
between Sud Aviation and
Avions Marcel Dassault
who
would fuse
their
similar efforts
together into one
pro
posal. The
other
manufacturer,
Nord
Avia
tion, would eventually decide to withdraw
from this particular
development
process.
A lthough the resultant French submission
was
not
as advanced as
t ha t o f B AC
there
was enoughof a resemblance to suggest
that
a joint A nglo-French approach might be
the course to follow. It was at this pointthat
the politicians from both countries would
begin
t h ei r i n vo l ve m en t which
would
resultin a merger
of
ideas
that
would
even
tually lead
to Concorde.
The Technological Challenge
Having assessed
the
potential and
the
pol
itics
of
designing a supersonic transport,
a t t en t i on n o w t u r n ed t o t h e m a th e ma t ic s
nd physics associated with
such
a design.
simplify
t h e b e ha v io u r o f s u pe r so ni c
flight it
can
be regarded a s varying with
the
square
r oo t o f t he
air
temperature,
which
i n i ts
turn
decreases with
height,
Ithough relationship is limited to
the
lower atmosphere,
the
tropopause, and
the
region above that,
the
troposphere. Above
hat is the stratosphere in w hich tempera
ture a n d t h us speed are constant. To add
'igures to thisstatement, the lnternation
I
S tandard A tmosphere
was
defined
thus:
t s ea lev el
the
speed
ofsound is approxi
mately
760mph 1,200km/h).
For
the
cor
responding 50,000
to
60,000ft
15,200
18,300m)
band
where
an
SST flies,
to
be
botheconomicand
speedy has
an
ISA rat
ing around
t he 6 60 mp h
1 ,060kmjh)
mark. The scale indicating the speed
of
~ o u was devised by Ernst Mach, an A us
Lrian scientist who investigated the behav
iour
of
objects passing t h ro u gh t h e air.
Research o n t he effects o f s o ni c booms
~ v e n t a l l y revealed
that
a h igh -sp eed
object
passing
through air
produces a dis-
inctive bow wave
which
forms a
cone; the
ooom comes from
t he s ho ck c on e
inter
~ e c t i n g with
the
g ro un d a nd t hu s
the
hange in air pressure causes the well-
o
Thiscutaway
view
ofthe
Sud
Aviation Super
Caravelle and the BAC Type 221 reveals the
convergence ofthinking byboth companies.
In theory, i t w a s thena shortstepto Concorde.
In reality,
i t w a s
amoretortuousprocess.
SSA Colecton
explore
it
a n d r e a ct t o t h e c o mp l ai n ts
gen
erated, although
i t was quickly
conceded
that
a c ce l er a ti o n t o
supersonic speeds
should be delayed until
the
aircraft was
o v er t h e
sea.
In France
the
government and
the
air
craft manufacturers i t sponsored were also
investigating the possibilities of a super
sonicairlinerduring 1957. Behind
the
sud
den
flurry
of interest
i n i t was
t he m ai n
Frenchairline,
Air
France. Initial approach
e shad
been
made by
the company
w it h a
specification
that
r equ ir ed a mid-range
capable
SST for use
within
Europe. As a
result
the
specificationwas extremely mod
est,requiring,as itdid, a range of some 1,900
miles 3,OOOkm) with a passenger loading of
betw een sixty
and
seventy. The reason
givenby Air Franceforsuch a modestspec
ification was
t h at t h e
airline wanted a fol
low-on from
the
extremely successful sub
sonic Caravelle
which
was in widespread
usc.
The
negative side
of
this
approach
was
t h at A i r
France wanted a supersonicairlin
er
that
could be operated
at
subsonic cost
ing, an unrealisticproposal from
the
outset
as events would subsequently prove.
o
SUD AVIATION
SUPER C R VELLE
SUDAVIATION
SUPER C R VELLE
BACTYPE223
o
BAC
TYPE 23
0 0
\:
SUD AVIATION
SUPER C R VELLE
84cm). By t h e e n d o f 1961 there was con
cern
about theeconomicsof scalelinked to
the
size ofthe aircraft, the usc
of
six engines
a n d t h e c om p le xi t y o f t h e intakes needed
to supply mass airflow t o t h e e n gi n e c o m
pressors. A further look a t t he design
by
BAC
would see
the emergence ofthe
Type
223 powered by four
Olympus
592/3
engines coupl ed t o a gross weight
of
260,0001b
l 1 8 , 20 0 kg ) a n d
capacity for
110 passengers. Retained from
the
original
specification was
the
capability to fly
the
London-New
York route as a singlestage.
The reduction in s iz e of
the
BAC SST
meant
that
the Type 223 des ign was the
preferred o pt i on ; t h us t h e larger Type 198
was eventuallyabandoned.
W h i le t h e M i n
istries
and manufacturers
werewrestlingwith
the
technology required
to create
a
supersonic transportthe
STAC
raised
concernsabout the creationof
son ic
booms and,more importantly, their effects
on
people below
the
flight path.
Although
no serious in-depth research concerning
the
public's view o n t h es e wascarried out,
the committee deduced that the bestway
to understand publictolerance
wouldbe
to
the
Bristol Aircraft
C o mp a ny a n d
its
p e 198 , f ir st r ev ea led in
October
1958,
would
capturethe attention ofS T A
the
two Ministries . In itsfirst iteration
Type 198was seen as
an
eight-engined,
der delta-winged aircraft, th is being a
ogee-shaped wing with
ds. Further development of the pro
sal wou ld see t he n um be r o f engines
to six a nd t he d el et io n o f t he
To assistBristol Aircraft, the Min
of Supplywould award the company a
in
order that comparative
studies
undertaken on
different structures.
ne would look
a t t he
structure
o f a n
air
e capable
ofMach
1
and
built
of
light
and
another
would consider the lay
an aircraft built withsteel and titani
r u se in Mach 3 operations. As would
eexpected, the latter wasquickly ruled out
tooexpensiveto manufacture and
perate, p lus t he p en al ty o f a n e xt en de d
evelopment period.
As
a fol low up
t o t h e
impressive Bristol
design,
the
Ministry
of
Supply would issue
a
joiMcontract
to
both
Bristol
and
Avro to
develop
an
SST jointly
that
would com
bine
the
ideasevolved through
the
former's
Type 198 and
the
latter'sType 735. What
would emergeat
the
e n d o f t h is processwas
a completely redesigned aircraft. Deleted
was the earlier mid-mounted wing, which
wasreplaced
by
a low-mounted, delta wing
above w hich
was a long,
slender
fuselage.
Power
came
from six Rolls-Royce
Olympus
engines
in
clutchesof three
in
twO
nacelles
under
the
wings. Regarded asan
optimum
design,
the
Ministry issued
another
con
tract
in
October
1 96 0 t o allow
both
com
panies to
continue
further development.
However, this was a period ofgovernment
sponsored consolidationw ithin the British
indllsny ami so Avro would eventually be
I h
\' 1
Ilf t hl s ec on d p ar t o f t h e SST
IC8
I
w r o c c ~ liS thIS wmpany was taken
Into the
Il1Iwkt r
Sidddl'Y Am.raft
Group,
\lui
BriM,,1
Aircrn t
I1wrgcd
WII
h English
nl l HI l ill V kkcrll til orlll
till Brit
ish
A,rlr l t t ~ o r p l l r a t i l l n (HAC). Althllllgh
Avro was thus cf(elllvcly l x d ll d l d, t h e
b l ue p ri n t t h at eme rged f rom
B t
III
August 1961 was largelybased o n t h e Typ\.
198issued in
O ctober the
previous year.
As
before,
the powerplants
were proposed as
the
Rolls-Royce
Olympus
rated
at
26,700lb
e ac h, t he se d ri vi ng
an
airframe
that
weighed in
at
385,0001b 175,000kg) with
proposed range
of
3,260 miles 5,200km).
m
..
d·1\
innwas set
at
136 passengers
t bcinl pitched
at
33in
18
19
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THE
SUPERSONI
IVILI N
cost viabil it y, w hil e Sud A viat io
cont i nue t o
persi st w i th
the
vis
shorter-range design.
Given
t h
obvi ousl y di sparate views, i t w as
prising
that many of
these meetin
in arguments
as both
parties
cont
assert
their
own requirements.
Since
this
situation
coulcl
allowed
to cont inue,
the politicia
exert
pressure
on both
groups of m
turers
t o c ome t o
a consensus.
Th
result i n a full -bl own
project
rev
in Paris
on
17
January 1962, wher
fram e m anufact urers decided t o
the development
of
both
design
with as
much commonal i ty
as
Fortunately,
the
bl ueprint s prese
both
groups w ere si mi l ar i n
outli
being powered by
Olympus
593
the
m ajor di fference w as
t he qu
f ue l i n
each
version
a nd t he n u
tanks required
to
house i t. It w as
ognized
that there might
be diffe
the radio
and
navigational requ
for
each
version; however,
the
fundamental
systems were
the
s
both
versi ons. A s w el l
as
using
standard materials for
constructio
intended that both
versions would
a h ig h
proportion
of
common
p
components.
To furtherincrease
c
ality,
the product ion
tools
and
jigs were identical.
Given
that
t
t ure for
both
versions was
the
sam
decided
to
f ol lo w a s im il ar
R
gramme,
which
w oul d encom pa
strength,
aero elasticity
and
fat
calculations.
The
initial design d
countersigned
b y D r W il li am
St
L uci en Servanty, revealed a
com
out
dimensionally,
the
onl y di
bei ng i nfuel capaci t ies w hich w er
and
17,400gal, respectively 57,
79,000Itr) and
maximum
take-of
c a lc u la t ed a s 2 0 9, 4 00
and
25
respectively 95,000
and
115,00
each
version.
At
this
point the
SS
was
shown
with
both
a fixed
and
a
geometry nose,
although the max
angle
ofattack
was
13
degrees,whi
on t h eSud
Aviationtrade
s t and when the
company
di spl ayed a scal e m odel of
their
own
Super Caravel
Ie SST.
Since t he
simi
larities
between the Sud Avi a t ion
model
and
the
proposed B ri stol T ype 223 desi gn
w ere fai rl y obvi ous,
an
official
meeting
between
representativesfrom both
compa
nies w as quickly
convened
i n Pari s
on
8
June.
By
t hi s t im e B ri st ol
Aircraft
had
been absorbed by
BAC
as
part
of a
shake
up
of
the
British industry, while
the French
representatives were still
part of Sud
Avi
ation.
A reci procal
meet ing between
the
twogroupswould take place
at
Weybridge,
once home
of Vickers Aircraft,
on
10 July,
where
the
first serious discussions
con
cerning the adoption
of a
common
design
and t he
pooling of resources w ere under
taken.
While
the
airframe manufacturers
were
taking
their
first,
tentative
steps
towards
col laborat ion, the engine
manu
facturers werealsoengaged in
negotiations
concerningthe development
of a
common
engine and supplementary
items. The two
selected primary
contractors
were origin
all y B ristol E ngi nes
at
Fi lt on, l ater
to
become
part
of
Rolls-Royce,
and
the
French
conglomerate SNECMA
Societe
Nationale d etude et
de
Construction
de
Moteurs
d Aviation), who
signed a prelim
inary
declaration
of
co-operation
in
Nov
ember
1961.
With
the
m anufact urers seemi ngl y
coming
t o a consensus, i t w as t i me for
the
politicians to finalize
their
aspects
of
the
project.
Presentat
this
meeting
in Paris
on
7 D ecem ber1961 w ere Peter
Thorneycroft
and
R obert B uran.
The
outcome
was a
joint formal request
t obo t h
groups ofman
ufacturers
to co-operate
fully in
the
design
and
development
of an
Anglo-French
u pe r so ni c t r an s po r t, i ts s ys te ms
and
engines.
Although the
politicians
and the
official entourages were
presenting
a unit
ed front
t o t he
world,
the
airframe
manu
facturers were still at odds
over t he exac t
n at ur e o f t h e
airliner required.
BAC
was
st il l pushi ng for
an
aircraftcapable
of
fly
ing
the Atlantic
i n a si ngl e st age,
on t he
grounds
of manufacturing and
operating-
esign n evelop lent
H PTER
TWO
ohn u and
Marianne
Become Engaged
With
all
the
technical, scientific,
theoreti
cal
and operat ional
meetings, discussions
nd papers compl eted, i t w as t i me for
the
politicians
to
enter
the
a r en a. I t h a d b e en
realized early
on that the
design, develop
mentand product ionof
a supersonic trans
port using only
the
resources available to
n a lm os t
destitute
Britain would
put
a
reat st rai n
on
the
economy, t herefore
tlpproaches were made
by
representatives
the
British
government
to
their counter
part s i n France,
Germany
and
t he USA .
he se wer e g iv en a mi xe d r ec ep ti on ;
r ma ny d ec li ne d a ny o ff er
to
become
involved for
the
reason that t hey coul dsee
no
use for such
an
aircraft
under
their
cur
rent
ci vi l ian avi at i on requi rem ent s;
the
.)lher
nati on t o
decline
the invi tat ion
was
he
USA
w hi ch h a d
intimated
plans
to
undertake development
of
thei rown
SST
based upon
the
experience gainedfrom
the
unique X B -70 V al kyri e,
Mach
3 , six-
ngined bomber.
The
only
country
to
Iccept
the
invitation
was France sincethey
100
w ere st il l i m poveri shed after
the
war
, lnd had al ready begun t o i nvesti gat e t heir
ow n versi on of
an
S ST , a
Sud
Aviation
d es ig n p ow er ed by four R oll s-R oyce
R8l67-1 engi nes. T o t his end Pet er
Thor
I eycroft
(Minister
of
A vi a ti on ) m ad e
lprroaches
to his Fr enc h
counterpart
R obert B uron Mi nist er
of
Publ i c Works
tntl T ra ns po rt ) i n A pr il 1 96 0. A s t he se
I
Ilks had
come to
an amicable conclusion
II
was proposed
that
a
meeting
b e h el d
hCLween desi gn t eam s from
the
favoured
1\IILish
and
French
manufacturers.
The
1\l ll lsh t eam from B ristol A i rcraft w as l ed
I y Dr
Archibald
Russell; his
counterpart
10m
S ud A vi a ti on wa s P ie rr e S at re . A s
hese initial discussions proved that
there
\ S
common
ground, i t w as proposed that
h er e s ho ul d be f ur th er o ne s,
although
llh
the
manufacturers would
continue
to
kvcloptheir
own
design in
the
meantime.
During
the
Paris
AirShow of
1961 a fur
her
spur towards
collaboration
appeared
difficultdue
to the changingcentreof
pres
sure that would occur as
the
aircraft trav
elled across
the
A t lanti c; yet i f such a
sys-
t em c ou ld b e d ev is ed i t w ou ld a ll ow f or a
reduction
o f t he
size
of
the
power units,
although
the SST
would need
the
already
envi saged powered fl ight controls and
an
artificial feel system.
Itseemsstrange
to
relate that, at
the
out
set
of t he
STAC
investigation,
the
aerody
namics workinggroup were unsure
whether
a feel system ofany ki nd w ould be needed.
This at t i tude
quickly changed
when t he
experience
of
t ho se a lr ea dy e ng ag ed i n
developingMach 2 fighters and a particular
delt a-w ing bomber w ere brought i n. H ow
ever, i t w as reali zed,
that
si nce t his w as a
civilian application,
not
only w ould a feel
systembe needed,
but
duplicationfor safety
reasons would be essential.
Thusan
exten
sive programme
of
development, including
the
useof specially designedtestbeds, would
be required. Further systems
development
covering
an
automatic blind-landing capa
bility
was
also seen
as
a necessity, although
whether
thiswould be
by
directvision, tele
vision or some form
of
periscope had
not
b e en d et er mi ne d . A ll t he se i nn ov a ti on s
were warmly welcomed by
the
participating
airlines, although they would express some
reservat ions concerning t hei r appl i cat ion
sinceany deterioration in controllability in
m an ua l m od e wa s s ee n
as
unacceptable.
As
the
British
SST
d es ig n w as s e t
to
incorporate many
radi cal changes,
the
commit tee concluded
that initial R D
contracts
could
be
ready for i ssue i nJanu-
a ry 1 96 0, w it h a
complet ion date
some
time
i n 1 96 2.
The
target
date
for ai rli ne
entry
was
put at 1971-72. This date
was
s e t f or
the
l ong-range ai rcraft w hil e
the
shorter-ranged
machine
was
set
forservice
entry
some
three
years earlier.
Costs
were
a
thorny point
in
the
STAC
report
as accu
rate figures wereimpossible
to
predict;
but
they did presentsome figures
which
would
entail
the expending of
£51 m i ll i on,
to
include
the
prototype
and the
develop
ment programme up
to Cert ificateof
Air
worthiness
standard, which
would
entail
the
use
of
up
to
five
production
machines.
These
figures covered only
t h e Mach
1.2
part
of
the
programmebecause
the
devel
opment of t he Mach
1.8aircraft would lift
the
final cost
to
approxim atel y £91 m il
lion. This
then
was
the
British Supersonic
Transport
i n all i ts paper glory; m uch
had
already
been
l earned, m ore w oul d need
to
be learnedbefore
the
aircraft
known
as
the
oncorde became
a reality
natureof t he
ai rcraft i nvol ved, i t w as rea
soned
that
i ts engi nes w oul dhave a hi gher
specific thrust
andj e t
velocityduring take
off,
h en ce a n
i ncreased noise
quotient
would be inevitable. Allied to this was
the
shape
ofthe
SST swing,which
is
very inef
ficient
at
low speeds
and
therefore more
power ~ ~ o u l beneeded
to
climbclear
ofthe
runway. To compensate for these potential
noise problems,
the commit tee
concluded
that
an
i nc re as ed a ng le o f c li mb a nd a
shortened
period
of
full power application
would be sufficient to negate any problems.
Having
achieved flight,
the
STAC
recom
mended
t ha t t he
engines be
throttled
back
within
the
designed safety margins
as
soon
as
possible
to maintain
a l ow noise output.
As
the
engines intendedfor
the
SST would
be fi tt ed w i th
thrust
augmenters,
complete
with variable nozzles,
the
reduced t hrust
output
would be compensated for
by
the
air
m ass flow remai ni ng consi stent, and t hus
jet
velocity
and
noise w ould be reduced.
Engines
and
their
number
for drivi ng a
Mach 2 ai rl i ner w eighing i n at 350,000 t o
500,0001b l59,000-227,000kg) would also
exercise
the col lect ive
m in d s o f
STAC.
Should smaller, low-thrust powerplants be
developed
to
satisfy
the
SST
requirement?
Or
would a newdesign
of
engine be better?
As
the
expected power requirement was
in
the
150, 000 t o 200,0001b t hrust range, a
numbe r o f
engines,
between e i gh t
ancl
t we lv e, wa s p ro po se d, e ac h w it h a t h ru s t
rating
of
20,000lbor more.
On the
subj ect ofsoni c boom
the
com
mittee
reiterated
that the
publ ic w ould be
the
final arbit er of
what
was acceptable;
however,asa startingpoint, theywouldrec
ommend
that s up er so ni c f li gh t b e k e pt
above 35, 000ft
(l0,700m)
as
t hi s was
deemed acceptable. Itwouldalsobe recom
mended
that,
in
the
case
of
transatlantic
departures, supersonic speed be restrained
until
the
ai rcraft w as over
the
sea; con
versely,supersonicspeedswouldbe prohib
it ed o ve r l an d. A s p ar t
o f t he
proposed
development
ofthe
SST
in
the
future itwas
suggested
that
a form
of
automat ic engine
c o nt ro l b e d ev el op ed ; t hi s wa s s ee n
as
a
good selling
point
to prospective airlines.
As well as a form
of
automatic controlfor
the
engines,
the
commi
ttee
aIso discussed
the
possibility
ofan
automatic,aerodynam
ic, balancingsystem. Butthis idea would be
placed
on
hold
as
its
development
was seen
as a long-winded process, especially
as the
requirementfor
the
manual reversion of
the
flyingcontrols was built into
the
specifica
tion.
This
l att erneed w ould be m ade m ore
changes t o perform effi cientl y under l ow
speed
handling
conditions.
Once
all
of
t hese fact ors had been t aken
into consideration
the
designers were able
to
set tl e down
to the
task
of
creating
the
Anglo-French Concorde.
The
STAC
would,however,
have
further
input
into
the
design process as it was proposed
that,
instead ofusingsize, range, take-off/landing
performanceto define
the
aircraft,they sug
gested
that to
relate size to payload instead
of
al l-up w eight m i ght m ake
the concept
moresaleableto potential customers. Even
so,
the
design was never going t o exceed a
maximum capacity
of
200 passengers since
the
available data suggested
that
a l arger
airframe would be
uneconomic to
operate.
Carefulconsiderationwould also have tobe
given
t o t he
manufacture
of
eachpart oft he
airfram eas any m arkeddi screpancy i n t his
area w ould i ncrease operat ing costs, espe
c ia ll y i n a il fr am es b ei ng o p er a te d o v er
longer distances
and
at
speeds bet ween
Mach
1.2
and
1.8.
This
proviso w as also
aimed
a t t he
engine manufacturers since
fai lure t o control all aspects of
the
design
could
p ut t he
a ir li ne s a ga in st a ny S ST .
These
possi bl e defi cienci es w ere greatl y
lessened if
the
required rangewerereduced,
and
thus
the
committee
concluded
t ha t t he
proposed
SST
shoul d be bui lt
in
twO ver
sions:
the
shorter-ranged vehicle would be
regarded
as the
l eadi n t o
the
longer-ranged,
d ef in it iv e a ir cr af t. I n t hi s m an ne r , i t wa s
concluded, any defects in desi gn and per
formance could be rectified in
the machine
built later.
Although thecommit tee
had, i n
concert
with
the
relevant workinggroups, discussed
the
behaviour of
the
jetengines
on
previous
occasions, they were still particularly con
cerneclabout
the
nuisance noisegenerated
by t hi s t yp e
of
powerplant and,
of
course,
the
potentiallydestructivebehaviourof
the
s on ic b oo m. In d ea lin g wit h
the
first
requirement,
the commit tee
were reaching
for
the
i mpossible i n requiri ng
t ha t t he
accept abl e generat ed noise shoul d be kept
t o t h e
same l evel as, or j ust below that
of
c o nt em po r ar y p is to n- e ng in ed a ir li ne rs
because jet
engine
noise
is
more pervasive.
Thus
a l i mi t of 103dB
was
seen
as the
high
est acceptable. A fter st art ing
and
taxiing,
t henex t
part
of t he
sequencewas
the
take
off. Yet agai n noise w as
the
prime factor;
here the commit tee
asked that
the
engine
manufacturers take into consideration
the
design
of
powerplant,
the
velocity
o f t h e
exhaust, totalengine
output
and
the
climb
performance
o f t he
aircraft.
G iv en t he
20
27
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Airframe Management Committee
n
Andre Puget
Chairman/Managing Director
alternates
with:
Sir George Edwards Vice Chairman/Deputy Managing Director
ierre Satre Technca Director
O r E Russe Deputy Technical
Director
Jr. Harper Directorof Producton Fnance Contracts
Lou s Giusta Deputy
Directorof Producton.
etc.
A H C Greenwood Sa es Director
WJ. Jakimiuk Saes Director
GE.
Knight Director
C Val eres Director
EngineManagement Committee
Sir
Arnold
Ha
Chairman/ManagingDirector alternates with:
H.A. Desbrueres Vice Chairman/DeputyManaging Director
DrE.J.
Warlow Davies
Technical
Director
M. Garnier
Deputy Technca Director
R
Abel
Directorof Producton
w Saxon
Deputy
Directorof Producton
J.
Bloch Sa es Director
W.H. Rees Sa es Director
r e su lt i n the f ix ed n os e b ei ng d ro pp e d.
Agreement
had been reached, however, on
the
materials
to
be us ed i n
construction.
Most
ofthe
structurewas
to
be bui lt using
aluminium
alloy
to
B R 58 B rit i sh Stan
dard)
or
i ts French
equivalent A-U2GN,
while the
remainder
w ou ld us e h ig h
t ensi le st eel si n hi gh-st ress areas
and
tita
ni um i nareas
of
high temperature.
DESIGN N EVELOPMENT
A f u rt he r
meeting
held on January
1 96 2 b e tw ee n
the
t wo m anufacturi ng
groups led
by
D r R ussel l and D r
Strang
of
BAC and
Pierre
Satre
and L uci enServan
ty
of Sud
Aviation resulted in a declaration
of intent
which
allowed for the
continued
development and
refinement of
both
de
signs so
that
a final deci sion
concerning
the
configurationand
the
details regarding
22
the
workshares, supposedly equally, could
b e h a mm er e d o u t.
The
declaration read:
Ir is feasiblero
have
a
common
hasicaircrafr in
rwo versions
one ofwhich
would
comrly
wirh
r h e n e e d s
exrressed
by
rhe
French
governmenr
and
approved by
Sud
Aviarion
and Ai r
France
for
medium
range
operarions
while
rhe
mher
would
comply
wirh rhe requiremenrs requesred
hy
rhe
B r ir i sh M i n is t r y
o f A vi ar io n a nd
aprroved
by
BAC
forusc
on
rhe
London-New
York transatlantic
route.
On 26Marcha further
meeting
w as held i n
London between
Thorneycroft and
Buron
at
w hich i t w asagreed that the preliminary
designs wereclose
enough to ac t
as
a basis
for
an
Anglo-French
SST
with
the
whole
being carried
o ut o n
a
50-50
basis.
After
t hese negot i ati ons the f ir st m aj o r m il e
stone
in
the Concorde
programm e w as
passed. This was the announcelTlent
of the
Anglo-French
Supersonic AircraftAgree
ment
w hich w as presented t o
the
world s
press
on
25 O ctober. This historic docu
ment wascounter signed by representatives
of
the two
governments
in
London on
29
November. Encapsulated
within
i t w er e
point s coveri ng
the
equal shari ng
of
all
development
and desi gn costs, i ncl uding
the
pursuit
of potential
sales
on
a w orld
wide basis. However,
nine
days earl i er i t
had been t ouch
and
go
at
a
Cabinet
meet
i ng held
to
decide
the
future
of the entire
project. Present
at
this
meeting
were the
Prim e Mi ni ster, H arol d MacMi l lan,
and
his son-i n-l aw , Juli an A m ery
(who
had
replaced
Thorneycroft
as the
Minister
of
A viat ion) and m embers
of
the
Treasury.
An
i ntense di scussi on revol vi ng around
development
costs and potential sales were
finally resolved
and
would allow
Concorde
to continue.
It w ould also affi rm
the
com
mitment to
progress
both
versions in paral
lel. Also
within
this
document
werefuller
t echni cal proposal s for the S ST , w hi c h
i ncl uded a passengercabi n capabl e
of
car
rying 100
at
a maximum speed
of
Mach
2.2.
TOP: Witha backdrop of aerodynamictest shapes
isthis unpowered drop testmodelof Concorde
preserved atthe Fleet ir Arm Museum Yeovilton.
BBA Colecton
LEFT Beforethe Fairey FD.2 was rebuilt as the
BAC
221
thisdrop model
was
manufactured
totest itsbehaviourin fl ight.
BBA
Colecton
Joint Oversight
Overseeing
the whole
project
w as a
stand
ing committee drawn from
both
countries.
This
w oul d i ncl ude a
chairman/managing
di rector, a vi ce
chairman/deputy
manag
i ng di rector, a French t echni cal di rect or, a
ritish deputy
technical
director, a British
director
of production, finance
a nd con
t ract s, w ho w oul d
have
a F r en ch d e pu ty
director, a British
and
a French salesdi rec-
or
and
a
director
representing
Sud
Avia
t ion and one
from
BAC doing
the same
j ob . T o i ns ti l a d eg re e of fairness the two
p p os ts
alternated
between the British
nd
the
F re nc h m em be rs , w ho w ou ld
hange
post s every t wo years.
Working
in
ncert
with the oversight
committee
was
civil servant
contingent from
eachcoun
ry whosepurposewas
to
supervise the pro
t
and
liaise
between the technical and
inance
directors. The role
ofthe
oversight
mmittee
w as t o k e e p both
governments
Informed of progress
a nd t o
make propos
lisfor
economy and
efficiency, arrange for
Joint airworthiness
and operational
regu
lations
and
g iv e a pp ro pr ia te a dv ic e if
Icquired
to
the
manufacturing
groups.
Fven
w it h t his
agreement
i n p la ce
there
w oul d st il l be some frict ion
between
the
manufacturers
that
would
end
only
when
a
dcsi gn w as chosen.
Oneo f t he
first deci
\ Ions m ade by the new organi zat ion w as
he
name
of the aircraft,
Concorde.
Even
this was not
without
controversy as BAC
had decided
not
to
spell
the
name
w it h a
rminal
e
while
the government
had
lcadfastly
promoted
it; the manufacturers
r ~ l l y g av e i n
during
D ecem ber 1967 as
I \Llch o f t he e xt an t paperwork reveals.
Ihis
minor
bureaucrat i c spat aside,
the
Itlanagement
of the
projectitselfwas
under
\less
d ue t o
the size
of the
several
man
IltCmentorganizations
that
hadevol ved i n
IIPoort.
DESIGN
N EVELOPMENT
As
both countries
had
created
a t ea m
of
consi derable size, the
decision-making
process w as bei ng sl ow ed
down
consider
ably
and
t hi s i n t u r n h a d
begunto
pushup
the
development
costs,
which had
origi
nally stood
at
£95 m i ll i on
but
had begun
to creep
inexorably towards
the £
billion
mark.
What
saved the
situation
were the
belief,
dedication and management
skills
of
Sir
George
Edwards,
t he BAC
chair
m an. H i sopposi te number,
the
chairman
of
the Airframe Committee,
Andre
Puget,
w oul d also
exert
maximum inf1uence on
hi s si de of the Channel
to
hold the pro
gramme
together. A further
spanner
in the
works
came
in 1 96 4
when
a L ab ou r g ov
ernment
assumed power.
Oneof
itsearliest
acts w as
to
tr y t o
cancel
all
outstanding
aviation contracts
in both the civil
and
the
m i li t ary field. A
memorandum to
the
Prime
Min
is te r, d at ed f or 2 4 J un e, c as t
doubt on the
project s viability as costs
at
that date
h a d a lr ea dy r e ac he d £ 2 75 m il
lion,
enough to
buil d t w o
Channel tun
nels.
The
paper also st ated that
to ge t
the
aircraft
into
servi ce w i th
BOAC a t an
early
date
could
have
far-reaching effects
on the o n ly B ri ti sh s u bs o ni c a ir l in e r
al ready i n
production,
t he VC-I0 .
The
proposed coursewas
to
drop Concorde
and
proceed w it h
t he Channel tunnel
while
passing
theSST baton to the USA,
which
hadexpressed a w ish
to continue to
devel
op
i ts supersoni c
transport
at a more
leisurely pace.
The apparent
pay-off was
that the VC-10
would
have
an
easier pas
sage
into the American
market. The
next
paragraph
then
turned the previous state
menton its
head
as the French part ofthe
agreement came in to
play. Although not
blatantly stating
t hat the
cost
of
pulling
out
wa s b e in g u se d a s a l ev e r t o k ee p
the
United K i ngdom i nvol ved,
the
govern
ment decided
that
a poli cy
o fn o
enthusi
asm was
the
answer, so
that
a get-outclause
Anglo French Concorde Management Committees
23
c ou ld b e
created
for
an
easy esc
allowing Britain
to
spend
no
mo
further
£30 to £50
million. Fortu
history,
there
was a no break clau
November
1962
agreement
whic
h e av y f i na nc ia l p en a lt ie s s ho ul
s id e d e ci de t o b a ck o ut .
Having
this brickwall, the
government
w
to
continue the project,
althoug
everything
i n i ts p ow er
to
cause
delays as possibleand cancelled
o
jects instead.
Changes had
alsooccurred in
th
process as
both
of the airframe m
t urers w ere now w orki ng
on
a si
j ec t, f or 1 00 p as se ng er s
at
a
m
speed
of Mach
2.2.
This
airfr
retained the medium-stage capa
2,400 miles
(J,840km)
for
Air
F
well as the l onger range capab
fen ed
by BOAC. This
gave maxi
up w eights
of nO,5001b
100,2
the m ed iu m v er si on w hi le
the
ranged ai rcraft w oul d
have
a
m
of 262,5001b
(l19,300kg).
Other
applicable
to the
shorter-rang
included airbrakes
to
reduce
the
run
and
a
ventral
a ir s ta ir t o a ll
more f1exible usage
pattern on
sm
fields with fewer facilities.
For
the
following twoyearsdeve
on both versions
of
the
Anglo-Fre
would continue, although, as expe
without rancour.
The
main stick
remained as before: t he B ri ti sh t
hated
the
idea
of the
extras require
duce
the
medium-range
Super
C
sincethey regardedit aseconomic
able, while
the
French disliked th
range ai rcraft bei ng pushed by
B
t hey could see
no
need for
the
ex
capability. Eventually
BAC and
S
tion
came to an agreemen t as
sense
and
a realizationofthe
econ
scaleprevailed
and
the British ve
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-
-.--
DESIGN ND DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN
ND DEVELOPMENT
•
\
RIGHT
To
explorethe behaviourofthe deltawing at
low
speeds
HandleyPage
was
contracted to buildthe strange looking
HP 115
researchaircraft C P
Russel Smith
C ol ec ton
BELOW One ofthe firstexperimentaltai l lessaircraftbuil t to testthe delta
wingwas the BoultonPaul BP lll seen hereat Cranfield Ithad a
pure delta wingwith elevonsat thetrai l ing edge The seemingly
overlargefin
was
requiredfor betterstabil ity along thelongitudinal
axis C P
Russel Smith
C ol ec ton
BonOM: Seen touching downat Farnboroughis theHandley Page
HP 115
Since
it
wasrequiredonlyfor low speedhandlingtr ialsthe
undercarriageunits were fixed
B B A C ol ec ton
AnotherConcordefeaturethat
was trialled
on
the BAC 221 was
theextended undercarriagethat
the
airliner
wouldneedto allow
for intake clearance
B B A C ol ec ton
ABOVE Undertakinga
slow
f1ypast
forthe camerais the BAC 221
rebuiltfrom aFaireyFO 2 Notonly
werethe wingsmodified t o a n
ogee planform but adroopnose
was
incorporated andshown in
action B B A C ol ec ton
The Bristol Type
188
was constructed mainly ofstainless steel forresearch into
high speedfl ight Theaircraftwas nota successsince
i twas
expensive to build
andoperate due to i tshigh fuelconsumption
B B A C ol ec ton
Beforethe appearance ofthe Fairey
FO 2
researchaircraft thecompany built the
delta winged FO formuch the samepurpose However
VX350 was
notthe success
envisagedsince
it
sufferedfromexcessive drag and instability
B B A C ol ec ton
adopted
for
continued development.
The
end
of
this
uncertainty meant that the
decision was made
to
virtually redesign
the
whole
aircraft in 1964.
The
mostobvious
alteration
was
an extension to the
fuselage
by
14ft 4.3m ,which wouldgrow
by anoth
e r6 .5 f t 2m during the
following twelve
months.
This
changeto
the
fuselageallowed
the number
of
passengers
to
be increased to
14 A further reworkingaffected the wings
whose gross area was increased
by
15 per
cent, the
final result
was
an
increasein gross
weight
to
367,0001b 166,800kg . Todrive
thisbigger
Concorde
Rolls-Royce offered
an
improved
version
o f t he O lympus
593
which
g av e a f in al
max imum thr us t o f
40,000lb l78kN
per
engine.
It was
at
this
point
in
the development
process
that
research a irc ra ft began to
make
their
presencefelt.
One
of the
most
expensive to build
and opera te
was
the
Bristol Type 188
which
was
constructed
mainly from stainlesssteel
and
powered
by
a pai r
of
Rolls-Royce
Cyron
engines.
The
main
purpose
of
this aircraft was
to
probe
the
behaviour
of
an
airframe flying
at
speeds exceeding
Mach
2
In t hi s
part o f
the
flight
envelopethe
main area
of
study
was
the
effect
of
sustained
kinetic
heating
onan aircraft.
The
first
of
theseunique air
frames, XF923, made i ts maiden fl ight
on
14
April
1961, beingfollowed bya second
Type 188, XF926,
on
29 April 1963. To
study
the behaviour
of
the
wing during
various phases
of
igh
was decided
to
allow BristolAircraft to rebuild
the
Fairey
FD
2
Originallythis delta-winged testair
craft
had been
used solely in research
on
this wing planform before being diverted
to
this
new task.
The
rebuilding
of
the
air
frame
meant tha t
a completely new wing
was fitted,
of
a s le nd er o ge e shape . T o
ensure longitudinal stability
the
fuselage
was
lengthened,
the
new airframe being
24
25
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DESIGN N EVELOPMENT DESIGN N EVELOPMENT
The
Nord Griffon II was
one
of the firstdelta-wingaircraftbuilt in France.
Used
entirely for experimentalpurposes
it
would make itsclaim for fame when Andre
Turcat passed Mach2 piloting
it
in
1959.
BBA Colecton
The SNCASE later Sud Aviation SE 212 Durandal was another French delta-wing
trialsaircraftthat wouldexert
some
influence
on
the Concorde programme.
BBA
Colecton
The Gerfaut II wasyet another delta-winged aircraft in which Andre Turcatset
another record
in
1957. Although
the
original conceptbehind
the
aircraftwas
to
act
as afighter prototype.
it
remained
as
atrials aircraftuntil the
end of
itslife.
BBA
Colecton
The SNCASE 9000 Tridentwas amixedpowerplant aircraftfeaturing ajet engine
in
the fuselage
and
rocket engines mounted
on
the wingtips. Turcatused
it
to push the
French questfor speed even further.
BBA
Colecton
Aviation, assumed responsibility For the
aircraft hydraulics, flying-control power
units,
automaticpilotand
stabilization sys
tems.
Some o f t h e avionics including the
radio
and
aerials
and navigation
systems
inc lud ing the p i to t s tat ic system) were
also be handled by French companies, as
were power
generation and
air-condition
ing
control,
plus
the complete
design
and
computation of the air-conditioning
sys
tem. The critical area of engine nacelle
design was given to Brita in; th is included
the
aerodynamic design and testing
of the
speciFication
and
performance
of the
nacelles,
which
also
included the in take
assemblies
and
ramps plus
the
nozzles.
Overall responsibility For the remaining
erodynamic workwas undercontrol ofthe
French; calculation
of
aero elasticity
and
strength
in a
three-dimensional
aerody
namic
loading Framework would
determine
t he behaviour o f t he
aircraFt
at
critical
peed points and was the responsibility of
the British, whilegeneral airframe calcula
tionswere
undertaken
by
the
French.
Cen
tre
of
gravity
and
weight
estimation
were
the responsibility of each country s own
esign teamand calcula tion of thecentre
of
:avity
For
each aircraft version was the
responsibility
of the
French manuFacturers,
who were also charged with providing
the
manufacturer s
empty
weight figures,
and
a
combined team would calculate the forward
weight and centre
of
gravity estimates plus
the
projected operator s empty weight . All
hese Figures covered in-flight ranges
For
both
versions.
To ensure continuity, each manuFactur
er would normally design and build each
sub-assembly
and
install
t he r el ev an t
wiring
and
subsystems
in to each
where
pplicable.
Any
modifications were dis
ussed under the aegis of thejoint commit
e, who assisted in gaining approval and
nsured
tha t the
work-share process would
tay in balance
at
40 per
cent For
Britain
dnd
60 For
France.
The
responsibility for
lhe powerplant
was
under the guidance of
Bristol Engines whoseareas of responsibil
ityincluded
the
basicengine.
This
baseline
item included
the
compressor, com buster
system,
turbine,
primary Fuel-control sys
tem, nozzle-area
control
system
a nd t he
majority of engine-mounted accessories
and drives suchas
the
combined drive unit.
NECMA
gained responsibility for
the
heat
Fuel-controlsystem,
the reheat
unit,
he convergent-divergent
nozzle
and
a
jet
ipe equipped with a noise suppresser and
thrust-reverser control system. To speed
air conditioning, de-icing, engine instru
mentation
andcontrol systems. Alsowith
in the British remit were
thedevelopment
of t he rmal a nd sound
insulation plus
calculationson thethermalcharacteristics
of the cabin. The French, led by Sud
Estimates of Design Costs
Mach 1.2 Aircraft E million Mach 1.8 Aircraft E million
Existng New
Existng New
engines
engines e ngines
engines
prototype
development
Airframe development and 17
17 22
22
flight costs
Engne development and supply 6
24
20
26
of
engine
costs
Tota
23
41 42
48
further
development to costs ofA
4development aircraft
12 12
15
15
10 OOOhr flight
tests 16
16 21 21
20 OOOhr flight tests
24 25 32
32
C A B
lO OOOhr
51 69
78
84
20 OOOhr
59
78 89 95
Planned Concorde
Costs
E million
Year
irframe
Engnes
Tota
1962
84 3.6
12
1963 8.7
8
16.7
1964
11.6 6.9
18.5
1965
264
11.6
38
1966
22.1
5.8 27.9
1967
145
3.3
17.8
1968
6.9
0.7
17.6
1969
-3.3 0
-3.3
Totals 95.3
39.9 145.2
BAC
also took
on
much
o f t h e
responsi
bi
I ity for
the
strategy
concern ing the
essential systems.
Included in t h is r emi t
were
the electrical, Fuel in collaboration
with Rolls-Royce), oxygen provision For
both passengers and crew, Fire protection,
redesignated as
the
Typ e 2 21 . I t w ou ld
make
its
maiden
flight
on
1May 1964. In
its
new
guise
theBAC
221 wasused
to
pro
videvaluable
dataon high-speed handling
on
behalF of the Concorde programme. To
cater For the
low-speed
handling
data
requirements,
the Hand ley
Page
HP115
wasspecially
constructed.This too
sported
a
delta
wing,
although with
a
straight
lead
ingedge, and made its maiden flight on 17
August 1961. For
the next
Four years
the
HP
115 made numerous , oc ca s ional ly
unstable, f ligh ts in
support of the
pro
gramme
beFore
retirement to the
Fleet
Air
Arm
Museum at Yeovilton.
The French
SST
development teamwere
also drawing
on the
test resultsgained From
a
number of
unique testailframes.To inves
tigate purehigh-speed flight
the Sud-Ouest
9050 Trident II research aircraFt had been
constructed, its propulsion beingdelivered
by apair
of
wingtip-mounted rocketengines.
Delta-wing research had been carried
out
with
the
Sud-Est SE212 Durandal
a nd t he
Nord
1502 Griffon,
which
would eventual
ly lead to the Mirage series of Fighters and
the Mirage IV s tr ateg ic bombe r. As the
French industry had
the
greater experience
indelta-wingflight, it
came
as
no
surprise to
Find that
Sud
Aviation
would assume
the
design and construction lead For the Front
section of th is major component plus the
e1evons.
In the
event, Sud Aviation eventu
allygained
the
greatershare 60 per
cent of
the
airframe design
and construction
work.
In contrast, the British beneFitted From
an
increase in the workshare in enginedevel
opment
as Rolls-Royce were chosen as
the
primary
contractor
to develop
the
Olympus
593 for
Concorde.
Responsibility for
the
design, development and manuFacture of
the r e levant majo r components was
assumed by
the
relevant division
of the
Four
primary contractors,
and
a ll wou ld in turn
be overseen by
the joint-manned
oversight
committee. In Brita inmost of the ailframe
work was concentrated at the old Vickers
plant
at
Weybridge,where the rear Fuselage,
fin and rudder sections were designed and
manuFactured. The Forward fuselage became
the
responsibility
of the BAC,
ex-Bristol
AircraFt, p lan t a t Filton, while the centre
fuselagesection wasmanuFactured in France,
even though i t was des igned
at
Filton.
Beyond
the Four
primary manuFacturerswas
Marshalls
of
Cambridge, now Marshalls
Aerospace, whose responsibility was the
unique droop nose. The design and manu
Facture
of
these assemblies were concentrat
ed
at
their bases in
Hum and Cambridge.
26
27
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DESIGN
ND DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN
ND DEVELOPMENT
ALLOY
system
and
confi rm structural in
and
ensure
that each
team was made
of
changes
when
they occurred.
Rolls-Royce covered
the
respons
for developing
the
bas ic Olympu
engine; however, beyond this
SNE
had
the
oversight
of
developing
the
e
thrust
augmenter
assembl ies and
intetfaces and
B A C at
Filton were ch
with
the
design of
the
complete engi
assemblies, plus
the
intakes and asso
ramps.
In
France there were four Sud
t ion factories assigned to ai lframe
and construct ion and in Bourges D
took
o n t h e
responsibilityfor the ma
ture
of the outer
wing panels.
Other
facturers
in
Europe were also involv
creatingassemblies forConcorde;thu
pano Suiza,
once
famous for i ts
ca
received
the contract
for
the
manuf
o f t he
main undercarriage legs whi
nose undercarriage leg was designe
manufactured
by
Messier. Other, s
concerns
in
France also gained lu
contracts
for the
manufacture
of
BRITISH
AIRCRAFT
C OR PO RA TI ON A ER OS PA TI AL E
Electrics Hydraulics
Oxygen Flying
Conlrols
Fuel Navigation
Engine
instrumentation
Radio
Enginecontrols
Air conditioning supply
Fire
Airconditioningdistribution
De icing
Production was split as close to 50 50 as possible thereby reducing duplicatio
countr ieshad aproduction line
with
components movedbetween each
as
re
The items shownhereare thesectionsdestined forfatiguetesting.
BBA
C
while hisdeputy
was
Dr
Strangand
a third
appointee
was Etienne Escola
as
the
assis
tant
director
of
engineering.
Their
remit
was to make maximum usage of eachcom
pany s
management
structure by which
means i t
was
hoped anyproblemscould be
resolved quickly.To providesupport for
the
engineering
direct ora te R .S . Brown was
appointed
as the
production
manager, his
deputy beingAlfredAsse ot and
an
assistant
was also
appointed
George
Gedge
from
Britain.
Their
responsibilities weredefined
thus: Asselot would takecharge
of
produc
tion
issues inFrance
and
wasempowered
to
accept engineering
requirements
on behalf
of SudA via tionand G edge
would fulfil a
similar rolein Britain. Each
of
these mem
bers
of
the productioncommittee
wasably
supported
by
representatives
from
both
BAC and Sud A via tion. To ensure that
there
was
no
discrepancy
between the
British
and
the
French
organization it was
arranged for all
the
drawings
and
docu
m en ts t o
be dupli ca ted
b et we en t he
manufacturers, this would
act
as a fail-safe
COMPONENT
DESIGN I MANUFACTURE
07 irIntakes
BAC BAC - PresIon
08
Engine Bay
BAC BAC -
FilIon
09
roop
Nose
BAC BAC -
Hum
10
ose Fuselage BAC
BAC -
Weybridge
11
Forward usel ge BAC
BAC -
Weybridge
12 Intermediate Fuselage
BAC A·S Marignane
24
Rear Fuselage BAC
BAC -
Weybridge
26 Fin
BAC
BAC -
Weybridge
27 R ud der
BAC BAC - Weybridge
13 Forward Wing Aerospatiale
A-S - Bouguenais
14
Centre W ing Aerospatiale
A·S Marignane
15 entre Wing Aerospatiale
S Bouguenais
16
Centre
Wing Aeros patiale
A ·S - Toulouse
18
Centre Wing Aerospatiale
A -S -
Toulouse
20
Centre
Wing Aerospatiale
A·S
- SI
Naza;re
21 Outer Wing Aerospatiale
A -S -
Bourges
23
Elevans Aerospatiale
A ·S ouguenais
51
Main
landing
Gear
Hispano Messier
51 Nose Landing Gear
Hispano Messier
06
TRA Nozzles
SNECMA
Engines
Rolls·Royce
119711 LId.
he process up,
optimal
use was made
of
all
vailable test facilities, including
the ov-
rnment owned
l aborat or ies in
both
untries.
At the beginning
of
the
initial
manufacture process
SNECMA
manufac
ured
and
tested
certain
parts
o f t he
test
ngines. As
the
process
continued
the
workshare
meant
that
Rolls-Royce (Bris
I
carried
o ut 6 6
per cent o f the deve
pment
work whi le
SNECMA
would
rry
out
the
remainder.
Production
was
ivided
at 60
per
cent
for
the
British
com-
any
and40
for
the
French.
PRODUCTIONM NUF CTURE RE KDOWN M JOR ITEMS SYSTEMS RESPONSI ILITIES
I I
__
_
i
Ina similar
manner
to
the
oversight com
mittee, the manufacturers also formed a
mmittee
to
ov rs the
day-to-day engi
neering requirements.
Heading
thisorgani
zation was Lucien
Servanty
who
had
been
esignated as director
of
engineering
by
. ierre
Satre
from the oversight
committee
The Manufacturers
et
Together
c ~ : · :
1
FRENCH
Photographed alongsidethe
French prototypeConcorde
F WTSS
isthe secondDassault
Mirage
IV
Both would benefit
fromearl ierdevelopment
programmes.
BBAColecton
BELOW: This diagrambreaksdown
theproduction allotmentsforthe
manufacturing partners. Although
production aircraft were
reputedlybuilt inj igs with little
variation investigations after the
Pariscrash showed thateach
airframewas virtually handbuilt.
thereforeall differ.Sections
2 2 1
and
2 1
areextrafuselage
sectionsfor pressure testing.
BBA
Colecton
Concorde wasmainly
constructed fromaluminium as
thisdiagramreveals.Othercon-
structionmaterials used included
steel titanium and resin formed
fairings.
BBAColecton
r ~ R I T I S
Ii :
RESIN BONDED
GLASS FIBRE
rr
STEEL
ROLLED ALUMINIUM
o
ALLOY
28
29
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DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN
AND DEVELOPMENT
simulation was
not
carried
out
w ith
instead an especially modified Can
bomber, WV787 f le w in f r on t of the
c a n, d is ch a rg ing its icy c a rg o f ro m a
rig
mounted under the
rear fuselage.
To reinforce the fact that Concor
regarded as a p r es tig iou s p r oje ct in
Britain and Fr an ce , a n e x te n siv e f a
testing programme was instituted fro
o u ts e t. To th is e n d a c o mp le te n os e a n
w ar d f us elag e s e ction , s o me 7 0f t 2 1
le ng th, w as d e liv er e d f or te sting . An
.
C> >
Addit ional equipment mounted
in t hi s
spaceincluded an independent fuel system
which would feed the test engine only. The
r e as o n f or th is w as
that
an accurate, com-
plete record
of
fuel consumption was need
e d t o
evaluatethe
performance
of t he
pow
erplant under a ll a s pe c ts o f t he flight
envelope.
Another
modification to XA903
was the complete delet ion
o f t h e
bomb
aimer s blister
under the
nose.
Mounted
in
its p la ce was a w at er spr ay rig which
allowed rainstorms to b e s imu la te d . I c in g
~ n g i n e plusits augmenter assembly, it was
returned to the Sa cla y te stin g f a cility in
rance. Here during A pr i l 1 96 7 i t u nd er
went further high altitudesimulation trials
whichcovered allaspects
of
engine behav-
iour. As
the
ground testingwas proceeding
a ir ly s m o o th ly, itw a s tim e f or a ir bo r n e tr i
als to begin. The aircraft chosen f or th e se
was
that
Farnborough stalwart
the
Vulcan
XA903. This
veteran w as Fine d w ith a
half nacelle complete with powerplant
and a u xiliar y s ys tem s in the bomb-bay.
RIGHT Heavilymodified Canberra WV787
was
used
by
the
RAE
and the A AEEfor i c ingtr ia ls .Ther igat
therear ofthe fuselage was used tospraywater at
the prototypes; depending on thealti tude,spray
came outeither as water orice.
BBAColecton
ABOVE Havingcompleted the in itial fl ighttr ials for
theOlympusengine, Vulcantest bedXA9 3 was
modi f iedto carrya waterspray r ig inplaceof the
bomb aimer s blister
on
thenoseto simulatefoul
weather.
BBA
Colecton
been id e ntif ie d f or c los e r in v es tiga tion .
These
included
the
electrics which were
undergoing
rapid
modification
at least
thirty changes b e ing p r op o se d in J a nu a r y
1966. The i nt ak es w er e d el ay ed u nt il
May-June [967instead
of
February, these
having
been modified by altering the
intake honeycomb
s t ru ct u re w h ic h r e
quiredfurther testing. The changes t o t he
intake l ip s a lso r e s ulte d in al terat ions to
t he engi ne
nacelle assemblies, which in
turn a ls o r eq ui r ed f re sh t e st i ng . E ve n i f
the airframe had been almost r e ad y a f ur
ther hol d up involving t he o n bo ar d
escape
hatch
m echan i sm and i ts b la st
s h ield h a d
not
been c lea r ed . A s imila r s it
uation a lso a r os e concerning the p i l o t ~
personal safety equipment which urgent-
ly needed test ing
and
clearing for flying.
Yet another problem regarding
the
crew
related t o t hei r
seats
which
werefound
to
be
uncom for tab le and needed
a d ra s ti c
redesign,
not
only for the prototype trials
but alsofor
the
production aircraft.
Running
in parallelwith
the
airframe was
deve lopment of t he p ow er pl an tj t hu s i n
November 1 96 5 a bench test e n gin e, a n
Olympus 593B Big)engine,began testrun
ning
at
Filton. By
June [966
a
development
O ly mp u s 5 93 p o we r pla nt, complete with
variablegeometry exhaustassembly, under
t oo k i ts f ir st bench test runs at Melun
V illa ro c he in Fr an ce .
With
the successful
completion o f t h e initial ground runs, the
w ho le a ss em bl y w as t ra ns fe rr ed t o the
NationalGas Turbine Establishment at Pye
s toc k in En gla nd w h er e it w as s u bje cte d
to
extensivetestingin the high-altitude testing
f ac il it y. A ft e r e xt en si ve t es ti ng of the
AvroVulcan
B l
XA9 3 neverentered service
with
the
RAF
being used for trials
throughout its working life. Thisfront-on view showsthe bomber with a Concorde
partnacellecomplete
with
Olympus engine underthe bomb-bay.
BBA
Colecton
the construct ion
jigs,
the remainderof the
airframe sections weredelivered on sched-
u le, s o
that
by March 1966 the first proto
ty pe w as complete enough to a llo w static
and
thermal
testing
to
be undertaken. [n
April final construction and
fitting
o ut o f
prototype Concorde 0 0 I b eg a n at Toulouse,
a nd a t Filton
the
final assembly
of Con-
corde prototype 002began inAugust. Even
though the
SST
had progressed farbeyond
a p a pe r e x er c is e certain a r ea s h a d a lre a dy
Photographed at a n SBAC Farnboroughshow,this Concorde model defined the end of
theresearch programme andthe startofthe manufacturingprogramme.
BBAColecton
c o ntr o ls , n a vig a tio n s ys tem components
hydraulic valves and jacks, communica-
tions components and parts of t he air-con
ditioning system. In Britain the remainder
of t he
system items were manufactured by
s u ch c o m pa n ies a s N o r ma la ir
Garrett and
Dunlop. All assemblies and sub-assemblies
were then
fed
into a production line, one
p e r c o un try ; h ow e ve r , s u ch w as the plan
ning
a lr ea dy i n p la ce
t hat t here
was
no
duplication of production in eithercountry.
G i ven t he
w ay i n w hich each aircraft
industry
approached certain
aspects
of
design,
development and manufacture
it
is
hardly surprising thar there were incompat
ibilities between the parts of the organiza
tion.
O neof
the majordifferenceswas in the
system
of measurements
since France used
the metric system and Britain used imperial
measurements. After a s e rie s
of
meetings
conversion tables were eventuallydrawn up
that
s a tis fie d b o th p a rties , a n d, h a vin g s e t
tledthis difference, construction ofthe first
prototypescould begin. First metal for
the
Anglo French SST prototypes was
cut
in
A pr il 1 96 5 i n
both
Britain and France.
With
manufacture well
under
way,
the
cons t ruc ti on of t he major sub-assemblies
proceeded rapidly, which allowed
the
first
sectionto bedeliveredto
CEAT
inToulouse
in
October. After the
first
combined
wing/
centre fuselage section had been p lac e d in
30
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ESIGN
N EVELOPMENT
ESIGN N EVELOPMENT
Trubshaw
as
chief testpilot, John Coc
co-pilot) and Brian Wa tt s f ligh t
neer). Also on board acting in the r
observers were M.R. Addeley, J.e. A
and
PA.
Holding. As with the French
totype flight,
the
British prototype w
round ), madeits maiden flight,although in
this instance it was not without incident
as
the No.4 engine initially failed to l ight up
correctly. After an enginerestart the aircraft
finally left the runway at Filton at 14:24
localtime. The crewforthis flight was Brian
This
unusual angle
of
Concorde
F-WTSS
reveals clearly
the
subtle curvesthat define
the
ogee
wing. The
box-like
objects on the outer wing arecovers forthe
outboard
PFCUs. BBA Collection
The FrenchConcorde prototype F-WTSS, departing Le
Bourget
on atest flight.
CP
Russell Smith Collection
Andre
Turcat
Famed for being the
Sud Aviation
test
pilot for the
first Concorde flight, Andre Turcatwas born
in
Mar
seilles on
23
October 1921.
the
son of a
noted vehi
cle
manufacturer.
He
undertook the latter part
ofhis
education
at
the Ecole Polytechnique from where he
graduated in
1942.
Three
years latertheyoung
Turcat
enlisted in the
post-warFrench
Air
Force, earning his
navigators wing
by
June 1947
and
hispilots wings
the
following
month.
His
t ime with the
Armee
de
Aire was
spent flying Douglas DC-3
Dakota aircraft
as part
of
the Touraineand Anjou operations groups.
Much of his flying was undertaken
in
Indochina dur
ing
thewar there. In December
1950
Turcat
was
sec
onded
to
the
FlightTest
Centre,
this
being followed
by
his
assuming command
of
the Test Navigator
School. Turcat
finished his t ime with theFrench
Air
Force
in
late 1953,
then joined
theaircraftmanufac
turer SFECMAS later
to
be absorbed by Nord Avia
tion.
With
both
companies
he
was the Assistant
Director
of Flight
Testing, being
promoted to Chief
Test
Pilot
not
long
afterwards. Oneof
his
first duties
was
to
test fly the
NORD
1402Gerfaut Ion 15 Janu
ary1954, in which he became the first European
pilot
to exceed the
sound
barrier
in
level
flight on 3
August.
This aircraft
would later
be modified
to the
Gerfaut 1
andbe flown
by
Turcat
supersonically in
level
flight
on
11 February
1955.
Following
on f rom the
Gerfaut,
he
test-piloted
the
Griffon Ion 16
February 1957
from
Melun-Villaroche.
This version of theGriffon wassuperseded
by
the
Mk.lI
which Turcat piloted
supersonically
using
the
built-in
ramjet o n 1 7 M ay . Afurther test
flight
of the Griffon
Mk1I on 27
October
1958was made
at
Mach 205,
with
a combination
of the
jet
engine andramjet. Andre
Tur
cat
set a
world
closed circuit
record
on
25 February
1959
for a maximum speed of l,020mph l,640km/hj
This was followed
by
a ceremony
on
11
December
when
he was awarded
the International
Harmon
Tro
phy by Vice-President Nixon for service to aviation.
In 1962 TurcatjoinedSud
Aviation
where he
took
part
in
the developmentflying of an autopilotsystem,
using
a
Learjet
and a
Caravelle
as testbeds. O n 2 7
September 1962
Turcat,
in
company with co-pilot
Max Fischl, made
an
automatic landing using the
Caravelle
testbed;
this
was followed by three
further
landings in
zero
visibility on 5
March 1963.
On
1September 1964
he
wasnamed as
Sud
Avia
tions Flight Test Director,
beingheavily
involved from
this t ime
onwards
with
the development of
Con
corde,also
known
asthe ransporte uper onique
TSSI. Turcat
was in
command when thefirst proto
type
Concorde
001
made itsmaiden flight
on
2
March
1969 in
the
presence
of
over
400
from the media,
Invited
VIPs and an audience
ofmillions.
He wasalso
n command on
30 June 1973
when an especially
quipped Concorde outfitted
for astronomical pur
poses carried seven scientists, following
an
eclipse
thesun for
74min
overMauritania.
Turcat
retired
in March
1976, although his involve
mentwith Concorde
was
notcompletely
over since
in
1987 he was instrumental in a successful attempt to
preservethe first
Concorde 001
prototype from the
rap heap.
cancel it very difficult. In
the
end howev-
er,
thegovernment
acquiesced.
On I I December 1967 the first French
built Concorde prototype 001, F-WTSS
was shown to an audience of
the
press, dig
nitaries
and
staff from
the
manufacturers
just before
the
start
of
its flight trials. The
British-built prototype, Concorde 002 G
BSST, appeared in publicduring September
1968, although it had already undertaken
extensive taxi tria ls at Filton before then.
Once
both prototypes had made
their
bow
they began intensive tria ls involving the
engines, brakes and flight controls. To gain
the most from these, both Concordes were
taxied up and down the runways at their
own ailfields, thus Filton and
ToulOLlSe
reverberated t o t he Olympus engines while
the flight test crews proved the validity of
the aircraft systems. Both machines would
pass these trials successfully, which would
allow
the
French prototypeto beclearedfor
its maiden flight
at the end of
February
1969. Proudly wearing the registration F
WTSS the French initials for supersonic
transport, Concorde 00 I taxied out to the
end
of
the Toulouse runway
on
the after
noon
of
2 March. The crewfor this historic
flight was Andre Turcat as chief test pilot,
the o th er s b eing Jacques Guigna rd co
pilo t), Henri Perrier flight engineer) and
Michael Retif flight testengineer).Taking
their
positionsalongside
the
prototypewere
an especially modified Gloster Meteor
NEll from CEV-Bretigny for use as an
observation aircraft and a Morane Saulnier
Par is , which was to be u sed as the photo
graphic chase plane to record for posterity
and
evaluation
the
stages
of the
flight.
Once
cleared for take-off, the throttles were
advanced to full normal power before being
pushed through the gate toallow the thrust
augmenters to kick in to full reheat power.
After all
the
gauges had been checked and
cleared the brakes were released and the
Concorde began to rol l down the runway.
At 15:38 local time the nose-wheel left the
ground and Concorde 001climbed smooth
ly
into
the
sky. Forthis firstflight
the
under
carriage was left in the down and locked
position. ven with thi s r es tr ic tion thi s
maiden flight, a ll 29min of it, proceeded
smoothly before the aircraft turned and
l in ed up for a pel f ec t l anding .
On
touch
down the
tailbrake parachute was deployed
to s low i tdown and reduce the loading on
the brakes.
iv weeks later, on 9 April, the British
prototype Concorde 002, with
the
registra
tion
G-BSST t o
some
the
r ight way
To f i t thi s extension in, much of t he extra
length was accommodated forward o f t h e
wing, while
the
remainder was gained by
moving
the
aft pressurebulkheadfurther
to
the rear. These changes would allow the
passenger compartment t o c ar ry 1 28 .
Other changes allowed for the inclusion
of
an
extra passengerdoor closeto the leading
edge
o f t he
wing and
t he cabin
windows
werereducedin size
sl
ightly tocomply with
American Federal Aviation Authority reg
ulations. The first appearance
of
this
updated Concorde was at Filton
on
17
December 1971 when
the
British-built
Concorde
02 was rolled
out t o
public view
I t was during 1971 t ha t t he first Royal
approaches were made by t he Comman
dant
ofthe Royal Flighton behalf
of
Prince
Phillip, who had expressed
an
in terest in
f ly ing in
one of the
prototypes.
This
request was
viewed
with some
trepidation
by the government who were about t o
undertake a review
of
the project that year
and were worried
that
a good in te rview
from
the
Prince might make any
at temptto
With a protective cover over the
pitot
head, and neither engines
nor
PFCUs fitted,
Concorde 2
is
rolledout
at
Filton. J A
Todd
Collection
viaLee Howard
part Concorde airframewas alsoconstructed
at Filton during late 1966, although itspur
pose was morecosmetic in nature. Itconsist
ed of a cabin and flightdeck mock-up which
became available for inspectionfrom Febru
ary 1967. It would soonhave positiveresults
as sixteen airlines would express an interest
in the purchase of up to sixty-sevenaircraft.
Behold, th e
Prototypes
The prototype Concordes 001 and
2
were regardedfrom
the
outset as trials and
evaluation airframes only
and
thus further
changes
were
undertaken
a s new
and
dif
ferent requirements c ame t o t he fore. In
May 1966 a revised fuselage was unveiled
for
the
preproduction Concorde airframes.
I n t hi s v er si on
the
fuselage had
been
extended
by a f ur th er 8 .5 ft 2 .6m) and
other modifications included a redesigned
one-piece visor and a fuselage step which
replaced the earlier two-piece assembly
and periscope to give improved visibility.
32
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--JJr ~ : - - = :
_
DESIGN ND DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN ND Di VELOPMENT
l
trials. Design calculations extensive com-
puter analyses
wind-tunnel
testing
and
sim-
ulatorflying would provide the data needed
to create Concorde.
At
least
the
pilots were
spared
the
ordeal
of
learningto steer
the
air-
craft y using a strange modified road vehi-
cle
that
had been employed during
the
de
Havilland
Comet
programme.
The
final
stage
of
these trials was
the comprehensive
series of flight tests that would eventually
clear
the
aircraftforgeneral usage. Eventhis
stage was subject to
the
usual round
of
inter-
national wrangling. However after many
meetings an in-depth flight test schedule
w s hammered
out
which was acceptable
to
both BAC
a nd S ud
Aviation
and
their respective aviation authorities. This
a
RGHT Concorde
G-BSST generates
the
usual
pollution
as
itliftsoff
from
RAF Fairford.
To
allow
for improved airflow and cooling the intake
auxiliary
doors
are fully extended. B B A C ol ec ton
BELOW: An
excitedgathering
o fp re ss,g u e sts
and
officials watch
as Concorde
prototype G-BSST
lands
at Fairford
at
the completion of its maiden
flight B B A C Ol ec ton
Brian Trubshaw
Bornon29 January 1924.ErnestBran
Trubshawwas
educated
atWinchesterbeforejoining the RAF in1942.
Hs
pilot training
was
undertaken
in
the
USA where
he trained on Boeing Stearman biplanes. After con
version training. Trubshaw
joined
BomberCommand
in
1944 where he flew
Stirlngs
and Lancasters.
After
a
tour
with the
Command.he transfered to
Transport
Command.His f y i ng s ki s
were
rated as
excepton
al.
which
led
to
h s b ei ng
transferred
t o t he K n gs
Flght in 1946.
After that,Trubshaw began teaching
at
the
Empre
Fyng Schoo
and
the RAF F y n g
Colege from
1949
to1950. He was almost
sent
to
Malaya asone of
only
two RAF piots who also
had
helcopter experence.
However,
this
movewas canceled
and
he was given
permissionto leave the RAF to become
a
testpilot for
Vlckers-Armstrongs,where he remained for 30
years,
becoming chieftest
pilot in
1960
and Director of Test
Fyng f rom 1966. Trubshawworked on the develop
m ent of
the
Valant V-bomber. the Vanguard civilian
transport. the VC 1
and the BAC-111, al
of
which he
test-flew. His
coolness in savng Britain s prototype
VC-l0 from disaster
o n a n eary
testflight w on h m
t he Derry
and
Richards Memorial
Medal
for out
standing test fying contributing
to
t headvance of
aviation in 1965:
structural faiure
had been
threat
ened
when an
elevator
secton
broke
loose and the
aircraft shook as
though
the tai
was
shakng
the
dog.
D ue t o
the excessive vibration caused
by
the
elevator
faiure, Trubshaw couldnot readthe
instru
ments, butbroadcastthe aircrafts behaviourback to
base
in
casehe could not return
the aircraft
to Wey
brdge; he
thenmanaged
to
land with
only
half the
elevator
control
functoning. He later descrbed this
manoeuvre as o ne o f
my
trickier moments , Three
years earler Trubshaw had beenawarded thesame
m eda f orhiswork in
the
eary
1950s
on
the Valant
jet bomber.
on which he tested
the delvery system
for Britain s first
nuclear
bomb,the 1O OOOlb 4,500kg)
lueDanube In 1985, on the
eve
of his retrement,
he revealedthat, while
flying aValant
V-bomber, he
had
been
compeledt o drop
a
concret ereplca of t he
weapon
into theThames
estuary to sa ve
the aircraft
from crashing.
Concordewas the aircraft that
would
propel Bran
Trubshaw
into
the
publc
eye when he f irst f lew it in
Apri 1969f rom Fit ont ot he
test
base
at
RAF Fairford.
After the Concorde
development programme he
moved
to
become the divisional director
and
general
manager of t he F i t on w o rk s o f Britsh Aerospace
from1980
to
1986. From 1986to1993 he was
a
mem
b er o f t h e b o ar d o f t he C iv
Aviaton Authority
and
worked a sa n
aviaton
consultant.
He
was awarded
the
OBE in
1964, the
CBE
in 1970
and
the
French
Aeronautcal
Medal in 1976.
On 25
March 2001 Trubshawdied peacefuly in hs
s le ep a t h s h om e n ea r
Tetbury,
Gloucestershire.
Commentng
uponthe Concordecrash,
he
would
say,
Ihavenever heard
somuch bloody
rubbish
in my
life,
Concorde
is
the safestai rcraft I
have
flown.
Let
that
be hs epitaph.
001 the British Concorde would use a tail
brake parachute to slow
the
aircraft down.
Even
though both
prototype flight tests
were the more reportable eventsfor the avi-
ation press they were
the
culmination
of
many mon th s o f
actual
and
theoretical
also make its maiden flight with its under-
carriage down
and
locked.
Only oneo ther
minor
problem would plague this flight: a
malfunction on both radioaltimeters on the
approach a l though the landing was com-
pleted
without
fur th er inc id en t. As with
Touchdown for
the
British
Concorde
prototype
at
Fairford after its
maiden
flight
The subtle blending of the wing a n d th e prominenttai l bumper is clearly shown. BBA
C ol ec ton
The internal
face
of
the
forward
e scap e h a tch in th e
prototype
Concorde.
Attached
to
the
door is a rope ladder to assist in
escape
in
an emergency.
B B A C ol ec ton
34
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DESIGN N EVELOPMENT
DESIGN N EVELOPMENT
. . . . .
i
On thegroundat Fairford arethreeprototypeand preproductionConcordeairframes: on thelef t i s 1 on ther ight i s
2
inthe centre isConcorde 1 BBAC
The primaryescortfor Concorde atthe startandthe endof itsfl ights was this Canberra. on detachmentfrom the FarnboroughAero Flight. BBA Colecton
Withits nose partlylowered and thevisor fully retracted. theBritishConcorde prototype landsat Fairford. Prominent on thefin arethefair ingsfor therudder
PFCUs
BBA
Colecton
BELOW:
One
ofthe safetyprecautions fitted to
Concorde G·BSST
was
atail chute to assistin
braking.By thetimethe productionaircraftwere
builtthisfeaturehad been deleted.
BBA
Colecton
The final agreement
on
the flight-test
s ch edule was comple ted in Janua ry 1969
and covered some 1,935hr for develop
ment
flying, 795 wereallocated forcertifi
cation
flying
and
a further 1 ,500wereallo
cated for rou te proving amI
endurance
flying. T o c ov er t he se 4 2 30 flight test
hours i t w as established
that
seven air
craft
were
n ee de d t o c om pl et e t he
pro
gramme in a reasonable time. To cover
this workload would require the use of
both
prototypes
t he t wo preproduct i on
aircraft and t hree of the early production
aircraft. The plan was
that
supersonic
f ligh t wou ld be
achieved
y mid 1969,
with t he M ac h 2 point being slated for
p as si ng in e ar ly 1 97 0. If al l proceeded
LEIT Thisdramatic nose-on shotof Concordereveals
thelocationofthe nose chinesand thecomplex
shapeof thewing.At theextremenose end i sapi tot
head with afull range ofsensorsfitted. BBAColecton
Flight Tests
schedulewasdividedinto threedistinct sec
tions, although there were overlaps.
The
first would cover flight development and
wasfollowed y certification andendurance
flying.
The
first phasewasessentiallyaimed
at developing the aircraft s complete flight
envelope to ensure that Concorde would
perform s predicted.
Any
problems identi
fied during this sequence of flights would
have to be rectified y modification before
the
wholeregime was undergone
once
more
during the certification process.
36
37
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DESIGN
ND DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN NI
DEVELOPMENT
been borne
out
by further flight
Another
modification
that
was intr
i nt o t he flight control system was
shaker
that
becameoperativeshould
craFtstart toapproach
the
sta
II
Th is
a
had been seen as a necessary requi
since Concorde h ad a h ig h s in k ra te
waspossiblefor
the
crewto overreact
rect this behaviour which in tUIll
Unliketheproduction Concordefleet,the pilot s panel on prototypeG-BSSTwas
comparativelybaresince thenumberof engine gaugeswas keptto aminimum.
The view is dominated
by
themovingmapdisplay.
BBA Colecton
TheprototypeConcorde was
well
equipped
with
communicationsequipment, as the
contentsof thisrack reveal.Somewere purelyfor contactuse, otherequipmentwas
usedfor telemetrypurposes.
BBA Colecton
smoother
throughoutthe entire speedrange
while its behaviourafter a simulatedengine
failure was also better than expected. Curing
the
flutter
of
the e1evons was seen
as
para-
mount
and thereforethe gear ratio initially
set at I 1 in pitch was altered to 0:2for the
preproduction machines and again to
0 7:1
for production build aircraft since 0:2 was
seen as rather conservative aresult that had
For such a hi-tech aircraft,someof theescape
measures lookdecidedlyprimitive as thisrope
ladder
by
theescapehatchshows.
BBA Colecton
Although the
British
government
was
indulging
in itsusual
interference the
exe-
cution
o f t he
flight test schedule carried
on
apace
even though
Sud
Aviation
had
been
absorbed by Aerosparialc
alongwith
Nord and SEREB in January 1970 In
France
the
flight test schedule was
under
the jurisdiction o f t he
test
pilot Andre
Turcat and in Britain Brian Trubshaw ful-
filled
the
same role. Communication
between the two a nd t he ir staffs would
ensure
that
there was
no duplication of
effort and so the Frenchteam concentrated
on
developing the flight envelope and the
British focused
on the
performance
ofCon-
corde but e ven so there were areas where
there were inevitableoverlaps.
Not
long after
the Concorde
flight test
programmehad begun a few problems were
identified.
lllese
concerned the variable
geometry intakes a ndthe slightflutter
of
the
control surfaces. Many
of
thesesurfaced dur-
ing the initial flights of prototype 01
F-
WTSS; this aircraft a nd t he British proto-
typestarted to give cause
For
concern since
they were to different buildstandards
than
the Following preproduction and production
aircraft. A lthough the in takes and control
sLilfaces were troublesome there had been
good news since the dragcoefficient ofCon-
corde had been overestimated and thus the
aircraft was able
to
t ra ve l f as te r w it h a
reduced kinetic heat signature. Handling
was a ls o b et te r
than
predicted being
now no
one is
preciselysure why this came
about especially as assurances
had
been
given concerning noise and pollution out-
puts although
the
aircraFt industrywas seen
as
the
prime suspect.
These
enForced delays
would mean that Concorde would not
enter
revenue earning service until
1976
three
years later
than planned.
and
environmental
issues came to
the
Fore
Th e
Former were due to
the
British govern-
ment
which had becomeopenly hostile to
the Concorde programme while the latter
was d ue to an American environmentalis t
and
his supporters
who
began a vociFerous
campaign to
stopConcorde
flights
in to the
USA
a nd t o N ew York in particular. Even
ABOVE: Attached to atug andsurrounded by escorting vehicles, British Concorde prototype
G-BSSTistowed outfor anothertestfl ight. Because
it
had been standingfor atime,the
fl ightcontrolhydraulicpressureshaddissipated allowing thesurfaces to droop.
BBA
Colecton
without incident ai rl ine services
were
scheduledto being by
the
end
of
1973 The
reality would see supersonic speed being
achieved
by
Concorde 00
l
on
I
October
1969 md Mach 2 achieved by the same air-
craFt
on
4
November 1970
UnFortunately
the
most vital area
t ha t o f
airline sales
would
h av e t o endure
delays as political
RIGHT
On
board Concorde
002
are Brian Trubshaw
chiefBritishtestpi lot) on theright andAndreTur
cat on theleft. NotetheCanberrachase aircraft in
the background.
J A Todd Colecton va Lee Howard
ABOVE:
To allow
forexternalairframe checksofthe
prototypeConcorde a periscope was fi tted. Note the
cable looms aroundthis installation.
BBA Colecton
38
39
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DESIGN N
EVELOPMENT
40
OPPOSITE PAGE
TOPLEfT
The co pilotposition inthe prototype
Concorde wasa testposition unlikethat inhis
commercialcounterpart. In this view thesteering
handle dominatestheside panel. BBA
Colecton
TOPRIGHr
The
view
outof thevisor
on
the prototype
Concorde was limited as this photographshows.
The commercial aircrafthad much improved vision.
BBAColecton
BOTTOM LEfT
Duringthefl ight tr ialsa small passenger
cabinareawas createdat therear ofthe fuselage.
Itwas used both to
trial
types ofseatand fitment
and to transport
VIP
guests. BBA
Colecton
BOTTOMRIGHr As testarticlesthe Concorde
prototypeswere moreconcerned with recording
performancedata than theprovision ofpassenger
facilities hencethe flight data recordersystem
occupiedmuch ofthe cabinspace. BBAColecton
induce stall.
The
stickshakerwouldcome
in to p la y ifa n a ng le
of attack of
17 degrees
were reached while at the 20 degree point
the s tic k s h ak e r wou ld inc rea se its o u tp u t.
Since
thiswasquiteviolentit was impossible
for the crew to ignoreand therefore the only
way to re du c e
the output
required
the
crew
to ta ke a c tio n. To a s s is t the
c re w in fu rth er
ha ndling C onc or de an auto-stabilization
package was developed
that
was also inte
grated i n to t h e autopilot system.
With the e le von
fluttertrials
under
way
i t w as
time
to
integrate the behaviour of
the
intakes an d t he flighl-test schedule
under
several flight
conditions. Running
them side by sidewas seen asessential
si
nce
incorrect
interaction
between
the
airframe
a nd t he
nacelles
could
g ive ris e
to
safety
and economic iss ue s. To in du c e flutte r in
the e le vons thr e e
types
of
inducer werefit
ted: the firstwas an electrically driven stick
e x citer while la ter a mechanical system
w as i ns ta ll ed . A f in al
exciter
u se d with
oncorde was
the
interestingly named
bonkers .
These
w er e s ma ll e xp lo si ve
charges
that
could be set offin sequence to
in du c e a
sudden deflection o f t h e control
surface; in this flight-test
pr ogra m me the y
w er e u se d d ur in g t he t ra ns on ic flight
re gime . All
the
activity ge ne ra te d dur ing
th e se flig hts was re co rde d
on e lec tr om a g-
netic tape for lateranalysis
o n t h e
ground.
During September 1970
a
further
series
of
te s t flig hts b e ga n . T hese concent rated
n
the
effects
o f t he
s o ni c b o om s h oc k -
wave
o n p e op l e a n d
buildings
and
required
fifty flights to be undertaken.
These
were
flown
along
a
route that
later
got the
nick-
DESIGN N EVELOPMENT
name
of
Boom Alley . Using
Concorde
002 ea c h s or tie de par te d
Fairford before
turning cast; after this the aircraft turned
north
accelerating all
the
t i me u n ti l
the
required speedwas
reached. At t he north-
ern
tip
of
Scotl andC oncorde t hen turned
southwards
to
pass
down the
west coast
of
4
ABOVE Concorde prototype G BS
seenhere with everythingretra
including the visor. The numero
differently coloured patches
underneaththe aircraft are
clearly visible. BBAColecton
LEfT located
i nthis rack are ma
theblack boxes containing
navigational equipment. In the
productionairframesall these w
replaced bythree INSsystems.
BBA
Colecton
Britain
at
supersonic speed.
Once
a
of
Fairford speed wasreduced
and th
craft turned towards the a irfield for
i ng . I n a ll these flights revealed
t h
general over-pressure levels were far
than
ha d be e n e xpe cte d a lthough
complaints about
noisewere receive
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DESIGN NDDEVELOPMENT DESIGN ND DEVELOPMENT
With anti-FOD air intake guards in place. Concorde
002
hasits wheels and
tyres inspected. Thelegfair ing isfixed tothe legandthus moves
with
it.
This view alsoshowsthe torque links between themain casting andthebogi
J.A. Todd Colecton via Lee Howard
AMP A S S E M ~ B
£ ± S - ~ t = = = F '
I : f ~ ~ - - - - _ Lo o
I PRIMARYNOZZLEIFFUSERHOCKPATTERN
Diagramshowingthe
two
primaryoperating modesof theOlympusengine as fi ttedto
Concorde.Theupper i l lustratestheaircraft inlow-speedfl ight,
while
the lower isthe
configuration forsupersoniccruise.
bothcasesthe rampscontrol theentryof air to
the engines.
BBA
Colecton
; : ~ I ~ : ~ = o
. i> ,
J
l
B OU ND AR Y L AY ER B L EE D A UX IL IA RY D O OR Y COOLINGDOOR
One
ofthe extra escape routesin theprototype Concordewas this
hatch atthe rearofthe cabin. Thisfeature
would
havebeen incorporated
inproduction machines asan air-stair,had the French medium-range
design gone ahead.
BBAColecton
as part
of
t hehot and high trialssequence.
A successful completion
of
this segment
would lead to a
demonstration
t ou r t o
South America
in September. In
contrast
with the fortunes of 001 prototype 002
departed from Fairford in]une 1972for an
extensive sales tourof
the
Middle and Far
Eas t p lu s a s id e t r ip to Aus tra li a .
Support
services were provided by
the
Royal
Air
Force since they had the only aircraftlarge
enough tocover the logistics requirement.
On both demonstrat ion tours presenta-
tions were made to
the
interested parties
from
the
a ir line s wh o were t rea ted to
speeds ofMach 2 on a regular basis.
Althoughboth Concorde prototypeshad
contributed extensively t o t he initial stages
of
the SST development programme they
were
not
representative
of t he
preproduc-
t ion norproduction
aircraft. In
the
light
of
th is it was decided to retire both aircraft
from operational test flying.
The
f ir st to
shutdown its engines for the last time was
Brian Trubshawphotographed outsideone of
the prototypeConcordes.
BBAColecton
U p t o
this
point
in
the
flight test pro-
gramme nei therofthe prototypeshad man-
aged to break through the Mach 2 barrier.
The first
attempt
t odo so was undertaken
on 4
November
1970
when
Trubshaw
aboard
Concorde
002 pushed
the throttles
asfar forward
as
theywould go. Even
as
the
SST accelerated the speed run had to be
aborted as a fire warninglight cameon for
No.2 engine, al though th is was b e t rac ed
to a hot a ir gas l eak. I n
contrast, the
French prototype airborne
on
a s imi lar
mission would
manageto
pass
throughthe
barrier with Turcat as pilot. The British
team finally claimedsuccesswith their air-
craft
on
2November.
By January 1971
t he Concorde
pro-
gramme had achieved 100supersonic test
flights although not without a few i nc i-
dents. On 27 January
Concorde
0 01 was
airborne undertaking deliberate power-
plant
surge testing in
the Mach
2 region
of
the
fl
ightenvelope. Duringa recycle ofthe
reheat/augmentersystem theengineover-
speed switch
on
No.3 engine malfunc-
tioned causing
the
Olympus to overspeed
and
surge.
Since
this was
oneof
a pair
the
next -door engine No.4 also began to
surge. Such were the forces inducedby this
reaction
that
the front rampdrive coupling
failed this being followed by theramp tear-
ingfree with partsentering the enginecom-
pressor faces and causingdamage to both.
Once the situation regarding the starboard
engines hadbeen stabilized Concorde was
turned
towards Fairford where a gentle
landing was carried out. Inspection
of t he
r i gh t -hand engine
group
and n ac el le
revealed that No. 3 eng in e h ad suffered
extensive damage, al though the strength
of t heengineand the design
ofthe
nacelle
assembly explosion blankets had ensured
that
the
aircraft itself
had
suffered only
minor damage.
As the aircraftwas needed to cont inue
the test programme the engines and ramp
control sys te ms were q uick ly rep la ce d
while repairs were carried
out
to
the
air-
frame
and
nacelle; thiswould allow001
to
undertake its first intercontinental flight
to Dak ar in West Africa a t t heend
of
May
BonOM: Photographed on the flight deckof the
prototypeConcorde areBrianTrubshaw left
and
Roy
Radford right .
BBAColecton
-
\\
-
42 43
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DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN
AND DEVELOPMENT
The crew seats inthe
developmentConcord
were
partofthe airfra
unlikethosein theTu
whichwere ejectable
Notethemic-tel ando
connectorsclearlyvi
on
the engineer s sea
Helo
Coelho
BELOW: Theaborted BA
TSR.2 providedone im
elementto theConco
programme:the rehea
Olympus engine.
BBA Colecton
w as r ate d w ith a s lig htly h igh e r th r
put. When
Concorde underwent
frame redesigna similar exercisewas
taken
by
Bristol Engines which r
in the appearance
of
the Olympu
dimensionally slightlylargerall roun
in cr e a se in s iz e le d
to an ex traga in
t hr us t o u tp ut w hi ch w as in cr e a
32,0001b
142kN , and th rus t
aug
tion
ourput
with l im ir e d r eh e<
increased
to
35,0001b
156kN .
d es ign c o ntr a cts w er e g r an ted in 1
called for the provision
of
engines
pressure stage.
This
wouldallow
the
pressure
r at io t o r emain a t
12:
I but increase the
mass air flow
into
the engine. Other mod-
ifications were made to
the powerplant
cooling
layout,
which
were
needed
to
compensate for the increased operating
temperature. A II these modifications result
e d in
theappearance oftheOlympus
593 D
which was intended
as
the development
standardengine.
Only
two
of
these power
plants were constructed for ground testing,
the
f irs tw o u ld h a ve a
thrustoutput
rated
at
28,1001b
l25kN
while the second engine
a L-anberra bombertestbedduring 1952. In
i ts o r ig ina l f or m
the
e ng i ne w as r at ed a t
11,0001b 49kN d ry t hr us t, a lt ho ug h a
series of steps saw the final unreheated ver
sion, the Mk.30101 ECU fitted in the Vul
can B 2 bomber,
r un ni ng a t a n o ut pu t o f
20,0001b 89kN . I t w as the development
potential of thisrobustengine for usc in the
TSR2
strike aircraft
that
led to its s e le c tio n
forConcorde.
TheTSR2
engine, rheOlym
pus Mk.22R was rated at 30,61 Olb 136kN
dry thrust and 33,0001b
l47kN
reheated.
Although
thisoutstandingaircraft was
can-
celled through alleged extensive cost over
runs and governmental decision, the princi
ple
o f t he
r e he a te d O lym p us e n gin e h a d
been successfully established. Given this
success, it was no surprise thatthe company
c ho se t hi s e ng in e f or Concorde. Bristol,
l at er R ol ls -R oy ce , i ni ti al ly c on s tr uc t ed
someOlympus 22R and 301 powerplants
for
u se in f ull-s ca le development tes ts , th es e
beingfollowed by
the
Olympus 593engines.
Once the 5 93 h a d u n d e rta k en its
full
devel
opment programme, both companies were
required to supply engines, jet pipes, con-
v er ge nt - di ve rg en t n oz zl es p lu s a ll
the
requiredspares and tools.
At the beginning
of
the Concorde pro
gramme the powerplantproject leader, Bris
tolEngines, were joined by
the
French man
ufacturer SNECMA.
This
company was
given
the
responsibility for
the
design and
development of the
thrust
augmentation
or
reheat system a nd t he variable nozzle sys
tem.
WhileSNECMA
were
concentrating
o n t h e
extras, Bristol Engineswere concen-
trating
on
redesigning
the
Olympus engines
to withstand higheroperatingtemperatures
and an increased
thrust
output. The major
changewas
to
the compressorstage, wherea
stage was removed from theh igh pressure
f an w h i le another was added to
the
low
not
completely removed the thrustdragdis
crepancy.
Curing
thisproblemrequired
that
the
w ing tip b e r e de sig ne d, w h ic h , in tu rn ,
improved the behaviour ofthe wing. While
the
structuralchangeswerebeing made, the
opportunity to upgrade
the
enginemanage
ment system was t ak en a nd t he nacelles
werefurther strengthened to protectthe air
f r am e f ro m d a ma g e s h o uld th er e b e a p ow
erplant
failure.
These
modifications were
in co r po r ate d in to the production Con-
cordes from the o ut se t, w hi ch w ou ld , i n
turn,allowforan extension
ofthe
type sper
formance limitations.
The
primary change
was a n i nc re as e in the permissible take
o ff w ei gh t f rom 4 00 ,0 00 t o 4 08 ,00 01 b
182,000-185,500kg) andthe availablefuel
was increased by 3,3001b l,500kg . Pelfor
mance w ou ld a ls o b e im pr o ve d as the sub
sonic cruise figure was increased from 0.93
to 0 .95 , w h ic h r e du c ed to ta l
fuel
consump
tion by 1 3 percent.
While BAC
were
concentrating on the
developmentand constructionof the Con-
corde ailframe, theirengine partners, Rolls
Royce, were applying themselves to bring
ing
the
Olympus
engine
up
to
speed.
Originally developed
by
Bristol Engines at
Filton, the O lym p us m a de its f ir st f lig h t in
PRODUCTION
367,000 LBS
159,625 LBS
28,000
LBS
193
190,000 LBS
132 34 PITCH
PRODUCTION
PROTOTYPE
184 6
174,000 LBS
118 34 PITCH
326,000 LBS
136,625 LBS
23,000
LBS
PROTOTYPE
Enter
the
Preproduction
Models
After the retirement ofboth prototypes the
g r ea ter p a rt
o f t he
types trials work was
shouldered by
the
preproduction
Concordes
01 and 02. Their first taskwasto investigate
a r e po r te d th r us t d r ag d isc r ep a nc y w h ic h
had
been
noted
on the
prototypes and had
recurred
on
both preproduction machines.
Careful redesign
by
both the ailframe and
engine manufacturers eventually resolved
this deficiency.
The
f ir st a irf r am e to
have
t he se c ha ng es a pp l ie d w as Concorde 02
which madeits maiden flight on 10January
1973, piloted by Brian Trubshaw and crew.
The m ai n c ha ng es t o the aitframe were
applied to the wing, where thecamberand
the leadingedgedroopwerealtered, andthe
fuselage was lengthened by 11ft
JAm
by
the fitting of an extended tail-cone. Rolls
Royce and
SNECMA
h a d a ls o m a de s o me
changes
to the
Olympus reheat/thrust aug
mentation system, mainly concentrated on
the secondary nozzle. At the end ofthe first
sequence
of
test flightsfurther modifications
were necessary since
the
behaviour
o f t h e
wingsflexingin flight needed to be recalcu
lated because the earlier improvementshad
•••••••••••••••••••• l
T.O.wEIGHT
A.P.S.WEIGHT
VOLUMETRIC
PAYLOAD
LENGTH
FUEL
SEATING
0.
a II a I
Cl
I I II a I II II I
I
a 0
II
II 0 C
C
O D
l
D
D a
I
G D
l
D II 0 a a a
I
I I I I 0 0
O
C.,
DATA
COMPARISON: PROTOTYPEAND PRODUCTION
AIRCRAFT
hisdiagram il lustratessomeofthe
changesbetweenthe prototype and
heproduction versionsof Concorde.
here would be onlyonefinal change
othe productionmachine,
an
extendedtail-cone. BBA
Colecton
p r oto typ e 0 0 1, which was fl ow n f rom
oulouse to
the
M us ee d e l A i r a t Le Bour
et
by
Turcat
on
19 October 1973. During
its shor t but significant career, the
Con-
c o rd e h a d f low n ju st in e xc es s
of
8 1 2 h r in
97 testflights.
Within
thissequence
254hr
h a d b e e n spent at Mach I or over.
The
sec
ond a irc r af t, p r oto typ e 0 0 2, w as r e tir ed to
the Fleet
Air Arm
Museum
at
Yeovilton,
w he re i t is displayed alongside t he BAC
221, WG744. Throughout i ts c ar ee r 0 02
h a d a c hie v ed 8 3 6 te st f lig ht h ou r s, d u rin g
which 438 sorties wereflown
of
which 173
were spent in the supersonicregime. During
its short career Concorde 002 suffered only
one
real scare in trials flying.
This
occurred
i n A ug us t 1 97 4 when a f a ult d e ve lop e d
with the left main undercarriage supports
w h ich h a d b e c o me detached from the main
structure. Fortunatelyfor
both
crew
and
air
craft, the undercarriage emergency blow
downsystem worked asadvertised and thus
the
crewwere able
to
executea safe
but
dif
ficult landing. Post-flight investigation of
the mounting failure would lead to modifi
c at i on s b ei ng m ad e t o
the
undercarriage
mountings
o n b ot h
prototypes
and
they
were incorporated from the outset in the
preproduction and production machines.
44
45
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_ ~ _
------
DESIGN
AND DEVELOPMENT
programme would mean
that
a n y g r
weight was
kept
in ratiowith availab
load and engine power.
Testing th e Airframe
Fro m a s tru c tu r al
po in t o f
view
the
corde airframe is fairly conventiona
chosen material was
an
alum
a lloy , r ef er r ed to in its 1 96 7
patent
a
tion as Hiduminium RR58. This pa
a llo y h a d the a bi li t y t o compens
overageing
and
a llo y c r e e p, b o th
of
drives costsup, which gave
the
design team
something
else
to
c o pe w ith. Be yo nd
the
complexity o f t he proposed systems the
d es ig ne rs w er e a ls o f ac ed w i th
another
problem
of
supersonic flight:
the
low pay
lo ad in r e la tion to the overall weight ofthe
aircraft. In
the
case
ofCon
corde only 6 p er
cent
would beavailablefor
any
kind
of
pay
lo ad ,a s ta rk contrast to the proportion in a
suhsonic, wide-body aircraft which hovers
around the
2 0 p e r
cent
point.
This meanl
thal
any g ro wt h i n the weight
of
the
airframe would ea t in to
the
available pay
load. However, careful
management ofthe
kin and on s
CHAPTER THREE
Comingcloseto completionand
on
its undercarriage.Concorde preproduction airframe
2was
photographedat Filton.Notethe numerousaccesspanels inthe upperwing; these provedusefulwhen it
was necessaryto modifythe productionairframesafterthe Paris crash. J A Todd Colecton v a Lee Howard
oncorde, f ro m a technical point
of
view,
w as a s u b tle b le n d
of cutting-edge technol
ogy and tried and tested technology. Asthe
aircraft progressed through
the
develop
ment
process,
the
British-
and the
French
built machines were close to identical; only
in the passengercabin and additions to the
on-board
systems would
there
be
any
rec
ognizable, cosmetic differences.The design
engineers werefaced with many new chal
lenges,
no t the
least
of
which was
creating
an advanced supersonic transport
that
was
complex in
the
extreme. The problem,
of
course, with complexity
is
that i t i n t ur n
f ir st p r oto lyp e in J a n u ar y 1 96 6, w ith f lig ht
c l ea r an ce t es ts b ei ng c om pl et e d i n J un e.
Typetesting
ofthe
engine was to ta k e 1 5 0h r
and b e c o mp lete d b y J u n e 1 96 7 and flight
certification trials were scheduled forcom
pletion by December 1969. The costs
of
engine devdopment w er e b as ed
on
the
requirement for
the
d es ign a n d d e ve lop
ment
p h as e w h ic h in clu de d
the
Olympus
22R and 30I engines, twentyOlympus 593
e n gin es f or te sting and flight trials usage,
plus thirty-six Olympus 593enginesintend
e d t o b e r et ro fi tt ed t o t he prototypes, the
preproduction aircraft andthe first two pro
duction
standard machines. The cost esti
matesalso included spares, overhauls, esti
mated
at
e ve ry 4 ,0 00 f li gh t h ou rs , and
tooling to produce
the
Olympus 593 series.
However,in agesture of parsimony, the esti
m ate s d id n o r in clu de a n y f u nd ing f or
the
building of much-needed test facilities.
To ensure that the Olympus engine was
s af e f or o p er a tio n s u n de r a ll f lig ht c o nd i
tions, it was extensively tested. The aircraft
chosento act as the airborne testbed was the
heavily modified Vulcan B.I, XA903. The
firstflight ofthe Concorde Olympus engine
was undertaken
on
9 September 1966, with
c lea r an c e f o r Ma c h 1 .6 b e in g obtained in a
preproduction Concorde i n 1 96 8. When
the first Concorde p ro to ty pe f lew i t w as
powered by s er ie s D as h
3B
powerplants
rated at 34,3701b
l53kN
each. Whenthe
preproduction Concorde began test flying,
the
p ow er p la nt f it te d wa s
the
Dash 4
e n gin e, w h ic h h a d a r a te d th r us t
output of
35,0801b 156kN). When the production
a irc r af t b e ga n to a p pe a r e a c h w as p ow e re d
by
the Olympus 593 Mk.610-14-28, each
being rated at 31,3501b
l40kN ,
plus the
availability
of
reheat which lifted
the
final
output to 38,0501b l69kN . Giventhat the
small Concorde fleet spent much of itstime
f ly in g a t s u pe r so n ic s pe e ds it
is
estimated
that the toral of such hours flown comfort
ablyexceeds the supersonicexperience of all
the
world s air forces.
BonoM: This artist s impression showsConcordein
BOAC
l ivery.a finish
it would
never
wear
sinceBA
was theoperatorwhen it finally went into service.
BBA
Colecton
In
common
with
mostaircraft. Concorde had a
generalarrangement diagramissued that displayed
its main dimensions. In thiscaseboth imperialand
metric measurements wereused.i l lustrating a
then currentdifference between Britain and
France. BBA Colecton
1 ft 10ins/3.3Zm
OJ{: ,
~
36ft Zins
11.0m
59ft8i ns /
18.Zm
0
611t6ins
18.7m
4 ft Oins/1Z.Zm
9ft
5ins/Z.87m
: : u
83ft1 ins
0 :
Z5.6m
PROBE
1It
9ins/O.5m
NOSEDATUM
46
47
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SKIN ND
BONES
48
OPPOSITE
P GE
TOP Filton was busy with theproductionrun
The more complete airframe
clearlyshows
the two section rudder filted to Concorde
J A
Todd
Colecton via
Lee Howard
BonOM
Concordes underconstruction are
pictured inthe Brabazon Hangerat Filton;
these were productionversions;in the
backgroundis theConcorde mock up
BBA Colecton
m ay c au s e w e a ke n ing a t t he a tomi c level
and possiblefailure
of t he
structure. Exten
sivetesting of this alloy showed that RR58
had high resistance to stresscreep, thermal
cycles and fatigue loading, from both nor
mal flying and thermal loading. The cost
of
d e v elo pin g th is a llo y f or u se in Concorde
e v en tu ally c o st about £ 2 m il l io n, a far
cheaperopt ion than the£200 million that
was estimated fora
titanium
structure.
The
in-depth
trials
on t h e
alloy revealed
that
it
should have a t he rm a l l if et im e of some
20,000hr. Fatigue loading tests wereessen
tia l in p r ov ing
the
structural strength and
safety
ofConcorde and
therefore majorsec
tions of it were subjected to extensive fail
safe tests. The loading applied to each sec
tio n p u sh e d each a ss em bl y t o i ts l im it s,
even as far as causing cracks and determin
in g h o w much residual strength remained.
The undercarriage also underwent rigorous
testing
that
i nc lu de d s t at i c, d ro p and
fatigue tests. The
culminat ion of
a ll th es e
sub-assembly fatiguetrials was the testing of
two complete a irf r am es f or c e rtif ic a tio n
purposes. The full-scale static loading test
wascarried
out a t t he Cent re
d EssaisAer o
nautiquede Toulouse CEAT on the third
ailframe, while the full-scale fatigue trial
was undertaken
at
RAE Farnborough on
the
sixthone. The aitframe
at
Toulouse was
a s se mb led b e tw e e n Ma y 1 9 68 and March
1969 and c o ve r ed a tw o -p a r ts ta tic te s t p ro
gramme, the f ir st c o ve r ed the nominal
take-off weight
of
385,0001b 175,000kg)
while the second stanza increased the all-up
weight to 400,000lb 182,000kg). It should
be noted
that
the a itfr a me u se d in th e se tri
a ls w as
the
third preproduction airframe,
but all the tests were applicable to a p ro
duction machine. Fuselage-pressurization
differential trials placed the cabin structure
under twice
the
n or ma l e xp ec t ed l oa d,
these being followed by c o ld s o ak tr ia ls to
simulate the m o st s e ve r e condi ti ons of
flight. Duringthese trials the aircraft would
s im ula te tak e- o ff , la nd ing , s tea d y under
p ow er c li mb o ut s
and
low s u pe r so n ic
SKIN ND BONES
speeds, all
of
which placed their own stress
loads
on
parts
of
the airframe. Possibly
one
o f t he
m o st p o ten tially d e str uc tive tr ia ls
was the limitload; thiswas the greatest pos
sible load ever experienced by an airframe
in its lif e
andConcorde
n e ed e d to p as s th is
without the
airframe showing any signs
of
deformation. Having survivedthis test,cer
tain parts
of
the aircraft were subjected to a
test deemed
the
ultimate load trial.
Under
these
condi ti ons t he
s tr es s f ac to r w as
in cr e as e d to 1 5 times the previous limit
load. This was the o n ly tr ia l w h er e d e fo r
mation and cracks were allowed, although
total failure
ofthe
airframe was
not
allowed.
Once t he bending, stretching and cold
trials had been completed, the test airframe
was subjected to tests
of
itsbehaviourunder
hot
conditions.To createthese,
the
airframe
w as b la nk e te d by heat f ro m in fr a -r e d
heaters, while the structure was put under
v ar iou s s tre ss loa ds by means
of
60-ton
hydraulicjacks. As before,
the
full range
of
a f lig ht w as s imu late d
as
closely as possible
from take-off to landing and included the
behaviour o f t he structure as the aircraft
sloweddown. During allthese tests any fail
u re s w er e r ep ai re d i n the sub-assemblies
beforebeing applied t o t he main trials spec
imen.
Once
the aitframe modifications had
beenproved,they were applied
t o t he
draw
ings destined for the production machines.
The trial period atCEAT inToulouse lasted
from August 1969 to June 1973, afterwhich
time
Concorde
was certifiedfor flight.
At
RAE Fa rn b or o ug h th ey w er e f ac ed
with creating a sequence of tests to simulate
the fatigue stresses generated by everyday
flight.
Once
t es t s pe ci m en f ou r h ad b ee n
assembled, a series of t ri al s w as b eg un t o
establish the temperature profiles that
would be experienced by Concorde during
flight. It was soon discovered
t hat t he
tem
perature range woulddip soonaftertake-off,
th is b e in g f ollow ed by a rise t o a st ea dy
plateau.
Once
Concorde dropped outof t he
intended cruise speed, the skin temperature
w ou ld d es ce nd b el ow z er o b ef or e r is in g
again. Internally, the airframe structure
would followa similar pattern,although the
t e mp er at ur e c ha ng es w er e s mo ot he r. T o
simulate this at a f as ter r a te than the actual
a irb o rn e f lee t w ou ld e x pe r ie n ce , Fa rn bo r
ough subjected the testspecimen to temper
atures outside
the
expected range.
When
each
of
th e se s imu late d f lig hts w as u nd e r
taken the cruise phase was shortened while
the climb and the landing phase weresub
je c t to in cr e as e d heating and cooling, as
appropriate.
Given
these radical extremes,
49
each simulated flight was classified
supersonic flights.
The
te st s p ec ime
housed in a specially constructed rig
RAE facility at Ball Hill, homeof the
tures Department, that totally encom
the airframe.
This
monstrouscreation
not
o nl y pu t
the
t es t a il fr am e
m e ch a nic al s tr es s, b u t w as a ls o c a pa
fullysimulati ngall the possible tempe
that
Concorde might experience.
Although Concorde
was a
tec
marvel, the Fa r nb o ro u gh te st r ig w as
great technological achievement , no
as hardware, but in developing softw
control the
whole ensemble. The r
large enough to cope with the Con
airframe, which weighed 80 t on
tonnes plus a simulated f ue l l o
4 0 t on s
41 tO nn e s) , le a vin g on
wingtips and the tip of the tai
e xp os ed . A s t h es e portions w er e s
s e c tio n it w as
thought that
th e y w e
t h in t o
besignificantlyaffected by th
fatigue. The remainder of the aircra
surrounded by heat ing ducts and su
ed by numerous h y dr a ulic ja ck s u s
load simulation. To
crea t e t he
re
temperature ranges two plant house
constructed, these fed t he ir o ut pu
the
ducting. Heating the a ir w as ma
via
heatexchangersthat
drew
their
from superheated, pressurized water
tained
at
180°C. The same matrice
u se d to p r ov ide
the
initial cooling
the
process,
although
in t hi s in
chilled water was used. To drive the
perature down belowzero liquid am
was
the
preferred medium. The f u
simulated by a
simulant
oil, which w
f er re d f or s a fe ty r e as o ns to the real
The r e as o n f or th is simulation was
the
real
Concorde the
f ue l lo ad w as
ed as a
heat
s i nk , t h er e fo r e t o l ea v
component ou t would have pro
inaccurate f at ig ue d at a . T o contro
mass
of
machinery bespoke software
e d t o b e developed for
the compute
plex. This computer s ys te m w as
responsible for managing and mon
the
test conditions, p lus r e c or d in
analysing
t he da ta
generated durin
t es t r un . These t housands of indi
inputs covered temperature, stress,
and deflection.
The British trials began
at
Farnbo
in A u gu s t 1 97 3
and covered t hehe
mechanical fatigue tests. During th
years
of
operation
the
rig and ai
simulated
approximately
17,500 f
a ltho u gh e a ch w ou ld b e o n ly s o m e 2
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: ; ; ~
SKINAND BONES
SKINAND
BONES
The
torture machinedesigned
to
simulate hours offlying
on
astatic testairframe.
As well as
theusual selection ofhydraulic jacks
to
simulate loading inflight
therig used high-pressure air formore accurate simulation.
The
rigwas also
capable ofsimulatingextremes oftemperature.
BBA
Colecton
i
;II
<>
duration but
even
s o a t ot al
of
44 000hr
were accumulated. A hiatus
of
nearly a year
followed while
the
rig
underwent
a
much
neededoverhaul a n d t h e airframe was thor-
oughly inspected. It was during this inspec
tion
that
cracks were discovered in
the
lowerbooms
of
the wingspars and therefore
a programme
of
inspections and modifica
tions was
put into
place
t o m o n i to r t h e
sit
uation continually forthose aircraftalready
in service. A lthough the cracking in the
spars g v some slight cause for concern
the
rig had
come
close to
proving
in
the
6
years
of
its operation
that
the required
designed fatigue life
of
45 000hr covering
24,000 flights was more
than
achievable.
Assafety was alwaysa major consideration
in the
SST
programme,it had be e ninte nd-
ed to run
both
testrigsto double
the
expect
ed life
ofthe servi e machines at
a factor
of
3: l This last figure ha d be e nc hos e n as the
ide al to over any possible varia tions in
Concorde s
usage. However,
the
utilization
of
the operational Concorde fleet was, in
reality, much lower
than
expected; in early
1981
the
fleet leaderhad made
only
2,200
flights.
S i nc e r u nn i ng t h e
fatigue rigs was
expensive, it was proposed
that
both be
shut down
y 1984.
The
decision was final
y approved in 1981, the accrued savings
annually being estimated at £63 million.
From 1981 until
the
end testingwas
con-
centratedon
thosesections
o f t h e
aitframe
that
were considered to h a ve b e en under
tested during
the
original regimen. Even
these tria ls
eventually ended in
1983
at
w hich point some 21,000 flight cycles had
been petformed, representing nearly 6 700
real flights
that
included significantsuper
sonic time. O n ce t h e RAE part o f t h e pro
grammeended the responsibilityfor testing
and
support for in-service Concordes
evolve
in Apr i l 1984
to
British Airways
and A ir France.
The
pressurizedfuselage, originallycircu
lar
but c ha nge d
t o a n
ov l
section for
the
production machines, consisted
of
fabricat
ed, machined alloyframes pitched
at
a dis
tance of
21.5in 54.6cm , these being held
in
position y extruded alloy stringers
and
load-bearing longerons, all of which were
c lad in
an
stressed alloy skin, much
of
it
chemically machined.
At
each
end of the
pressure cabin was a pressure bulkhead out-
side
of
which were
the
unpressuriz
and
tail-cone assemblies.
Altho
seemed to be one complete assem
fuselage was actually manufactured
distinct sections, these consisting
nose and the forward, the intermedi
c e ntre a nd the rear group. Inset in
sections was a single row
of
windo
ran
dow n e a ch
side
o f t h e
passenge
Each window assembly was mult
and compriseda load-bearingpanel
to
a
thennal
insulation panel. In tu
window was m ounted into a frame
ually machined from an aluminium
To allow for fuselage expansion an
traction,
the
window, in its frame,
rigidly fixed to the aitframe butcoul
inresponse to
the
thermal loadsplac
the
structure.
Not only
didthisdeal w
thermal loading, it a lso reduced th
bility
of
structural failure due to l
stress-overloading
o f t h e
fuselage. A
idea on a grander scale was applied
cabin floor which floated on load
and would allow
the
fuselage
to act
a
arate
entity
in periods
when
therma
eswere placed o n t h e fuselage.
VENTILATED
AIRSPACE
C
DETAIL OFVAPOU
SE L
FLOOR
]
R M
LOWER WING
FILLET
fR M
R M
SECTION
A-A
SECTION
B-B
I
F ~ 5 M e
To
~ p ~ w i t h thermal stresses
and
the l ~ I ~
pOSSibIlityof fuel vapourventing the
I
cabinfloor consistedof the
two
types ~ o ~ . J
= : ; : : . ~ : ; : ~ ~ ~ ~ : : : ~ : ~ ~ : ~ , : P b : - - -
~ ~ f t : . ; . o - ; C : ; : ~ - ~ ~
I P ~ ; : u , . : = 1 l f = = I : ~
MAIN FRAME
]
SECTION C- C
The
fuselagewas slightlyoval in
cross-section
and
mainly pressurized
although certain areas such as the
fueltrim-tankbays didnot require
thisservice.
BBAColecton
UNPRESSURISED T NKI
EQUIPMENT
B Y
CENTREAND AFTZONES
UPPERDECK ONLYPRESSURISED
~
SECTION D- D
SYSTEM ROUTING
ZONE
S EC TI ON A - A S EC TI ON B - B
I
SECTION E- E
FORWARDZONE
PRESSURISED
o
SECTION F- F
LOWERWING
SURFACE
50
51
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_ : ~
SKIN ND
BONES
SKIN ND
BONES
o
i _
SECTIO
l
SECTIO
B
C
A
MACHINEDWEB
RIB8 BETWEENSPAR POINTS69 72
RIB14 BETWEENSPAR POINTS60 63
6
A
The
Wing
RIB23 BETWEENSPAR POINTS63 66
Bolted under the fuselagewas the cantilever
wing
which
was
agee
in planform
and
based
on a slender delta
withslight
anhedral and
varied camber
on
the leading edge Struc-
turally
the
wing wasa multi sparassembly
with
many in te rspar r ib s f or structural
strength Internally the
wing
was skinned
with stretched aluminium a l loy pane l s
OPPOSITE: Mounted in itsj ig aConcordeframe is
being preparedfor assembly.Notethe useof
Englishand Frenchon the jig frame.
Bristol ero
Colecton
RIGHT The assemblies atFil tonin thisphotograph
would soon be rol led out as the first prototype.
Bristol eroColecton
BELOW:
Thestructureof theConcorde
wing
was
more complicatedthanthat needed
for
a subsonic aircraft andgavethe aircraft great
strength. BB Colecton
J b W W U ¥ O ¥ O ¥ O ¥ O ~ U ¥ f ¥ U W U ~ o ¥ U R u ~ u ~ ~ ~ ~ v ~ v V 4
SEC
C
52
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SKIN AND BONES
SKIN AND
BONES
however
the
production aircraft w
with visorswith panels greater in ar
improving the availahle area
of
vi
the
fully-up position
the
nose
an
gave
Concorde
an extremely clean
namic shape. To mainta inboth com
in this position the hydraulic jacks
both i tems simultaneously to
the
positionwhere mechanical lockseng
spread the load and hold them in p
the down position the nose and vis
heldin place through hydraulicpres
counterbalance
springs.
Nacelles, Engines and In
At
first glance the engine nacelle
l oo k as i f they were integral to
frame; they were in fact manufac
separate
assemblies.
Conta ined
each box-like structure was a pair
o
Royce
Olymrus
593engines. Each
was
built
from two sub-assembli
consisting ofthe engine
bays
and th
the air-intake structures. To the rea
engine bays was an extension
that
the
secondary variable nozzles the
mainly constructed
from steel
a
ABOVE:
This
view
ofthenose-conein the fullyraisedpositionshowsthe locationofth
probe whenthis wastaken theairframecompletelylackedall paint work AdrianFa
LEFT Ensconced inthe Filtonnose dock,this Concorde has itsvisor retracted.Notethe
differencebetween thevisor and themain flight-deckwindscreens.This was due
to
thegold film heating elementsembeddedin individual screens. Adrian Falconer
The
Nose
Unique
features
of
the
Concorde
design are
the
retractable visor
and the
drooping nose
develored to give greater visibility during
the landing and take-offphases. The droop
noseconsists
of
a single
structurehingedat
i ts lower edge
and
raised
and
lowered by
hydraulic jacks. The subcontractor for th is
assembly was Marshalls
of
Cambridge,
who
originally began work
o n t he
jigs to
construct
a
circular-shaped structure only
to
find that they had to redo the wholejob
for a mo re oval-shaped nose-cone. Pro
tecting the
main windshie ld assembly was
a
retractable
v isor whose purpo se was to
d iver t k ine t ic heat away from the inner
screens and provide a more aerodynamic
shape to
the
nose. In
the
prototype aircraft
the
visor area
of
visibility was
quite
limited
rrovided mountings
for
the
rudder-powered
flying control units PFCUs and the con
trol sUIfaces themselves. The rudderwas a
two-part lightalloy structure whose prima
ry
structural
member
was a s ingle spa r to
which was attached the strengthening and
shaping ribs all covered by alloy skinning.
manufactured
from single alloy
bi
lIets.
The
wingsparswere continuous across the fuse
lage
the
whole wing being regarded as
one
assembly that
reached
from
one engine
nacelle
to
the other. The
forward wingsec
tionswerebuilt asseparateentitiesattached
to each side
of the
fuselage.
At
the trailing
edge
of
each mainplanewere
three sera
rate
e1evonsections which were primarily
man
ufactured from steel and mounted on the
aitframe with bearings through which were
fitted close-tolerance
mounting
bolts. To
gain access to
the
parts
of the
aitframe for
maintenance purposes Concorde wasliber
ally designed with removable panels. Many
of
these were chemically-manufactured
stresseditems witha series
of
alloy
strength
eners to spread the load and ma in tain the
s ha r e o f
the panel. Externally the whole
airframe was clad in chemically-machined
skins with
cut-outs
for
the
access panels
each being reinforced with alloy landings.
Above the fuselage were the fin and rudder
sections which consisted
of
similar multi
spar assemblies
and,
in
the
case
of the
fin
a ct ed as a t or si on b ox t o gi ve g re at er
strength to
the
whole. Mounted
on
the for
ward face
of the
fin were
the
dorsal fin and
leading edge panels while
the
trailingedge
SHEAR PANEL
S E T I O ~
_ -
LEFT Incontrastto the mainpartof
thewing,theleadingedge was
conventionalin construction, except
forthe thermal expansionjoints
insertedbetween each section.
BBAColecton
DETACHABLEASSEMBLY
BELOW: Incomparison tothe rest
ofthewing structure, the f il letsat
front and rear werelightweightin
constructionsince theirfunction
was purelyaerodynamic.
BBAColecton
RIB
4 I I I I
FUEL TANK
ATIACHMENTOF SPARS30 34 38
ACCESS PANEL
PN JOINTEDSTRUTS
CHEMICALLY
MACHINED
SKIN
PANELS
TYPICALSPARB•B
FILLET./ \
BonOM
MACHINEDTYPICALSECTIONA A ~ \ CABINPRESSURE
_
~ L F ~
L \ \
~ I R S P E
LEADINGEDGE SPAR
MACHINED
LEADING
EOGe
SLIDING
JOINT
DETAIL
LEADINGEOGe SECTIONS
WING JOINT
CAPPINGSTRP
ATIACHMENT SCREWS
ff/ .J
,.
A
HIGHTENSILE
STeELBOLTS
...
/
LOAD INDICATING WASHER
ABOVE: The outerwing panels were bolted
to
the innerwing
by
themethodshownhere. Note theindicator washers
placed underthe locknut,their purposebeing
to
show
anyproblems
with
the mountings. BBAColecton
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SKIN AND
BONES SKIN AND
BONES
SPILLDOOR
RAMPS
SECONDARY
N O Z ~
~ N E Y S
NGINE
AIRINTAKES
/
N
L
REDUCE
SIGNAL
INTAKE
CONTROL
UNIT
BELOW
The
position ofthe intakerampwas dependenton the
speed ofthe aircraft
as
setagainstany external data inputs
althoughthere wasa l imit systemto protecttheenginefrom
incorrect systemcommands. BBA
Colecton
RIGHr. The rearend-on
view
ofsomeof thebusiness partof
Concorde.Theinboard elevon hasits access cover missing
and theengine-bay doors are open for inspection.
Adrian
Falconer
ABOVE The engine nacelleswere divided intolones
as
shown
here. Thisnot onlyhelpedduring maintenance butassisted in
the containment and suppression offire. BBAColecton
SECONDARY NOZZLE
ACELLEREAR FRAME
NACELLEFRAMEATSPAR 72
REARNACELLE OOORS
o
ENGINEMOUNTINGS
THRUSTREVERSECASCADES
UPPERAND LOWER
@ THRUSTREVERSEBUCKETMOUNTING BRACKETS
® CENTRALWING
ATIACHMENT
SPIGOT
flexible jointsand deformable seals located
between the nacelleand
the
underwingskin
to maintainairflow integrity.
The version o f t he Olympus turbojet
installed on C oncorde was a twin sp oo l
enginewhere
the
low and
the
high pressure
compressorsare driven by separate turbines.
ontrolling the engine to give its best per-
formance was the responsibilityof threesep-
arate processes. The first concerned
the
in take ramps
which
were automatically
adjusted to provide the greatest airmass to
the compressor face. In the subsonic part of
the flightenvelope
the
rampsare in
the
fully
open
position
although
as speed increases
the ramps progressively close. The throttle
lever was the second enginecontrol which
exerted greatinfluence
on the
management
ofthe
powerplant. Itstaskwas togovern
the
rate of fuel flow into the combusters. This
inturn limited d e speed also known as N
of
the high pressure turbine driving the
high pressure compressor. The
other
para-
meter sometimes known
as
N governed
the
rotation speed
of
d e low pressure tur-
bineand hence
the
lowpressure compressor
by varying
the
primary convergent diver-
gent nozzle. This in turn matched theN
figure and the flight conditions hence N1
was the primary sensed parameter
that
FORWARO
NACELLEDOORS
UPPERHEAT
SHIElO
this including the in tegral engine bay
dividing wall. At the rear
of
the nacelle
much of
the
structure
was
of
stccl
sheet
for
greater strength.
The
mounting of thiscom-
bined intake nacelle and exhaustassembly
was achieved by using mountingpins with
LONGERON
CENTRE
BAYWALL
TERTIARY AIROOORS·TOP ANaBOTIOM SURFACES
WINGSPAR
FRAME 6
The
engine nacelles were built
as separate assembliesfrom
the rest oftheaircraft
and
housed a pairof Olympus
engineseach.Mounting was
viaflexible locatingpoints
which allowedfor thermal
expansion. BBAColecton
BELOW: The underneath ofthe Olympus
engine appearscomplicated buta careful
examinationwould reveal thelocation ofthe
hydraulic pump theelectrical generator engine
lubrication and theotherservicesneeded
to
keepa
modernjet engine working efficiently. AdrianFalconer
minium. In contrast the intake assemblies
were mainly
of
aluminium construction
although the
leading edgcs were
of
stain-
lesssteel to protcct them from erosion and
heat damage. The n ac e lle b ox i t se lf was
mainly
of
steel honeycomb construction
56
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-
SKIN N
BONES
SKIN N
BONES
w ould i ndi cate a
potential
bearing
Early in
the development
program
of
the
main identifiedproblemswa
the
driveshafts breaking. As
the
O
was
a high-speedengineoperatingin
speed
environment
sucha failure w
disastrous
as
the
turbine
and
com
sections
would
run
o ut o f
cont
always the
solution
wasfairlysimp
tial
investigationson
a
test bench
revealed that there
wasa tempera
ference between
the
hot
top
of the
and
the
cooler, lower section.
This
ance
in
heat
distribution was the
causc of driveshaft breakage
whi
cured by includinga slow rotation
ity in
the
engine relightsequence.
The
m at e ri al s u se d i n
the
Co
engineswouldalsorequire expensiv
opment work as new
or
modified
needed
to
bet ri edt o
hand le the he
erated.
Unlike
the
st andard ci vi l
whose
intake
temperature
hovers
also subjected
to
similar trials.
Once
these
had been completed an
actual
intake and
engine
were tested undersimulated ground
conditions. To
give
the
sameseries of tests
under
airborne
conditions the
test facility
at theNationalGas
TurbineEstablishment
at
Pyestock was used.
Having
successfully
completedthis testseriesan engineinstalled
in a p a rt n ac e ll e w as t es te d
under
Vulcan
B 1 XA903.
Havingproved
tha t the
Olympus
engine
was
capable of
generating
the power
required,
the whole
assembly was
then
redesigned
to
allowfor ground
maintenance
s in cc i n i ts o ri gi na l f or m
thc powcrplant
needed
to
be removed
to change
a defec
tive
component.
Also incorporated
into
the
Olympus engine
were modifications
that
allowed for
internal
inspections while
it was still installed in
the
aircraft. Anoth-
er
development
was
the application
of
the
magnetic
plugsystem, designed
to collect
minute
particles
of
ferrous metals
which
meant that development
costs were driven
up since
no
compromise
on
safetycould be
al low ed. Furthermore, shoul d
the
safety
m argin dropt o below
the
5 p er
cent
level,
Concorde
would cease
to
bea safe t ransat
lantic
aircraft.
During
the
development
process
both the prototype and the
pre
production machines were subject
to
many
aerodynam
ic,
t ol er a nc e a nd c le ar a nc e
checkswhich would
eventually
leadto
the
Olympus
593 beingseen as
the
m ost t her
modynamicallyefficientengine everdevel
oped i n i ts class.
TogetConcorde tothisstagerequired
the
development of
numerous t est rigs, m any
associated with engine/intake interaction,
which
was of
primary importance. Initially,
wind tunnel
testing at
various speedswas
used
to
determine
the
airpressure
and
veloc
ity flow
patterns. Having determined
the
theoretical layout
of
the
engine/intake
interface in
the
small scale,
the next
stage
was
todevelopa full-scale mock-up
that was
Whena Concorde underwenta majoroverhaul
it
was thoroughlystr ipped inthis purpose-builtaccess dock.
Adrian Falconer
The
Concorde
engine-control system
was designed to operate in a wide variety
of
temperatures, therefore
the
control sUlfaces
were driven by hydraulics while
the
actual
function
ofthe
system
was
computer-driven.
The
bonus with thiskind
of
control
was
that
any
changes required
t o t h e
parameters
of
the flight-control system could be quickly
engineered
i n softw are
and
flight-tested
almost
i m mcdiat el y. In fact ,
thc normal
sequence
w oul d be
to define the
require
ments
rework
the
software
overnight
and
refly the
changes
next day. A si mi l ar
analogue
syst em w as used
to control the
engines,
although at
least
onesequence of
testflights was
undertaken
using
an
exper
imental digital-control system;
however
this was
not accepted
for general use
even
though there
w ere few report ed probl ems
w i th i t. From
the
pilot s
point of
view,
the
engine control
s ys te m wa s h ig hl y a u to
mated
and
t herefore he useda
mode
selec
tor
to
define
engine
behaviour,
and to
give
a degree of flexibility
the engineshad
sep
arate switches.
Selectable
modes included:
take-off,climb,
transonic
acceleration
and
cruise.
This
degree
of
automation meant
that
theoretically,
the
pilotcould place
the
throttle
fully forward, press
the
start
button
and
let
the powerplant
move
through the
completesequenceto ground idle revs,
then
accelerate
to
take-off
poweLIn
reality,mov
ingConcorde requiredan
output
justabove
idle totaxi theaircraft to
the
runway. At this
point
a
retardation to
idle power was need
edt o compl yw i t hnoi se
abatement
regula
tions.
Since
t hese need
to
be followed rig
orously,
the
use
of the engine
modes was
negated; however,
once
airborne the inter
l i nks t o
the
sophisticated
autopilot came
into play.
The
settings
of the
Mach
and
alti
tudelocks
meant that thethrottle
respond
ed
to commands
from
the
autopilot,
as
did
the intake
ramps.
Since
thesesystems were
fully
automated the normal
role for the
flight
engineer
was
that
of
monitoring;
however,should a fault
occur the engineer
had
the
facility
to
assume manual
control.
F ro m t he p oi nt
of
view
of
fli ght and
engine management
Concorde
was a well
rounded product.It was inregard to
the
pay
load where there
was
always some concern
since the aircraft s ability
as
a transatlantic
transport
was
marginal
at
best. To illustrate
thispoint, 1 OOOlb 455kg)
of
payload con
sumed 1per
cent
of
the fuel
load; this
meant
that
shaving
the
structure down
to
its bare
minimum wouldgiveonlya potentialdiver
sion
fuel
load
of
betw een 5 and 10percent .
This
concern t ocreat ea fuel safet y m argi n
ARTIFICIAL
FEEL
engine at
the
time
of
selection.
These
noz
zles
had different operating
modes,
they
were slightly
convergent at
take-off, while
insupersoniccruise mode theyaredescribed
asconvergent-diver gent togive
the
bestrate
of
expansion efficiency, and the final mode
saw
the
thrust reverser buckets fully closed
to provide thrustreversal
on
landing.
YELLOW SYSTEM
4000 PSI
that
t he i nt ak e r am p wa s
at
the
t position toallow
the
correct mass
of
air
enterthe
engine.
Havingmatched
the
enginesand intakes,
systems
came in to
play
when thrust
or
reheat
was selected,since
convergent divergent
nozzle
h ad t o
the
operating parameters
of
the
illustrates Concorde s hydraulic system showing itemsoperated
eachcolour theirpointsof interactionandthe location ofthe ramairturbine RAT .
for
usein an emergency. BBA Colecton
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SKIN AND BONES
SKIN ANDBONES
=
theprocessof being fittedout this engineer s panel showsits complicatedlayout
instrumentsand switchesgrouped accordingto role. Bristol
Aero
Colecton
thatofConeor
de
is
nearly threetimes
andeven t he
so-called
cooling
air
the
turbine
is
proportionallyhotter. Hav
ngdeveloped the required metallurgyit was
specialist lubricantmanufactur
apply their skills;
not
onlydid the oils
greases
need
to
consistently
perform
d er n or ma l o pe ra ti ng temperatures
a lso h ad t o r et ai n t he ir capabilities
viscosityfor t henex t time.
Nacelle d e sig n w as a lso u n us u al in
that
fou r w e re d iffe re nt in la yo u t.
This
was
t o t he
fact that
the
in tak e s w e re to e d
slightly andt ha t in fro n t ofeach intake
the
w ing p rofile w as d iffe re n t.
This
in
turn meant
that
the airflow en try pa th
i n to each i nt ake
was different
and there-
f or e a central intake control s y ste m w as
developed that allowed each intake ramp
to respond to
the
requirements
o f e ac h
engine th u s e n s urin g a smooth flow of bal
anced a irto each powerplant. At the
other
e nd o f t he e ng in e was
the
convergent-
divergent nozzle.
This
toobrought its
own
problems; however careful design would
ensure that
the
intake
engine and
nozzle
would operate efficiently throughout the
whole flight envelope.
60
Doors
To gain access to
Concorde
there weresix
doors
three
p e r s ide
which
allowed
the
crew passengers
and
a irlin e s e rv ice s
to
e nt e r. T wo w er e d es i gn a te d a s p as se ng er
doors and t he other four as service doors.
Other a c ce s s d o ors in
the
lower fuselage
gave
entry
to
the
upper
andt he
lowerbag
gage
and
freight hold
and
allowed ground
maintenance personnel to gain access to
the aircraft s services. The passenger doors
were
of
the p lug ty pe and located on
the
left-hand side
of t he
fuselage
a t t he
front
and themid point
of
thecabinand opened
o ut wa rd s. A s w ou ld be expected both
d o ors c o u ld b e opened from the inside and
the outside although th e y w e re is ola te d
from
inadvertent opening
when airborne.
The four designated
cabin
a cc e ss d o ors
were
operated and control led
i n a s i mi l ar
mannerand a lls ix c o u ld b e u s e d fo r e m er
gencyegressshould
the
need arise.
Flight Deck and Flight Control
Between the fron t p re s su re b u lk h ea d a n d
the
forward intermediate bulkhead was
the
flig ht d e c k w ith accommodation for th ree
c rew a n d
an
observer
al though the
proto
t yp e h ad p ro vi si on f or a n av ig at or . The
three re gu lar c rew for a Concorde were the
captain co-pilot and flight engineer all
p rov ide d w ith in d iv id u al o x yg e n a n d c o m
munications equipment.The crew
and
pas
sengers aboard Concorde u se d o x yg e n for
emergency breathing al though the crew
couldselect theirs when required while in
the passenger cabin it was either controlled
by a detected
change
in
cabin
pressure orby
the
crew s selecting it for deployment. Fac
ing the twopilotswere the main instrument
p a ne ls w h ich contained the usual instru
ments and s w itc he s a n d a c e ntra l sh a re d
p a ne l h e ld
the
engine-monitoring instru
ments. The roof panel located above
the
g la re s h ie ld cont a ined t he autopilot
VOR/ILS frequencyselectorand
the
flight
director autothrottle m o d e s ele cto r. A lso
on thispanel were controlsand switches for
the
external lighting navigation and land
ing de-icing de-misting PFCU inverters
autostabilizers auto trim artificial feel and
e ng i ne s hu t d ow n. B ec au se r oo m i n
the
cockpit was l imited th is o v e rh e a d p a ne l
had
to
be installed in stepped groups with
a final flat panel t o t he rear. Accessible to
allcrew members this panel had the throt-
tle system switches high-pressure control
Photographedbeforeinstal lation isthis centre
console from aproduction Concorde. Prominent
arethethrottle levers wit thegangedreheat
selector
swit
below. Bristol
Aero
Colecton
valves ignition switches flying control
hydraulicsystemchange-overswitchesand
anti-icingcontrols. On
each
sideoutboard
of t he
pilots were consoles
on
w h ich w ere
mounted the controls for the nose-wheel
steering weather radar flight-deck and
c o n tro l-p a n el ligh tin g . Lo ca ted b e tw e en
the p ilo ts s e ats w as a c o ns o le
that
was
home
to
the
throttle levers thrust reversers
and
the
ganged reheat/thrust
augmentation
switches together with the controlsfor the
v is or a n d d roo p n o se a n d th e ir o w n s ta nd
by selectors the normaland the emergency
b rak e le ve r p lu s
the
emergency undercar
riage lowering lever; finally communica
tions navigation a nd I NS programming
panels werealso located there.
The flight engineer w as s e a te d behind
the
first officer/co-pilot and had h is own
select ion of
p a ne ls. Laid
o ut o n
these
which were sectioned i n b lo ck f or m to
del ineate their different functions were
the aircraft systems switches and dials.
The duties
of t he
flight engineer included
management of the
fuel flow
and
balance
system plus the hydraulic system a nd t he
on board electricalsystem which required
monitoring of its output and routing.
When
i t c am e to designing the flight
control system
the
te am w ou ld d raw u p on
the
e x pe rien c e g a in e d fro m
the
Vulcan
b o mb e r w h ere e lev o ns w ere u se d for p itc h
a n d roll c o ntrol. The rudder sections were
conventional in natureand controlled yaw
ingand trimming. All the flight-control sur
faces weredriven by separate PFCUs each
b e in g c o ntro lle d
by
an electrohydraulic
servo-valve. Due t o t he location o f t he
enginenacelle boxes the elevons were split
into twogroups perwing. The twooutboard
groups consisted
of
elevons 1 2 Sand 6
w hi c h w or ke d i n u ni so n as did
the
two
remaining control surfaces 3 and 4 A ll s ix
c on tr ol s ur fa ce s h ad m ec ha ni ca l s to ps
which ensured
that
theycould
not
bedriven
p a st th e ir s e td e fle c tio n ra n g e lim itw ith o ut
causing majordamageto
the
airframe. Also
protecting the aircraft from flight-control
reversal during high-speed flight the outer
e le vo ns w er e l oc ke d i n to the n eu tr al o r
zero deflection position which eliminated
th is p o te n tia lly d isa s tro us p rob lem . The
trimming of Concorde s elevons
was
also
borrowedfrom the Vulcan. All the wingsur
fac es c o uld b e trimm e d to b a la n ce the air
craft; onlypitch controlwas madeavailable
in manual auto-trim and auto-pilot modes
since the delta-wingshapehas a tendencyto
ris e if
not
k e pt u n de r p o sitiv e c o ntrol. To
assist the p ilo ts in fly in g Co n co rd e it w as
f it te d w it h an auto-stabilization
whose primarypurpose was to m a in
natural stability ofthe aircraft in the
a ny t ur b ul en ce a nd t o m ai n ta i n
control should
the
a irc raft te nd to
fro m its s e t flig ht p a th a fte r e n gin e
Feeding the auto-stabilization syste
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SKIN N BONES
SKIN N BONES
. - -_
OUTER ELEVON
LOWER RUDDER
The Concorde flight control system
familiar to anyoneassociated
with
d
aircraft since it centredaroundt
elevons.not individualai leronsand e
Bristol
Aero
vert ical speed and aircraft i nci den
warned ifanywereoperatingoutside
erence poi nts. C oncorde
was
na
through three independent inertial
tion
systems lNSs)
that
provided
tion, heading and altitudeinformati
standard practice
was f or
two
of
t
platforms to control
the
aircraft w
third acted
as
overall m oni t or and
s wi tc h i n i f
o ne o f t h e
primary pl
started to malfunction.Linkedinto
platforms were
t he VOR
a nd t h
receiving their inputs via duplicate
signals, w hich i ndi cat ed t hei r di st
the
nearest DMEbeaconand theclo
localizerand glide-slope indicators.
indicatordisplays weredriven
by
com
from t hree di st i nct sources: t he
VO
ILS and t he INS.
Toensure
the
safety
of
Concorde
altitudes was the purpose
of
a p ai r
altimeters, set to operate between z
2,500ft 760m) and capable
of
cross
ing each
other
for errors.
One
of
th
s ys te ms t o be f itt ed t o C on co rd e
ground-proximity warning system,
of
providi ng audi ble and visual w
should
the
ai rcraft descend bel ow
determi ned, safe height
othe r th
approach and l anding. C oncorde
w
equippedwith a nose-mounted, all-
radarwith a limited ground-mapping
POWERED FLIGHT
ONTROL UNITS
MIXING UNIT
became engaged for safetyand back-up rea
sonsduringlanding. If
at
any time
the
pilots
w ere required t o disengage
the
autopilot,
there were disconnect buttons mounted
on
each
flight-control yoke. Further functions
available via
the
auto flight-control system
includeda full range
of
status lights
to
indi
cat et o
the
pilots the state
of
the autopilot
and
the autothrot t le
duri ng crui se m ode.
Extramonitoringfunctionscame to
the
fore
w he n a ut om at ic a pp ro ac h a nd l an di ng
m odes w ere selected.
Waming
functions
w er e a ls o a va il ab le s ho ul d t he a lt it ud e
dialled into
theAFCS
drift too far from
the
selected settings.
The
AFCS
also provided
monitoring functions
of
all
t he o t her
sys-
t ems i nput ti ng data t o t his system; shoul d
t he re b e a ny c ha ng e i n
the
status
of
these
functions, further warning lights were illu
m in at ed , t he se b ei ng s u pp le me nt ed
by
attention-getting warninghorns.
Concorde s navigationsystem was depen
dent
upon
both
i nternal and external data
inputs,
one
being generated intemally
by
the
aircraft while others came from nearby
ground stations. To master
and
process this
d at a, a p ai r
of
air data computers,
one
per
side
of the
d ro op n os e s ec ti on , w er e
e mp lo ye d. E ac h c o mp u te r h ad a b ui lt -i n
servo
monitor
system
that
checked each
channel s parametersfor altitude, airspeed,
M ac h n um be r, o ut si de a ir t em pe ra tu re ,
ONTROL OLUMN
PIT H
I
Y W
ROLL
The control of Concorde
was
handled
by
t he au to
flight-control system,
which
moni to red t he behaviour of
the
aircraft
and
also supplied
the
autopilot and
auto
land functions,
the
latter
being rated
as
Cat.
III capable.
Interl inked to
t hese t wo
syst ems w ere
the autothrot tle,
warning
and
landing system
indicator
displays. In
common
w i th m ost
autothrottle
systems,
this
uni t control led the
behaviour
o f t h e
enginesthroughout the
wholeflight
enve
lope
when
i t w as acti vat ed.
An
available
secondary
function
ensured
that the
engines
w ere protected from over-speed
ing
when
the autopi lot
wa s e ng ag ed i n
m axi m al crui se m ode. Further
protection
for
the throt tle-engine combinat ion
was
provided by
disconnect
sw it ches fi tt ed t o
throttle
l evers 1
and
4
there
being a fi nal
override,
the
manual disconnect
clutches.
When
Concorde
was
flying in autopilot
mode its
input
was via twosignalchannels
that
integratedb oth
the
autopilotand flight
directorsystem feeds. Ina similar
manner
to
most autopilot systems,
that
fitted to
Con
corde operated i n
the
rol l, pi tch and yaw
axes.
When
engaged,
the
autopilotoperated
asequence
of
jackswhich, in turn, impinged
on
mechanical linkages
that
overrode t he
pilots control. In cruise mode, both flight
directors
w ere engaged,
although
only
one autopilot
channel wasengaged,
both
LEtT Seenin c lose up isoneof theelevon
PFCUs
Although it looks complicated it isessential ly a
hydraulic. solenoid controlled jack.
Adrian Falconer
ABOVE This view ofthe Concordefin showsthe
location ofthe rudder PFCU andthe complicated
jobfor finisherswhen theypainted thisarea.
Adrian Falconer
stabilization/air
data
computer.
The
first
visible
indication
gi ven t o
the
pilots that
Concorde might
be
approaching the
stall
was
act ivat ion of the
stick
shaker
system.
If
the
aircraft
cont inued to
rai se i ts nose,
the
arti fici al feel syst em j acks physi cal ly
shook the cont rol
r un s, w hi ch , i n t ur n ,
moved
t he cont rol
yokes.
Should
these
positive inputs still fail
to
alert
the
pilots,
a s ec on d a nt i- st al l s ys te m k ic ke d i n.
Known as
the
super stabilization system,
this
came into
its
own
should
the
angle
of
attack
e xc e ed 1 3. 5 d eg re es , i ts p hy si ca l
manifestation
b e in g t o
input
a posi t ive
down defl ect ion t o t he
e le vo ns . A f in al
stall
warningcomplete
with
warning
lights
and
klaxons
activated
when the
angle
of
attack
exceeded degrees.
d id s pe ed . A s t hi s h ap pe n s,
the
range
of
movement
availableto
the
pilotswas limit
ed
and
thus
the
possibility
of
airframeover
stress was greatly reduced.
Aiding the
flight-control systems was
the
stall
warning
system,
which
received
data
from
t he p it ch channel of t he au to-
much
of
its operating data
was
t heai r data
computer w hich i nterpreted signals from
motion
sensors detecting changes in direc
t i on and
movement
in
the
pi tch, yaw and
roll planes. Artificial feel was provided on
all t hree axes, t heuni t sbei ngbased around
a spri ng
the
tension
of
which increased
as
62
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SKIN
ND
BONES
SKIN ND BONES
BELOW: This diagram clearly ex
theoperation ofthe fuelsystem
both aircrafttr im andpropulsio
BBA
Colecton
NOMINALTOTAL FUEL95,430 kg
SPECIFICGRAVITY =0.8
100520kg
MAINTRANSFER T NKS
D TRIMTRANSFER T NKS
D
ENGINEFEED
T NKS
ABOVE:
To gain access to the pyramid
componentsthat surroundthe Olympus
engines,thenacellesare provided
with
aplethoraof access panelssuch
as
this
one which has beenremoved to reveal
partof thefuel feedsystem.
Adran
Falconer
)
o n t h e main undercarriage legs
that
ensured
a ut om a ti c d ep l oy m en t o n t ou ch do wn .
I
nadvertentoperationof the
reversers was
prevented
by a
protection control unit;
however, there was the facilityfor the thrust
reversersfitted
t o t h e o u t bo a rd
engines to
be
operated
in flight,
although they
would
on Iy engage w henthe powerplants wereset
in
the
reverse
thrust
idlespeed band.
In
c o nt r as t t o t h e
fuel system employed
by
other
airliners,
that
on
Concor<.le was
u n iq u e in its a p plica tion .
Not
only lid it
supply
the
four engines, its
other
task, just
as
important, was
t ha t o f
balancing
the
air
frame throughout the
full
envelope
of
flight.
The
fuel system in Concorde consiste<.l
of
thirteen
tanks
which
could
contain
a maxi
mum
usable load
of
26,330gal 119,790Itr).
The
tankswerein three distinct groups: one
dealt with engine fuel feed,
another
was
optimized for
the
m a in f ue l tr an s fe r f un c
tion, and the last was concerned with the
fuel trimming in
the
aircraft. Supplying fuel
directto
the
engines was
the
role
ofthe
inte
gral fuel pumps, handled b y a f ue l f lo w con
troller.
The
fuel in
the
trimmingsystem was
used to
maintain the centre of
gravity c.g.)
throughout the
aircraft s full speed range.
To
ensure
that
i ts d ef in ed l im it s w er e not
excee<.led,
the
cockpit c.g. indicatorscould
b e s e t by
the
c r ew to d e fin e
the
trim limits.
Although
each engine in a powerplant
group
had
its
o w n d e di c at e d c o ll e ct o r
tank, there was
the
facilityto cross-feed fuel
t o a n d
from
a n e n gi n e o r group ofengines
should it prove necessary. The filling of
the
collector tanks
was
accomplished
using
tanks
5, 6, 7
and
8
and
a
sequencer that
ensured that the c .g. w as
not
altere<.l too
radically. As its
name
suggests,
the
trim
transfer
system w as u se d
to
move fuel
between tanks w ithin a group t o t h e opti
mum requiredfor take-off, landing, subson
ic
and
supersonic flight.
The main controls
for
the
fuel
system
were
located
o n t he
I ~ n g i n e e r s control panel, the system being
advanced enough
so that an
automatic
transfer
sequence
couldbe
set
up.
The con
trols for
the
trimsystem for
both
pilots were
limited to an overridewhich allowed either
to
carry
o u t a n e m er g en c y
f ue l f o rw a rd
transfer should
the need arise. Although all
the ta nk s in th is g r ou p w er e e q uip pe d w ith
p u mp s to tr an sf e r f ue l to
the
correct loca
tion,
the
rearmost
tank
was fitted with four
pumps for the expresspurpose of emergency
forward transfer. All the tanks installe<.l on
oncorde
w er e f itted w ith a
venting
system
in o r de r to les s en the explosive fumes that
remained after the f ue l w as u se d, w hi le a
lEFT TheOlympusengine installation. with
i tsmanypipesand cables.seemed
complicated. althoughthe diagram
shows i twas entirelylogical and
gave accessto engineersundertaking
repairsor changingthe magneticplugs
used as partof theenginemonitoring and
wear-detection system. Bristol
Aero Colecton
ABOVE:
Groundrunning ofthe engines was
undertakenusingthis speciallyconstructed
testhouse atFil ton. fi tted with noise
suppressors and pollution-prevention
equipment.
Adrian Falconer
engine
cross-feed
v lves could
be
opened,
which allowed
one
engine
to
start
the
remaining
three. In
the
unlikely
e v e nt o f
a n e n gi n e
surge
or
flame-out,
Concorde
h a d a n a u to restart system, backed u p b y a
m a nu a l r e li g ht system.
C on tr ol o f t he
variable
secondary
nozzle was
the
role
of
the nozzle angle scheduling unit
NASU).
At speeds above Mach l.1 these nozzles
were
fu
II y open; however,
shou Id the
speed
drop
belowthis
point, the NASU
starts
to
reduce the size
of
opening, in accordance
with signal inputs generated by
theengine
scheduling
unit.
To
assist
Concorde
in
br a king a f ter la nding, eachengine was fit
ted with thrust reverser buckets
that
could
be linked to compression switches
mounted
9 (' 4::
SLIDINGJOINT
.
LOCATION
O 1
ENGINE Y
SECONDARYHEAT
EXCHANGER
T o g e t Concorde
clear
ofthe
ground
and
p us h i t through the Mach 2 b ar r ie r , the
reheat thrustaugmenters fixed to
the
rear
of
each engine
were used.
Once Concorde
was
safelyairborne, the reheat units were dese
le cte d in the mandatory noise
abatement
zone.
Once over the
sea,
the reheat
gang
s w itc h w as s e le c te d a ga in.
This increased
theenginethrust by burningextra fuel,
the
flow of which was
monitored
by
an
e1ec
n onic control
unit.
When reheat/thrust
augmentation was not e n ga g ed , f ue l f low
was controlled by
the
full authority digital
engine control
unit.
To s t ar t t h e e n gi n es o n t h e ground, an
external, low-pressure start trolley could
b e u s e d f o r
eachengine
individually
o r t h e
FWDENGINE
MOUNTINGS
MAIN HYDRAULICPIPES S
HYDRAULICPRESSURE
IPESTO INTAKES
FORWARD
displayingits results
on
screens in
the
cock
pit. Communicationssystemsfittedto Con
cordeincludeda multi-channel VHF radio,
matched
by an HF system. SELCAL, a n a ir
traffic control
transponder
p lu s a c oc kp it
voice recorder, were also integrated. Con
corde had its own
internal communica
tions
system
consisting of
a
cabin inter
phone/PA system linking the flight deck,
p;:Issenger cabin, galley, ground services
and
passenger servi es together.
More on
the
Engines
E a c h R olls- R oyce Olympus 593
engine
c a me c o m pl e t e w i th
a
r eh ea t o r t hr us t
a ug m en t er u n it a t t h e
rear.
The power
plants were housed i n p ai rs i n box-like
nacelles, eachengine being separated from
its
neighbour
by a
central
firewall which
was stressed to
absorb the
forces
generated
by a dis inte gr atinge ngine . T o
the
front
of
the
nacelle assemblies were
the
variable
geometry
intakes,
which had
hy<.lraulically
< lriven
r am ps t o a ss is t i n controlling the
amountof
air presented to
the
compressor
f ac es , w h ile a n y e x ce s s w as
vented
by air
spill
< loors
To
the
rear
o f t h e
nacelles were
the
v a ria ble a r ea n oz zle structures over
which were
mounted
clam-shell shieldsfor
t he t hr us t
reversers.
A i di n g t h e
perfor
manceand the behaviour
of
the intakes at
high
Mach
numbers were perforations in
the
lower surfaces
o f t he inta ke s w hic h
alsobled any excess
of
air away a nd c r e at
ed a s ta ble boundar y layer.
6
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SKIN
N
BONES
SKIN
N
BONES
Complete with atug more suitedto
towing
Boeing 7 7s this Concorde
awaits
i tsnextseriesof
functionals. Notethe accessstepsfor ground engineeringstall. Adran Falconer
With an
external
power
cartplugged into providegroundpower thisConcorde isprepared fora post-
maintenanceflight test. Adran Falconer
f ail in f lig h t
and
should there b e a
failure
o n t he
ground,
although
automatic system to engage the
had to be
running at
5 8 p er
cen
The hydraulicsystem
on Concor
ated
at
p re ss ur es b et we en 4 ,0
supplying
the
aircraft s essential services
u nt i l a s af e landing c ou ld b e m ad e. This
part
of the
p o we r s u pp ly s y s tem k ic ke d in
automatically
should
oneof themain
elec
tr ic a l b u sb a rs f ail; a s im ila r r e sp o ns e a lso
happened
should
either
No.1 or 2
engine
supply. The 28V D C o n t he aircraft was
supplied byfour transformer rectifier units
and
b a ck e d u p y a p ai r
of 25A/hr
bat
t er ie s. A f ur t he r p ow er s up pl y b ac k- u p
w as s u pp lie d y an hydraulically-driven
emergency generator
that was
capable of
Since
many
o f t he
systems aboard
Con
corde were electrically
driven
it is
not
sur
prising
that
i t was w el l e qu ip pe d w it h
p ow er g en em t or s, w it h
one
per engine
rated
a t 6 0kVA each.
F or u se
on the
ground, the aircraft had external power
sockets under access panels, which allowed
for
the
plugging in
of an ex te rna l
power
Electrics
and
Hydraulics
Concorde.
These
w er e a im ed
at
cooling
the
aircraft s
equipment
racks
and
initially
took their a ir fl ow v ia t wo extractor fans
from the passenger cabin. The expelling
of
the
air required
the
use
ofthree
fans which
covered the forward electron i c r ac ks ,
instrument panels, weather radar, TRU
and INS
crates.
The
residualair finally left
the aircraft through the forward discharge
valve.
Additional
f an s, tw o p r im a ry and
one
s tan d by , w e re u se d to
extract
air from
the
rear equipment racks, which, in turn,
vented the
air to
the
aft discharge-valve
region. A
non-return
valve allowed for
the
extraction
of
the a ir f ro m the underfloor
area
i nt o t he e xt ra ct or
ducting, which
m o ve d i t
t o t he
forward discharge valv ts.
T o b a c k u p the primarysystem there w as a
forward emergency relief valve to ensure
the extractionof air underabnormal flight
conditions.
Surplus
cabin
a ir w a s a ls o u s ed
to c oo l a mi
ventilate the
main landing
g e ar b ay s a nd t he flying control chassis;
the
f or me r u se d a i r b le d f ro m
the
cabin
u n de r f lo o r a r ea , w h ile
the
flight-control
c h as s is h y dr a ulic s y ste m h a d its own ven
tilation valve, controlled y a barometric
pressureswitch.
The
hydraulic baylocated
t o t he rear o f t he a irc r af t w as n o rm a lly
ventilated w i th a ir drawn from
the
cabin,
th is b e ing a s sis te d y a fan
drawing
air
f r om o u tsid e the aircraft when
the
cabin
d if fe r en tial p r es s ur e w as low , s u ch s dur
ing
the landing
phase.
When Concorde w as p a rk e d on t he
ground i tc o u ld b e
either
heated
or
cooled,
as needed, y
the
use
ofan externalcondi
tioning unit which plugged in to the main
distribution manifold,
the connection
for
which
w as in
the
lower rearfuselage.
This
input supplied conditioned air d irec t to
b ot h t he
passenger
c ab in a nd t he
flight
deck while the equipment bays, home to
much
of
the avionics, used an indirectsup
ply drawn
through
y
electric
fans.
Further
cooling w as p r ov i de d b y u si ng e xp el l ed
cabin air to cool
the
main undercarriage
bays
and the
hydraulic-system bay.
o nc e t he
main u n de r ca r r ia g e leg s w e re
lowered
s ince the
two
jet
p um ps i n
the
main-gear bays could b e u se d t o s up pl e
mentthe
ram airflow, while
at
higher alti
tudes
and
speeds
the
fuel/air
heat exchang
ers undertookthe same role.
Upstream from each primary
heat
exchanger
air
regulation
wascarried
out
y
u si ng a r am a ir v al ve which modified the
inlet flow upstream
o f t he
c o ld- a ir u n it.
This maintained an ambient temperature
of
100°C when the inlet temperature was
b e lo w 2 5°. The fuel/air
heat
exchangers
provided
further
air
cooling
in supersonic
flight. Should there be overheating in the
primary or secondary
heat
exchangers,
the
downstream duct c lo se st t o t he h ea t
exchanger or in
the duct
downstream
of
the
cold-air
unit, the conditioning
valves
closed and la tched shut . Shou ld there be
over-pressurization in
the
system
down
s t reamof the
b lee d v a lv e ,a s im ila r
action
was made by the bleed valve. The condi
tioning v a lv e w ou ld c lo s e s h o u ld there be
an indicat ion of
high differential pressure
b etwe en t he c ab in a nd t he c o ld- a ir u n it.
Cabin
pressure control was managed by
using
the
discharge valves
and theground
pressure reiief valve which regulated the
outflow
of conditioned
a ir f ro m
the
pres
surized zones.
On-board control
was gov
erned
y
identical systems known
s
SY SI
and S YS 2; t he s e i n
turn
controlled two
discharge valves positioned fore
and
aft
on
each system. Both systems were automatic
in operation and governed y
the cabin
altitude
selector,
throttle
settings
and
weight switches.
There
w as a d eg re e
of
limitedmanual
control
for
each
pressuriza
tion system which allowed the flight engi
n ee r t o
shut
any
o f t he
discharge valves
manually
if required. The settings for
the
cabin differential pressureranged between
10.7 and l1.2psi 0.75-0.78kg/sq cm ,
the
lower
limit
w as g a ine d f ro m
the
amplifier
of the selectedsystem while the upperwas
the
value set y the pressure limiter
on
each
discharge valve.
Cabin altitude
was
set to
11,000ft
3,400m
by
the cabin
alti
tu d e lim ite r
on
each valve although this
increased
to
15,000ft
4,500m when
all
f ou r v al ve s w er e in operation. Should
there
be a requ irement to dump cabin
pressure
there
wasprovisionfor it, restrict
ed to the p r es s ur e r a ng e
of
t he c ab in
altimeter
limiters.
Although
air
conditioning
forcrew
and
passengers is the most apparent aspect
of
a
comfortable aircraft
environment, there
were further cooling enhancements on
Beyond his responsibilities for
the engine
and fuel systems,
the
flight engineer also
controlled
the
air
conditioning
and cabin
pressurizationsystems.
The
former consist
ed
of
four independent groups, e ac h o f
which
w as s up pl i ed f ro m
the
relevant
engine s high-pressure compressor
and
fed
into
the
air conditioning s ys te m vi a a
b lee d v a lv e comprising a
shut-off
valve
and a p re ss ur e -r ed uc in g v al ve . D ow n
stream the airflow ed into fourcross-bleed
valves that allowed cross-feeding
through
out
the system. These w er e f it te d w i th a n
external tapping that allowedfor
the
con
nect ion of ex te rna l coo l ing
tr olley s . To
maintain a s u ita b le temperature through
o ut t he
cabin,
the
air tapped from
the
compressors passed
throughheat exchang
er
m at ri ce s b ef or e b ei ng m ix ed w it h
another, colder air supply delivered y the
cold-air
unit.
Fur ther cool ing of the
air
took p lac e in a s e co n da r y
heat
exchanger
before
the
process finished
a t t he
fuel/air
heat
exchanger.To cool
components
with
in
the
a irf r am e b le ed a ir w as drawn from
s ma ll i n ta k es
mou nt ed o n t he e ng in e
nacelles during low-speed flight, while at
higher speeds there w as a further air bleed
located
with in the
in tak e s th em s elv es . A
further cool ing op tion became available
Air Conditioning and
Pressurization
tank
pressurization system cameinto
orer
a t ion a t h igh a l ti tude , which
assisted
the
pumps in moving fuel and s to pp e d it f ro m
b o ilin g o f f. I n the
even t o fan
emergency,
f ue l c o uld b e
dumped through
a
vent
pipe
a t t he rear o f t he airframe, the required
venting
pressure being supplied y the
pumps
fitted
t o e ac h c ol le ct or
group.
Putting fuel i nt o t he a irc r af t w as done
through a p ai r
o
pressure refuelling cou
pling
points
in
the
wing lowerfairings for
ward
of
t he m ai n undercarriage bays.
These
in turn were
connected
to
the
trim
transfer gallery, the whole
being fuelled
under pressure. To g ive a m e as u re
of
con
trol during
the
refuelling operation,
the
refuel pa ne l all owed for a complete
sequence refuel
of the
whole system or for
p a r tia l r e fu e llin g
of
individual
t an ks t o
give an overall calculated percentage.
Dependingon the
degree
of control
need
ed,
the
refuel
operator
could
either
set
the
refuel panel to carry outthe replenishment
automaticallyo r, f or f ine r control, manual
selection
wasavailable.
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SK IN ND BONES
SKIN ND BONES
BELOW Each main wheel on Concorde
was
fitte
with
oneof these multistatorbrakeunits.
The
t
used toalign allthe tangsbefore thewheel s
refi tting isknown as a spider.
Adran Falconer
Accommodation, Fittings
and Safety
To
the
passengers boardingConco rde,
first impressions might
not
be compl
favourable since
the
fixtures and fit
were
not
palati al, all being designed t
within thecabin;
that
heftypremium on
descent
of
the
undercarriage units th
selves
under
gravity
and
in free-fall.
operation
ofthe
mechanical release for
undercarriage
was
v ia a r el ea se h a nd
the
cockpit.
When
operated,
the
upl
retracted
and
allowed
the
le gs t o d
lthough
gravity was held
to
be
enoug
force
the
legs into
the
locked-down
t ion, shoul d t his fai l
to
occur
pneum
pre ssur e c ou ld be d iv er te d from
hydraulic reservoir to complete
the
ex
sion
ofthe
gearstruts. Aircraft braking
applied hydraulically
t o t he
main wh
each
brake
unit
being a multistatoras
bly To
prevent
brake l ock-up and su
quent
brakefires and damage, there
wa
anti-skid system fitted
which
cycled
brakesto
prevent
this. When
Concorde
on
the
ground, nose-wheel st eering
hydraulically powered,operated throug
el ect ronic controll er l inked t o
the
ru
pedals and
hand
wheels.
In
t heeven t
system failure,
the
b ra ki ng s ys te m
e qu ip pe d w it h a b ra ke a cc um ul at or
had enoughbrakingenergy for
one
land
DR G
STRUT
LEG
ABOVE Concordes maingear
was
fair lycomplicated in operation
althougha bonus
was
that it had
onlyoneoperating doorperbay
to cycleduringretraction and
extension. Bristol Aero Colecton
LEFT
The main gearfi ttedto
Concorde is substantial.This
view
ofthe right-hand assembly
showsthe mainretraction jack
and shorteningassembly.
Adran Falconer
CROSS E M
Should
Concorde
s uf fe r a
total
loss
of
hydraul ic funct ion, t here w as
one
final
option available, this being
an
emergency
release
of t he
undercarriage locks with
the
RETRACTION LINK
RETRACTION J CK
PITCH
D MPER
undercarriage system was supported
by
a
standby circuit
that
operated outside
the
main systems and increased
the
undercar
riageloweringoptions available
tothe
crew.
TELESCOPIC STRUT
4,500psi 280 and 320kg/ sq em ). Syst em s
driven
by
hydraulics included
the
powered
flying cont rol unit s, arti fi ci al feel units,
l an di ng g ea r, w he el b ra ke s, n os e- wh ee l
steering, windscreen visor, nose-conedroop
and raising mechanism,engine intake vari
ableramps and
the
fuel pumpslocatedin
the
aftfuel transfer tank. Services to thesesev
eral sub-syst em s w ere provided by three
independent
systems designated green, yel
low and blue.
The
first two were recognized
as
the
primarysystems, while the third
was
treated
as
t he ai rcraft standby. A l though
each
systemreservoir waspressurized during
maintenance,
an
auxiliary pump was avail
able to recharge
the
reservoirs, which would
eliminate
the
possibility
of
pumpcavitation
that
could becausedduring engine start.
In
theeventof
a main hydraulicsystemfailure,
Concorde
was equipped with a two-bladed
r am a ir t ur bi ne , w hi ch h ad
the
ability to
dr ive two
h yd ra ul ic p um ps . F or us e i n
ground operations, thereweretwo hydraulic
pumps
that
coul d be used t o pressurize all
three hydraulic systems, which allowed for
the
functioning
ofthe
aircraft s systems.
Outside
the
flight-control system PFCUs,
the
aircraft s undercarriage was
of
primary
importance.
This
was
of theconventional
hydraulically-operated type and consisted
of
a t wi n-w heeled nose l eg assembly and a
pair
of
main legs
that
hada bogie
mounting
four w heels and brake unit s each. L ocat ed
in
the
rear fusel age t ail -cone w as a t ai l
wheel
unit
w ho se t as k w as t o
protect the
rearfuselagefromground scrapes.
Thisuni t
hada pair
of
small tail-wheels
that
replaced
the
skid
of
the
earl ier protot ype and pre
product ion C oncordes. E ach m ain under
carriage
unit
retract ed i nboard w hi le
the
nose
unit
retracted forward; as
each unit
began
to
move
tothe
retracted position,
the
greater part
of
each nosedooropened
to
let
the
leg
enter the
bay
while
the
main-gear
doorscycled through
openand
close func
tions as
the
legs moved
into
theirown bays.
When the
undercarri age w as selected
down,
the
reverse
happened
so
that
only
the
legs were exposed
to
the airflow.
While
the
m ai n a nd n os e u ni ts w er e c yc li ng
through
eitherthe
upor
the
downfunction,
the
tail-wheel
unit was
also moving into
the
bay or extendi ng.
Since Concorde
ha d a
powerfulhydraulic system,
the
retractionor
extension
o f t he
undercarriage units hap
pened almost simultaneously.
Whe n t he
undercarriage unit s w ere up
and
locked
into
t he i r b a ys t he y w er e h el d i n p l a ce b y
hydraulic pressure
and mechanical
locks.
As would beexpected,
the
primary hydraulic
STEERING UNIT
J j - - - TELESCOPIC
DRAG STRUT
TORQUELINKS
The tail-skid
as
fi ttedto Concorde
had
two
functions. One w a s t o p r o t e ct t h e r e a r
fuselagefrom damage;theother with the
closing of amicroswitch
was
to alert
the crew tothe possibil i tyof a highAoA.
Bristol
Aero
Colecton
GEAR UPLOCKS
ROCKING
ARM
LEG
OLEOSTRUT_
i
SHOCKABSORBER
SKID
RETRACTION JACK
FULLY EXTENDED
nose gearof Concorderetracted
to enterthe bay Innormal
doors cycled open
on and extension.
Aero Colecton
68
69
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SKIN ND
BONES
BOVE Viewed fromtherear the tail wheel bumperin therearfuselage was aneat installation. In the
developmentaircraft
it was no
more thana skid; forthe productionmachineswheelswere added.
dran Falconer
RIGHT
The Concordenosegear:affixedtothe rearupperpart ofthe legis thefixedfair ing andmidwaydown
abovethe torquelinksare thejacksfor thenose wheelsteeringassembly. The frameworkoverthewheels
themselveswas usedfor rain dispersal a nd to protectthe airframe fromforeign object damage.
dran
Falconer
7
L FT With acraneattachedto theslings the
completedforwardfuselage ofF WTSSis almost
ready forshipment to Toulouse.The close spacing
ofthe str ingersunderthe skinis clearlyevident.
Bristol
ero
Colecton
t ic ke t w as f or s pe ed .
The
passenger cabin
w as 1 15 ft 3 5m ) l on g and 8 ft 7 i n 2 . 6m )
wide
at
itsmaximum. The seating arrange
ments were based on four-abreast seating,
s pl it i nt o t wo b an ks s ep ar at ed by a 1 7i n
43cm) aisle. Originallyan arrangement of
108passengers, pitched at 38in 97cm), was
put forward for premium-class passengers
and an e c on o my - cla ss la yo u t c a ter e d f or
128, pitched at 34in 8 6 c m ). A f ina l, a lte r
native
arrangement
was for a higherdensity
layout
that
w ou ld c ar ry 1 44 p as se ng er s
pitched
at
32in 81cm). Eventually, after
m u ch m a r ke t r e se ar c h and consideration,
both Air France and British Airways would
settle on a passenger numberof just100, the
cabinbeingsplit into sections by adividerto
accommodate t he m. I n the forward com
partment the
seating arrangement housed
forty passengers with the remainder in the
rear compartment. To service both cabin
sectionsthere were a pair ofcompact galleys
and similar-sized toilet facilities. To convey
the passengers baggage and any high prior
ity f r eig ht th e re w er e two h old s u n de r the
passenger floor.
Other
equipment
installed in
Concorde
included ant i ice and rain protection and
dispersion systems. Both t he wing leading
edges,
the
leadingedges of
the
intakes and
the
a ir s p illd o o r s a ll benefited from
anti-
ic in g , a s d id
the engine
inlet guide vanes.
Rain dispersion and ant i icing w e re a lso
available for both t he visor and
the
inner
windshield assemblies, although
the
for
mer operated only when
the
visorwasfully
up
and
locked.
Both
wereelectricallyoper
ated as were the anti ice systems installed
in the static vents and galley drain masts.
T o k ee p the windscreens clear, Concorde
u se d a
combinat ion of
windshield wipers,
deflectors and rain repellent,
al though the
last
became
effective
onlyabove
100kt.To
keep the screens clear f r om r a in w as only
one requirement for the crew s visibility,
since
at
low level insects
and
dust became
::mother hazard to d ea l w i th . F or this pur
pose
Concorde
h a d a s c r ee n -w a s h s y ste m
installed which operated in conjunction
with the windscreen wipers.
Although Concorde spent much
of
its
time operating
at
highspeeds, it too had to
comply with
the
regulations regarding
the
carriage of emergency equipment. In flight,
SKIN ND
BONES
BOVE Withthe lower halfof theshipping
containerin position theforwardfuselage of
thefirst prototypeis lowered in.Clearly
visible underneathis thebayfor thenose
gear. Bristol ero Colecton
7
BELOW Insidethe Brabazon hangerat Filtonanot
protectivecasesectionis lowered intoposition.
Before development ofthe SuperGuppyfor
air
s
airframesections travelled
on
specially constru
flatbed trailers. Bristo l eroColecton
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SKIN AND BONES
d at Filton beforeenteringthe Brabazonhangarfor maintenance this Concordehad itsway blockedby auniquegateacrosstheperimetertrack
dran Falconer
Given itsimportance sections intransitrequiredspecial to typecontainers
hey were alsobil lboardsfor some subtle advertising r isto l eroColecton
=
c=:=
SOUND/THERMAL INSULA
OXYGEN SYSTEM
FUEL SYSTEM
ENGINE INSTALLATION
ENGINE CONTROLS
FIRE WARNING/EXTINGU
common with the real aircraft the
t or feat ured all the equipm ent fit
Concorde even down t o the elec
drivencrewseats.
Once
the creww
ed i n t hei r si mul at edai rcraft t heyc
through
the
full pre-start sequenc
starting engines. When the Olymp
erplants begantheirstart sequence
i ar rum bl e whi ne and vi brati on b
assertthemselves. Once a simulated
fic cl earance t odepart had beengi
simulator could give a distinct impr
nose-undercarriage bounce as the
w ere t weaked duri ng
the
taxi s
Such was the depth
of
reality that t
lators created t hat t he trainee cre
forgotthey were flying a simulator
L:To
§
lD
I
I
g
:oJ
[ I
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FLIGHT CONTROLS
NAVIGATION
RADIO
AIR CONDITIONING
ELE TRI L SYSTEM
D BRITISH AIRCRAFTCORPORATION
D SUDAVIATION
<:::::J [ J
I
I
Thisdiagram il lustratesthe division ofwork bythe Anglo Frenchpartnership the air-
frame split eventuallybecame 6l} 40 infavourof France with thepowerplantwork
swinging theotherway Colecton
built up Once the end of course was reached
each crew member underwent a thorough
examination
set j oint ly by
the
manufac
t urers and
the
European
Joint
Airworthi
ness Authority.
All successful candidates
then
w en t t o a
flightsimulator either in Paris or Filton. As
withall flight simulators
each
is a compli
cated machinehoused in
an
air-conditioned
room. Externally they arebox-shapedstruc
t ures m ount ed on a series
of
hydraulic rams
whose purpose is t o si mul at e m ovem ent
a r ou nd a ll t hr ee a xe s. E nt ry t o the flight
deck
w as by
an access l adder w here each
crew m ember was faced w it h Concorde
parked on an a ir po rt r am p a nd v is ib le
through the simulated cockpit windows. In
lying t astest irliner
CH PTER FOUR
Training
the
Crew
To
get
Concorde
into
the ai r w as
quite
a
complicatedprocess. Both the flightand the
cabin crew underwent rigorous training to
prepare them for allemergencies. Training
o ne o f Concorde s three man flight crew
normallytookabout five monthsand all the
applicants were already highly experienced
inall aspectsof commercial jet flying. Before
even entering the cockpit each new mem
berspent at l east si x w eeks i n the training
school classroomswhere much of t he theo
ry ofsupersonic flight was discussed;howev
er only the aspects relevant t o t he aircraft
werepresented since the complexity
of
an
aircraft such as Concorde would take years
to master properly. One theme that pervad
edal l the training lectures was safetywhich
was seen
as
paramount and thuseach exer
cise was studied under normal abnormal
and emergency conditions so
that
compar
isons could be made. Further analyses were
provi ded by
computer which
s h ow ed i n
graphic form
the
actions undertaken by
each crewmember.Supporting the training
programme were extensive audio-visual
aids which in France centred around each
trainee
with his individual
terminal . In
Britain
the
original
training regim e w as
based
around
electronic
working
models
although technology finally caught upand
computer terminals were incorporated later.
The ground-schoolpart ofthe course was
provided by BritishAerospacea nd Aerospa
tiale and
both
pilots underwent thisprocess
f or s ix w ee ks w hi le
the
flight engineer
course lastedseven weeks. Throughout this
period study
of
all Concorde s systems was
undertaken manywere already familiarto
eachcrewmansincethey were variations on
equipment already in use. Where intensive
training was needed was in the handling of
the enginesand theirassociated systemsplus
an
understanding of the fuel system. Once
the
study of t ext sand sli des hadbeen com
pleted the trainees moved
on
t o a fli ght
deck m ock-upw here procedurescoul d be
practised and a familiarity with
the
instru
ments and controls and
their
behaviour
4i l '
system vent pipe thereby preventing any
ignited fuel vapour from blowing back into
the system. Shoul d fire break
out
in the
vicinity of
the
f ue l t an ks t he re w er e f ou r
e xt in gu is he rs ; t he se c ou ld b e o pe ra te d
manually from the flight deck by the crew
a nd s ho ul d t he re be a c ab in e me rg en cy
involvingsmoke or fumes Concorde was fit
ted
with
twooxygensystems. Bothfunction
on lowpressure one
for
the passengercabin
and t he o t her for the flight deck. Should
t he r e b e a n ee d f o r the crew t o m ove about
u nd e r s uc h c ir cu ms ta nc es t h er e w er e
portable oxygen packs availablefor use. To
alert the crew
that
there
was
an emergency
the aircraft was well equipped with visual
and aural warningsactivated at allstations
whenthe aut oarm sw i t ch was operated on
the
flightdeck. With the crew alerted they
could prepare
the
passengers and
the
cabin
forevacuation.
Once
an emergency landing
was made the o rd er c ou ld be g iv en t o
deploy the escapeslides fitted to each cabin
door. Most of thesecould be used as rafts as
well as slides. Other emergency
equipment
on Concorde included smoke masks fire
extinguishers cots for infants and a defib
rillator for heart-attack resuscitation. In the
event of Concorde survi vi ng a di tching
rafts w ere stowed equi pped w i th rati ons
and
other
survivale quipment.
Throughout the
life
ofConcorde
much
of
this
equipment
remained essentially
unchanged except for m odi ficati ons and
upgrading although thischanged radically
after
the
crash inJuIy 2000.
freight holds. Surrounding the engines and
the
nacelles was a dual-sensor system that
warned
of
overheati ng or fire outbreaks.
Before the fire suppressionsystem operated
a s et of secondary fire-damping doors were
activated with
the
purpose of starving
the
fire of oxygen. A further fire-detection sys-
tem
was
installed in the fuel tanks. This
used flame detectors l inked t o a vent i gni
tion suppression system which automati
cally discharged extinguisher into the fuel
ire
is
regarded
as
the m aj or e n em y a nd
therefore Concorde was f it te d w it h b o th
udible and visual warning systems to alert
he
crew.
I n t he
main these systems were
entred around the engine nacel les and
oncent rat ed upon engine overheati ng or
fl agrat i on but t hey also provided t he
eans t o exti ngui sh any fire.
There
were
urt her protecti on and
detection
systems
hose sensors were situated in
the
air-con
i oning duct i ng passenger cabin and
72
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FLYING Ti l
F ST ST
IRLIN R
FLYING 1111 F ST ST IRLIN R
This view ofthe secondpilot spositionreveals much detail includingthe INSselector
switches.visorcontrolsandthe Machmeterand airframee.g.tr imstr ip indicator.
BristolAeroCol ecton
From anyanglethe flight deckof Concorde was cramped. Withinthis restr icted space
werethe
two
pilotsandthe fl ightengineer. Adran Falconer
Having completed the
simulator conver
sion training, the n e w c r ew m o ve d t o t he
real thing. As before, entrance to
the
flight
d ec k w as u p
the
h igh s e t
of
flight steps
to
compensate
for
the height ofthe
undercar
riage. Entering the flight deck, the crewsaw
the seats for the pilots and the engineer,
rlus
two for supernumerary crew members,
s u ch a s c r e w f lig ht c h ec k er s , a ll f itte d w ith
full oxygenand communications equipment.
Flight-Deck
Layout
Getting
to grips with the
autorilot
real
ly started with
the
thirdsimula tor mission,
where the en ti re
f ligh t w as f low n
surer
sonically, although this
one
h ad an auto
stabilization failure thrown in for go od
measure. As
delta
aircraft
have
a
tendency
to r is e
and
f all in f lig h t,
there is
a p r ed is
position f or p il ot s to overcorrec t this.
Returningthe
controls to neutral will stop
t he mot io n a nd therefore ri
lots
can
try
again. Following on from this fairly gentle
introduction to systems failure, there fol
lo we d a
sequence of
missions
where
more
and more incidents
were added
to
test
the
crew s knowledge. During theeighth sortie
the
instructor w o uld f ail an
e ng in e a t
Mach
2;
having
r e co v er e d f r om th is ,
the
instructor would
then
restore the missing
engine only
to
be followed by a
shutdown
of the
pair
on the opposite
side.
The
final
s tag e w as to p r ac tise
three-engined
land
ings which has stood c r ew s in g o od stead
w h ile f ly ing
the
real thing. From
the
eleventh simulator sortie the
crew
rractise
flying and operatingthe a ir cr a ft f r om d if
ferent scats, thus
the
flight
engineer
gets to
land
Concorde
from
the
co-pilot s
rosi
tion. During this sequence the engineer
alsolands
Concorde
with ju st tw o engines
which is
easier
than
most
due to the
reserve
of rower available
from
the
after
burners. Having played musical chairs, the
crewshould by now
have
been f o r min g a
team and therefore the next
series
of
sim
ulator runs concentratedon bondingthem
together to
0rerate
efficiently under pres
s ur e . Pr a ctic es
covered
in
this
phase
included autothrottle failures, the droop
nose stuck
at
5 d e gr e es which blocks
much
o f t h e
runway),
instrument
failure
and emergency go-rounds
in
the
face
of
changing weather conditions. The last
three
sorties covered noise
abatement
pro
cedures for
opera tingou t o f New
Y or k, a
full daylight sortie and a complete night
flightfrom ramp to ramp.
flight
engineerrractised
fuel trimbalancing,
w h ic h , in tu rn , rrompted the p ilo ts to a dd
t he c ent re
of
gravity e.g.) meter to their
constant scanning of
gauges
on the
rilors
panels. Unlike on most modern subsonic
airliners, the e.g. meter was
oneof
the most
imrortant
instruments
on Concorde
since
itstrim
rosition
governed
the
wholebehav
iour o f t he aircraft. Having grasped the
imrortanceof
this,
the
crew
then
moved on
to
exreriencing the
trimchanges
at Mach
I
and 2, these manoeuvres being followed by
an investigation
o f t he
autorilot. Again,
unlike subsonic airliners,
the autorilot on
Concorde
was used in preference
to
manual
flying. As this system
had seventeen
flight
and thre e
autothrottle
modes, there were
n u me r ou s f lig ht
combinations
available,
many of which automatically functioned
duringan in-flightemergency; for
examrle
should there be a n engine shutdown
on
take-off, the rudder trimmedoutthe change
in d ire c tio n. Although t hi s s ys te m m ay
seem miraculous to some, there were ri10ts
who
left
the
conversion course since
the
importance ofthe autopilot as an extension
of
their skillsescaped them.
PORTE DE
SERVICE
PORTE PASSAGERS
SOUTE DE TRAINAVENT
SOUTE
A BAGAGES
SORTIES DE
SECOURS
TYPE
3
RESERVOIR DE CARBURANT
SO
UT
DE TRAIN PRINCIPAL
CAMPARTIMENT EQUIPMENTS
FOND
DE CABINE ETANCHE
RESERVIOR DE TRANSFERT
POINTE· V NT
P RTIE V NT DE FUSEL GE
P RTIE INTERMEDI RE DE FUSEL GE
P RTIE ENTR LE DE FUSEL GE
P RTIE RRIERE DE FUSEL GE
increasingin
comrlexity
as
the
course
went
on .Many
of
the actions were rereated over
andover again, many for rractice others to
reinforce
the
safety
asrects of
flying
and
handling Concorde in an emergency.
Th e
complete range
of
actions was undertaken
under the
scrutiny
ofan
instructor
who
had
the
dual role
of
also
acting
as
the
air traffic
control centre.
The
instructor was able, via
his
computer
te r min al, to s e lec t
the
flight
rarameters
so
that the
trainees could
have
their simulated flight changed to practise
the
more difficult
ra rts o f
aircraft control
s u ch a s la nd ing . Re ga r de d by a ll c r ew s a s
the hardestpart ofhand
Iing
an
aircraft,
that
practised in
the
simulator
centred around
a
landing under ILS guidance.
Although the
simulated
landing
could
cover
all
the tech
n iq ue s n ee de d, t hi s is o ne r ha se t ha t
r e qu ire d f lying in
the
a c tu a l a irc r af t to
develop
itsfiner pointsprorerly.
The firstsimulatormission was astraight
f or wa rd , s u bs o nic c r uis e w h er e the crew
went
through
the
first, basic, systems usage
and handling
p ha s e. I t w as d u rin g
the
sec
ond mission when simulated supersonic
f lig ht w as u n de r tak e n. D u rin g th is r u n
the
NOSE
FUSEL GE
FORW RD
FUSEL GE B
INTERMEDI TE FUSEL GE C
ENTRE FUSEL GE D
RE R
FUSEL GE E
SERVICE
DOOR
PASSENGER DOOR
NOSEGEAR
BAY
3
BAGGAGE
HOLD
4
TYPE
3
EMERGENCY EXITS
5
FUEL TANK 6
MAIN GEAR BAY 7
EQUIPMENT BAY
8
REAR PRESSURE BULKHEAD
9
FUELTRANSFER TANK
\
A
r
B C
I
D
FR
1
M I
FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M
L
28 41
46
54
Y
i
,I :,
. ~ m d ~ d ~ =.J
b \ \
1 2 3 4 5 6 5 7 6 8 1 9
ncing the
feel
of the s imulato r
the
task
ofthe
computer system which
ated the
hydraulic r a ms . I t succeeded
tricking t he i nn er e ar i nt o believing
i t w as experiencing the sensations of
thus minor
movements
stimulated
feelings
of climbing diving accelerat
tu rn ing and decelerating. The
rams
move
the
simulator in
the
direction
r i lots
selected by using
theircon
yokes,
and thus the crew seemed to
a climb or d ive , w h ile an out
observer w ou ld s ee
the
simulator
move
in small, jerky
movements.
ugh on a day-to-day basis the simu
r normally behaved
itself,
there
w as a
system
integrated intothe control
uit should the motion control
system
violentlyouts ide its normal working
To
cut
power to
the
simulator
it
rerform incorrectly there
was
an
rower cut-off switch on t he
deckwhich whenoperated storred
simulator
in its tr ac k s.
established
themselves
in
the
the t r ainee c rew undertook a
o f n i ne t ee n 4 -h ou r
missions,
thediagrams issuedfor
corde were inEnglish and
h. emphasizing the joint
reof theproject.
Colecton
74
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FLYING
TilE
FASTESTAIRLINER
FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER
This view ofthe fl ightdeck encompassespart ofthe fl ightengineer s position
on
a
aircraft
l
seats wereblue and
ir
France seats grey . COlecton
far enough a ftto monitor
the
systems m
agement
panel. The
co-pi l ot or
first
cer sseat could alsotrack rearwardsto
behind t he centre console, which allo
access to
the
crew position. Height aU
ment
for
both
seatswaselectrically
act
ed, although there was a m a n ua l re ve r
fa cility if n e e de d . Other adjustable p
o f t he
f r on t t wo s ea ts i n cl ud ed
the
back and a rm res ts . The flight engin
s e a th a d two p rim a ry d irec tion s : outbo
towards
the
systems
management
pane
forward to a s s ist in
operatingthe
throt
The seat floor-rails for this seat,electri
ly-powered fore and a ft, g a ve ite a s y a c
t o t h e c e nt r e
console. It
too
c o uld b e e
tric a lly a d ju s ted v e rtica lly , with
ma
reversion. In the
event
of a crash, the
h ad t o b e within 2 in S c m)
o f t h e
ri
hand
side
oft he
aircraft s
centrel
inc
ot
wise
the
c ras h lo ck
pin
would
not
di
g ag e. I f
at
any time
better
a cc e ss w
n e e de u to
pansoft he
flightdeck,
the
e
neer s scat could be tracked forward u
the systems management desk. To pre
the
possi
bi
Iity
of
a c las h between
the
tain s
and the
engineer s scat,
an
inter-
strut was positioned o n t he inboaru ra
the
rear
oft he
pilot sseat. Shoul u t he s
approacheach
other, a striker
o n t h e
s
when compressed, operated a limit s w
which electrically disarmed both s
Shoul d t he captai n need to move fur
rearwards
a n d t h e
area wasclear,
an
o
ridepedal, operated o n t h e engineer s s
r es et p ow er t o the p ilo t s s e at. A s im
but
re m ov a b le s trut, c o uld b e fitte u to
captain s seat
to
stop
i t c o llid in g with
occupant
of the
supernumerary s s
Contact
between
the
seats was preven
b y a m icro -s witc h s b e ing tripp e d
o n
pilot s seat, which broke the tracking
c u it o f
the
pilot s seat. The first supe
merary
seat
was
completely
manu
operated a nd m ou nt ed o n sliuing r
The manual adjustments possible inclu
fore anu aft
movement, heightadjustm
anu
partial
rotation. W he n n ot
requ
for usc,
the
s e a tp a n c o uld b e Iifted u p
folded upwards to
the
s e at b ac k, w he
was h e ld in p lac e by
the
safety harness
provide further clearance, t h e s e at c
be disengaged from
the
latchplate, w
allowed full rearward
movement
and
stowage in
the left-hand
rear
corner o
i gh t d ec k. The second supernume
seat was s to we d flat against the left-h
equipment
rack
w he n n ot
i n u sc , b
h el d i n p l a ce by a c la w
arm catch.
Re
ing t hecat ch allowed t h e s e at t o besw
The Crew s Seats
Should
the
crew
continue
to ignore an
MWS
l ig ht , a s in gl e- st r ok e g on g w ou ld
s o un d e v ery LOsee u n til re ctific a tio n h a d
b e en c a rried o u t.
The
primary gongs were
b ac ke d u p by a s ec on da ry g on g s ys te m
wh ich s o un d ed if
t h e M W S
failed; this was
part
of
the aircraft health monitoring sys
tem
and
sounded
at Lsec
intervals. The
MWS am ber
lights, some
o f t h e
red lights
and their associatedprimarygongscouldbe
inhibited via
t he M WS
panel, although
there
was a re ca ll s ys tem
that
reactivated
any
outstanding
fault warnings should
the
relevant system still be inuicating a defect.
Certain
p ri ma ry r ed w a rn i ng l ig ht s w er e
m a rk e d with a
T ;
this indicated
that
they
h ad a push-to-test facility available.
The
three
main c re w s e ats for
the
pilots
and engineer
were
mounted on
rails
and
electrically operated. A f ou rt h s ea t was
also
on
rails and manually operat ed and
was used by
the
first supernumerary crew
m em be r, f r eq ue nt l y a f li gh t
checker or
pilot on a l iv e conversion c ou rs e. A l es s
palatial fifth seat was available and could
b e u se d by a fu rth e r
supernumerary
crew
member. The rail la yo u t o f t he primary
crewseats
m eant t hat
all three crew mem
b ers were p rov id eu with maximum mobil
ity
about t he
fligh t d e ck . In p rac tice ,
this
meant
t h at t h e
captain s seat could travel
were divided into fou r c a te go rie s : Cla ss I,
which covered warnings
of
serious faults
or
an emergency requiring the immediate
at t ent i onof t he
crew and
their
immediate
act ion; a Cl ass 2
warning
i n di c at ed a
les s s e rio us p ro ble m
that
s ti ll n e ed ed t o
be brought t o
t h e a t te n ti o n o f t h e
crew,
although
i m me d ia t e a c ti o n was
not
re qu ire d ;a Clas s 3 indication covered any
abnormality that required monitoring and
needed to be dealt with before
the
situation
b e ca m e a Clas s 2 fa u lt; a Clas s 4 ,
and
final,
warningclassificationcovereu minor, mis
cellaneous indications.Class 1 and 2 warn
ings werepresentedby
both
audio
and
visu
al indicators o n b ot h t he
master
warning
panel and the systems management panel;
audible warnings were broadcast o v er t he
fligh t-d e ck s pe a ke rs, s o me c o uld b e
can
celled while others needed their faults to be
rectified before
cancellation
was possible;
visual warnings were classified by colour:
redindicatedClass
amber
Class2, yellow
las s 3 and g ree n Clas s 4 . The associated
master warning system
MWS)
was orient
ed towards givingwarningsfor Class
Land
2 failures;
not
o n ly d id
the relevant colour
lights c om e o n, b ut a s ing le-s tro k e g o ng
also sounded to emphasize
the
seriousness
oft he
prohlem. Each master
warning
light
on t heMWS m oni t ored a numberof warn
ing sources. The l ig ht itse lfc o u ld b e can
celled by pushing
the relevant
lightswitch,
a lt ho u gh t h e g on g w ou ld c o nt i nu e t o
sound until
the
f au lt w as dealt with.
a rtificia l fee l s witc h es a n d e ng i ne s h ut
down
controls.
The
rearflat
panel
couldbe
reached
by
all three operating crew mem
bers and was h o me t o t h e t h ro t tl e system
switches,
HP
valves, ignition controls, fly-
ing
control
hydraulic switchovers, system
h e at e r c o nt ro l s a n d a n ti -i c in g switches.
To
the
rear
o f t h e
co-pilot were
the
sys
tem
management
panels
operated
by
the
flig h t e n gin ee r. S om e o f these controls
were deemed
of
such importance
that
they
a re a lso a c ce s sib le to
t he captai n,
should
he
reverse hisseat fullyaft.
The
panelsdis
playeu inf or ma tion c ove ring the power
p lan ts, fue l s y ste m, h y dra ulics , e le ctrica l
s y ste ms , a ir
condit i oni ng and
pressuriza
tion,
oxygen, fire
det ect i onand ant i-i cing
s y ste ms . To a id the engineer, a nd t o some
degree
the
p ilots to o,
the
systems, where
appropriate,
w er e d is pl ay ed i n a l og ic al
layout which was et ched and highlighted
in wh ite .
All
the
primary systems were equipped
with a u dib le and visual warnings, which
ABOVE located between the two pilots,this
overheadpanelcontrolsmanyof Concorde s
systems.Thosetothe rearwere accessibleto
the
flight
engineersincethe panel
was
stepped
to presentthe controlsin thebestpossiblemanner.
dran Falconer
seated,
the
p ilo ts fac ed a le ft
and
a
t d as h p an el c o nt ai n in g t h e flight
a nd the c e ntr e dashpanel with
e n gi n e i ns t ru me n ts . A b ov e t h e c e n
ua s h panel
was
the glare shield panel,
h h o us e d the autopilot, autothrottle
or, plus the VORjILS frequency
tors for
each
pilot.
The
right anu
the
p ilot c o ns o le h o us e d the controls for
nose-wheel steering, weather radar and
switches for
t h e p a ne l
lighting. The
r e c o ns o le c o n ta i ne d t h e t h ro tt le s ,
reverser controls, visor a n d u r oo p
standby
controls, parking
and
emer
braking
selectors,
standby landing
communicationsand naviga
control panels.
centrally-mounted
r oo f p an el
the
two p ilo ts,
w hich st ret ched
k to wa rds the f li gh t e ng in e er , h el d a
of steppedsub-panels rounded offby
t p a ne l.
The
former housed
the
master
indicators,
external lighting
warning l igh ts for the dc-icing
dc-misting c o ntro ls , flyin g control
switches, autostabilizer,
auto
trim,
n pilot s panel.showing theplethoraof switches.knobsand dials. Prominent
centre arethegaugesconnected with engine monitoring. ristol
ero
Colecton
76
77
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FLYING Ti l
FASTEST
IRLIN R
CAPTAIN S
SEAT
STOWAGEGUIDE
RAIL
- •
RAILEND
STOP
2NDSUPERNUMERARYSEAT
This diagramil lustratesthe seats on Concorde s
flight
deck andtheir operatingtracksand
anti-collision bars. Colecton
down
its legs
to
e n ga g e w ith f loo r la tch e s
a n d t h e b a ck to b e r a is ed i n to t h e vertical.
To reverse the process a lever m ount edon
the
forward legfreed
the
legs from
the
floor
cat ches and allowed the s e at b a c k to fold
for stowage. The safety seat harnesses fit
ted t o t he captain s
the
co-pilot s
the
flight engineer s
a n d t h e
first
supernumer
ary seat w e re p r ov ide d w ith in e rtia r ee ls
while
the
second supernumerary s e at h ad a
fixed harness
m ount ed t o
a single
anchor
age p oi nt on t he floor a nd t hr ee s ea t
anchor points.
Lighting
The flight
deck
and passenger cabins were
well supplied with internal lighting these
b ei ng a mixture
of
fluorescent electrolu
minescent
instrument
integral Spot and
flood. Forgeneral
illumination
purposes a
pair of f lu or e s ce n t la mp s w er e f itte d in the
f o rw ar d r a ck ing a r e a and control l ed by
switchesclose to
t he ci rcui t
breaker panel
a n d t h e c ab i n crew forward control panel.
Tw o s p o tlig h ts w e re mounted as boarding
l igh ts in
the
forward vestibule and a fluo
rescent
l ig ht w as
mounted
in
t he r oo f o f
the flight-deck compartment. Lighting at
each crew station was controlled by the
individual a n d c o ve r ed
both
panel
and
general
illumination.
During some flights there was the risk
of
encountering lightningstorms whichcould
overpower
the cockpit
lighting and leave
the c r ew u n sig hte d. To counter this Con
c or de h ad s to rm l i gh t in g i ns ta ll ed - h ig h
intensity fluorescent lighting which oper
ated in combination w ith a r o of - m ou n te d
floodlight both ofw hi ch provided intense
lighting
t o t he
d a s h p a ne ls
and
overcame
any
intenseglare
t hrough t he
windshields.
looking downthe lengthof thepassengercabin of
Concorde revealsthe narrownessof thefuselage.
Although i twas neverfilted
with
thelatest
hi-tech seats dueto weight restrictions such a lack
didnot botherthe passengers as theywere paying
forspeed notexcesses ofcomfort.
dran Falconer
FLYING Ti l
FASTEST
IRLIN R
Toilets on Concorde were justbig enoughfor theirpurpose due to thesizeof the
fuselage. dran Falconer
Giventhe restrictedsizeof theConcordemain cabin
it
ishardlysurprisingthat the
galley is an excellentexample ofintegrated minimalistdesign; even so the menus
wereof thehighestquality. dran Falconer
9
oncorde w as a lso p r ov ide d w ith a w
range of external lighting intended
cover
mosteventualities.
There
were t
anti-collision lights installed at the ti
the tail-cone and wing-root leading ed
all
of
which flashed simultaneously. Li
w e re a lso in sta lle d o n t he
left-
a nd
right-handside oft he frontfuselagefor
purposes. To assist
Concorde
dur ing n
landings there were landing ta xi li
m ou n te d o n t h e left- a nd t he right-h
nose-gear doors. To confirm t h at t h e
was down
and
locked
the
lamps would
illuminate
even
if a lr e a dy s e le c ted to.
c o nt r ol t h e h e a t generated
by
these la
on
the ground each
one
h ad a 400W
ment controlled
by a w e igh t- on - gr o
microswitch. Once airborne the releas
the microswitch allowed a 600W filam
to i l lum ina te . A s th is happened
the
l
rotated
sl
ightly downwards
to
compen
for Concorde s approach attitude. Sup
menting
the
nose-mourned I ig ht s w e
further set
m ount edon t he
leading edg
the m a in u n de r ca r ria ge d o or s . A s w ith
nose-mounted lamps the main-gear li
would
not
i l lum in ate u n til
the
leg
down and locked even if p r es e le c te d
There was an aut omat i c blow-back sy
that
operated should the leg s s till b e d o
at
a speed
of
365kt. The final lamps
o n
a irf r am e in clu d e n a vig a tio n ligh ts :
mounted on the tail-cone and two a t
leading edge
of
each wingtip.
rew
and
passenger
comfort
w as a l
priority not only to justify the cost bu
safety as well. The air-conditioningsys
consisted
of
four
independent
groups
e
o f w hi c h t o ok high-pressure air from
engines ami conditioned i t b y c oo l
heat i ng and
dehumidification. The re
ing a ir w as u se d to pressurize t he rel e
areas and to cool and vent il at eequi pm
racks. On
the
ground
Concorde
c o ul
supplied
with preconditioned
air
thro
anext ernal connect i on in the rear fuse
which wassupplied d i re c t t o t h e distr
tion manifold.
W h en t h e
air
conditio
was
operating
correctly
the
f ou r g r
supplied air to parts
of
the airframe. Gr
1supplied
the
flight deck group2 fed
the
forward
c a bi n a n d t h e r e ma i ni n g
supplied the rear cabin. Temperature c
t ro l w as n or m al l y automatic; thus
g r ou p I selector
cont rol l edt he
ight d
a r ea g r ou p 2
covered the
forward
c
and group4 managed the rearcabin. Se
automatic
control
o f t he
temperatur
each
groupwas possible
through
a
stan
temperaturecontrol for each group.
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FLYINGTHE FASTEST AIRLINER
FLYING THE FASTEST AIRLINER
SECONDARYNOZZLE
THRUST REVERSE
PRIMARYNOZZLE
BELOW:
To
maintain
an
even flow
of
air
to the compressor throug
thefl ightenvelope. BAC with R
Royce designeda system of ram
anddoors.
BBA
Colecton
Therewere three hydraulic
systemsfitted to Concorde. The
primarieswerethe blueandthe
greensystem;the
yellowwas
us
in standbymode.There
was
som
interchangeability betweenthem
maintain operation and system
pressure.
BBA
Colecton
engaged while the f li gh t d ir ec to r w
operation
the
modereverted to
pitch
a nd he a ding hold although in land
the autopliot would also engage the
mode.
There
wasa proviso however r
ing the g o -a r ou n d m o de w hic h
return the a ut o pi l ot t o b as ic o pe
ENGINE BAY
VENTILATION DOOR
RAMPS
AUXILIARYDOOR
ARTIFICIAL
- FEEL
INTAKE RAMP, NOZZLEAND DOOR POSITIONS
TAKE-OFFAND LANDING
INTAKE RAMP, NOZZLEAND DOOR POSITIONS
CRUISEAND DESCENT
< = = t ~
AKE-OFF LANDING
were engaged a nd t he a u to p ilo t h a d o n ly
one channel
in full operation although
b o th c o uld b e s e le cte d when land mode
was engaged.
The
selection
of
modes for
both the autopilot and the flight director
was u nd er common s w itc hin g c o ntr ol;
t he re fo re s ho ul d a n a ut op i lo t m od e b e
GREEN
MAIN
YELLOW
STANDBY
BLUE
MAIN
HYDRAULIC SUPPLIES
throttle systemwasrate-limited to5 degrees
of lever movement/sec and by a command
a u tho r ity limiter which required
the
throttle lever to be within
the
to
-36.5
degreesrange. Should the autothrot
t ie b e e n ga g ed o u ts ide
of the
-36.5
point
they w ou ld a ut om at i ca ll y m ov e t o t hi s
p o in t.To g iv e a g r ea ter r a ng e of sensitivity
t o e ac h t hr ot tl e lever s position,
there
were switches
t hat
isolated each le ve r s o
that individual tweaks could b e m ad e.
Other switches
known
as instinctive dis
connect
switches were fitted to the out
board
throttle
levers.
These
would disen
gage the a utothr ottle system while as a
final safetymeasure there were slipclutch
es i n
t h e a u t ot h r ot t l e drive mechanism
whichallowed directmanual override.
C ontrolling C onc or de in f lig ht w as the
purpose
of the
autopilot
and
flight director
there being
twO
separate integrated chan
n els f or e a ch .
The
input signals a n d c o m
putingwere
c om m on to
each autopilot
and
ightdirector;those of
the
autopilot operat
ed the pitch roll and yaw relayjacksin their
autopilot mode duringwhich
the
mechan
ical inputs were locked while the electrical
systemwasenergized. During normal opera
tio n b o th f lig ht d ire c to r s ys tem channels
AFT
OMP RTMENT
FORWARD
OMP RTMENT
FLIGHTOECK
speeds w h en t h e a u t o pi l ot was engaged in
maximum cruisemode. Duringan
automat
iclanding
the
throttle settingwas automat
ically retarded by the autopilot.
The
auto
throttle
s ys te m c om pr is ed t wo s ep ar at e
channels, s e le c te d b y s e pa r ate s w itc he s .
During flight both c ha nne ls were normally
engaged although
channel
1 a ct ed a s
the
primary controller with the other acting as
asynchronized standby. Tosafeguardagainst
malfunction each
channel
was self-moni
toring and wouldswitch out should there be
a s el f- de te ct ed f ai lu re a f ai lu re i n the
air data system or in
the
INSwhich supplied
m a nome tr ic a nd a ttitude data.
The
auto-
:
i
PREcONOA1RFTDISCHARGE
VALVES
FORWARD
DISCHARGE
VALVES
Cabin andflight-de ck pressurization and
conditioning requirementswere drawn
from enginetappings. Passing througha
cooleranda pre-cooler.the finalmixto
thecabin was achievedby adding ram air.
BBA
Colecton
and landing
displays plus
an
interlock fail
ure and monitoring test system.
The
autothrottle sub-system provided
c ontrol ove r
the
engines thrust during
the
approach and cruise phases
of
flight. With
in the autothrottle blackbox was circuitry
that
managed airspeed a n d M ac h control
modes the latter including datum adjust
ment provisions. There wasalso an airspeed
acquire m ode w hic h could capturea select
ed speed in the range
of
130-400kt,
although i t w as s u bje ct to a longitudinal
acceleration limit
of O l The
autothrot
t ie s ys te m a ls o h a d a p r ote ctio n p r ov isio n
b u ilt in that
guarded against
engine
over-
SUPERSONIC
CLASS
ROW 26
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
2
21
22
23
24
25
26
During
their
simulator
t r ai n in g t h e
tyro
pilots a nd e nginee r were intr oduc e dto the
automatic aspects of operating Concorde.
These
were
centred
around
t he aut om at ic
flight control system AFCS) which had
the capability
for
hands-off
flight
during
the
climb cruise
and
let-down phases
of
flight and had the a b ility to fly Concorde
during
a go-around.
Such
was
the
reliabil
ity builtinto
t h e A F C S t h a t
it c ould quite
easily manage a
Ca t
III
landing in the
foulest weather.
Integrated i n to t h e A F C S
were
t he aut ot hrot t l e,
autopilot, warning
The
Systems Take Over
Thisdiagram illustrates
thestandardseatingplan
used by Air France and
British Airways. although
it
could be altered according
to the requirements.
BBAColecton
TOILETIWASHROOM
IT]
80
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r
des. If
the
flight director was engaged
the
autopilot,
t h en t h e
alreadyselect
m odes w ould be accepted
by the
flight
ctor. Modes
that
c ou ld b e e ng ag ed
automatic
capture were indicated
by
hts, which illuminated to signal
cessful arming. A subsequent selection
hold woulddisengage
the
primed
e, thusextinguishing
the
prime light.
autopilot
was
authority-limited to plus
m in us 15G and
30
degrees
of
roll,
t ho ug h t hi s i nc re as ed t o 3 5 in a c on
There
wasalsoa ratelimitation
f 0. 10G /sec
at
a r ate
of
5 degrees/sec,
this
is
increased to0.25G/secdur
modeafterglide-slope captureand
go-around mode.
The
autopilot servo
ps were self-monitoring
at
all t im es;
ever, shoul d t here be a need t o di sen
the
autopilot, there was
an
instinctive
s c on n ec t b u tt on o n e a ch c o nt r ol
yoke,
as
a final safety measure
the
mechani
linkage between
the
rel ay j ack and t he
column
contained
a compressible
that
allowed
the
pilot
to
override
the
command
direct.
The
autopilotapproach modes were fully
monitoring; thus when
both channel s
re engaged duri ng l and m ode a st at e
of
ll failure survival was possible should
the
ary No.1
channel
fail. Its switching
would allow
the
fully energized No.2
to
take over automatically. Failure
any peripheral systems would cause
the
todisconnect
ifitwereengagedin
m od e
that
required
the
use
of
data pro
ed by
that
system. However, there were
epti ons; t hus a fail ure
of
the
ILS data
ed during
an
approach would
not
causea
nect, although
the
radio altimeter
ings musthaveexceeded600ft 183m);
s obviated nuisance disconnects. Simul
failure
of
both glide-slope receivers
t we en 2 00 a nd 7 5f t 6 1 a nd 2 3m ) r ad io
tude, or
both
localizer receivers below
also
notdisconnect the
autopi
t , al though an auto-Iandwarning l ight
ld illuminate to warn
the
crew
of
asub
stem fai lure. T o al low for
minor
adjust
of
the
speed hold modes,
the
autopi
datum
adjust
unit
installed.
The
datum
adjust was zeroed
and
inhibit
in
max. cruise mode, while in heading
an
autopilot turn
knob
allowed adjust
t he
heading
at
a fixed roll rate.
The autopilot
provi ded i nformat ion
t he
operational status
and
functional
of
t h e A F CS
in
t he aut om ati c
and l andi ng m ode
and
displayed
s for
both theautopilot
and
the
FLYINGTIlE FASTESTAIRLINER
aut othrot tl e during t he
cruise phase.
This
particular
arrangement
hadt w o
data
chan-
nelswhich operated
a t t h e
sametime; thus
No.1 fed
the
captain s display
andt he N o.2
channel
operated
the
first officer s display;
however,
the
most
important
warnings
were cross-fed
t obot h
displays so
that
both
crewmen
received keyinformation
even
if
one channel
had failed.
Certain
malfunc
tions
that
occurred
within
the
latter stages
o f a n a u to ma t ic
landing would cause
the
auto
l and l i ght
to
i l lum inate, w hich, i n
turn,prompted
the
crew
either
t oi ni t iat ea
manual
take-over
or
allow
an aut om ati c
go-around t o t ake place.
A furt her w arni ng system buil t i nto
the
AFCS/autopilot
was that
which protected
the
altitude setting.
This
was indicated
by
both audible and visual warnings when
the
altitude deviated from
that
selected
o n t he
AFCS
control panel.
Although
thealtitude
alert wasintegrated with
the
autopilot/flight
director tomakeoperationeasier, thesystem
w as, i n fact, compl et ely i solated from
the
AFCS
engagement modes.
The
altitude
alertsystem was inhibited when the under
carriage
was
in the down position.
Backing up
the autothrottle, autopilot,
autostabilization, trim
and the flightdirec-
tor
was
the
interlock
failure
monitor
and
testsystem
whichconstantly
surveyed
the
engagem ent st ate of
these modules
with
their
peripherals
a nd d at a
streams
and
flagged up a fail ure
t o t he
crew.
Should
there
be
an uni ntent i onal di sconnect t he
disengagement
was analysed to
determine
the
cause, displayed
t o t h e
crew
and
held
i n m emoryfor
subsequent
retrieval by
the
groundcrew;
th is function
was still avail
able
even
a ft er p ow er h ad b ee n r em ov ed
from
the
aircraft
a n d t h e n
restored.
The
sLllfaces
controlled
bythis myriad
of
electronics included
the
elevons
on th e
wing trailingedgeswhich provided rolland
pitch control,
while yaw
control
was cov
e re d by
the
use
o f t he
multipart rudder.
Each
of
these
control
sUlfaces
was
driven
by
an i ndependent
powered flying
control
unit PFCU).
The
controlof
these sLllfaces
was
by conventional
y ok e a nd r ud de r,
although
theywereactually linked by three
signal channels:
the
twoelectricalones are
notated
green
and
b lu e a nd
the
third
labelled mechanical. Each
oft he
electrical
channels
had i ts power suppli es deli vered
by their
ow n i nverter, colour-coded
to
m atch t he channel .
Each electrical
chan-
nel generat ed a si gnal via a synchro t rans
m it t er, referred t o
as
a r es ol ve r, t o
the
PFCU s servos. Each
o f t h e
flight control
groups,
the
middle,
outer
and
inner
elevons
and
the
rudders operated t hrough i ts ow n
resolvers; those
handl i ng t he
wing flight
control
providing
the
relevant mixing for
the
pitch
and
roll senses.
The mechanical
channel
coul d also t ransmi t
the
relevant
pilotcontrol inputs
t o t he
PFCU s servos;
thiscircuitbecame
declutched when
either
o f t he
electrical
channels
was engaged.
When
the
mechanical
channel was
engaged
its inputs were delivered to
the
PFCU sser
vos via l inkages and cabl es t hrough a rel ay
jack incorporated into
the
ci rcuit t o com
pensate for linkage inertia. As
the
elevons
were dedicated to
both
pi tch and rol l axes,
the
system required a m echani cal m i xi ng
unit
which was located downstream
of
th
pitch and rollrelayjacks.Builtinto
the
mix
ing
unit
was
the
capabilityto limit
the
range
of m ovem ent of t he i nner
elcvon sections,
which, in turn, minimized
the
aerodynam
ic
interference
of
thesesections
o n t he
fin
and
rudder, thusreducing
the
yaw
moment
in
the
roll sense.
The
maximum range
of
each set
of
elcvons through
the
front and
rear m ixeruni t sw asset
at
15 degrees fully
up and
17
fully d ow n in pur e p it ch ,
although
there was
an
override facility to
fullyup whichwouldgivea deflection
of 17
degrees, should
the
si tuati on w arrant i t.
This,
however, required some application
of
force to move
thecontrol
surfaces. In
the
roll sense
t heout er
a n d t h e
middle
elevon
secti on coul d m ove 20 degrees
each
way
while
t he i nner
sections werelimited
to 14
degrees each
way The
rudder had its limits
set
a t 3 0
degreeseach way The mechanical
stops
at
the
elevon
PFCUs
limited
the
inner
elevons
to 19
degreeseach
way
while
t h e o t he r
s e ct io ns w er e l im it ed t o 2 3. 5
degrees in
either
direction.
The
hydraulic
systems
that
normally supplied pressure to
the
PFCUs, relay jacks
and
artificial feel
unit s w ere
the
green
and
blue circuits,
although
in
t he event of ei t her
a bl ue
or
a
green system fail ure
the
yel low ci rcui t
coul d besw i tched i n,
although
its applica
tion
was limited
to
the
PFCUs
a nd t he
relay jacks only.
Select ion oft he
hydraulic
syst em s w as carri ed
out
using
the
servo
controls panel.
The m on i to r in g o f t h e
flight
control
systemscovered
the
behaviour
oft he
ight
control
inverters,
the
pressure
w i thi n t he
hydraulic systems,
operation
of
the
servo
controlsand
the
operation
oft he
electrical
controlchannels. Shouldthere
bea failure
in
o ne o f
t he control channel s, t he
moni
toring
system would
automatically
switch
over
to
t h e n e xt
available
channel.
Also
monitoring
the
behaviour
o f t h e
aircraft s
flight
controls
was
t he com parator
which
observed
t he i np ut o f e i th er t he p il ot o r
t heaut opil ot andt he
resultant
control
sur
face displacement.
Shoul d t here
b e a d is
agreement between
the
control channel s
the comparator
defined
the
suspectbefore
s wi tc hi ng o ve r t o t he
good
channel,
although
thiswas negatedshould
there
be
a h ig h r at e
o f c o nt ro l i np ut o r t he
flight
control
surface feeds back
inaccurate data
due
to
the
sudden
application ofh
igh aero
dynamic
loads.
Further protect ion
from
over-control was provided by
t he neutral -
ization system
which
engaged in
the
tran
sonic speed regi on
at
high
indicated
air
speeds
and
locked
t h e o u te r
elevons
into
the
neutral position
a t V MC
plus 25kt .
When
i t w as safe for
t he out er el evons
to
be re-engaged
there
w as a t i me-del ayed
transition
before t hey becam e operable,
thus reducing
t he chances of
airframe dis
turbance.
This
protection systemwasavail
able only t hrough
the
blue
a n d t h e
green
electrical
channel , not
in
the
mechanical
channel
selection.
The
relay jackswere twin-ram,electrohy
draulic
actuators
whose ram displacement,
di rect i on and
speed
were
controlled
by a
spool valve. A s
each
spool
valve
was
con-
trolled
by
b o th t h e
blue
and the green
hydraulic
systems,
there
were
indicator
l i ght s for
each
relay
j ac k a n d
its
p a ir o f
hydraulic
systems;
t herefore, should t he
spool valve lock upforany reason,
the
alter
nate,
hydraulic
syst em w oul d
t a ke o v er
operation
oft he
relay jackwhile
the
affect
ed sel ect or valve w as shut, t hus removing
hydraulic power from
the
jammed circuit.
This
fail-safe ensured
that
anyjammedrelay
jack would
not
affect the operation
of
the
fli ght cont rol system. Movi ng
the
actual
control sUlfaces was
the
purpose
of
the
PFCUs.
These
weretwin-ram actuators
that
were also controlled in a similar
manner
to
the
rel ay j acks, via a spool val ve. Shoul d
t here be
an
indication
of
a spool valve jam,
the
defective side
o f t h e
valve would auto
matically switch
out
t o l eave
the
working
side
oft he
systemin operation.
Integrated into
the
ight
control
system
was
the
auto-stabilization system whose
other
purpose was
to
minimize
the
effect
of
turbulence and
reduce
the
resulting flight
path
disturbance following
an engine
shut
down. The autostabilization system
con-
sisted
of
two separate
channels
for
each
control axi s, t hus
maintaining
control of
pitch,yaw
and
roll. Each
channel
for
each
a xi s c ou ld b e s el ec te d
by an
individual
FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER
This view alongthe wingtrailing edge
shows
the
location of
thethrust
reverserbuckets
in
the
up
position nlike most
other
aircraft the
augmentor
assemblies areshaped
to
conform
to
theshape ofthe nacelle box
instead
ofbeing round Adran alconer
Whenthe system
hydraulic
pressure is
fullydissipated
theelevonsdroop
against
their limit stops
as shownhere otethe
staticdischarger wicks on
theouterelevon
section and
the
open rearservice
door
Helo oelho
83
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l I ,, ,
_
FLYING THE FASTEST
IRLIN R
FLYING THE FASTEST IRLIN R
Communications
Given
that
Concorde
w as a hi ghl y
plex ai rcraft i t should
come
as
no
su
to
find
that
it was fitted
withan exte
range
of
communications equipment
basi c syst em consi st ed
o f VHF a n
radios,
SELCAL, ATC
transponder,
phone
systems
to
the
groundservice
and the
cabin/galley
and
passenger ad
systems. Also
partof the communic
suit e w as
the cockpit
voice recorde
stalled
s
a safety m easure
a nd mat
recoru should
an incident
occur.
The VHF
suitecomprised two ide
radio installations
which
are provid
cover the 118-135 .975MHz
freq
range,
there
being a 25kH z
channel
ing
betweeneach
selectable
channe
H Fsystem w as si mi l ar t o
theVHF
i
ittoo had twoseparate installations
provided single side-band
and
ampl
modula ted operat ion to
give t w
communications
at
2,182kHz
and
2,800kHz-25MHz
band.
The SEL
SELective
CAlling
was us ed in
junction
with
the
aircraft s
VHFan
radios
and permitted
a ground
s tat
FUELTRANSFERFORWARDFOR RAPIDDECELERATION
FUELTRANSFERAFTFOR TRANSONICACCELERATION
FUELTRANSFERFORWARDAS SPEEDREDUCES
twochannels, with No.1 s
the
primary and
No.2
in
synchronized standby mode.
The
super stabilization function became active
when the
angle
of
at tack exceeded 13. 5
degrees; this
in
t ur n g en er at ed a d ow n
e1evondeflection through
the
pitch autosta
bilization
channel,
this being proportional
to
the
angle
of
attack,
the
nose-uppitch rate
and
the
aircraftdecelcration.
The
deflection
of
theelevonswaslimitedto 8 degreesdown
and 0 degreesup-e1evon.
Should the
flight
control
system experi
ence
any form
of control jamming there
was
an
emergency system
that
operated in
both
pitchand
roll axes.
The operation of
the
emergency
fl
ight
control
system was
via
strain
gauge bridges
within the control
yokes
which
measured
the
p i tch and
roll
forces
generated
against
t he j am
by
the
pilot. When a
control jam
was
detected
the command
signals were
inpu t d i rec t to
the
electrical
fl
ight
control
systems. It
shoul d be
noted
that
there
were
no
emer
gency flight
control
funct i ons i n
the
yaw
mode.
When
the
emergency flight
control
s ys te m w as e ng ag ed
the control
forces
experienced
were similar
to those w ith the
artificial system disengaged.
L _L
L 6 ~
Fur th er p ro te c ti on
for
Concorde
throughout varyingangles
ofattack
waspro
vided
by the
high-incidence protection
sys-
tem, comprising
an
i nci dence t ri m m ode, a
st ick shaker and
the
anti-stall system. The
incidencetrimmode was integrated into
the
automatic pitch stability correction system
and operated
at
angles
of attack
above II
degrees. Should
the
n os e r is e a bo ve 1 6. 5
degrees, a stick shaker operated
on
the
cap
tain s control yoke, although the
input
was
felt acrossboth yokessince theywere inter
connected
via mechanical linkages.
The
st ick shaker gained i ts i nput signals from
either channel of the
airdata computer,
s
needed.
Cancellationofthe
stickshaker was
possible
by
pushing
the
c on tr o l y ok e
through
the
trim neutral position. Protect
ing
Concorde
from lOsec after take-off w s
the
anti-stallsystemwhich cameinto play
at
270kt.
When
the
aircraft reached a high
angle
o f a tt ac k t he
anti-stall system aug
m ent ed basic
pitch
st abi li zat ion w it h a
super-stabilization function
that
generateda
posi ti ve w arni ng t o
the
crew duri ng
the
approach
to
very high angles
of attack
via
the
artificial feel unit. As
the
anti-stall
sys-
t em wa s v it al t o p ro te c t C o n co r de , i t h ad
Duringthe
flight
phases the engineermonitored
themovementof fuelbetweentanksto achieve
the levels oftr im shownhere Shouldthe need
arise there was an emergencyforward trim
selectionavailableto thepilots Colecton
This gaugewas o ne o f
themostimportanton
thefl ight deck It
showed thepositions
ofthe
flight
control
surfaces the hydraulic
systembeingused for
operation and thee g for
theaircraftat anygiven
moment
Colecton
pitch
trim selector
on each control
yoke
or
via
the
autotrim
whenthe autopilot
was
engaged.
oncorde w as also provided w it h auto
maticpitch stability correction whichcov
ered four separat e m odes.
The
first w as
M ac h t ri m w hi ch
came in to
play during
transonicflightwhen
the
aircraft s
centreof
pressure moved rearwards, reducing pitch
stabil it y. T o restore t hi s,
the
M a ch t ri m
function automatically signalled
an
up
e1evon
demand
which
w s
related
to
any
Mach
number
betw een 0. 69 and 1.34.
The
s ec on d m od e wa s i nc id en ce t ri m w hi ch
compensated for changes
t o t he c en tr e o f
pressure w hen t heai rcraft al t ered i ts angl e
of
attack.
This
m ode began operat ion at
1 0. 5 d eg re es a nd r ea ch ed i ts m ax im um
point at
19.5.
This
m od e a ls o h ad a s ec
ondary purpose
in
that
itwouldincrease
the
st ick force required t o reach high angl es
of
attack; thus
s the
nose-up angle increased,
the
i nci dence t rim appl ied a nose-dow n
pi tch t rim . A s
the
speed rose, pitch stabili
t y correcti on
w s
introduced, integrated
with
the
Mach trim
channel
and
automat
ically signalled
an
up-e1evon
demand
relat
ed to
an
airspeed
input
betw een 200 and
600kt.
When the
aircraft passes
i nt o t he
supersonicpart
ofthe
flight envelope a fur
ther
speed t rim m ode
came
into play, pro
portional to
the
Mach number.
The
auto
pi tch stabil it y correcti on m odes w ere also
activated
when
autopi lot Mach t rim w as
engaged.Should there bea failure
or
disen
gagement
of
both electric trimsystems,
the
a ut op il ot s ys te m w ou ld a ls o d is en ga ge ,
although thiswasnegated should
Concorde
be below 100ft JOm).
envelope
the
pitch
artificial feel
main
tained
a
constant
loadfactor,wh
i e
the
roll
artificial feel
channel
kept a
constant
rela
tionship
between
the
rate
of
roll
a nd t he
control-wheel
force
during
the
full flight
envelope.
The
yawartificialfeel limits were
governed
by
the ruddcr requirements
matched to
the
aircraft s structural limita
tions.
Should there
b e a f ai lu re i n
either
the
blue
o r t he
green hydraulic system
or
e it he r o f t he
air
data computer channels
there
would be a corresponding loss
of the
artificial feel system
channel. Such
a l oss
would cause
the
system
to
defaul t auto
matically
to
the
back-upsystem. It should
be
noted
that
failure
of the
No.2
Channel
in
standby
m od e h ad n o e ff ec t on
the
behaviour
of
the
arti fici al feel syst em .
Integrated
intothe pitchchannel
artificial
feel was
the
stick wobbler
func t ion of the
a n ti -s t al l s ys te m; t hu s i t wa s a p ri ma ry
requirement
f or t hi s
channel
to
remain
operable
at
all times.
Concorde not
o nl y h ad fuel s ys te m
trimming
available,
the
flight
controls
w er e a ls o f it te d w it h a
conventional
trim
syst em avail abl e for roll , yaw
and p i tch
axes.
The operation
of
the
trim system
cancelled
the
load
of the
artificial feel by
altering
the
feel
datum,
w hi ch , i n t ur n,
altered
the
neutral position
o f t he
flight
controls.
The
t rim syst em fi tt ed
to
the
pitch channel
w as el ect ric i n
nature and
comprised two separate
channels.
During
norma l o pe ra ti on b ot h
engaged, w i th
No.1
channel having
authorityand
No.2
being
maintained
ina synchronizedstand
by
cond i tion. Control o f the
electric trim
system was
either
by
the
pilot using
the
F
f jl l
i tc h, a ll w er e e ng ag ed
during
normal
ation, although Channel
1 was
the
ary while
Channel
2 w as i nsynchro
standby
mode.
The
autostabilization
generated
si gnals i n pi tch, rol l amI
s
a function
ofthe
aircraft s speed
and
number
from
the AOC. These
sig
independently
supplied
through
electrical
channels
d ir ec t t o
the
servos,
although there
was
no
feed
t o t he
p il ot . A s we ll as
the
basic
abilization functions,
the
system
provi ded a roll /yaw
turn co-ordina
function
that
reduced side-slip angles
l ow er speeds i n response t o l argel at eral
demands.
The
autostabilization
N o.1 w as normal ly l i nked t o
the
e el ect ri cal
channel , a l though
this
d switch across
to
the
green
control
in
theeven to f
a failure. A similar
ess alsogoverned
the No.2
autostabi
na si mi l ar
manner to the
other
control
o n Con co rd e, t he
artificial feel
alsooperated
on
two separate
chan
pitch,
r oll a nd y aw a ll b ei ng
con
ed byindividualswitches. During nor
aircraft
operation
allsix feel
channels
re engaged,
although Channel
I for
s
the
primary.
The
mechan
unitthat
controlled
the
range
of
move
availableto
the
pilot
was a spring rod
increased
the
control
stiffness
in
rela
to
the
aircraft s speed.
The Channel
I
s were powered by
the
blue system
anu
theNo.2 Channel
were fed
by
the
en hydraul i c system. Jack syst em pres
es were governed by speedsignals gener
by
the
AOC.
Throughout
the
flight
84
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FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER
FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER
IRD T
PRO E
and mechanical springs. The nose a
b ly h a d
three
positions: up
a n d l o ck
degrees deflection and fully d ow n a
degrees. The n o se w as h e ld in the up
tion y two mechanical uplocks, at
degree
point
tw o ja ck s
and their in
l oc ks h el d i t i n p la ce a nd t he fully
r o si t i o n w as ach i ev ed by
the
u
hydraulic pressure,
aerodynamic
load
weight. O p er a ti o n o f t h e nose and
came from the greenhydraulicsystem
alsosuppliedpower to release
the
nos
visor
locks.
S hould the
g r e en s ys tem
c ou ld b e r ep la ce d
y
the yellow sy
although its input w as limite d to lo w
the
nose
and
visor,
the
former req
assistance from the assembly s weigh
aerodynamic forces s in ce t he hyd
p o we r r e le a se d only
the
locks. S
there
b e a to tal h y dr a u lic f a ilu re
the
could
b e r el ea se d by a
mechanical
r
o n t he
flight deck.
This
released the
and
allowed
the
nose
to dror t o t
degree rohlt, a t t he same time this o
tion alsoreleased
the
visor which wa
e r e d in s e q ue n ce ,
WE THER
R D R
PITOT
HE D
Nose Operations
glideslope. When the f irs t f o ur w er e a c ti
v a te d , a r ed f las h in g lig ht w as illuminated
accompanied
y
an
audible
whoop,
whoop pull up .
When
mode five was acti
vated
the
warning was aural onlyand con
sisted
o f t h e
wording glide slope .
Concorde w as a ls o rrovided with a
weather radarsystem comprisingduplicat
ed radardisplays, transceivers
and
a s ing le
radar
antenna,
managed
through
a s ing le
control unit. The r a da r s y ste m p r od u ce d
continuous
information on
the
approach
ing
w eather and
c o uld b e u se d f or
ground
mapping if required. The radar scanner
a ng l e c ou ld b e a dj us te d t o match
t h at o f
the
nose droor angle.
The
droop nose andslidingvisorensured thatthe
flight
crew
had areasonable sight
ofthe ground during take off and landing. Colecton
The
droop
nose assembly was required
on
Concorde
to a llo w g o od v isib ility during
landing
and
take-off. The visor was main
tained
in
the
up position y a
mechanical
uplock, while thedow n position was main
tained in p o s itio n y hydraulic pressure
in c id e nc e . To e n su r e
that
there were no
discrepancies in the data provided, each
of
the
ADC units cross-checked for
any
dis
parity.
The actual navigation was handled by
three
separate
INS
s ys tem s w h os e ta sk s
were to
provide navigation,
heading and
rlltitudeinformation. The No.1 system pro
vided d at a t o
the
le ft d a sh p a ne l and
the
AFCS
N o .J
andN o.2 [N S
did
the
samefor
the right-hand panel andA F C S No.2. The
th ird p latf or m h a d
the
capability to trans
fer
data
to
either
d a sh p a ne l,
although
it
had n o i n pu t t o e i t h e r A F CS . Each o f t h e
INS p latf or m s h a d a p r og r a mm in g m o d u le
in
the centre
c o ns o le w h ic h c o uld b e u se d
to r e trie ve
data
in d igital f or m
and
loa d it
for any desired route. On the ground, the
[NS p latf or m s to ok 1 5 min to a lig n , th is
b e ing in itia ted y a m od e s e le ct o r u ni t.
There
was
o ne M SU
for
each
platform,
th e se b e in g o n t he flight engineer s panel.
O nc e t he
s e le c to r h ad b ee n operated in
navigation
mode
it needed
not
be
operated
again unless there was a failure o f t h e [NS.
Protecting the
AFCS
platforms was a com
parator
able
t o d e te c t w h et h er t h er e
had
been a n [ NS f ailur e; s h ou ld th is happen
t h e r e le va n t A F CS o r [ N S would discon
nect
and d is pl ay a w ar n in g t o
the
crew.
S hould there
b e a f a ilu re
o f t h e
No.l
INS
to the captain h e w as a b le to s w itc h to the
No.2 system to regain data; a similarfacili
ty wasafforded
t o t h e
first officer.
Also aboard Concorde w as a duplicated
radio navigation s ys te m w ho se p ur po se
w as t o give bearings to
t he V OR or t he
A D F beaconor thedistanceto the nearest
A D F b ea c on , localizer and g lid e s lop e
indications. Other systemsavailable to
the
crew included
the
horizontal
situation
in dic ato r , w ith in p uts f r om t he V OR , t he
ILS a nd t he [NS. At low level
Concorde
was
protected
by t wo
independent
radio
altimeters
that yielded
low-altitude
infor
mation in the range 0-2,500ft 0-760m).
This
system was integrated into
the
auto
matic landing
system
a n d t h e
low-altitude
flight system. To
e n su r e t h a t t h er e
was
no
hidden f a ilu re , th is m o s t important of sys
te m s w as monitored
three
times per sec
ond. S upporting the
radio
altimeters
was
t he g ro un d p ro xi mi ty system which
warned
of
any impending c o llis io n w ith
the
terrain.
T h i s h a d
five
warning
modes:
an ex essive rate o f d es c en t , ex essive
ground closure rate, loss
of
altitude below
700ft 214m) a f ter ta ke - of f , c los e ne s s to
t h e g r ou nd
with
the
a irc r a ft in
landing
configuration and a d u ck u n de r
of
the
Each fl ig ht- d ec k a u dio s e lec to r
ranel
provided integration
o f t h e
radio
commu
nications and r a dio n a vig a tio n s ys tem s
and
the
crew s interphone network. The
flight
interphone
system allowed commu
nications
between
the
flight crew
stations
internally and between t h e s t at i on s a n d
the groundcrew handling
connection
m ou nt ed o n t he
n o se la n din g g ea r.
The
flight interphone system could under some
circumstances be connected to the service
interphone
system. The latter was provid
ed to
allow
communication
betweenflight
c r e w s ta tio n s a nd c ab in c r ew s tatio ns .
The system also permittedcommunication
b et w ee n c re w s t at i on s
a n d b et w ee n
all
i nt er na l a nd e xt er na l c om mu ni ca ti on
points.
Another
system available t o b ot h
flight a nd c ab in c re w was
the
public
address system. The P A c o u ld b e
orerated
from
the
flight
d ec k a nd t he t hr ee c ab in
attendant roints
in
the
passenger cabin.
This
a llo w ed a ta pe r e p ro d uc e r
to
be
con
nected and thus routine announcements,
such s safety demonstrations, c ou ld b e
played automatically. Similarly,
announce
ments
which
c am e i nt o
play
w he n t he
emergency oxygen masks weredeployed in
the passenger cabin c o uld b e p lay ed a u to
matically
it
couldalsobe used to broadcast
music .
On e later a d di t io n t o t h e c o mm u ni c a
tions s u ite w as
the cockpit
voi e recorder
C V R ) w hi c h
recorded
any communica
tions from t h e c a pt a in , t h e first officer or
the
flight engineer
on
to ta pe . I n addition,
t h e C V R
recorded
any
verbal
communica
tions generated through the b o om m icr o
phones, regardless
of
any communications
switching,
and
any f ligh t-d e ck n ois es
p ick e d u p y
an
area
microphone.
iven the speed
of
Concorde it is hard
ly
surprising
that
its navigation system was
extremely accurate. The system included
both ground-dependent and independent
position-indicating systems, which dis
played data
t o t he
crew.
This
information
was provided
y
the air data system whose
inputs
came
from
the
ADC
No.1
and
2
computers. These, i n t ur n, g ai ne d their
data
from
thepitot
probes for total pressure
and readings from t h e r e le v an t sensors:
temperature from the temperature probe
sensors, droop n os e a n gle f ro m
the
trans
mitter units, static pressurefrom the static
ports and aircraft weight from the FQI
selector a n d t h e e.g.
channel
selector. Each
o f t h e A D Cs
h ad a
built-in servo monitor
whichchecked for altitude, airspeed, Mach
n u mb e r, te m pe r a tu r e, v e rtica l s p ee d and
chimew hich
repeated
every
5sec
until the
c a ll w as a n sw e r ed . A ls o f itted in duplicate
to
Concorde
was
t he A TC
transponder
system. The s e co n da r y r a da r enabled a
ground controller to identify the aircraft
anddetermine its height.
r
a p a r tic u la r a irc r af t; th is r e m ov e d
need for the pilots to
monitor
the
os continuously. When
SELCAL
was
a f las h in g lig ht indicated to the
t w hich communications
channel
the
a d c as t w as o n ;
there
was a
two-tone
communicationsbetweenthe cabinandthe fl ight deck
crew
this interphone
themaincabin was used.
drian
Falconer
view
ofConcordes nose
was
rarelyvisible to boarding passengers. Observation
alsthat close to thechine underthe
windows
arethesecondary sensorsthat
was drooped. Colecton
86
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FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER
FLYING THE FASTESTAIRLINER
More on the Electrics
All
the equipmenton Concorde
re
a large
amount
of electricalpower;th
provided by four engine-mounted
g ra te d d ri ve g en er at or s IDGs a
hydraulically-driven emergency gen
for essential supplies under failure or
gency condi t ions. External ground
could be connected to
the
power dis
t ion system through a single-pointg
connection. The primary electricals
was a.c. ,wirh d.c. power from transf
rectifier unitsand batteries.
The
a.c. system normally had its g
power supplied from an external gen
during which operation itwas monito
voltage, frequencyand direction of ro
When ground power was applied, a
breaker closed, which directedpower
split system breakers,
the
bus t ie br
BTB rhen to the a.c. main bus-bars.
Concorde started its engines, the o
from
each lOG
was automatically di
to
the
a.c. main bus-bar as soon as
the
imumrequirements for voltageand fre
cy were reached and frequency synchr
tion had been achieved. Frequency c
for each
generator
was provided by
vidual
constant-speed
drive CSD
These
could be di sconnect ed i n
should
the
need arise; however,
the
could be resetonlyon the ground wi
relevant engine stopped. Each gen
was protected
at
all times by a faul td
tion system that trippedshould any lim
exceeded. EachlOG was connected
re la ti ve bus-bar v ia a generator c
breaker. All the generators could be
ated
in paral lel
and
i n any combin
between two and four outputs; i
arrangement the bus-bars themselve
then connected via the relevant BT
split systembreakers SSB . The SSB
nected the left-hand
main
a.c. bus-b
the right-handmain powersystem.No
ly
the a.c. essential bus-bars were po
by
the associated a.c. main bus-bars, h
er in
theevent
of
the
failure
of
a ma
bar, the emergency generator would
automatically and
connect
to
the
essential bus-barthus restoringpower
Should there bea failure
ofthe
p
electrical generators the emergency
generator would kickin.
This
hydrau
powered supply was driven. by the
hydraulic system and couldsupply e
power to maintain power to al l ess
services. This generatorwould start s
there be a total failure of any of
the
nosejacks
L
5
noseuplocks
isoruplock
aerodynamicloads
and gravity
OPPOSITE Thisshowsthe range ofmovement
selectablefor thenose droop mechanism the
methodof lockingthenose inpositionand the
position ofthe visorat eachpoint.
BBA Colecton
SUBSONIC
ND
SUPERSONIC FLIGHT
NOSE
ND
VISOR UP
I
FIN L PPRO H AND L NDING
NOSE DOWN ND VISOR DOWN
T KE
OFF ND INTERMEDIATE PPRO H
NOSE TO 5 DEGREES VISOR DOWN
droop nose greatlybenefited
crew
however undercertain flight
it
couldset up a disturbing
buzz
BBA Colecton
Safely ensconced inthe purpose buil t
dockat Filton thisfrontal
view
of Concorde
hasizesthe almostdart l ikeshapeof the
Adran
Falconer
88
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FLYINGTHE
FASTEST IRLINER
FLYINGTHE
FASTEST IRLINER
CAPACITIES
RATED: 3 PERSONS
OVERLOAD:40 PERSONS
CAPACITIES
RATED: 36 PERSONS
OVERLOAD: 48 PERSONS
SLIDE/RAFT AUTO/MANUALIN
INTERMEDIATESERVICED
SLIDE AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)
REARSERVICEDOOR
SLIDE AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)
FORWARD SERVICE DOOR
Concorde
was
reasonably
well
equipped
safetyand survivalequipment,although
chancesof itsbeingused would be slen
aftera lessthanperfectlanding.
BBA
Co
/
s u pp r es s in g a f ir e in its o w n
or t headj
engine bay. W h e n a n extinguisher w
charged, its contents weredispersed a
the
bay by nozzles
around the
peri
and
its operation c los e d a f ir e v lve
shut off the f lo w t o the air-conditi
primary and secondary heat excha
Further protection for
the
engine ba
provided by f ir e f la ps w ho se ope
sealed off the engine b ay to s ta r v e it o
gen. These normally acted as seconda
doors and engine-bay
vent
d oo rs i
engine firezone.
These
wereoperated
emergency
by
an engine shutdown h
in the c o ck p it. Pr o te c tin g the fuel
·
·
,
·
·
SLIDE/RAFT AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)
FORWARDPASSENGERDOOR
CAPACITIES
ATED: 4 PERSONS
OVERLOAD: 53 PERSONS
LL
SLIDE/RAFT PACKSCAN BEDISENGAGEDAT THE
DOOR
SILL
T OS E R V E A S R A F T S A N D F L OTA T ION A I D S
of simple temperature sensing elements
connected in s e rie s to f or m lo op s o n t he
engine-bay doors.
Their
primary purpose
w as t o
det ect hot
gas
or
a ir le ak s. Be yo n d
t heengi ne nacelles there were furthersys
tems, one l oc at e d i n each w ing le ad ing
edge and providing coverage
of
any hot-air
le ak s f ro m
the air-conditioning
system.
H a vin g d e te cte d a f ir e or high overheat
ing, there were four extinguishers available
forsuppressingany conflagration.
There
was
one
e x tin gu ish e r b o ttle in e a ch e n gin e bay
these beingcontrolled from the flight deck
by e lec tric al in itia tio n . Eac h e x tin gu ish e r
h ad t wo f ir in g h ea ds a nd w as c ap ab le
of
NOTE:THE FORWARDLlH SLIDE/RAFT
P K
C A N B E R E MOV ED F R OMI T S L OC A T ION A N D D E PL OY ED
THROUGH EITHER INTERMEDIATEPASSENGERDOOR
SLIDE AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)
REARSERVICEDOOR
SLIDE/RAFT AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)
INTERMEDIATEPASSENGERDOOR
CAPACITIES
RATED: 38 PERSONS
OVERLOAD: 5 PERSONS
the
flight-deck overhead panel or
the
stew
a rd s p a ne l.
These
lights
c am e o n
auto
matically should there b e a f ai lu re o f t h e
d.c. essential bus-bar.
The emergency oxygen systems tted
p r ov id ed f or
both
crew
and
passengers.
The c r e w s y s tem w as o f t h e gaseous pres
sure breathing-on-demand type, the gas
for which w as h e ld in h igh - p re s su r e s tor
age cylinders.
Oxygen
was delivered
at
a
lowerpressure suitablefor human use
vi
a
control regulator which was operable u p t o
a cabin al t it ude
of
32, 000ft 9, 800m).
ove this,
the
crew were supplied with
undiluted
oxygen
at
a p r og r es s iv e ly in
creasing pressure, accordi ng t o
the
cabin
altitude. The p a ss e ng e r s ys tem w as s u p
pi i ed f ro m
three
cylinders vi a s ys te m
control panel. Regulation o f t he g as w as
m ai nt ai ned at 40psi 2.8kg/sq em)
vi
a
distribution panel that
had
an emergency
override to d el i ve r a p re ss ur e
of
90psi
6.3kg/sq em) if required. N o t o n l y could
the passengersystem be used for emergen
cies, there was a medical/therapeutic point
in
the
passenger cabin, this
having
its own
mask. The emergency p r es s ur e w as s u p
plied automatically should cabin al t it ude
exceed 14,000ft 4, J00m ) and resulted in
the
passenger masks beingdeployed with
out manual intervention. The use offixed
point o x yg e n s y ste ms w as augmented
by
the provision
of
s om e por ta ble sets, which
a ll ow ed c r ew m em be rs
to
move freely
about t he cabin.
oncorde w as a lso protected from the
airman s greatest fear: fire in the a ir .A m u l
tiplicity
of
systems were installed
o n C o n
corde, thus
there
weresmoke
detection
sys
te ms in the air generation ducts as w ell a s
in the cabin and the freight holdarea. Both
audible and visual alertswarned the crew
of
any problems. The fire
detection
system in
t he engine bays consisted of a dual-loop
sensor which required
that
both loops must
detect a f ir e b e fo r e giving a w a rn i ng t o
the
crew.
This
ensured
that,
should
there
be a
f ailur e in one loop, no spurious warning
was indicated
and that
a f aile d lo op c o uld
b e s w itc h ed o u t, le ving
t he ot her
to p r o
vide cover
Supplementing the
fire detec
tion system was that covering engine over-
heating, although t hi s w as s pe ci fi c to
certain parts
oft he
engineand
not
general
like
the
fire detectors.
O ut si de t he
general
fire detection system in t he engine nacelle
there was asimilar double-loop system with
similar redundancy t o d e te c t a torching
f lam e. A f u rth e r
overheatdetection
system
w as lo ca ted in the nacelles; this consisted
cabin on the le ft- ha n d s id e. Em er g en cy
transmitter equipment in clu de d tw o r a dio
beaconsto the rear oft he forward cabinand
one
to the rear
of
the aftcabin.Should there
b e a n e ed f or th em , th e re w er e f ir st-a id kits
located
in
the forward, right-hand centre
and rear amenitystowages. As in other air
c r af t, e a ch p as se ng er h a d a life jac ke t u n de r
hisseat and a further sixwerecarriedfor the
use of infants; the c a bin c re w a ls o h a d lif e
jackets.
Other
equipment carried includeda
battery-operated megaphone,a fire axe and
cabincrew portable oxygen sets.
The slides a n d c o mb i ne d slides/rafts
could be used during
the
evacuation
oft he
aircraft; those d e s ig n ate d a s s lid e s/r af ts
c o uld b e detached f or u se a s r af ts , a n d t h e
slides wouldalso float, although they were
not
designed for long-term use. To supple
m ent t he
slides/rafts werea thirty-six-man
raft
complete
with
an emergency
pack; fur
ther emergency p a ck s w e re a v aila ble f or
use with
the
combined slides/rafts. To sig
nal
that
a
Concorde
was down, i t w as f it
ted
w ith tw o r a d io b e a c on s ,
each of which
was self-buoyant, dual-frequency and bat
tery-operated. The e s ca p e r o pe s c o uld b e
used inseveral waysto assist
the
passengers
and
crew
to
e sc ap e f ro m a
di t chi ng or
a
c ra sh l an di ng . D ur in g a n y e m er g en c y
there were e m e rge nc y lighting systems
available
that
c o uld b e a r me d f ro m
either
This
view
along
an ir
France Concorde showsthecurvesengineered intothefuselage
and wings by
the
aircraft s designers. Lookingto therear.oneof theaft access doors isopento allow thecabin t o b e
servicedbeforethe nextgroupof passengersboard. Bernard
Chares
automatically actuated at allstationswhen
ever the flight-deck control switch was set
to
the
on p o sitio n . I f a n e m er g en c y w er e
signalled,
the
crew, both flight and cabin,
had access to emergency equipment. This
included a torch
at
the flight engineer s sta
tions, smokegoggles forall three flightcrew,
p lu s a p o rta b le o x yg e n p a ck s tow e d in
the
miscellaneous equipment rack.
n
case of a
fire there w as a carbon dioxide fire extin
guisher,asbestos gloves and a f ir e a x e .Sim
ilar
equipment
w as s tow e d in
the
miscella
neous equipment r ac k a nd in rac k 215.
Should there b e a n ee d f o r them, ropes and
lifejackets werealso available.
The passenger cabin was equipped with
carbondioxide fire extinguishers at the
for-
ward, c e ntr e a nd r ea r le ft- ha n d d oo r s a n d
th e re w as a w ater /ga s e x tin gu ish e r at the
centre r i gh t- ha nd d oo r. S h ou ld t he re b e a
n ee d f or
Concorde
t o d it ch , t he re we re
ditching lines, one lo ca ted to b o th p o rt and
starboard in the centre amenitystowageand
in the f or wa rd a m en ity s tow a ge w as the
escaperope.Each
oft he
six cabindoorshad
slidepacksinstalledin them,those at t he for
ward passenger a n d c en t re doors also dou
bled as rafts.
Another
raft waspOSitioned at
the
rear
oft he
passenger cabin
on the
right
hand side. Emergency packswere in the for
ward amenitystore:two at the rear of the for
ward cabin and one m o re a t the rear
of
the
ough C oncorde
h as h ad a g en er al l y
p l ar y s af et y r ec or d i n comparison
subsonic a irc r af t, i t h a d ample safety
emergency systems and equipm ent .
u d ed in th is c a te g or y w e re
the
emer
evacuation alert
system,
emergency
equipment, passenger and crewoxy
supplies and escape equipment.
emergency evacuation alert system
aural
and
visual warningsfor
bot ht he
and the c a bin c re w, th is a ls o p e rm it
the c ab i n c re w t o o pe r at e the cabin
system
by
remotecontrol from
the
passenger door position.
The
indica
bleeper and a flashing
the flight compartmentand in e a c h
three vestibules. The warnings were
rearservice doorandthe cabin
windows
were
sizeto comply
with
American
Helo Coelho
on Safety
bus-bars or if N o s I and 2 engines be
in flight.
d .c. p o we r generating s y ste m w as
by f ou r t r an s fo r me r r ec ti f ie r
TRUs). Nos
l a n d 4 w e re p o we r ed
the a.c. essential bus-bars, while the
draw their power from
the
a.c.
bus-bars. The
on-board
battery
con
t e d t o e a ch e s se n tia l d .c. b u s- b ar
vi
essential main is ola te b r ea k er s a lso
power.
90 9
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_
_
JL
-- -
,--
-
FLYINGTHE
FASTEST IRLINER
FLYING
THE FASTEST IRLINER
system waspowered
by
a two-bladedram
t ur bi ne w hi ch i n
use
w ou ld d ri ve
hydraulic pumps should
the
main po
plants windmilling speed be insufficie
drive
the
hydraulic and
the
electrical
tems in
theeventof
afour-engine flame
T o suppl y hydraul ic pow er for ground
vicing purposes there were twoelectric
driven pumps
that
would pressurize
bot
mainand
the
standbysystem.
The
green hydrauli c syst em sup
power
to
the
No.1
and
2
engine
air
in
ramp
and
spi
doors, plus
one
ram ea
the
power fl ight control s
a nd t he
jacks. It alsosupplied pressure
t o t h e
ficial feel,
one
No.l1
fuel
tank
p
droop
nose
and
visor, l andi ng gear,
wheel brakes, anti-skid units
a n d t h e
wheel steering jacks.
The
bluesystem
pli ed power
to
Nos 3
and
4 air
in
ramps
and
spill doors,
the alternate
for
the
power flying
controlsand
the
nate
feeds
to
the
relay jacks.
The
blu
tem
also provided
the
secondsupplyt
other
arti fici al feel
c ha nn el a nd
remaining No.ll
tank
pump.
Sta
power w as suppl ied by
the
yellow sy
which
could, i f needed, supply hydr
pressure
to
all four
intake
ramps
and
doors,
the
flight controls,
the droop
and
visor, landing-gear
deployment,
w
brakes
and
anti-skid, emergency
and
ing braking,
w ithout the
anti-skid sy
being operative, and nose-wheel stee
One ofthe
primarysystemsdriven
b
greenand
the
blue hydraulicsystemwa
o
C
G Co
5
56
f FWD
60
58
50 -
52
delivered it
to
the
blue system; pumps
on
N os2 and4 engi nes covered
the
yellow
sys-
t em . D uri ng norm al operati on
the
three
hydraulic systems operated
at
a pressure
of
4,000psi 280kg/sq cm ) and t here
was an
overpressure limiter
that
allowed for a max
imum pressure
of
4,500psi 316kg/sq cm).
T o p r ev en t c av it at io n
of
the
hydraulic
pumps
the
three systems reservoirs were
pressurized and there
was
an auxil iary air
compressor
that
coul d berun t oensure
that
the
reservoirs were pressurized before
the
engines started. The emergency hydraulic
IlIII
COLLECTOR GROUP
c= J
MAIN
T NKS
_ TRIM T RANSFER G ROUP
More on
the
Hydraulics
Hydraulic power was
a t t h e
heart
of
\ on-
corde operati on. It w as provided
by
three
independent
systems; two, blue and green,
acted
as the
primaries andthere
was
a yellow
system desi gnated for st andby purposes.
Each
o f t he
t hr ee was p owe re d by tw o
engi ne-dri ven pum ps per powerpl ant and
em ergencypow er came from a ram air t ur
bine.
The pumpsmounted on engi nesN os 1
and 2deliveredhydraulicpower to
the
green
system and t hose
on
N os 3 a nd 4 e ng in es
BELOW
The achievableMach numberfor Concorde wasdependent on the
c.g. location;thusthe two setsoffiguresare displayedon these cockpit
instruments. BBA
Colecton
Concordes fueltank system
was quitecomplicatedsince
some tanksactedpurelyin thetr im
roleand othersfed theprimaryengine
groups.Cross connection was possible
should
it
be needed. BBA Colecton
the
f li gh t e ng in ee r s f ue l
management
panel
and
at
the
refuel
control
panel dur
ing refuelling.
The
fuel gaugi ng syst em
supplied
datato
thecentral
dash
panel and
t h e m a na g em e nt a nd
refuel panels,
and
al so provi ded
tank
limit
control during
trim transfers
and
refuel s, as w el l as c.g.
data
at
the cockpit
panels,
Mach
limits
to
the
samepanels
and
warnings in
the
cock
pit
should
the
c.g. limits be compromised.
The
load
control
system pumpedfuel from
tanks
N os 9
and to i n to N o s 1 1 ,5 a n d
7
to
provide a rearwardc.g.transfer,
a n d t o
gain
a forw ard t rim , fuel w as t ransferred from
tank
No.ll
to Nos 9, 5
and 7. The
trim
tank contents
were preselected using
the
loadlimitselectors,
there
beingsettings for
tank
Nos
9, 10
and
11.
Any
fuel excess
outside
trimming
requirements was auto
matically transferred
to
N os 5 a n d 7 t an ks .
Since
t hi s wa s a v it al s er vi ce ,
the
trim
t ransfer syst em had
duplicated
electrical
control
circuitry whose No.1
channel
was
the
prim ary and
N o.2 monitored
it
and
w ould sw it ch i n i fN o.1 fai led.
The
c.g. was indicated in
the cockpit
by
three distinct channels. The
primary
one
was
the
main
channel
w hich drew i ts
data
from all
the
fuel tanks
and
used i t
to com
putethe
c.g.
Standbychannel
No.1 gained
its
data
from
the
tanks
o n t he
left-hand
side
o f t h e
aircraft
and channel
A
of
tanks
9,
to and
11. For
computational
purposes,
the
resultant
figure was doubled
and
pre
sented
to
the
crew.
The N o.2channel
took
its
data
from
t h e r i gh t -h a nd t a nk s
plus
channel
B
of
t an ks 9 , 1 0
and
11
and
pre
sented
i ts result s i n a si mi l ar m anner.
The
settingof the
c.g. limitsby
the
crewwas by
the
use
of
,bugs which defined
the
forward
and
aft limits
throughout
the
Mach
range.
These
were set
o n t h e M a c h me t er s
in
the
cockpitand
movedrelativeto
the
aircraft s
speed
and
c.g. range.
The
limits weredis
pl ayed by t wo separate
channels, one
was
contained
in
the
N o. 1 st andby e.g. pack
and
delivered
d at a t o t he
captain s posi
tion
and
the other channel
was
contained
w it hi n t he N o. 2 s ta nd by
e.g.
p ac k a nd
delivered its indications
t o t he
first offi
cer s
and
the
flight engineer s indicators.
S inceC oncorde
was sensitive regarding
i ts e.g., i t had a c.g.
and Mach
limit warn
ing system.
The
first level
of
warningindi
cation
activated as
the
set boundary l i mi t
was reached
and
should
the
set boundary
be breached.
The
warnings were initiated
through
the
standbyNos
1
and
2c.g. packs
andactivated
lights
on
the
master
warning
p a ne l a n d t h e
flight engineer s station.
The
main
transfer group
of
fuel t anks
i nc lu de d N os 5, 6, 7 a nd 8 t an ks , w hi ch
operated
in
sequence to reduce
the
disrup
tionto
the
aircraft sc.g. whilesupplyingfuel
to
the
engine collector tanks. The main
transfersequence
was
manuallyselectedand
used
the
pumps i n
Nos
5 a nd 7 t an ks ;
the
form er fed fuel i nto N o. 1
tank
via
the
left
h an d p um p a n d
N o. 2 t a nk
via
the
right
hand pump, while the latter
fed
fuel
to
No.3
tank
via
the
l eft -hand pump and t o
No.4
tank
via
the
ri ght -hand pum p. A s soon as
N os 5 a nd 7 t an ks h ad e mp ti ed , t he ir r ol e
was
taken
over
by
N os6 and8 t anks. B efore
N os5 and 7 t anks sw it ched out, t hey w ere
replenished by Nos 5A and 7A t anks.
The
t rim t ransfer system
was
u se d t o
redistribute fuel
in
the
t rim t anks andm ai n
transfer tanks so
that
t he c.g. c ou ld be
moved
to
its
optimum
position for take-off,
subsonic and supersonic flight.
Under
nor
mal operation,
the
system was automatical
ly
controlled from
the
engineer s panels;
however, there
was
a forward transferover
ride cont rol avai labl e t o t he pil ot s for
use
underabnormalcircumstanceswhichmight
requirea rapid transferforward
of
fuel.
To reduce
the
possibility
of
fume explo
sions,
the
fuel t anksvented i ntoa ri ng m ain
gallery which
then
fed ascavenge
tank
that
subsequent l y vented t o
the
atmosphere
through
the
rearfuselage.A scavengepump
autom at i cal ly removed any fuel
that
had
entered
the
scavenge tank
and
returned it
for reuse i nN o. 1 t ank.
When
flying
at
high
altitude,
the
aircraft s tanks werepressurized
to
between
1.2
and 1.5psi
0.08-0.llkg/sq
cm)
which prevented
the
fuel from boiling
off.
This
increased differential pressure was
required
to maintain
a
minimum
pressure
as
the
altitude increased.
Should
t he re be a
need for it, there was a fuel-jettison system
installed whichwaspart
ofthe
trim transfer
group;
the
dumping
of
fuel w as t hrough a
vent
pipe
at
the
rear
o f t he
aircraft. To
ensure
that
sufficient fuel remained for
the
engines,
the
system monitored
the amount
b ei ng d um pe d b ef or e s wi tc hi ng o ut . T o
combat the
possibility
of
aerat ion i n t anks
10, 11,6,8,
5 A a nd
7A, whose
contents
remai ned m ainl y st at i c duri ng
the
c1imb
o ut, t he re was a s pec ia l p ump i n
tank
No.
to
the
others used
the
built-in system
pumps.
These
de-aerated
the
f ue l i n
the
t anks, t hus reducing
t he c ha nc e o f
pump
cavitation
o r t ra ns ie nt s i n
tank
pressure.
Fuel
contents
were measured by
the
fuel
quantity
indicators
which
worked
through
capacitor-type gauging
channels. T hese
gave
indicationsof each
tank s
contents
at
the
purpose
o f t h e
fuel
tank vent
igni
suppression system.
This
used a flame
that automatically
triggered adis
ofagent
into
t h e v e n t
pipe
between
d et ec to r a nd t he
fuel t anks.
This
that any
ignition
o f t he v en te d
by any external
sourcecould
not
feed
t he
fuel tanks.
Further protection
provided by smoke
detectors
in
the
air
ducts
and
the
passenger
cabin
freight holds.
the Fuel
e the
design
of
subsonic aircraft,
the
system
o n C o nc o rd e
had
t wo func
the
unusual
one
being
to
provide
ing throughout the
aircraft s speed
The
f uel was h ou se d in
thirteen
t anks i ntegral
w i th t h e
wings
and
and
divided
i n t o t h re e d i st i nc t
engine
feed,
main
transfer
and
trim
Arranging
the
fuel in thesegroups
that
i t w asdel ivered t o
the engines
ow rates, temperaturesand pressures
t
y with
the
engines
operating
para
The
t rim group w as
the
means
of
and
adjusting
Concorde s
cen
of
gravity
throughout
the
flight
enve
and
also
compensated
for
the
differ
centres of
pressure
experiencedduring
sonic acceleration and deceleration.
fuelsystemalsoacted asa
heat
sink
for
heat
generated
by
the
hydraulic
a n d c a bi n c o nd i ti o ni n g a n d t h a t
by kinetic
energy. As
the
fuel
st ored i nseparate t anks, t his reduced
possibility
of
fuelsurges
a n d t h e
devas
effects
of
hydraulicdieseling. A fur
precaution
to
compensate
for
Con
s st eep
climb-out
a ng le was
the
system
which
ensured
that
air
tanks
did
not
become
a hazard.
o f t he
Olympus
engines
h ad i ts
f ue l f ee d f ro m a
dedicated collector
, butthere
was a cross-feedsystem
that
wed any
engine
orgroup
of
engi nes t o
i edfrom any
other
collector
tank.
r t h e
possibility
of
low pressure in
fuel l i nes
there
was
an
accumulator
delivered fuel
untilthe
pumpstook
the
slack. Between
the
low pressure
a nd t h e e n gi n e- d ri v en p um p
was
LP
protection
system
which
allowed
to
bypass
the
air
conditioning and
heat
exchangers in
t h e e v e n t o f
fuel pressure.
When
the
bypasscircuit
disarmed a
constant
flow
of
fuel passed
h t h e h e a t
exchangers.
92
93
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FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER
indicators this w ou ld b e f ol lo we d b
audio
cancellation
at lBOkt otherwis
pulledundercarriage
circuit
breaker w
set
the
warning system off. Once
parts
o f t h e
checklist had been comp
the
a ir c ra ft w ou ld b e d ep re ss ur iz e
b e lo w 1 0 0 0 0ft
3,000n.). Once this
been
done
b ot h t he c ab in a nd
the
a
altitudeshould be roughly
the
same
w
fuel still
on
board.
While
this was
happen
ing
thecabin
crewwould
have
advised
the
passengers t o p u t o n t h ei r u ni n fl a te d life
jackets an
a c ti o n t h a t
they themselves
would
have
a lr ea dy c ar r ie d o ut .
These
actions completed, the
flig h t c rew wo uld
begin to discharge fuel and pull the circuit
breakers that controlled
the
ground prox
imity w ar n in g a n d l a nd i ng gear warning
High abovethe clouds a BAConcorde G BOAA cruisestowardsthe point
where
the
thrust augmentationcan be selectedto push
it up
toMach
2 BBA Colecton
Handling Emergencies
ri ls nd ribul tions
CHAPTER
FIVE
As well asdispensingmeals and drinks the
cabin c r ew w er e w el l v er se d i n the disci
p line s re la te d to
the
safety
o f t h e
aircraft.
Beforetake-off
the
cabincrew
went
through
t h e c u st o ma r y
safety
r ou ti ne a nd t he n
described what passengers m ig ht n ee d t o
do
in emergencies s uc h a s a crash-landing
or
a
ditching. T hey then
ensured that
the
passenger luggage
bins
we re c los e d
and
that
those marked
C R E W U SE O NL Y
RESERVE A L EQUlPAGE did
n o t c o n
t a in a n y
metallic objects
that could inter
fere
w i th t h e
flu x v a lv e s b y a
magnetic
dis
turbance. Part ofthe briefingalso concerned
smoking areas which wererestricted to the
passenger cabin zones and
the
flight-deck;
smoking was
not
allowed in
the
toilets
and
t h er e w er e h ar d- wi re d s mo ke d et ec t or s
installed to warn
of
infringements.
S h ou l d t h er e
be a need for
an
emer
gency
evacuation
all
the cabin
crewassist
ed. Once the aircraft hadstopped the crew
g u id e d p a ss e ng e rs to wa rds
the
forward
cabin
exits after
which
they we re to shep
herd
their
charges
c le ar o f t h e d ow ne d
m a ch i ne . S h ou l d n e it h er o f t h e
forward
escape slides beavailable
at
least
one
crew
member used
the
e sc ap e r op e i n
the
for
w ar d v es t ib ul e t o l ea ve
the
aircraft
and
a tt em pt t o
realign
any of the door
s lid e s/rafts for e s ca p e u sa ge . S h ou l d t h e
aircraft
have
t o d it ch ,
the
f l ig ht c re w
would
have
already
transmitted
a m a yd a y
w hich included the
disposition
o f t h e
crew
and passengers i n te n ti o ns o n landing
location and a description
of
any danger
ous cargo plus
t h e r e ma i ni n g q u a n ti t y o f
The outward
face
of Concorde
was
the
cabin crew movingabout, efficientlydeal
ing with
the
needs
o f t he ir
passengers.
Although
thissupersonic marvel was slight
ly cramped
in sid e b e ca u se its p u rp os e was
to achieve flight speeds above Mach
1
the
s e rvic e a b o ard it m o re
than
amply justified
the
p rice tag . In c lu d ed in
t h e t i ck e t
price
was a m e al
excellent in
every way.
Even surrounded by groundequipment
Concorde looked a purposeful sleek aircraft;
andits dramaticsweepsand angles are
emphasizedin thisphoto Nick Chalenor
landing gear.
This
consisted
o f t he
two
main gears
the
noseleg
andthe
tail bumper
wheels plus the geardoors. In the
e v en t o f
an emergency there weretwo standby sys
tems:
one
was
the independent
hydraulic
system
a nd t h e o th er
u se d a m e c ha n ica l
release and free-fall under gravity to drop
the undercarriage intothe locked position.
oncorde s braking system compriseddual
hydraulically-powered multi-disc wheel
brake units governed by an anti-skid sys
tem all being mounted on
the
main legs.
S hould there
b e a los s
of
primary hydraulic
p ower em e rge n cy b rak ing c o uld b e s us
tained
by
an accumulator which provided
pressure fora short period. The final under
carriage systemwas
the
nose-wheel steering
w hi ch w as e le ct r ic al l y c on t ro l le d
and
h yd rau lic a lly d rive n th rou g h
the
rudder
pedals a nd t he h an d wheels
on
the flight
deck.
This
then was
t h e c o mp l ex m a ch i ne
that
ourtyrocrew would fly for
either
British
Airways o r A i r France.
lEIT looking more like an insect with everythingout
anddown an ir France Concorde approaches
ParisCharles de Gaulleafter anothertransatlantic
journey BernardChares
BELOW: The endresult highabovethe clouds
BA Concorde G BOAG
flies on
its w y to alanding
at Heathrow
BBA Colecton
94
95
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TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS
-
- _ ~ - , - . . : . . .
: : : : ~ : : : ~ -
: :.,.,
~ : . _ - _ r : : : _ ~ : : : : :
.
.
.
.- ~ \ . -
. ,
_ ,) lAlR'/' . .
, , , _ C ~
..-
British Airways and Air
France
Test Crews
British Airways
Air
France
aptain
Sen io r Fl g ht Sen io r Fl g ht
aptain
SeniorFl ght
SeniorFlght
Officer
ngineer
Officer
ngineer
AR Meadows CJD Drebar WD Johnston
GJacob Metias Frot
HC
McMullen
BR Olver J Stanbrdege MGies R
Puyperoux
R
Duguet
AJ Massie MBannister
TB Dewis F
Rude
A
Col oc Cuechiaro
JD Eames oWhitton PEggington PDuda
Marchand
Roganbach
JD
Cook
WI
Smith
PJ Phi ps
M
Butel Holbecq Ranty
JC
Hutchinson CD
Green
DA
MacDonald
MCheme Chambr er Pouan
JLChorey
RJ
Tayor
JA
Rodger
MCaiat J
Marcot Diou
NA Britton BHoland
RC
Bricknel La anne Lor sch
ABanc
BO
Walpole
JRWhite
PLng GIe Gaes JC Delorme HPerrer
JW
Burton
PW
Horton
RN Webb Machavoine J Schwartz M Vasseur
J
Bradshaw
MRWithey TJ Quarrey CMarty Y
Pingret
PDuffey
AI Head
SG Foyd Lecerc
VVenchiarrut
KD Leney WD Lowe IF
Smith
PDuda BViale
J Hirst
KWiliiams
M Cooper J Franch
NV
Todd
BR Holand
WJ
Brown JL
Chatelain
BJ Calvert DC Rowland IV Kirby GDefer
DG
Ross
WJ Piper
PJ Newman AQui chini
CMorris B Irven W Dobbs
MA Riey
DG Mitchell
J Groatham
BAC
Test
Crew
BGT Tichener
BJ Calvert AA Brown
Pi ots Fl ght
Observers
JC McNeilley oCobey
SL
Bolton
ngineers
HJ
Linfield B
Harmer
F JE Lidiard
EB
Trubshaw
DFB Ackary
AADrver
JM Renda
AWinstanley
PP Baker
A
Heywood
RG Campbe
o
Brister
ASmith BG Watts
o
Corbyn
PAlan
GWikinson
CAA
J
Lowe
MBannister
the
emergency depressurization
ctorto be engaged.
All theseactions would happen ina very
d and would befollowed by the
briefingdelivered by the cap
This would be followed by the pred
ng checklist which required the seat
signs and no smoking signs to be on
the emergency lighting system
was
t t o a rm . The flight crew would then
in their final checklist which included
the
landing gear, nose and visor being in
the uppositionand the intakeramps at 0
percent, the ramp masters on manual and
the bleedand ditching valves selectedshut.
The
f inal cal l wou ld be to lock the sea ts
and power them down. Completing these
steps would lead to a descent to
OOOft
(305m) where the PA cal l of 'Take up
ditching positions' would be given to be
followed by 'Brace, brace' at 200ft (61m).
Should the PA systembe unavailable, the
96
When Concorde
touches down.tyre contact
generates alarge amount ofsmoke,
as
thisview
of
aBritishAirwaysaircraftshows. Alpha Echo
wears
the
Chatham
Dockyard
flagmotif
on
itsfin
and
rudder.
NickChalenor
s ame si gn al c ou ld be g iv en
by
cabin
signs. As the 50ft (ISm) altitude point
approached, the autothrottlewould bedis
engaged, the throttle sett ing being held
manually. At a signalfrom thecaptain, the
flight engineer would pull allengineshut
down handles . Hav ing survived such a
touchdown, the crew would begin passen
ger evacuation
by the
most convenient
door.
While
the flight crew were carrying
out their tasks and passing on instructions
to the cabincrew, theytoo wouldbe carry
ing out their own actions to prepare for
d it ch ing. Hav ing acknowledged the
instruction to prepare to ditch, thesenior
cab in c rew member ensured that col
leagues were fully aware of their duties,
a ft er which the passenger s were ful ly
briefed
on
the situation and the cabin
lightingwouldbe turned tomaximum.
The
cabincrew
then
secured allloose hand bag
gageand equipment, lockeddown the gal
ley trolleysand equipmentand turned off
the
galley electricalsystems. Since
the
fit
ting of lifejackets could be difficult with
small children, the
cabin crew needed to
do this, after which blankets and pillows
would begiven to passengers, who
by
then
would have been redistributed.
The
reason
for this
was
to placeable-bodiedpassengers
next to the disabled, the physically unsta
ble, children andyoungpeople. Before the
final stage of the descent the cabin crew
would check that the lifejackets fitted cor
rectly, the seats were in the upright posi
t ion, any h igh-heel shoes removed and
TOP:
Pictured soon after its maiden flight is
the
French
Concorde
prototype 01. F-WTSS. complete
with shorttail-cone later extended
to
improve
stability. Alongside is an Armstrong-Whitworth
Meteor ll of
the
CEV acting as a photo/chase
aircraft.
JA Todd Colecton
va
Lee Howard
ABOVE The next Concordeto fly wasthe British
prototype
G-BSST.
Typical
of
theOlympus engine
is
the
dirty exhaust. a problem thatnearlysaw
Concordebanned
from landing in New York.
Unlike
the
production
machines,the prototypes
hadan unusual paint scheme appliedfor
photographic recording
purposes.
BBAColecton
RIGHr. Although
muchof Concorde
waswhite. the
engine
nacelles and wingleading edges
on the
British prototype were paintedblack. The latter
had white photo-calibration
marks imposed
for
data recording purposes. BBA
Colecton
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TOP:
Shockconesfromthe thrustaugmentorsfeaturestronglyin this
view
ofthe Britishpreproduction G-AXDN.
A closel ook atthe tail-cone underthe rudder reveals the locationof thebrake-parachute door.
BBA
Coecton
ABOVE: With everythingout and downthe French prototype F WTSS sporting theParis show number
375
comesin to land. BBA Coecton
FOLLOWINGPAGE
Thisdramaticangle emphasizesthe sl
ofthe Concordeairframe.Notethe def
upperrudder segment andpity thepai
applying the irFrance taillogol Bern
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BonoM:A furtherchangein thecolourschemeforthe British
irw ys
Concorde fleet
s w themajor colours switch places. Thus thecheat line became red.
with
thespeedbird
incorporated attheleadingedge.thestylizedflag onthe
fin
became more pronouncedly
blue and the titling featured capital lettersfor bothwords. BBAColecton
OPPOSITE P GE
TOP WhenBritish irw ys accepted i tsfirst Concordes theyretainedtheir white overall
finish.over which
w s
applieda blue cheatline.Thefin sported ared-basedplay
on
the
UnionFlag.Thismachine is G-N94AD.registeredfor usein thecombined Braniff/B ritish
irw ys flights. BBAColecton
~ c > . z c : : r E J
Possiblythe mostunflattering aspectof theConcorde
its
first
position. with thevisor retracted;the angle
the dart-like appearanceof the aircraft. Adran Falconer
P GE
Concorde on thegroundat RAF Fairford which w s
as thetestbase.Althoughtheaircraft is thecentre of
ion the surroundingvehicles andground equipmentare
rthy.since theyare bedecked with the full range of
colours.
Adran Falconer
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BELOW:
Only one BritishAirways Concordewas allocatedto theSing
Airlines run this being G N94AD buteventhis was half hearted as
Singaporeschemewas appliedto onlyoneside BBAColecton
···l
ABOVE: Caughtjust beforetouch down at Farnborough is thepreproduction
aircraft G AXDN The unusual markings were required for useby cameras
recordingthe behaviourofthe aircraft in f light BBAColecton
ELOW:
Captured on film in ew Zealand thisBritish Airways
Concordeglistens afterrecent rain
Rob
Nei
ir France Concorde
F BTSC
wearsthefirst and short lived originalcolour scheme;a
onewas carried by such aircraftas the Comet BBAColecton
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97
This
vi w
of
an Air
France Concorde
shows
the
undercarriage
units
retracting as it leaves Paris.
The glow
ofthe afterburners can
just
be s e e ni n SierraDelta s jet pipes. P hi ppe Noret
either trapped
in thetanks, in thesumps
and
in
galeries. O
capacites
perengine
were
given
quarts 1281tr ,
of
which 11 1 0.5Itr)were usable
quarts [6.2Itr]
beng required
forstarting)
The
maxmumoperatng altitude of 60,OOOft
came
next,
aftermenton was made
of
the con
face range of movements the p io ts m an ua
source for these). The all-important Certificate
worthiness for Export/Certificat
de
Navigabi
Exportaton
carred aboard each Concorde w
toned
in
the nextparagraph,
these
being seri
bered
between 01 and
16. Ths
document had
referencenumber:ConcordeDocumentNo. 408
Issue 2, including
revision
1. Al modifications
out
by
British Airways
and
Air
France
and
app
t heCAAandt he DGAC
were
laid
out
in Air Fra
ument
No. AF-Ol-TSS,
t he indexof
Air
France
ed modifications
and
Civi
Aviaton
Authori
9/30/CDN
10FH, dated
15 December 1978. A
paperwork
needing to
be
carred
on
Concorde
the FAA Standard Airworthiness Certificate,
wh
based
on the
two
documents
issued by
the
Br
the
French
airworthiness
authorities.
Concorde s
certification was
based on FA
a)1
)I ) , which, in
turn, was
based
on
the
Angl
Supersonic Transport TSS Standards, as
defne
tents list No 29,dated
26
March 1976, porton
25
effective from February
1965 which inc
amendments
appropriate
to
a
supersonic
tr
p o rto n s o f
the
US Special Conditons for C
No.25-43-EU-12,dated
21
June1972,
pus FAR
The aircraft
was
approved with respectto opto
tification requirements relatng to ditching,
equipment and
ice
protection
that corresponde
25.801.25.1415 and 25.1419.
The
type certifica
appledfor
on
15 July 1965and approved on 9
1979
TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
Type
CertificationAir
Data
Sheet
No.A45EU
Ths t ype
certification
was issued
by
the
Federa Avia
tionAuthority on 9January 1979,
with
copies goingto
British
Aerospace
atWeybridge and
the
Bristol Division
and
t ot he
Societe
Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale,
at
37
Boulevard
de
Montmorency
in
Pars.
The first secton
descrbed
Concordeand included
the
fuels and o i s a va i a bl e f or
unlmited usage. These
included ASTM1655-57GradeJETA1 aircraft fuel, this
having the
French specification
AIR
3405 CIssue
4,
and
the
Britsh
equivalent being D.Eng RD2494 Issue 7; the
Canadian specification
was given
as 3-GP-23h. Ony
one
fuel additive
was
specifed as
mandatory: Shel
ASA antistatic additive. Others that could be added
included
anti-icing,
corrosion
inhibitors
or
a
combina
tion
pus
automate
yellow
for
u se in
fuel-system
leak
age detecton.
O
types approved for the Olympus
engines included t heproduct s of
BP
Esso,
Mobil and
Shel. and Esso
were
approved as t heonly
suppler
of
the
ois
required
for
the
integrated drve
generator.
Performance
specifications
concerningengine
limita
tons
were
the
nextdefned
items, theseincludedmax
ima concerning thrust outputsat several altitudes, such
as the maxmumoverspeed
of 110
percent beng
avai
ablefor only2sec.
O
systemparameters were thenset
out,
these
including temperatures and pressures, and
simiar dataforthe fuelsystemwas
lsted
next. The cer
tificate
then
laid
out the
flight
restrictions, these includ
ing
severa
speeds and altitudes, although many
of t he
fgureswere
to be found in the p io ts manual. Further
handlng data
was
also defned;this including
the
c.g.
range,
datum, maxmum
weights,
the minimum
crew
always the piot, the co-pilot andthe
flight
engineer),
t he m axm um
passenger
number andbaggage weight.
The capacites of
the
fuel
tanks
were
given
at
maxi
mum contents
with
aspecific densityof 6.68Ib/USgal.
Also
laid
down in
thistablewere the
usable
andunus
able
fuel
totals, unusable
fuel
being
that which
was
stowed seatbelts secured ties and collars
loosened spectaclesand dentures removed
a ll s ha rp o bj ec ts r em ov ed a nd
t ha t t he
bracingposition w s understood
by
all pas
sengers. The c ab in c re w s f in al a ct i on
would be to tu rn th e lig htsto d im a n d te ll
th e c a pta in that cabin preparation w s
complete; at thispoint theywould take up
theirown ditching positions.
The c ab in c re w we re a ls o t ra in ed f or
crash-landings. There a re two t ypes of
these unpremeditated and premeditated.
The
former
w s
defined
s
one
that
takes
placewithout warning such
s
duringland
ingor take-off and the latter is defined s
g iv in g a mp le tim e to p re pa re for e v ac ua
tion. Duringeitherof these themostimpor
tant
factor is t im e a n d thu s th e c a b in a n d
t h e f li gh t c re w a re d ri ll ed so
that
their
actions almost border
on
the automatic.
ny landing that could involve fire or the
breaking of the aircraft s structure required
that
the cabinstaffbe warned
s
quickly
s
possibleso
that
theycould evacuate
the
air
craft s soon s itcameto rest. Should there
bea landinginvolvinga hung-upundercar
ria ge leg th e c a bin c re w h a d to b e a wa re
that
the aircraftcouldeitherbe restingon a
wingtip or more awkwardly on its tail. n
eithercase a quick decision hadto be made
regardingthe deployment ofescapeslidesto
ensure that p asse ng ers c ou ld slide to th e
g ro u nd safely. D urin g a n igh t e v ac u ation
thecabinlights wererequired tobe dimmed
so that crew and passengers could adjust to
outsideconditions quickly.
BELOW Air France used essentially onlyone basicfinish on
its Con cordes.
This
was
based on the
tr icolour withthe
EU
star
symbol overthe flash on the
fin.
Here F-BVFB
prepares
to touch
downat snow-covered
Charles
de Gaulleairport.
Bernard
Chares
Instead of t he m ore rigid irlin scheme British Airways l t r
adopted
series of styles
as
ethnic .
That
applied
to
Concorde
was
based
on
the Chatham
Naval Dockyard flag.
to be one of t he m ore
popular
schemes. By
thetimethis
picturewas
taken
the
e s full titl hadbeen restored
to
the nose the previouslyapplied British having been
to criticism. BBA
Colecton
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TRI LS
ND
TRI UL TIONS
TRI LS
ND
TRI UL TIONS
Magnificent
isthe onlvword thatdescribesthis
view
of a
Concorde leaving
LondonHeathrow on another flight to JFK Airport.
New
York. Colecton
Concorde G BOAA
with
i tsvisorin positionfor high speedfl ight;not longafter.the afterburners would
be
engagedand theaircraftaccelerateacrosstheAtlantic.
Colecton
also be e nobje c ting
to
the aircraft. A
ble reverse effect involving trade be
t h e U S A and the Europeans wasalso
as a pote ntia l c ons eque nce of such a
With
the way clear for ope r ations to
both Concordes
left their
home
ai
and headed
across
the Atlantic.
Although a triumph
of
technica
operational achievement,
the
total pr
tion
of
C onc orde s , inc luding proto
and preproduction
a irf r am e s, w ou ld
o n ly t w en t y i n a ll . The reasons b
s u ch a short run stemmed from
the
or
over-optimisticordering by foreign a
and a n ina c cur a te e s tim a te that
worl
requirements c o uld r e ac h 2 40 . I llu s
this is the Pan Am order p lac e d in
1 96 3 f or s ix
Concorde
S ST s, t hi s
goings upe r sonic ove r a ny pa r t o f t h e
t i nent al U SA .
Other
r a rt s o f t he j ud gm en t h
down
by
Coleman covered
many a
of C oncorde ope r ations; thus Britai
France w ou ld b e most careful to co
since
t he econom i c
impact
o n t he
tr ie s a m i thei
I
ai rI in es w ou
Id
be gri
should Concorde be banned from la
due to a ny inf r inge m ent. Should s u
event
happen i t w o uld , h o we v er , la
U S A o p en
to c laim s
of
favouritism
regard to their own airlines, w hi ch
completely and carefully avoiding
the
impact
t h at t h e
existing fleets
of
subsonic
airliners, pr oduc e d m a inly b y Bo ein g and
Douglas, were h a vi n g o n t h e
environment
due to their use
of
inefficient turbojet
e n gin es . I n
the event, Coleman
granted a
limited,
sixteen-month
a c ce s s f or
Con
c o rd e t o conduct scheduled flights to the
USA, beginning
on
4 February.
The
crite
r ia a s la id
down
allowed for two flights per
day
i nto John
Kennedy Airport
in
New
York and
one
p e r d a y into Dulles Airport
in Washington. Further restrictions placed
upon
the
aircraft
m e an t t h a t
it could
not
land
w it h in t h e U S A
earlier
t han 07: 00hr
nor depart a f ter 22:00hr local. In common
with the authorities in Br ita in and France,
America
w o uld a ls o ban
Concorde
from
det erm ine t he effects that s u ch a n aircraft
could have
on
the quality
of
the
human
environment.
Making
the
Europeans
joint
case
to William Coleman, Secretary of
Transportation, wererepresentatives ofA i r
France, British Airways, government offi
cials from
both
na tions a nd representatives
from
the
airframe
a nd e ngine m a nuf a ctur
ers. Standing in opposition was a collective
of e nvironm e ntalis ts w ho would
attempt
to p o rtr ay
the
Anglo-French
Concorde
as
a s i ng ul ar s ou rc e
of
excessive
pollution
that would poison North America, while
Routes an d Sales
etting to
this
momentouspoint
had
been
an
u p hill s tru g gle
since t h e A me r ic a n
a uthoritie s m a de s tr enuous efforts t o b an
the
aircraftfrom la ndinga nyw he r e within
their borders.
The
legislativetool employed
to confound t he A nglo-French
proposal
was t he N at ional E nvironment al Protec
tion
A c t o f
1969, requiring
that
a f ull e v al
uation
be presented
and
investigated
to
January 1976
at
1l:40hr
G MT , si m ul t a
neous departures took place
from
London
H eat hrow and Paris Charles de Gaulle air
ports. These were
not
ordinary flights since
the
stars
oft he
show were
both
Concordes.
possible t o o p en i t f ro m the passengerside
by a key This might s ee m l ik e a
point
of
vulnerability; however, there was al so a
mechanical
bolt,
an
o b se r va tion m irr o r in
the ceiling a n d a n observer-scopebuilt into
the door. By contrast, the toilet doors we
manually locked but could be
opened
from
outside by using a special tool.
Although much o f t he foregoing may
s e em like a catalogue
of
potential accidents
and
disasters,
the hardest battleConcorde
would
ever
f ac e w ou ld b e
t h a t o f gaining
permission to fly into New York. On 21
a
warning
light
that
flashed
amber should
the line pressure exceed 70psi 4.9kg/sq
cm). Once
the
pressure increased above
8 5 ps i 6 .0k g /s q
c m) t he w ar ni ng
light
should
go
out. Should t here
b e a f ai lu re i n
the oxygensystem there was a manual over
ride knob available
that
would mechanical
ly override the barometriccontrol, whichin
turn would pressurize
the
oxygen system.
This would be the case until the emergency
o ve rr id e r et ur ne d t o n or ma l.
The
cabin
crewwerefully briefedin the use
of
the oxy
gen system
under
emergency circumstances
and in individual cases where an
ill
passen
ger might require the gas.
oncorde h a d tw o d o or s f or p as s en ge r s
and
f ou r s e rv ice d oo r s. A ll w e re outward
ope ning,a lthough only the forward passen
ger and service doors had observation win
dows.
Other
doors
on
the aircraft included
an upperbaggage
compartment door
which
c ou ld b e a cc es se d f ro m the o u ts ide , a l
t h ou g h t h er e w as a means
of
opening the
compartment
from
the
inside by
an
emer
gency handle.
T h e o t he r hatches
covering
the lower baggage hold and other miscella
neous compartments couldbeaccessed only
from
the
outside.
The
flight-deck access
door
was electronically locked through a
striking plate controlled b y a s w itc h o n t he
flight-compartment roof panel; thisensured
that
only
the
c r ew c o uld open
the
flight
de c kdoor
from
the
inside,
although
i t w as
forwardpassenger cabin was in use, normal
ly only s ixtee n people were on board and
thus evacuation,
guided by
the
senior
cabin
crewmember,was
by
the left-hand, forward
door.
Once
the warning
of
a crash-landing
had been given those in the c a bin ne e de d
to
be briefed,
the
galley
equipment
t o be
turned off and the cabin dividers placed to
o pe n a nd t he doorways kept clear of such
th ing s a s the aircrews nav bags.
Once
completed,
the
l igh ts w er e s e t
at
dim
and
the captain
informed
t hat t he c a bin a nd
its
occupants w e re r ea dy f or c r as h -la nd ing .
Once
the aircraft had stopped, the selected
door
must
have
i ts e m er g en c y ligh ts
on,
after which the occupants could evacuate.
Not
every i ncident on b o ar d a n a ir cr a f t
involves collision with
the
gr ound; how
ever,
there
a r e oc c as ions
when the
emer
gency equipment needs
to b e u se d.
The
most likely i t em t o b e u se d is the oxygen
system, w hic h c om es into play when
the
cabin altitude
exceeds 14,000ft
4,300m).
When this happens the regulator pressure
is increased to 90psi 6.3kg/sq cm) and the
therapeutic v a lv e a lso opened.
O n ce t he
pressure line was
open
i t f o rc e d
the
pas
senger cabin m as ks t o b e presented and
provided a continuous flow of oxygen.
O n ce t he
cabin altitude stabilized below
10 OOOft
3,OOOm)
the
o xy ge n f lo w w as
reduced
to nor m al
pressure.
While
this sys
tem was in use the c r e w ne e de dto monitor
Possibly
the
most difficult
event to
deal
ith
is the unpremeditated crash-landing.
or there to be survivors the c re w n e e d t o
quickly and decisively. If time
is
avail
t he captai n
will
order an
immediate
a cu at io n o f t he
aircraft
and define
doors and e s c ap e s lid e s a r e to be
The unpremeditated crash-landing
is
announced over t he
PA
that
all
a r d m u st P r ep a re
for
crash-landing .
passengers are warned via ei t her t he
or
the
flashing
of
cabin signs t o s t ra p
in. On
t he d es ce nt t he
first
erwould call Brace,
brace or
flash
the
lights at 2 00 ft . E xi t d oo rs a re nor
until the aircraft c om es t o rest,
r w hic h
the
c r ew a re e x pe c te d t o h e lp
passengers to
e va cua te ,ha ving
defined
set
of
doors to use. The c a bin c r ew
t heir ow n duties to p e rf o rm b e fo r e a
similar t o t ho se for
ditch
thus
a ll l oo se i te ms
of whatever
need t o be s ec ur ed and stowed
y. Passengers are also warned about
and
other
items, afterwhich
cabin attendant
will
report that
passenger cabin is ready for the events
follow.
O n ce t he
a ir cr a f t h a s stopped
crew would operate o n l y t h os e doors
cted byfire
or other
hazard.
The
pas
ers would then be directed o u t o f t h e
a n d t h e crew a uthor iz ed to use rea
f or c e to ensure
t h a t t h e
evacuees
kept
moving.
As the
passengers
the forward door and i ts s lid e
would be urged to Jump, jum p,jum p ,
the
instructions for
t h e c e nt r e
r ea r d oo rs a re s li gh tl y m od if ie d t o
to the slide and jump .
When
assist
passengers down a
sl
ide
the
crew are
to
move
them
physically along,
only
below
shoulder
level,
the
foot
or
kne e c ould b e u s ed i n the small o f t h e
tip them down the slide. Although
slide down
o n t he
buttocks is
the
pre
means
of
departing,
to
hurry up
the
a n e je ction in any position is rec
Obviously the c r e w c ould
not
evacuat e t he
aircraft
o n t he ir o wn
s o a s s is ta n ce in
the shape of
four-able
ie d p e rs o ns w o uld b e needed to help
e of f the slide and awayfrom the air
O nce
all
the
passengers were clear,
c r ew m a ke
their
departure.
Not a ll f li gh ts i n Concorde w er e r ev
someflights were for training
delivery purposes. Since most
of
the
pa nts dur ing th es e tr ip s w e re a irc r ew ,
evacuation instructionswere complete
d iff e re n t. D u rin g th e se f lig hts only the
98
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TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
government i n to an 80/20
profit-s
scheme.
This
arrangement l asted
1984
when
the
Concorde
purchasede
finally completed.
Other
financial ar
mentscovered repaymentsto British
space and R oll s-R oyce t o cover de
ment and
support costs.
Although
Airways readily
accepted
these
to
them
from
an on-going
financial
co
ment
across
the Channel , the Frenc
shocked si nce t his
part o f t he Con
development
treaty
had been
overl
by
the government ;
after
much
shrugging
and procrast inat ion
the
eventually
pai d up.
Whi le t he
obli
fi nancial m anoeuvri ngs w ere going
number of product i on Concordes
still
being
used for
development
tria
;.
rilillh ~ ~ ; ~ J ~ ~ . -
.... . ~ : : ~
.
-- 2 t:::
H;
,,_a.
BAG-BFKWstartsitstaxi movementtowards theHeathrowrunways. Eventuallythe
aircraft was reregistered as G-BOAG.
BBA
Colecton
d is pe ns e w it h i t a lt og et he r.
The
deal
b etween t he
airline
and government
allowed British Airways
to
buy five
of t he
Concordes
for £16. 5 m i ll i on each, w hil e
theother
twoweresold for
the knockdown
price
of
£1
each
f o r a f le et
ofseven that
cost
the
taxpayer
£164mil l ion
originally).
Included i n
the
arrangement
were all
the
spares,
including
engines,
that
w ould be
needed
tooperate the
fleetfor
the
foresee
able future,
although
separate
contracts
were
negotiated
with Rolls-Royce, British
Aerospace, Aerospatiale
and SNECMA
fordesign
engineeringauthority and
major
overhaul
s up po rt . A
further
financial
advantage
was gained by British Airways
during 1978-79 when
an
outstandingdebt
o f £ 160
m i ll i on w as
converted
by
the
British airwa \
::
or
1 J;1.r:.
- .
-
-
. .
British
irways
Concorde G-BBDG
was
used for hot-and-highplus intake performancetr ials. hence the
special datummarkings on thefuselage to calibratethe tracking cameras.
BBA
Colecton
was
the
ten-yearsupportrequirement- nei
t her t he
British
nor t he
French negotiators
felt ableto offermore
than
a five-year block
f support;
the other
five years would have
to be renegotiated
to account
for
the
possi
bility
of
rising costs.
The
final phase
of
negotiations ended unresolved in February
1983,
the
very
month t ha t
Federal Express
had hoped
to
start theirnew service.
During
this periodBritishAirwayswere
operat ingtheir Concorde
fleetfullysubsi
dized by
the government , al though such
a
state
of
affairs, requiring taxpayers money,
could obviously
not
continue.
The subject
finally
came
to
a h ea d i n
the
first years
of
the
Thatcher
government , when
British
A irw ays w ere gi ven
t he o pt i on e it h er t o
purchase
t he Concorde
fleet
outr i gh t or
structural
strengthening w ou ld a ls o b e
n eeded i n
localized areas
o f t he cabin,
w hich w ould need t o w i thstand l oads up t o
9G.
A
II
the
cargo
nets
were stressed
to
absorb
the
s am e l oa di ng s; b o th n et s a nd
mounting
couldbe moved toaccommodate
vari ous l oads. Federal E xpress st ipulat ed
that
they would require three modified air
fram es, support ed by B rit i sh A irwaysfor a
period
of
t enyears, andadded t ot hi sw oul d
be
an
extensive support
contract
supplied
by Britain
and
France i n
which both
air
linesand manufacturers would be involved.
Although the
study
conceming the
struc
tural modifications
was
undertaken
success
fully,
the
negotiations for
the
supportcon
tracts
soon
ran i nto t rouble
and
eventually
brokedown altogether.
The
sticking
point
of
the
lease, the deal
fell
through. Allied to
manning
problems were those
of
sparesand
maintenance
costs and w hich part y w ould
foot
the
bill.
Eventually
British Airways
stepped
in
tooffera form
of
counter
propos
al
w hich required B A
to
supply
an
aircraft
andcrewsto
fly
the route
London-Bahrain
Singaporein
retum
fora share
ofthe
profits.
Only
a singl e ai rcraft w ould be i nvolved
and
i t w as
painted
in
Singapore
Airlines
colours
on the
port
side,
retaining
BA
colours
on
theother
side. By 1980this ser
vi ce w as
cancel led since
passenger loads
wereuninsp iringand, more importantly,
the
flights wereloss-making.
While
thiswas tak
i ng pl ace at tem pt s w ere being m ade t osel l
off
the
remainingfive white-tail
Concordes
to
the
Philippines
and South
Korea. After
manytestflightsand presentations by teams
from
Bri tain and
France,
both countries
eventual ly rejected Concorde, al though
at
least
one
passenger
is reported
t o have
increased her footwear collectionconsider
ably
during this
period.
Asthe s t ored
air
frames were
complete
air-tested machines,
theyeventually enteredservice withBritish
A irwaysand A i r France, w hi ch gave each
airline a seven-strongfleet.
One final
attempt
was made
to
sell
the
Concordes
in storage;
the
expected opera
tor
was to
be FederalExpress whichwished
to
use
the
aircraft in
the
high-speed freight
carri er rol e. A st udy i nto
the
feasibility
of
such a conversi on w as undert aken during
1981-82.
As
this
was
to
be a
complete
change
in
the
aircraft s role
most of the
passenger-based
equipment
would
be
dis
pensed with; thus
the
cabinoxygen system
andai r
conditioning
would beremovedand
parts
of t he
undercarriage emergency low
e r in g s ys te m w ou ld n ee d t o b e r el oc at ed
since
the
frei ght pall ets w ould cover t hei r
original access points. A certain
amount of
quickly followed by TWA s, which
tenta
tively placed
an
order for a furthersi x.
The
totalorders
and opt ions
for
Concordes
are
shown i n
the
table left .
Many of
t hese ai rl i nes had pl aced
their
orders
under the
assumption
t ha t t he
cre
a t ion of
sonic boom s
over
l and w ould be
acceptable.
The
study
of
the
effects
of
such
disturbances
in
Bri tain, France
and
the
USA
had
proved
inconclusive;
however,
the anti-Concorde
movement had
in
creased
its
influence
especi all y as
US
Senator
Proxm ire hadgi ven his aid
t o t h e
cause. A s
the
pressure
mounted
against
Concorde t he
enthusiasm
of
the
airlines
w aned, l eavi ng
only
Air
F ranc e and
BOAC l a t er Br it i sh
A ir wa ys ) a s
the
only confirmed customers. Not only
was
the contentious
issue
of s on ic b oom
given
as a r ea so n
t o cance l
by
Pan
Am
and J
AL,
but t he iI adherence t o
tradi
tional
accounting
methods
meant t h at
t hey coul d
not
accurately
determine
any
profits or losses from operating
Concorde,
although
t hey w ere si l ent w hen asked
the
same quest i on
concern i ng t he
subsonic
airliners
due t o
be
ordered
by t hem . One
o f t he
s tr a ng es t r ea so ns g iv en f or
can
celling
an
order w as
that
the
aircraft did
not
come
equipped wi th an
auxiliary
power
unit
to
provide
independent
power
supplies
and engine
starting.
The
initialtake-up
ofthe
production air
frames
meant
t ha t o f
the
sixteen production
aircraft, five were placed instorage after test
flying unsold. In Britain airframes 214 and
216sat unusedand in France ailframes 203,
213and 215 were parked, awaitinga buyer.
An attempt to interestSingaporeAirl ines
wasonly partiallysuccessful. Originally
the
airline required a wet lease,
completewith
crews, forfour years. As
the
manufacturers
felt unable to providecrews for theduration
4
6
2 11
4
2 21
5
4
2
6
3
2
3
3
2
6
2
6
6
4
2
8
3
4
6- first
order
- fnal total is 8
6- first order - fnal total is 8
6 +2
81
inc . options.plus
16
delivered.
1965
Air Canada
Air India
Amercan
Braniff
Eastern
JAL
Lufthansa
MEA-Air Lban
Dantas
Sabena
TWA
United
Concorde Orders and Options
1972
Iran Air
Air France
CAAC
BOAC
/984
British Airways
98
Air France
1966
Dantas
Eastern
1964
Amercan
Air France
BOAC
Contnental
TWA
Total
1963
Air
France
BOAC
Pan Amercan
G-N94AD wearsthe titlesof Singapore Air l ines on i tsportside as partof acombined operationto
apore viaBahrain.This service
was
eventuallyca ncelled
as
uneconomic.
BBA Colecton
100
101
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TRIALS ANDTRIBULATIONS
Eleganceand artistryare less than adequatewords
to describethis moststr iking ofaircraft. Foxtrot
Bravo of Air France is captured on approach.Those
with keeneyeswill alreadyhave noted thecurving
shape ofthe nacelles andintakes.
Bernard Chares
BELOW: Surrounded by ground equipment,BA
Concorde G BBDG on therampat Tengah,
Singapore.
The
aircraft,
on
loan from British
Airways, was being used intr ials required to
refine theoperation ofthe ramp control system.
BBA Colecton
6 January 1977 Capt Brian Trubshaw lift
ed
Concorde
202,
C-BBDC,
from Filton s
runway t o u n de r ta k e t e st f li gh t n o. 4 28 .
The route to ok it to Tangier in 2hr55min,
of
which just over 2hr were
spentat
super
sonic speeds. The maximum
height
reached
was
54,000ft 06,500m , t h e m a xi m um
speed achieved being Mach 1 .8 5. T e st
f ligh t n o .43 3 w as misnamed as i t was, i n
f a ct, a CA A training flight which saw
the
aircraft flying between Filton
and
Fairford
w it h a f li gh t t im e of
Ihr
lOmin.
Aboard
were Capt
E
M cN am ar a a nd C ap t C .
Wilkinson
of
the Civil A viation A uthori
ty; the Fligh t En g in e e r w a s D .EB. A c ka r y.
Pastures New
While
Concorde
was scoring a range
of
enviable
f ir st s, i t w as a ls o
involved
in a
series
ofdevelopment
trials,
but
for
these
production
aircraft wereused in preference
to the preproduction aircraft. The first trip
TRIALS ANDTRIBULATIONS
been t a ke n t o carry
o u t o f
a series
of
upper
atmosphere
intake
development
tr ia ls in
order to
refine
the behaviour ofthe intake
ramps under various heights and flight con
ditions. During 1979 Concorde
C-N49AE
was flown from London to New York under
thecommandof C apt
BrianWalpole; from
New
York
the
aircraft was flown
to
Balti
more and Philadelphia to undertakeCate
g or y 2 Instrument Landing SystemValida
tion flights.
Jn-service operation
o f C on c or d e
by
Britis h A irw a ys g o to f f to a s h ak y s ta r tw ith
the company s concern over the costs of
operating the aircraft. The p r ob lem h a d its
r oo ts w ith the directors o f B OA C , which
hadbeen subsumedtogetherwith BEA, into
British Airways in April 1972.
They
regard
ed Concorde a s a n e x pe n siv e lux ur y that
w ou ld c os t f ar t oo m uc h t o purchase and
operate
at
anysort
of
a profit.Eventually
the
offer
of
public money helped
the
a irline to
m a ke u p its m ind to e x er c is e its p u rc h as ing
options.
Adding
to
the
emerging British
J u ly 1 9 77 . Tw o further flights were
taken
in
1 97 8- 79 w he n t he t h en
a irf r am e s 2 1 4
and
216
undertook
maiden flights. The former, registe
BFK W, le ft Filto n on
2
A p ril w ith
s ha w a t
the
controls. After a
sho
round
the
Bay
of
Biscay and s o me
landings
a t t he
Fairford test base,
t
craft returned th e re . D u r in g thisrun
than 1.5hr weresupersonic. Airfram
registered C- BFKX, flew on 20 Apr
Tr u bs h aw a g ain in
command.
Afte
t o t he
Bay
of
Biscay
a nd 4 9m in
sonic, t h e C on co rd e r et ur ne d t o
a nd w en t i nt o storage; eventually
A irw a ys a c qu ir ed it. Outside i ts n
a ir lin e d u tie s
Concorde
also assist
RAF
on 1 A ug us t 1 97 9 in
an
e
North Sea
the
a ir cr a f t in v olv e d w
B B DC , simulating a s up er so ni c
attackingover
the
North Sea.
When Concorde finally entered
w ith Br itish A irw ay s in 1 97 6
the
p
i ni ti al r ou te s w er e q ui ck ly
extend
Concorde Alpha Echo parked atHeathrow
with
i tsnoseful ly
up
andits visor
fully
retracted.This
photograph
was
takenwhen theunpopular British ti tling wasapplied
to
the nose.
BBA Colecton
102
=:
c::) :
.
;
involved production
Concorde
202 C
B B DC , w hich
undertook
a
development
t ri al t o
the
Middle
and
F ar E as t d ur i ng
August-September 1974. Trubshawwas in
command for the 7 A u gu s t d e pa r tur e , the
flight taking i n v is it s t o Abu Dhabi, Iran,
Qatar
and Singapore. On 5 A pr il 19 78
Concorde
202,
C-BBDC,
wasflown under
Trubshaw s
command
f ro m F il to n
to
Casablanca to undertake aseries o f h o t a n d
high performance trials which would occu
py
the
aircraft throughout A pril and May.
The return f lig ht to Filto n w as made on 5
M ay . I n
C asablanca the opportunity
had
Airways concerns was the excessive slip
page
of
delivery dates,
which
would throw
the
airline s plans
into
disarray. Deliveries
to
Br itish A irw a ys s a w
C-BOAC
leaving
Filton for Fairford to undertake a series of
shake-down f lig h ts b e fo r e acceptance.
Proving that a r e g is tr atio n sequence had
no
bearing
on
deliveries,
Concorde
206
C
BOAA left
the
British
Aircraft Corpora
tiontest base at Fairford to
fly
to H eathrow
on 14 January 1 9 76 , s o me months after
AC .
Airframe 2 08 , a ls o known as C
BOAB, followed on
30
September, and C
BOAE,
airframe 212, was delivered
on
10
103
in clu de tw o r o un d tr ip s to N e w Y or
although i t w ou ld ta ke u n til 1 97 8 f o
objections to be overcome. In contra
Washington/Dullesservicewasgreete
bunting and
speeches
w he n t h e
fi
France and Br itish A irw ay s Co n
landed almost simultaneously on 2
1976. The f igh t f or Concorde to o
into
New
Yorkeventuallyspilled ov
boththe
legal and
the
political arena
New Y or k Po r t Authority tried t o
f ro m la nd ing th er e . Ev en tua lly t h
ruled infavour of
Con
cordesinceit h
cessfullycomplied with all
tbe
deman
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TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
TRI LS ND TRI UL T IONS
Concorde s CulinaryDelights- British irways in
2000
We
are
going
to
rerun the
first
commercial
fligh
Bahrain t og ve
the favour
of
travel ng
by
Conco
Brtsh Airways flight BA300 aboard Concorde2
G-BOAA crewed
by
Capt Norman
Todd,
in comm
with Capt Bran Calvert act ng as Frst Offcer,
John Lidiard as Flght Engneer, The c ab n c re w
thisoutboundleg wereMisses
Carvie and
S.
ham,
pus
D.
Brackey, J Hawkins,J. Hitchcockan
Tayor. Chocks werepuled
clear
at
11
:20hr
GMT
the aircraft
was
pushedback.
The
nose
was
dro
to 5 degrees with thevisor
retracted,
Concorde
ingt o t herunway t hreshold. Cearedt o depart
Heathrow
runway 28 left, the throttles were pu
forward
and the
thrust
augm ent ers engaged
11:41 hrt he aircraft
left the
ground. The rout ng
G-BOAApass
over
Midhurst,
leaving
Engand
atW
t hi ng , c ro ss n g i nt o France,
p as s ng P ar s
Ramoui et
before enterng
Italy
and
overfying
Banc
in
the process.A slght detour over
Switze
was folowed
by
a re-entry intoItaly before the
craft passed over Brndisi and headedpast G
beforedong t he
same
past
Cyprus and
Crete. N
of
Beirut Concorde
altered
its
course
slghtly
no
overfy
northern
Lebanon, Syra,
Jordan
and S
Arabia before
lning
up
on Bahran. Durng thepa
the flight over water a maxmumspeedof 1,320
2 125kmjhr) was reachedat an altitude of 58,
17.700mj. At a dist ance of 250m ies 402km
Bahran, t he aircraft began t o
slow
down, b
t ouching down at 15:18hr, havng t aken 4hr
chocksto chocksto
complete the
entre
journey
ingcovered 3,000 nautcalmi es
15,500km).
BA301 was
the
return
flightwhich
was under
on22 January, this t m e Capt Calvert wast he p
command
and
Capt Todd w a s F ir st O ff c er
remainder of the
crewwere
the
same
and the
home
to
Heathrow
wast he reverse of t he outb
flght.
except
for a slght diversion
overBiggi
The
total
a ir bo rn e t m e w as 4 hr
13min, wit
supersonict me being
2hr 1
Omin
in total.
A Concorde Flight
Withits nose drooped to 5 degrees and its vi
retracted BA Concorde, G·N81AC, taxies aw
t he r am p a t Heathrow
before
departing to th e
BBACollection
p rop e ns ity to finis h its o wn fle et in b rig h t
disruptive colour schemes. The first flight
was undertaken
on
l2
january
1979 by
an
Air France Concorde ro ute d fro m Paris to
Dallas Fort Worth v Washington.
The
returntrip was flown
the next
day. Yetagain
passenger revenue failed to live upto expec
tations and
the
relationship ended.
While BOAC
later British Airways was
dithering over whether Concorde would
enter
commercial service Air Fran c e h a d
no h e sita tio n in a c ce p tin g its a lloc a tio n of
the fleet since the French government held
the
m a jo rity s h are ho ldin g in
the
airline.
While British Airways and Air France had
initially concentrated on breaking into the
North
American market
the
latterwasalso
looking towards the South American mar
ket to extend itsavailable routes and gener
a te m o re re v e nu e .All
the
flights wererout
ed v New York from th e re two flig hts
would cont i nue on t o D ul le s w hi le the
remaining eleven flights
continued on
to
Mexico City.
Other
flights would also land
e lse whe re in La tin Am eric a
at
such desti
nations as R io d e
janeiro and
Ca rac a s in
Venezuela. During the period in which Air
France was instigatingthese routes to Latin
America it was suddenly
hit
by
the
respon
sibilityfor the day-to-day running and oper
atingcosts
of
its Concorde fleet.
The
result
in g re d u ctio n in government
subsidies was
followed by a c o st-c utting e x erc is e to c o n
trol expenditure and thus
the
LatinAmeri
can r ou te s c ea se d i n A pr il 1 98 2. F ur t he r
cuts saw t he t e rm ina ti on of
the
route to
Miami in
March
1984
and t he Washing-
ton section ended in November 1994.
Where the Concorde
fleets really made
their
profits wasin
the
provision
of
aircraft
for charter flights. Some we re ju s t ro un d
the coast type pleasure trips but o t hers
were
of
a
more
h igh p ro fi
Ie
nature.
The
fo rm e r ty pe round the coast or Bay of
o n t he operators concerning noise genera
tion and pollution control.
On
a typ ic al
BritishAirways Concorde flight to theUSA
a nd b ac k
the
aircraft left Terminal 3
at
Heathrowdeparting at
13:00hr local with
an expected arrival at Dulles of 12:lOhr
local. The flightwasscheduled insucha way
that connections to
several airports
i n t he
USA could be achieved without rushing
toO much; therefore passengers were able
to connect to Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland Dallas Detroit
Houston Kansas Los Angeles Miami
Nashville New York Richmond
San
Fran
cisco and Tampa.
Havingobtained landing
rights in
the
USA attention turned to
other
zones
of
interest. The first to be looked
at
wasAus
tralia; however this destination was never
managed since
the
route
extension
reached
only to Singapore
v
though this
was
only
a
co operative venture with Singa-
pore
Airlines
begunon
9
December
1977
as an extra leg to
the
Ba h ra in ro ute
the
dedicated aircraft being
G BOAD which
had Singapore Airlines markings painted
on
its right hand side. The return leg was
flown
t henex t
day
the
pilots in
command
included Capt j.W. H i rs t and Capt A.
Meadows outbound;
Capt
B.j.
Calvert
and
Hirst
overe
the return
legs.
But
servi es
were suspended afteronlya few flights since
the
Malaysian
government
raised strong
object ions to the
aircraft s
overflying the
Strai tsof Malacca. Negotiations between
airlines and o ffic ia ls a llowe d fligh ts to
re su me in e arly 1 97 9
but
finally ceased by
1980since the earnings and passenger load
in gs we re
deemed
insufficient. Another
joint
venture involved servi es sharedwith
BraniffAirlines; originally the whisper was
t hat one
side
of t he
a irc raft wou ld b e fin
ished in Braniffcolours and titles although
thiswas quicklydropped given the airline s
ABOVE:
Wearing
the
combined
BNBraniff registration
G-N94AB, applied in 1979,
this aircraft i s a t Heathrow
undergoing pre-flight
maintenance
before
flying
to the
USA.
BBACollection
Apair of Concordes touching
down
a tOrla n d o International
Airport on
18
October
1982.
To the
front
is
a BA machine
with
an
Air
France
aircraft
to
th e re a r.Th e y were going for
the dedication o fth e British
a n d th e Fren ch pavilion at
theDisney
EPCOT centre.
BBACollection
For those
with
enquirng
mindsand discerningpalates, mango. For those fnal little spaces a mixed seasona credentals. theirwine choices werealwaysof the
best
the appetzers consisted of a canape
selecton which
saladwas served
with
a vinaigrette
dionnaise. To
fol- and t hus passengers on Concorde coud
expect
to
included
foie
grasmousse. smoked halbut. c av ia r a n d l ow . t h e d e ss er ts i nc lu de d c r em e brOee, favoured with choose fromthe champagnes Mo e te t Chandan, Cuvee
sourcream
barquette.lf
thiswas
not
enough.the appe-
va ni a
enrched
with
doublecreamandg azedwith
nat-
d e Da m Pergnon 1980.Pommery. Cuvee Speciale Lous
tzer
menu
also
offered
mousse
of
samon
and trout
ura brown sugar. The
oblgatory
cheese board had
a Pommery
1981, G H Mumm Cuvee Rene
Laou
1982,
enveloped
in
thinly slced
Scottsh
s al mo n, a l b e n g
se le cto n o f Stito n, L eicester
and tomme
de S avo e. and
Krug,
8rut, Grande
Cuvee.
White
burgundies on
served with pinwheels
of
buttered
brown
bread. After with
butter, crackers and
crudites. To
wash
this
down.
offer
included Chabls,
Grand Cru
Les
Preuses,
Domaine
strugglng through
this,
passengers
were
given achoice coffee,
with
or without caffeine, andtea
were
avaiable.
de la
Maladiere 1987, Pulgny-Montrachet. Cos
du
of t hree m an courses.
The
first
was based around a
The
caterng
department was especialy p ro ud o f t h e V ie ux C ha te au L ab ou re -R o 1 98 6, Pulgny-Montrachet.
prme fillet of
beef
dressed
with
herb butter and served a irln e s wine celar, overseen by experts including Trufferies Lous Latour 1985,Beaune, Cos des
Mouch-
with tomato,
broccol spears,
holandaise
and baked
Michael
Broadbentand HughJohnson. The former is
a
es Joseph Drouhin 1986, For those with
a
slightly
dif-
potato.
The
second
consisted of
crayfsh ta is
poached
MasterofWine, adirector
of Chrst e s and
head o f th ei r f er en t t as te , a range ofclarets
was
offered thatinclud-
with
white
wine and fnished
in
acream
and
D ol ce la tt e w in e d e pa rt me nt .
He is
one
of
the few
Brtons
to have
ed Domane
de
Chevaler
1983, Grande
Cru
Classe
cheese sauce,
this, in turn,
beng
garnished
with been
awarded
the prestgious French LDrdre Natonal Graves Leognan Les
Forts
de
Latour
1976,
Paul ac Les
sauteed
pimento,
asparagus spears and saffron rce
du
Merite.
Hugh Johnson is
a Docteur
de V n
of t he Forts
de
Latour 1978, Paul ac Chat eau Talbot 1978,
piaf.
The
third choice was lighter - h on ey -g la ze d d u ck - A ca de mi e of t he Conf rere desChevalers
du
T aste vn G rand e Cru Casse Saint-Julen, Chateau
Lynch
Bages
lng
breast
and
country-style
h am g ar ni sh ed W it h f r es h a nd t he
author
of numerous books on
wine.
Gven their 1983, and Grande Cru Casse Paul ac.
7 4
7 5
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_
ay trips were frequently
advertised
as
flights and lasted about 1hr
w it h a
short surersonic
burstas
the
The latter
type
ofchart er
were
a lly booked by s u ch c o mp a ni e s as
si
who
w o uld h ire F-BTSD from
Air
a n d h a ve
it
rerainted
in
the com
colours in which g uis e it w as
out
i n A pr il 1 99 6. A more unusual
more
restrained
venture
was
spon
by
t he A m erican
lingerie
comrany
Secret but
little was
changed
TRI LS ND TRIBUL TIONS
externally only a discreet logo a r r1 i ed t o
the
tail most
o f th e
d e co r at i o n b e in g
reserved for
the cabin. Addingsrice
to
the
occasion w e re a b e vy of super models who
h a d b e en i n vi t ed t o grace it.
Fewrealized
that Concorde
h a d a fan
and
a supporters club b o th o f w hic h booked
the
aircraft for trips in 1 97 8.
The
first trip
involving G-BOAE Capt Peter
Duffey
took place on November lasted v r 2hr
a ndtook in the delights
of
the Bay
of
Biscay
whilea second flight with
the
same aircraft
crew
and
r oute took place seven dayslater.
[n addition
to
regular and charter flights
both airlines provided
Concordes
f or V IP
flights on request.
The
first notable to take
s u ch a flig ht w as Princ e
Philir
who flew in
Concorde 002 on
12
January
1 97 0. [ n
Fran ce Pres ide n tG e o rge s Po mp ido u h a d a
similar
e xr e rie nc e on
7 M ay
[97l. While
Concorde
gained
column
inches from
the
ta blo id s for its ric h and famous passengers
the
aircraft frequently filled in
on
domestic
routes to use upsome capacityexcess.
RIGHr
Takingthe Pepsi challengeis this irFrance
Concorde touching downin Madrid
JoseM Palacios
BELOW: The tailwheel requir inglessfluid issafely
stowed and thenosegearis fol lowing Closebehind
arethemain undercarriageunitswhose innerdoors
have cycled open to
allow
them in
Phippe
Noret
BOTTOM:
FoxtrotCharliehas everything stowed
away
to begin theclimb before
it
reachesthe acceleration
pointoverthe Atlantic The thrust augmentorshave
beendisengaged and
will
not be relit unti l the dash
acrossthe ocean begins Phippe Noret
TRI LS
ND
TRIBUL TIONS
irFranceFoxtrot Bravo isawaiting its
nextpassengers forwhom theforward
accessstepsare in place
To
thefront
of theai r craft i sa
power
supplyset and
avehicle to
tow
it clearonceConcorde
hasbeenclearedto depart
P
Russel
Smith olecton
BELOW:
FoxtrotBravo lined
up
on the IlS for
afaultlesstouchdown atParisCharles
de
Gaulle
Even
indaylightal l theexternal
landing lightsareselected to on
Phippe
Noret
7
7
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TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
TRI LS NDTRI UL T IONS
view ofConcorde G BOADshowsthe aircraft on therampbeforemovingintoposition
Heathrow. The nose is
the5 degreesposition with thevisorpartly retracted. BBAC o e cto n
The
U SA a nd t he
world-famous
koshair event would also begraced
b
corde.
This
t ime it w as a irf r am e
G-B
under thecommand ofC apt J.D. Coo
took i t t o thehome of America s hom
and
vintage extravaganza
a t t h e e n d
1985. This was n ot t he f ir st f lig ht
North
Americasince
G-N94AA
wa
from
New
York after delivering its
ger s t o t h e C a na d ia n Internation
S h ow a t
Toronto, flying past
an
im
audience on 1 September 1979. N
w ou ld itb e the onlyvisitof
Con
cord
s ho ws s in ce i t h as f re qu en tl y v is it
Royal International A irT attooat R A
f or d. La tin A m er ica h a d a ls o b e en
earlier that year when during 6-7 A
B O A B unde r t h e c o mm a nd o f
Cap
pole
and Capt
Mas sie a r riv ed in L
having s tag ed th ro u gh New Yo
Barbados to reach Rio de J
During the Barbados-New York re
i ng w as t o u se
G-BOAE
to makean inau
gural flight from Sri Lanka
to
London.
The
first legwasfrom C olomboto B ahrain, this
b e ing f o llo we d b y
that
f ro m Ba hr a in to
Paris,
C h ar l es d e Gaulle. This
was
an
unscheduled stop since a n u ne x pe c te d
headw ind had reduced
the
aircraft s fuel
safety margin.
With
refuelling
complete,
the
final
short
stage to L ondon wasmade.
There
was a
contrast
in s tyle s
w he n G
BOAB
t oo k a m ix ed l oa d
of international
bond dealers and En gla nd f o otb all s u p
porters
to
Helsinki
on
22 M ay 1 98 5 as
flight B A9 08 3 C; t h e return f l ig ht w as
made
the
same day. A f li gh t
t o New
Zealand during e ar ly A pr i l 1 98 6 s aw G
BOAB land
at
Auckland.
On the
return
flight
on 7-8
April
the
aircraft was
under
the
command of Capt
John
C ook, making
the
f a ste st f lig h t f ro m
New
Zealand
to
London in 19hr 6 m in , s e tt i ng a w or ld
record in
the
process.
what
t h ey h a d b e e n missing after
the
can
c e ll a ti o n o f t h ei r o wn
SST
programme.
Concorde
w ou ld a ls o r e ac h p la ce s i n
the
F ar E as t
a nd t he A nt ip od es w he n G
BOAE, p ilo ted b y Capt H .C . McMullen,
wi
th
J L Chorley, flew
t o C o lo m bo t h en
proceeded to Perth, arrivi ng on 14 Febru
a r y 1 9 8 5 a s ight BA9060C. Having com
pleted the turnaround
in Pe r th ,
G-BOAE
flew to Sydney u nd er t h e c om ma nd o f
Capt
McMullen and
Capt
Leney.
The
fol
lowing day the same Concorde le ft A u s
tralia to fly on to B ahraintaking
9hr
5min
t o d o
so. Aboard
the
aircraft were several
senior p il ot s s uc h a s McMullen, Leney,
Chorleyand
Massie, all taking i t i n t u rn t o
occupy
the
flight-deck.
D ur ing this
phase
Mach 2 w as achieved, with an altitude
of
b et w ee n 5 7, 0 00 a n d
60,000ft
17,400
18,300m) throughout. H aving landed in
Bahrain,
the C oncorde
was then flown
on
to Colombo. The
purpose
of this
position-
Surrounded
by
the
Red
Arrows Hawks. a
Concorde flies past
an
admiringaudience.
BBAC o e cto n
hock-to-chock
t im e w as 3hr
52min,
air
borne time26min shorter. British Airways
alsobegan British internal flights;
the
first
trip
into Birmingham and
back was
on
1
Ma y 1 9 81 , u s in g a irc r af t
G-BOAA,
Capt
Lemay;
the
total
airbornetime
was
65min
for both l eg s, w it h a maximum speed of
Mach0.6 beingreached.
Scotland
was
the
n e xt d e st i na t io n, t h e
f irs t G la sg o w
and
back to London flight taking place
on
11
October
1987.
On
12
September 1982 C o nc o rd e G
BOAE, piloted by Capt J.D. Eames, made
an
inaugural flight
to
Rome,
the
flight tak
ing 2hr52min, with 36min
at
Mach
2
On
a further trip
C oncorde G -B O A A
flew
to
Larnaca, in Cyprus
on
14 November 1984,
the
pilot being Capt Walpole with
the
return
leg
u nd er t he c om ma nd o f
Capt
M as si e. T wo d ay s later Eames took
G
B OA B t o S ea tt l e
T ac om a , v ia B oe in g
Field, to show the aircraftoff and secretly
t o s ho w
the
Boeing
Company
precisely
This
Concorde wears a united UK/USA registration. G N81AC foruse on the
combinedBraniffand British irways operation. BBACollection
the
pilot in
command
being Capt
A.R.
Meadows, with an airbornetime
of
49min.
Fivedaysearlier
the
sameaircraft with
the
same pilot in command h ad b ee n u se d to
fly the
Queen
from London t o K uw ai t i n
4 h r I m in . The
f ina l leg
of
this
tour
was
flown on 19 February by the sameaircraft;
the
pilot in
command
was Capt A.J.
M as si e, w i th M e ad ow s a s
supernumerary
crew; t he t ra ns it t im e from Dhahran to
Bahrain
was r ec or de d a s l Om in , w it h a
maximum speed
of
391mph 630km/hr)
being reached. The c re w for t hi s f li gh t
included
C apt N orman
To dd in
command
with Capt Brian Walpole as First Officer.
I n au g ur a l f lig h ts b y Br itish A irw a ys
con
tinued unabated, oneof the last undertak
en i n 1 97 7 was
on
23
November
with
oncorde
f in al ly e xe r ci s in g i ts r i gh t t o
l a nd i n New York as flight BA170. Oper
ating
under the
guise
of
BA173,
the
twice
d aily f lig hts b e ga n
on
1 June 1 97 8, w ith
aircraft
G-BOAD,
Capt
John
Hirst.
New
00
occasions in
Concorde s
histo
have included the first transatlantic
t from Washington to L ondon
on
25
y 1 97 6, w it h B ri ti sh A ir wa ys f li gh t
7 8 , th is b e ing the return f ligh t a f ter
24 M ay tr ip;
the
a ir cr a ft w as
G-
Capt
N.v.
T od d in
command.
of
the earliest
charter
flights involved
from
London
for
San Juan,
Puer
Rico, then a r e tu r n t o L on d on which
a
Concorde
f ro m 2 6 to 29
June
6 , w ith Capt Duffey.
A lthough C on
and itssupporters had won
the
legal
to
l and in
New
York,
the Port
insisted
that
t es t f li gh ts b e
to measure
the
noise levels generat
by
C oncorde w hentaking
off.
This
was
n e o n
20
October
1977 and required
C oncorde
land
w ithan on-board
load
174 tons l77 tonnes). Piloted
by
h Airways Capt BrianWalpole,
Con
left
the
13,400ft 4, 100m)runway
at
ph 370km/hr) generating a n oi se
of
88dB, as recorded by
the
Federal
Authority, the Port Authority
b e ing 1 12 .
This
w as f ol lo we d b y a
n t A ir
France/British Airways
Con
e landing t wo d ay s l at er . The first
tis h A irw a ys Ro ya l Fligh t w as under
k en o n 2 November 1977 wi th t he
on board aircraft
G-BOAE
for a
to Ba rb a do s ; t h e t i me t a ke n
chocks
was
3hr
29min.
A nother
such
occurred
on
1 2 Fe br u ar y 1 97 9 w ith
first leg departingH eathrow to Kuwait
aircraft
G-N94AB.
Five d a ys la ter
the
t wasflown from
Bahrain
to Riyadh,
7 8
709
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I , tl c ; • \ ~ . : :,,+
. , ,: , .
TRIALS
AND
TRIBULATIONS
TRIALS
AND
TRIBULATIONS
up Concorde fordeparture was quitecomplicated as this
view
shows.
To
thereararea pai rofair
to turnoverthe engines while tothe frontarethe access stepsfor passengers and another
theexternalpower leads.
C.P. Russel Smi th Coecton
ABOVE: This
Air
France Concorde
F-BVFC,
hashadmany
windows
blanked out
since it is on hireto theInstitutWeizmanndes Sciencesfor thestudyof asolar
flare.
BBA Coecton
BELOW:
Air
FrancesFoxtrotAlphaflaresout as themaingeartouchesthe
runway.Prominent inthis
view
i s theneatway thevisorstows awaywh
thenose isdrooped.
Phippe Noret
s et a n ew wor ld r ec or d of 2hr
n for this distance, much
of
it flown at
2
at
60,000ft (18,300m).
The
aircraft
been chartered
by
Cunard to collect
gers from the
QE2
l iner after com
ga world voyage.
Th e outbound
leg
of
ightwasmade
on
5 ApriIfrom London
Brazil, th is taking
8hr
45min with
Capt
Capt
Bradshaw and
Capt
Massie
ingit in
turn
to b e in
command. Anoth
trip to America would begin on 28 April
when
G-BOAC
left Heathrow for the
The
total a i rborne t ime was
4hr
the first landing beingin New
York.
depositing the passengers to catch up
the
QE2
the aircraftstaged
on
to Indi
with Capt
A.R. Meadows.
The
urn journey was t h e n e xt day, with G
staging via jFK Airport, before
the
supersonic trackfor Heathrow.
journey time was 4hr 41min, flown at
l7,300m) with a maximum speed
Mach 2.02.
Concorde
hasalso been used
promote the o
British week which was
its zenith in 1985;
the
aircraft arrived
at
Airport, Stockholm
on
28 Septem
having
flown low
over the
city to show
to asmany people as possible.
The
o t h er C o nc o rd e
operator,
Air
nce, was also
active
in
promoting
its
ugural flights to unusual
or new loca
One
of
the most adventurous trips
undertaken
over
12-l3 October
1992
e n t he airline a t te m pt e d t h e
fastest
round-the-world flight. Known
S u nc h as e r O n e, t h e
publicity for
the
flight promised
that
the C oncorde would
fly so fast around
the
world
t h a t t h e
sun
w on t have time to
set . Beforethis ,
Con
c or de 0 01 , F
WT S S
flew t o a nd from
Dakar during
25-26
May 1971,
the
return
flight
taking2hr 52min. This
wasfollowed
by a
training
f l ight to
South
Africa
over
the
period
23-24
February 1973 with
Con
corde 002.
W he n t he
aircraft finally
entered revenue-generating
service
with
Air France, airframe
F
WTSC undertook
an
endurance
flight from Paris to R io d e
j a n ei r o a nd back
in
january
1976,
this
being the airline s inaugural commercial
flight with Concorde. A
joint
venture
with British Airways followed on
24-25
May
w hen C oncorde
F-BVFA,
operating
as flight AF053, u n de r t h e c o mm a nd
of
Capt
Pierre Dudal,
went
from Paris to
Washington,
Dulles,
taking 3 h r 5 0 mi n t o
make
the
journey. The return leg involved
a British Airways aircraft under
the
com
m a nd o f C a p t
Todd,
which
left
Washing
ton
for
London,
using aircraft
G-BOAG,
the
flight
time
was
3hr 40min. Air
France
flight AF002 was
of
great significance to
the airline
as
this
signified
t he e nt ry o f
their aircraft into jFK, New York
on
23
November
1977. Five years later an
Air
Francefirst flightwas
not quite
so
dramat
ic since this involve d a flightfrom Paris to
Luxembourg and back
on
20 May 1982,
taking
28min. A s light ly longer journey
was
undertaken on
I
October
1983
when
F-BVFF f lew f rom Par is t o D ub li n a nd
back,
u n de r C a p t
G.
jacob,
in 1hI 9min.
710
The following yearwouldsee the same air
c r a ft m a king itsfirst landing in Rome
on
8
july
1984.
Capt Gilles
was in
command
t he e nt ir e flight lasting Ihr 55min,
of
w hich 20min weresupersonic. In
the
same
year
Air
France
took Concorde
to Austria,
when
i t f l ew a
round
tr ipfrom Paris , land
ing
at
Linz a nd V ie nn a o n 26 October.
Nuremberg
was
o n e o f t h e n e xt
placesvis
ited by
a n A ir France C oncorde, w hen F-
BVFF, operating as A F4860, la nded
on
19
july 1986. August
o f t h at
same year saw
oncorde landing at
Tel Aviv
Interna
tional from New York o n t h e 1 7t h as AF
4160. The inbound aircraft was F-BVFF,
while
t h e C o nc o rd e
u sed for
t he n ex t
departure
to Par is was
F-BTSC.
In 1987
Air France Concordes visited Kathmandu
and
Delhi duringOctober,
and
in Decem
bera
short
flight from Paris
to
Toulouse for
charity purposes was made in support
of
a
cancer
trust.
Concorde
F-BTSD flew from
Paris
toStavanger
in Norway,
transporting
financiers for a
meeting, returningto
Paris
the same
day. During
the
period
1-17
November
1993
Concorde
F BVFA
undertook
a wor ld
tour
v ia Barbado s a s
flight AF4853,
Capt
Franco is Rude. A
change of
flight
number
t o A F 4 8 57 c o v
ered
t he n ex t
leg from Kuala
Lumpur
to
New Dehli, with the s a me p i lo t in com
mand. The final leg b e ca m e A F 48 5 9 a n d
included a
departure
from Bahrain to Paris
w i th R u de
in
command
as before.
On
24
August 1986 Air France flight AF4862 sig
nalled
another
first for
C oncorde w hen
it
made
a
return
flight to
Hahn and back to
Paris. Flight F-BTSC was chartered to fly
French football fans
to
Liverpool for a
European Cup game on
25
August
1979.
Another
charter involved a f li gh t f rom
Paris to
the
Island
of
Kish, or ja z ir e h
Ye
Queys, a luxurious holiday
development
0 the coast of
Iran,
on
24
january
1978.
This
wou ld be
the
start
of
a semi-sched
uled
charter fl
ight
thatcontinueduntil the
overthrow of the S hah.
Criticisms and Accidents
A l t ho u gh C o n co r d e
finally
proved
a
money-spinner
for
both
operating airlines,
the reasons given for the cancellation of
orders by
other
airlines extended far beyond
political
and
media opposition.
Some
could
squarely be laid a t t h e door o f t h e aircraft s
designers, who had insisted on incorporat
ing some features
t h at t h e
airlines did
not
r eq ui re , s uc h as a
moving
map display
711
which , in rea li ty , was u se le ss g iv e
oncorde spent much
of
itstime flyin
water. Also viewed with some scep
was the a utoe ngine m onitor ing syste
was designed purely for use
on
Con
the
airlines suggested
that
they
mu
fen ed
an existingsystem to be incorp
Similarcircumstancessurrounded th
a product
of
Sagem-Ferranti,whereas
tial customers hadexpresseda prefere
a systemmanufactured by Delco and
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TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS
ABOVE: Complete with a shimmeringsmoke haze an ir France Concorde taxies
towards itsparking slot.
Even
intheseconditionsthe nose issl ightlyloweredto
improve visibility. Phippe Noret
BELOW:
Asnow covered Charles de Gaulle Airport isthe venue for
ir France Concorde F BVFB landing afterf lying fromthe USA.
BBA Colecton
II
/l Il l l
1111
I
Engine starting was a ls o a b on e
of
con-
tention with the airlines requesting the use
of
an
extemal airstarter whereas
the
proto-
types were fitted with gas turbine starters
and the preproduction machines were fitted
with
an
MFPU.Units werealsocontentious
many of the airlinesbeing used to observing
system pressures in pounds persquare inch;
however
the
French as
is
their wont insist-
ed that all measurements be displayed in
bars. Doubts were also raisedabout the via-
bility of the droopnose and visorassemblies
a nd t he ir c on ti nu ou s an d safe usage
althoughextensivetestingsoon proved
that
the
equipment was safe. hen the airlines
began their investigations into Concorde
112
they raised
concems
about
the
visor in the
raised positionand the resulting lack of vis-
ibility.
his was
quickly explained away
as
beingapplicableto
the
prototypesonly and
t hat t he
production machines would have
visorswith agreatervisiblearea.Having had
these fears assuaged they then raised con-
cernswith reference to the behaviour ofthe
ABOVE: With an air startertrol leyplugged
intoNos3 and4 engines an
ir
France
.concordestartsengines before
departing on a post maintenance
trials flight.
BernardChares
RIGHr With its burnersquietened the ill-
fated AF Concorde F BTSC passesthe
camera with vapourplumes bleeding
from theouter
wing
panels.
BBA
Colecton
113
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TRI LS
ND
TRI UL TIONS
f
RIGHT This nose on view ofthe XF 92 reveals
thepure delta shape ofthe wing andthetapered
fuselage
To
curethe XF 92 ofits problems it was
redesigned gaining an area ruled fuselageand
a revamped wing leading edge The result was
the XF l02
CourtesyNASA
TOP: TheConvair XF 92 wasbuilt as the
prototype fora new seriesof fighters Due to
theshapeof thefuselage it didnot perform as
well
as expectedand therefore
went
to NASA
for trials use Courtesy
NASA
Having
declined
t oj oi nt he
British
andt he
French i n pursuit
of
a
multinational
SST,
t h e U S A
gave every indication
of
forging
it s o wn
path
t owards supersoni c glory.
A l t hough t he A m eri cans had ent ered t he
jet
age belatedly,
t heir can-do
attitude
allied
t o t he i nform ati on
gained from
the
wreckage
of
Nazi
Cermany
spurred
them
o n t o
push forward
w i th t heir ow n
devel
opment
programme.From theseefforts
the
first
of
a seri es
of
straight-winged
jet
air
c ra f t w ou ld a pp ea r, m ai nl y p ow er ed by
centrifugal
jet
engines.
The adopt i on oft he
axial
j e t e n gi ne a n d
its improved
thrust
utput
plusits improvingreliability
meant
t hat t he A m eri can
aviation industrywould
advance t he
airframesthey were
mounted
in.
The
first expression
of
this
new
tech
nology was
the
seminal
N ort h A m eri can
A i rcraft F-86
Sabre
single-seat fighter.
With
this
the
sound barri ercould be
com
fortably breached.
Having
proved
that
a
jet-poweredairframewith sweptwingswas
t hepat h
to follow,
the
military
a n d t h e U S
Air
Force m ade great
d e ma n ds o n t h ei r
manufacturers
to
produce supersonicfight
ers
and
st ri keai rcraft; t hus w oul d be born
t he C ent ury
series
of
fighters, comprising
the NAA F-I00Super
Sabre,
t he McD on
nell F - I 0 l
Voodoo,
the
Convair
F-I02
Delta
Dagger,
t he L oc kh eed F -I 04
Starfighter,
the
Republic F-I05
Thunder
c h ie f a n d t h e C o nv a ir
F-106 D elt a D art .
The lerican
CHAPTER
SIX
Transatlantic Interest
a f li gh t
outbound
from
Shannon
when
No.3
engine
needed t o be
shut
down,after
w hich a returnw asm ade t o
Shannon.
Fol
l ow ing a si mi l ar
pattern
to
the
reported
engine
problems,
near
misses were unusual,
although
this
happened in
A ugust 1998
when
two
C oncordes came w i thi n
820ft
250m)
of
vertical separation in
the
vicin
ity
o f N e w
York.
Structural
problems
con
cerningConcorde
were likewise fortunate
ly few
O nl y o ne
i ncident concerni ng
fuselage integritywas reported, affecting
an
Air
France ai rcraft i n w hich cracks w ere
found rounda passengercabin w indow. A s
a safety
precaution
the
captain
deci ded t o
return
t o N ew
Y ork and reduce
the
cabin
pressurization to
the
minimum.
Other
cracks
have
beendiscovered in wing struc
t ures, t hesecom i ngt o l i ght i n A ugust 1994
on
a British Airwaysmachine.
InJuly
2000
BritishA irwaysbegan to subject
their
fleet
to
extensive
NOT
checks
o f t h e
structure
during
maintenance.
D uri ng t his process
minute
cracks were discovered in
the
wing
spars, which led
t o t he
temporary ground
ing
ofone
aircraftfor further investigation.
In contrast,
Air
France carried
out
the
samesequence
of
checks,
but
allowed their
fleet
t o cont inue
revenueoperations.
A ll t he s e
incidents
w ould pale
into
insignificance following
the
events that
took
place
on
25 July 2000.
\
This rear
view
of an ir FranceConcordeshowsthe burners still alightafter
take off andthe slightly flattenedunder fuselage nearthe main undercarr iage units
plusthefair ingscoveringthe
PFCUs BBA Colecton
frequency
of
fai lures w as reduced, t hey
w ould never be complet el y el im i nat ed
as
sections
oft he
rudder
continued
to
come
off
the
airframe,
the
last casebeing reported in
October
1998.Fortunately
the
elevonswere
morerobust, although
o n a t
least
one
occa
si on a sect i on w as t orn cl ear
of
its ailframe
i n May 1998 from a B ri ti sh A irways
Con
corde, w hich result i n
the
aircraft s making
an
emergency return to
New York
Concorde
engine
probl em s have been
fortunately few most beingspurious,
but
all
resul ti ng i n
an
em ergency di versi on for
safety reasons.
One oft he
most difficultfor
the
engi neers t o di agnose
concerned C
BOAC which
reported a low oil-pressure
warning light illuminated for No.3
engine
intransit from
New
Y orkt o L ondoni n May
1994. A s a precaut ion
the
engine was
shut
down, however,
the
s am e l ig ht f or N o. 2
engine
a ls o l it u p, r es ul ti ng i n a p re ca u
t io na r y s hu t do wn . A s uc ce ss fu l l an di ng
was made
at
H eathrow and
investigations
revealed
that i ncorrect servi ci ng proce
dures had
been
followed, resulting in
the
engine
oiltanks beingunder-filled. During
2000 British Airways began
to
experience
a seri es
of engine
failures.
The
first hap
pened i n January
on
a fli ght t o B arbados
which required
that
the
engine
be
shut
dow nand
emergency vehicles be in
atten
dance. A second
engine
failureoccurred
on
nose radome assembly in
the
drooped posi
t i on, t he rout ing
of
the hydraulic system
pi pew ork and
electrical
l oo ms in
the
vi cini t yof t he
engines.
Three
sets
of
mod
ificationswere required beforeall weresatis
fied
that
a catastrophicengine failure could
be survived
by
these most vital
of
systems.
A s w it h all a ir cr af t,
Concorde
has
evolved
as
t i me has passed
and
incidents
have
occurred.
The
first , a precursor
of
events that
would follow,
took
p la ce i n
June
1979
when
a n A ir
France
Concorde
leaving Dullessuffered a blow-out
of
tyres
N os 5
and
6
and t he di sint egrat ion of t he
wheels,causingdamage
t oN o. 2 engine to
three
fuel tanks
a n d t h e
hydraulic system.
The N at ional T ransport and
Safety Board
recommended that the
undercarriage
shouldalways remainlocked
down i n
such
circumstances
and
an
emergency landing
made
as
soon
as possible.
Similar incidents
al so occurred i n Jul y
and Sept em ber t hat
year. In contrast, B rit ish A irw ays w ould
not
h a ve a r e po rt ab le
occurrence
until
September
1980
when
C-BOAF suffereda
tyre blow-out.
Other
faults plagued
the
computerized
engine m onit oring
system,
which
resulted in a British
Concorde
hav
ing
t o di vert
to Boston as a safety precau
t io n o n a t
least
one
occasion.
One o f t he
m ost seri ous i nci dent s t o
affect C oncorde i nvol ved A i r France air
craft F-BVFD, which
was
badly damaged
duri ng a heavy l andi ng
at
Paris. Such
was
the
extent
of
t hedi st ort ion t o
the
aitframe
that
the
aircraft was withdrawn from rev
enue
service i n D ecem ber 1994 for spares
recoverybefore being scrappedsome twelve
years later. During 1989
the
British Airways
fleet began tosuffer a seriousspate
of
myste
rious failures to sections
of
their aircrafts
rudder sections.
The
first recorded incident
was
reported
in
April, being followed
by
similarincidents
in
January 1991 and March
1992. Other problems
continued
to plague
theConcorde
fleet, especiallywith regard to
tyre failures
o n t h e
main-gear bogies. In all
these incidents damage
was
alsosuffered
by
the
engines, fuel t an ks a n d h yd ra ul ic
pipelines, and
o n a t
least
one
occasion
the
sweeperbar
for
removingFOD
o n t he
bogie
fai led, t urni ng t he remnant s i nto shrapnel
that
punctured
the
wing. Modifications
were
then
ur ge ntly p ut in h an d to fit
strengthened undercarriagesweeper bars to
the
British Airways fleet and a further pro
gramme
was
begun tostrengthen the rudder
section mountingsand reduce
the
potential
for play in
the
operati ng cont rol runs.
Although
muchwork
was
expendedand the
774 775
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The civilian
branch
of the aviation
industry, on the other hand,
was
slow to
get any benefit from
the
militarydevelop
ments being made available. One reason
was the surplus of retired military trans
portsavailable
for
the established and new
airlines and the development of similar
aircraft specifically for
the
same market,
thus
the
BoeingStratoliner, the Lockheed
Constellation
and versions of Douglas
transports went intociviloperation. Possi
bly de Havil land and i ts Comet airliner
would be
the
spur for
the
appearance of a
turbojet-powered machine in America.
THE
MERI N SST
All of
the
initialcontenders, Boeing,Dou
glas and Convair,
concentrated
on similar
looking aircraft, with four podded engines
mounted two perswept wing.
The start
of
the Anglo-French project
was
first regard
e d w it h s ome s ce pt ic ism in the USA,
although NASA
and
i ts predecessor
NACA
had already undertaken extensive
research
into
swept-wing behaviour. To
prove these theories NASA developed the
'X' series of research aircraft to push the
boundaries forward.
Having
explored
the
possibilitiesof high-speed flight, itsapplica
tionto thecivilindustrywas quietly shelved
116
and
all efforts were aimed towards the mil
i tary. All this changed when the aircraft
industry and NASA began to takenoticeof
the Concorde project.
To stimulate the industry, the Federal
Aviation Administration issued a request
on
15
August 1963 for designsfor a super
sonic transport; this came from
the
'Pro
ject Horizon' initiativesponsored
by
Pres
ident Kennedy inan effortto stimulate the
stagnant
American
economy. The avia
t ion i ndus tr y' s r em it was t o
outline
a
des ign for a horne -grown SST.
Giving
backing and impetus to thi s e ffor t were
In ordertocatch up with therestof theworld the
USA used air launched rocket powered aircraft for
itshigh speed research. Thisis theBell
X 1
in
fl ight. Althoughprovidingvaluable data on the
physics offlying above Mach
1
i twas recognized
from theoutsetthatrocket propulsion was not
acceptablefor civil transport. Courtesy
NASA
BELOW: Afterachieving Mach
1
the nexts tepwas
to breakthe Mach2 barrier.
To
thatend Douglas
builtthis X plane; as before the aircraft was air
launchedfrom a carrier aircraft. Courtesy
NASA
Kennedy
a nd t he
Congress. Before the
appropriations were made the President
decided that a full investigation i n to t he
costs to thegovernmentand the economy,
and
the benefi ts, should be made.To this
end
Vice-President Johnson c ha ir ed a
cabinet- level committee, beginning its
investigationsin May 1963.
The
FAA,
the
driving force behind the project, made the
strongest representat ions and its report
stressed
the
great benefitsto
the
economy.
Their arguments were strong
enough
to
convince
the
President that approval
shouldbe givenand the compet ingmanu
facturers informed; thus on 5June theSST
programme was launched, although ironi
cally
Pan American
Airways had signed a
purchase
option
for six Concordes justtwo
days earlier. Following
on
from this con
firmation, Najeeb Halaby delivered an
address to
the American
Institute
of
Aero
nautics
and
Astronautics which was in
tended topromote
the
SST, not only from
an economic
view but also as a j um p in
technology that the project would bring.
The stipulationpresented to the majorair
craft
and
engine manufacturers in August
required that they take
notice
of
both t he
commercialand the technical aspects and
applicationsof theirdesigns; the resulting
a ir cr af t had the re fore to be a super ior,
commercial, supersonictransport, appeal
i ng to the world's airlines, not only from
the
poin t o f view of t echnology but of
operating economics.
Other
pointsrequir
ing attention included the price per air
craft that each customer could afford to
pay safety, and a reasonable deliverydate
for entry intoservice.
The
aircraftproject
ed by the
FAA
needed to havea sustain
ablecruising speed in the region of
Mach
2 .2 , c ar ry ing a pay load of 30, 000 t o
40 OOOIb l3,600-18,00kg , t hi s t ot al
i nc luding 125 to 160 pas senger s over a
range ofabout 4,000miles (6,400km).
The
accompanying advertising conveyed the
impression t hat the aircraf t would be far
safer than andsuperiorto any other avail
able from elsewhere.
The development
of
the American
SST
was
seen
as
requiring a three-stage plan.
The f irst would encompass the design
competition
i ts el f and was scheduled to
beginin January 1964. The second part of
thisstage would begin
once
the
engine
and
airframe manufacturers had
been
chosen,
and required thatthe FAA, manufacturers
and a ir li ne s get t oge ther to move to
the
next stage. In
the
second stage the chosen
manufacturers would begin to flesh out
THE MERI N
SST
theiroriginalsubmissions, while
the
third
stagewouldcover
the
development, design,
manufacture and thorough test ing of two
preproduction prototypes. Funding for
stage
one
wouldcorne mainlyfrom
the
gov
e rnment; t he second and the thi rd pha se
would be supported
by
loans with repay
ments coming from thesalesachieved.This
did not guarantee any purchases by or on
behalf
o
the
US gover nmen t; but it
promised that i t would provide all assis
tance necessary to capture sales overseas.
At
the end of the second stage interested
air lines would beasked to pay a royalty of
200,000 perairframe ordered within six
months , whi le those coming on-boa rd
afterwards would beaskedto pay 850,000
per aircraf t. Further payments garnered
from the airlinesafterdelivery would be a
1 5
per cent royalty
on
revenue generated
by
seat sales , which would be paid to
the
government
as recompense for
the
devel
opment,
whichwould lastfor twelveyears.
The
FAA Takes Command
The
guiding agency charged
with
oversee
ing
the development
of
the
American
SST
was
the Federal Avia ti on Authori ty ,
whi ch s et up the Supersonic Transport
Development
Office under the guidance
ofNajeeb Halaby,
an
FAA Administrator;
this would work in conjunction with rep
resentatives ofthe interested airlines.
This
group would cover the f irst phase in great
detail, their remit embracing
the
manage
ment, t echnology, oper at ions and eco
nomics of operating an SST. Technical
aspects were subdivided into six areas: air
craft systems, sonic-boom effects, aerody
namic behaviour, airframe design, propul
s ion and systems, plus cert ificat ion and
tests.
Operations
and economics covered
flight operations, safety, economic para
meters, ground operation costsand train
ing planning.
Management
covered com
pany
competence
evaluations, managerial
organization,
development
and produc
tion
facilities,
development and
produc
t ion master planning, management con
trolskills
and
subcontractorcapabilityand
competence. Successfulco mpletion of this
phase would allow the start of the second
stage; this was expected to last for twelve
months. At the conclusion
of
both stages
the final productswould berevealed,these
being mock-ups of
complete
airframes,
partial airframe mock-ups, engine mock
ups and full experimental data .
Although
117
the
airframe
and
powerplants were
great prominence, there was also
development work being undertak
volving the avionics and flightcon tr
tems forwhichevermanufacturerem
as the eventual winner.
With all these reference points
lished it appeared
that
the America
was
all set for take-off in 1963. Ho
the
75-25 per cent cost spli t led th
tion industryto complainabout i ts l
financial risk.
The
alternative was
cost plus incentive fee that would
the manufacturers' risk. In turn, th
ernment rejected this proposal and
mate ensued. Realizing that t hi s s
affairs could
not
be allowed to con
Halaby advised President Kennedy
the f inancial community for advic
arbitration. The chosen specialists
Eugene Black, r et ir ed pre sident
World Bank, and Stanley Osborne,
man
o f O li n Mathe son, t o r evie
financial risk assessment
of
the SS
gramme. They delivered theirrepor
December1963 to
the
nowPresiden
son. Their report resolved the dif
and recommended that
the
risk splits
be c ha nged t o a 90-10 per
cent
r
favour of the manufacturers, which i
ed an easing of the penalties for an
overruns incurred, althoughit was al
ommended that
the
airlines should
strongervoiceconcerning the overa
ception of the SST.
In
addit ion to
financial recommendations, Blac
Osbornealso warned that sucha cra
gramme
as
this could be dangernu
technically and economically. Thei
warning was that to
enter
into a rac
the Anglo-Frenchconsortiumcould
to be far morecostly than was at fir
ized
Although
t hi s was a s tr ong r
mendation
it was not accepted ou
butJohnson,at the suggestion of th
BudgetBureau Director,set upa hig
SST overviewcommitteeto keep an
proceedings.
This
Presidential Ad
Committee on
SupersonicTranspo
sisted
of
Halaby, Douglas Dillon fro
US Treasury, Luther Hodges fro
Commerce
Department,James Web
NASA,John McCone from
the
CIA
Blackand Osborne.
With
the costingarguments close
olution, the groups of manufacturers
to plan their initial submissions. Th
sen airframe manufacturers were B
and Lockheed and
the
designofthe e
was given to General Electric and P
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THE
MERI N SST THE MERI N
SST
Atthe otherend ofthe designspectrum NorthAmericanproduced themassive
six-enginedXB-70 bomber. Althoughcapableof performing thetasksset forit
it neverentered US F service because ofits prohibitivecost andthe improvements
to Soviet air defences.
CourtesyN S
81014
pitching
momentof
inertia
at
lowspe
offset these difficulties Boeing added
of canardwings to the nose which in
selves would pose problems. Wind-
testing
of
the new combination s
that, contrary to expectations, the c
would make
the
handlingworse as
th
gitudinal stability of the a ircraf t
become even moreunstablethrougho
completeflight envelope. Further in
analysis showed
that
additional weig
strengthening would be required to s
the canards and counteract their in
t ion and to reduce the aitframe's ae
ticity. This was beginningto develop
catch-upsituationwhere each modif
generated i ts own set
of
problems
then requiredyet a furtherset of fixes
out, andthismeantthat, as eachwasa
to the design and the wind-tunnel m
the situation worsened.
Furtherstudies involvedmoving th
pivot points to various distances fro
aircraft'scentreline;but theiroptimu
tion was a s close to the centreline as
b le to gain the benefits of subsonic
with variable-sweep wings. This opti
not
feasible from
an
engineering
p
view; the alternative was to move the
outboard. And this brought further
lems as there was an increase in the
ments of the aerodynamic cen tre
resulting changes in
the
flight spee
angle of attack. Tocounteract the ou
relocation of the pivots, the tail s
neededto beincreased inarea; this w
requiredeven when canards were in
F rom a pract ica l po in t
of
view, the
pivotposition also caused
the
lift:dra
to suffer a t b ot h subsonic and sup
speeds. Moving the wingpivotsfurth
board also reduced the benefits o
sweep
at
lower speedssince there wa
of
available wing area to produce use
Even after Boeinghad introduced a
weight reduction the airframe was sti
cent aboveacceptable limits.
Structurally
the
Boeing 2707 con
of
closely spaced, shaped frames
co
ed
by
numerousstringers, all beingco
by a titanium s ki n whi ch was d
capable of acceptingthe kineticgen
by speeds
of
Mach 3;
the
airframe str
itselfconsisted o f a n alloy
of
9 0 p e
titanium, 6 aluminium and 4 vana
The
wing glove extensions which h
the wing pivot points were built ar
closely grouped pressure web beam
ture, to
the
front
of
which were l
edgeslats.
Aft of the
wing pivotswe
The Boeing Bid
Boeing's first a tt emp t a t the design was
known as Model 2707-200 (Dash 200), the
most outstanding feature of which was its
variable-sweep wings.
This
innovation had
beenproposed since it wouldgive
the
Boe
ingaircraftgood performance and stability
at all points of the speed and flight enve
lope. A furthergainwould bea lowerland
ingspeed, which, inturn,wouldreduce
the
length
of
runway required for
both
take-off
and landing.
The
only proviso was that
sucha swing-wing mechanism should not
e xc ee d 4 p er
cent
o f t he gross structural
weight of t he aircraft.
The
dimensions
given for this version
o f the
Boeing
SST
included a fuselage length of 318ft (97m),
the wings in their swept-back condition
would have a span of 106ft (32m) and in
the fully forward position the wingspan
would increase to 174ft (5301).
The
gross
weight wi th 292 passengers and luggage
was calculated at 675,0001b (306,800kg).
The
intended powerplants would be four
General Electric augmented turbojets,
each being rated at 60,000Ib.st (267kN),
thisin turn was intended to give
the
Dash
200 a maximum speed of Mach 2.7. Since
the Boeing
SST
wouldbe a long, heavyair
craft, it was decided to incorporatea form
of
direct lift control which used spoilers
placed infront
of the
flaps to improve flight
control during the landingphase. The air
frame would consist mainly of steel and
titanium, thus allowing the designers to
push for a topspeed
of
Mach3,shouldsuch
an increase inspeedbe desired.
Overall,
the
Boeing Dash 200 was a far
more exciting design t h an the competing
Lockheed/Pratt
Whitney proposal; how
ever, it had already been realized
that
the
cutting-edge machine from Seattle was
not
inany state to be constructed as quickly as
was first thought. I t was at this time that
problems started to arise.
The
first to
appear was the swing wing, which, after fur
ther study by Boeingengineers, was no t the
boon i t was f ir st held to be.
Not
only was
there an inherent balance problem caused
by
the rearward mounting o f t h e engines,
the close coupling of the flight control sur
faces to the aircraft's e.g. meant that there
was an unforeseen increasein the high trim
drag coefficient and in the pitching move
ment at lowspeedswhich completelynegat
ed the supposed safety benefits. It was later
revealed that the swing-wing aircraft suf
fered f rom poor mass d is t ribu t ion due to
the
aft location
of the
engines, plus a high
evolved intoPhase 2Bwithout anyobvious
progress towardsa final selection. Secretary
ofState Robert MacNamara and hisdepart
men ta l o ff ic ia ls were a lso coming under
pressure inearly 1965from Halabyto make
a decision
conceming
the
SST
programme;
but MacNamara was still insistingupon fur
ther feasibility studies.
Having survived numerous investiga
tions, the study o f t he final submissions
began in September 1966. After due con
sideration, the result of the designcompeti
tion was announcedon 31 December,with
Boeing and General Electric beingchosen
as the preferred developers. However, even
thispart of the process wasslowed as Presi
dent
Johnson would
not
give
the
final go
ahead until 29April 1967. With Phase 2C
successfully completed, the chosen manu
facturers immediately began work o n t he
development
of
theirown parts
of
Phase 3.
At
the end
of
this phase
the
selected con
sortium would not only have two pro to
types , i t wou ld a lso be on course to com
pleting the airworthiness certificationand a
planned production schedule for the air
lines.
The
funding arrangements were des
tined to remain
a t t h e
same level
of90
per
cent from the government, although it
would insist that each interested airline
should contribute 1 million towards the
final programme cost
that
had been calcu
lated to reach 1,444 million. Eventually
teno f fifty-two interested parties agreed to
s tump up thei r share o f t he risk funding,
which allowed Phase 3 funds to bereleased
and the contractsto beissued to Boeingand
General
£Iew ic on
1 May 1967.
This
in
turn allowed the projected first flight date
for a p ro to ty pe t o b e s et for the closing
months of 1970.
The
Boeing design office
startedwith a series of concept drawings of
which sixteen were seen as having further
development potential.
The
lead design
wasalways the 2707-100variablesweepair
c ra ft , a l though i t wou ld appear that the
company were alreadycoveringall the pos
sibilitiesshould this version fail.
The
inter
nal model numbers for these designs were
964-404 for the swing-wing aircraft, 969
321 , which fea tu red a h ighly swept , cam
bered arrow planform with fold-outcanards
on
the forward fuselage, while
the
final
back-up proposalwas known as Model969
302, based arounda plain delta wing. Alto
gether the newBoeingproduct hadattract
ed optionsfor sixty-threeaircraft, an ironic
twist being
t ha t BOAC
had p laced an
option forfouraircraft, which made
the
air
line unpopular in Britain.
Evaluation
not be required since the sonic boomruns
had proved
that
they wou ld be an unwel
come
nuisance over populated areas.
The
trials werecarried out over Oklahoma and
lasted six months, and elicited over 8,000
complaintsand more than 5,000claims for
compensation.
By September1964all four companies were
ready to hand in their submissions foreval
uation
by the
FAAand
other
interested par
ties. Comprising over 22,000 pages, they
wereread by over200 expertsfrom NASA,
the USAF, t he FAA and t he C iv il Aer o
nautics Board.
The
proposals from both
groupsweredisappointing since
neither
was
ableto coverthe range requiredand payload
requiremen ts , and both wou ld a lso have
higher than expected operating costs.
The
engines too would fall short of
the
design
parameters; but both General Electric and
Pratt
Whitney were lucky enough t o b e
g ranted a fur ther s ix months in which to
improve their offerings. Given this situa
tion, itcame as no surprise thatthe Depart
ment
of
Commerce was asked to undertake
a further financial study
of the
entire pro
gramme. By December 1964 Phase 2A had
Edwards AFB to under take sonic -boom
flights to determinetheir effectsupon peo
ple
on
the ground, buildings and the envi
ronment
in general.
The
aircraft involved
with these trials included
the Lockheed F-
104, the Convair B-58, the North Ameri
can XB-70 and the Lockheed YF-12A.
Th e
trials were intended tobe run in two phas
es; however it became clear after
the
first
series
of
flights
that the
second set would
Wh
itney. Inearly 1965 the preferreddevel
opment
teams had crystallized
into
two
groups, thesebeingBoeing/GeneralElectric
and Lockheed/Pratt Whitney. Changing
the way that the government , FAA and
manufacturers looked at theAmericanSST
was one external factor- the cancellationof
the
BAC
TSR2 by the British, which
was
seen
as
creating a delay
in
the development
of the Bristol/Rolls-RoyceOlympus engine
forcivil supersonic use In response, theUS
governmentdecided to extend the develop
ment time allocated to the SST.
Having
stretched
out the development
period, the redesignated Phase 2A got
under way; this nowmeant
that
the devel
opment
period had been extended from
twelve months to eighteen. This allowed
a ll fou r manufac tu rers to resume their
research efforts for the design/production
part o f t he contract. Within this phase
each manufacturinggroupwas expectedto
provide detai led des igns , mock-ups
of
major parts
of the
airframe and engines
and experimental data. By the conclusion
of both phases the government had esti
mated
that
development cos ts wou ld be
24 million for the first stage and lO mil
lionfor
the
second, covering
the
airframe
designs and
the
two
engine
designs.
While
the technical aspect of the
SST
was final
ly g at he ri ng momen tum, t he FAA was
undergoing an upheaval, with senior and
middle managementchanging and unfore
seen fundingproblems
coming
to
the
fore.
Once t he FAA
waves
had
se tt led , i t
resumed contact with other organizations,
o ne o f t h e first being NASA.
The
first
request to
NASA
was for a irc ra ft f rom
One
ofthe best-knownexponentsofthe delta-wing planformin the US
was
Convair
who successful lyintroducedthe F-l02 andF-l06fighters andthe B-58Hustlershown
here.
Colecton
118
119
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THE
MERIC NSST
THE
MERIC NSST
Movable forebodyhinge. downward to g iv ep ilo ts
added
vis ibility at subsonic
speeds.
2 F lig h td o ck.
3 . Entr y d o o r .
4 F i r t ~ c a u passenger
seots
four abreast
5.
Nose
gear.
6 Stowage console
7. Galley unils.
8 Six·abreast tourist closs
pouenger
seats
extend
o ft t o
cargo retaining bulkhead
9 lower·deck
cargo comportment
1 0 . Bo dy f r ames.
1 1. Lead ing - ed ge . I ots.
12. Rib•.
13. Floor blooms.
l Pressure w structure
1 5. F u el to n k.
1 6 . M ain lan d in g
gear
well.
1 7 . W in g p ivo t.
18 Outboard wing section pivoted forward to
30·
sweep.
19. Flops.
20. Spoilers.
2 1 . A ilero n .
22 Wing sweep actuator
23 Main landing
gear well.
24. Engine.
25. Cargo retaining bulkhead.
2 6. Car g o d o o r .
27 Maindeck cargo compartment
2B Elevon.
29 Elevator
30 Preuure bulkhead
3 1 . V entr al f in.
32. Fin.
33 Tail cone
34 Emergency exit
m ai n- g ea r b ay s w h ic h w er e c o mp l et el y
covered i n fli ght w hil e w i th the gear
extended
the
minimal amount of under
carriage bay was exposed t o
the
airflow.
Each ofthe four main undercarriage units
wa s a b og ie u po n w hi ch w er e m ou nt ed
four wheels to allow forenough clearance
upon retraction and the main-gear units
were slightly staggered two forward
and
outboard of
the
aftpair. A similar arrange
ment appl i ed t o
the
twin-wheeled nose
undercarriage whichwasmounted well aft
ofthe flight deck
and
would require some
careful steering
by
the crewto remainsafe
Iyon the tax iwa
y
To
the
rear ofthe aircraft
were the delta-shaped fixed tailplanes
which werealso
home
to
the
podded pow
erplants two perside.A similar methodof
a ss em bl y was us ed in t he se s tr uc tu re s
although
t he y w er e m ad e c on s id e ra bl y
strongerto absorb
the thrust
loading of
the
engines
andthe
aerodynamic forcesgener
ated by
the
inboard-mounted elevators
and the tip-mounted elevons. The wings
w er e f ai rl y s le nd e r i n n a tu r e s in c e i n
the
s we pt -b ac k p os it io n t he y f or me d a d e lt a
with
the
fixed t ail planes and i n the fully
forw ard posit i on a ful l range
of
sl at s and
Fow ler t ripl e-sl ot t ed flaps w ould al most
double
the
t o ta l a re a
of the
w in g a nd
extend
o v er 8 5 p er cent of the leading and
trailing edges. Roll
control
was dealt w i th
by ailerons
mounted
close to the tip ofthe
wing.
The
wings themselves were mount
e d a ro un d a s in gl e p iv ot h av in g t hr ee
selectable positions. In
the
forward swept
position
the
leading edgesweep was set at
20 degrees for l andi ng the intermediate
position was 30 degrees for take-offand at
supersonic cruise
the
l eadi ng edge sw eep
was 72 degrees.
There
was an intermediate
position between
30
and
72
degrees
which
c ou ld b e s el ec te d f or s ub s on ic c ru is in g.
Mount ed above
the
rear-most section of
the
fuselage
and
its tail-cone was
the
fin
c o mp ri si ng a m ul ti sp ar s tr u ct u re i nt er
spersed with spacing
and
shaping ribs all
covered
by
a
titanium
skin. T o
the
rear of
the
fin w as the multisection rudder each
element being powered by i ts ow n PFCU .
Flightcontrol
at
low speeds in lateralmode
wa s p r ov id e d b y conventional ailerons
and
the elevators catered for the pitching
moments. Once
the
wings were fullyswept
back flight control w as achieved by
the
pivoted tips
of the
tailplanes these being
the onl y m eans of
control. The
G
Electricengines were GE4 turbojets r
60 0001b
267kN ,
each having an
burner
and
variable inletand exhau
On
5
January 1968 Boeing after
months of trying finally admitted
with the design of the Dash200 aircr
a sk ed f or e xt ra t im e t o r ev am p t h e
design completely. In effect the co
had managedto create
an
aircraft tha
easily cross
the
Atlantic but empty
FAAagreed to
an
extension until31M
not
only was
the
prestige of the Am
i ndust ry at st ake but
the
agency w a
c ha nc e to re co ve r so me o f t he
already expended. B oei ng t ook t he
back t o t he draw ing board al thou
provisogiven by t he FA A was that t
design mustbe ready for construction
i nt w elve m ont hsand a prot otypere
a first fli ght i nMarch 1972.
Boeing
Try
Again
Boeing s answer to its designcrisis w
the
2707-300 which featured delta
w it h a l ea di ng e dg e s we ep a ng le
n
lJ lJ
l 1L Jlll lO
i
······· R 0
Thissecond incarnationof theBoeing
SST was
known
as
Model 2707 300;
i tsdevelopmentinto acommercial ly
viableaircraftwas notpossible
SSA
Colecton
BelOW:
TheBoeing swing wing SST was intendedto have fourmainundercarriageunits plusa nose
unitto carry itsimmenseweight The multistagenose
was
intended to obviatethe need forsecondary
external sensors as Concorde didwhen itsnosesection was drooped Thelocationof theenginesand
theswing wings endedthis version SBA
Colecton
ABOVE
This diagramrevealsmany ofthe internalfi tments
thatBoeingproposedfor the Model
2707 200 swing-
wing SST being at an earlystage thedrawing lacksthe
canardsfitted lated BSA
Colecton
120 121
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THE MERI N SST
THE MERI N SST
Boeing designed
two
versionsotthe
27 7 SST
This isa mock up ofthe second theDash
3 Gone were
he swing wings replaced by adelta plantorm Had it beenbuilt i twould havebeen twice thesizeof
Concorde CourtesyBoeing
and
a
span that
w as s imila r in s iz e
o
tha to f
the Boeing 707, this being based
the
Mo de l 9 6 9- 3 02 . I t w as
not
dissimi
ar
to the
losing Lockheed proposal, a fact
ot
lost
o n t he
design
team at
Lockheed.
hangovers from
the
carlierDash
00 design was
the re tent ion of the
alI-fly
ng
tailplane
assemblies.
The
deleting of
he swing wings a nd t he associated flight
s ys te m l ed B oe in g engineers to
ig n a h igh - lif t s y ste m
i nt o t he
wings;
h is w as b as ed
on
tr a ilin g e d ge f la ps
and
laperonsfor improved roll control.
At
this
oint
in
the
aircraft s
development
in
June
L969
the
p ro je ct e d a ir c ra ft w ei gh ed
50 ,00 01 b 3 4 0,9 00 k g) g ro ss w e ig h t w ith
for 234 passengers, later to
e increased
to
250,
and their
baggage
over
r an ge
of
3 ,5 75 m ile s 5,800km . Other
nnovationsput forward by Boeing includ
a d o ub le -s te p,
droop
nose
which
gave
he
pilots
an excellent
view
duringthe
low
handling phases such as take-off and
a nd in g, w hi l e i t a ll ow ed
the
detectors
oun ted on the
nose assembly
to remain
oin ted a long the line of the aircraft
instead of relying on a s e co n da r y s e t.
The
abin
layout
meant tha t
for tourist seating
heycould
b e c a r r ie d s ix a b re a st, s inc e th is
ection extended f ully a f t to the cargo-
re taining bulkhead, a lthough,
in
common
with other aircraft types, it was highly like
ly
t h at t he
2 7 07 in s e rv ice w ou ld have a
small section
of the
passenger cabin divid
e d o ff f or f ir st -c la ss p as se ng er s i n l es s
cramped, four-abreastseati ng. Underneath
the
forward
p ar t o f t he
passenger cabin
w ou ld b e a
combined
freight baggage
hold
and a further compartment aft
of
thecabin
on
the
upperdeck was set aside for the same
purpose.
Serving the
passenger
compart
ment
were
at
least
two
g alley u n its ,
matched in number by fixed toilet blocks
that
w e re p r ov ide d w ith external
cleaning
points. Access
t o t he
aircraft was
by
four
entry d o or s in the forward fuselage, which
also allowed for cabin servicing trolleys to
be
exchanged. Should there
be
an emer
gency, two f ur t he r d oo rs w er e mounted
above
the
wing gloves to allow escape.
Dimensionally the
Boeing design would
change
as i t
evolved,
growing larger
with
each modification. The o r ig ina l Bo ein g
Model 733 had a w ing s pa n
of
98ft Sin
JOm),
an
overall
length of
271ft
82.6m ,
a height of 45ft 3in 13.79m and a w i ng
area
of
5,019sq f t 4 66 .3 sq m ).
The
pro
posed
engines
were four
General
Electric
GE4/Js.
These
were
needed to
lift
an
air
frame
that
w ei gh ed a maximum
of
500,0001b 228,000kg ,
w ithi n whi ch
were to be s e ated 250 passengers, being
pushed a long a t Mach 2.7 at a maximum
altitude of
65,000ft 09,800m . The pro
jected
r a ng e w as
es timated to
be
3,480
nauticalmiles/4,000 miles/6,440km.
The 2707-100 had
an increased wing
span to
174ft
3 in 5 3. 1m , w hi ch t hu s
increased the wingareato 9,000sqft 837sq
m).
The
fuselage length was also increased
by a f ur th er 3 0f t t o 306ft 93.27m).
The
powerplants remained
the
same,
although
the top speed had increased to Mach 3 and
the
passenger
complement
to 2 77 .A
II
these
changes
l ed t o a g ro wt h i n
t he maximum
weight to 675,0001b J07,000kg . The trav
elling time between New York and London
w as g ive n a s ju s t
under 2hrand
from Seat
t le to To ky o v ia Honolulu wasestimated to
take just over 3.5hr.
The
appearance
ofthe
2707-200ailframe
saw
the
wingspan rise by a f ur th er 3 ft 2 in ,
but in contrast the f us elag e le ng th w as
reduced to 298ft 91m , a lthough enough
of
a redesign had beencarried
out to
,dlow
the
passenger loading to in cr e as e to 2 92 .
Yet
again, the c h an g es led to a n in cr ea s e in the
a ll- u p w e ig h t to 6 80 ,00 01 b J 0 9,0 00 k g) .
Having admit ted defea t with
regard
to
the
swing-wing version ofthe SST, Boeing
ABOVE: A photograph ofa NASAwind tunnel which
dwarfs
thescientistandthe
SST
mock upabout
to be placedinside Courtesy NASA
RIGHl: Thisnosesectionwas fromthe final Boeing
SST
submission; by thistimethe multistage nose
hadbeenreplaced
b ya n
assembly
similar
tothat
on Concorde CourtesyBoeing
proposed a fixed-wing design. Designated
2707-300, the a irf r am e h a d a w ing s pa n of
1 41 ft 8 in 4 3m ) w hi le
the
fuselage was
r ed uc ed i n l en gt h a ga in t o 2 80 ft 8 5m ).
Beinga slightlysmalleraircraft, the passen
ger
complement
fell
to
234;however,
the
all
u p w e ig ht h a d g o n e u p a g a in , to 7 10 ,0 00 1b
J22,000kg).
The
maximum speed was also
dropped to
Mach
2.7.
Whenthe
first proto
typedrawingsweredeliveredthere
had
been
a
few
changes from the Dash 300 prototype.
Th e
wingspan was extended by a f u r the r 4 in
and
the
fuselage had grown by a further 7ft.
These alterations allowed the passenger
number
to
increase
to
250, commensurate
wi th a g row th
of
m ax im um w ei gh t t o
7 50 ,0 00 1b 3 40 ,00 0 kg ) . A s if
the
written
details were not enough, Boeingproduceda
mock-up to the judgingpanel with
the
usual
Hollywood razzle-dazzleto show it off.
Governmental Scepticism
The report was
handed
over to
the
gov
ernment
agencies.
The
FAA
and
its project
office reviewed
the
design
during
Decem
be r L968 and f o un d it much more accept
able,
not
only f ro m a technical
po in t o f
view,
but
a ls o f ro m
the economic.
To
muddy the situation
further
there
was a
change of administration, w ith Pr e sid en t
Nixon
returned to
theWhite L Louse
One
of
hisfirst
actions
was
to
f or m a
committee
under thechairmanshipof the Under Sec
retary
of
Transportation, James Begg, to
review
theentireSST
programmein
depth.
One of those commenting upon the Boeing
SST
wasDr Raymond Bisplinghoff, who, at
the
time,was a well-respected aeronautical
engineer and Dean of the Schoo lo f
Engi
neering
at
the Massachusetts Institute of
Te ch n olo gy , w h os e input concen
upon
the
impact
of
sideline,
not
engine,
noise from
the
SST,
which
not
be reduced
without
a further red
ing of
the
entire aircraft.
Other
a
concern
included
the
economic , na
financial
and environmental
aspec
the
technological f a ll- ou t. A s w ell
financial risks,
the committee
stress
environmental
issues,
oneofwhich
w
safety
of
passengers and crew and a
t he c on tamina ti on o f t he
u p pe r
phere
b y w a te r v a po ur . The airline
alsocausingproblems
since theyhad
ed
tha t the
original six-abreastseati
t oo c ramped
and
they p r ef e rr e d
a b re a st in ste ad . Bu ta s
the
aircraft h
proceeded much beyond the d
b oa rd , B oe in g f el t a bl e to c o mp l
potential
purchasers wishes.
722
723
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THE MERI N
SST
THE MERI N
SST
This slightlv indistinct image isof the lockheed l 2DDD SST mock-up.Although it
would appearto be themostviabledesign it would losetothe competingBoeing
model. Courtesy
Lockheed
Martn
With its afterburnersblazing this lockheed SR 71 leavesEdwards AFB on atest
flight. Itwas rumoured that lockheed used thisdesignto develop their
own SST
BBA
Colecton
Whitney PW JTFl7A-201s, althoug
General Electric GE4/J5Ks were pro
as alternatives, both sets being ra
60,0001b
267kN)
thrust perengine.
imum all-upweight was given
as
480
(217,720kg), to travel at a maximum
tude of 80,000ft (24,400m).
The
pro
range was around3,480nauticalmiles
miles/6,440km.The airframe
was
con
ed main ly of t i tan ium alloys with
amounts
of
steel being used in areas o
stress, such
as the
undercarriagemoun
I t was the L-2000's simplerdesig
won it friends among some of the a
and some political supporters; howe
regards civilian transport aircraft B
h ad t he grea ter in fluence and thu
swing-wing aircraft gathered the m
even though the Lockheed machin
seen as
t h e o ne
design
that
would
America to produce an SST t ha t
easily rival
Concorde.
Lockheed we
pushing their partner'sengine, the P
Whitney
JTF17 , asa far more able
which, because of i ts fan je t s t ru
would also achieve more success t h
GE
offering, which wasa straight tu
Lockheed a lso used i ts exper ien
both transport aircraft design and
works' aircraft to promote the L-200
many observersbelieved that the SR
Mach 3, double-deltaaircraft, was ac
a virtual prototype for
the
L-2000. H
canards and the swing wings; noneof these
was in the Lockheed submission.
The
sim
plerairframe was also slightlysmaller and so
the L-2000's capacity of 230 passengers was
smaller than
that
ofthe Boeing2707.
The
dimensions given for
the
L-2000
seriesincluded a wingspan
of 116ft(35.4m),
a fuselage length
of
260f t 79 .3m) and a
heightof 47ft
11
in
l4 .6m). The
wingarea
was specified
at
9 ,026sq f t (838.5sq m).
The
original engines were four
Pratt
The Other Contenders
While Boeingand GeneralElectrichad suc
ceeded in gaining the SST development
contract their rivals, Lockheedand Pratt
Whitney, were still investigatingand devel
oping theirown submission. The Lockheed
machinewasdesignated the Model L-2000,
with the company's designation
of
CL.823.
This
would feature revolutionary aerody
namic innovations that drew extensively on
the work previously done by
NACA/
NASA. The
basis
of
the wingcentred upon
a double delta-wing planform which would
supposedly assist the aircraft in reaching a
Mach 3 cruising speed. From this it would
appear
that
everything about the L-2000
wasrevolutionary,
butthat
would
not
be
the
case
as
Lockheed used their normal design
philosophy of si mpler, safer,bet ter'
to
create
their machine. To the rear
of
the double
delta wingwerea full range of elevons anda
multi-section rudder and leading-edge slats
that gave a total of sixteen flying control
surfaces. By contrast, the Boeing 2707-200,
with itsvariable sweep wings,was bedecked
w it h f if ty -n in e f li gh t c on tr ol s ll lf ac es
that included triple-slotted flaps, movable
investigate the source of the 350,000
recently pledged to support this organiza
tionand
whether
i t had been provided by
the very corporations that would benefit
from the continuation o f t he
SST
pro
gramme. But even
at
the t ime
t h at he
was
speaking to
the committee the
fate
of the
SST was already decided.
AIthough the SST is state-or-the-art techno
logically, it is not economical norenvironmen
tallyfriendly.
Seat
permilecostsarenow fartoo
highdueto risingcosts,whilethe damage to the
upper atmosphere is too dangerous on t h e basis
of present knowledge. I beli eve i t wou ld be a
mistaketo become
committed
toa multi-billion
dollar SST programme without the reasonable
certainty that SSTs will be practical economi
cally ancl acceptable environmentally.
to a s teep inc rease in fue l p rices. Given
these concerns, many airlineswere report
ed to be
unhappy
with
having
to sign firm
options for an aircraft which existed only
on paper and was increasing incost, as well
as their confirmed orders for
the
subsonic
fleets.
At
this
point
a
comment
by
Charles
Lindbergh
on
behalf of these concerned
airline officials was read out. This telling
declaration stated that:
At
this timeLockheed Aerospace were in
financial trouble and Rolls-Royce had just
filed for bankruptcy; thus the chances of
Boeing going
the
s ame way whi le s ti ll
be ing involved in
t he SST
project were
extremely high. Unfortunately, the closing
statement cent red on the sudden loss of
aerospace jobs
that
had afflicted Rolls
Royce and would
hit the SST
builders just
as quickly.
The
second argument placed before the
committee centred on the environmental
issues whose risks were
not
fully understood
a t t he time for lack of research. Although
scientists would be called to provide more
experttestimony,their statementsrelated to
the potentialdamagecaused by an SST, and
the
effects
of
subsonic aircraft and
other
fossil-fuel burners were overlooked. The
final point p laced before the committee
concerned American national priorities.
orrectly, Udall stated that, although
the
SST was technologicallyadvanced, itsben
efits in theend would applyonly to an elite,
wealthy few, and was unacceptable, even if
the SST
were profitable from
the
outset.
Such vast amounts
of
money already
spent
and promisedshouldhave beendeployed in
support
of
economic, social and environ
mental gains. This was a lso the t ime when
manyprogrammes, such as the Lockheed C
5A Galaxy, were overrunning theircosts by
great margins.
Having pu t
forward a variety
of
argu
ments against the SST, Udall then raised
the spectreofthe pro-SST lobby.
Whether
this wasdiversionary was
not
revealed, but
he
did state
that the commit tee
should
implications may have strucka chord with
the
media but
the
knock-on social effects
were even more d isas trous with Boe ing
layingoff 7,000 in all departments almost
immediately the announcement was made
on
18 March. A similareffect was seen at
General
Electric where more
than
6,000
were let go. Although these were the big
announcements, the cancellation o f t he
American
SST
wasfelt across the whole
of
theUSA.
The Opposition
None
of this imp inged
on the
Citizens
League Aga ins t the Sonic Boom, whose
avowed intent was to first stop Concorde
entering America by any means possible,
a fter wh ich they turned thei r attention to
their home-grown products. Led
by
Senator
Proxmire, the movement was growing in
strength daily. Fighting a rearguard action
against cancellation, was
the
unenviable
task fac ing Secre ta ry of Transportation
William Magruder, whose department had
assumed responsibility for the
SST
project
from
the
FAA in April 1970. Possibly
the
final nail in the coffin was hammered home
before the Transportation Sub-Committee,
of the HouseAppropriation Committee, on
2 March 1971. Delivering this requiem for
the American SST was Stewart L. Udall,
who a t one time had been the Secretary of
the Interior. Hisstatus was
that
of represen
tative
o f t he
Coalition Against the SST,
basedin Washington,DC. Hisopeningcom
ments were based around the original argu
ment
that
the aircraftwouldbe damagingto
the environment, a statement based on t he
beliefbysome anti-SSTscientists that super
sonic transports would cause irreparable
damage to the ozone layer. This view had a
few holes in itsince thecurrent subsonicair
liner fleet had engines that generated vast
quantities of pollution,astarkcontrast to the
efforts madeby the
SST
engine manufactur
ers to reduce hazardousoutputs. Udall then
moved
on
tostate
that the
efforts
of
Ameri
can technology could better serve people
materially and with regard to theirenviron
mentalhealth. During hisperiod
as
theSec
retary of the lnteriorUdall hadappointed a
team of scientists whose primaryaim was to
rubbishall SST projects.
Three statements
were put forward by
Udal l on beha l fof the Coalition.
The
first
stated
that
the American airline industry
was in a parlous state, especially as the oil
crisis was beginning tobite;this in turn led
The
report that thisbodydelivered was
in
the
ex treme , bu t even so the
Secretary,
John
Volpe, rec
on the
advice
of the
FAA,
that
1April 1969 that theprogramme should
This decision was eventually rat
by Nixon in September,although with
reduced budget, which was approved by
by
the end of the year. Whi Ie Boe
was struggling to produce a workable
, itspress and publicity department was
sy promoting
the
need and virtues
of
an
SST to counteract the threat of
oncorde.
The
material pumpedout at this
tha t the Boeing aircraft would
capture at
least
20
billion
of the
25 billion
SST
world market
1990. A further argumentwas that,even
the
American
SST
were slow in coming
service, itsability to carry more pas
than itsrivals would sooneven up
market.
The
following year was the turning point
the Boeing programme as numerous
ups began to co-ordinate their opposi
to the project o n t he grounds of cost
potential damage to the environment;
only were theycomplainingabout their
home-grown aircraft, they were also
ing their attention to the perceived
posed by Concorde. As ifto reinforce
feelings of the opposition movement,
signed the National Environmental
licy Act, which committed all relevant
departments to protecting the
The
supporters of the
SST
ramme immediatelybegan to lobby on
as they feared that it would bepre
as a sacrificial lamb on t he altar of
tingnature. All of this came toa head
n 1970 w hen t he Senate voted on 3
er against the 1971 funding appro
Since two versionsof thesame bill
been presented to Congress, a reason
compromise was
reached that allowed
nt funding to continue, albeit at
reduced rate. However,a further twist
was
out dur ing March 1971 when both
es voted heavily against spending any
money on the SST programme. Even
s hada sting in itsince terminationcosts
not c ome che ap ly a nd e ve nt ua ll y
million.
Thisthen
would
the end o f t he American supersonic
sport dream and all that remains are a
drawings, photographs and mock-up
in museums.
At thepo int o f
termi
1 billionand 8.5million man-hours
d been expended on creating nothing
than
a paper d ream.
The
financial
724
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THE
MERI N
SST
The MiG-21was oneof themostsuccessful delta-wingedaircraft built inthe USSR
although
it
still reflectedthe beliefthatthis
wing
planformrequired atai lplanefor
pitch control.
BBAColecton
So Close:
t
Tupolev Tu 44
CHAPTER SEVEN
One ofthe first Sovietattempts atdesigning a n SST isencapsulatedin thislayoutfromTupolev designated the Tu 4.
BBAColecton
Competition from the East
Whi le t he
Anglo-French consortium
was
creating
an
SST
that would be
the
most
thoroughly
tested aircraft ever
bui l t and
t he Americans
were
c re at in g onl y on
paper)
the
most thoroughly
untested
SST
never built,aircraftdesignersin
the USSR
were forging
thei rown
version
of t he
SST
and
would
beat t hem
all
i nt o t he
skies.
Un like the
American
and
the
western
European offering,
the
Russian aircraft was
very
much
politically driven;
the
others
were expressions
of
a financial and
techno
logical need.
The
technology
to
createsuch
an aircraft was already available since
the
military within the Soviet
Union
were Ay-
ingdelta-winged fighterssuch
as the
MiG
and
the less than
successful Myasischev
Thisartist s impression isof theNorth
American offering closely resemblingthe
XB-70 bomberfrom which
it
was derived.
CourtesyNASA
LEFT WhentheXB-70was cancelled by
the
USAF
theprototypeswere passed
toNASAfor usein exploringhigh-speed
fl ightandthe behaviourof thedelta
wing
throughoutitsfl ight envelope.
CourtesyNASA
ABOVE Although the XB-70
would
not
enter USAF service it wasthe basisof an
SST designput forvvard by NorthAmerican
Aviation.
CourtesyNASA
to
assume that
ei therthe General
Electric
or
Pratt
Whitney
powerplants would be
chosen.
The
projected range for
the NA
60
was given as 3,480 nautical miles/4,000
miles/6,4400km.
North Americaneventu
ally pulled
o ut o f t h e SST
project since
they needed to
concent rat e on t he
prob
lemsbesetting
the
XB-70 bomber.
At the
time
the
projects
ended , t he
USA
had
spent
1,035 million
on R D,
testing
and
mock-ups. Britain
and
France
had
bothspent
a similar
amountof
devel
opment
funding,
the
difference being that
oncorde
was
on t he
threshold
of gaining
full certification.
Onlyone othercompany
putupa design
for
t heSST
project:
North American
Air
craft,
who
based
their
design
on t he
exist
ing XB-70 Valkyrie.
This
machine would
be
known
as
the NAC-60,
which featured
a conical, cambered, modified delta wing
and
fixed, forwardcanards,all derived from
the
Mach 3 strategic bomber. The
known
characteristics
of
this a ircra ft inc luded a
wingspan
of
121ft 4in
37m),
a leng th
of
1 95 ft S in ( 59 .6m) , a
heigh t of
48ft
3in
04.7m)
and a w in g a rea
of
6,417sq ft
(597sq m). The
accommodation
was given
as 170, travelling
a t Mach
2.65.
Although
the
engines were
never
specified, it
is
safe
ed their design as hard as they could,
eed weredisappointed to receive
the
that
they had lost
the
SST
competi
on
3l December 1966. During
the
eed design phase
the
aircraft under
three initial iterations, known as
the
sh l , 2 and 3 , before f ina lly set t ling
on
Dash 7 layou t as
the
production ver
. Boeing's victorywasseen assomewhat
uded since their aircraft would undergo
le redesignsbeforebeingcancelledin
1. Lockheed then stopped its develop
supersonic transr0rts,preferring to
uea variety
of
military projectsand sub
wide-body passenger jets.
126
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SO
CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU-144
SO CLOSE: THETUPOLEV TU-144
40.31ft 12.29m a nd a height
of
15
4.71m). The maximum take-off w
was 19,8411b 9,020kg). The fitted po
plant
was
the R-l3F300
turbojet, rat
8,972lb 39.92kN d ry t h ru st , w hi l e
reheat engaged the ou tpu t increase
14,3071b
50.32kN .
Other characteri
o f t he A na lo g i nc lu de d a t op s pe e
Mach 2.06
at
altitude; at low altitude
s pe ed w as 745mph 1 ,2 00km/h r ,
l a nd i ng s pe ed w as 139mph 224km
and
the
greatest altitude achievable
65,656ft 20,025m).
The selection of such an aircraft w
l a yo ut h ad b ee n
the
result
of
a h a r d-
battle against the more traditional air
and
aerodynamic engineers within
Soviet hierarchy and ministerial ve
interests who wereoriginally
bent
on
ing
an
aircraft
with
a ta ilp lan e .
To
r
this point, extensive wind-tunnel tes
of
models with and
without
tailplanes
been
undertaken, the
collated
data
fin
proving that a carefullydesigned and e
neered delta wingwould perform far
b
with the tailplane removed.
By
the
end
of
1969
at
least
l40
test flights
had
been undertaken
in
supportof the
Tu
144project, duringwhich a maximum alti
tude
of
6 2 ,30 0 f t 1 9 ,00 0 m) w as a c hie v ed .
D u r in g th es e f lig h ts the A-l44 r e ac h ed a
top speed
of
Mach 2.06 l,3I7mph/
2,120km/hr). Once
the
first
Analog
had
completed itsflight-testprogramme,it was
used for generalflying during which i tw a s
lost while performing aerobatics; the pilot
on thisoccasion was
V
Konstantinov. The
second
A-144
w as d e liv e re d to
the Cro
mov FlightResearch Institute fordevelop
ment
flying, after which i t was us ed to
train
the
f ir st t wo p il ot s f or
the
Tu-144,
including EV Elya n , w h o p u sh e d the air
craft
to
a
maximum
speed
of 1,550mph/
2,500km/hr. On its retirement, the aircraft
wentto
theA ir
Force Museum at Monino,
w h e re it is alongside an exampleof the Tu
144. Such was the performance and stabil
ity
of the
A-I44
Analog
that serious con
sideration wasgiven todeveloping it
as
the
MiG-2lLSH,
heavy armoured
attack
air
craft Shtun?lOvil< . The
A-l44
h ad a s pa n
of 37.72ft 11.5m , a f us ela ge le n gth of
To
assistthe TupolevOKS in designing their SST a MiG 21 airframe w s rebuiltto incorporate the
proposed wing Afterthisconversionthe machine w s redesignated as the A 144Analog
Rea Wings Photographs
provide aircraft based
o n t he M iG -2 l
to
tr ia l a n y of the selected wing shapes. The
converted MiG-21 was a taillessdelta, des
ig na ted a s
the
A -1 44 A na lo g in i ts n ew
g uise , a n d to b e b u ilt a t t h e Voronezh Air
craftPlant, locatedsome
370
miles 600km)
south of Moscow,
as
would the airliner. Two
Analog prototypes were built; the first was
u se d to d e v e lop
the
elevoncontrol system.
I n a s im il ar manner to the Tu-144, the
elevonsectionswouldoccupy the complete
trailing edge
of the
wings, while
the
wing
leadingedgeswereswept backquite severe
lyon
the
inner sectionand
the outer
wing
p an el h ad i ts a ng le
of
s w ee p r e du c ed . To
record
the
behaviour
of
the t es tb ed i n
f lig ht, r e co r din g c a m e ra s w er e p lac e d in a
fairingbehind thecockpit and on top ofthe
fin. To simulate
the
changes in e.g. expect
ed w it h the f ull- size d a irline r , a 6 4 0lb
2 9 0k g ) b a la n ce w e ig h twas incorporated.
This
c o uld b e m ov e d
either
fore
or
a ft, a s
needed
by
controls in the cockpit to alter
the
c.g. The
A-I44
Analog, alsoknown as
the M
iG-Zll,
madeits maiden flight on 8
April 1968, the pilot being Gudkov.
l.35, 1.45kg/hr). First runs
of
a te stb ed
engine were undertaken in 1964. Although
the K u zn e to v O K B w er e f airly s ur e
that
their
engine
would work, an insurance pol
icy powerplantwas put underdevelopment.
This
w ou ld b e a s tra igh tfo r wa r d tu rb o je t,
under the guidance o f t h e P O. Sukhogo
O KB . A s the d e sig n loa d in cr e as e d, s o me
waspassed
out
to
other
design bureauxsuch
as
Antonov, w h ic h w ou ld b e co m e h e av ily
involved with
the
design and manufacture
of the aircraft s outer wingpanels. Tupolev,
havingassembledhis preferred team,which
included Yu N. P op ov a nd B. A.
Gant
sevskiy, t he n w en t t o meet the Politburo
and b e g ive n th e ir in str uc tion s r e ga r din g
the p r oje ct; th es e in clu de d the develop
ment t im elin e a n d t he n umbe r o f proto
types required. The former required
that
the p r oto typ e s h ou ld b e r ea dy f or its m a id
en
flight in 1964, and
the number of
aircraft
n e ed e d w a s d e te r min e d to b e tw o .To a ss is t
the T up ol ev O KB in t he ir development
programme, the help
of the
Mikoyan
B ur ea u w as e li ci t ed . I ts r ol e w ou ld b e to
c:::>
and
that
some
of
th es e f ligh ts w er e ta kin g
inordinately long.
Although Tu po le v w as the preferred
deve loper o f the
Ru ss ian SST,
the
dis
graced Myasischev, out o f favour after the
oun er f ia sc o, w as s ti ll d ev e lo pi n g h is
o w n d e sig ns f or an
SST
even though his
design bureau, OKB-23, hadbeenshut and
its participants dispersed.
Some
would
progress towards aerodynamic m o de ls in
the
M-55 series, although
none
actually
appeared as aircraft. Like Myasischev,
the
Tupolev OKB was approaching an SST
d e sig n f ro m s c r atc h , a f ter
having
rejected
ideas of basing the new aircraft on th e Tu
n s u pe r s on ic b om b er . A s imila r situation
faced
the
d e s ig n a te d e n gi
ne
designers
N .D . K uz n ets ov , w h os e p r od u c t, la ter d es
ignated
the
NK-144, developed from
the
enginesassigned to the
Tu-l35P
proposal,
h a d b e en s u gg e ste d b y
the
designer S.M.
Jager.
These engines
w er e tw o- s po o l tu r
b o fa n s w ith a f ter b ur n e rs a n d had a specif
ic fuel consumption in
the
supersonic
regime
of be tween
2.97
and
3.19Ib/hr
Supportingthe Tupolevdevelopmentprogramme were apair ofmodifiedMiG 21s
whose main feature
w s
theinstal lation ofthe double cranked wing as shown
here
BB
Colecton
M-50 Bounder heavy bomber. In civilian
air transports
the
Soviet
Union
was almost
on a p a r w ith th eir We ste r n o p po s ition as
several Ilyushinand Tupolevairliners would
show.
The
Po litbu r o b e ca m e a w ar e that
Britain and F ra nc e w er e b eg in ni ng t he
design work necessary
to
build
an
SST,soon
to b e co m e Co n c o rd e , a n d th e ir a r c h r iv als
the
Americans were also thinking
of
doing
the same. In response, the Politburo con
v en ed a m ee ti ng i n e ar ly 1 96 2 i n M os co w
w h er e A n dr e i A n dr e ivic h Tup olev , s o n
of
the famous designer Andrei Nikolaevich,
andcurrentlyhead ofthe TupolevOKB, was
approachedto begin to investigatea Russian
SST. This decision was ratified by Premier
Kruschev
on
26 July; h e f avoured t he
TupolevOKB above the othersand charged
them with creating the a irc r af t s o on to b e
known
as
the Tu-144, known to NATO
as
the
Charger.
Justification for
the
project,
s ho ul d s uc h b e n ee de d w i th i n
the
Soviet
Unionat th e tim e, w as thatthe stateairline
Aeroflot needed to
fly
long-haulroutesover
s o me d es o la te p a rts
of
i ts m as s iv e e m pir e
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SO CLOSE: TilE TUPOLEV TU-144
SO CLOSE: TilE TUPOLEV TU-144
closelyspaced ribs, allcovered
by
alu
u m a llo y s k in s m a n uf a ctu r ed f ro m i
the
majority being
of
VAD-23, a
aluminium alloy.
The
trailing edge
w ing w as line d by the elevon sectio
which th e re w er e f ou r p e r w in g, a ll d
by a p ai r
of
powered flying
control
P FC Us ) e ac h, t he r ed un da nc y
r eq ui r ed a s a s af et y f ea tu re . E ac h P
c o uld b e driven by
o n e o f t h e
three p
ry
hydraulic systems, and thus only a
failure
of
a PFC U or a catastrophicsy
failure would stop
the
PFCU from o
ing. As
the
elevons w e re in
part
p lac
the g as s tr ea m generated by the en
they were skinned with t i ta n iu m t
tect against
overheat i ng. C om pl eti n
fl ight-control s ys t em w as t h e t w
rudder, which wasalso driven by PF
these a lso f e atu r ed a
redundancy
cap
i ty i n a
si m il arm anner t o t he el evon
were also titanium-skinned.
It is i n te r es t in g t o n o te
that
b ot h t he
Tupolev and the Anglo-French designers
settled upon thiswing for their design, and
the Americancontenders
would, discount
ing the Boeing swing-wingeffort, settle on
the double-cranked deltafor their twomod
els. The Tu -1 4 4 w in g w a s a b le nd e d d o u ble
d e lta in p lan f or m, w h er e the forward sec
t i on h ad a s we ep s et at 76 degrees, which
would flare out to t h e o ut e r wing panels,
swept
at
57 degrees. The aerodynamiccom
plexities o f a n excessively multi-cambered
wing wereavoided by Tupolev by building
the
w ing a cr os s a s ing le p lan e ,
although
a
certain am ount of wing leading-edge fixed
droopwasapplied t o t h e aerofoilto improve
the
airflow across
the
upper surface.
Struc
turally the wingwas built around a series of
multispars, which gave the assembly great
strength and provided mounting pointsfor
the
enginenacelles
and the main
undercar
riage legs. C onnect i ngt he spars weremany
trialled by pilotless aircraft
capabl e of
fly-
ing a t M ac h
These were designated the
Tu-l21 f or h i gh -s pe ed r es ea rc h, w hi l e a
further
development
would become
the
Tu-l39. The
final wingdesign
chosen
was
that
o f a n ogee shape of a composite com
pound nature. The result
of
this indepen
dence
w o uld b e
seen
in
the
f ir min g u p
of
the Tu-144specification, which g a ve a top
speed
of
Mach 2 .35 , a r a ng e
that
w o uld b e
over 4, 000
miles
6,400km),
w it h a pa s
senger com pl em ent of 1 21 h ou se d i n t wo
cabins, plus their baggage and some cargo.
I n a s imila r
manner
to
t hat
experienced by
t he A nglo-French C oncorde
te a m, th o se
at
the Tupolev OKB w e re a lso evolving
their design, and so
the
final aircraft which
appeared
i n 1 96 8 h ad
changed
from
the
original layout w hen t he design wasfrozen.
In comparison t o i ts nearest rival,
Con-
orde,
the
Tu-144had aslightlylongerfuse
lage mounted upon an ogee-shaped wing.
In
a
similar manner
to
their American rivals.theTupolev bureautested
their proposed
designs
in
massive
windtunnels. In today s
design
environment powerful computers would
be
used forthe same
purpose.
Real Wings
Photographs
design. Supporting Tupolev in their devel
opment efforts was t he T SC Ac Gc I , t he
Institute
of
A e ro d yn a mic s, w h o s tu d ied in
depth
information picked up from Western
sources and passed on the resul ts to
Tupolev. Bothorganizationspresented their
r es ults to
t he C ou nc il o f
Minis te r s, w h o
confirmed t h a t t h e aircraft would be desig
nated the Tu-144
on
1 6 J uly 1 96 3 under
ounciI
Order
798-271;this was confirmed
by
contract
order
MAP276,
d a ted 2 6 J u ly .
T hi s cont ract covered the construction of
five ailframesduring
the
period 1966-67;
of
t he se , t wo w er e intended for extensive
fatigue testing. In a similar m anner t o t heir
Westerncounterparts, the Soviet designers
and
engineers examined numerous layouts
to determine which w ou ld b e the most
aerodynamicallyefficient. [ncharge
of
opti
mizing
the
aircraft s aerodynamics was
G.A.
eremukhin, whose
counterpart
in
the
engine depart m ent was VM. Bulem. Ini
tially, Tupolev andt he AerodynamicsInsti
tute investigated
ten
differentlayouts, some
of which involved the fitting of a conven
tional tailplane, although this was quickly
discarded since trials proved
that
i t w ou ld
destabilize the behaviour oft he
wing, espe
c ially in the low s p ee d p a rt o f t he flight
r e gim e. Ma ny of
the
w ing d es ign s w er e
I
•
I
I ••
< ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
, . . . : : - _ T . - - - - - - ~ l . . = . = - : . : : - ~ : : : - - - - - - - - ' T
I I
I
i
I
}
I I
0
I( )t
I( ]'
II
stopped by
the
French
Secret
Service, who
concocted a substance
t hat
resembled rub
ber-tyre scrapings, but would, upon testing,
p r ov e to b e u n s uita ble f or tyr es c a pa b le
of
w i t hst andi ng t he rigours o f a n S ST land
ing. Britain and itsprimary Concorde man
u f ac tur e rs w e re a ls o
not
immune from
at t empt s at
espionage. One
o f t he many
and most blatant w ou ld b e the visits to
Rolls-Royce at Bristol by numerous Russ
ia n d iplo ma ts, a ttac h es , jo ur n alis ts and
other functionaries displaying an unhealthy
interestin the metallurgical secrets behind
the
Olympus engine. The upshotwasa dis
p lay m o de l
o f t h e
Tupolev Tu-144
a t t he
1963 Paris A i rShow at
Le
Bourget. At first
g la nc e it c los e ly r e se m ble d C oncorde and
h en ce t he
press bestowed
t h e n i ck n am e
C on c or d sk i o n t h e
p r oje ct. H o we v er ,
closeobservation revealed
that
there were
major differences between the twoaircraft,
including the
grouping
o f t he
engines
together a s in the first prototype and a fuse
lage
t hat
w as m or e o va l i n c ro ss -s ec ti on
t han t hat ofC oncorde.
While,at firstglance, Russiandesign and
development w ou ld a pp ea r t o b e d r a wi ng
their inspirationfrom scraps
of
infotmation
garnered from the West, the Tupolev OKB
w as , i n f ac t, f ol lo wi ng i ts o wn c ou rs e of
o .
o
c
--
i le t he designers and engineers were
g flat out, rumours were surfacing of
attempts
by
t h e t h e
KG
B
In
the
es te rn n at io n s t hi s p os si bi li ty h ad
e a dy b e en b ro ug ht t o t he a t te nt i on o f
he
Anglo-French
Concorde
design teams
nd
to a lesser
ext ent oft he A m eri canSST
esigners. One o f t h e first commentscame
rom the press, w hi c h p o in t ed to the
ppearance
o f a n S S T
model
o n t h e
stands
f t h e TupolevBureau during the Paris Air
Show l oo ki ng j us t l ik e Concorde , a
pat ent l y unt rue
statement
as subsequent
events
showed. However,
the appearance
o f t h e rear-engined Ilyushin IL-62 airliner,
which bore an uncanny resemblance to the
BAC
Vickers)
vc tO
seemed
to
rein
force the charge of espionage.Further inci
dents
that
e m er g ed f r om th is p e rio d w e re
centred
within France. The first
concerned
the head o f t h e Aeroflot m iss ion in Par is
who wasarrestedwhile preparing t odepart
to
Moscow with a briefcase allegedlyfull
of
oncorde
blueprints.
A not her concerned
attempts to bribe an a ir po r t w o rk e r at
Toulouse to provide rubber scrapings from
oncorde s high-speed taxi trials for analy
s is in the USSR. T h is o n e was apparently
rty Work foot
diagramillustrates the
prototype
Tu-144. characterized
by
the
grouped engines
within
one
nacelle
block.
BBA
Colecton
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S O C L O S E: T H E
TurOlEv
TU-144
S O C L O S E: T H ETurOlEv TU-144
flight test engineer, with flight
engin
T
Seliverstova. Throughou t t he
flight
the
undercarriage remained
down
and
this mostradical
of
shape
Ru ss ian s k ie s
made
a s af e,
untro
l a nd i ng . F ro m t hi s poin t, the flig
schedule p r og r es s ed s m oo thly , w i
second
flight, lasting
50min, taking
in e a r lyJanuary 1969, once all the t
t ry h ad been analysed. The f irs t T
finally achieved supersonic flight
May
and
speeds
a bove Mach
I
achieved a shorttime afterwards on 5
During test flying
on
2 6 Ma y 1 9 70
t
144finallyexceeded
Mach
2
at an a
of53,480ft
16,311m).
Further
high-
flying saw t h e t es t c re w p us h t o a
of
1,242mph 2,000km/h
at
55
l6 ,970m and the
maximum s p ee
a t ta ined la te r tha t
year
when
1,51
2,430km/h was passed. Further dev
ment
ightswere
undertaken
to p r ov
behav iour of the environmental co
system, the variable intakes, inertial
gation and
the
autopilot/autoland sys
The l as t w as i n va l ua bl e i n returnin
Tu-144
to t he ground when
all
M os co w a i rp or ts w er e blanketed
white-outand blizzards. The system w
accurate
that
the
aircraftwas landed
p lete ly in automatic m o de . To a s sis
pilots, a CRT display was mounted i
centreof the
main
instrument
p a ne l
of
publicity
concerning the
n e w Tu p ole v
product escalated. This adversely affected
the
maiden flight
date
that was already
pencilled in by
the state-controlled
media
and began to affect the aircraft s produc
t io n a nd i ts f ligh t-te s t s c he d ule . To this
e nd , t he c ompl et io n o f t he
first
a nd t he
building of the second prototype werehur
r ie d i n a n e ff or t t o k ee p up with
the
pro
paganda. The roll-out
o f t he
f irs t p r oto
type,
CCCP-68001, took
p la ce i n e ar ly
December 1968, withthe maiden flight set
f or la ter that
month, once
a f ul l r an ge
of
ground,
engine and
t ax i t ri al s h ad
been
completed satisfactorily. When r e ad y f or
The second iterationof the Tu 144 s w theenginesdivided into two distinct nacelles
whil theaircraft was supported on revampedundercarriage units. BBAColecton
itsfirstflight, the prototype was stoppedby
that familiar bugbear that besets many air
craft
and their
anxious design teams:
the
weather.
Thus
poised
and
ready,
the
Tupolev team had to wait until 31 Decem
ber for
the
f irs t f lig ht, r e qu ir in g 6 ,2 35 f t
1 ,900m of the
runway
at
Zhukovski.
Unlike Weste rn a i rl ine test crews, those
f ro m T u po l ev w er e seated
on
ejection
seats,
although
th e y w e re not r e qu ire d to
use
t hem on thi s
first
uneventful
flight
of
38min. Initially the flight-test crew con
sisted
of the
standard tr io p lu s a f ligh t- te s t
engineer not
required for
the production
aircraft). The crew for this firstflight con
sisted
ofchief
testpilot E.v. Elya n ,la te r to
b e m a de a
Heroof the Soviet Union,
M. V
K oz lov a a s
co-pilot,
V.N.
Benderova
as
N .D . K u zn e ts ov NK-144 engines, devel
opedfrom
the
earlier NK-8, and
their
after
burnersweregroupedin paired nacelles,
the
original single-box assembly having been
abandoned as inefficient. Each powerplant
was capable
of
d e ve lo pin g a d ry
th rus t o f
28,6001b
119kN ,
w h ich w as in cr e as e d to
38,5801b
l72kN
with reheat engaged; the
latter
option
was
not
e x er c is e d in c r uis e
mode. During
the
early series
of
test flights
the crew reported overheating and vibra
tion problemswith
the
engines operating in
the
subsonic regime.
Overheating
affected
not only the engine nacelle assemblies but
also around the rearfuselage. Rectifying the
reported harmonic v ibr a tio n w as f ina lly
cured by replacing
the
prototype power
plant RD-36-5Is with pre-series production
e n gin es RD -ZB-5 1 , w h ic h w e re f ar better
b a la n ce d . Fu r th e r p r ob lem s w e re e x pe r i
enced
with
the
engines in
that
a
change of
fuel was causingcorrosionto thecom buster
c h am b er s , w h ich , in
tum,
led initially to a
d e gr a da tion in p e lfo r ma n ce
and
in
one
incidentcomplete engine failure. The over
heating problem would becured only when
the
single engine-nacelle box was replaced
by
tw o s e pa r ate and distinct u ni t s w i th
improved cooling alTangements. To supply
the
e ngi ne s a t ot al fuel c ap ac it y
of
19,230gal 87,500Itr) was available, being
h el d in i nt eg ra l t an ks i n the ou te r wing
panels,
the
leading-edge wingsections and
the
lower section
of the
fuselage. To allow
f or tr im c h an g es in f lig ht, the Tu-144 was
e q uip pe d w ith tr im ta n ks in the fin and the
f or wa rd f us elag e, f ro m w h ich f ue l c o uld b e
pumped
to maintain
a correctc.g. through
out t he full range o f t he flight envelope.
The fuel consumption
of
the prototype
engines was fargreater
than
h a d b e en p re
d icte d. I th a d been expected thatthe reheat
s el ec t io n w ou ld i nc re as e consumption;
however,
the
higher f ue l u sa ge in
the
sub
sonicregime
came
as a surprise
and
needed
further investigation. The results of this
revealed
that
the intakes and their sec-
ndary
vent
d oo rs w ou ld n ee d
to
be
redesigned; however, given
the short-turn
usage expected from the f ir st p r oto typ e , it
w as d ec id ed t o l ea ve a ny r ed es ig n to
the
preproduction
and the
production version.
First
Appearance
With
the first flying prototypeand fatigue
specimen steadily taking shape, construc
tion
having started
in 1 96 5,
and
a p r ov i
sional date f or its appearance, the
amount
s e c tio n b e in g G .F. Naboyshchikova, ably
supported by L.M. Rodnyanski
who
had
undertaken s im il ar w or k f or the eng ine
d e ve lop e rs P.O . Sukhogo and for
the
Myasishchev OKB. The
AFCS
wasdevel
oped from
that
installed in
the
earlierTu
supersonic bomber. Other factors
that
Tupolev took into consideration were
the
existing airfields, aircraft
handling
facili
ties and air-traffic control systems, the
replacement of which would have pushed
the p r o je c t c o s t u p a s tr o no m ic a lly . The
OKB also took account o f u p pe r a tmo s
phere radiation and its effects upon bo th
crew and passengers, and thus an
attempt
w as m ad e
t o p ro te ct t he o cc up an ts
by
incorporating s hi e ld i ng i n the fuselage
structure.
Supporting
the
T up ol e v T u- 14 4 w as a
most unusual undercarriage.
The
main-gear
units consisted of twelve-wheel bogies, with
the wheelsgroupedin foursalong each axle.
When the
undercarriage was selected up,
the legwould moveforwards and
as
i td id s o
the
bogie would
rotate
to lie f la t
on to p o f
it
beforedisappearing into
the
slender under
carriagebays. Movingin
the
opposite direc
tio n w as the nose undercarriage assembly,
d e riv ed f ro m a n e a rlier Tu po lev p r od u ct,
the Tu-ll4
turboprop airliner.
This
wasfair
ly conventional in concept, having only
tw o w h ee ls mounted, one p e r a xle . The
braking system was applicable to
the
main
wheels only
and
c o uld b e
supplemented
by
a tailbrake-chute mounted in the tail-cone,
w hi c h c ou ld b e d ep lo ye d i f n ee de u. The
loaded by using either
the
ventral access
doors
or
overwing
conveyer
belts. In
com
mon with Concordethe Tu-144 used main
ly aluminium alloys throughout i ts a ir
frame, althoughsome use was made
of
steel
and titanium. The
former was required
to
hand le the loa ds in h igh s tr e ss a r ea s and
the
latter in areas
of
high temperature,
the
designer
having
realized from
the ou tse t
that th is w o uld b e a m a jor p r ob lem . Unlike
the Anglo-French consortium, the Tupo
lev OKB already hadsome experience with
h ea vy a ir cr af t t r av el l in g
at
supersonic
speeds, having uelivered the
Tu-n
Blinder
to
the
Soviet
Air
Force. Other
than
struc
tural
and engine
considerations,
attention
w as a ls o p a id to the deve lopment o f lubri
cants, fuels and sealing compounds able to
withstand drastic changes in temperature
without
breaking down.
The
powerplants
a lso r e qu ire d r e wo r kin g to w ithstand the
temperature changes, although
the
Tupo
lev Bureau
had
already
latched on
to
the
idea that thei r aircraft and engines would
operate at their
mostefficient
at
very high
altitudes.
This
in t ur n brought its own
p r ob lem s , s in ce n e w
air-conditioning and
p r es s ur iza tio n u n its w o uld a lso b e needed
for t hi s far m or e r ig or ou s environment.
Since
flyinglong distances manuallywould
b e v e r y tir in g, itw a s d e c id ed f ro m theout
set that
the
T u- 14 4 w ou ld r eq ui re
an
autopilot, AFCS, autolandand an inertial
navigation
s ys te m t o b e c re at e d.
Control
of
the aircraft was
by
electro-mechanical
means,
the
departmental h ea d f or this
n e o f t he more obvious alterations from
models shown
a t t he
Pa ris A ir Sh o ws
that
the
f us ela ge c r os s -s e ction h a d
from
an
oval
to o ne t ha t
was
circular in shape with an external
terof
just over 11ft
JAm .
Punctu
ng the
fuselage
main cabin
w e re tw en
ve small windows and a p ai r of access
each side. Forward
of
the passenger
was
the
flight
deck
w ith p r ov isio n
three f ligh t c r e w consistingof a p ilo t,
ightengineer, and in f r o n t
of
flight deck was
the
droop nose and
retracting
visor
th e
green
which gave the c r e w im pr o ve d
dur in g t he l an di ng a nd take-off.
etween
the
crew
a nd t h e
visor were
the
direct
v isio n p a ne ls,
t o t he
rear
of
wereside windows for lateral vision.
assembly was capable
of
ueflecting
to
a
maximum of
2 degrees
was hydraulically driven in either
ctionwith mechanical
locks
to
h o ld it
position.
The
passenger
cabin
was near
87ft 26.5m
l on g w it h a
maximum
nal diameterof 10ft 3m and a m ax
he igh t o f
7ft 2.lm .
Within
this
e a w as s e at i ng f or 1 26 p as se ng er s
and
b in a t tendant c re w, a slight increase
the
e a r lie r s p ec if ic a tio n , a ll c a rr ied
f iv e- ab re as t s ea ti n g. F or
t he c on
eyance of freight and baggage the Tu-144
equipped w ith h o ld s at
the
front and
he rear
o f t he
fuselage which c ou l d b e
production version ofthe Tu 144 wasfitted
with
canards locatedbehindthe cockpit.These had both
and trai l ingedgeflapsthatassistedtheaircraftin take off and landing.
BBAColecton
ilar, Not Identical
732
733
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SO
CLOSE: THETUPOLEV TU-144
SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU-144
with
Concordeso with the Tu l44 theinnercabin was laden
with
test and
monitoring
equipment mounted in
passengerswould later sit. BB
Coecton
speeJ anJ locational and navigation
data. Before the prototypes were retired
ISO test f l ights were under t aken. Many
ere
made between
Khabarovsk
and
Yuo
osibirske
although
to reach either desti
ation required t ha t t he Tu-144 be as
ightiy loaded as poss ible otherwise there
asa chance
that
the aircraft could run
out
fue\.
A publ i c
showing
of the Tupolev Tu-l44
ad
already
beenmade
in the USSR on 21
ay 1970 at Sheremetvo Airport near
oscow; however o ther than intelligence
eports the aircraft was l i tt le known in the
est . Duringits
development
trials the Tu
144was f lown extens ively
within
the Sovi
t Un ion during May andJune 1971.
The
irst Western appearance was in May 1971
hen the Tu-144 was revealed a t t he Paris
ir
Show.
Rout ing to
Le Bourget was via
Sofia the flight
time
f rom Moscow last ing
no more than one hour. I t is highly ironic
that, as both the Tu-144 andConcorde were
makingtheir
world debuts
American
politi
cians were effectively kil ling off
the irown
SST programme.
After
Paris the Tu-144
returnedto theUSSR and would not appear
i n publ i c again until 1978 when the first
production
aircraft was rolled
out
from
the
manufacturing
facility at
the
Venyukovsky
fi tt ings plant . Th e f irst f l ight by this
machine was on 27 April af ter
which
ex
tensiveflyingtrialstook place_This progress
c ame to an abruptha l t on 2 3M ay when a
p ip e i n
one
of
the engine compartments
split allowing fuel to ignite on
the
hot sur
faces of the engine. Fortunately the experi
enced tes tcrew of
Popov and Elyan were
able to bring the damaged Tu-144 in f or a
belly
landing
because the undercarriage
4
could not be lowered. This was not
without
casualties as Elyan was injured and
two
of
the flighttest engineerswere killed. Itwould
be left to the final three completed produc
tion
aircraft
to
finish flighttestingbefore
the
Tu-144 was c1eat ed for
Aeroflot
service.
Design Changes
By t h is t ime
the
airframe had undergone
some radical
changes.
The
most obvious
was in the double-delta
wing
a nd t he fit
ting of retractable canard foreplanes just
aft
of the fl
ightdeck. The reworkingof
the
wings
increased
thespan
and
changed the
l e ad ing-edge c amber , whil e
the use of
more advanced
materials
reduced the
weight o f t he airframe
at
the s ame t ime
increasi ng its structuraI strength. The
BOVE
Wearing its
Paris
Air
Show
number 345
Tu 144CCCP 77102
crashedatthe show on
6
June
1973
killing all
on
board. BB
Coecton
RIGHT
This
photo reveals
the
height of the Tu 144
undercarriage as it dwarves the people around
it atthe Paris Air Show.
Real Wings Photographs
75.5ft
23m
long
engine
nacelles
also
underwent a complete reworking under
the aegis
of
the Institute
of
Aerodynamics,
becoming similar
in des ign
and l a yout to
those
fitted to Concorde . They too fea
t u re d va ri a ble
intake ramps a nd d ump
door s to contro l the airflow to the com
pressors
at
the sametime a more efficient
anti-icing
system wasf i t ted. At the o ther
e nd o f t he
nacelle
boxes the engine ex
hausts had
also undergone some redesign
work being much improved in functional
ity a l though no th rus t reversers were f i t
ted.
Originally there had b ee n
a require
ment
to
fit
thrust
reversers
to
the
two
outboard
engines,
a l though , due to thei r
complex ity a nd t he efficiency o f t h e taiI
brake chute as shown by the prototypes,
this was rejected. Alterations were a l so
m ade t o
the
undercarriage:
the
nose
leg
had
been extended in leng th and been
brought forward in the bay a nd t h e main
unde rca r ri a ge unit s had been complete ly
redesigned. Replacing the multiple wheels
on each
axle as f i tted
to
the
prototype
bogies
those
on the reworked
aircrafthad
the wheels
reduced
to e ig ht a nd t h e legs
retracted into bays located between the
engine i n takes . Each ma inwhee l had a
diameterof37.4
inches 950 mm and was
pressurized
to
297psi 21 kg/sq
cm .
The fuselage had also been
increased
in
length by over 20ft 6m , which in turn led
t o a n increasein the number of cabin win
dows to thirty-four. These then served
an
increased
number
of passengers the
com
plement growing
to
140. There were
three
5
separatecompartments, the forward
first-class passenger with a seat layou
two plus onea t a spacing
of
40.2in
l0
while
the
other
compartments had
layout of
two
plus three wi th a s pa
34.25in
87cm .
Entrance to the
was by a hydraulical ly-dr iven door
forward left-hand side o f t he fusel
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SO
CLOSE:
THE TUPOLEV
TU t44
SO
CLOSE:
Ti lE TUPOLEVTU 44
I
ABOVE:
Captured during aflyby at le Bourget in
May 1973 isthe preproduction Tu 144 CCCP 77102.
Althoughthe wing planform was double deltain
layout there
was
some subtle blending ofthe
harsheranglesin
an
efforttoimproveaerodynamic
behaviour
P
Russel Smith
Colecton
RI Hr When Tu 144
CCCP 77102
crashedat Paris
muchof thedebris
was
scatteredoutsidetheair-
fieldboundary Thisis partofthe wing assembly
with partofthe conditioningpipework Rea Wings
Photographs
BELOW: The retractable visorassemblyfi ttedto the
Tu 144 was far less subtle inconstruction being
likened toa greenhouseby many Behindthe cabin
side windowswere thefair ingsforthe retractable
canard P
Russel Smith Colecton
collision. Before this the chief pilot Kozlov
hadtried tooutpetform the previousslot air
craft, Concorde. At
the
opening
of
the dis
play
the
Tu-144 had madea slow flyby along
runway 060 - s o s lo w w as i t that watching
journalists commented that they were wor
ried about itsreducingairspeed.Close to the
e nd o f t he
runway
the
afterburners were
fully engaged and the Soviet SST made an
a lm os t v er ti ca l c li mb . C le ar ly t hi s was
beyond the stress design limitations as the
lef t r e tr a cta ble c a na r d w as to rn c lea r
of
its
mounts
and
smashed
i n to t he
w ing r o ot.
The impact ruptured the adjacent wing tank
andcausedan explosion that resultedin the
aircraft scrashing.
Other
investigationscen
tred onthe captain smisidentifying the des
ig na ted f ly by r un wa y. The subsequent
attempt to reposition the Tu-144 threw the
c o- pi l ot , w ho h ad b ee n f il mi ng the show
from
the
air,
i n to t he
flying controls.
This
r e qu ire d a s wif tr e a ctio n f r om b o th p ilo ts to
recover control. Unfortunately, their efforts
were far too enthusiastic and a m a in a cc es s
panel came adrift and caused
the
aircraft to
come apartthrough over-stressing.
In spite ofthe accidentand itssubsequent
investigation, production
of
the Tu-144
continued
for
the
only operator, Aeroflot.
G r a nd io se p lan s w er e laid f or c o mm e rc ial
f ligh ts a r o un d the w or ld , a ltho u gh the
burgeoning reality was different since this
_ ; = : ; .
Disaster in Paris
stood out from the fuselage a t a n angle of
90 degrees; upon ret ract ion the canards
folded back
into
fairings
a t t he
rear
of t he
flight deck. The p u rp o se f or f ittin g
these
extras to product ion a ir cr a f t w as to im
prove t he handl ing dur i ng take-off and
landing,
their
deployment
meant t ha t t he
elevons
would
act
more likeelevators
than
flaps during these phases. They also assist
e d in r e d uc in g the runway length require
ments and improved handling in the low
and
slowarea
of t he
flight envelope.
The first production aircraft made itsmaid
en
flight in August 1972; itsfirstsupersonic
f lig ht w as on 20 September while flying
b et w ee n M os co w and Tashkent. The
i mp ro ve d T up ol ev T u- 14 4 m ad e i ts f ir st
a p pe a ra n ce in the West a t t he Paris Air
Show in June 1973, although this aircraft,
CCCP-77
102, and i ts s ix o c cu p an ts w er e
l os t i n a c ra sh f ol lo wi ng s om e v io le nt
manoeuvres and another eight were killed
due to fallingwreckage. Several claims were
made about the crash, the most ropular in
t he USSR
being
that
a F re nc h Air Force
Mirage IllB on a photographic and filming
sortie alongside the
SST
h ad c au se d i t to
undertake evasive manoeuvres to a vo id a
illustrates
well
thecomplicated methodusedto retractthe mainundercarr iage unitsintotheir
e nacelle bays
BBA
Colecton
l asfurther mechanically-operateddoors
c a bin a cc es s. Much o f t he passenger
in in ter io r d e c o r w a s p r ov ide d by orga
ions in East Germany. To give
the
pas
ers moreconfidence, the ejectionseats
the f li gh t c re w w er e r em ov ed and
by more conventional seating.
improvements had been
undertaken
t he nose-cone and its associated visor,
latter having glazingpanels of increased
E xt ra fuel t an ka ge h ad a ls o b ee n
ded to increase
the
available on-board
to 26,I00gai L18,750Itr).
The
fuel
contained in the wings, which was also
lo ca tion f or the f or wa rd e .g . b a la n ce
Other
c h an g es w e re m a de to
the
trim
em, with the introduction of a f or e and
rapid transfer capability to augment the
e a dy in sta lle d f ue l b a lan c e s ys te m; its
had beendeemed necessary to
any
possible imbalancesexperi
duringtake-offand landing.
Although the changes to the wings and
fuselage werefairlyobvious,
the
great
area of
modification to
the product ion
to the ret ractablecanardfore
n e s. Ea ch
of
these spanned 20ft 6m ,
were almost rectangular in shape_ At
forwardedge
ofeachcanard
were lead
g e dg e s la ts a nd t he tr a ilin g e d ge w as
d with flaps. When derloyed,each
showed a m ar ke d anhedra l and
136
137
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SO
CLOSE:
THE TUPOLEVTU 144
ingout atParisin May 1973 thisTu 144 hadits nose fully droopedand thevisorretracted forbetter
vision Notethe prominent PFCU covers on the
fin
and ruddersections P Russel Smith
Colecton
SO CLOSE:
Ti lE TUPOLEVTU 144
CCCP 1111
Theexpanse ofthe elevonsandthe rudderfi tted tothe Tu 144 are clearly
shown
here as isthe careful
blending ofthe
wing
leading edge This
aircraft
is a productionTu 144S CCCP 77110
with
theParis
display code
345
Afterservice with Aeroflot the aircraftwas preserved atthe Museumof Civi l Aviation
Ulyanovsk P Russel
Smith
Colecton
Tu 144 CCCP 77144 at
le
Bourgetin June 1975 wearing Aeroflot titling Aftera l imitedflying career the
aircraft
hada second
life
as a NASAtestbed P Russel Smith
Colecton
ngry aircraft
heg<m to enter
rev
service during the 1973 oil
The escalatingprice
of
fuel wouldbe
e o f t he
reasons why
the
Tu-144 was
from service far carlier
than had
originally planned. However, having
the
first supersonic transport
the
world,
the
Russians
and
Tupolev
determined
to
put the technology to
and therefore an intensive devel
programme was put in p la ce
to
the
aircraft yet further
both
in
the
a nd on t he ground.
and Outof Service
result
of
this was the Tu-144D, which
Aeroflot service
on
I November
Although
numerous commercial
ghts were carried
out between
Moscow
Alta ,
Khazakhsran,
the
impres
gained by most observers who trav
on the
aircraft was
that
it was
very noisy
and subject
to
numer
s in -f l ight eme rgencies . In total, 102
gerflightswere made before
the
ser
e was cancelled as
uneconomic.
The
nal airframe was
never
fully
competed,
was retained a t t he Voronezh manu
plant for spares usc. During this
the
passenger load wasrestricted
to
an
increase to
the maximumof
140
would
have
reduced
the
available range.
Then came the crash of
a
Tu-144Don
23
May 1 97 8 while on a t es t f li gh t.
This
would turn
out
to b e the lastflight
of
aTu
144 to carry passengers,
although
freight
flights
cont inued to the more distant
parts
of
the Soviet empire.
During
the
l at e 1970s
the
Tu-144Ds
undertook
numerous flights,
a t t he end of
which
a limited
Certificate of Airworthi
ness was issued restricting the aircraft to
service within
the
Russian sphere
of
influ
ence.
Dur ing a
subsequent
series
of
test
fl
ights
the Tu-144
was subjected to a series
of
range-payload trials, the upshot
of
which was
that
with a
IS-ton
15.3 tonnes)
payload
the
aircraft could
fly
supersonical
ly over
a
distance of
3,312miles
5,330km)
and wi th a load 2 tons lighter the range
increased to 3,417-3,541 miles
5,500
5,700km).
Wit h t he
payload reduced
to
jus t 7 ton s,
the
range increased
to
3,852
miles 6,200km). During the 1980s the Tu
144s
continued
to be used for flight tria ls,
mainly
concerned
with developing a sec
ond-generation
heavySST. Yet
other
trials
inc luded upper atmosphere tests, ozone
layer depletion studies, sonicboom effects,
the
thermal effects
on
materials
and
struc
tures,
aerodynamic
studies, flight perfor
mance and behaviour, the observation
of
the
boundary layer and
the
study ofanom
alous
phenomena
in
the
atmosphere. In
7 8
July 1983
o ne t he
Tu-144Ds crewed by
chief
test
pilot
S.
Agapov and co-p i lo t
B
Veremey established a
sequence of
world
records, including an averagespeed around
a closed loop
of
621.4 miles l,OOOkm
of
1,262.4mph 2,032kmfhr) w it h a l oa d
of
30 t on s a nd
a
maximum a lt it ud e o f
59,710ft 18,200m).
Whi le t he
production a i rc ra ft were
undertaking such
trials
anda t tempt ing to
establish
the
type as adequate for passen
ger and freight use, discussions were being
held
on
improving
and
developing
the
air
craft further.
The
first projected upgrade,
designated the Tu-144DA,
required
the
redesigning o f t h e wing, which would be
increased in area, while
the
engines would
be uprated
andmatched to
reworked vari
able
intakes
to
improve both
sub-
and
supersonic performance. As the wing had
an increased area and volume, it was
intended that
125
tons
127.5
tonnes) o f
extra
fuel
should
be added.
This
in
turn
would see an improvement in the load
carrying capability a swe ll a s an increased
range. The
number of
passengers would
also beincreasedto a
maximum of 160 and
the maximum range was set at 4,660 miles
7,500km).
This
project was, in
the
event,
stillborn, a s were
many o th er s t h at
fol
lowed.
These included the Tu-244,
also
known as the SST-2, and several military
versions. The first
of
these was
the
Tu-144PR, intended
for use as a long
range interceptor; the Tu-144P, intended
for electronic countermeasures;
and
two
contemplated
strategic versions,
the
Tu
144K
a nd t he
Tu-144KP.
The
former was
i nt en de d t o launch stand-off missile
attacks againstground targets and
the
lat
t er was to
attack naval
vessels. The
nascent Tu-244
wouldalso
have
a
handful
of
military derivatives env isaged for i t;
however, these, like those
o f t h e
Tu-144,
remained no
more
than paper
prospects as
the
less
than
successful
Tu-160
swing-wing
strategic bomber was designed instead.
The Russian space programme also bene
fitted from
the
Tu-144
since at
least
one
a ir cr af t w ou ld b e us ed to
simulate the
Buran reusable spacecraft.
While the
Tu-144 was being us ed a s a
tes t b ed for v ar iou s p ro je ct s ,
strenuous
attempts
were
be ing made t o c re at e a n
economically viable aircraft,
n ot one
heavily
dependent
upon state subsidies. A
benefit not available to Aeroflot
was
the
7 9
succession
of wealthy businessme
celebrit ies who used Concorde a
fastest means to cross
the A tlan tic
type
of
disposable capital was
not
able within the Warsaw Pactuntil a
collapse, by which t ime most
of
th
viving Russian SSTs were grounded
museums. Also working against
th
144
n ea r t h e e nd o f
its
career
was a
ing official indifference which gra
saw support being withdrawn.
Alth
t he Tu-144 p ro je ct
had
garnere
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SO CLOSE:
THE TUPOLEV
TU 44
SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEVTU 44
The Tu 144LL was amulti agency/
companyventure designedto
investigate the NASA sponsored
Hi Speed Flightprogramme.Although
deemedsuccessful only one more
fl ight was made to theUSAwhere
aprivatebuyerhad purchased it for
display. CourtesyNASA
BELOW: Seenfrom underneath this shot
ofthe
Tu 144LL flyinglaboratoryshows
thattheTupolevO were close to
achievingthe correct configuration
fora viable
SST;
themissingingredient
duringthe Aeroflotdays
was
reliability.
CourtesyNASA
one of the
remaining a ir fr ames was
reworked a s
the
Tu-144LL laboratory ,
which
began
test
flying
around
March
1996, s o on a f te r its r o ll - ou t a n d g r ou n d
testing. The airframe chosen for this was
the T u-144D,
77114,
o ne o f t h e
last
to
be
b ui lt a nd wh ic h h ad
flown
o nl y s om e
83hr, most of w hich involved flight test
ing. The modifications embodied in
the
Tu-144LL flying laboratory included
the
removal
o f t h e o ri g in a l N K- 1 44 e n gi n es
and theirreplacement by uprated NK-321
augmented turbofan powerplants, origi
nally
developed
for
the Tu-160
l ckj ck
swing-wing
strategic
bomber. To
t h is e n d
the engine nacelles and their systems were
modified to allow these more powerful
engines to be safely fitted.
These
engines
were
c ap ab le o f g en er at in g
55,0001b
24 5 kN ) o f t h ru s t e a ch , p u sh i ng t h e air
craft s top speed a b ov e M a ch 2.3 quite
comfortably and increasing
the
range to
4,040
miles
6,500km).
The maximum
take-off
weight
for
the
Tu-144LL was 410,0001b l86,400kg),
of
Resurrection
Fortunately,
this
would not be
the
case
since NAS A, plus interested parties from
t he A me ri ca n a nd t he
Russian aircraft
industry , were in
t h e m a rk e t
for a super
s o ni c t e st
bed for
N AS A s H i gh S p ee d
Research Program, w hich continued its
activities for
both
civilian and military
needs. The
American companies
included
Boeing,
McDonnell
Douglas, Rockwell,
Pratt Whitney a n d G e ne r al Electric.
P ushing this forward politically was Vice
President Gore, w ho countersigned the
agreement
with
the
Russian Prime Minis
t er V ic to r C he rn om yr di n. T hi s pro
gramme had begun in the early 1990s and
culminated
in a ser ie s
of
test flights with
the
purpose
ofcollectingdata
for
in-depth
comparisons with that garnered previous
ly
from t h eo r et i ca l a n d w i nd - tu n ne l
experiments.
S i nc e t h e
airframehad been
constructed
by Tupolev
ANT,
i t was de
c id ed t o n om i na te t hi s o rg an iz at io n t o
upgrade t he i r o wn p ro du ct . T o t hi s e nd
a .I
Tu 244 was intendedto be theversionthat would correct thenumerous failings ofthe
Bythe time i twas schemedenthusiasm for the Russian SST was on thewane.
BBA
Colecton
of a prestige rrogramme,
the
support being
given to
the
seIl
of
militaryaircraft such as
the MiG -29
soon outstripped it. The harsh
reality
o f t he
overseas market
that fighters,
not
SSTs, made
better
and
wou ld , i n e ff ec t,
s ou nd t he
ningof the end.
The loss of a Tu-144 marked
the
e nd o f
attempt to
use
the
typefor revenue ser
w ithin and
beyond
theS oviet U nion,
therefore other useshad to befound for
aircraft. Most
of
these concentrated
the
study
of and
trials
concerning
behaviour,
engine
perfor
vementsand the earth s ozone
and i ts reported breakdown. The
collapse
of
the Warsaw Pac t in
9 seemed to many observers
to
be
the
knell o f t he e nt ir e Tu -144 p ro
me since a lack of general and specif
threatened to lead to
the
penna
grounding
o f t he e nt ir e
airworthy
which
by
then
consisted
of
just
three
140
141
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SO CLOSE:
THE TurOlEv
TU 144
SO CLOSE:
THE TurOlEv TU 44
Tu 144ll
NASA Handling Report
IIIl
Thishead-on view
o fth e
Tu-144LL shows that,from certain angles, its looksrivalled
Concorde s,
Courtesy NASA
f1
mg testbed; some
the changes
made
hose
from a
Tu-160 bomber,
BBA
Coect on
?
.A;
1
f
I
dl
;
C:l
L.J
[
==--
l
c::;:j
I
I
J
I
t
Ia:
Tu-144f
ASA
hireda late prod
included replacing th
Experiments
carried out
on the g round
i nc l uded the
effects of
the
airflow
as
it
entered air-inlet
structures and
the
effects
on engi ne per formance when
supersonic
shock w ves rapidly changed position
in
t he e ng in e a ir i nl et .
During
the
second
series of test
f l ights the
crews
concentrated
on
further
investigations into
six
of
the ai rborne
exper iments from
the
first
equence.
For this, further instrumentation
was
installed by Tupolev technic ians to
assist
in the acquis i tion of
data.
The
pri
mary
purpose of these
fl ights
and
the extra
equipment
was t o monit o r
the deflection
of
t he w in g. Mos t
of
the equipment
was
American and included
transducers
and
sensors their purpose b ei ng t o measure
sonic boom
pressures angle of
attack
and
ideslip
angles
with improved
accuracy.
Th e crew
selected to
f l y thi s p rog ramme
were Robert Rivers from
NASA
Langley
and
Gordon
Fullerton
of NASA
Dryden,
who eventual lyco l laborated on an exten
sive report on the
handling
of the
surface
unde r var i ous tempera tu re and
pressure loads the internal structure and
engi ne temperatu re , bounda ry l ayer a i r
f low behaviour, the wings ground-effect
characteristics, interior and exterior noise
profiles, handling
qualities
in several
parts
of
the
flight envelope, and the flexibility
of
the structure
in
fl ight.
Some
of
these
behaviours
wereidentified as duet ot he pilots
aggressive
handlng
of
the aircraft. Durng Flght
23
a smootherstyle of handlng wast red; this resulted in a
strong reducton in pitch bobblng and
a
gentler transition
between
manoeuvres. On
this
fnal
flight both piots commented
that
changing
their handlng
o f t he
Tu-144
reduced the workloadconsiderably
and
madethe aircraft easier t o f y .
The flght-path dynamicsof the
Tu-144LL
wereinvestgated
in
boththe subsonicand
thesupersonic cruise conditons.
Difficulty
wasexperencedin keepng vertical speed
and
flight-path control when following the
VRI
durng
the clmb
becauseof
two effects:
pitch attitudesensitivity and a
perceived
lag between
pitch
attitude andthe
flight path
responses.As the total length
of
the flightswas
short,
it was not
possible
to determine
whether t helagwas caused by instrumentation lagort he aircrafts dynamics. Further
discrepancies were
experenced
between
the
power settngs
and
pitch
attitude when
cruise
altitudes were
captured
at speeds between
Mach
0.9and 2 although, once
set,
the aircraft waseasyto control.
Once
at
Mach
2 the
Tu-44LL
was found to
handle
well
in turns,
although
the pilot hadto maintain an attitude within the
3-3.5
degreesarc to
maintain a
steady turn. Durng these flights the
piots
both commented on the fact
that,
durng c.g. fueltransfer,
their workloads
increased
dramatcaly.
Overal, t he NASA p io tsfe lt th at there was adverse harmony between the controls
caused byheavyforcesdurng the rol;
it was
discovered that inputting
a
rol command
caused an
inadvertentpitch
command
input, which,
in turn,produced relatively large
pitch control transients leading
to
cross
couplng between
the
axes.
Otherareas
that
g av e r s e t o
comment
were thatof throttle adjustments
since
their friction
damping
was so
stiff
as
to restrict movement to two a t
a
tme.
Such
behaviour ledthe piots to
over-control power
durng
acceleraton
and
deceleraton, which
causedsome problems
durng approaches and landings. However,
some
f nesse of
control
could be achieved
by adjustng the
pitch of
the aircraft, otherwise the
engines
behaved
as
advertsed in
normalcruise flight.
One of t hem ost detaied part s of t he
analysis
concerned the interestingly named
Neal-Smith pitch bandwidth
criterion
trials. To
ensure
thatthis
datawas
colected
cor
recty,
a
lead
lag
compensator and
pure tme
delaymodule
were
put
into the control
loop t o
represent
a simple pilot m odel, t hust he loop betweenpitch attitude and stck
deflection transfer
functons
was closed. Thecompensator could be adjusted to meet
specific
cosedloop
characteristics
and reacted
to
meetthe
presetcharacteristics and
maxmum
ampltudeof the
frequency response
of the
closed
loop. The
data
gathered
durng
the flight trials indicated that the piots werecorrect
in
theirobservaton that
the aircraft bobbled,
and
this increased depending on the severity of themanoeuvre.
The data
retreved
from these flights was carefuly compared and reveaed that the
most
sensitve area in handlng
was
around the pitch
axs,
where
both
piots
com
mented on thetendency to overcorrect
an
over-pitch, while trying to
capture
apitch atti
tudechange. Much ofthis wasexperenceddurng Flght 21; bythe tme thedata from
Flght
23 was analysed the piots hadlearned
not
to
overcorrect
the
pitch-up,
thusthe
aircraft
would
capture the
pitch
attitude change
quite
easiy. However, in the super
sonc regim e t he pitch-up
tendency was
reduced considerably a nd t hu s t he piots
learned that reducing theirpitch axs urgency would
create a
stable cosedloop pitch
response.
The conclusionsdrawn by
theNASA
piots report
centredaroundthe use ofthe
Neal
Smithdata analysis as
appled to theTu-144LL flghts. They hed that more
accurate
fying was possible by usng
an
inertialy-derivedvertcal speed feedback, as opposed
to
pitch
attitude as required by the
analysis
loop. Overal, however, t he piots com
mented
that
the Tu-144 could
have been
developed
into a better
aircraft had the
tme
and
funds
been avaiable; hadthe Tu-244 been
developed
many of the faults with the
Tu-144
might
havebeen
successfuly eradicated.
generatedwhen theai rcraft
was
travelling
at
speed. The first sequence of
nineteen
flights
began in June 1996and
included
six
flight and two g roundexpe rimen ts i n the
maiden flight
schedule,
which
were
con
cluded in
February
1998. The experi
ments, which original ly
totalled
fifty,
v-
ered
the behaviour
of
the aircraft s
cxterior
Four
handlng testfl ghtswere
conducted
with the
Tu-144LL
SST with the object
of
col
lectng quantitative dataand qualitative pilots reports.
The
datawas thencompared
with previous vaues and covered Neal-Smith
short-period
damping,
tme
deay, con
trol anticipation parameters, phase deay,
pitch bandwidth
as
a functon
of
tme
deay,
andthe flight path as a functon ofpitch bandwidth.
The
baselne usedto comparethe
data f rom t he
Tu-144LL
was that generated bythe Lockheed
YF-12
and SR-71 andthe
North
AmercanXB-70,
al
of
which
hadalreadybeenoperatedby NASA. TheTu-144LL
was
controled by a conventonal
column
and
rudder pedals
and
ratefeedbacks
were
addedt o ad
damping. Turn
co-ordinatonwas
aidedat
speeds betweenMach 0.9and
1.6 by an aileron-rudder circuitinterconnect. At speeds higher t han M ach 1.6 sideslp
feedbackwas added for
stability augmentaton.
The two
prmary instruments
useddur
ing
these phases
were the vertical
rate
indicator whichdisplayed
the
aircrafts
altitude
and airspeed
with the profies
for
the clmb to
and descent fromcruise
flight)
and the
attitude ladder which gave its display in0.5 degree
increments). The
Tu-144LLwas also
fitted
with
an autopilot and an autothrottle, used
only
in the
landing
pattern.
The first handlng
flight test was
carred
out
by a
Russan
crew
who undertook
a
shake-down flight,
Flght
20, snce t he aircraft
had notflown
for an extended perod.
Afterthis flight and its
subsequent
rectification,
the Tu-144LL
washanded to
an Amer
ican crew of two p io ts and three engineers.
Flght 21 was
dedicated to investigating
thesubsonic
handlng
envelope and
concentrated
on take-off and
landingcharacteris
tcs
and
aircraft behaviour
in
subsonc cruise
flight
at
Mach0.9. Flghts 2 2 a n d 2 3
cov
ered flying at
Mach
2 although the to ta l tme a llo tte d was
only40min.
Durng
these
flights specifically
defned
manoeuvres were carred out.Known as the integratedtest
block, these manoeuvresincluded
pitch
attitude, bank-angle,headingcaptures, steady
heading
sideslps and a deceleraton
and
acceleraton
manoeuvre.
A slow flight
manoeuvre
was aso carred
out,
involving
the
p u ln g back of
the
control coumn
to
achieve
a
specifed deceleraton to
capture
theminimum speed before the stal. Ths
was
carred
o ut i n b o th
level
and banked flight.
A simulated engine-out
manoeuvre
involved throttling
back
of an outboardengine
to itspower
minimum, after
which
flight
was
stabi zed and the crew
performed
a
heading capture. Each of t he
take-offs was
made
with
thenose canardsextendedand thenoseset at
11
degrees droop.
The
nom
inalapproachand landing
was a
visual one,
with
thecanards extended,geardeployed,
the
noseat 17 degreedroop,
and
autothrottle engaged. Approaches
and
landings
were
also
carred
out
beyond the
normal parameters,
such
as
lateral offsets, retracted
canards
and
with the nose
up. Flghts
with the throttles
set
t om anua and
using
the
instrument
landing
system localzer
were
aso undertaken. Ot her investigations in
these flights included
le ve l n g
off
and maintaining
subsonic
and
supersoniccruise
alti
tude,makng levelturnsunder supersoniccruise
conditons
at M ach 2 and
clmbing
to
and
descending
from
supersonic cruise
flight.
The
pilots
comments concerning the lateral directionalcharacteristics pointed out
theheavycontrol
wheel
andrudder forces.
Although it
was
possible
to
rol
the aircraft
without
too
much trouble,
t hey dd comm ent
that, with modification,
the aircraft could
be madeto
handle better,
buteven so the Tu-144LL
was
assessed as
adequate.
The ful
range of manoeuvreswas
carred
out int he lateral axs,
although
the piots thoughtthat
thesteadyheading
sideslps
required largepeda forces.Yaw damping wasconsidered
satsfactory,
the
piots
commentng
that
heading captures
were
easy
to
perform.
Around
the pitch a x s t he piots
noted
that the controls were
moderate
to heavy,
although they werenot as deficient as the lateral axs. Durng pitch
up,
both piots
notced
that the aircraft had
a
tendencyto bobble durng the
pitch
attitude
capture
task
in Flght 21.
Ths
in
turnpresented
the piots
with
few cues which led
tosomeover-con
trol o f the aircraft. They
also
indicated that to control the pitch
a x s w a s
a hgh work
load task,
especialy
d ur n g c l m b t oand descent from the Mach
2
cruise
conditon.
224,000Ib
(101
,800kg)
was fue l.
total
cost of these
modifications
and
including
the
installation of a
re M d i gi tal data
system was
35 0 million. Further insta l led
included thermocouples, pres-
e sensors
microphones
and
skin-fric
gauges
to
mcasure
thehea tand noise
742
743
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SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU 44
NASA Experimentswith theTu-144LL
er ganged sw it ch
was
l if te d u p t o e
t h e a u gm e nt a ti o n.
The
b ra ke s
released
a nd t he
blended
delta
air
began t o rush
d o wn t h e
tarmac strip
ever increasingspeed with
the
wind
back.
The
r ec or de d d ep a rt ur e t im
14: 42 l ocal t im e;
within
2min
the
wasover.
Uh r 58min
Crew
Concorde
for
New
on
E ch o 2 6 we need
the
whole
leng
26 right
1 4h r 0 7 mi n
Controller
plan
fo
right [Crewconfirm
and
read back]
1 4h r 1 3m in U se e
So
total
fuel
I ve g o t n in et y- s ix f ou r w it h n in et
three
for ninetyJfive
on
board
14hr
13min46sec
First Officer
Fir
tection ;
Flight Engineer
Tested
1 4 hr 1 4 mi n
17sec Ca nain
The
ence
speeds are
VI
150knots
VR
18
220 240 280 it s displayed
o n t he
1 4 hr 1 4 mi n
28sec
First Officer
T
Captain
It s
thirteen
degrees
luxury liner
MS
eutschl nd
around
Latin
America.
The
scheduled
departure
time
had
been pushedbackby
the
latearrival
of
the
main
luggage
collection
from
Ger
many
and
its
subsequent
delayed loading.
A d di n g t o t h e
delaywas
the
need
to
recti
fy
a
N o.2 engine thrust
reverser problem
whichhad required
the replacement of the
Goodyear pneumatic
actuator. Eventually
the
passenger
complement
of
ninety-six
Germans
t wo D anes
one A merican
and
one
Austrian plus
the
flight
a n d c a bi n
c re w w er e a bo ar d.
The external
walk
a r ou n d h ad b ee n
completed the
engines
started
the
t ug h oo ke d up
and
the
Air
France
Concorde
w as pushed back.
With
the
tug
disconnected the throttles
were
advanced to
gi ve t axi speed
the
aircraft
proceeding
under
ground
c on tr ol t o t he
runw ay t hreshol d.
Cleared
for rake-off
Concorde
was
throttled
up
and
swung
round
t o p o in t
down
the
runway
centre
line.
With
brakes applied
t h e t h ro t tl e s
were advanced after
w hich the
afterburn-
CHAPTER EIGHT
As
It Happened
e th
n
is ster
Concorde Concorde
z er o 4 59 0 y ou h a ve
flames you have flames behind you
l
The
controller s voice was tinged with fear
and
di sbeli ef- t his
was the
flagship aircraft
of
Air
F ra nc e a n d i t wa s
on
fire.
This
short
phrase marked
theend
of
Air
France
Con
corde F-BTSC and of
one
of
the
most
impressive safety records in aviation histo
ry
And
yet
the
warning signs had already
been flagged up i n
the
type s
incident
logs
which carried reports
of
tyre damage
and
failures
engine
fai lures and punct ures t o
the
wing lowerskinning.
On t h e m o rn i ng of 25
July
2 00 0 A ir
France
Concorde
Sierra
Charlie
was
on
the stand at
Paris
Charles
de
Gaulle
Air
port scheduled
to depart
w it h a g ro up
of
passengers with
the
flight
designation
AF4590. It was
under charter to
a
German
·tour
operator
w ho h ad s p on so re d a
com
bi ned t rip i nvol vi nga fl ight
to
New
York
to
be fol lowed
by
a c ru is e a bo ar d
the
On
ahappier occasion
F-BTSC
the aircraft lost in th e crash
on 25
July
2000)
touches down
at
Paris
Charles
de
Gaulle.
BernardChares
Tu-144LL.
The
first three flights
ofthe
sec
ond
series included
h a nd l in g a t b o th
sub
sonic
and
supersonicspeeds while
the
final
four covered purely
data
collection. After
the
analysis
o f t h e
generated dara seven
moreflights were carried
out between
Sep
t e mb e r 1 99 8
and
A pr il 19 99. A ll
the
flights were carried
out
from
the
Tupolev
airfield
at
the
Zhukovsky
Development
Centre.
Once t he y h a d b ee n c o mp l et ed
the
T u-144L L w as agai n grounded si nce
NAS A
a nd i ts c om me r ci al p ar t ne r s h ad
lost
government
fundi ng t o
continue
the
further
development
of
an
American
SST.
The
purpose
ofthe
flights wasessentially
to
investigate
the
t echnology base for a sec
ond-generation American
SST.
The
goalS
set for t hi s
next generation
included envi
ronmental
friendliness
and economic
per
formance.
This
second grounding w ould
mean
that
y et a ga in
Concorde
would
remain
as the
onlycommercial
SST
in
the
world
the
others beingbut dreams.
Handlng
qualities
assessment:
a
supersonic
aircraft has
different handlng characteristics from other types,thus
an in-depthinvestgaton wasthoughtnecessaryto deter
m net he
behaviour
of anext-generaton
SST
Coeffcient ofpressure coefficient friction
and
bound-
ary layermeasurements:
these
required
the
taking of
seventy-five wingstatic
pressures.
These experiments
concentrated on the aerodynamicdrag generated
by
a
supersonicairframe and wouldgive
abetter
understand
ing of
design
criteria.
Structure/cabin noise: thisrequiredtwenty-five flush
mounted pressure sensors, eight microphones andsix
accelerometers.
Hgh speed
travel through
air
generates
a substantial
amount
of
noise, thusthese
experiments
were needed
to
measure the noise coefficient, which
wouldgude the developmentof adequate sound proofng.
In flight
wingdeflection
measurements:
t hese exper
ments wereundertaken so
that
the
safest
coefficient
of
elasticity could be
engineered
into the
wing
structure.
Surface/structure equibrium temperature verification:
this required the installation of 248thermocouples. Its
purposewas todetermine
the
types of
material
needed
t o b u i d an
aircraft
capable ofcarrying
300 passengers
at supersonicspeeds.
Propulsion system
thermal environmentdatabase:
this
required
the installationof a further ninety-six
thermo
couples. I ts purpose wast o
determine
the detrimental
effects heat had upon engines driving an
aircraft at
supersonic
speeds and,
as
a
side
experiment,
t hebest
way to control the flow o f a i r i nt o the engine s com
pressor face.
Slender wing ground effects: the infuence
of
ground
effect on more
conventonal
airlners was fully under
stood; however, the behaviour
of a
supersonic aircraft
wasnot ,
and
t hus t heam ount of push back by the
air
under the wings
and
the p io ts
reacton to
it needed
investigation.
Tu-144D
CCCP-77112 was originally
on
displayatthe Tupolev OKB, Zhukovsky, before
being
sold to
Sinsheim
Mu se um in Ge rma n y. He re cranes u n loa d th e airframe
from
its special barge. Asimilar procedure
was required with
the
retiredAir
Fra nce Co n co rde so ld
to
th e sa me mu seu m. ealWings Photographs
744
745
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DEATH
ND
DISASTER
DEATH
NDDIS STER
CONCOROE
T KES
OFF.CREW
UN W REOF
FIRE
UNTILW RNEDBY
AIR
T FFle
CONTROL.
NO2ENGINESTARTS TOMALFUNCTION.
14h43m 23.7 25 3s: NO engine at
4
percent th
NO 2
engineat
12
percent
thrust
14h
43m
26.2 28.4s:
NO engine
thrust fals
to 4
cent; NO 2 engine throttle to fully retarded po
14h43m
28.7 29.3s: NO 2 engine shuttng down
14h43m
28.3s: Nos
3
and
4
engnesoperatng in co
gency
mode
at f u l power
14h43m 35 5s: NO engineoperatng in contng
mode
although
thrust no morethan 5per
cent
14h43m
59.5 44m 11.5s:
NO
engine underspee
and
suffers fnal
surge
14h 44m
24.7 27s:
Nos
3
and
4
engineleversreta
possibly by
crew attempting
to equalze asymm
conditon of aircraft
Engine Performance
and
Warning Data for F BTSC
14h43m 11.7 12.3s:
a fourengnesoperatngcorrecty
14h
43m 12.7 13.3s: deviatons in N1/N1 parameters
engine NO 2
14h
43m 12 13s:
engine surging
Nos 1
and
2
engines
14h43m
12 1 14.1s: the GO lamps
go out. NO engine
14h43m
15.7 16.3s:confirmation of surge
NO
engine
14h43m
16.1 18 1s: NO engine GO lighti uminates
14h 43m 16.7 17.3s: NO 2 engine thrust dropsto idle
14h 43m
18.1 20s:
No 1 engine GO light
goes
out;
Nos
3
and
4
engine GO
lghts
go
out
14h43m
19.7 20.3s:
NO
engine thrust drops
to80
per
cent
14h
43m 20.7 21.3s: NO 2 engine recovers thrust
to
15
per
cent
The wreckage still smoulders
as the
fire services turned
up
to
douse
the remains of
Concorde andthe hotel it hit. Rea Wings Photographs
14hr
43min
41sec Engineer:
The gear
No
l4hr
43min
42sec Controller:
at
your
convenience,
you have priority
to
land
14hr
43min
42.3sec [Second fire alarm
sounds]
14hr
43min
44,6sec CO-/Jilot:
I m
trying
l4hr 43min
45.6sec Engineer:
I m
firing
it
14hr43min
48.2sec Pilot:
Are
you
shut
tingdown engine number
two?
14hr
43min
48.2sec Engineer:
I ve
shut
it
down
14h r 4 3min
49sec Controller:
End
reception middle marker
14hr
43min
49.9sec
Co-pilot: The
air
speed
l4hr 43min
57sec
Co-pilot: The
gear
won tcome
up
14hr 43min
58.6sec [Third fire alarm
sounds]
14hr43min 59sec-44min
03sec
GPWS
a/ann: Whoop whoop
whoop, pul l up
...
whoop whoop
whoop,pul l up
14hr 43min
59sec
Co-pilot: The
air
speed ;
GPWS
alann: Whoop
whoop
whoop, pul l up
14hr 44min
05sec Fire Service Leader:
De Gaulle
towerfrom Fire ServiceLeader,
authorization
to
enter
twenty-six right ;
ontroller: FireService
Leader- theCon
,
corde
1don t know his
intentions, getinto
position
near
the
southern
parallel run
way, Fire Service Leader correction:
the
oncorde is returningon
runway
09
in
the
opposite
direction
14hr44min
14.6sec
Co-pilot:
Le Bour
get,
Le
Bourget, Le Bourget
14hr 44min
17sec Pilot: Too l at e, t oo
late
14hr 44min
18sec
Pilot:
No
time,
no
. ,
time
14hr44min
18,5sec
Co-pilot: Negative,
we re trying Le Bourget
14hr44min
20sec Co-pilot:
No
l4hr 44min
2lsec
Fire Service Leader:
De Gaulle
towerfromFireService Leader:
can
you g iv e me
the situation
of
Con
corde?
[Pilotnoises- sounds
of
exertion]
[Pilotnoises- sounds
of
exertion]
[Pilotnoises- sounds
of
exertion]
[The cockpit
voice recorder
made
its
lastrecording
at
4:44:30pm;
the
recording
ended at
4:44:31.6pm]
14hr45min
10sec
Controller
to FireSer
vice Leader:
The Concorde
has crashed
near
Le
Bourget, Fire ServiceLeader
PARIS,
CHARLES DEGAULLE
AIRPORT
®
14hr
43min
11.9sec Co-pilot:
Watchout
14hr
43min
13Asec Controller:
Con-
.
corde zero 4590
1
You
have
flames, you
have
flames
behind
you
14hr
43min
14sec
Flightdecl< voice
not
identified :
Right
14hr
43min Asec
Engineer:
Stop
1 4h r 4 3m in
17sec
Co-pilot:
Well
received
l4hr 43min
Asec Engineer: Break
down
eng-,
breakdown
engine number
two
l4hr 43min
22.8sec [Fire alarmsounds]
l4hr
43min
24.8sec Flight Engineer:
Shut
down
engine number
two ;
Flightdecl<
voice
not
identified :
It s burningbadly -
huh
14hr 43min
25,8sec Pilot:
Engine
fire
procedure
14hr
43min
27.2sec
Co-pilot:
Watch,
the
airspeed,
the
airspeed,
the
airspeed
14hr
43min
28sec Controller: It s burn
ingbadly
and
I m
not
sureit s
coming
from
the engine
l4hr 43min
29.3sec [Fire
handle
pulled]
14hr
43min
30sec Pilot:
Gearon retract
14hr43min 31secConr:roller: 4590, you
havestrongflame
behind
you - as youwish,
you have priority for a return
t o t he
field
14hr
43min
,5sec Engineer:
The
gear
l4hr
43min
32sec Controller: Begin
ning
reception
of
middle marker
14hr 43min
40sec
Co-pilot:
Yes, well
received
AIRCRAFTLEFT
MAIN
GEAR
STRIKES
MET L
OBJECT
ON
RUNWAY, RESULT NTD M GE
PUNCTURES
FUEL T NK
5
ND
,
CAUSESFIRE.
CREW
CARRYOUTFIRECRILL
TTEMPTM DETORAiSE
UNDERCARRIAGE.
2MINUTES 31 SECONDS
talked about,
we
land
back
on
runway 26
right
14hr40min
19sec
Captain: How much
fuel
have we
used? ;
Flight
Engineer:
We ve
got
800
kilos
there
14hr 4 min
09sec Flight Engineer: Brake
temperatures checked one hundred
fifty ;
Ca/Jtain: I s i t
ho tte ron the
left
or
the
right
there?
Flight
Engineer: It s
aboutthe
same
14hr
40min
02sec Controller:
4590
line
up26 right ;
Crew:
We
l ine upand hold
on
26 right
4590
14h r 4 2min
I7sec Concroller: Air
France 4590, runway 26 r ight , w ind
90
degrees,8 knots, take-off authorized
14hr42min
l7sec CO-/Jilat:
4590 taking
off26 right
14hr 42min
20sec
Pilot:
s everybody
ready?
14hr42min
22sec Co-pilot: Yes
14hr42min
24sec Engineer: Yes
14hr42min
3lsec
Pilot:
Up
to
100, 150,
top
14hr42min
40sec Engineer:
We have
four
heated
up
14hr
42min
54,6sec
Co-pilot: 100knots
14hr 42min
55sec Pilot:
Confirmed
14hr42min
57sec Engineer: Four
green
14hr
43min
03.7sec
CO-/Jilot: V
one
14hr43min
5sec
Pilot:
Confirmed
14hr43min
1O.lsec[Noise recorded
on
CVR over
t he n ex t
few seconds to
14hr
43min
l3,8sec]
FAILUREO FNos 1 2ENGINES FOLLoweo
BY
FAILURE
OFPORT
WINGFLIGHTCONTROLS.
AIRCRAFTB NKS THROUGH90 DEGREESWHICH
CAUSESLOSSOFPOWERTO
Nos
3 4 ENGINES.
CONCORDEDESCENDSROLLING
LEFT
AND
ALMOSTVERTICAL
T il
FIRST.IMPACTFOLLOWS
HOTEL
L
PATTED OIE
GONESS
14hr 14min
53sec Ca/Jtain:
Next
the
control
lever
is
at
fourteen
and
you ll
have
N2 of ninety-seven and
a b it ; Flight Engi
neer:
N
inety-seven
14hr
34min
Controller:
Air
France
4590,good morning, taxi
to holdingpoint
26rightviaRomeo ; crewconfi rmneedfor
the
whole
runway
14hr 37min
51sec
First Officer:
Hey
you ve got
the
indicators going
into
green
all
the time
14hr
38min
55sec
Flight
Engineer:
you re r ight , we ll s tay in yel l- , i n
green
l4hr 38min
59sec
First Officer: We ll
stay ingreen,eh?
14hr39min
04sec
Ca/Jtain:
S o t he
take
off
is
- at
maximum
take-off weight,
one
hundred
eighty tons
one
hundred, which
meansfourreheatswitha
minimum
failure
N2o f
ninety-eight. Between zero
andone
hundred
1stop for anyaural
warning
-
the
tyre flash.
The
tyre flash
and
failure call
out
from youright. Between 100
knots
and
V1 I i gnore
the
gong Istop for
and
engi
ne
f ire, a t yre f lash
a nd t he
failure call-out.
After
VI we
cont inue on theSID
we
just
The lastflight of Concorde Sierra Charlie was
tragically shortwhen. afterstruggling to maintain
height and
speed.the
aircraft crashed
on to
a
hotel.
BBA Colecton
746
747
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E TH N IS STER
E TH N IS STER
statements
may
s ounds ta r k
in
nature,
but
theyare takenfrom
the cockpit
recorder
tape and the air trafficcontrol tapes.
Their
ccuracy
is without doubt,
unlike
the
media
ccounts,
mostly hysterical
and
inaccu
rate,
that
followed this m os t tragic event.
he baldness
o f t h e
taped
conversations
xhibit an
icy
calmness which
is remark
ble
considering
the
c l am o ur o f
gongs,
alarms and recorded warnings
that
were
urrounding the crew
as
they
struggled
to
bring their stricken C oncorde under con
trol
and
return it
and
its occupants safely
t o t h e
ground. Eyewitness reports garnered
jus t a f ter t h e e v en t stated that C oncorde
began its take-offrun w ithout any trace of
a problem. At
the pointof rotation
a flash
of
fire was o b se rve d in
the vicinity of
no.2
e n gi n e, t h is w ould quic kly
grow
into
a
long streak offire, estimated
at
180-275yd
200-300m)
in
length, that
did
notappear
to besubsiding.
A lthoughthe
aircraft
man
aged to take-off, it wasseen to be struggling
to
m a i nt a i n h e i gh t a n d
forward airspeed.
The direction of flight
was
seen to waver
slightly
before
Concorde
reared
up,
obvi
ously
o u t o f c o nt r ol .
As it
continued
its
climb,
i t ro lle d
90 degrees t o t h e g r ou n d,
totally
o ut o f control,
before falling
o ut o f
the sky i n a s ide s li p a n d l a nd i ng
on
the
Hotelissimo, La Patte
d Oie,
in Gonesse 3.7
miles
5.8km)
from
the
a ir po rt . I n
the
resulting impact and fire ba ll, a ll 1 00 p as
sengers,
the
crew
o f n in e
and fou r h o te l
employees werekilled
and the
aircraft
and
the hotel annexe
were destroyed.
At
the
time
o f t h e
crash F-BTSC had completed
11,989flying hours
and
3,978 cycles.
eeking an xplanation
O nce
the
smoke,
dustand media
feeding
frenzy had subsided,
the
crash investiga
tors
began their inte nsive s e ar c h
for
the
cause
o f t he
tragedy.
To
this
end
all
the
wreckage and debris were carefully noted
and
collected
for further
examination
and
reconstruction
in a
hangar at
Toulouse. In
t h e m e an t im e , t h e British Airways
Con
corde fleet
continued
to fly
albeit
after in
depth
special checks;
those o f A i r
France
were
immediately grounded.
Initially,
the
investigators looked
a t t he
possibilities of
a terrorist
b om b a n d e n g i ne
failure as
the
prime
causes.
These
w er e q ui c kl y d is
counted since
the
flight characteristics
a n d t h e
debris
pattern
did
not
fita n y
ofthe
known
crash profiles.
By this
time,
the
French
accident
investigation organization,
the
Bureau Enquctes-Accidents BEA),
with s o me a s sis ta n ce fro m
the
British
Air
Accident
In ve s tig a tio n Bran c h, felt
that
e nough e videnc e h ad b ee n g at h er ed and
processed to allow
them
to iss ue a p relimi
naryreport,
which
dulyappeared
on
27July.
I n i t the BEA stated:
Duringtake-off the aircrafthauexceededV
One
when the c o nt r ol t o we r w a rn e d t h e c r ew that
flameswere streamingfrom the rear o f t h e air
craft.
The
cockpit voice recorderrevealed that,
uponrotation,the crew
announced
a failure
in
No.2engine,addingshortlyafterwards that the
undercarriagewould not retract. Analysis o f t h e
flight data recordershowed
that
duringr otation
therea loss of powerin engine No.2,followed by
a t e mp o ra r y l os s of performance from No.1
e n gi ne . D ur i ng i ts h r ie f f li gh t, t h e f li gh t d a ta
recorder revealed t ha t t he aircraft s forward
speed had barelyincreased and that itsaltitude
had changed little. Although N o. 1 e n gi n e h a d
regained full powerafter
one
minute, the power
plant starteu to malfunctionagain. Shortlyafter
this, the C oncorde hanked sharply
to
t h e l ef t
and crasheu.
The
resultant wreckage was con
centrated
in a limited area;
although
a certain
amountof debris was spreaualong the aircraft s
flightpath, there was also some debrisfound on
the runway at C harlesde Gaulleairport.
A follow-up reportwasissued
by the
BEAin
August,
that recommended t ha t t he Cer
tificate
of
Airworthinessbe
withdrawn
from
the
remaining
Concorde
fle et. In th is
the
French investigatorswere fully supported by
t h e A i r A c c i de n t
Investigation
Branch
in
Britain.
O ther
conclusions drawn in the
same
document
involved some
o f t h e
caus
es
o f t h e
accident.
This
h ad b ee n
pinned
down
toa wingfuel
tank having
beenpunc
tured by sections
of
whe e l a fte r a tyre had
suffered
catastrophic
explosive failure. Due
to the
lack
of warning
systems in
that
sec
tion ofthe wing, the crewwould ha ve be e n
unaware
o f t h e
source
o f t h e
fire
and
there
fore
their
first,obviousconclusion would be
t o c o nt e nd t h at there w as a p ro bl em w it h
either
No.1
or N o.2
engine,
or
both.Further
investigationswere being
undertaken
to p in
d ow n t he
cause
and
thus
the grounding
order wasstrongly recommended
to
contin
ue. To this end,
the
Certificate
of
Airwor
thiness paperwork was removed from
each
f li gh td ec k, w it h t ho se p ar ke d a wa y f ro m
home b e in g s e ale d to prevent removal. In
D e c em be r 2000 the
BEA iss ue d
another
and
moredetailedreport
that expanded
fur
ther upon
the
investigators previousefforts.
T he document
revealed
that C oncorde
F
748
TheBEA
report
wascompied inaccordance of Annex
13 of t heConvent on on
Internatonal
Civ
Aviaton
and
EC Directve 94/56 and
Law
No. 99-243,
dated 29
March
1999, wh ich state sth a t its
conclusions
and
safety recommendatonswere notintendedto appor
ton
blam enort o assgn
responsibi ty.
The
report
began by outlning the circumstances
surrounding
thecrashand folowed
with
themake
up
of
the investigation team.
The
BEA assigned the
majority of investgators under t he comm and of a
principal
investigator who was nominat ed as the
investigator in charge.Included in theteam
weretwo
investigators from
the
AAIB and
experts from BAE
SystemsandRo s-Royce.Other
observers
camefrom
Germany, the BFU
and
the
NTSBand
the
FAA,
the
Amercan
regulatory
bodies. Yet
other
experts were
drawn in,
as needed, fromRo s-Royce,SNECMA and
Air
France.
With the teamchosen,
the
French Minis
ter
of
Equipment, Transport and Housng
formaly
establshed the Commisson
of
Inquiry
o n 2 6
Juy.
By this
tme
the investigator in charge had
estab
lshed
seven
working
groups with distinct areas of
responsibity: site and
wreckage, aircraft systems
and engines,
preparaton
and conduct
of the flight
pus
personnel
information, flight recorders, aircraft
performance, witness testmony andthe examinaton
of previous events. On 16 August the BEA and t he
AAIB issued
their
first
safety
recommendatons,
which
were
formaly
publshed on
31
August
2000.
With the initial fndings
in
the publc
domain
the
investigation was slm m ed
down
to concentrate
on
four areas: wreckage, conduct of the
flight
andt he
aircrafts performance, previouseventsp us certifica
ton,
and
regulatons and technical
research. The
wreckage
team concentrated
on
the left-hand
sideof
the aircraft, in particular t hedry
bay,
wing andt he
landing-gear bay. There hadbeen
some
delay
incol
lectng
wreckage from that area
and
assemblng it
for
investigation
because of
the
presence of asbestos.
Complcatng the whole
procedure was
the need
for
the engines, the flight engineers pane. t yre
debrs,
partsfrom NO.5 f ue t ankand t he landing gear,
al
of
which were subject
t o t he
paralel
judicial
inquiry
with a l th at th at imple d .
A
descripton
of
the flight
and
t he cabn crew fol
lowed
this
in
which
partcular attention
was
givento
eachmembers fying qualfications
and
medical his
t ory, none of which was f oundt o be deficient. With
the personne
dealt
with,
attention
turned
to
the
air
craft
itself.
Airframe
F BTSC wasdef ned as a Con
corde
Type
verson 101 with the
constructors
num
ber
3. The
aircraft
hadentered Air
France
servce
on
24 October 1979; however, its airvvorthiness
certifi
cate
had
originaly
been
issued o n 2 3 December1975
and wasvald
unti
29 September
2002.
Up
to
thedate
of
t he crash SierraChare had
completed
11,989 fy
inghours
and
4,873 cyces.S nce itslast
in-depth
ser
vicing, a type 01 general overhau completed on
October 1999, the aircraft
had fown
576 hours and
181
cyces. The maintenance cyce completed
just
before
the fateful flight hadbeen
undertakenbetween
17
to
21
July 2000, this beng
a
schedued A01 check
that h ad a s o i nc u d ed t he r ep la ce me nt o f t he left
Summary
of
the rench ccident Report
man
gear
boge
which
hadbeen done in
order to correct an acceptable deferred
defect
which
related t ot he under-infaton detecton system. Snce the A01 check
and
rectifi
caton
the aircraft had flown on servce
between 21
and24 Juy.
Defects
requirng
rectification before the final
flight
included slight
thrust
surges in
cruise at Mach
2
with illumination of a
start-pumpwarning lght. Rectification includ
ed
in-depth checks of the thrustcontrol units
and replacement
of the N1 limit amplifi
er. Further checks
were
carred
out on
the EGT sensng
lne. The
brake overoad warn
ing lightfor
wheel
No.4had i uminated, requirng the replacement of a cable
and
a
slow leak
had
been
detected
in theblue
hydraulc
system that
had
required thereplace
ment
ofthe connectng
joint
on the
artificial
f ee cylnder. The
fn a lite m
requirng
atten
ton
was
thetyre
on
wheel No.5, the whole
assembly
beng
replaced.
Before itsfn a l f lig h t SC had beenp aced
on
standby for
F BVFA
which hadbeenthe
planned aircraft for AF 002t o New
York,
while F BVFC hadbeen alocated to
flight
AF
4590. Due amaintenance
requirement,
F BVFA hadbeen repaced by F BVFC since the
former
had
become unserviceable.Th s
meant
that F BTSC was the
only
aircraft
avai
able f or
flight 4590.
Before beng
alocated
to
this flight
SierraChare
hadbeen con
frmed
to have
no
acceptable
deferred
defects in its
log,
although the Garrett
pneumatc
motordriving the NO.2 engine secondary exhaustnozze buckethadbeen replaced, after
which it
was
declared fit
for
flght.
Havng
confrmed
the
last
known
defects
to afflict Sierra Char e and t hecircum
stances surrounding
itsal ocation
to
flight
4590, the report concentrated upon the sys
temsdeemedto havepayed
a
significant part
in
the crash.
The
first to
be
defned
was
the
undercarrage
and
its detectors,
in
particular the under-inflation warning system.
Ths system lg h tstwo red tyre-warningl ghts on each of t he pilots instrument panels,
wh ie t here was an amber
warning
on the second p io ts pane
which
i uminated a
wheel lght. There
w as a s o an ambertyre
warning
light on theengineers panel.
Ths
detection
system was
inhibited
when
thespeed of the wheels was below lOkt
or
the
steerng
angle of
thenose
wheels
exceeded
degrees
and
none of
the
throttle
levers
was
in the fully forvvard positon.
The
red tyre-warning lghts would notilluminate if the
indicated
air speed exceeded 135kt.Th s system
was
self-monitoring and
would illu
minate
a yelow system
warning
lightthat
was situated
on t heengineers pane
and
would
light
up
shoud a
fault
be found
in
the under-pressure
detecton
system.Retrac
t o n o f the
undercarrage was
controled
by a
lever with
three
positons:
up,
neutral and
down. To retract the undercarrage electrical power needed to
be
avaiable, although
up coud
not
be selected unti the
left
gear
weight-off
microswitchindicated that the
shockabsorber
was
fully uncompressed. Durng the
retracton
sequencethe gearwas
fully upand locked
after
12sec.
Otherundercarrage itemsdefned in
the report
included
the way
in which
the
brakng
system operated and was indicated, while the
main-gear
defectors
were
covered in
detai. Located to the front of each main-wheel b og e t he r o e o f t he deflector
was
to
shift
water
lifted
by thetyres from enterng theintakes.
These
weighed
approximately
91b
4kg)and were
made
fromcomposite
materials,
except
for
the fasteners. In 1995
the
defectors
were subjectedto an
optonal
Servce
Buletn,
SST 32-103, dated 12 Janu
ary 1995, which proposed thattwo cabes
be inserted in
the
leading
edge of the defec
torsto reinforce t hem incaseof faiure. AlthoughBritsh Arvvays dd t his, Air
France
declnedto do so.
The
wheels
and
tyres instaled on F BTSC were manufactured
byDun
lop
and Goodyear,
respectvely.
Al
had been fitted durng theprevious
two
months. It
wasaso noted
that
the
use of
retread tyres
had ceased
on
Concorde
durng
1996.
The
report
then
moved
on
t ocovert he fuel and
the engines, it beingnoted
that the
aircraft had received
a
final top-up of Jet
A
f uel at 13.55hr,
when an
extra 66gal
3001tr had
dispensed
t o t anks 1 2 and 4. At th is p o in t the total f uel load
was
208,0001b 94,470kg).
The
engines
werenotatednext,
the
includeddatacoverng
the
individual
serial
number,number
of
cycles
and of flying
hourssince installation,and
the
date of installation. The longestserving powerplant
was in
the NO.2 position, hav
ingbeen installed
on
August 1999. G vent he factthat Concorde was the onlyair
liner
that used thrust augmentation or reheat during take-off, it was
no
surprse that
there was
aback-up system in placeshould an engine fail on take-off. Known as the
contngency
mode, it could be
activated
either by manual
or automatic
means. In
either case, the
following
criterion
neededto be
satisfied: reheat needed to
be
acti
vated on
any
engine,
the take-off monitor was
armed
and that
the
N2
reading
of any
engine hadt o fall below 58.6per cent indicated. When contngency mode wasacti
vated,
the
remainingthree
engines couldincrease thrust automatically toreach a the
oretical maximum
of
105per cent . There is also a
reheat
cut-out which engaged
should the engine
o u tp u tfa l b e lo w 75
percent,
although
the
functon was res
when
output reached
81
per centthrust.
As the
fre detecton
and
sensngsystemsp ayedacrucalpart inthec rcumstance
roundng
the
crash,
their
functonswere defned in depth. The detectonsystemco
ed of
two loops,
one ofwhich detected
fre around the
engne and theother detec
torchingf ame in
the vicinity
of
the
combuston
chamber. For
an
engne fre
warning
ton to i uminate, bothloopshadto detect
a fault. Once
ths happened, an aura
wa
sounded to reinforce the i uminated light
and
the
red
fashing light on the indiv
engine-fre
hande. Operaton of thishandle
had
the folowing resuts: the air
cond
ing beedvave cosed,
the
hydraulc
shut-off
v a ve d d
the same,
as
d d t he HP
an
LP f ue vaves,
thereheat
f ue vaves
and the
secondary air inlets.
The fnal
effect
p ul n g o f the fre hande wast hecosng
of
thethe auxiary groundrunnng fap, W
tests
were
carred out
on a
servceable Concorde
it
was dscovered that these ac
were completed in between 5 and 7sec,
against
a regulatory requirement of 3
Each Olympus engine consisted of twelve modules,
the
maintenance
ofwhich
undertaken by Air
France,SNECMA
services or by GEAES depending on
the
dep
engineerng
required,
with the fnal
assembly
beng
carred out by
Genera
Electrc
craft Engne Servces,
The maintenance
covered
included visual
inspecton, p
refurbishment
and
complete major overhauls, al based on the Oympusmainten
manual. Supportng themaintenance
effort
werereadingstaken by the flight eng
durng supersonic
flght;
these included
EGT
and fue
fows.
Weights
and balanceswere
computer
generated and
based
on threesets
of
par
ters.
The
first was the
Phase
forecastthat was
determined by
enterng known
age weights forpassengers,baggageand anyintended freight. For SierraChare
firsttotal was
411,
100lb 186,864kg). After
correcton
the
fnal
tax weight was c
lated
at 411 9521b
187,251
kg), down
to 409,7521b 186,251
k g a t
the point of tu
on
to
the
runway fortake-off.
The itemsnoted ab09rd F BTSC included 122 piec
baggage, calculated t o have
an
average weight
of 45.51b
20.7kg)
giving a
to
5,5551b
2,525kg),
although
only103
were noted on
the manifest. Each passenge
given an average weight of 1491b 84kgl peradult and nib 35kg)
for
each
chid
1321b 60kglof newspapers. Gven t hese
calculatons
Concorde Sierra Char e
slightly overoaded
at 407, 1541b
185,070kgl
forits projected
journey. C.g. percen
were
the next areacovered, these beng predictedat 52.3per
cent
at
zero
fue we
increasing t o 54.2 per
cent
for taxing with fuel. For
a
take-off weightof 406,7
184,880kg) the
c.g.
had t o
be
at 54 percent , t hust o changet he original percent
was noted thatat
least
1,540lb 700kg) of fue
would
need to be
transferred
for
fromtank 11. In fact,the
investigation
discovered
that
the actual c.g. was54. 2
cent,
whichwould need atleast
1,7601b 800kgl
of
f ue t o be
transferred forvvard
tank 11 t o g v e
a
correct
c.g.
Shoud Concordes weight
and
balance
be
outside
parameters, there was
an
alarm fitted to warn the
crew
to carry
out
correctve a
Havng
determined
the weights and balances,the other informaton requirng a
ton
were thespeedrangescoverng the
handlng
of t he aircraft with
either oneo
engines shutdown.
In
the
flight manua
the zero-rate
clmb speed
with undercar
retracted and
three engineswas 193kt,
which
increased
to
262kt
with
only
two en
running. With the
undercarrage
extended,the fgures changed to
205kt and
less
300kt. These fgures were
vitally
important in the
operaton
of Concordes nce f
below
them
wouldresult
inthe aircrafts becomingunstable,thusleadingto asta
f gures generat ed f ort he
distance
needed for a
three-engine take-off
were 3,6
3,370ml.
the entre take-off run
coverng
4,046yd
3,700ml. The tailwind
of8kt
an
extra
ton of cargo
were
determined to
be
neglgible
in
causng the
accident.
The
behaviour of the flight control surfaces
and
syst em s weret he next area
investgated.
An
explanaton
ofthe
hydraulc
systemsrequiredto operatethe
fligh
trol
system
folowed,
thenoted
point
being
that
power
to
the
PFCU
synchrovalves
derved from
common sources.
The
avionics
were also
investgated
in depth,
the
beng the SundstrandMk.1 ground proximity warning system, which
had fve
fun
modes.
The
alarm nose identified on the cockpit voice recordertape reveaed tha
GPWS wasselectedto Mode 3
which
indicatedthat thenosewas at 12.5degree
radio altimeter
height was greater
than 50ft
15m),
although t helossin altitude
previously
was
greater than thatalowed.
Havng coveredthe majorareas
of
the
and
the
aircraft, the investgators
turned
theirattention
t o t he
meteorological
c
tons. Over
Europe
at the tme therewas
a
succession of low pressureareas, wh
the vicinity ofChares de Gaule t he wind speed overrunway 26
was
4kt,although
increasedto 8 gust ng t o 9 intermittently.
749
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DEATH
N
DISASTER
oncorde Sierra harlie Wreckage isposition
DEATH
N IS STER
The
debrs trail for
Concorde
F-BTSC
began
on therunway
where
partsof
the left
under
carragewater deflector
assembly
were discovered 5,384ft 11,642m)from the end
of
runway
26R. Cose
by
th is p o in t some
sectons
of NO.2 tyre
were
also discovered,
including
the
cut
secton.
The strip o f
metal
about
17n 43cm )
long was
found
in
the
same area
on
the runway shouder. It still hed som e o fits Cherrylok rvets.
Also
found
in the vicinity was partof the lower skn surf ace f rom f uel t ank NO.5. Slightly further
alongthe
runway a
brake servo valve cover
showingoverheatng
and
deformatonwas
discovered. From this
point, further
along
the runway,
sgns
of
an explosion
anddam
aged concretewere found. Indicatonsthat Concorde
had
begun to slew off the
runway
were
revealed
by
the
discovery
of
a
broken
light
cover at theedge of therunway;
it
had
been hit by Concordes
left undercarrage.At
the
5,925ft
,B07m)
point,
marksmade by
adeflated tyre were
noted; these
lastedunti the 7,672ft 2,340m) point
and
were con
sistent
with
that ofthe NO.2 wheel. Furthertyre tracks contnue
intermittently
up
t ot he
9,279ft 2,B30m)
point.
Fue andsoot marks
were
found to start at
adistance
of
5,967ft
1 ,B20m) from
the
threshold. These contnued
up to
9,OB2ft
2,770m)
fromthe thresh
od,
after
which the burnevidence contnued over t he grasst o t he 10,377ft 13,165m)
mark. From theend of the
runway
t ot he crash
site
further
wreckagewas located:
at
the
3,280ft ,DOOm)
mark
a secton
of elevon
was
found, as was t he
tai-cone
anti
co lsio n lg h t, a
severely
fre-damagedinspecton pane f rom t he left winglower sur
f ace, pus seven inspecton panels
without
fre damage evidence that had originally
been
fitted
t o t he
left
wing upper surf ace dry bay. From the 3,2BO t o t he 8,200ft
,000-2,500m)point further wreckageconsistng
of
another
dry
bay
upper
inspecton
panel. a
fre-damaged
ductsecton and fre-damagedsectons fromthe tai-conewere
discovered. Assome of these itemswere burning when they hit theground,
there
was
supplementary fre
damage. Further smal
items
were discovered slightly further
on,
many of whichwere fre-damaged;
t here wasalso
a
trail
of fre-damaged structural
items,
including
rvets,
honeycomb panels
and
sectons
fromthe rearfuselage.
At
the crash
site
the team surmised that the aircraft
had
been heading along 120
degrees
with little forward speed. On impact it
broke up, distributing the
wreckage
mainly tothe south. Oue to itslow speed,most
of
the wreckage was concentrated with
in astrip some330by 165ft
00 by
50m).
exceptforthe cockpit
secton
which was
out
sde
this
zone. Inside
this
area, the
wreckage
was severely
fre
damaged;however,the
frontfuselagesecton had largely escaped. Other items were found outside the prma
ry
zone, m any bengbured t hrough t hef orce of t he im pact. Complcatng matters was
the
wreckage
of thed estroyed hotel.
although,
perversely,someof the important
debrs
hit parts of
the
buiding,
thus
Nos
and
2
engines
were
found restng on
a
water tank.
Inspecton of the undercarrage units
revealed
that t helegs
remained
in
the locked
down positon, even thoughthe crew had attempted a retracton.
Inspectonof
the
cockpitinstrument
panels revealed
much
pertinent data
to
theinves
tgators. Thusthe
engine
gauges
revealed
that
the
thrust levels of
theengines
were
at
2 B , 4 ,
80and
85per cent forNos to 4, respectvely; however,the fuel
flow
indicators
were
mainly
burnt
beyond recogniton. The indicators
for
the brake system showed a
discrepancybetween
the
left and
the
right
sde,
that to
the
left
beng no more than
400psi
28kg/sq em) whilethat t ot he right displayed
1,500ps 105kg/sq em).
Both p io ts panels
weresuccessfuly
recovered andnotes
were
maderegarding the
positonsof
thegauges,leversand
switches. The first
officers pane revealed that the
nose visor selector
was in thedown
positon,
the
undercarrage selector
was
between
the
down
andthe mid-selection positon, the
rudder
indicator
revealed
that the upper
secton
was defected left by
20
degrees, while the lower
secton
had deflected 12
degrees
to
the
right,
both
wereoperatng
fromthe green
hydraulc
system.There was
no evdenceconcerning theelevonss nce they
were
in mechanical
mode.
Observaton
of
the
airspeed
indicator showed that the forward speed
was90kt
while
the
STBY
fag
was
showing,
the V2 bug
wasset
at230kt. Navigaton instrument readingsshowed the
HSI
at
105degrees.the AOI showed
a
3D-degree
rol
t ot he left,
with
the
nose se ta t
32 degreesdown;
some otherinstruments were
unreadable
although the altimeter
was
indicating 240ft 73m). Thepane cockwas reading 14h 45m UTC.
The captain s
instrument pane showed an HSI heading of 105degrees, the ADI was
at
15
degreesof
rol to
the left, the
nose wasindicating 75
degrees down,the standby
horzon
wasat 90
degrees rol t ot he left, with
18
degrees nose
u p. Tr m
indication
was
at54.3per cent. Thecoaming instrumentation revealed that the autothrottles Nos
and
2were selected to
O FF,a s
were
autopilot channels
and 2and
the
flight directors
Nos and 2were a s o i n t he
OFF
positon. Autothrottle speed
was selected
to
285kt,
the altitude selecton was 9,500ft 2,900m). the left display wasreadng a heading of
329 degrees and course 285degrees, wh ie the right
display
showed338degrees
with
a
course of 287 degrees.
The
overheadpane
displays
revealed
that
the
servo control
hydraulc selectors wereat
normal,
theauto ignition switches
for
Nos 1,2
and
3were
s et t o O N , while No.4had
melted.
Theengine
ratng
mode switches
for
Nos 1 , 2 , 3
and4
were
at
TAKEOFF and while the
HP selectorswitches
weredamagedthe
select
ed
positonswere still visible andread NO.1 OPEN, NO.2
was
broken,
No
3
wasshut
and No.4 wa sa t TAKE OFF The NO.2 engine shutdown/fire handle was puled and
pointng
upwards added to
which
the fre
extnguisher fred
indicators
were
unread
able.
The investgatorswere fortunate to fnd the fying control indicator panel:
thus
the
auto
stabwas unreadable on
Channell,
while NO.2
displayed pitch
a x s t o OFF, the
rol
axs was unreadable and the
yaw
a x s w as
at
OFF.
The artificial
feel system
showed
that Channe NO.1
wasusing
the
blue
hydraulc circuit, the pitch axs
was OFF,
t he rol axs wasunreadable
and
the yaw axs was UP. Channe NO.2 was operatng
fromthe green circuit, while the
pitch, rol
and
yaw
axs
we re a l
selected to OFF. By
contrast,
the
invertercontrol
was
difficult toread;
however,the
investgators
surmised
that both t heblueand
the
green
channels
were set t o
O FF. The
flight control mode
selectors
were
damaged, although there
was
a strong suppositon that the outer and
middle
elevons
were
in m echanical m ode, t he inner elevons
were
usng t he green
hydraulc
system,
and
the selected rudder
circuit
w as b u e .
The anti-stall selectors
Nos
and
2 were unreadable. I twa s n o t possible t oread t he central warning pane
since most of thebulbs and covers
were
missing.
The flight
engineers pane
sectons were
recovered, the
first secton reported
on
bengt he fre panel, which showed
that
the
fire
loop
selectorsindicated NO.1 at BOTH,
NO.2 at LOOP A, No.3 LOOP B , a nd N o. 4 a t neutral. Engne system pressures for
P7
showed that Nos 1 , 2 ,
3
and
4
engines
displayed
readings of 18,12,
18
and18ps 1.27,
0.84, 1.27
and
1.27kg/sq
em).
respectvely.
Furthersystem readings showed
thebrake
hydraulc pressurewas reading
6,000psi
1422kg/sq
em)
with
an
indicator
fag,
thebrake
fan switch wasat
ON ,
andthe brake
temperature
reading was170°C.The pane cock
stopped
at 14h45m
UTC.
The
enginesecondary
nozze indicators were
shown
to
be at
0,
15
and
5
degrees and unreadable for
Nos
1,
2, 3
and
4
engine,
respectvely.
The flight
engineers
central
fuel
and air-conditioning pane was recovered but dam
agedand therefore the investigators
were
able to determine the state of thefuel tanks
and their
contents:
tank no
9:
fue quantty indicated: 11 tons;
left
pump to AUTO, rght pum pt o ON
tank no : fue
quantty
indicated 12 tons;
left
pump to OFF ,
rght
pump to AUTO
tank no SA: fuel
quantity indicated 2.4
tons; both
pumps to
ON
tank
nO 7A:
fuel quantity indicated 2.2tons; bothpumpsto ON
tank no 5:fuel quantity indicated 2 tons; bothpumps unreadable
tank no 6:fue
quantty
indicated4.6tons;
left-hand
pump unreadable, rght-hand
pumpto ON
tank no fuel quantity indicated 4.2 t ons; bot hst andbypum ps t o ON , m an
pump
to
ON
tankno : fuel quantity
indicated
0.11 tons;
a l thre e
pumps to
ON
tank no
7: fuel quantity indicated 6.6tons;pump switches
unreadable
tank no 8. fuel quantity indicated
12.B
t ons; bot hpum ps t o ON
tankno 3: fuel quantity
indicated
4.3 tons; pump
switches
unreadable
tank nO 4: fuel
quantity indicated 4.3
tons;
pump switches
unreadable
tank 11 71: fuel
quantity indicated 10
tons;
left-handhydraulc pumpto AUTO ,
right-handto
OFF; electric pump indicators unreadable;main
left
in vave
SHUT; overrde
not
readable; man
right inlet
valve
and
overrde unreadable.
The standby
inlet
vaves Nos 5, 6
and
were selected OPEN, while NO.2 was at
SHUT. Standby
inlet
valves Nos 3, 4,10 and
7were
at SHUT and NO.8 wasat OPEN.
Fue jettison
switches NO.1
and
3were
in the
intermediateposit on; No.4
was
OPEN
and NO.2 was SHUT.
The
masterjettison and trim ppe drainswere
unreadable.
Other
fuel readings include a zero fuel weightof 91.9tons with ae.g. of 52.29 per
cent
and
the total
contentsindicator
was
at
7B.8 tons
with awarning
fag
showing.
The hydraulc indicators
on
the flight engineers pane
showed
that the
green
circuit
had a level below
zero
with awarning f ag; Nos and 2pump shut-off valves showed
indicator fags and their
switches
and indicators
were
at
ON .
Hydraulc pressure
showed2,000psi
1141kg/sq
em)
with
an
indicator
fag.
The
yellow
circuit indicated a
totalcontentsof 6 US gal 1231tr) with awarningf ag; pumps Nos2and 4shut-off valve
showed warning f ags andt he pumps and indicators w er e s et t o
ON .
System pres
sures
were
unreadable.
The
bue circuit showed
a total contents
level of
2.7
US
gal
Otr)and
the shut-off
valves
for Nos 3
and
4wereshowing warning
fags.
Nos 3
and
4hydraulc pumps were at ON andthe selector for NO.3 pumpwas at OFF; NO.4 was
at OFF.
Hydraulc
pressure was at 6,OOOpsi 422kg/sq em) with a
warning
fag. Al
alternator
switcheswere at ON , althoughoutputs for Nos 1, 2
and
3had
unreadable
outputs,that of No.4showed
an
output of 60kW .
The
flight
engineers electrical control pane did not revea manydetais throughbe ng
badly
burnt,
however, some information was
retrievable
as t ot he
state
of the electri
ca
system
at the t m e o f thecrash.Data
from
this
pane showed
that
the
transformer
rectifier
unitswere outputting, thus NO.1 wasburnt beyonduse,No.2 wasbroken, NO.3
30AandNo.4 70A. The TRU
selectorswere:
TRl unreadable, TR2 NORMAL, TR3 ISOL,
and
TR4 wasmissing.
Al fo ur
engine
nozze indicatorswere
at NORMAL
but
damaged
and
t hef uelt ank pressurewas
at
zero. Otherdata
recovered fromthe pane
included
the passengeroxygen pressure at 40ps 2.8kg/sq em), the
crew
oxygen at ze
selector
was missing,
and
the
fourfire-extinguishercartrdgeindicatorswere at
although thecheck selectorswere unreadable.
Whenthe investgators began to interrogate therecoveredwreckage the first ob
t on t hey
made
was that theuppersecondaryexhaust nozzes forNos 1,
2
and
4
e
were in
pacebut
NO.3 had
separated.
Asimiar situation
was
dscovered with re
the prmary exhaust
n ozze s.No
nozzesect onsshowed sgns
of
overheatng no
anysgnsof an uncontained engine burst found. Observaton of theengnes show
nozzes
Nos and 2
were at
21
degreesconversant with
either
the
take-off ort h
down of
the engnes,
and
the positons of the
other
two
were
at
zero.
Investga
NO.2 compressorshowed that t heenginewas barelyt urningat t he t m e of
impa
showeds gnsof
FOD
damage, as dd t he compressorof
NO.1
engne. By contras
Nos 3
and
4
engnes showed
indicatonsof
operatng
at a
much higherthrust
th
matching pair
on
the left-hand sde. None of t heengnesshowed sgns
of
fre da
Next on the
investgators list
were t he wheels.
NO.1
wheel was
completely
although
therewas no evdence
of materal
separaton,
thehubs
were complete
thebrake unit
had separated
from the
wheel and
axe; a l we re besmirched
by
soo
wheel showed fre damage
and
the two beads were
no
longerlnkedby t he t rea
outer
bead
ofthe tyre wascomplete
but
theinnerwas broken, with the reinforcing
showing through.
A
sectonof
the
tyrewas
found to
be missng. The wheel
hub
was
to
be
complete
and
still
retained thebrake unit.
The
other
two
wheels
on
the
lef
boge, Nos 5
and
6, were f oundt o
be
complete with somepost-crash
fre
damag
wheel
hubs
were still in pace with
brake units
still mounted.
The
reconstructon
of
the debrs concentrated
around
the left-handwing
and na
However,a ful reconstructon wasnot possible since there hadbeen destructon,
cialy in t he vicinity of the
main-gear
well. Much of the
material
from NO.5 fue
was
not
recovered.
Another area
of t he
aircraft
for
which little
was
found
wast h
cone, although NO. 1f uelt ank situated just forward revealed much material pus
tain amount of the
vent
system pipework. The
fre
spread to the tai-cone v a t h
iliary
tailwheel gear door.
The
investgators aso
took
tme to ascertain
the
positons of the crew seats,
were found to be
in
the correctpositons fortake-off.
As
the
undercarrage
had c
problem s durng t he crash, t he
positonswere
of serous interest t ot he BEA a
AAIB. Examinaton showed that both m an legs
were
locked down
butthat
the
gearlock hadbeen broken
and
that thedoors
and
t he leghad started to move.
Havngcoveredthewreckagefrom Concorde, the investgators
turned
theiratte
tothe DC-l0 from
which
the
metal
strip
had
come. Ths was
quickly
identified as
bng strip from a
CF6-50 engine
thrust
reverser
cowl. Acheck
of
the
departure
r
for Chares
de
Gaule reveaed that the strip had com e f rom a DC-l0 registe
N13067 andoperatedby
Contnental
Airlnes to
Newark,
NJ as
flight
COA 55.
T
frm this,
helpwas requestedfrom, and
granted
by, the NTSB
and
the FAA. Wh
aircraft was located
and grounded
for investigation it
was discovered
that the
left
wearstrip on the right engine was missing. It wasaso f ound that the replac
strip
had
been incorrectlyfitted. Servicing
had previously
beencarred
out by Israe
craft Industries and at
Houston,
where
parts
of
the
cowl
rubbing
strps had
replaced.
Snce it is difficult to seethese strips whenthe thrust reverser cowl is
normal positon the
fitting
of an incorrect
part
was
noteasiy determined.
h ad t ak en o ff f ro m r un wa y 2 6R
ing a take offspeed upon rotation
of
t. During
the
take off run
the
left-
main gear hadrunovera st rip
of
metal
had fal len off a
Continental
DC IO
hadlefta short t imeearl ier. It
w s
later
t hat one
of
the
engine rubbing
ipshad become detached duringtake off.
the
investigators followed this lead
t hat a t an
earlierstop
the
DC IO
been
found tobe missing a rubbingstrip
that
thereforea replacementhad been
ally manufactured
by the
inspecting
mechanic and fit ted. Unfortunately
the
material
w s
of the
incorrect specification
being toosoft
to
beheldin place
by the few
re ta in ing r ivet s. Such w ere
the
stresses
induced during
the
take off run
t ha t t he
strip
w s
pulledover
the
rivetsand fell
on
to
the
runway.
This
innocuous piece of metal
landed
at
s uc h a n a ng le s t o f or ce its
upwards edge
into
No.2 tyre
on
the left-
hand
main undercarriage
of
the Concorde.
This
in
turn
caused explosive decompres-
sion
o f t h e
t yre and som e dam age t o
the
hub.
The
force generated by
the
tyre failure
5
converted sections
o f t he
t yre i nt o h igh
speed projectiles.
These t henhi t t he
under-
sUlface
o f t h e
wing puncturing No.5
fuel
tank.
The
shock
ofthe
penetration appears
tohave deformed
the
fuel tankwalland
sent
a severeshockwave through
the
fuel.
The
resul t caused fue l t o l eak under pressure
from
the
rup ture and
t he vent ing fuel
swirled
about
like
an
aerosol around
the
undercarriage bay before ignit ing.
The
resulting fire
then
caused malfunctions in
both
left hand engines
the
final cause
of
which still needed
to
be determined. Still
ablaze
the
aircrafttook offwith a stabilized
flame plume streaming behind i t.
t
this
poin t t he
No.2 engine fi re warning l ight
illuminated to which
the
response
of
the
crew
w s to
announce
their
intention
to
shut the
enginedown.
lthough Concorde
w s
airborne
the
a ircraf t was unabl e t o
accelerate since
the
undercarriage legs were
stuck in
the
down posi tion and because
of
the
behaviour
of
the
port engines.
One
matter that
w s quickly discounted
from
the
investigation concerning
the
undercarriage
w s
a bearing spacerfound to
be missing from
the
left hand bogie gear
mounting.
lthough
some eyewitnesses
had mentioned
that Concorde
appeared to
be dri ft ing s li gh tl y t o t he l ef t dur ing and
after its take offrun this was ruled
out
from
causing
the
undercarriage malfunction.
The
intense fire
in the
wingwasdeter mined
s
the
reason for
the
undercarriage staying
down
either
through failure
of
the electrical
controlor
the
hydraulicsystems or through
a complete
or
partialfailure
of
both.
t
this
point
the crew reported
that
the
aircraft
w s
stable even though i ts speed
w s
not
151
increasing; they also stated
that
th
confidentenough to
fly
the
strickena
on
to
e
Bourget since this would
themto makea virtuallystraight in la
Shortlyafterthis report
the
portengin
virtuallyshut downdue toa combina
hot
airand fuel in
the
intake whichb
off
the
airsupply to the engines.Also
to
the
mix was a structural fai lure
vicinity
of t he
intake box assembly
caused distort ion to
the
mounting
imbalancein engine powerand a fol
failure
o f t h e
flight control system
7/24/2019 Concorde - Crowood.pdf
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/concorde-crowoodpdf 82/103
DEATH ND DISASTER
DE TII ND DISASTER
SECTIONTHROUGH
BOGIEPIVOT POINT
]j lei
• That Air
France
shoud improve theemergencyprocedures
in
theConcorde O
tons Manual
indealng with emergencies.
•
That
Air
France should
instal
enginedata recorders
thatmonitored their
par
ters everysecond; this dd not applyto British Airways Concordes which already
such
a
system instaled.
• That t he
FAA
should carry
out
a fu l a u dit
on
Contnental Airlnes and its sub
tractors concerning the applcation and adherence to maintenance proced
• Thatthe manufacturers
and
airworthiness authorities shoud improve theana
coverng t he
functoning of
the aircraft systems and improve the
correctve a
response.
•
Thatthe IACO shoud
confrm
dates
for the installation
of videorecorders on
b
aircraft undertaking publc transportflghts.
•
Thatthe DGAC and
otherregulatory
bodiesshoud institute
a
programme to
in
externalviewers
so
that
crewscould observe hidden parts
of
the
airframe for
age
or other problems.
• Thatthe same organizaton shoud improve the sweeping and colectionof deb
and from airfields within France either
by regulaton orby agreement
with the
vantorganizatons.
• Thatthe IACO in
conjuncton
with
manufacturers
and
other
authorities shoud
up the proposals
and implement
them
to
identify
al
knowndangerous substa
aboard eachtype o fcivi a ircra ft.
•
Thatthe DGAC shoud carry out
further
investigations and
regulaton
concernin
craft
tyres and
their conformity to requirements.
•
That t he DGAC shoud undertake an
audit
of
Air
France
Concorde operatons
maintenance procedures.
The
recommendatons
specifc
to Concorde
operaton
as recommended
by
the
and
supported by
AAIB
included:
A
The BEA Final Crash Report
At the tme
of t he
crash
the aircraft
possessed avald Certificate
of
Airworthiness, and
the captain s andthe first
engineers
documentaton
and
certificationwere
up
to
date;
however,the
first
officers lcence became invald after 8July 2000. Thespacer in the
left-hand landing-gear
boge
was
not reinstaled durng
its replacement
on 7 July
2000; however,
its
omission dd
notc ontribute
tothe crash. As regardsthe paperwork,
the aircraft had
no
outstanding acceptable deferred defects
and
the Concorde
was
operatng
within
lmits. Although the al-up weight wasover by 1 ton, the effect
on
take-off performance
was
neglgible. Durng take-off, after reaching V tyre NO 2 was
cut by
a
metallic
striplying
on the runway;
this had come
from
a
DC-10
which
had
departed 5m in earer. Ths
strip hadbeen
replaced
at
Tel Aviv
and laterat
Houston. In
the latter casethe manufacturers instructions had not beenheeded. Damaged
sectons
of t yre and NO 5 fuel tank
were
found on t he runway; t hep ece of tyre had set
up
a
hydrodynamic pressure surge in thefuel
which had
t hen f orcedf uelout on
to
the run
way.The
f uel was
then ignited,
probably
by electrical
sparks. The fames
were report
ed tothe crew
by
the air traffic controler;their responsewas to shut
down
NO 2
engine.
Further problems
were
experenced
with
both left-hand engines, which included surg
ing.
Although
theConcordewas travel ng forward
slowly,
its speed and height
were
diminishing
as problems
were
beng experenced
with
the
retractng
of
the
undercar
rage.
Ths hadbeen
traced
t ot he incomplete
opening of
the left-hand main-gear
door
which stopped the gearcyclng through. With the fnal loss of thrust to NO engine,
the aircraft adopted a pronouncedangle of attack and
rol
attitude. Theloss of thrust
to
Nos 3and 4
engines
was
traced
to a
delberate
retardatonof
the throttles
and
surg
ingcaused by
excessve
airflow disrupton;
however,
its effect
wast o
reduce
the
rate
o fro l.At the point
of
impact the aircraft was travelng forward,below safespeed,was
losing
altitude andhad
almost leveled
out. On contact with theground, a buiding was
destroyed
and
thewreckage consumed in
a
violent
fre.
The
investigators
concluded
that,
even
if
the engines had been
operatng
norm aly, t hedam age to the
aircrafts
structure
and
systems would h av e l e d t o t h e
eventual
destructon of the Concorde.
The probable causes weredetermined as starting
with
thehigh-speed impactof NO 2
tyre
with ametal strip
on the runway,
which
led
to itsdestructon.
Ths led
to
thepunc
turn g o f
NO 5 fuel tank
which, in conjuncton with
thehydrodynamic forces
imparted
uponthe fuel. caused a
massve
leak. Ths
in turnwas
ignited by either
an
electrical
arcfrom a damaged loomin the undercarrage bayor contact
with
the hot part sof t he
engine, orbot h. Ths ledt o a sheet of f am e
streaming
behind the aircraft, which, in
turn, causedmassve damage
to
the
structure and
the systems in the
wing
pus
a
severe
loss
of
thrust fromNos 1and 2engnes. Althoughnot a prmary cause
of
the accident,
the
impossibility
of
retractng the undercarrage
and
its
assistance
in retaining
and
sta
b i zing of t he f am e st ream p ayed a significant part.
T his general head-on view of
the
main undercarriage bogie
mount
showsthe location
o fth e
missing spacer
that was thought at first to have contributed to th e events that overtookSierraCharl ie. Althoughnot directly
responsible,i t did callinto question some of the engineering practices applied to the French Concorde
fleet. BBAColecton
Aseach stage
the
investigation report was
released itwasgreeted by mediaspeculation
most which wasill-inFormed. GivenCon-
c a rd e s s aFety rec o rd in c o mp a ris on with
other
civil airliners it had always been the
intention ir
France and BritishAirways
t o r et ur n t h ei r Concorde fleets to service.
The
First
part th is p ro ce ss was to c o ns u lt
with
the
twoair accident boards plus senior
representatives from
the
manuFacturers.
AFter a series meetings running in paral
lel with the investigations the interested
Returning to Service
the
aircraFt angle
attack
and
bank
to
increase beyond the aircraFt s flight enve-
lope parameters. This then c au se d a th rus t
drag imbalance which coupled to the
asymmetric thrust
the
two re ma in in g
engines pushed the aircraFt right over so
that it was travelling
at
righ t a ng les to the
ground.
Now
totallyoutside the designpara
meters
the
remaining two engines
Nos
3
and
4
then
experienced
uncommanded
shut-downs due toslipstream distortion into
the engine intakes.
Now
totally
out
con-
trol
the
airliner crashed.
The
o n ly a rea
investigation
t hat t he
British and the Frenchcould not agree upon
was the source
the Fires
Three
points
ig nition were ide ntiFie d: e lec tric al
hot
engine contact or contact
with
the
emis
sions From the air vent in the undercarriage
bay The last was thoroughlyexamined by a
team from
B e
Systems who conclusively
proved
t ha t t he v en t
was
n ot t he
source
since the emissionswere not ho t enough to
ignite any fuel whateverits then condition.
This leFt
the BEA investigators and their
British counterparts to lookmore closely
at
theother two possibilities. They pelformed
a simulation
that
would mimic as closely as
possible
the
behaviour
a large object strik
ing a large flat sUlface and
its subsequent
aFter-effects. This simulation showed that
the s ki n p an el s uf fe re d a s ev er e b e nd i ng
moment which caused a hydrauliccycling
efFectinside
the
fuel tank.
Thisthen
caused
the motion the fuel tosplit the inner tank
skin open Followed bya rupture to the outer
skin. Hydraulic pressure acting
o n t he
fuel
F or ce d i t t h ro ug h
the
r up tu re w he re i t
swirled into a vaporousstate. Furthertesting
prove
that
the original source ignition
was electrical this being supplemented by
morefuel s igniting
on
a
hot
engine sLilface
Yet again the missing bogie bearing spacer
was Fou nd to h a ve h a d no effect on events.
SPAR52
REAR
SENSING
ELEMENT
RIB22 RIB23A
RIBt
RIB25A
\ \ \
R I ~
\ R IB 26 A R I B2 7
~ 1 B 4 f l 7 . . 7 f } K ? 7 M ~ ~ . , 1
RIB21
\
S P A R B ~ ~ l f 7
illustrates the fire-detection system fitted in th e port engine nacelle the
rboard was similarl. This system informed the crew about a spurious fire in NO.2
in reality,
the
fire
was
in
the
wing
tank
which had
no
detector system.
ENGINE 1 3
OPPOSITE SIDE IN BRACKETS
CENTRAL
SENSING
ELEMENT
structure surrounding No.5 fuel
tankwas
quiteclosely
spaced,
imparting great
in
that region;however, it was unable
to
restrain the hydraulicallyejected
venting into
the
airflow. BBA
Coect on
75
753
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DE TII
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DE T II ND
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that although each
a irfra me s e c tio
constructed on jigs each Concord
virtually hand built. Modifications
French
Concordes
were
undertaken
A i r France m ai nt enance d iv is i on
assigned a team of twenty-five to th
who firs t lo ok e d a fter
the
stored ai
beforemoving
on
to incorporating
the
ifications.
When
this programme wa
geared up over a hundred engineers
assigned
to
it
augmented
by thirty
s
metal workers drawn from Orly
Le
B
and
Riossy who werespecificallyassig
the
fuel tanks.
Three engine techni
werealso
seconded
aswere teamsfro
av ion ics and m echani cal worksho
undertake component
overhauls. I
background
the
logisticsbranch also j
in their ro le b e in g to oversee purch
and warehousesupplies. After the mod
tionswerecompleted
on
each aircraft
inspected by
the
Direction
Gcncra
l Aviation and the Civil Aviation Au
ty beforebeing certified for return tose
F BVFC
.
T
..
and
its
engineers
were
beginning to mod-
ify
Concorde
G BOAF
Alpha Foxtrot.
A lt ho ug h t he
m odi f ica ti ons t o
the
hydraulic
and
electrical systems went with
out
a hitch there were someproblemswith
the installation o f t h e Ke vla r m a ts in the
fueltanks.
These
hadbeen manufactured by
using
the
original drawings; however
when
the time came to ins tall them they would
not fit. Afterdouble-checking the drawings
and
t hen t he
given measurements against
the intemal structure ofAlpha Foxtrot the
engineers found
that there
were discrepan
cies.
Th e
d e cis io n was ta k en to u n de rtak e
s imilar c h ec k s with
the
remainder
of the
British Airways fleet. These too revealed
that
the intemalstructure
of
each tank floor
was m arg in ally d iffe re nt. A re qu es t to Air
France to undertake similar checksshowed
a similar situation and th us it was d e cid ed
that
each
o f t h e
remaining aircraft would
n e ed to b e in div id ua lly m ea s ure d to e n su re
an accurate fit
of
the Kevlar mats.
The
con-
clusiondrawn from theseinvestigations was
I • • • • • • •
RIGHr
As
well
as theimpounding stickers theair-
portauthoritiesplaceda tailsupportunderthe rear
fuselageto protectthe airframefromaccidental
damage. Justn
Cederholm
ABOVE: Afterthe Concorde crash inJuly
2000
all
others
were
groundedand impounded.This is
F BVFC complete
with
impoundstickersover
thedoorsand windows. Justn
Cederholm
looms.
The
total modification cost was ini
tially estimated at £l7 m illion for e a ch a ir
craft added to w hi ch BA h ad d ec id ed t o
refurbish
the
interiors
of
their Concordes for
a further £l4 million.
While the
interested
p a rties were d isc us sin g the modification
programmeand itsrequirements
oneof
the
impounded
Air
France
Concordes
was
flown home from JFK. This machine F-
BVFC had completed a transatlantic flight
to
theUSA
and was waiting to return when
Sierra Charlie crashed. To allow the aircraft
t o l ea ve
the USA
a s pe ci al l ic en ce w as
authorized to covera single flight although
only
the
c rew were a llo we d to trav el p as
sengerswere strictly forbidden. This would
be the last flight for several months.
It would
not
beuntil 8 January2001
that
Air France Concorde F-BVFB left Charles
de Gaulle airport for a short l ight to Istres.
Herethe
aircraft
underwent
fuel-flow
and
d isp e rs ion tria ls in
advance of
a
return to
service. While the French authorities were
undertaking
their checks British Airways
parties produced a blueprint for action
that
allowed
Concorde
to resume revenue oper
ations.
The
mainareashighlighted for mod
ification included
the
fue l ta nk s and the
structure surrounding
the
undercarriage
bays plus the adding of further protection to
any pipework
and
electrical looms.
The
pri
maryform
of
protectionchosen for
the
mod
ification programme wasKevlar a synthetic
fib re d e ve lop e d b y Dupont d e Ne mo u rs
manufactured into specially shaped panels.
K ev la r h ad b ee n c ho se n s in ce i t h as g re at
resistance to high-speed impacts from hard
objects and thus is d ifficu lt to p e ne trate .
The
h y dra ulic s ys tem p ipe lin e s wou ld b e
further protected by fitting reinforced con
d ui t s o ve r t he m a nd s imilar p rote c tio n
wou ld b e a p plied to
the
vulner<lble wiring
ABOVE: Duringthe modificationprocess many of
Concorde smain components such as theengines
andthe majorityof the wing accesspanels were
removed.
Courtesy Britsh
Airways
view s h ow s a BA engineerfi tting oneof theimpregnatedmatsin thefuel tanks.
modification
was
requiredto
allow
a
new
Certificateof Airworthiness
be
issued.
Courtesy Britsh Airways
75
755
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DEATH N DISASTER
DEATH
N IS STER
on the ramp. More thorough inspe
and maintenance needed hangar sp
carry out. These s ta rted with a
Che
carried
out v ry
210hr a nd consist
preset checksplusany special requirem
Check Bwasto becarried out
v ry
4
ing hours and required a preset gro
c he ck s pl us a ny s pe ci al r eq ui re m
Check
C was
to
be carried
out v ry
flying hours and followed a similar
p
to the
two previousinspections. After
flying hours Check was mad e
required greater in depth inspection
maintenance again plusany specialre
ments.
The
final
maintenance
requir
was
Check 0 or
a major overhaul.
required the a ircraf t to b e g ro un de
about a y ea r and was required after 1
flying hours. As part
of
this the Con
wasstripped
of
most
of
itsoperational e
ment which
was
then sent to the re
contractors for a full rework. Once th
frame was in effect empty i twasto b
jected to full inspections repairsand
fications plus extensive non destr
testing for cracks
and other
defects.
the
ailframe
had
been virtually rebu
systems components would be reins
a nd t he aircraft subjected to extensiv
flight testing.
While the
airframewas
overhauled the e ng in es wou ld b e
hauled
either
by Rolls Royce and
S
MA
on
behalfof British Airways whi
Air France ones were refurbished und
guidance
of
the Air France industrial
ticsbranch.
British Airways.
This started with
a p re -
flight
check
before
v ry scheduled depar-
ture
followed by a d ai ly
check covering
routine operat ions and inspections v ry
24hr both
of
w hic h c ould be carried out
After
633
flying hours.Concorde 101 G AXDN was retired tothe ImperialWar
Museumat Duxford Cambridgeshire
on 20
August
1975 BBA Colecton
A New Servicing Regime
Support ing the modificat ion
programme
was
an improved servic ing schedule to
be
fully
adopted
by
b ot h A ir France and
BA Concorde G BOAAwas one two airframesnotsubjectto themodification programme; it thus remained
instoreat Heathrow. BBA
Colecton
Theprimary modificationappliedto the
remainingConcordesin ordertoreturn
them to service included instal ling Kevlar
l iningsinthe fueltanks as shown here.
BBA
Colecton
• UNMODIFIED T NKS
D
MODIFIED
T NKS
Aftera successful post modification testfl ight. F BVFC landsat Charles de Gaulleairport. Bernard Chares
156
157
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DEATH
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DISASTER
E TII N IS STER
•
0
I
.•..
1
Picturedat Fil ton awaiting maintenancewas BAConcorde G BOAD which underwent post crash
modificationat Heathrowand returnedto revenueservicein September 2001 SSA Colecton
de AlphaBravois theotherairframenot modified;
it
tooremained atHeathrow
SSA Colecton
Training
final aspec t of re tu rni ng Concorde
service
concerned
the training
of
the
ami
cabin
c r ew s . Fo r
Air
France
s m eant
that
twelve captains eleven
t officers and el even flight engineers
continuation training while Con-
was grounded.
Unlike
British Air-
Air
France c r e ws w e re
hired on
a
yearly basis from the general pool of
airline s crews. The training undertak-
keep up to
date
in relat ion to
Con-
each crew
to fly 4hrof
group
simulatortraining comprising
three
take-
offs
and
landings.
Further
flight
simulator
missionswere required toensure crewtype
rating currency. When
Concorde
was
beingclearedforserviceafter modification
the
crews
undertooktechnical
verification
flights followed by non commercial train-
ing flights. Supporting these flights were
additional simulator missions and ground
classroom training.
The Concorde cabincrewswereseventy
six strong rostered as r e qu ire d to cover
e ac h c om me rc ia l f li gh t. E ac h c ab i n c re w
m e mb e r n e e de d to h a ve
at
least three years
experience and pursers needed
at
least three
years seniorityin postbeforebeing consid
ered for Concorde. A ll c a bin s taf f w a n tin g
to fly on Concorde were required t o have
excellent
English
and
a second foreign
language.
Once chosen
f or tr a in in g th ey
were cleared only when the deciding com
mitteehad interviewed them indepth. This
committee comprised seven instructors six
female and
nine
male pursers plus others
drawn from twenty-six female and twenty
s e ve n m a le f lig ht attendants a ll w it h a n
averageage of 32 and eitherthen serving or
recently retired
Concorde
cabin crew. The
training
o f t he
cabin c re w i nv ol ve d t wo
courses: a safety course followed
by
a th r ee
day marketing course. The first consisted of
a n i nt en si ve t he or et i ca l s ec ti on d ea l in g
w ith s af ety e q uip m en t s af ety in str u ction
presentation and
features specific to
Con-
corde. This was followed
by
a practical part
covering evacuation procedures the testing
of
equipment such as fireextinguishers and
oxygen masks plusa familiarization briefing
covering Concorde and itson-board equip
ment handling. The marketing course was
h e ld in
the
in-flightservices school and was
attended
by those
cabin
crew
who
had
passed the Concorde course. This course
coveredcust omer profiling interaction with
flight crews and ground staff the Concorde
lounge
at
Charles
de
Gaulle airport briefing
preparation product promotion in-flight
catering plus for the pursers cabin man
agement. After the Concorde crash cabin
staffundertook c<lbin simulmor training to
familiarize themselves with the situations
that
couldbe
encountered
in flight.
Maintenance and
Modifications
When the Air France Concorde fleet was
grounded after revocation
of
their Certifi
cates
of
Airworthiness
the
airline began
a s e qu e nc e of maintenance checks that
included running the engines and systems
every fifteen days. In parallel with the air
frame modifications
the
tyre manufacturers
Mic he lin w er e u n de r tak in g develop
work on a new tyre known
as
theNear
Growth Tyre that would be resistant t
kind of failure that h a d a ff lic ted S
Charlie. The f ir st two a irc r af t to r e tu
serviceswere
sent
to Istres for trials wo
BVFB was used from 8 January to 3 F
a ry 2 0 0 1 f or a e ro d yn a mic c h ec k s on
leakage and dispersal and F-BTSDwas
f or Mich e lin tyr e tr ia ls f ro m 7 April
May. An extensive series of tax i a n d f
te sts w e r e ta k e n to p r ov e the validity o
n e w typ e and to reinforce the data ga
from
the development
programme in
laboratory. On 8 June t he trials ended
weredeclared a success.
Modifications continued apace on A
Foxt rot w it h t he a i rc raf t begi nni ng
atug attached by a towing armto the aircraft Concorde G BOAC ismoved fromtheramp Afterthe
h modificationshadbeenmade theaircraftreturned toservice on July 2002 SSA Colecton
After
it
had flown nearly 13 000hr ir France F BTSD was deliveredin June2003 tothe museumat
Le
Bourget SSA Colecton
7 8
7 9
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DEATH
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DISASTER
DEATH
N
IS STER
Optimism
Restored
While the aircraft were undergoing mo
fications
the
public relations
departme
of
each airline w as a ls o l i mb er i ng u p
modify the public perception ofthe type
asafe
and
fast mode
of
transport now
ev
safer to fly in
than
b ef o re . To th is end
massive worldwide consulta tion and m
keting
e x er c is e w as
under taken whi
wouldask justone question: Do ournorm
Spar 72; applied to the rearspar this mo
fication was carried out on all the aircra
whether
c r ac ks h a d b e en detected
or
n
FR N E
retention cablefrom
the
undercarriage and
the reprofiling of deflectors to accommo-
datethe changed tyreprofiles. A modifica
tion was alsorequired to
the
anti-skid pro
toc ol s t o t ak e note
of
the changed
mainwheel tyres
and
a f lat- ty r e
detector
s ys tem w as a ls o r e qu ire d .
This
detection
s ys tem w as d e fin ed as a
NOGO
item
s ho ul d i t f ai l i n o pe ra t io n.
One
further
change w as ins isted u p on in
the
aircraft s
operating procedures concerning the oper
ation ofthe
brake-cooling fans which were
to b e s w itc he d o f f d u r in g the take-off and
the landing phase. While both Concorde
fleetswere safely in
their
hangars
the
oppor
tu n ity w as a ls o ta ke n to incorporate Mod
With i tsnose still drooped ir France Concorde F BVFA speedspast the camera; it hassincebeen
deliveredto theSmithsonianInstitutein Washington DC Bernard Chares
Wearingthe ChathamDockyardflag on itsfin BA ConcordeG BOAC roarsofffrom Heathrow its undercarriage
units retracting quickly.
BBA
Colecton
Airways decided
that
its restart
date
would
beslightly earlier inOctober.
The
mandatory modifications required
toallow
Concorde
back into
the
air includ
ed the fitting of the Kev1ar linings
of
Michelin Near Zero Growth Tyres instead
of
the normal type and
the
protectionand
reinforcement of the hydraulic pipelines
and electrical looms. Each of the mats was
saturated with Viton a waterproof sealant
developed specifically for Kevlar.
The
new
eyre w as m a de f ro m c o mp o site m a te r ia ls
that
d e fla te in s u c h a
manner
as to protect
other parts
of
the undercarriage. Secondary
modifications also declared
as
mandatory
included removal
o f t he
water-deflection
and i ts F r en ch e qu i va le nt t he DGAC
undertooka thorough
r v w
of the
modifi
cations proposed
by
the manufacturers.
On
5 September
2 1 the
authorities jointly
issued a mandatory airworthiness directive
that
allowedeach Concorde toreturn toser
vi e
and regain itsCertificate
of
Airworthi
ness as each completed the modification
process independent inspection and sign
ing off.
With the
paperworktrail beingcom
p lete d e a c h a irline m ad e p lan s to restart
supersonic commercial flying. Air France
o p te d f o r a r e sta rt in Novemberand British
British
airways
both subsonic
and
supersonic speeds
the
Concorde
turned back
and
landed
at
RAF
Brize Norton A s er ie s of intensive post
flight inspections were concluded success
fully
The
aircraft left three d ay s la te r f or
another verification flight after which it
landed backat Heathrow.
During
the
following August and Sep
tember the final piecesof information need
ed
to
return
Concorde to
revenue-earning
servicewereappearing. BothAir France and
British Airways crewswere taking refresher
courses in the
simulator while
the CAA
G · . i . ~
j-
trials
at Heathrowon
4 July.
On
17
July
the
same
machine
left
on
itsmuch anticipated
testflight. Aboard for this momentous flight
were Capt Jock Reid acting
as
an observer
on
behalf of
the
ivil Aviation Authority
and
Capt
Mike Bannister the senior Con-
cordepilot
for
BritishAirways.
The
purpose
of the
flight was to s imu late a c o mp le te
tr a ns a tla ntic f lig ht to s ee h o w the n e w lin
ers and th e ir w eig ht w ou ld a ff ec t the air
craft s behaviour and trim. Itwasalsoimpor
tant to s e e h o w w ell the fuel acted as a heat
sink. Having flown out over the Atlantic at
With i tsvisor fully retracted BAConcordeAlpha Echotaxiestowardsthe runway atHeathrow. It re entered
servicein September 2001 alongside Alpha Delta. BBA Colecton
Thisalmost head on view shows graphicallythevisorand itslocationwhen retracted.BA Concorde
G BOAF would be the first post crashmodifiedaircraftto re enterservice in July
2001 BBA
Colecton
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161
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DEATH
N
IS STER
AF
Concorde
F-BVFC flies
pastthecamera on its
way
to the USA FoxtrotCharlie subsequentlywent to i ts
Toulouse birthplace
for
display
B B A C ol ec ton
i tems were covered in
protective
plastic
coverings, each identified by t he Con
corde logo baggage tag.
At
each destina
tion
the
baggage was pushed through cus
toms to expedite formalities. As Concorde
passengers had paid overthe oddsfor their
tickets
they
were granted yet
other
privi
leges.
These
includedexclusive lounges
at
each destination airport
that
at Charles
deGaulle being the airside l Espace lounge
in
Terminal
2A where passengers were
granted a full-length view of their aircraft
and direct access to it. Passenger transfer
wasalso expedited
at
both Paris and New
York; at the fonner a courtesy taxi service
was offered and at the la tte r a limousine
was provided.
Althoughthe fares charged
by Air
France
to its Concorde passengers might seem
E T II N
IS STER
between Par is and New York, although
they had to travel together over both legs.
Before relaunching their Concorde ser
vice, Air France released some interesting
statistics
conceming
their passenger break
down: two-thirds travelled on business, of
whom 80 per cent were male.
The
clientele
by nat ion inc luded 50 per
cent
from the
USA while of the remainder 48 per cent
were French.
Other
facts released included
the information that most Concorde pas
sengers
flew
on the aircraft a minimum
of
four times a year, anda substantial number
travelledalmost monthly.
Other
benefitsfor
Air France passengers include a frequent
flyer programme which allowed passengers
to accrue credits for each supersonic flight;
togaina free round-tripConcorde ticket a
passenger needed to amass 160,000 miles.
ailframes through a complete rebu
Dur ing th is per iod i t
was
estimate
each Concorde would complete
8,500supersonic cycles. While taki
in
the modification development p
British Airways would also undert
investigationinto extending theirfle
to
complete
at
least 10,500cycles. H
programme been done, the airline e
ed that Concorde would retire be
2015 and 2018, by whichtime the air
would beforty or more years old. Alt
these p lans in
the
e nd c ame t o n
British Airways was hoping that a
fac tu re r o r conso r tium would prod
oncorde replacement. But on 10
3 Air France and BritishAirways
a joint statement that they would d
tinue Concorde operationsduring th
French
Cuisine
in
the Skies
To celebrate the
return
of the Air FranceConcorde fleet to
service.the
airline
engaged
a wel-known
chef
pus Ph i p p e Faure-Brae world sommeler champion
of
1992 to
create
something extra special.
Their creaton
covered two distinct menus one for AF002 the
flight
from
New
York
and onef or AF001 the
Pars departure.
The
New
York menubegan with champagne
and
cavar this beng folowed
by
a
choice
of hors
d oeuvre
consistng of lobster with
baby vegetables or
pate de foie
gras in port aspic bothbe ng
accompanied by
fresh
garden salad.
The
man courses offered included panned tenderloin steak served
with
celery
puree pus
eggplant
ratatouillewith oyster mushroomsand
o l v e o i ;
the alter
natve was
turban
of
soe garnished
with
blackolve puree
with vegetable
confit and
cheese
raviol.
both served
with a
medley
of
vegetables. Passengers
were
then
offered
a selecton of
fne
cheeses
and
a fresh fruit platter of
melons
mangoes and strawber
res. Shoud t here be a smal
spot
requirng further
nourshment
thecabin crew coud
offer
chocolate
eclairs
strawberry andcoconut
tartlet
or ava ni a macaroon.
As
the
departure
f rom Pars wasscheduled t o
arrve
at
breakfasttme
in
New
York
the
menu
was
adjusted
accordingly. For openers. passengers
were
served
petals
of
mango and kiwi fruit
garnished
with red fruits. Ths would
be
folowed
by
a
choice
of
hot orcod dishes whichfeatured t hechef s
special;
this comprsed scrambled eggs
with
truffles
and
me da lo n s o fMa in e lo bster served
with
creamed white morels. To
caterfor vegetarans
therewas
ahotpotof a tmbaleof
polenta
with a
medley
of
sprng
vegetables.
There
wasalso
a
gourmet
platter
of f oie
grasmarbled with truffles gar
nished with Bordeaux-nfusedaspic. A fnal mea offered was a seafood platter con
sisting oflayered
monkfsh truffle
and chanterele frcassee served with sauteed kng
prawns seasoned with paprka.
Supportng
t he m a n m e a
were a selecton of
French
regional
cheeses
and raspberry
tart. ganache-fi ed
gateauor
va ni a
macaroon.
Asthe menu was intended
as
a
gourmets
delght the wine list
was
intended tocom
plment
it.
ThusfromNovember 2 to January 2002the list
consisted
of Champagne
Cuvee Specale:Champagne Dom Pergnon1993 BourgogneBlanc Meursault 1er Cru
1996Laboure Ro Bourgogne Rouge
Nuits
Saint Georges
Les
Porets 1993
Antonin
Rode Bordeaux Rouge
Pomerol1996
Chateau
La
Crox Du Casse and Bordeaux Blanc
Liquoreux Sauternes
1er Grand Cru Casse 1994Chateau Reussec.
The
list from
Feb
ruary 2002 t o
March
2002
consisted
of Champagne Curvee
Speciale Krug
Grande
Cuvee. Bourgogne Blanc Chabls Grand Cru Les Clos 1997 Simonnet-Febvre Bour
gogne Rouge Vonay
1
er Cru Les
Tai epieds
1996 Bouchard Pere et F s. Bordeaux
Rouge Paui ac
Grand
Cru
Casse
Chateau
Ba ta ie y
1996
and
Bordeaux Blanc
Liquoreux Sauternes
1er Grand
Cru
Casse 1994Chateau Reussec.
Subsequent
wine
lists
consisted of
avariety
of
these wines and
contnued
until the Air
France
Concorde
fleet was withdrawn from service.
AF Concorde F·BVFF pictured justaftertake off from Paris This machinewas notgiventhe post crash
modifications andits fateis uncertain
BBA Colecton
oncorde passengers want
the
aircraft to
re tu rn to service and, even more impor
tantly,wouldthey wish to fly in it? Fortu
nately for the airlines
the
passengersvot ed
yes, and so
on
7
November
2001
the
two
despatched a Concorde each ostensibly
on
a
routine
flight, from
Charlesde Gaulle
and Heathrow. For Air France, getting
oncordebackinto the air and backas the
acknowledged leader o f t h e fleet was laid
down in a press release runningto fourteen
A4
pages in
October
2001; consisting
of
four sections, the press statement covered
the p lan to p resent Concorde to its pas
sengers,
the
revised training given to
the
flight
and thecab in
crew,
in-depth techni
cal modification assessments, and several
annexes coveringrelated matters. Much
of
the
information covered
the
bare facts,
although some were trumpeted more than
o the rs, such as pointing out
that
an AF
Concorde was
the
first aircraft
of
the day
from Europe to land in
the USA.
Flight
departure from Cha rl es d e Gau ll e o n its
scheduled service
toNew
York would sub
sequently be
at
10:30 instead
of 11
:OOhr
Thischangeenabled the aircraft to land at
JFK Airport at 8:20hr local time and thus
passengers would have more time to catch
internal flight
connections
plus
there
was
the added advantage in the reduction of
the previous long wai t
at
customs and
immigration.
The
re tu rn f ligh t lef t New
York
at 8:00hr
local
t ime and
was
sched·
uled to land at Paris at 17:45hr local
time; thisallowed passengers to depart on
162
prebooked flights to
at
least sixty major
cities within Europe.
Unlike other airline passengers, those
boarding Concorde wereallowed
to
choose
their
own seats, while
other
complimenta
ry and pre feren tia l services were a lso
offered, such
as
hotel booking, car rentals
and office and conference space
at
several
airports or centres. To speed theConcorde
passenger through to his or he r seat, there
were dedicated check-in desks at the
French and
the
American airports; this
allowed the passenger to check in 45min
before departure, instead of undergoing the
normal, interminable wait. Added to this,
experienced staffassisted
the
passenger in
any way possible, Baggage was also given
the special Concorde treatment; thus the
steep, the pricedid include the flight to Paris
from airports
within
Europe.
The
fares
charged at theAir France relaunch includ
ed a r ou nd t ri p Paris-New York-Paris for
8 000
euros/£5,509/ 8,621,
although
this
dropped to 6 600 euros/£4 545/ 7 I l3 if
the ticket were purchased four days before
departure.
Other
fares included travelling
one
way
in Concorde
with a return in first
c la ss subsonic for 9 280 euros/£6,390/
10,000 , whi lea s imi lar t r ip wi th a retu rn
in business class cost 8,274 euros/£5,697/
8,916. Asa bonus,a companion fare of 50
per
cent
of the original, full fare was avail·
able for anyoneaccompanying a passenger
travelling
on
a round-trip
Concorde ticket
Optimism
Dashed
In comple te contrast to the receptions
given t o t he aircraft in earlier years, the
simultaneous landings in
New
York were
greeted with tumultuous welcomes,
both
airlines deeming the flights successful.
A ft er r et ur ni ng t o t he ir n orma l f li gh t
schedule, the Concorde fleets settled back
in to thei r s tandard
pattern of operation.
Once the aircraft were flyingagain, the air
lines issued a jo in t s tatemen t that given
steady usage,
the
fleetswould remainin ser
viceuntil 2010, at which point it wouldbe
decided whether to replace Concorde with
acompletelynew buildtypeorpu t selected
163
The
statement concentrated upon th
son for the aircraft s retirement: the r
tion in passenger numbers since Con
had returned to service accompani
increasingcosts, which
meantthat th
was no longer economically viable
Francewas the first to withdraw Con
from revenue service inJune.
Before then however, British Ai
flew
the
usual Barbados flights, begi
on 26 July a nd e nd in g o n 3 0 Augu
well as the normaldaily runs to New
Ifthis were
not
enough, a final trip t
Royal
International AirTattoo
wasu
taken during 19-20 July, where many
an emot iona l last farewell t o t he
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DEATH AND DISASTER
CHAPTER NINE
into th utur
I R C R F T
B
\
I R C R F T
I
/ V\ TAKEOFF- HOLD
L SUBSONICCRUISE· APPROACH- LANDING
E R O D Y N M I C L1FT IDRAG RATIO
C U
IMPROVEMENT C H R T
C
IAIRCRAFT B
L
AIRCRAFT A
GA
ZEROCL IMBGRAD IENT0 . 77 3 .94
4.24
T KE OF F
SECONDSEGMENT
4.97
5.58
12
NOISEABATEMENT
I
ROCEDURE
6.00
7.38
23
b
P P R O C H 4.35 4,75
9.
HOLD AT 250KTS 10,000FT
c
9.27
13 1
41
SUBSONICCRUISE
AT
M= 0.93
11.47
12.92
12
F
UPERSONIC
610 ENGINE
>
NI
j.
CRUISE
7.
IS +
SOC
610ENGINE + 25
>
NI
7.69
From airframe 217 theConcordeproductionstandardwas scheduledto switch over
to the B designshown here, Unfortunately, manufacture stoppedat airframe
216
BBA Colecton
Really
th e
End?
Now that
Concorde
has finally reti red
from commercial service, wil l this be
the
e nd o f
supersonic fl ight for
transporting
passengers
around t he
globe)
The
first
attempt
to replace
or
extend
Concorde
was by
t he A nglo-French con
sortium.
Having
run
the
full
gam ut of
pro
totypes,
p r ep r od u ct io n a n d p r od uc t io n
m achi nes t o
deliver
no
more
than
twenty
airframes,
t h e n e x t
twoscheduled produc
tion machines
were identifiedas airframes
217
and
218.
These
were destined
to
be designated as
B
Concordes.
Changes
from
the
first
production
version included
extended
wingtip
outer
panels
and
leading-edge
flaps for
bet ter handli ng
at
lower speeds.
The
flaps were designed
to
beselectable in
three
positions: in
the
fully-up position
the
airframe was cleared for supersonic flight;
in
the
mid position
the
flaps
catered
for
subsonic cruising
and
the
initial
approach
to
an
airfield; in
the
fully-down position
the
flaps would be used only
during
take
off
and
landing.
This
version
never
ent ered product ion and
thus
No.
216 was
the
final airframe.
A l though t he
majority
o f t he
airlines
that
had expressed interest later cancelled
their options, leaving just British Airways
and
Air
France to fly
t he C oncorde
flag, a
further
contract
nearly came to frui tion.
This
was
the
interest expressed
by
Federal
Express for freight carrying.
Three
plus
crews were requi red from BA; however ,
contract
wrangles eventually ki lied
the
entire
deal.
This
left
the
handful
of
remain
ingwhite-tail Concordes lookingfor useful
employment
before their final acquisition
b y B A and
Air
France.
One
idea was to
use
at
least
one as
a supersonic flying test bed.
The
projected changes were regarded
as
minimal;
the
greatest
change
was
the
installation
of
canard wings
o n t h e
forward
fuselage for improved stabi li ty while
an
external
load was beingcarried
on
a pylon
under
the
fuselage.
This
was
i ntended t o
carry
e it he r a n
engine or
other
stores,
Afitting closing photograph forthis chapter isthat
of
F BTSC
blasting
away
fromthecamera
with
all
four burners lit. BBA Colecton
delta. Events
planned
for
the
BA
Con
corde fleet before
retirement
included a
visi t to
Toronto
on
1 October,
to
be fol
lowedby visits
to
Boston
on
8
O ct oberand
Washington
Dulles
on
14 October.
Once
the
North
American
t rip had
been com
pleted
one
aircraft was be used for a series
of
farewell flights around Britain
during
the
period
20-24 October taking
in Birm
ingham, Cardiff, Manchester, Belfast and
Edinburgh,
On
24
October
a Brit ish Air
ways
Concorde
landed
at H eathrow
after
returning
from
New
York,
shut dow n
its
engines,
a n d a n
eradrew
to
a close.
In a
not
unsurprising move, Sir Richard
Branson,founder
of
Virgin Atlantic, offered
to purchase
the
five remaining BA aircraft
for£5 million to
continue
operations,a mas
sive increase from
the
original offer
of
just
£5
However, his approaches were quickly
rebuffed by
the
chairman
of
BA,Lord Mar
shal l, who stated
that
Airbus Industries/
EADSwould be
ending
technical
support
allegedly
at
the
behest
of
British
Airways
inlate 2003, although AirFrancewerecited
as
t he m or e
likely
candidate
for
such
a
move.
The
withdrawal
of
technical aid
and
its
attendant
engineeringauthority support
would require
any
new
operat or t o
reap
ply for type
certification
with itsmassive
expense and
the
possibility
of
failure; this
c.Iifficulty
would becompounded
by
the
need
to
find
an engi neeri ngaut horit y and
sup
port organi zat i on. A l t hough t he chances
of
Virgin
Atlantic
taking
over
Concorde
operations
were looking increasingly slim,
Branson had
been
in
touch
with
the
BA
board
concerni ngt he
formation
of
a char
itable trustwhosesole
concern
would be
to
keep
one
or
two
of
these aircraft in semi
commercial service. To reinforce its
com
mitment
t o C o nc o r de
Virgin
Atlantic
promised to
donate
£1 million to
st art t he
ball rolling.
There
werestill problems
to
be
resolved
with
this plan,
although
British
Airwayshad expressed
an
interest in keep
ing
one airframe semi-active
for special
occas ions . However , a ll t hi s
ca me to
naught w hen
BA decided
to
dispose
o f t h e
entire
fleet
to
selected museums
around
the
world, thus
ending
any
speculation
about t he
future
of Concorde.
Disposalof the Air France and theBritish Airways Concorde Fleet
Air
France announced the disposal details for its Con the
major
cities.
Thus
on
20
October
2003
Birmingham
corde
fleet
before British
Airways.
On 12 June 2003 saw the famous delta G BoAC whilethe
following day
BVFA was f l own to Washington for display in the
Smith
Belfast was the venue with G BoAE visiting.
On
22
sonianMuseum.F BVFC
was
returned to its birthplace of October
Manchester was
visited b y G BoA G while
Toulouse
on
27 June
while F BVFB was promised
to the Cardiff International
followed
the
next day seeing
G
Auto und
Technik Museum at Sinsheim
Germany upon
BoAE touching down.
The final visit
was
made to
Edin
payment of
a
symbolic
Euro. Thefinal flyable aircraft
burgh
on 24 October by G BoAG. Just
prior
to 16:00
BTSD was
despatched to the museum
at
Le
Bourget
dur hours that afternoon the final
three
Concorde flights
ing
June
t o jo in the prototype F VVTSS The fate of the
were sighted inbound
to London Heathrow.
In
succes
final aircraft F BVFF is undecided although
as anunmod
sion G BoAF G BoAE and G BoAG
touched
down. At
ified airframe i t is l ike ly to
be
a
candidate
for scrapping. 16:05 hours on 24 October 2003
British
Airways
became
The
aircraftthat facedthe mostcomplicated journey just another airline.
The
Americas were not ignored
was F BVFB
which landed at Karlsruhe Baden Baden
either
as
earlierthat month
Toronto
Boston
andWash
on
24 June 2003.
However this
was
notthe
end
of
its ington
Dulles were graced
by the elegant
delta.
journey and
a
certain
amount of dismantling was Prior
to
the final flights
of
the BA Concordefleet
there
required so that the aircraft could continue first by was much speculation about its final disposal. There
ship then
by road
to Sinsheim. Even with the
outer was
talk about retaining onefor special flightsand air
wing panels removed
the roads
needed
modification to displays. However
financial realities
meant
that such a
road
signs
and
the
like
to allowthe
aircraft through.
The
plan was soon
scrapped
andthe
dispersal
plan was put
greatest difficulty that faced the museum was how to
into
place.
The
first aircraft to leave Heathrow was G
get
the
aircraft
off
its transportation ship. This
was
BOAC whichlanded
at
Manchesteron 31 October while
solved
by
theuse of
a
pair of
special cranes. Foxtrot G BoAG was
flown acrossthe Atlanticto
Seattle
for dis
Bravo finally
arrived
on
18
July
2003. play in
the
Museum of
Flight on 5 November.
On 10
There is one furthertwist in the Air FranceConcorde November G BoAD was
flowninto
JFK
Airport
for even
tale concerning
aircraft
F BVFC. I t was impounded on tual displayon
a
bargealongside the retiredcarrierUSS
the orders of
Judge
Christophe
Regnard
soon
after ntrepid A
weeklaterG BoAE
was
delivered
by
Captain
landing at Toulouse.
The reason
was an attempt
to
dis
Mike Bannister to
Grantley Adams
Airport in
the
prove the
thoroughly researched
BEA
crash rep or t and Bah amas .
The
final remaining flyable
Concorde
G BoAF
attempt
to
blame the accident on the absence of the landed at Filtonon 26 Novemberthis beingthe
last
ever
spacer
in
the left hand bogie. Findings of
a different Concorde
flight.
Of
the three remaining machines G
cause would
possibly
exonerate thetyre
manufacturer
BOAAis due
to goto the
Museum
ofFlight.
East
Fortune
Goodyear from legal responsibility. Scotland in
sectionswhere
itwill
be reassembled
while
Although Air
France
retired their Concordefleet with G Bo A B i s
slated
for display at Heathrow. The one
little fanfare British Airways decided
that
such
a
singu remainingaircraft
G BBGD
is scheduled to leave Filton
larevent
should
bemarked
with
more
ceremony. To this where it hasbeen used as
a spares
source for eventual
end
a
tour
of Britain
was organized that
encompassed
display at BrooklandsAir Museum.
764
765
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SST INTOT
FUTURE
SST INTOTHE FUTURE
New American
Interest
ATSF3
989
In
t he USA, cance ll at ion of t he
in
nous
SST
programme left
the
particip
c ompani es i n a
state of
limbo.
H
gained much data t h roughout t he
d
opment
programme
and
learned ho
to
apply it,
interest
in
an American
still lingered, even though no funds
available
to
pursue
the concept
furth
wou ld fal l to
NASA
to
pick up
the
baton
and
take i t fur the r as part o
Superson ic C ru ise Resea rch Pro
whi ch h ad s ta rt ed l if e as
the Adv
Supersonic Technology Program.
N ot e t he a ba n do nm en t o f
super
transport
in
order to
spare Congress
blushes.
This
project began in 197
ended in 1981 with
an
annual bud
between 12.5
and
17.2 million
£8
mill ion ) . In this per iod
NASA
dre
conclusion
that
there would be an
98
ATSF
wing layout
and mount ed
four engines.
Only
the ATSF
I
retained the
conceptof
engines
in nacelles ina similar
manner
to
Concorde. The other
two designs placed
the
engines
in
separate
pods
under
the
wings.
Changes
were a lso made
t o t he
engines
themselves:
gone
would be
the
pollution-generating Olympus
engines
to
be replaced by more efficient powerplants
t hat no t
onlyburned fuel moreefficiently
but
greatly reduced
the pol lut ion output .
Three
distinct
types
of
powerplanthave
been
under investigation by
the
Anglo
Frenchconsortium and
its
counterparts
in
the
USA,
all substantially different from
the
preceding Rolls-Royce Olympus and
its SNECMA
thrust
augmenter, as
the
studies
concentrated on
a
turbine
bypass
turbojet,
the
double bypass turbofan
and
t he t an de m
bypass, a proof-of-concept
engine
offering
both
a h ig h
and
a low
bypass mode.
978
ATSF
969
CONCORDE
1ERVOL
FIRST FLIGHT
;
EVOLUTION DES CONFIGURATIONS ETUDIEES
AEROSPATIALE ENTRE 1979-1989
HISTORYO CONFIGURATION STUDIES
T
AEROSPATIALE 1979-1989
Althoughattr ibuted to Aerospatiale.this diagramof projectedConcordereplacementshasbenefited greatly
from inputby British Aerospace.
Colecton
come as no
surprise
thatboth
were heavily
involved in
the development
of
a replace
ment
for Concorde. Although
Concorde
lB had seemed a distinctpossibility, in real
ity it was
no
more
than
a minor upgrade
of
the original. Therefore Airbus began to
des ign a new
SST
while drawing
o n t he
advances in
the
understanding
of
aerody
namic
behaviour gained since
Concorde
was designed.Added to this was
the
ability
to model
by
computernot
only
the
aircraft
designs themselves,
but
their behaviour in
flight before
either
models
or
prototypes
were built.All
the
designs were
much
larg
er
than
Concorde and
featured
engines
mounted
in a var iety
of
positions.
These
studies ran until 1989 before
the
funding
wasscaledback and
the
project
puton
hold,
although
the
studies
continued.
Before
being
scaled back, Airbus had prepared
three
designs
known
as
the ATSF 1,2 and
3 . All were based around a double -del ta
ABOVE: One ofthe first
proposalssuggested
forConcorde included
modifyingsomeof the
thensparewhitetails
foruse inthe high speed
freight role on behalf
of Federal Express.
Colecton
LEn: This diagram
il lustratesthecurrent
thinking atAirbusIndus-
tr ieconcerning areplace-
mentfor Concorde.
Whetherthis isfeasible
remainsto be seen.
Colecton
REAR
ELECTRONICS
O ~ O O ~ ~
SNAPHOOKS
ELECTRONICRACK
PROTECTIVE COVERS
REAR STREsseD
BULKHE D ACCESSDOOR
15.5FT
in
the United
Kingdom the British Air
craft Corporation became part
of
British
Aerospace, laterrenamedBritish Aerospace
Systems. In F ra nc e S ud Avi at io n h ad
evolved into Aerospatiale, before growing
into Airbus Industrie. Both organizations
wereheavilyinvolved in
the
design, manu
facture and production
of
numerous ver
sions
ofthe
Airbusrange and thus itshould
CABINLIGHTS
PITCH8FT
of
the
supersonic transport was
not
com
pletely dead. The situation in
theUSA
was
similar,while in Russia
the
indigenousaero
spaceindustry managed to resurrectits
SST
programme,al beit only briefly,
at the
behest
of NASA
and its partners
s Chapter 7
since
there was
no
funding available from
the
Russian
government
to
continue
any
flyingor development.
126FT
CABIN
SMOKE
DETECTORS
S
RESTRESSEO FlOOR
MOUNT INGPOINTS FORWARD
UNOERFLOOR
N OS E GE AR F RE IG HT H OL D
EMERGENCY
OPERATION
INDICATOR
C RRY ON
TOilET
RELOCATION
R\
UNDERC RRI GE
EMERGENCY
OPERATION
theconcept
slightlyf urther forward,
here were
sl
ight rumblings from
the M
in
stry
of
Defence concerning a heavily mod
fied version
of the Concorde
asa replace
ent
for
the
ageing Vulcan
B 2
bomber;
his wou ld have been known ,
not
unsur
risingly, as
the
Vulcan B.3.
Noneof
theseevermatured. But
the
pop
larity
ofCon
corde
meant
that the
concept
766
767
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SST INTOTH UTUR
SST
INTO
TH
UTUR
. :;;
available to
the
development team
werealso tasked
wi thcreatingmathem
models of thesematerials in order to
their useful servi e life and to plan m
ical trials
of
structuralsections,which
simulate long-term flight conditio
effects of fatigue.
It was during this phase
that
Boei
gested that
the
a i rl ine market wa
Pratt Whitney inconcert with General Electric were eventuallyto pooltheirknow
andresourcesto create themixed flow engine portrayedhere. swith many SST pr
itscontinued developmentwas inabeyance.
BB Colecton
standinghightemperatures and their associ
ated manufacturing techniques. The mate
rials under investigation included interme
diate temperature aluminium, aluminium/
lithium alloys, high temperature titanium
alloys, hightemperaturepolymers and com
posites, highertemperaturepolymers,metal
matrix composites and carbon/carboncom
posites. As high-powercomputers were now
all
ofwhich
wouldbe neededforsuchexot
ic disciplines
as
ceramics, intermetallicand
meta l mat r ix composi tes , a ll n eeded to
withstand
the
great temperatures
at
the
core of any engine . Ai rf r ame
contracts
were handed out to Boeing, Lockheed and
McDonnell Douglas, their role also being
to investigate the development and appli
ca ti on of
new materials capable
of
with-
ABOVE
Thisi l lustratesthe second stabthe USAmade atcreatingits
own SST
Much advanced development
work on
airframestructures andengines hadbeen
accomplished beforethe programme was cancelled.
BB
Colecton
NASA s
Plans
To further the development aims o f t he
HSR
programme NASA issued contractsto
cover specific areas
of
investigation.
The
most important of these went to General
Electric and Pratt Whitney,whoacted in
concert with
the
Lewis Center, under the
title
o f t h e
Enabling Propulsion Materials
Program. Their expertise was neededin the
fields of fibre analysis, fabrication of com
posites and structural analysis techniques,
reversed this decision and a recommended
restoration
o f t he
technology budget was
pushed through. Following this decision
NASA felt that enoughhad been achieved
for them to issue development contracts to
Boe ing and McDonne ll Douglas for the
design
of
a second-gene ra tion SST, to be
called the High Speed
ivil
Transport
HSCT .Three
years laterNASA upgrad
ed the programme and renamed it
the
High
Speed Research Program.
This
was seen as
an essential first buildingblock in the subse
quent development
of
a joint industry/
government high-speed ivil transport.
The
purpose
o f t he
exe rc ise was a imed more
towards environmental standards develop
ment, not to the furtherance of technology,
much o f whi ch was a lr ea dy c om in g t o
fruition. The threekey
environmental
areas
undergoing assessment
as
part of t he High
Speed Research HSR programme includ
ed the depletion
of
the ozonelayer by engine
exhaust emissions, airportand surrounding
community a rea noise , and the e ffec ts of
sonicboom. This last point required further
in-depth analysis since itscompulsory con
finement t o t he subsonic regime overland
would reduce a newaircraft s
economic vi -
bility.Within
NASA
fourseparate divisions
were involved: the Langley Research Cen-
ter in Virginia, the Lewis Flight
Center
in
Ohio,the
Dryden FlightResearch
Centerat
Edwards AFBand the Ames ResearchCen-
ter in California. Langley was charged with
the management of
the
entire programme,
as well as development work
on
aerody
namics, airframe materials and structures,
flight deck ergonomics plus aitframe/sys
tems integration. The Lewis
Center
(later
renamed
Glenn
was responsiblefor engine
and propulsion systems, and Ames and Dry
den wereresponsible forcovering any flight
test requirements. Joining the four
NASA
divisionswere teams from Boeing Aircraft,
McDonnell Douglas, Honeywell, General
Electricand Pratt Whitney.
-
-
Thesethreetypesof engine were
investigated by GeneralElectric and
Pratt Whitneyforthe new generation
SST
being sponsored by NASA.
BB Colecton
-
toge the r to inves tiga te a
j oi n t SST
pro
gramme, withNASA enteringduring 1980
to further the developmentof all possible
and potential technologies. All the partners
eventually agreed
that
a viable second-gen
eration
SST
cou ld be in service by 1990.
The joiningtogetherofMcDonnell Douglas
with British Aerospace was a continuation
of
an earliercollaboration
that
had involved
Rolls-Royce in
an
investigation
of
noise
reducinge ngine exhausts.The addition of a
government agency would end fairlyquick
ly since the administration
of
President
Reagan felt
that
therewould be few benefits
forthcoming and t hat t he funding could be
betterusedelsewhere. As ever in American
politics, persuasion and political muscle
BYPASSFLOW
CORE FLOW
SECONDARY
EXHAUST DUCT
HIGH BYPASS
VALVE
TANDEM FANCONCEPT
HIGH-BYPASS MODE
REMOTE
FRONTFAN
TURBINE-BYPASS
TURBOJET ENGINE
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DOUBLE-BYPASS
TURBOFAN ENGINE
FIRSTBYPASS
SECOND BYPASS AIR .........
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-
BYPASS
rde market
for
at
least
300
SSTs,
ially if t he US airlines could be per
t o t akea t leasthalf. While NASA
spearheading
the
SST
concept
on
lf of
government
the
aircraft manu
turers were also researching
their
own
ideas. Boeing came up w it h a project
around a blended-wing/fuselage
which derived itspropulsion from
le cycle engines,
and
Douglas
con-
n tr at ed on an aircraft based around a
wing, an idea that Lockheed were
so studying closely, although in
their
the
engineswere podded
and mount-
above and below the wing.
In the closing months of 1978 British
pace and McDonnell Douglas joined
168
169
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SST
INTOTH
FUTURE
SST I NT O
TH UTUR
oughpowerful computers canmodelmuch ofa projectedaircraft s behaviour it is
alto want to seethe resultsin reali ty. As currenttechniques now enable wind-
be
producedmore cheaply more
quickly
and moreaccurately
it
is
ibleto producechanges
within
days. CourtesyNASA
of
taking on an
economically
and environmentally acceptable
ersonic transport. However,
getting
e two aspects
to
ge l i n
one
airframe
ld be
the
difficult part,
and
therefore
manufacturers suggested a
joint
indus
working party to pushdevelop
further. The topics that cou ld be
with most easily included low-emis
n engines, noise suppressors, variable
high temperaturecom-
es, high-lift devices and t hei r
AFCS
ems, all
of which
werequickly achiev
le. Longer-term goals
o n w hi ch
some
earch had been
done
included
advance
i ne and
airframe
concepts laminar
control
improved
high temperature
and a c ompl et el y n ew i dea
thermal-stability fuels.
S in ce much
of
this technology was
ady well advanced,
NASA
decided to
ing forward Phase 2
of the H SR
pro
amme, which had been penci lled in for
6. But by 1993,
the
environment-based
P ha se 1 h ad b ee n c ompl et ed a nd
so the
technology phase
was
begun.
This was
a
joint
ventureand required
that
the wording
needed togain
the
appropriate Federal fund
ingplayed moreupon the positives
thanthe
negatives, thus much
was
made
of t he
eco
nomic benefits,
the
number
of
highly-paid
jobs
that
would becreatedand the improve
ment
in
the
industrial strength
of th e
nation. However,
the
slightly negative side
was
the
cost, estimated
at
4.5 billion,
which would beneeded before
the
aviation
industrycould
even
begin construction and
certification. As this was
an
era
of
political
and economic uncertainty, it was suggested
that
the
government
should cover most
of
the
development costs since the manufac
turers felt unable to contributeany funding
until
t he H SCT
wascloser to reality. It was
also stressed
that
as much
of t he
proposed
developments were high-risk, the manufac
turersand their subcontractors would have
to waitup to fifteenyearsbefore gainingany
financial reward for
their
efforts.
Although
Phase1
had been completed
relatively easily, it was recognized
that
the
three a reas p rimari ly involved in Phase 2
wou ld involve g reat r isk and d if ficu lty.
These
were ailframe technology, propulsion
and the ergonomics
of t he
flight deck.
The
airframe part was intended to bui ld upon
already available aerodynamic technolo
gies,
although
the goa ls were s t ringent in
theiroutline,these beinga33 per
cent
range
increasecoupled to a 50 per
cent
reduction
in
the
noise footprint
of
any new aircraft.
Alliedto
the
aerodynamics was thedesire to
develop
materials
and construction meth-
ods
that
could reduce
the
aircraft's basic
we ight by up to
40
per
cent even though
there
was still a
requirement
for
the
s tr uc - ,
tures to beable to withstand temperatures
up
to IS0°C
with a fatigue life
of
60,000
flying hours.
The
structure
o f a n
airframe
built
to these specifications would follow
many earlier ideas, based around compos
ite frames
and
ribs to whi ch wou ld b e
attached honeycomb
compositepanelling.
At t he poi n ts of grea t
hea t , such as
the
nose,
intake
lips
and
leading edges,
the
structure would be
titanium honeycomb-
based. Ina
change
fromprevious concepts
only formed
honeycomb
panels would be
used in
the manufactureof theouter
wing
panels, fin tip
and
rudder.
Unlike
Britain,
which
has only
one
pri
mary enginebuilder, thereare severalin
the
USA
and thus any collaboration between
the
major players was unusual. But
both
General Electric
and
Pratt
Whitney
soon
realized
that
to worktogether
on
suchapro
ject
cou ld only benef i t both , even i f
the
home-grown second-generation
SST
failed
to
movebeyond
the
drawing board. During
their collaboration
the
companies investi
gated materials capable
of
withstanding
temperatures up to
3 000°C
and
the
use
of
ceramic matrix and intermetallic compos
i te s in
t he ho tt e r
sections
o f t he
engine,
including
the exhaust
nozzle.
During December 1995 a single design
was chosen to be
the
focus
of
an intensive
technology drive
that
would
concentrate
all those involved in
the
programme for
the
next
three years.
The chosen
design
intend-
ed for use
as the
Technology
Concept
Air
c ra ft was based
on
a
concept
that
had
evolved from
the
earlier Boeingand Dou
glas HSCT designs.
This
would accommo
date 300
passengers, seated in three sepa
rate
compartments
travelling
at
a speed
of
Mac h 2.4 o ve r a d is ta nc e
of
5,000
miles
S,OOOkm . The
initial design
was
carried
out
on computers using extensive
mathematical modelling, followed by
the
wind tunnel testing
of
precision manufac
tured models.
This
kind
of
modelling,it was
postulated,wouldenable
the
design team
to
create
an
aircraft
of
superiorpetformance
to
satisfy
the
most stringent environmental
requirements.
Such concentrat ion
would
also allow
the
developers to narrow their
perspectives, thus as regards
the
engines,
two designs based
on
a modified turbofan
emerged:
the
mixed flow turbofan
and t he
fan on blade. In each case the a im was t o
reduce engine noise
on
take-off
and
land
ing.
This
would be ach ieved by mixing
ambient
air withengine exhaustgases.
This
inturn would lead
on to
researchinto mixer
ejector nozzles, which meant
t ha t t he
mixed flow turbofan was
chosen
as
the
pre
felTed powerplant. The use
of
any
engine
in
b ot h t he
subsonic and
the
supersonic
regime
is
alwaysa source
of
conflict andso
it
is
surprising
that
a mixed powerp lan t
arrangement was
not
investigated;
the
Concorde
designers had looked
at
this idea
but
hadshelved itdue
t o t he
projected air
f rame 's s ize. As
t he A merican
aitframe
wouldhave been larger, itwould havebeen
possible to build efficient, subsonic turbo
fans into
the
rear
ofthe
fuselage forusedur
ingtake-off, landing
and
overland cruising,
while
the
turbojets mounted externally
could have
been
used supersonically.
The
LEFr This is
an HSR
testshape
to be run intothe wind tunnel f
testing.Notethe useof tai lplan
althoughin thisinstance theen
areunderthe wingsnot under
tailplanes as inthe early Boe
model. CourtesyNASA
BELOW Thesame aircraftmode
from underneath;notethe eng
mountedto therear ofthe wing
CourtesyNASA
777
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SST
INTOTHE FUTURE
SST
INTOTHE FUTURE
ABOVE
NASAproposed the
XVS
eXternalVision System, as a moreadvance
meansof controll ingthe HSR aircraft.This would combine sensors and vis
aidsto replacethe cockpitwindows,the visorandthe droop nose. Remov
thelast
would allow
for
an
increasein payload.
Courtesy NASA
ABOVE
With
an
American dime
forscale purposes, thisis the
laminar-flow wing panel and
its micropores as installed
on theF-16Xltestaircraft.
Courtesy NASA
RIGHT
NASAF-16Xl, 8 8
in flight
with
the micropore
laminar-flowcontrolpanel
installed
on
theleadingedge
ofthe portwing.Although
the tr ialswere successful no
commercial applications have
yet appeared.
Courtesy NASA
through for purposes
of
comparison.
Other
potential hazards
of
flying above 35,000ft
10,700m), and rarely considered, are cos
m ic and sol arradiat ion. A s
the HSCT
was
i ntended t o operate
at
altitudes between
52,000and 70,000ft
l5,900-2l,300m the
hazardfrom
both
types
of
radiationwas mea
surably i ncreased and t hus
the
E-2R was
used
to
gatherdata for analysis.
A lso being exam i ned i n
depth
was
the
possibility
of
making laminar airflowa dis
tinct
reality.
This
version
ofthe
test aircraft
em pl oyed m icroholes i n w ing skins i n
the
a re as m os t s us ce pt ib le t o a ir fl ow t ur bu
lence.
Smoothing
t his t urbulent ai r w ould
r ed uc e s ki n f ri ct io n d ra g w hi ch in t ur n
would reduce operatingcosts sinceless
fuel
w ou ld b e n ee de d. T o t es t a l am in ar w in g
section inaction,
oneofthe
NASA
F-16XL
development
ai rcraft w as fit ted w it h a sec
tion
of
wing
and
flew trialsfrom
the NASA
Dryden Flight Research
Center
at
Edwards
AFB,California.
Whi le t he
more
conventional
SST,
capable
of opera ting
in
t he M ac h 2-3
ai rframe desi gners w ere also l ooki ng
at
new ways
of
doing
things;
one o f t h e
first
to
gain
their
attention
was
that
of
the
visu
al requirements
of
the pilots.
Concorde,
from i ts outset, had
been
beset by restric
tions
when
the
visor was fullyup,
andeven
with
the
bi gger cl ear panel s fi tt ed
to
the
production
aircraft the crew s visi on w as
restricted.
By contrast, NASA a nd t he
manufacturers
had
every
i n te n ti o n o f
eliminating
windscreens entirely.
In thei r
placewould be computer-aided vision sys
t ems w hose result s w oul d be di spl ayed
on
cockpit
screens.
Although
it was
accepted
that
such developments
would
need
ex
t ensi ve t esti ng for accuracy, safety
and
consistency,
the
saving i nw ei ght bydel et
ing
the
nose-droop
mechanism
was
thought
worthwhile.
This
would
have
al lowed for a sl ightl y l onger nose, w hich,
i n t urn, w oul d
have
reduced
the
airframe s
dragcoefficient.
To
t est t his t echnol ogy, t est flying w as
carried out during
1995-97
using a
NASA
B oei ng 737
and
a Westinghouse-owned
BAC-l i l
t est bed confi gured for avionics
test usage.
The
firsttrials involved
external
sensors capable
of detectingother
aircraft
and
major obstacles
o n t he
ground; these
were followed
by
flying approaches
and
l an di ng s w it h a f ul ly -e nc lo se d
cockpit
installedin the passenger
cabinofthe
Boe
ing.
The completion
of
thesetrialswas fol
lowedby
another
sequence
which
also used
the
B oeing, i n w hich
an
external vision
s ys te m, X VS , wa s f it te d
i nt o t he
main
p il ot s p an el . D ur in g t he se f li gh ts r ea l
w orld visual cues w ere compared i n
depth
with
the
display
on
the
X VS panel s.
Although
a few probl em s w ere experi
enced,being rectified as theyoccurred,
the
t ri als w eredeem ed a
complete
success and
convinced
all
the
design teams
that
the
windowless
cockpit
was more
than
feasible.
While
the technicaladvanceswerecom
ing thickand fast, scientific ones were also
happening apace. Special ists i n envi ron
mental studies were gathered from
allover
the
w orld t o devel op computer m odels
of
the
eart h s at mosphere and
the
effects
of
engi ne exhaust s
on
stratospheric ozone.
Although
computer m odel li ng coul d pre
d ic t s om e r es ul ts , r ea l r es ea rc h w as a ls o
needed.
Th is
took
the
form
oftheNASA E-
2R high altitude research aircraft, based
on
the
Lockheed
U-2R
reconnaissance plat
form.
This
long-spanned ailframewas ideal
for high altitude atmospheric samplingand
was also employed in sampling
the
atmos
pherebeforeand after Concordehad passed
ADVANTAGES
SYNTHETIC XVSRANGE OFVISION
LL
AIRFIELDS CAT
III
ADVERSE
WEATHEROPERATING CAPABILITY
UPTO 50 REDUCTION
IN
RESERVE FUEL
AKEOFFGROSS WEIGHTREDUCEDBY15 )
FIXEDNOSE RANGE OFVISION
DISADVANTAGES
1,500-2,000
L S
EXTRASTRUCTURE
AND SYSTEMS
DROOP NOSERANGEOF VISION
OVER20,000LBS INCREASE
IN
~ O W G ,
somediagrams to illustrate why anyfuture SST should have XVS fitted
eadof having to rely on thenormalvisualcuesfor thepilots.
Courtesy NASA
thisinstancethe
HSR
model isbeing used tofl ight-testthe
wing
and
so
the
anes andfin have been removed.
Courtesy NASA
172
173
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SST
INTOTH
FUTURE
SST INTO
TH FUTUR
tured landing atthe Zhukovsky DevelopmentCentre nearMoscow isthe Tu 144llflyinglaboratory
rcontractto NASAandinterested
US
aircraft manufacturers.
CourtesyNASA
e, wasbeing investigated, someeffort
also beingmadein researching
the
pos
of a Hyper soni c Nat ional Aero
ce Plane. A similar project (known
as
was also being investigated
by
i tish Aerospace in co-operation with
This
unique machine
was
ded to fly on theedgeof space. evel-
began in 1982and the project
was
sonably well advanced, with a detailed
ine design and mock-up, by t he t ime
British government stopped its funding
the mid-1980s. HOTOL would have
offhorizontally, with a transition to
re r oc ke t p ropu ls ion i n the Mach
speed range, followed
by
an ascent
to orbit . A moderat e r e- entry profi le
reased the thermal loading constraints
HOTOL re tu rn ed via a glide
oach to a landing on normal undercar
e unitson a
conventional
runway.
Redivivus
the
USA
was
pushing ahead
th a high-prof il e development pro
me, the Europeans wereforging ahead
larideas,albeitat a lower level [n
r ch 1989 the two origina l Concorde
nersmet in Toulouse on the
twentieth
versary of the type s first flight to dis
ss a possible collaborat ive project for a
d-generation European SST. Its ini
l costing was estimated at 10 million,
service entry in the early years of the
century. While these discussions were
being undertaken, the potential partners
were inves ti ga ti ng the ir own proje ct s.
Aerospatiale wereengaged upon the Avion
de Transport Supersonique Futur (ATSF),
which was i n tended to c ruis e between
Mach 2 and 2.5. Running parallel to this
programme
was the
Avion a
Grande
Vitesse,a hypersonic transport intended to
ope ra te between Mach 4 and British
Aerospace were investigat ing their own
machine,
known
as the Advanced Super
sonic Transport . Both companies took
their projects to the negotia t ing table in
May 1990, f rom which emerged a joint
declarationco ncerning the second-genera
tion aircraft.This agreement was extended
in Apr il 1994
when
Deutsche Aerospace
joined the partnership. The threepartners
declared their collaborat ive venture to be
the European Supersonic Research Pro
gramme.
The
outlinesketch ofthe aircraft
to replace Concorde
was
a Mach2-capable
aircraft which could carry 250 passengers,
seated
in
three classes, over 6,210 miles
(lO,OOOkm). At this point thepublic rela
tion
people stepped in todeclareoptimisti
cally thatthe potential market for such an
aircraft
was
between 500and 1,000units.
All this talk of European collaboration
seemed to worry the Americans,since they
invited the Europeans to a conference in
NewYorkin May1990. At this wererepre
sentatives from Boeing, McDonnell Dou
glas, Aerospatiale, British Aerospace and
DeutscheAerospace.The outcome
was
the
formationof a
joint
studygroupto createan
international , next-generation SST,
by
774
now named the Supersonic Commercial
Transport. The f irst inklings of i ts work
were unveiled during the September 1990
SBAC show a t Farnborough, when an
announcement was made concerning the
formation of two specialistworking groups:
the first would concern itselfwith the busi
ness practices needed for a collaborat i
project and the second would concentrate
on technical and marketingaspects.
During 1991 the Italian manufacturer
Alenia
Aeronautica,
the
Society of Japan
ese Aerospace Companies and the Tupo
lev Design Bureau joined the consortium.
Three years later, at a European confer
ence, delegatesfrom five ofthe companies
presented an overview i n which Ameri
c an , Eur opea n a nd other technologies
might be co-ordinated
in
a predevelop
ment phase, to be followed
by
a full-scale
development programme to last through
the 1990s.
While
much of this looked promising on
paper, the real progress
was
being made
by
NASA and its partners, who were actually
spendingmoney to push
the
technologyfor
the
HSCT
project. Leading the industry
side were Boeingand McDonnell Douglas,
who were operating under a 400 mill ion
NASA
contract
on theHSR Phase 2 tech
nologies. Honeywellweredealing with the
avionics and flight-deck development. [ t
was estimated
that
thefinal cost to
NASA
would r each 2 bil li on, with indus try s
contributions possibly reaching 4 billion.
The
upshot of this expenditure was that
the development of an actual aircraft was
pencil led in tobegin in 1995,with the first
del iver ie s to be made in 2001. To speed
some of the technologies already available,
NASA hired aTupolevTu-144Dairliner
as
a fly ing t es t bed . By August 1997 the
NASA
scientific teams were reporting that
the
critical, high-risk technologies were
coming close to fruitionand therefore that
the
HSR
programme should be progressed
to
its conclusion. In mid September 1998a
refocusing of t he H SR programme was
undertaken by
NASA
and its partners, in
that they would concentrate upon super
sonic research instead of pushing on with
technologies that would lead toa prototype
aircraft.
The
change was brought about by
the realization that the originaltechnolog
icaldevelopmentpath would not bringto a
culmination a viable aircraf t for deploy
ment
by
2010. There followed the complete
cessation of the whole programme
by
the
e nd o f
that
year. This had, i n par t, been
caused
by the
decision of Boeing (now
the
ownerof McDonnell Douglas) to
abandon
RIGHT: waiting
i tsnext researchtr ip isthe Tu 144ll
RA 17114 Hard by theportnose arethe entrance
stairs leadingto the flight deck. Courtesy
NASA
BELOW: Withthe localequivalent of
an
aircraft
tractorhooked tothe nose leg theTu 144ll is
moved towardsthe hangarfor furthermaintenance.
Althoughthe visorwas likened to a greenhouse
it faired intothenoseextremelywell. Courtesy
NASA
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SST
INTO
TilE
FUTURE
SST INTOTHE FUTURE
Radical Technologies
because
of
a d ve r se w ind conditions a
rescheduledfor J4 july,
when
it was bri
delayed again. The
test
m od el was t o
l au nc he d t o a n a lt it ud e o f 1 2. 5 m
(20km) over South Aus t ra l ia on the b
of a
rocket
b oo s te r . I t w o uld then h
been pu t th rough
a series
of
manoeuvr
dur ing which te lemetry measureme
w o uld b e
taken
as i t
re tu rned to ea rth
nearlytwice the speed of sound. owe
the scale model,
36ft
(lIm) long,
and
t ed w it h
over
900
sensors was launch
correctly
bu t then went
ou to f
control a
c r a sh e d in f lam es ; the c au se w as d et
mined
to bea software failure. The proje
which involved Mitsubishi eavy Ind
tries
and
the Nissan
Motor Corporati
h a d c o s t 80 million. Japanese research
h a d a ls o
spent
five years
and an estima
350 m illio n in r e de v elo p in g Woom
for
the launch
as
part of the NEXSTI
p
gramme. NAL planned f ou r m or e
flights at
Woomera
for 2003.
Helping to push the deve lopmen t o f
next-generation
SST wererapid
advan
in
materials
that were not
only light
also
exhib ited grea t s t rength and
re
t an ce t o high
temperatures.
Impro
ments
in the accuracy
of computatio
flight dynamics a lso a ide d developme
Computers contributed extensively to
proved flight control systems
since
th
speedhad increased
dramatically
from
period of Concorde.
Powerplants
a
underwent
radical
changes,
with
the
v
able
cycle engine being the preferred ty
The arrival
of these new techno log
spurred on bot h
Boeing
and McDonn
Douglas
to g rea ter
efforts,
a l though
PR departments seized on the informat
to projectthese newtechnologies
as lo
range, high-altitude aircraft
capahlc
of
ing across the Pa cif ic in a f ew h o ur s . T
first of
these
new
transports
was estima
to be ready for
commercial
s er v ic e
2010.
The designs
put
forth
by both
organ
t i on s w er e r e ma r ka bl y s i mi l ar i n l ay o
the main difference be tween them be
the flight envelopeeach was trying
to
fil. Boeing proposed an aircraft capable
travelling at
Mach
2 .4, w h ile
McDonn
Douglas p i tched thei r design
to
re
no more than Mach 1.6. This design
h
the benefi t o f being slightly sllulkr
lighter, which would lead
a n·dll(l\on
A lt ho ug h t he USA ,
Britain
and
Russia
have currently shelved their supersonic
transport development
programmes,
the
baton had
been
picked upby the Society of
japanese
Aerospace
Companies
i n 1 99 5.
This h a d b e en m a de p os sib le b y the Soci
ety s
involvement
with
the
study group,
w ho s e in f or m atio n f or m ed the basis of
their
research.
This
programme,
under the
guidance ofthe National Aeronautics Lab
oratory
of japan,
had
three
primary aims:
Th e
r e su lt w o uld b e
an
aircraft
capable
of
cruising at
Mach
2 .2, w ith a r a ng e
of6,340
miles (l0,200km) w ith a p a ss e ng e r com
plement
of 300. The
intended span
of this
SST w o uld b e 1 4 2f t (43.3m), with a fuse
lage
of310ft(95m).This
w o uld r e su ltin a
w in g w ith an area of9,200sq f t 8 5 5s q m),
which
in
turn
would
support
a
maximum
load o f 3 9 9 t on s 407 tonnes), of
which
2 43 2 4 8) w e re
allocatedto
fuel.
To
flight
te s t th is d e sig n and conduct research on
r el a te d t ec hn ol og y, t wo t yp es of scaled
supersonic experimental airplane, consist
ing
of
two
non-powered and
two
jet
powered experimental aircraft, were built.
On 1 4 ju ly 2 0 0 2 a p ow e re d m o de l
ofthe
japanese SST w as l au nc he d f ro m the
Woomera Test
Centre
in Australia. The
National Experimental Supersonic Trans
port,
NEXSTI,
project is
a t t he
leading
edge of a p us h b y J a pa n s
National
Aero
space Laboratory,
NAL , t o
create a new
generation of supersonic commercialairlin
ers. The test launch, originally scheduled
f or a f ew d a ys e a rlie r, h a d
been
postponed
i To a c qu ire
and
establish
advanced
air
craft integration
technology
by developing
scaled supersonic
experimental
aircraft
and
conducting flight
experiments.
ii.
To
use
computational
fluid
dynamics
(CFD)
and
flightverification in the design
of aircraft bodyshape.
iii . To in cr e as e the
sophistication
of
com
posite-material
techno logy and
other
next-generation supersonic technologies.
Japanese Interest
the
p r oje ct in o r de r to
cut operating
costs.
The departure of Bo ein g le d to the disinte
gration
ofthe
study group in
january
1999.
A f in al pronouncement by Daniel Goldin
of
NASA
s ta te d th at,
The
H igh Sp e ed
ResearchProgramand the AdvancedTech
nology programs are now
discontinued
for
the foreseeable future.
The
Assessment of NASA s
High Speed Research Program
In 1997
a
m eet ng washed
to
thrash
out a
report on
Am ercan supersonic comm ercial aircrah. There
were two bodies present: the Committee on Hgh
Speed
Research and t he Aeronaut cs and Space
Engineerng Board,formingthe Commisson on Eng
neerng andTechnca Systems,
which
was
to
report
to
the Natonal ResearchCounc.
The
Committee on
High SpeedResearch
drewits
membersfrom numer
ous
organizatons including the USAF, Genera Eec
tric,
Becan Engineerng,StanfordUniversity,Boeng,
Northrop Grumman,Amercan Airlnes and the
Unit
ed Technologies Research Center.
The
Aeronautcs
a nd Sp ace Engineerng Board also had
a
diverse
membership, onceagain Boeng, Lockheedand the
USAF were prominent.
The assessment began with
a descripton
o f t h e
NASA High Speed Research HSR Program and
defned it
as
a focused technologydevelopment pro
grammeintendedto leadto thecommercialdevelop
ment
of
a
high speed
civi transport.
The HSR Pro
gram wasnot intended actualy
to
design
or
test
a
commercial aircrah; thiswas the responsibity of the
aviaton industry.
The
HSCT was
seenas
a second
generaton
aircraft with
a
better performance than
either Concordeor theTupoev Tu-144.
Phase
1
of theprogramme wascompleted in 1995
and concentrated on environmental issues, including
noise
and
engine emissions. Phase 2, to be complet
ed by 2002 but canceled in 1999), was intended
to investgate propulsion,
airframe
materials,
struc
tures, flght-deck systems,aerodynamic performance
and systems integration.
The
HSR Programwas con
frmed as a wel-m anaged operat on on target to
complete
its
goals.
The
concludingparagraph stated that, following on
f rom t he complet ed Phase 2, t he t echnology and
informaton gleaned from it
would
enableAmercan
industry t o buid a second-generaton
prototype
for
testfying in 2006.However,oneproviso was that the
industry alone
would
not be abe t of und
such
an air
crah
and
thereforethat government support in depth
would
be required.
The Commisson concentrated mainly on Phase 2
and
itspotental.
and
thusthe nextstep,the Techno
ogy
Maturaton Phase, would
n ee d to
be furthered.
Ths
wouldinvolvedefning amanufacturng
base,
pro
ductvity demonstratons and the ground
testng
of
ful-scale components and systems.
Ths
phase shoud
aso coverthe developmentof theengnes and shoud
incude a pair of
ful-scale
demonstraton engines.
The
difficulty
of
buiding
a
second-generaton
SST
wasalready underst ood snce t he
X-33
programme
and its management
had
already demonstrated that
it
was
feasible.
On
a
more parochial level,the HSCT
was
seen
as good
for
Amerca and its economy and
that it would give t he aviaton industry a much
needed
technological
boost, leading to spin-offs
for
the consumer market. Other areas that came in
for
praise included t he dynam ics of t he
integrated
air
craft, the propulsion, flght-deck systems,supersonic
laminar flow control
and
manufacturng technology
and durabity testng.
BonoM: Although the Tu-144 did
n o tsh a re th e success of Concorde,
it
did
lookelegant i n t h e s k y .
Courtesy
NASA
BELOW: Captured just after lift off
the crew o fth e Tu 144ll are
alreadyretracting the canard
wings intotheirfairings behind
the
cockpit. Once
set
intocruise mode,
the afterburners are
shutdown
and
n o tu se d
again,
since the Tu-144
was capable of exceeding the
sp e ed o fso u n d without them.
Courtesy
NASA
lEFr. Parked on th e ra mp is the Tu
144l l dedicated to th e HSR
research p ro gra mme .As th e
hydraulic systems have losttheir
pressure, the elevons are fully
droopedhard against th e ra n g e
stops. Courtesy NASA
.
lIIiil \\
176
177
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SST
INTOT
FUTURE
SST INTOTHE FUTURE
LOW PRESSURE
TUR INE
natureand was to be cantilevered out
the
fuselage
although
i t would inc
rate a transverse wing carry through
section to impart reasonable strengt
rigidity.
An
imaginative
element
i n
multi-part winginvolved the use ofex
sion
joints
between each section to
the stresses generated
by
thermal bui
to be safely dispersed a vital need
the
dissimilarmetals used in its
cons
tion with their differing expansion
By contrast to the
wing
the
fuselage w
be
built
as
one structure
with
the
radome and tail-cone being the only
rate items.
The
primary load bearingm
b ers in thi s a re a determined that it w
consist
of
individual frames to w
wou ld b e
attached
Z section stringe
give strengthand shape; as before the
ering skin would be
HPC
bonded
to
frames and stri ngers.
With the
ailframe manufacturers
ing progress
the engine
builders beg
give their part
of
the project serious
sideration
in
conjunction
with
NA
who were advancing the idea of a
engine concep t
under
the
title
o
HIGH
PRESSURE
TUR INE
TUR OF N
ENGINE
COMPRESSOR
COM USTOR
EXH UST
NOZZLE
/ A A \
sections whose outer panelswere intended
to be
of
highaspectratio witha relatively
gentle
sweep angle.
The construction of
theouter
wingsections was intended to be
ofthe multi-rib
type
sheathed
in a
honey
comb skin manufactured from high poly-
meric composites
HPC .
The
outer
pan-
els would be attached to the main spar and
its
attendant
sub spars for it was here
that
the
main load bearing
s t rength of each
design was concentrated. Attached to the
main wing section would be
the
engines
main undercarriage units and t he trailing
edge of
the
mid wingpanels.To emphasize
the st rength and heat-protect ion
require-
ments of thi s majo r component i t was
sheathed
in a fou r l ay er
titanium
skin.
Mount ed on the forward face of t he main
sparwas
the
mid wingpanel whoseprima-
ry
purpose was to
act
as a
housing
for
the
main undercarriage units. These would be
constructed in a s im il ar
manner
to
the
outer wing panels also being encased in a
skin
of
HPC. To
the
front
of t he
mid wing
section
was
the
wing strake assembly to be
of
a l igh te r construct ion than
the o ther
wing sections.
This
was
of
a highly swept
F N
SHOCKSYSTEM
\
i
NLET
CENTRE BODY
The original engine requirementspostulated by NASA werebasedarounda poddedturbofan engine the
airflow of whichwould be controlled by themovable centre bodyat thefrontof thepowerplant as in
the 8 58 Hustlerbomber
CourtesyN S
IR INT KE
production and design costs. The con
st ruct ion of ei ther
aircraft would require
t he deve l opment of more exotic metals
the
currently available range
of
alloys
being
thought unsuitable
in this
instance.
The materials
then
available
that
were
seen as usable in any newaircraft included
titanium, elevated-temperature alumini
um
and high-temperature
polymer com
posites examples
of which
were already
under c lo se s tu dy and in some cases
already being flight tested.
Although
opti
mistic forecasts had been given for service
entrydates
of
an
American
SST some cau-
t io n was b ei ng
sounded concerning the
deployment
of
such new materials without
proper
development and
testing.
In spite of these reservations the basic
airframe layout foreach version
of t heSST
had
already
been
defined
through exten
sive
comruter
modelling which enabled
the
designers
to alter
details as required
a nd t he n test t hem wi thout spending
scarce
development
money
on
solid mod-
els every
time
for
wind-tunnel
testing as
had been the c ase in the past. The wings
destined for
both
aircraft consisted
of
four
MAIN WING
BOX
t ijf
This diagramil lustratestherangeof materialsthat would have
been used had an HSR HSCT been built Courtesy
N S
MAIN WING BOX
TI
HONEYCOMB
SANDWICH
FUSELAGE
PMC SKIN STRINGERS
OUTBOARD WING
PMC HONEYCOMB
SANDWICH
WING STRAKE
PMC TI PMC
HONEYCOMB
SANDWICH
SECTION
FUSELAGE BARREL
SYNTHETIC VISION SYSTEM
lthough no aircraftwere everbuilt as aresult ofthe
HSR
and HSCT studies
ASA went togreat lengthsto determinetheextent oftestingrequired
eforeany such machine was clearedfor fl ight
Courtesy N S
178
179
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SST
INTO Til
FUTURE
SST
INTOT
FUTURE
testspecificaircraftbehaviour thedesignersand scientistshavesectionsof
it
acturedseparatelyfor wind tunneluse.
In
this
view
themodelhas
no
rear
agesince thetr ials areconcerned more with theinteractions between thewing
and
the fuselage.
Courtesy NASA
Cycle
Engine Development Pro
Their s t ar t ing a ssumpt ions were
on the
available power, fuel efficien
andt he twomain constituents of pollu
n : nois e and particulate matter. The
or players were General Electric and
Whitney.
The
General Electric
was based o n t he variable cycle
which offeredgood power
output
would require further development
to
the noise generated. Pratt
Whit-
y had s et tl ed on the turbine bypass
which u sed a convergent diver-
nozzle coupled to a
chute
suppressor
that would, it was hoped,
control
the noise
output. A s both types of engine had good
points
i t was d ec id ed
that
a
combined
engine known
as
the mixed flow turbofan
should be deve loped
by
both companies.
I t s hould be noted that
NASA
were
not
in the business of designing or supporting
any particular design for a second-genera
tion SST.
Their
purpose was to foster the
advanceofthe several technologiesin con-
junction with the primary manufacturers.
When
the programme had been running
fo r f ou r y ear s J am es F le tc he r, a NASA
adminis tra tor , was called before Congress
180
to confirm
t hat t he
organization was
not
actually developing a n S S T b u t was leav
ingit to industry. The statement presented
inJanuary 1975 confirm
that
the superson
ic research programmewas not specifically
directed to the design anddevelopmentof
anSST
but l imited to
the
identification
of
any major problems and the development
ofthe technologiesnecessary for their solu
tion.
Further oversight
was exercised
by
Congressin April \978 when the Office of
Technology Asses sment was tasked w ith
investigating the
potential
benefits of a
second generation S ST a nd t he funding
associated with the
SCR
programme. Two
years later t heO TA informed a Congres
sional committee
that
the programme was
delivering value for money; however, they
commented that unless the funding were
increased, there wou ld b e a r educ ti on i n
future technological benefits.
In
support
of
t he O T A findings, NASA
commissioned
further research into aircraft designs capa-
ble
of
operating
at
Mach 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5
from McDonnell Douglas , Boeing and
Lockheed respectively.
Whil e t he
ailframe manufacturers were
s ti ll i n the process of sketching out their
designs for the SST, rapidadvancesin tech
nology were leading Boeing and Lockheed
to revise their studies to incorporate those
seen as important in supersonic flight. One
of t he most significant of these was fly-by
wire a nd t he associated AFCS computers
needed to control aircraft behaviour; simi
larly, advancesin the field of aerodynamics
w er e a ls o r el ev an t i n second generation
SST
design, especially in the application of
high-lift devices . Thus both disciplines
wouldbe incorporated into the second-gen
eration designs with alacrity. Further input
came from Boeing who had flight-tested
some developments on the ir B.757 test bed.
But the most important
advance
was lami
nar flow control which wasseen as essential
for smooth low-level, low-speed handling.
Flying Test Beds
Havingdeveloped the theories andsome of
the technology it was time to put them to
the test. Given that
no
supersonic transports
were available in t he U SA and that all the
Air France and British Airways Concordes
werefully occupied, NASA turned itsatten-
t ion further afield to f ind a flying test bed.
Before the Concorde option was dropped,
Alan Greenwood from British Aerospace
had proposed in February 1980 to
NASA
and
i ts a ss is ta nt a dminis t ra tor Dr A .M.
Lovelace that a Concorde would be ideal for
the
SCR
programme. A joint technical
team from NASA and BAe investigated
oneofthe airframes at Filton inOctober. By
March 98 a wholly pos it ive r eport was
delivered. This was based o n t he fact that
Concorde had been in commercial service
for fiveyears and thusa highlevel of under
standing o n t he operating of a supersonic
aircraft was available.
The
report specified
the six goals
that
Concorde would be used
for: advanced f ligh t procedure s for noi se
abatement the assessment of handling qual
ities, the analysis
of
intake aerodynamic
surge loads,wake vortices measurement, the
measurement of ailframe skin fric tion and
engine nacelle drag,
and
the measurement
of airframe noise due to supersonic speeds.
The
test-flying programme would be based
in Brita in, with engineering and
computer
simulation support from British Aerospace.
NASA
had 500 ,0 00 t o f und the whole
exerc ise; howeverin March 1982 the
entire
SCR programme was be put on hold
as
the
Rea ga n a dm in is tr at io n h ad d ec id ed t o
reduce the technology development budget.
Fortuna te ly th is dec is ion was eventual ly
reversed by the mid 1990s, although by
that
time t he chanceof using a Concorde had
gone and therefore another aircraft type
would berequired.
This
was
the
TupolevTu
1440 airframe, of which a
few
remained air
worthy, having been grounded by Aeroflot
as uneconomic
to operate.
Since
they were
readily available, the most servicable was
reclaimed by Tupolev for overhaul and
upgrading. The backers of t h is venture
would be NASA the primaryAmerican air
frame and engine manufa cture rs and , to a
certain extent the Russian manufacturers,
w ho hoped t o g ai n f ur th er i ns ig ht into
advanced
SST
flight behaviour. Designated
the Tu-144LL, the a ir cr af t unde rtook a
sequence of successful test flights. Given the
political uncertainty
that
alwayssurrounded
the American SST, i t came
as
no surprise
t hat t he programme was suspended due to
lack of furtherfunding. A subsidiary reason
was the absorption of McDonnell Douglas
by Boeing Aircraft in 1998, which reduced
t he e le me nt o f
competition
favoured
by
American politicians.
The
publ ic pro
nouncements gave the reasons as a p er
ceivedchange in
the
projected salesfigures,
plus the technical r isks in pursuing such a
programme.
At
this point
NASA
also
placed the High Speed Research Program
on a lower priority; the whole project was
finally abandoned inearly \999.
Hope Springs Eternal?
Although i t would appear
that
the quest
fo r a s uc ce ss or t o Concorde has for the
time being beenabandoned by the major
manufacturers and associated government
bodies,
some
smallerorganizationsar
pursuing this moste lusive of goals.
U SA Reno
Aeronautical are
conce
ing on something smallerin the
shap
Mach 1.5-capable, twin engined bu
jet . A l so in America Gulfstream, the
known business jet manufacturer, wo
in conjunction with the Russian ai
manufacturer Sukhoi OKB, unde
joint designstudies fora four-engined
ness cum small airliner des ign - l at e
celled
due to
differences
between
partners regarding design concepts. M
while in Europe, both Airbus lndustr
British
Aerospace
continued low
development both individually and
ly
although
neither
would commit t
form of product ion
since
no govern
funding was forthcoming.
Given allthese half-started, half-fin
programmes, will the
Aerospatiale
oncordeend
by
being the only one
kind ever to be built? For all
the
trial
tribulations that beset Concorde sinc
day the idea was conceived the ai
eventually proved to be a w inne r. L
hopethat any successor is
as
good.
Af i t t ingend isa view of a Concorde prototype
It was and still is the onlysuccessful supers
transport not badfor an aircraftdeemedto
b
a
white
elephant.
BBA Colecton
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Fuel system
rank I: 9,36l\b 4,255kg
tank 2: to,2071b 4,640kg
tank 3: to,2071b 4,640kg
tank 4: 9,36l\b 4,255kg
tank 5: 16,072lb 7,305kg
tank SA: 4,9631b 2,256kg
tank 6: 25,8891b (ll,678kg)
tank
7:
16,5251b 7,51 Ikg)
tank 7A: 4,9631b 2,256kg
rank
8:
28,6451b 13,020kg
tank
9:
24,7471b
(II
,248kg
tank 10: 26,6181b 12,099kg
t ank 1
l
23,2181b 10,554kg
unusable: 1,021lb 464kg
total: 211,797lb 96,27lkg
Pressurization
normaldifferential: 10.7±0.Ipsi 738±7mbar
temperature range: 15-30°
lectrical system
main: 60kVA 200/1 15V, 400Hz
emergency:
26V,
1,800Hz
batteries: 24V
Hydraulic system
fluid type: Oronite M2V
caracity: 74.8gal 340Itr
pressure: 4,000psi 275bar
aggage holds
combined total: 697cu ft 20.03cu
m)
forward lower: 227cu
ft
6.7Icu m)
upper hold: 470cu ft 13.32cu m)
Weights
maximum take-off weight: 389,0001b 176,445kg
maximum taxi weight: 404,0001b 183,251
kg)
maximum landing weight: 245,000lb I 1I,130kg
maximum permissible weights-tax iing: 41
1,1361b
186,88
take-off: 407,1541b 185,07
landing: 244,4861b (lll,13
zero
fuel:
202,5761b 92,08
Landing
gear
main-wheel
base: 59ft8in 18.19m
track: 25ft 4in 7.68m
tyre:
47
x 15.75; pressure: 187psi 12.9bar
steering range: ±60degrees
NZG tyres: 43.3 x 15.74; pressure: 230psi 16bar
nose- tyre: 31 x 10.75;pressure: I74psi 12bar
rail uni t - tyre :3 .20 x 120; pressure: 294psi 20bar
oncorde ata
APPENDIX I
Range
Movement
yaw: ±30 degrees
pitch inner clevons 15 degrees up/l7 down
pitch outerclevons 15 degrees up/I 7 down
roll
inner elevon: 14 degrees up/
14
down
roll outer elevons: 20 degrees up/20down
maximum range- innerelcvon: 19 degrees up/I9 down
outer elevons 23.5 degrees up/23.5 down
ngines
Rolls-Royce/SNECMA Olympus 593
reheat thrust: 38,0501b 16,925kN , at sea level
specific fuel consumption at 53,000ft Mach 2:
1.1
91b/
Ib thrust/hr (l.
19
kg/kg thrust/hr
levons
area: 172.2sq ft 16sq m)
Fuselage
length over ll 202ft3.6in 61 .66m
external height: 130.7in 3.32m
pressurecabin length: 129ft 39.32m
maximum internal height: 77in I .96m
maximum external width: I13Ain 2.88m
maximum internal width: 103Ain 2.63m
Rudder
area: 112sq
ft
10Alsq m)
Fin
height:37ft I in 11.32m
area: 365sq ft 33.91sq m)
root chord: 34ft8.7in 10.58m
Wings
span: 83ft tOAin 25.56m
area: 3,856sq ft 358.25sq m)
root chord: 90ft 9in 27.66m
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APPENDIX
II
oncorde
ncidents
Operator
Registration
Location
Remarks
AF
N/K
Caracas
wheel damagedafter
hitting
runway beacon light
AF N/K
mid
Atlantic
engine
problem
AF F BVFB
Paris
No.2
tyre burst
AF F BVFA
Washington
No s 1
and
2 tyresburst
due
to foreign
object
damage
AF
N/K
mid
Atlantic
engine
problem
AF
N/K
Dakar
tail/engine
damagedue
to
misjudged landing
AF
N/K
mid Atlantic
engine
problem
AF N/K
New
York
engine shut down
before landing
AF
N/K
N/K
No.4
tyre deflated; treadseparated
BA
G BOAD
N/K
No.2
tyreburst; hydraulic leak/deflector damage
AF
F BVFA
N/K
No.7
tyre burst
AF F BVFA
N/K
No.1 tyre burst
BA
G BOAC
New
York
engine shut down
aftertake off; secondary airdoor unserviceable
AF F BVFC
Washington
No.2
tyreburst
AF
F BVFC
Dakar
N os 5
and
6 tyres burst; wheels brakes
and
No.1
engine
replaced
AF
F BVFC
New
York
No.6
tyre treadfailed causingdamage
to
wing
and
hydraulic
and
undercarriage
AF
F BVFC
Washington
Nos
5
and
6 tyres burst
on
take off causingdamage to
undercarriage
control
circuits/fuel
and
hydraulic systems;
aircraft
returned
to Dulles foremergency landing
AF F BVFD
Washington
tyrefailure caused damage
to No.2engine
compressor
AF F BVFD
Dakar
tread loss
No.3
tyre/wheel
and
No J
engine
replaced
BA
G BOAA
Heathrow
No.4
tyre failed causing damage
to
N os 7
and
8 wheels
andN os
3
and
4 engines
AF
F BVFD
N/K
tread loss
to No.7
wheel
AF F BVFD
Washington
aircraft
hit
two
deer
on landing causing damage
to
right
main
gear
BA
G BOAB
Heathrow
tyres burst
on Nos 5 6
7
and
8 wheels
BA
G BOAD
Heathrow
No.8
tyre burst causing damage todeflector/brakes and
hydraulic system
AF
F BVFC
N/K
No J
tyre burst
BA
G BOAF
Washington
No.8
tyreburst
on touchdown damagingengineand
airframe
AF
F BTSD
Washington
Nos
land
2 tyres replaced afterforeign
object
damage; aircraft
diverted
toN ew
York
784
CONCORDEINCIDENTS
Date Operator Re gi st rat io n Lo cat ion
Remarks
13.7.81
AF
F BVFF Paris tyre
No.5
failed causing damage
to No.2engine
9.8.81 BA
G BOAG New
York Nos 1
and
2 tyres burst causing damage
to No.2engine
and
adjacent
fuel
tank
20.9.81 BA
G BOAD New
York
No.6
tyre burst causingdamage
to N o.2 engineand
brakes
valve
14.12.81
BA
G BOAD
New
York
Undercarriage failed
to
retractafter take offdue
to unbalan
gear truck
26.12.81 BA
G BOAE New
York
No.2
tyredeflated
30.4.82 BA
G BOAF
Heathrow No.4
tyredeflated
3.6.82
AF
F BVFB Paris
No.4
tyrefailure
9.5.83
AF
F BVFB
New
York
Nos
1
and
2 tyres deflated
29.4.84 BA
G BOAE
Heathrow
No.8
tyredeflated
11.7.84
BA
G BOAD
Heathrow
No.1 tyre burst; brake
and
deflector damaged
14.8.84 BA
G BOAA Heathrow
No.4
tyre burst; deflector damaged
20.2.85
AF
F BVFF
New
York
No.8
tyre burst; damage to undercarriage
27.2.85
BA
G BOAE
New
York
Nos
4
and
8 tyreslost t read
on
landing
14.11.85 BA
G BOAE
Heathrow No.7
tyre burst causing brake fire
15.11.85 BA
G BOAB Heathrow
No.5 tyre burst causingdamage
to
main gear
doorwhich
i
turn punctured
No.5 fuel tank; Nos
land
2 engines needed
to be replaced after foreign
object
damage
18.5.86
AF
F BVFB
Paris No.5 tyre burst
11.8.87
BA
G BOAC
New
York Nos
1 2 4 5 6
and
8 tyres burstdue
to
braking problems
locking brakes
on;
damagecaused
to No.3engine
deflecto
and
undercarriagedoors
10.9.87 AF F BTSD
New
York No.8
tyredeflated due
to
foreign
object
damage.
29.1.88 BA
G BOAF Heathrow
tyre
hub
failure causing damage
to No.7
fuel
tank
9J.88
BA
G BOAC Heathrow
No.1 tyre burst damaging hydraulic pipelines
10.4.88
AF
F BTSD
New
York No.7
tyre burstafter tread failed
due
to foreign
object
dam
18.6.88 BA
N/K
Heathrow
undercarriagefailed to retract; aircraft
returned to Heathro
19.7.88 BA G BOAG
New
Yo rk h yd ra ul ic s ys te m f ai lu re r eq ui ri ng r et ur n
to
base; aircraft ve
runway
dueto inoperative
brakes
13.2.89
AF
N/K
Paris
outer
window panel cracked after take off; aircraft
returned
base
12.4.89 BA
G BOAF
Tasman
Sea
failure
of
upper ruddersection; aircraft
cominued
on
toSydn
14.8.90
AF
F BVFA Paris No.5 tyre burst due to foreign
object
damage
on
runway
4.1.91 BA
G BOAE
mid
Atlantic
upper rudder
section
failed; aircraft
continued
toN ew
York
13.2.92
BA
G BOAG
Heathrow
No.7 tyre treadseparated;deflectordamaged
21.3.92 BA
G BOAB Atlantic
upper rudderseparated from aircraft in flight;
No.2engines
down due
to vibration
27.3.92
AF F BTSC New
York No.1 t yre burst due
to
foreign
object
damage
4.9.92
AF
F BVFF
New
York
No.4
tyre burst
due to
foreign
object
damage
16.1.93
AF F BVFF
Paris
Nos
7
and
8 tyres losttread causing damage
to
deflector
undercarriage
No J
engine and
wing root
785
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ON ORDE IN IDENTS
Operator
Registration Location Remarks
BA G-BOAF Heathrow Noo4 tyre burst causing damage
to
brakingsystem No.3 engine
I
APPENDIX
III
and No.8 fuel tank
AF
F-BVFC New York loss oftread on No.2 tyre
BA
G-BOAG
New York
No.2 engine shutdown; high oil pressure; No.2engineshut
J
oncorde
n
Tu 44
Fleet
etails
own on approach as a precaution
BA G-130AB Heathrow No.2 tyre b urst causing d amage
to
hydraulic system
BA
G-130AF
Atlantic
No.1 engineshutdowndue to fuel pressure warnings
Concorde
Fleets
I3A G-BOAB Heathrow blue h ydraulic system t otal loss; aircraft returned
to
base
C/N
Registration Series
Operator
First Flight
Status
SA G-BOAE
N/K
Nos 3 and 4 engines shut down due to surging and
low
oil
01
F-WTSS
Sud Aviation
2.03.69
after test flying
was
retired to Paris Le
pressure respectively
Acrospatiale
Bourget 19.10.73
for
display
in
the
BA G-BOAB
N/K
No.2 engine experienced thrust reverser problems
Musee
de
l Air; hours: 812
BA G-BOAE
N/K
No.2 engineshutdown due to problems with thrust reverser
02
G-BSST
BAC/BAE Systems
9.04.69
to
MinTeci. 06.05.69 to MoS 19.02.71
BA
N/K
Heathrow
fuel
emergency declared after missed approach
arrived at RNAS Yeovilton 26.07.76 fo
preservation in Fleet Air Arm Museum
BA G-BOAC New York No.2 clevon sL section ofsurface; aircraft returned to base
hours: 836
7.98 AF F BVFF Paris No.8 tyre burst
101
G-AXDN
BAC/BAE Systems
17.12.71
to MinTeci. 16.04.68;toMoS 19.02.71
BA G-BOAE New
York
No.3 tyre deflated due to foreign object damage
to Imperial War Museum Duxford
for
preservation 20.08.75; hours: 633
BA
G BOAC
Atlantic
partial separation of rudder; aircraft landed at New York
102
F-WTSA
Sud Aviation
10.01.73
to Paris Orly
for
display 26.05.76
AF
F BVFB
New York nosegear failed
to
retract; aircraft returned to]FK
Acrospatia
Ie
hours: 642
BA
G-BOAE
Heathrow
aircraft experienced hydraulic system problems on approach
201
F-WTSB
100
Aerospatiale
6.12.73
withdrawn from usc on display at
1.00 AF F BVFF New
York
Noo4
tyre burst
Aerospatiale Toulouse; hours: 754
BA G-B Heathrow aircraft suffered e ngine failure o n approach
202
G-BBDG
100
BAC/BAE Systems
13.02.74
registered 7.08.73;
for
spare parts usc at
Filton 12.81; owned by British Airways
BA G-BOAA Shannon
No.3 engineshutdown and landing madeat Shannon
For Brooklands Museum 2004?
BA G-BOAF Heathrow No.6 tyre burst
hours: 803
BA G-BOAI3 H ea th ro w No.6 tyre failed due to foreign ob jec t damage; defl ecto r damaged
203 F-WTSC
100/ Acr ospa tial c
31.01.75
reregistered 28.05.75
F-BTSC
101 Air France
crashed 25.07.00
7.00 AF
F-BTSC
Paris aircraft c rashed s oon after t ake-off; all on board killed
hours: 11 989
BA
N/K
H ea th ro w e ng in e p rob le ms on ta ke- of f; f lig ht a ba nd on ed 204
G BOAC 102
BAC
27.02.75
registered 5.01.74
BA
N/K
New
York in
transit engine surged; aircraftlandedat ]FK
G N8 NC
BA
delivered 13.02.76
N81NC
Braniff
joint register 5.01.79
BA
N/K
H ea th ro w e ng in e p ro bl em r equ ir ed a ir cr af t t o r e tu rn t o base
G-BOAC
BA
returned to BA I 1.08.80
BA
N/K
Heathrow cracks d iscovered in outerwindow panel
returned toservice after modification
11.07.02; preserved Manchester31.10.0
1.02 SA
N/K
H ea th ro w en gi ne surge required retu rn to base
hours 22 259
AF
N/K
New York engine failure; aircraft continued to Paris
205
F-BVFA
\01 Air France
27.10.75
delivered 19.12.75
I3A
N/K
H ea th ro w p ar ti al r ud der f ailure p ro mp te d r et ur n t o base
N94FA
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
F-BVFA
Air France
returned 1.06.80
AF N/K New
York
No.3 engine shutdown;aircraft diverted returned to service 02.02;
AF
N/K
New
York
partial rudder failure caused return to ]FK
to Smithsonian 12.06.03; hours: 17 824
206
G-BOAA
102
BAC
5.11.75
registered 3.03.74
G-N94AA
BA
delivered 14.01.76
N94AA
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
G-BOAA
BA
returned 28.07.80;
in
store Heathrow
to East Fortune Scotland 2004
hours: 22 786
207 F BVFB
101
Air France
6.03.76
delivered 8.04.76
N94FB
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
F BVFB
Air France
returned 1.06.80
786
I
787
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CONCORDE N TU 144FLEET ET ILS
•
CONCORDE N TU 144 FLEET ET ILS
Registration
Ser ies Ope rat or
First Flight
Status
Tu 44 Fleet
c nt
returned to service24.08.01
R eg is tr at io n Model
First F light Status
to
Sinsheim Auto und Technik
Museum Germany 23.06.03
68001
Tu 144 3l l 68 prototype aircraft scrapped
hours: 14 771
68002
Tu 144
static testairframe
G BOAB
102
BAC
18.05.76
registered 3.03.74
77101
Tu 144S 1.06.71 preproduction aircraft scrapped
N94AB
BA
delivered 30.09.76
N94AB
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
77102
Tu 144S
20.03.72 first
production aircraft; crashed 6.06.73 Paris Air Show
BOAB
BA
returned 17.09.80;aircraft
in
store at
77103 Tu 144S 13.12.73 history unknown
Heathrow;
for
display Heathrow 2004;
hours: 22 296
77104 Tu 144S 14.06.74 history unknown
F BVFC
101 Air France 9.07.76
delivered 3.08.76
77105
Tu 144S 30.11.74
modified
to
Tu 144Ddevelopment aircraft; last noted
in
scrapyard near
N94FC
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
Zhukovsky Airport
1993
F BVFC
Air France
returned 1.06.80
77106
Tu 144S 4.03.75
Aeroflot
used for
cargo flights; currently on display Monino Museum
returned to service
10.01
retired to Airbus factory for display
77107
Tu 144S
20.08.75
on display at
Kazan
Aviation Production complex
hours: 14 332
77108 Tu 144S 12.12.75
in store at Samara Ouchebny Research Institute
G BOAD 102
BAC
25.08.76
registered 9.05.75
77109
Tu 144S 29.04.76
Aeroflot used for passenger flights remainsstored at Voronezh Aircraft fa
G BOAD
BA
delivered 6.12.76
G N94AD
Braniff
joint register 5.01.79
Tu 144S statictest airframe
G BOAD
BA
returned 19.06.80; returned
to
service
77110 Tu 144S 14.02.77
Aeroflot used for passenger flights; on display at Museum ofCivil Aviatio
28.09.01; preserved New
York
10.11.03;
Ulyanovsk
hours: 23 394
F BVFD 101 Air France
10.02.77
delivered 26.03.77
77111 Tu 144D
27.04 .78 crashed 23.05 .78 ;remainsscrapped
N94FD
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
77112 Tu 144D was
on
display
at Tupolev
OKB Zhukovsky
sold
to
Sinsheim
Museum
Germ
F BVFD
Air France
returned 1.06.80
77113 Tu 144D was
on display at Tupolev OKB; aircraft now dismantled and stored
damaged in heavy landing 27.05.82
reduced
to
spares 18.12.94
77114 Tu 144D
converted to Tu 144LL
for
NASA
use
then tostoreat Tupolev
OKB;
hours:
5 821
reported for sa Ie 05.01
G BOAE
102
BAC
17.03.77
registered 9.05.75
77115 Tu 144D on display at Tupolev OKB Zhukovsky
G BOAE
BA
delivered 20.7.77
77116
Tu 144D in store in uncompleted state; construction ceased 1984
joint register 5.01.79
G N94AE
Braniff
G BOAE
BA
returned 1.07.80; returned to service
28.09.01; preserved Bahamas 17.11.03;
hours: 23 372
F WJAM
101 Aerospatiale
26.06.78 registered 0 6.78
F BTSD
Air France
reregistered 4.09.78
N94SD
Braniff
joint register 12.01.79
F BTSD
Air France
returned 12.03.79
returned to service 15.10.01; hours: 12 974
G BKFW
102
BAE
Systems 21.04.78
registered 2.01.78
G BOAG
BA
delivered 6.02.80
reregistered 9.02.81
returned to service 19.10.01; preserved
Seattle 5.12.03; hours: 16 232
F WJAN
101
Aerospatiale
26.12.78
registered 12.78
F BVFF Air France
reregistered 23.10.80
not modified
hours: 12 420
G BFKX
102 BAE Systems
20.04.78 registered 27.01.78
G BOAF
BA
delivered 9.06.79
N94AF
Braniff
joint register 14.12.79
BOAF
BA
returned 12.06.80
returned to service 17.07.01; preserved
Filton 26.11.03; hours: 18 255
188 I
189
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ibliography
all, T.E.,
Concorde The Story The
Facts
The Figures
(Foulis, 1969)
Brian, Flying Concorcle Airlife, 2002
s, G
Lin
ter,
Aerospatiale/British Aerospace Concorde Crowood/
Airli
fe 200
I)
G COllcorde: The Inside Story Weidenfeld Nicolson, [976
G Concorde and the Americans: International Politics of the Supersonic
TranslJon
Smithsonian Institute
Press, 1997)
haw, Brian, Concorde- The Inside Story
Sutton
Publications, 2000
alsofeatures in
numerous
magazines;
additionally there
is a
wealth of
material publicly
available a t t h e
Public Record
e, Kewfor
thosewho
like
the political in-fighting associated withsuch
projects.
lly, I recommend www.concordesst.com for
the
latest news
about the
aircraft.
9
Advanced Supersonic
Technology Program
167 174
Aeronor 130 136 139
Aerospatiale 73 101 166
Airbus Industrie/EADS 164
166 167
aircnlft
Avro
Type 698Vulcan
10
13,17,31,45,46,59,
61,166
Avro Type720 13
Avro
Type730 13
Avro York
12
BAC-IIII72
BAC 221 26,44
BoeingStratoliner I 16
Boeing737172
Boeing 757 180
Brahazon 12
Bristol Aircraft Type
188
24
Bristol Aircraft
Type 198
18
Bristol Type223
anbena
31
Caravel
Ie 13
18
Convair B-58 118
Convair
F-I02
Delta
Dagger 115
Convair
F-I
06 Delta Dart
115
DC-IO 150
de HavillandComet
12
13,35, 115
de
Havilland Mosquito
10
DH
108
Swallow
10
DH 11010
Douglas DC-3 12
Douglas DCA 12
English Electric Lightning
10
II
F-16XL 173
Fairey FD.2
24
FW 190fTa 1527
General Dynamics
F-III
9
Gloster Meteor 8 32
Handley Page HP115 26
HawkerTempest7
I-leinkel He 178 7
IIlyushin IL-62
130
LockheedC-5A Galaxy
124
LockheedConstellation
116
Lockheed
F-I
04 Starfighter
115,118
Lockheed L-2000
125
Lockheed SR-71
125
Lockheed U-2R/E-2R 172
173
Lockheed YF-12A I 18
McDonnell F-IOI Voodoo
115
Messerschmill Me 1 63 7
Messerschmitr
Me 262
7
MikoyanA-144 Analog
129
MiG-21 127
129
MiG-211 129
MiG-21
LSH 129
MiG-29 140
Mirage
IIIB 136
Mirage
IV 2 6
Morane Saulnier Paris
32
Myasischev M-50
Bounder I
28
Nord
1502
Griffon
26
North American Aircraft,
XB-70Valkyrie21,118,
126
North American Aviation
F-86 Sabre I15
North American Aviation
F·IOO
SuperSahre I15
North American Aviation
P-51
Mustang 7
Repuhl
ic
F·I
05
Thunderchief
115
Spitfire 7
Sud
Est
SE212 Durandal
26
SudOest 9050Trident
II
26
Super Caravclle 21,23
TSR2 45,118
TupolevTu-22 128
132
Tu-135P 128
Tu-144 Charger
128 129
131-5,136,138
Tu·160
138 140
Tu-244 138
139
Type707 10
Vampire 10
Vickers VC
10
12,22, 130
Aircraft Research
Association 14
AirframeCommittee
22
Air France
18,51,70,94,99,
100,105,106,110,114,
145 149 152 155 157
158 160 162-5, 180
Air Registration Board
14
AleniaAerospace
174
American Institute of
Aeronauticsand
Astronautics I 17
Antonov 128
Annie de lAire
13
Armmong Slddeley 14
ArmstrongWhitworth
9 13
17
Index
ASTFI,2,3167,174
AvionsMarcel Dassault
19
29
Avro 13 17
BEA
Bureau Enquetes·
Accidents 148
152
Boeing 99 108 117 118
124,125,140,168,169
honkers
41
oom Alley 41
Brabazon Committee 12
BraniffAirlines
105
Brisrol Aircraft/Engines 14
17,18,21,24,26,44,45
BritishAerospace Systems
(BAe)(BEAS) 73,101,
152,166,168,174
BritishA ircraftCorporation
(BAC) 18,21-3,26,29,
31,32,100,105,119,
166
BritishAirways 51 70,94,
99-101,104,105,110,
114,149,152,155,157,
158,163,164,165,180
British European Airways
(BEA)
13 104
BritishOverseas Airways
orporation (BOAC)
13,23,104
BritishStandard BR58
22
Brize Norton, RAF 160
entred EssaisAeronautique
de
Toulouse (CEAT) 30,
49
Certificate ofAirworthiness
20 138
148 159
CEV 32
Citizens League Against the
Sonic Boom
124
ivil
Aeronautics
Board
I
18
ivil Aviation Authority
103 160
ivil
registration
F-BTSC 110 Ill, 145
F·BTSD
106 110 159
F·BVFA
110
F-BVFB
155
F-BVFC
155
F·BVFD 114
F-WTSS
32
39,
110
G·BBDG
103
·BFKW 103
G-BFKX
103
G-BOAA 103 108
G·BOAB
103 108 109
C;·BOAC 103 108 110
(J·BOAD 105 108
9
G·BOAE 103,106,108,
109
G·BOAF
114 155
G·BOAG 109
110
114
G·BSST 32
G-BVFF
110
G·N94AA 109
G·N94AB
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CL.823 125
CoalitionAgainst theSST
124
College ofAeronautics
at
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14
Commandantof the Queens
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32
Computational Fluid
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177
Concorde, BAC/Acrospatiale
7,12,19,20,22,23,26,
30-6,38,39,41,42,44,
46,47,49,51,55,
59-69,71,72,78,79,
81,84-7,89,91-5,98,
99,101,103,105,106,
108-10,112,114,
124-6,130-2,134,139,
145-64,165,168,171,
72
177 180
Continental Airlines
150
ControllerAircraft
14
ountries
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109
Austria 110
Bahrain
105 108 109
Ba
rbados 109
Brazil 110
Cyprus
108
England 30
France
20
Germany 20
145
Iran III
Kuwait
108
New Zea land 109
Puerto Rico
108
Singapore
105
South Africa 110
United Kingdom
23
UnitedStates 20 109
USSR
130 134 136
Venezuela
105
Cranwell, RAF8
Cunard
110
De
Havilland
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13
14
Delco III
Departmentof Commerce
118
Deutsche Aerospace
174
Douglas 99
Dunlop 30
Dupont de Nemours
1
English Electric
14 17
Enahling Propulsion
Materials Program
Europe,m Cup I I I
EuropeanJoint Airwor
Authority
73
EuropeanSupersonic
Research Program
174
Federal Aviation Auth
(FAA) 32,116-8,
124
FederaI Express 100 10
165
Fleet AirAnn Museum
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night;
AF002110
AF4590145
AF4853
110
AF4859 110
AF4862 I
10
BA 170108
BAI73 108
BA378 108
BA9060C
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BA9083C
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General Electric I 17-2
122,124-6,140,1
170
Gloster Aircraft Comp
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Gulfmeam 181
Handley Page
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17
Ilawker SiddeleyAircra
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High Polymeric Compo
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179
HighSpeed Civil Trans
168,170,173
High Speed Research
Program
140 177
Hispano Suiza
29
Honeywell 168
IIOTOL
174
HouseAppropriations
ommittee
124
Ilypersonic Narional A
Space Plane 174
l y u ~ i n 128
InternationalStandard
Almhphcrc (ISA)
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100
154 155 160
1 30
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128 133 140
III
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109
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110
110
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110,114,164
164
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168
173
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109
21 26 32
108
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107 110 114
160
162
122
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108
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151
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164
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114,145,162,163
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118
105,110,
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110
108
108
108
122
Sheremetvo Airport
134
Stockholm 110
Straits ofMalacca
105
Tel v v International 110
Tokyo
122
Torol1lo 164
Toulouse
30
32,44, 110
130 174
Venyukovsk
134
Vienna 110
Voronezh Aircraft Plant
129
Washington99,164
Weybridge 2I,
26
Lockheed 117 118 124 125
168
169
Marshallsof Cambridge/
MarshallsAerospace 26
Massachusells Instiluteof
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McDonnell Douglas
140
168
169
Messier 29
Michelin 159 160
MikoyanOKB 128
MilesAircrnft, M.52
9
10
Minisler ofAviation21,22
Minister ofPublicWorksand
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21
Ministryof Defence
166
Ministry ofSupply 9
13 14
18
Ministryof Transportand
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Mitsibushi Heavy Industries
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119
Model 2707-200119,120,
125
Model 2707-300 120,123
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NACA115 125
NASA 115,118,125,140,
166,168,170,172,173
Ames 168
Dryden
143
168
173
Langley 143 168
Lewis 1 6 8
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Laboratoryof Japan
177
NationalAerospace
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National Enviromental
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National GasTurbine
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National Physical Laboratory
14
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160
NESTI 177
New York Port Authority
103 108
Nissan MotorCorporation
177
Nord Aviation
19 39
IN X
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30
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OKB-23
128
Olympus22R, 30101,59318,
21 24 26 29 30 44
45 55 59 73 92 93
130 167
P an A m 1 00 117
ParisAir Show 21 130 132
134
people:
Addeley,M.R. 33
AckerI,
D.F.B.
103
Agapov, S. I
38
Alland,
J.C
33
Amery, Juli1I1
22
Asselot, Arnold
29
Bannister, Capt Mike 160
Begg
James
123
Biplinghoff,
Dr
Raymond
123
Black Eugene I
17
Bradshaw,Capl I 10
Branson,Sir Richard
164
Brown, R S 2 9
Bulem
V .M . 1 30
Buron, Robert
21
Calvert, Capl B.J.
105
Ceremukhin, G.A. 130
Chadwick,
Roy 17
Chernomyrdin,Victor 140
Chorley J .L . 1 09
Cochrane, John
33
Coleman, William 99
Cook, Capt John
109
de Havilland,Geoffrey 10
Derry
John
10
Dillon, Douglas 117
Dudal,Capr Pierre
110
Duffey
Capt Peler 106
108
Eames CaplJ
108
Edwards,Sir George
23
Elyan,
EV 129
Escola Etienne 29
Fletcher,James
180
Fullerton, Gordon
143
Gantsevskiy,
B . A. 1 28
Gedge, George
29
Gilles, Capl
110
Godlin, Daniel
177
Gore, Vice President 140
Greenwood,Alan
180
Gudkov OV 129
Guignard,J cques32
Halaby, Najeeb1
17
I 19
Hirst, Capl
J.W. 105 108
Hodges, Luther I 17
Holding,
PA 33
Jacob, Capt G. 110
Jagger, S.M.
128
Johnson, Vice President
117 119
Kennedy, PresidentJohn
F
116
Konstantinov,
V 129
Lemay Capt 108
Leney
Capt
109
192
Lindbergh,Charles
124
Lovelace, Dr A.M.
Macmillan, Harold
22
Marshall, Lord
164
Massie, Capt A.J.
108
I 10
Matheson, Olin 17
McCone, John I 17
Mcmullen, Capl H.C
109
McNamara, Capt E. 103
McNamara,Roben 119
Meadows, Capl A.R. 105
108,110
Morgan, SirMorien
13
Musgrave, Sir Cyril 13
Naboyshchikova, G.F.
132
Nixon, PresidentRichard
123 125
Osborne, Swnley
117
Pelly AirChief Marshall
SirClaude
14
Perrier, Henri
32
Pompidou, President
Georges
Popov Yu. N. 128
Prince Phillip32, 106
Proxmire, Senator 100
124
Puget, Andre
22
Reagan, PresiJel1l
168
Reid, CaptJock 160
Retif, Michael 32
Rivers, Robert
143
Rodnyanski, L . M . 1 32
Rude, Capt Francois 10
Russell, Dr Archibald 21
22,23
Satre,Pierre2 I, 22 23 29
ServantI , Lucien
21 22
23
29
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Dr
William 21,22,
29
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20 22
Todd, Capl
NV
107 110
Trubshaw, Brian 33 34 39,
44,103
Turcat, Andre 32 33 39
42 44
Udall, Stewart L 124
Veremey
B 138
Volpe, John 124
Walpole,Capt Brian
108
110
Watts, Brian 33
Whittle,Sir Frank 7
Wilkinson,Capt G. 103
Pepsi
106
Politburo 128
Power Jets Ltd
7
8
Pratt Whitney I17 I
18
119 125 126 168 170
Presidential Advisory
Committeeon Super
sonic Transport I 17
Project
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QE2110
RAE Ball Hili/::>truclllres
Department 49
RenoAeronautical 181
Rockwell
140
Rolls-Royce 9,
14
18,21,26,
29,44, 101 124 130
157,167,168,174
Rolls-Royce Derwel1l 9
Rolls-Royce Griffon 7
Rolls-Royce Gyron
24
Rolls-Royce Merlin 7
Rolls-Royce RB167-1 21
Royal Aircraft Establishment
(RAE) Farnborough
9
10 14 49
Royal Air Force (RAF) 43
Royal International Air
Tattoo 109,163
Royal Flight 108
Sagem-Ferranti II 1
SEREB39
Short Bros 14
Singapore Airlines
100
SNECMA 13 21 27 29 44
101,149,157,167
Society ofJapanese
AerospaceCompanies
174 177
Specification E.24/43 9
SpecificationE.28/39 8
Squadron,616 8
SudAviation
13
19,21,22,
23 26 27 29 39 166
SukhogoOKB 128,132
Sukhoi OKB
181
SunchaserOne I 10
SupersonicCruise Research
Program
167
SupersonicTransport Aircraft
Committee(STAC)
13-5, 18,20
SupersonicTransport
Development
Committee
17
Technology ConceptAircraft
170
Third Reich,
The
7
Treaty ofVersailles 7
TSCAcGcl
130
Tupolev, Andrei Andreivich
128 130 3 138 143
144
TWA
100
USAF 118
VariableCycle Engine
Development Program
180
Vickers Aircraft 10 14 18
21,26
VictoriasSecret
106
VirginAtlantic
164
Viton 161
Whittle W2/7009
WoomeraTest Centre
177
XVS (external vision syslem)
172
Zhokovsky Development
Centre
144
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